

Freedom

THE ANARCHIST WEEKLY

"There's room upon the
earth for all"

SCHILLER

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Threepence

IS THERE STILL A VESTED INTEREST IN GERM WARFARE

April 7th, the Soviet delegate appealed before the United Nations General Assembly Political Committee for the signature of the Geneva Protocol for the signature of the Geneva Protocol banning germ warfare. The fact that the appeal was not successful makes no real difference one way or the other so far as germ warfare is concerned since it is notorious that no government or State respects the Geneva Protocol when it is not convenient to do so.

It is of some interest, particularly in these days when it is considered old-fashioned to link up germ warfare with economics, is American attitude to germ warfare. *Worldover Press* provides us with some historic dates on the subject: the first date is August 27, 1916. On that day in World War I, a German military attaché connected with the German Embassy at Bucharest opened a valise filled with germ bacteria for use in spreading disease among the Rumanians. The plot was frustrated by the police, but the details of this attempt was subsequently published in a League of Nations document, dated September 1924, entitled 'Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments.' The Rumanian incident made slight impact on the Western world, but it was through the Balkans and East Europe, and undoubtedly played a part in the later formulation of the Communist germ warfare charges levelled against the United States.

Another important date is June 17, 1925. It was on that day that the Geneva Protocol banning poison gas and bacteriological warfare was adopted by the League of Nations and offered to the world for signature by the nations. Since then, more than half the countries of the world have ratified, but the United States has been the most important and the most conspicuous holdout. The real reasons why can be understood only by going back to another historic date, in the U.S. Senate chamber, December 13, 1926.

On that fateful day, an editor of *Worldover Press* was in the Senate

gallery. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg had urged Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to present the pact for American ratification. Armed with Kellogg's letter, backed by a letter of equally strong support from General Pershing, Borah turned all his eloquence on a packed and hushed Senate. Public opinion in general, throughout the country, was behind ratification. It appeared certain that the step would be taken. But before long, the tide began to turn. Senators David A. Reed and James W. Wadsworth, Jr. brought in charts purporting to show that poison gas was a humane way of waging war. In the widespread reaction against gas, bacteriological warfare though linked with it in the Protocol, was hardly mentioned.

Seeing eventually that he was facing sure defeat, Borah did the best thing open to him—he moved to refer the whole question back to the Committee for further study. American ratification was killed. It has remained dead ever since.

What really beat the State Department, Pershing, thousands of U.S. citizens who had requested ratification, and the decent opinion of the civilized world? Not the debate on the Senate floor. Behind the scenes were powerful forces which had lobbied and brought economic pressure calculated to make a Senator hesitate unless he had singular independence. The American Legion opposed ratification. So did the Army.

But among the most influential groups to kill the motion for ratification were business organizations destined to profit substantially from the manufacture and sale of chemicals to the Chemical Warfare Service. A number of famous chemists led the lobby. They were backed by the American Chemical Society, and by the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers' Association.

The failure in 1926 to ratify the Geneva Protocol against germ warfare was tied up with the failure of public opinion to best the interests financially concerned with the making of poison gas. To that extent, and only to that extent, is the section of the Protocol banning bacteriological warfare, in 1939, 'outmoded.' It is contended by the United States that a treaty against germ warfare cannot be enforced. If that means no guarantee can ever be provided against the use of germs by a desperate and unscrupulous nation, the answer is, of course, that if one nation were to start the use of bacteria on another power, that power would undoubtedly retaliate. But a power which, contrary to most, refuses to sign, exposes itself to a worldwide feeling that it wishes in an 'emergency' to be first. A more positive action, such as forthright ratification, would afford a starting point from which popular opinion, the world around, could be mobilized—not to attack the U.S. as now, but to attack war itself and this particular combat horror."

Coronation Flashes

No One will be Out of Step

THERE can be no doubt as to the thoroughness with which preparations for the Coronation are being carried out. Public money is being spent with gay abandon on vast tubular steel scaffolding structures and imported timber is being used by the mile to accommodate the posteriors of Lords and commoners alike, though it must surely have been noted that special provision is being made in those stands reserved for our generals and politicians to keep their heads protected from the midsummer sun or the elements. Perhaps there is some subtle reason for wanting to expose the heads of those who are prepared to pay £5 or £20 for the show while keeping cool the heads of the politicians and generals. But these considerations are too speculative to be of value.

What drew our attention to the Coronation, apart from the new brightness of London's lamp-posts, was the publication of the 128 page *Administrative Instruction* which as one press correspondent put it covers "every conceivable and inconceivable side of quartering, feeding, paying and generally caring for the 43,143 men of all Services" who will be in London for the Royal Circus.

No military operation could possibly have been conceived in greater detail. We are not told whether the Instruction has to be memorised before they dare step out of their camps, but what is certain is that when they do their stride must be 30 inches and they must take 112 steps a minute. Thus they will cover a mile in just under 19 minutes.

The *Associated Press* reports that: "The elaborate procession will be a precision manoeuvre of utmost complexity, the elaborate order showed. Signalling equipment enough for several divisions would make it a parade of split-second perfection, and no one will be able to make any excuses, for the British Broadcasting Corporation will tick off time-keepers for the marchers."

