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## The Myth of Pluralism

Mario Savio recently warned multiversity students taking sociology courses that they were sure to learn, "in inscrutably 'scientific' language, just what is so good and only marginally improvable in today's pluralistic democratic America."<sup>1</sup> Pluralism is a widely accepted theory of the way Western industrial democracies work. It is believed to be particularly applicable to the United States of America which is seen as a complex interlocking of economic, regional, religious and ethnic groups, whose members pursue their various interests through private associations. These associations in turn are co-ordinated, regulated, contained and encouraged by the government. It is assumed that power in America is distributed in such a manner as to guarantee that no one group can dominate any particular segment of society. When an interest threatens to gain the upper hand, opponents emerge to put it in its place. Pluralism is said to stand for the guarantee of freedom, the preservation of diversity, the limitation of power and protection against extremist mass movements. Its proponents put forward an harmonious picture of American society composed of a multitude of self-regulating interest groups, enjoying amicable relations with one another and with the government. From de Tocqueville to Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset there has been no lack of apologists for pluralism, which has become a term of praise in the academic political vocabulary. As Henry S. Kariel has observed: "Virtually all the academic studies of American politics undertaken today seem to confirm this soothing vision of American politics as an interminable process which gives every interest its due."<sup>2</sup>

It is the purpose of this article to draw attention to the weaknesses of pluralism which lie in the ideological consequences of

its application to the reality of American society. A number of radical social scientists have critically examined the major premises of the pluralists to show that a liberal rhetoric is used to uphold a most conservative ideology. In particular, Robert Paul Wolff has brilliantly demonstrated that the application of the theory involves ideological distortion in three different ways. The first stems from the 'balance-of-power' interpretation of pluralism; the second arises from the application of the 'referee' version of the theory; and the third is inherent in the theory itself.<sup>3</sup>

### The 'Balance-of-Power' Theory

According to the balance-of-power theory of pluralism, the major groups in society compete through the electoral process for control over the actions of the government. The politicians are forced to accommodate themselves to a number of conflicting interests, among which a rough balance is maintained. The major groups said to comprise American society today are the big economic groups, representing labour, business, agriculture and the consumer, and the large ethnic and religious communities. There are also a number of well-established voluntary associations such as the American Medical Association and the veterans' organisations. It is essentially a static picture of American society. Changes in the patterns of social or economic groups tend to be unacknowledged because they deviate from the frozen picture depicted by the theorists of pluralism. Thus, the application of the theory always favours existing groups against those in process of formation.

The 'countervailing power' of supposedly co-equal units is stressed by the pluralists. Lester W. Milbrath has described the equilibrium thus achieved as follows:

"An important factor attenuating the impact of lobbying on governmental decisions is the fact that nearly every vigorous push in one direction stimulates an opponent or coalition of opponents to push in the opposite direction. This natural self-balancing factor comes into play so often that it almost amounts to a law."<sup>4</sup>

An approximate equality is said to be maintained between business and labour, but the fact that labour constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population is not seen as a reason for allocating influence in proportion to relative numbers. Organised labour represents directly only about a quarter of the total American labour force and its share in decision-making has never

involved more than the tangential bargaining process of wages — hours — conditions — benefits for workers in its particular jurisdictions. Today, even this narrow bargaining priority is being assaulted by 'national interest' no-strike pressures in defence industries and in key industries such as railroads, steel and automobiles.<sup>5</sup> As for the large corporate institutions, Andrew Hacker has shown that they are largely free to determine the level and distribution of the national income, to direct the allocation of resources, to decide the extent and rate of technological and economic development, to fix the level and conditions of employment, the structure of wage rates, and the terms and tempo of production. They are not effectively nullified by countervailing forces.<sup>6</sup> Consumers in general have always been notoriously unorganised beyond the few co-operatives and magazines which cater to the middle class. Grant McConnell has said that "the unstated assumption that the thesis of a given force will create its own antithesis is no more than the wishful metaphysics of countervailing power."<sup>7</sup> And C. Wright Mills has noted that "to say that various interests are 'balanced' is generally to evaluate the *status quo* as satisfactory or even good; the hopeful ideal of balance often masquerades as a description of fact."<sup>8</sup> Mills goes on to point out that the theory of balance often rests upon the idea of a natural harmony of interests: "So long as this doctrine prevails, any lower group that begins to struggle can be made to appear inharmonious, disturbing the common interest."<sup>9</sup> Or, as E. H. Carr expressed it: "The doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant position."<sup>10</sup>