If a soldier should need to throw away a piece of paper from his rations package, an order tells him where to find the litter baskets, with positions pinpointed on a map of many colours."

Meanwhile Lord Alanbrooke's *Orders for the Procession* is of only 56 pages. We understand from the *Manchester Guardian's* London Correspondent (on whom we must rely as we have not read the document: he, after all is paid to do so) that "all but seven pages contain appendixes, many of them examples of how the administrative tail wags the military dog. They detail all the movements, and give the 'who's who' of the processions complete down to the last Adjutant in Brigade Waiting. A number of officers from colonels to captains may be able temporarily to daydream about being field-m Marshals. They are to carry red-and-gold batons to show that they are responsible for marshalling the procession and telling commanders when to give orders."

With the heartening thought that no one will step off on the wrong foot (or put their foot in it) and that no scrap of paper will be put in the wrong litter basket, we will conclude with one further piece of good (Coronation) news.

It is the announcement by the Indian Education Minister, Mr. Azad that in India's possible claim for Indian Art Treasures which have been removed from India by purchase or "other means" during the British occupation the Koh-i-Noor diamond will not be included as it is not considered a work of art. How important an announcement this is can only be realised by the knowledgeable, and the readers of our patriotic illustrated weeklies. It forms the central stone—indeed, the brightest jewel—in the Queen's crown. Imagine the feelings of her loyal subjects on the Day to see her wearing her crown with a gaping hole right in the centre. It would be just as disastrous as if the smiling model for Maclean's tooth paste were to look down at you from the hoarding with her centre tooth missing. Such a situation has been fortunately avoided by the tact and understanding of India's Education Minister. Who, in the circumstances, can deny that the white man has not had a profound influence on Indian manners and thinking? R.

The Struggle for Recognition of Birth Control

ITALY

JUSTICE has at last triumphed! A letter dated March 17, 1953, from Dr. Dino Origlia of Milan, states that he is at last free. The brave pioneer who founded marriage guidance clinics there and in Turin was arrested under the Italian Penal Code, Section 553, because of his book on voluntary parenthood, "Procreazione Volontaria." He was acquitted on May 31, 1952, but the verdict was appealed by the Public Prosecutor. Dr. Origlia writes: "Two weeks ago the case . . . was to be brought up . . . but at the last moment the Court of Appeal decided to give up the case, thereby rendering my acquittal definitive. Which acquittal means that I or anybody else will be free in future to carry on our propaganda. Three months ago, moreover, two Italian Members of Parliament filed a petition for the abolition of the relative article in the Penal Code inserted by the Fascists."

CHINA

IN Anhwei province, within six months last year, 1,972 babies, mostly infant girls, were either drowned or discarded, according to the New China News Agency, Feb. 26, 1953. The cause ascribed

is the lack of successful enforcement of the three-year-old Marriage Law in a country where feudal belief in the superiority of man over woman is still dominant.

Throughout March, 1953, the Chinese People's Government staged an intensive mass campaign to popularise this law and smash the traditional family system. Regions, provinces, counties, townships, cities, village-groups and individual villages were invaded by thousands in specially trained cadres, backed by elaborate propaganda. Radio talks, newspaper articles, lectures, speeches, music, poetry, films, plays, cartoons, and mass demonstrations were employed. During March every family and every person was to have this law carefully explained. Until now, in the greater part of China, officials have been lax in enforcement and some have even resisted the law's implementation.

The Marriage Law forbids polygamy (but few can afford it now and concubinage is going out of fashion), infant marriages, and marriages arranged by the family. Women receive equal rights with men—within and without the home—and equal choice in choosing their life partners. Ill-treatment by husband or by mother-in-law is prohibited and the People's Courts are encouraged to inquire into complaints. This social pattern is wholly strange to the majority of the Chinese people. In consequence, opposition has been both active and passive. Young women who have tried to exercise their rights have been murdered or driven to suicide by outraged husbands or elder relatives—between January and August last year, 4,105 cases are reported in East China alone. Arranged marriages are still the rule; many young couples have committed suicide together, because their families will not let them follow their hearts.

Had social reform been the only object of the Marriage Law, the Government might have proceeded more slowly. But the Marriage Law has two other important purposes: to entice the Chinese women through new freedoms into support of the Communist revolution; and (significantly) to make available for work in field and factory the home-bound half of the population. Both these objectives are vital for the success of the five year plan of national rehabilitation launched last January . . . even if the customs of the whole nation have to be changed.

(Bulletin of International Planned Parenthood Committee, New York & London, May, 1953.)

Better Late than Never!

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LOVE IS LOVE EVEN IN MOSCOW

AN A.P. report from Moscow shows that with all the regimentation and de-humanising that must accompany any attempt to turn out millions of people in one mould, human beings remain human beings.

A young woman student at the government film institute charged scriptwriters with underestimating love and said you cannot replace the theme of love with the theme of production.

"It is impossible," she wrote in the magazine *Soviet Art*, "to say to one's beloved: 'If you fulfil the norm by 100 per cent., I shall love you.'"

"Or: 'When you become a Stakhanovite hewer, I will become your wife. If you don't become one, look for another.'"

The author of these charges was M. Shmarova, a student at the All-Union State Institute of Cinematography. She said in the post-war years the theme of love in Soviet films was often replaced in scenarios and films by the theme of production.

She said the theme of unshared, unrequited love had also dropped out of Soviet film art.

"But it hasn't disappeared from life," she added, "and it is a matter of shame for artists that this theme to-day finds no reflection in our films."

"Many people are inclined to think it is an idle matter to inquire into the spiritual experiences of the hero."

ISRAELI INTOLERANCE

OF all the people who know how stupid and destructive are racial and national intolerance, the Jews should know the most. They have suffered from the irrational hatreds of fools in all the countries where they have been minorities and one would have hoped that they would have had better sense than to fall for the same things themselves when they achieved their "national home".

The recent attacks on the violinist Jasha Heifetz in Jerusalem, however, show that the Israelis, like any other national group, have their lunatic fringe.

Heifetz was on a fortnight's tour of Israel, and had refused a request from the Minister of Culture, Professor Ben-zion Dinur not to play works by German composers.

"There are only two kinds of music—good music and bad," replied Heifetz, and he carried on playing at his concerts works by the German composer Richard Strauss.

Heifetz was born in Poland of Jewish parents. He could clearly have no love for the Nazis and he is to be congratulated on taking an objective attitude towards German composers.

Some members of the Hebrew Youth organisation found it difficult to be so objective—and as he was getting out of his car outside the King David Hotel in Jerusalem he was attacked by a youth with an iron bar who attempted to break his arm.

The attempt failed, but Heifetz left the country vowing never to return.

We can remember when, during the war, some orchestras in this country made themselves look ridiculous (and severely reduced their repertoire!) by refusing to play music by German composers, thereby in some queer way associating Bach and Beethoven with Belsen and Buchenwald. We can also remember that the Nazis did the same thing by refusing to allow German orchestras to play works by the Jewish composer Mendelssohn.

Cannot this stupid circle be broken somewhere? And is there not enough wisdom and dignity among the Jewish people in Israel to accept gracefully the attempt by a Jewish artist to rise above the nationalism from which their own people have suffered so terribly for so long?

BOOK REVIEW

JUSTICE by Giorgio del Vecchio (Edinburgh University Press, 30s.)

THE purpose of A. H. Campbell in presenting us this edition of Prof. Del Vecchio's essay on Justice is, presumably, that students and dispensers of the Law in this country may feel moved by it to care a little more for the ideal form of Justice, while busying themselves a little less stolidly, though not less conscientiously, with its empirical contents.

The essay, well-knit and inspired, weighty and agile, is accompanied by a mass of notes in which practically every philosopher and jurist who had some-

thing significant to say on the subject is represented. So Godwin, Kropotkin and Proudhon are duly mentioned, though not in the context one would expect, but no mention is made of Pietro Gori who was one of the few anarchists with a training in Law, and the only one to our knowledge to write a book on criminology.

Anarchist doctrines are not specifically mentioned, but we can read a criticism of them where the author speaks of "the failure to make a sufficient distinction between the being and the becoming of the person" as being "the source of the characteristic errors of the abstract schools of political philosophy which reach their extreme forms in anti-social and anti-state individualism" (pp. 141-2). With greater fairness and exactness we would rather say that the anarchist is one who, among the many clearly defined and incontrovertible truths stated by Del Vecchio, lays emphasis on the principle that "there is always the possibility of an antithesis between justice and law, since any datum whatever of juridical experience may always be compared with an absolute requirement of the same kind, which consciousness cannot draw from anywhere but itself" (p. 115). Del Vecchio's emphasis in the field of critical analysis lies in the definition of Justice as that form of the spirit which recognizes the subjectivity of other selves and constitutes by this 'metegoistic' character a co-ordination of selves. In the practical field, however, remembering that he paid allegiance to the Fascist régime, we fear he may have laid too much emphasis on the thin and ghostly truth of such statements as these: "There is a certain justice even in those inter-subjective relations where one party has a maximum of claim with a minimum of obligation and vice versa . . . There is a certain justice even where the recognition of the personality of others is limited by and subordinated to empirical and accidental conditions, such as membership of the same stock or of a particular social class" (113).

Del Vecchio belongs to the idealist school of thought, and his prose has much of Croce's perspicuity and some of the vibrations of Gentile's. To follow his argument is to be conquered by its purity and logical beauty, is to hold in one's mind a core of intense light that is reflected in pools of truth scattered in

the writings of a thousand philosophers. But, for some reason, the idealism of a Fichte or a Hegel never developed an anarchist branch, unless it be the rather poor specimen of Max Stirner. The subject of Justice, on the other hand, is by far the most suitable for anarchist reflection, and Del Vecchio's treatment could serve as a most useful guide. Unfortunately (or fortunately) the anarchist fights shy of a purely juridical domain, and would reluctantly abandon the subjective standpoint according to which Justice is a virtue, an "ordo amoris" (St. Augustine), a "caritas sapientis" (Leibniz), or a "harmony and peace of the whole soul with due rhythm" (Polus Lucanus). In him, like "in Plato the moral and the juridical valuations are fused. Politics are not distinguished from Ethics, nor even from Psychology" (p. 20). Perhaps, to solve the problems of mankind he relies more on love than on justice, and perhaps also he is aware and deeply fond of the dramatic sense of

life which he thinks it would be impossible and a pity to suppress for the total triumph of the ethical sense.