Another important way in which the established image of the major economic groups in American society conservatively falsifies social reality is that the existence of an assumed approximate parity between business and labour overlooks or suppresses the fact that there are many non-unionized workers and small businessmen whose interests are ignored in the pluralist picture. The theory of pluralism does not promote the interests of the unionized against the non-unionized, or of large against small business. However, by presenting a picture of the American economy in which those disadvantaged elements simply do not appear, it perpetuates the inequality by ignoring rather than justifying it. The concrete application of pluralism supports inequality and injustice by ignoring the existence of certain legitimate social groups such as migrant workers, white-collar workers and small businessmen, not to mention Negroes, Puerto

Ricans, Mexicans, the aged and the unemployed. As Charles Perrow has observed: "Political pluralism simply has not reflected the interests of those who probably need most representation."<sup>11</sup> Thus, we may speak of the pseudo-pluralism or sham pluralism of contemporary American politics.

Referring to the exclusion of many individuals from any membership or effective participation in the pluralist system, Grant McConnell has written:

"Thus farm migrant workers, Negroes, and the urban poor have not been included in the system of 'pluralist' representation so celebrated in recent years. However much these groups may be regarded as 'potential interest groups', the important fact is that political organization for their protection within the pluralist framework can scarcely be said to exist."<sup>12</sup>

E. E. Schattschneider has brought forward impressive evidence to show that the pluralist system ignores the diffuse, the unorganised and the inarticulate. It has a very pronounced business or upper-class bias and is loaded and unbalanced in favour of a fraction of a minority of the American people:

"The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 90 per cent of the people cannot get into the system."<sup>13</sup>

For example, only a minority of farmers belong to farm organizations and those who do not participate are largely the poorer ones. It is the rural poor, moreover, among whom the major problems of the farm population are concentrated.

The theorists of pluralism ignore the unrepresentative nature of the leadership of many groups in the system. In large-scale oligarchical associations the individual is smothered very effectively. There are few checks or limitations upon the power of small groups of leaders. Even where Americans have joined an organization, they do not belong to anything genuinely theirs. As Kariel has observed:

"... the organisations which the early theorists of pluralism relied upon to sustain the individual against a unified government have themselves become oligarchically governed hierarchies, and now place unjustifiable limits on constitutional democracy."<sup>14</sup>

Stanley Rothman has also pointed out that there is little evidence that group members influence the conduct of their leaders. Members tend to be apathetic, attend few meetings and rarely partici-

pate in group deliberations. In fact, decisions are taken by self-perpetuating oligarchies.<sup>15</sup> One could say that pluralism is not the politics of group conflict but the politics of group leadership conflict, with the leaders socialized into the dominant values of American society.

Pluralism's theorists ignore the fact that "doomed and defeated classes" which are part of the system may not abide by the 'rules of the game' when faced with the defeat of what they regard as important aims or when faced with social changes involving a loss of their power and status. Joseph R. Gusfield has cited the American Civil War, the Algerian crises and the role of the 'old middle class' in the McCarthy and Radical Right movements as instances of "doomed and defeated classes" rejecting compromise despite the fact that they possessed channels of representation in parliamentary bodies and so on.<sup>16</sup>

In pluralist politics, there is a very sharp distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate interests. A group or interest within the framework of acceptability, no matter how bizarre its policy, can be sure of securing some measure of what it seeks. No legitimate interest gets all of what it wants, but it is not completely frustrated in its efforts. In the words of one well-known celebrant of the American political system, "all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision."<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, an interest outside the system, no matter how reasonable or right it may be, receives no attention whatsoever. Pluralism does not extend its tolerance for diversity to movements which are felt to threaten the perpetuation of the existing social order. A policy or principle lacking legitimate representation has no place in the society and its proponents are treated as 'dangerous extremists', 'irrational crackpots', or 'foreign agents'. According to Charles Perrow, one of the major defects of pluralism is the view that "conflict on the part of the less privileged is automatically deemed disruptive, while the harmony of interests exists for those who have interests worth harmonizing."<sup>18</sup> The very sharp line between acceptable and unacceptable alternatives has led Robert Paul Wolff to describe the territory of American politics as being "like a plateau with steep cliffs on all sides rather than like a pyramid." On the plateau are all the interest groups which are recognized as legitimate, while in the deep valley all around lie the extremists and the outsiders. The result of this state of affairs was to be seen clearly during the recent Negro riots. While the government dealt with the established Negro leaders such as