To be a lover of justice it is not necessary to be an anarchist, and after reading a book like Del Vecchio's it is possible even to ask whether the jurist who is sincerely trying to make positive law coincide as far as possible with ideal justice is not doing a better job than the anarchist who merely protests against unjust laws and never takes on himself the direct responsibility of securing even a minimum of justice in the society in which he lives. It is possible also to agree with Charles Reith who in his "Blind eye of history" pointed out how infinitely of greater importance than all the philosophers' thoughts on justice are the means to secure that justice is practiced and just laws not broken impunely. Abhorrent as the idea may sound, some form of kin police as suggested by Charles Reith imposes itself on the per-

son for whom anarchy is not merely an ideal, but a practical proposition. In other words the anarchist has to acknowledge the necessity and reality of the "ethical state". If he does not acknowledge it, however, it is not out of pig-headed unrealism, but because he cannot see the ethical function of society developed to any existing "phenomenal state". Any existing state is unethical both in its origin and in the tremendous power it has come to wield. Because of this power the state can turn and does turn into the greatest and most dangerous criminal, and what can society do when the voicing and the preservation of its ethical consciousness have been devolved to such a state? Slender, misdirected and impeded as anarchist action may be, it is still the only one uncomprehendingly defending society's right to justice, the only one unmasking and warning against its greatest potentiality, not actual criminal, and anarchism is the voice of society's ethical consciousness, not yet wholly silenced, not yet utterly confused.

GIOVANNI BALDELLI

FREEDOM BOOKSHOP

OPEN DAILY

(OPEN 9—6.30; 5.30 SATURDAYS)

- Avro Manhattan: Terror over Yugoslavia 10/6
 - The Catholic Church Against the Twentieth Century 2/6
 - Latin America & the Vatican; The Vatican and the U.S.A.; Spain & the Vatican, the 3 pamphlets for 6d.
 - J. W. Poynter: The Popes and Social Problems 2/6 (was 7/6)
 - Archibald Robertson: Church and People in Britain 2/6 (was 7/6)
 - Joseph McCabe: The Papacy in Politics To-day 2/6; The Popes and their Church 1/-; The Passing of Heaven and Hell 6d.; Why I Left the Church 1/6
 - Chapman Cohen: Morality without God; What is the Use of Prayer?; What is the Use of a Future Life?; Atheism; Must We Have a Religion?; Agnosticism or . . . ; Did Jesus Christ Exist? 2d. each
 - F. A. Ridley: The R.C. Church and the Modern Age 2d.
 - Charles Duff: Handbook on Hanging 2/6 (was 5/-)
 - TWO TOPICAL PAMPHLETS . . . The Crown and the Cash Emrys Hughes 6d.
 - Why Mau Mau? Fenner Brockway 1/-
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Cinema

IS THE EARTH INHABITED?

SOMETIMES one's brain gets clogged with existentialism, syndicalist pyramids and the orgone theory and one flees to a cinema, which is a clean dimly-lighted place (to paraphrase Hemingway) and one's thinking processes are totally suspended while Hollywood does its worst. Usually Betty Grable is the best bet but of late Hollywood has been curdling our blood with science-fiction films.

The latest burnt-offering is the "War of the Worlds" which has just been released (or did it escape?). This is based on the novel by H. G. Wells which was written way back in the nineteen-hundreds when the death-ray was the fashionable weapon of the future, and the atom-bomb was undreamed of.

George Orwell in a review accused H. G. Wells of planning a future in the nineteenth century which became too horribly true in the twentieth and when it arrived Wells didn't like it either. Reality so far outstripped science fiction that Jules Verne became old-fashioned very soon, whilst Wells' death-ray was side-stepped in favour of the atom-bomb and its progeny the hydrogen bomb.

That Orson mad-fellow, the other

Wells produced "The War of the Worlds" as a radio play in the late thirties. By then people had begun to believe in the possibilities of a horrible future for mankind and when the radio announced the Martians had landed at Grovers Mill, New Jersey, the inhabitants and quite a number of sophisticated New Yorkers panicked and left town.

The realities of 1939-45 and the "peace" since have made it more bearable that the invaders should come from another planet. We can believe anything possible so long as their separateness is impressed upon us. The reality that the menace to the peace of the world is not to be found in Mars, or in Russia, or in a revived Germany, but in our own ruling class and in our own attitudes of mind which make Belsens and Hiroshimas possible. In fact a threat from Mars would be a factor making for peace between the nations. There was a *s.f.* film which showed an emissary from Mars threatening to eliminate the world unless the nations made peace and not atom bombs. But the Pax Mars is as hideously unreal as the Pax Romana which was a tension between conqueror and conquered masquerading as "Peace".

The mass worship of power and de-

structive ability is shown in the addition of the Martians and the "enjoyment" of such films and books. Also the unmovable contemplation of the destruction of San Francisco (not that one of any objections) is a sign of the unhealthy death-wish of our society.

The ending of the film is a twist as a boost for religion. The Martians succumb to the germs in the air of the gross city they are destroying. The unctuous tones of Cedric Hardwicke remind us that God also made the tiny germ which destroys the Martians. He evades the point made by a clergyman that God made the Martians too—unfortunately the Martians fail to recognize a fellow creation, not even his crucifix, so he is blasted down. The point of the necessity for a return to church-going is emphasised and God is given credit for the beneficent germs, of course the germs of T.B., V.D. and infantile paralysis and something the devil slipped in.

We can speculate all we wish on life on other planets but we evade the point as to whether we live, in the fullest sense, here. Our talent for laying waste our own planet from time to time makes the probable ravagings of Martians a mere academic exercise. J.R.

IV

Kropotkin claims that anarchism, unlike other varieties of socialism, does not seek after an abstract set of desiderata, but exploits tendencies already at work in society. It is commonly assumed that these "tendencies" are instincts. But in the *Britannica* article, he follows this statement immediately with a listing of them: "The progress of modern technics, which wonderfully simplifies the production of all the necessities of life; the growing spirit of independence and the rapid spread of free initiative and free understanding in all branches of activity—including those which formerly were considered as the proper attribution of Church and State—are steadily reinforcing the no-government tendency."¹⁶ Still, there is no denying that Kropotkin's is an instinct-theory, or at least involves instincts. Ashley-Montagu, in an unwonted show of brilliance, notes that Kropotkin did not entitle his book *Mutual Aid: The Factor of Evolution*, but *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*.¹⁷

What did Kropotkin mean by "tendencies"? Whatever he meant, it is certain that he didn't mean instincts in the derogatory sense with which some modern psychologists use that term. He seldom uses any other word but "tendency":

The mutual-aid tendency in man has so remote an origin, and is so deeply interwoven with all the past evolution of the human race, that it has been maintained by mankind up to the present time, notwithstanding all vicissitudes of history. It was chiefly evolved during periods of peace and prosperity; but when even the greatest calamities befell men . . . the same tendency continued to live in the villages and among the poorer classes in the towns; it still kept them together, and in the long run it reacted even upon those ruling, fighting, and devastating minorities which dismissed it as sentimental nonsense. And whenever mankind had to work out a new social organization, adapted to a new phase of development, its constructive genius always drew the elements and the inspiration for the new departure from that same ever-living tendency.¹⁸

The natural and social calamities pass away . . . All this is certainly a part of our existence. But the nucleus of mutual-support institutions, habits, and customs remains alive with the millions; it keeps them together; and they prefer to cling to their customs, beliefs and traditions rather than to accept the teachings of a war of each against all, which are offered to them under the title of science, but are no science at all.¹⁹

In the practice of mutual aid, which we can retrace to the earliest beginnings of evolution, we thus find the positive and undoubted origin of our ethical conceptions; and we can affirm that in the ethical progress of man, mutual support—not mutual struggle—has had the leading part. In its wide extension, even at the present time, we also see the best guarantee of a still loftier evolution of our race.²⁰

¹⁶ *Britannica*, op. cit., p. 873.

¹⁷ *Darwin*, op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁸ *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (New York: McClure Phillips and Company, 1902) p. 223.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 260-261. ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

KROPOTKIN, MARX AND

Allée uses terms like "drive", "principle" and "evolutionary force", in applying Kropotkin's "co-operative tendencies" to man. While recognizing the dangers inherent in generalizing from the unconscious forces at work in the lower species to the conscious morality of man, he still doesn't shirk the task:

There seems to be no inherent biological reason why man cannot learn to extend the principle of co-operation into the field of international relations to as great an extent as he has already done in his more personal affairs. In addition to the unconscious evolutionary forces that play on man as well as on other animals, he has to some extent the opportunity of consciously directing his own social evolution. Unlike ants or chickens or fishes, man is not bound over to form castles or peck orders or schools, or to wait for a reshuffling of hereditary genes before he can discontinue behaviour that tends towards the destruction of his species.²¹

Kropotkin's well-known motto is, "Without equality, no justice; without justice, no morality." The last words he ever wrote develop this thesis (and make us long for "what might have been"; he had intended to devote the second volume of his *Ethics* to "the bases of realistic ethics, and its aims."²²): "The fact is, that while the mode of life is determined by the history of the development of a given society, conscience, on the other hand, as I shall endeavour to prove, has a much deeper origin,—namely in the consciousness of equity, which physiologically develops in man as in all social animals . . ."²³ Kropotkin could—and did—go on from here, making no more adventurous statements about consciousness than this, basing his development largely on Chapter IV of *The Descent of Man*, and he would not get into methodological trouble with Dewey.

"But," says Herbert Read, "Biology is not enough; we are self-conscious animals and we need a science of consciousness; it is called ontology. There is, that is to say, a science of existence which we call *biology*; there is a science of essence which we call *ontology*."²⁴ This embroidery is not necessary to Kropotkin's theory; in fact, it appears to hamper even Read's own theory. I shall consider later some of the Kropotkin-type philosophies which involve ontologism, but here it should suffice to note that equity, justice and morality—considered as aspects of evolution—have no demonstrably necessary dependence upon an immutable reality.

²¹ Warder C. Allée, *Co-operation Among Animals* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951) p. 201.

²² Kropotkin, *Ethics: Origin and Development* (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1947) N. Lebedev's "Introduction," p. ix.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 338. The manuscript ends with these words.

²⁴ Herbert Read, *Existentialism, Marxism and Anarchism* (London: Freedom Press, 1949) p. 17.