Martin Luther King and Roy Wilkins, it did not have any lines of communication open to the militants. A high administration official declared in sorrow: "In fact, to be truthful about it, the whole U.S. Government does not know three Negro militants in the 17 to 22 age group."<sup>19</sup> Insofar as King and the moderates are turning towards militant policies for the oppressed Negro people, they are jeopardizing the position of NAACP up there on the plateau. It should also be pointed out that rigid adherence to the pluralist model by the political scientist restricts the range of his observable data, so that he may fail to see what is taking place outside of his frame of reference. Thus, the NAACP can still be handled within the pluralist conceptual schema, but Black Power cannot.

The balance-of-power version of pluralist theory tends to deny new groups or interests access to the political plateau. It does this by ignoring their existence in practice, not by denying their claim in theory. Of course, after a struggle some groups such as labour in the thirties manage to climb onto the plateau where they can count on some measure of what they seek. Thus, pluralism acts as a brake on institutionalized change or change within the system. It does not set up an absolute barrier to social change, but it certainly slows down the process of transformation.

### The Referee Theory

Although some pluralists assume that 'countervailing power' emerges somehow naturally, others such as John K. Galbraith in *American Capitalism* (1952) realize that government intervention is necessary to help create it. According to the referee theory of pluralism, the role of the federal government is to supervise and regulate the competition among interest groups in the society so that none of the interests represented will abuse their power to gain unchecked mastery over some sector of social life. Out of the applications of this theory have come the anti-Trust bills, pure food and drug acts, Taft-Hartley Law, as well as the complex system of quasi-judicial regulatory agencies in the executive branch of American government. In *The Decline of American Pluralism*, Henry S. Kariel has shown that this "referee" function of government systematically favours the interests of the stronger against the weaker party in interest-group conflicts. By tending to solidify the power of those who already hold it, the government plays a conservative, rather than a neutral, role in American society.

Kariel details the ways in which this discriminatory influence is exercised. For example, in the field of regulation of trade unions, the federal agencies deal with the established leadership of the unions. In such matters as the supervision of union elections or the settlement of jurisdictional disputes, it is the interests of those leaders rather than the competing interests of rank-and-file dissidents which are favoured. Again, in the regulation of agriculture, the leaders of farmers' organisations draw up the guidelines for control which are then adopted by the federal inspectors. In each case, the unwillingness of the government to impose its own standards or rules results not in a free play of competing groups, but in the enforcement of the preferences of the existing predominant interest.<sup>20</sup>

Another massively documented review of the undemocratic character of the pluralist system is to be found in Grant McConnell's *Private Power and American Democracy*. He demonstrates that many of the governmental agencies supposedly regulating the economy have become the handmaidens of dominant group interests. Almost everywhere one turns, it is to find public subservience to the dominance of the reigning oligarchies of private groups, each of which tends to be a law unto itself within the sphere of its own domain.<sup>21</sup>

One of the unhappy consequences of government regulation is that interests which have been ignored, suppressed, or which have not yet succeeded in organizing themselves for effective action, will find their disadvantageous position perpetuated through the decisions of the government. The government, by simply enforcing the existing rules in the game, does not thereby remove injustices in pluralist politics. In fact, it may actually make matters worse, because if the disadvantaged groups band together and fight it out, the government will accuse them of breaking the rules and throw its weight against them. For example, the American Medical Association exercises a stranglehold over medicine through its influence over the government's licensing regulations. Doctors who are opposed to the A.M.A.'s political positions, or even to its medical policies, do not merely have to buck the entrenched authority of the leaders of the organisation. They must also risk the loss of hospital affiliations, speciality accreditation, and so forth, all of which powers have been placed in the hands of the medical establishment by state and federal laws. These laws are written by the government in co-operation with the very same A.M.A. leaders. Not surprisingly, the interests of dissenting doctors do not receive favourable attention.