The reason Kropotkin's "co-operative instincts" do not involve ontology is this: the existence of these tendencies is nothing more nor less than an hypothesis. Natural laws are not imbedded in reality; they are human constructs to help us understand nature. Kropotkin would be the first to admit this. It is a way of looking at evolution. Given such and such phenomena, what causes them? True, Kropotkin's anecdotal and semi-anthropomorphic method of observation don't help do away with the idea of ontologism, but this method is not essential to the theory, as Allée has shown.

Tinbergen, a comparative psychologist, discusses this (*supra*) causation in innate behaviour. He cites workers who have taken "directiveness"—teleology—for causation, and others who have attributed the effects to subjective phenomena like emotions. While not denying the existence of either of these, he claims that neither presents causes because they do not admit of scientific observation, whereas ethology ("the objective study of behaviour") does, and truly studies causation insofar as it can be studied.²⁵ Furthermore, both the teleology of McDougall and the subjective phenomena of Bierens deHaan lead to ontologism, whereas Tinbergen's ethology does not. Tinbergen's position is that it is idle to either claim or deny the existence of something which can't be observed objectively.

However, it is not necessary to know the precise cause of this behaviour (the "tendencies", aptitudes, predispositions, etc., observed by Kropotkin) to establish that it is to some large extent unlearned. Further, prenatal or very early (and inevitable) learning can be regarded for all practical purposes as instinctual. Thus, whether instincts exist *qua* observable becomes largely a matter of definition.

"Learning and many other higher processes are secondary modifications of innate mechanisms," says Tinbergen.²⁶ Only this "learning and other higher processes," plus that which we know to be reflexive, are amendable by direct, deliberate human action, *i.e.*, can be changed by any action short of large-scale revision of the environment. That body of behaviour which remains—call it instinct or what you will—is our "given", or, as Dewey would have it, our "taken". We "take" this behaviour and subject it to Kropotkin's hypothesis: If X is operative, then it is the sole necessary and sufficient cause of Y; phenomena Y are observable; therefore X is operative, and—some would say—"exists" (*i.e.*, X if and only if Y). Our "ought"—the "evolutionary imperative"—proceeds primarily from the satisfactory answer to this problem of residual behaviour.

²⁵ N. Tinbergen, *The Study of Instinct* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951) pp. 3-5.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

THE RANKS OF TUSCANY

THAT government governs best which governs least" is a dictum of Tom Paine's that is often quoted with approval by anarchists. Paine, however, is not a figure greatly admired by the opponents of revolutionary ideas, even if they do go as far as Theodore Roosevelt to call him (quite mistakenly, for he was a deist) "a dirty little atheist." Samuel Johnson is a sage whom one would not naturally turn to for anarchist truths, yet to our great surprise a saying of his is used in the text by a first leader in the *Times* (9/5/53) for a sermon against

the small of all that human endeavour, that part which kings can cause or cure", and the comments: "Dr. Johnson's dates from an age when the sources of the modern State—were notoriously capable of reaching into the deepest recesses of private life—had scarcely begun to be developed; yet its relevance is not exhausted." The argument proceeds to point out that there is "a narrow area of human activity which both in fact and principle belongs to the range of political power which habitually remained untouched by the most violent of social convulsions." It draws attention to instances where every-thing proceeded side by side with major historical events: the theatres remained open during the Russian revolution even though the Winter Palace in Petrograd was under fire; farmers worked in the fields while the invasion of Normandy on D-Day was proceeding; workmen continued to carry out their jobs while the Germans were occupying the city. One could multiply illustrations almost indefinitely, far beyond these instances given by the *Times*.

It is a strange sensation to read this first leader when it observes: "No one can travel in Western Europe to-day without marking the extraordinary indifference of those not immediately concerned in politics to the fate of projects like that of a European Army which politicians believe must change the face of the world."

The *Times* goes on to say that modern States can and do interfere with human life to a far greater extent than in Dr. Johnson's day.

"Johnson's epigram, it is true, needs qualifying to-day. The capacity of Governments to increase, if not to cure, what human hearts endure has been strikingly demonstrated, but it is one thing to recognize that the State can disrupt a tradition of behaviour on which the security and decency of daily life depends and quite another to maintain that it can forge out of the resulting chaos an order to its own taste. The energies and resources at the disposal of those who wield political power are, by an invariable law of political dynamics, somewhat less than those of the society over which they preside. They may disturb the activities upon which the life of the community depends by trying to bludgeon its members into conformity, or they may frustrate and dissipate them by failing to provide the conditions of civic order and economic opportunity in which they can flourish. But the fact cannot be altered that the life of a people is the life of individuals gathered together in diverse associations for an indefinite variety of objects and held together by an infinite complexity of habits and manners which Governments did not create and cannot wholly destroy. Only where this truth is grasped is politics compatible with liberty.

But even where it is grasped the level at which politics is conducted and debated is still far apart from that at which everyday life is lived, and there is some evidence that the gap is growing.

At a time when politicians on both sides are tempted to compete with each other in proffering plans for the "good society" to be realized within a specified period of time it is well that they should be reminded that even in this anxiety-ridden age most men's energies are largely absorbed in providing for and serving the day. This should not make politicians cynical. It could make them realists. It might even cause them to be more successful. For mankind will all the more surely stride out

to a finer future when it can feel the ground under its feet a little firmer here and now. And politicians could give ordinary men and women no greater assurance of security than a guarantee to leave them alone."