As for the "countervailing power" of government, it plays a relatively minor and marginal role in the corporation economy's decision-making process. The late President Kennedy noted in his speech on "Economic Myths" at Yale in June 1962 that the place of government in the present American economy is generally highly overrated and misunderstood. The federal government's powers lie chiefly in the frozen tax system, marginal regulatory prerogatives (often regulated, as we have seen, by the industry) and an unco-ordinated jumble of monetary, credit, contract, expenditure, and subsidy policies which all contribute to rather than countervail the corporation economy.<sup>22</sup>

The net effect of government action is to weaken, rather than strengthen, the play of conflicting interests in American society. Even such a well-known apologist for pluralism as David Truman has identified a tendency of established public agency-interest group relationships to be "highly resistant to disturbance":

"New and expanded functions are easily accommodated, provided they develop and operate through existing channels of influence and do not tend to alter the relative importance of these influences. Disturbing changes are those that modify either the content or the relative strength of the component forces operating through an administrative agency. In the face of such changes, or the threat of them, the 'old line' agency is highly inflexible."<sup>23</sup>

On the assumption that individual freedom will be extended when the government acts seemingly as a neutral umpire, the theory of pluralism warns against positive federal government intervention in the name of principles of justice, equality, or fairness. According to the theory, justice will emerge from the free interplay of opposed groups, but the practice tends to destroy that interplay.

### The Limits of Pluralism

The monolithic reality behind the pluralist facade has been eloquently portrayed by a number of critics of American society, particularly the non-socialist Paul Goodman and the socialist Herbert Marcuse. Goodman, in his recent *Masseys Lectures*, points out that genuine pluralism would mean conflict and not harmony, increased class consciousness and faculty power in the universities. He then goes on to condemn pseudo-pluralism as follows:

"For the genius of our centralized bureaucracies has been, as they interlock, to form a mutually accrediting establishment of decision-makers, with common interests and a

common style that nullify the diversity of pluralism. Conflict becomes coalition, harmony becomes consensus, and the social machine runs with no check at all. For instance, our regulatory agencies are wonderfully in agreement with the corporations they regulate. . . .

There is a metaphysical defect in our pluralism. The competing groups are all after the same values, the same money, the same standard of living and fringe benefits. . . . There can be fierce competition between groups for a bigger cut in the budget, but there is no moral or constitutional countervailing of interests."<sup>24</sup>

Marcuse argues even more strongly that the reality of pluralism extends rather than reduces manipulation and co-ordination in American society:

"At the most advanced stage of capitalism, this society is a system of subdued pluralism in which the competing institutions concur in solidifying the power of the whole over the individual. . . . Advanced industrial society is indeed a system of countervailing powers. But these forces cancel each other out in a higher unification — in the common interest to defend and extend the established position, to combat the historical alternatives, to contain qualitative change."

For the administered individual, of course, pluralist administration is far better than total administration:

"One institution might protect him against the other; one organisation might mitigate the impact of the other; possibilities of escape and redress can be calculated. The rule of law, no matter how restricted, is infinitely safer than rule above or without law."<sup>25</sup>

The theory of pluralism in all its forms has the effect of discriminating not only against certain groups or interests, but against certain sorts of proposals for the solution of social problems. The Left must be careful, however, to avoid falling into romantic utopianism by appealing to the 'general good' or the 'common good'. Robert Paul Wolff, for example, argues that there are some social ills in America whose causes do not lie in a maldistribution of wealth, and which cannot be solved therefore by the techniques of pluralist politics. He takes as an example the fact that America is growing uglier, more dangerous, and less pleasant to live in, as its citizens grow richer. The reason is that natural beauty, public order, and the promotion of the arts, are not the special interest of any identifiable group. Accordingly, Wolff observes that

" . . . evils and inadequacies in those areas cannot be remedied by shifting the distribution of wealth and power among existing social groups . . . fundamentally they are

problems of the society as a whole, not of any particular group. That is to say, they concern the general good, not merely the aggregate of private goods. To deal with such problems, there must be some way of constituting the whole society a genuine group with a group purpose and a conception of the common good. Pluralism rules this out in theory by portraying society as an aggregate of human communities rather than as itself a human community; and it equally rules out a concern for the general good in practice by encouraging a politics of interest-group pressures in which there is no mechanism for the discovery and expression of the common good."

Pluralism does not acknowledge the possibility of wholesale reorganization of American society: "By insisting on the group nature of society, it denies the existence of society-wide interests — save the purely procedural interest in preserving the system of group pressures — and the possibility of communal action in pursuit of the general good." Pluralism is fatally blind to the evils which afflict the entire body politic. It obstructs consideration of the sort of largescale social reconstruction which is so needed to remedy those evils. It is wrong as a description of American politics, and inadequate as a prescription. It frustrates the development of democracy and stunts political thought. Radicals, Wolff concludes, "must give up the image of society as a battleground of competing groups and formulate an ideal of society more exalted than the mere acceptance of opposed interests and diverse customs." Socialism, as opposed to pluralism, "both in its diagnosis of the ills of industrial capitalism and in its proposed remedies, focuses on the structure of the economy and society as a whole and advances programs in the name of the general good."

It is clear that Wolff's argument as outlined above has strong utopian overtones, particularly in so far as it minimizes the importance of class conflict.<sup>26</sup> He fails to distinguish between the short-term and the long-term aims of socialism. The overall aim of socialism is certainly to express the general good, but its immediate aim is to advance a program of fundamental social and economic change not in the name of the common good but in the name of oppressed classes and groups (including Negroes and students, as well as the industrial working class). Socialism will proceed through the struggle of *opposed* interests and it is utopian to hope that "communal action in pursuit of the general good" can be realised on any large scale *before* the ongoing social system has undergone fundamental structural changes.

Preoccupation with the stability of the social and political system characterizes the writings of the pluralists. A young

historian, Michael Paul Rogin, has recently written that while their concern with stability is to safeguard individual freedom,

"their interest in the freedom of the nongroup member and in the problem of freedom within the group is minimal. Because the pluralists are so quick to see dangers to stability, their concern for liberty in practice can become secondary. Thus for the authors of *The New American Right*, the great danger of McCarthyism was its attack on social stability. The damage done to innocent individuals received much less notice."<sup>27</sup>

The pluralist vision, Rogin continued, is a distorted one. The concern for stability and the fear of radicalism have interfered with accurate perception:

"Thanks to its allegiance to modern America, pluralism analyses efforts by masses to improve their conditions as threats to stability. It turns all threats to stability into threats to constitutional democracy. This is a profoundly conservative endeavour. Torn between its half-expressed fears and its desire to face reality, pluralist theory is a peculiar mixture of analysis and prescription, insight and illusion, special pleading and dispassionate inquiry. Perhaps pluralism may best be judged not as a product of science but as a liberal American venture into conservative theory."<sup>28</sup>

The same point was also made by Theodore Lowi, who noted that "It is amazing and depressing how many 1930's left-wing liberals have become 1960's interest-group liberals out of a concern for instability."<sup>29</sup>

The pluralist stance has well served the widely proclaimed 'end of ideology' in the West.<sup>30</sup> The attribution of all virtue to the pluralist system has been accompanied by a revulsion against ideology (including any large goals in politics) and a cynicism about the meaning of the "public interest". While the Left insists that morality and politics are indivisible, the pluralists segregate ethics from politics. The *status quo* defended by Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell is the already achieved good society. They have reduced politics to a constellation of self-seeking pressure groups peaceably engaged in a power struggle to determine the allocation of privilege and particular advantage.<sup>31</sup> Bell has written that ethics is concerned with justice, while concrete politics involves "a power struggle between organised groups to determine the allocation of privilege."<sup>32</sup> Thus, in the words of two of Bell's critics, concrete politics "is not concerned with the realization of an ideal, but with the reaping of particular advantages within the limits of a given ethic — an ethic which sets out clearly the rules

of the game governing the political jockeying for position and privilege."<sup>33</sup>

The politicians keep on telling us that "politics is the art of the possible." The Left, however, must insist that politics become the art of the pursuit of the impossible. As even Max Weber put it: "Certainly all historical experience confirms the truth — that man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossible."<sup>34</sup> With the relinquishment of utopias, Karl Mannheim once wrote, "man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it."<sup>35</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to Hal Draper, *Berkeley: The New Student Revolt* (New York: Grove Press, 1965), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Henry S. Kariel, *The Promise of Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 106.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Paul Wolf, "Beyond Tolerance", in Robert Paul Wolf, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). See also the critical reviews of this work by liberals David Spitz and Henry David Aiken in *Dissent* (New York) and *The New York Review of Books* respectively and the subsequent correspondence in both journals (*Dissent*, Sept.-Oct. 1966, Nov.-Dec. 1966, Jan.-Feb. 1967, May-June 1967; *The New York Review of Books*, 9 June 1966, 26 Jan. 1967). I am particularly indebted to Professor Wolf's essay for a number of the formulations used in this article.

<sup>4</sup> Lester W. Milbrath, *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 345.

<sup>5</sup> Robb Burlage, "The American Planned Economy", *New University Thought*, Summer 1965, p. 13.