The argument of the *Times* leader are presented in generous summary because it is surprising to note how far a commonsense view of politics is in accord with what are commonly regarded as the extremist tenets of anarchy. Of course the *Times* does not go far enough. It disparages the human importance of politics but does not write them off altogether. Dr. Johnson's dictum is similarly cautious, and even Paine implies that governments do have a minimum function to perform just as he does in that other much-quoted remark that "society is made by our wants, governed by our wickedness."

Anarchists do not accord to governments even this much justification. And it is interesting to note the distinctions implied in the examples cited by the *Times*. Work went on in the fields while governments organized invasion: while the Nazis invaded Paris, necessary work was still carried on by the workers: during the attack on the Winter Palace, the people of Petrograd still felt the need for relaxation. (The *Times* quotes Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*: "From acquaintances coming from the direction of the People's House Redeemer learned, to the tune of a canonade, that Chaliapin had been incomparable in *Don Carlos*").

Governments cannot create society nor provide the "infinite" complexity of habits and manners" which hold it together. It cannot wholly escape observation that in the examples given the rôle of politics is destructive or unproductive while the life of society is carried on by its individual members. It is the life and work and loves and relaxations of human beings that make the world go round, whereas the activities of politics are such that the attitude of ordinary people noted by the *Times* may well be due not merely to "an extraordinary indifference" but to an active revulsion from all that goes with taxation and police and labour regimentation and conscription.

American Writing

PERSPECTIVES 2. (Hamish Hamilton, 2s. 6d.)

THE second number of the quarterly of American writing, *Perspectives*, is edited by Lionel Trilling, one of the ablest and more independent critics. On the whole it is a livelier selection than the first, and, if it gives a slightly academic view of American culture, and studiously avoids both the tough boys and the "degenerates", this is a bias which will doubtless be corrected by the choices of later editors.

Probably the most exciting item in the volume is a group of thirteen poems by E. E. Cummings, accompanied by an enlightening explanatory essay by Theodore Spencer, *Technique as Joy*. Cummings carried the use of typography to give emphasis in poetry to an extreme, and he has had many imitators, but it is evident that such a technique was successful only within the context of his particular poetic talent, and, where other poems of this kind so often appear pointless *tours de force*, the work of Cummings still has a freshness and punch that remind one of his success in another way as the writer of one of the best of all war novels, *The Enormous Room*. I have no room to quote any of these poems, but if you see a copy of *Perspectives*, read "the great advantage of being alive (instead of undying)" or "here is little Effie's head."

If the Cummings poems alone don't seem worth your half-crown, then you might consider the group of eight colour reproductions of paintings by Arthur Dove. Dove was an early American abstractionist; nowadays, wherever one goes in the United States, from New York to San Francisco, abstraction is the diet on which one is regularly surfeited, until anybody who isn't a conscientious art snob begins to stay away in desperation from exhibitions which have become about as lacking in newness of appeal as a daily diet of *Shredded Wheat*. But Arthur Dove is something quite different: a luminous revelation of what abstraction can be. Where the modern schools of imitators try the impossible task of performing abstractions *in vacuo*, Dove realised that by definition you can only abstract *from*, and in his work abstraction becomes the burning transfiguration of natural shapes, their reduction to fluent form and striking colour.

Randall Jarell contributes one of the best critical essays on Whitman that I

have read, and Jacques Barzun justifies his book, *Berlioz and the Romantic Century*, with some eminently sensible comments on the art of biography. And there is an entrancing section from a new novel by Saul Bellow, called *The Einhorn*.

Some of the other items are not so impressive. Mary McCarthy, in her essay *America the Beautiful*, rambles at great length to prove that a rather laboured paradox about the vulgarity of America being the expression of the impoverishment of Europe's masses, "a manifestation of all the backwardness, deprivation and want that arrived here in boatloads from Europe." The ostentation that has come with prosperity in America is in fact something which does not lie so much in the past as in the present economic situation, and, so many years after Veblen wrote, it is surprising to find Mary McCarthy's whimsicalities taken seriously.

To my mind a much more important social point is made in a pair of essays by Negro writers: *A No to Nothing* by Richard Gibson and *Everybody's Protest Novel* by James Baldwin. Both of these writers are up in arms against the conversion of the Negro intellectual into a kind of performing pet by the American Liberals. Richard Gibson points out that a Negro novelist is automatically expected to write about "The Problem", and that this attempt to force writers into a single pattern has in fact been responsible for a great deal of mediocrity and monotony among self-conscious "Negro Literature". James Baldwin points out the underlying acceptance of class division and race division which is so often a basis of the protest novel. Such novels, as he claims, do not envisage the end of division; they merely carry it into another level, but fundamentally retain the old categories of black and white (or whatever else may be the basis of the division). "The failure of the protest novel," says Baldwin, "lies in its rejection of life, the human being, the denial of his beauty, dread, power, in its insistence that it is his categorisation alone which is real and cannot be transcended." I think that even those who recognise, as I do, that protest is valid and necessary as an element in literature, can profitably ponder over this warning against the tendency to allow the protest to become preponderant, and hence self-frustrating.