<sup>6</sup> Andrew Hacker, "Power To Do What?", in Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), *The New Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 134-146.

<sup>7</sup> Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 350.

<sup>8</sup> C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 246. See also Karl Loewenstein, *Political Power and Governmental Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Bernard Rossiter, *The Mythmakers* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), esp. ch. 5; Michael Reagan, *The Managed Economy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1963); and Victor Perlo, *Militarism and Industry* (New York: International Publishers, 1963).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 248.

<sup>10</sup> E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (London: Macmillan, 1949), p. 80.

<sup>11</sup> Charles Perrow, "The Sociological Perspective of Political Pluralism", *Social Research*, Winter 1964, pp. 414-415. See also Otto Kirchheimer, "Private Man and Society", *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1966, pp. 16-24.

- 12 McConnell, *op. cit.*, p. 349.
- 13 E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 35. See also Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 36-37.
- 14 Henry S. Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 3-4. See also McConnell, *op. cit.*, p. 342.
- 15 Stanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach," *American Political Science Review*, March 1960, p. 22.
- 16 Joseph R. Gusfeld, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," *American Sociological Review*, Feb. 1962, pp. 24-25.
- 17 Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 137.
- 18 Perrow, *op. cit.*, p. 422.
- 19 *The Australian*, 4 Aug. 1967.
- 20 Further critiques of pluralism by Professor Kariel are to be found in *The Promise of Politics*, pp. 103-113; "Behind Pluralism's Facade," *The Nation*, 4 July 1966, pp. 22-23; "At the Dead Center," *The Nation*, 26 June 1967, pp. 827-828; "Political Pluralism," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Crowell-Collier, forthcoming).
- 21 See also Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 258.
- 22 Burtage, *loc. cit.*
- 23 David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 467-468. See also Theodore Lowi, "The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism," *American Political Science Review*, March 1967, pp. 20-21.
- 24 Paul Goodman, *Like a Conquered Province: The Moral Ambiguity of America* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 127-129.
- 25 Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 50-51. For Marcuse's impact on some of the most creative radical thinkers in the social sciences, see Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr. (eds.), *The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
- 26 The same criticism can be levelled against some of the writings of Marcuse. The almost total absence of any account of contemporary American social structure in *One-Dimensional Man* is pointed out in Alasdair MacIntyre, "Herbert Marcuse: From Marxism to Pessimism," *Survey*, Jan. 1967, pp. 38-44; and Karl Miller, "The Point Still is to Change It," *Monthly Review*, June 1967, pp. 49-57.
- Marcuse, however, has more recently insisted that his fellow marxist critics have misunderstood *One-Dimensional Man* in depicting it as a despairing analysis of a totally integrated and impregnable American capitalism, which has nullified any potential for radical action within it. For a reaffirmation of the necessity, and possibility, of revolution in the West, see his "On Changing the World: A Reply to Karl Miller," *Monthly Review*, Oct. 1967, pp. 42-48; and "The Question of Revolution," *New Left Review*, Sept.-Oct. 1967, pp. 3-7.

27 Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), p. 293. The contributors to *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books, 1955) included Seymour Martin Lipset, Talcott Parsons, David Riesman, Nathan Glazer and the editor, Daniel Bell.

28 Rogin, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

29 Lowi, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

30 The "end of ideology" thesis is set forth in Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: Collier Books, rev. ed., 1962), pp. 393-407; Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (London: Mercury Books, 1963), pp. 403-417; and Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindholm, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), pp. 3-18.

31 Stephen W. Rousseas and James Farganis, "American Politics and the End of Ideology", in Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-271. For further sharp rebuttals to the "end of ideology" thesis, see Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," *American Political Science Review*, March 1966, pp. 5-16; Henry David Aiken, "The Revolt Against Ideology", *Commentary*, April 1964, pp. 29-39; Daniel Bell and Henry David Aiken, "Ideology — A Debate", *Commentary*, October 1964, pp. 69-76; Michael Harrington, *The Accidental Century* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 103-112; William J. Newman, *The Futitarian Society* (New York: George Braziller, 1961), ch. 10, "The Conservative Mood: Daniel Bell and the End of Ideology".

32 Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

33 Rousseas and Farganis, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

34 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1947), p. 128. For a devastating critique of the misinterpretation of Weber by Lipset and Bell, see Rousseas and Farganis, *op. cit.*

35 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1936), p. 236.

**DR. IAN TURNER**  
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