GEORGE WOODCOCK.

DEWEY - 2

Just how is this evolutionary imperative manifested? How does one go about basing ethics on biology? We have already seen what Kropotkin would have us do (*supra*, particularly p. 5—"help evolution"). Allee basically agrees with him:

Widely dispersed knowledge concerning the important rôle of basic co-operative processes among living beings may lead to the acceptance of co-operation as a guiding principle both in social theory and as a basis for human behaviour. Such a development when it occurs will alter the course of human history.²⁷

Tinbergen helps to clarify this conception of instinct: "The manifold forms of co-ordination between individuals, toward which congregation is usually but the first step, are based upon highly specialised behaviour patterns." Ecology thus becomes the most important adjunct of sociology. Behaviour is an essential element in the equipment serving this (ecological) end.²⁸

Allee, a confessed admirer of Kropotkin, is more cautious than this in the extension of his findings about the lower species to man:

All that can be found is a gradual development of social attributes, suggesting, as has been emphasized throughout this book, a substratum of social tendencies that extends throughout the entire animal kingdom. From this substratum social life rises by the operation of different mechanisms and with various forms of expression until it reaches its present climax in vertebrates and insects. Always it is based on phases of mass physiology and social biology which taken alone seem to be social by implication only.²⁹

It is thus tolerably well established that instincts in some sense "exist", and that co-operative behaviour has been a significant factor in evolution. If it can be established in addition that co-operation is the rule and not the exception and/or that anti-social behaviour is the exception and not the rule, so much the better. But the important thing is to ground ethics on the evolutionary process, and not on some abstract, static set of desiderata.

V

It now remains to summarize what kinds of questions these about instincts are, and to see how they fit into Dewey's philosophy.

To say that instincts exist is to affirm that certain tendencies, etc., appear to manifest themselves in evolution, and that it is fruitful in the explanation of given (or "taken") phenomena to assume that the antecedents likewise exist. This is not the same as to say that anything-in-general exists,

but merely that an hypothesis has some claim to existence; this is only what Dewey calls "the existential matrix of enquiry"—it is not existential quantification. Kropotkin's "tendencies" form an hypothesis in the same sense as does Darwin's evolution. Both probably require patching-up, but this is no reason to—on the one hand—discard the hypothesis or—on the other—to believe that the concept of "instincts" or "evolution" is somehow a copy of nature. To say that co-operative instincts exist is to say that "instincts" of a certain character—this character testable by evolutionary survival—have manifested themselves a significant number of times. To say that instincts don't exist is simply to deprive ourselves of a method which has proven useful. The Deweyan scientist doesn't say that instincts "exist"—in this hypothetical sense—eternally; as soon as the concept becomes useless, we are free to discard it. Dewey formulates this in a highly tentative fashion:

One must add the rashness of the prophet to the stubbornness of the partisan to venture a systematic exposition of the influence upon philosophy of the Darwinian method. At best, we can inquire as to its general bearing—the effect upon mental temper and complexion, upon that body of half-conscious, half-instinctive intellectual aversions and preferences which determine, after all, our more deliberate intellectual enterprises.³⁰ Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them.³¹

Furthermore, if the existence of Kropotkin's co-operative tendencies is hypothesized, and people are to carry on inquiry and action on the basis of this hypothesis, it is necessary to acknowledge certain connections between the pattern of inquiry and our own pattern of life. Dewey outlines this "existential matrix of inquiry" as follows:

1. Environmental conditions and energies are inherent in inquiry as a special mode of organic behaviour
2. The structure and course of life-behaviour has a definite pattern, spatial and temporal. This pattern definitely foreshadows the general pattern of inquiry
- a. There is no inquiry that does not involve the making of some change in enviroing conditions
- b. The pattern is serial or sequential
- c. The serially connected processes and operations by means of which a consummatory close is brought into being are, by description, intermediate and instrumental
- d. The basic importance of the serial relation in logic is rooted in the conditions of life itself
- e. From the postulate of naturalistic continuity, with its prime corollary that inquiry is a development out of organic-environmental integration and interaction, something follows regarding the relation of psychology and logic The assumptions of "mentalistic" psychology have no place in logical theory the recognition of a natural continuity of inquiry with organic behaviour [is needed].³²

The fact that these biological conditions are "inherent in"

³⁰ John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910) p. 9.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³² Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949) pp. 33-36.

the conditions of inquiry doesn't mean that the two interact; quite the contrary. The conventional notion of interaction implies two or more entities given prior to, and outside of inquiry.

Here is an example of this method applied to the sorts of things in which we are interested here:

The underlying philosophy and psychology of earlier liberalism led to a conception of individuality as something ready-made, already possessed, and needing only the removal of certain legal restrictions to come into full play. It was not conceived as a moving thing, something that is attained only by continuous growth. Because of this failure, the dependence in fact of individuals upon social conditions was made little of.³³

Kropotkin perhaps had more faith in the liberating influence of "the removal of certain legal restrictions" than does Dewey, but the method of the Kropotkin-type philosophy doesn't necessarily contradict that of Dewey. For instance, I think that the following example from Darwin falls within the confines of Dewey's method and at the same time makes Kropotkin's point: Darwin quotes with approval Cuvier's comparison of instinct with human habit. Among many statements by Darwin on this topic are: "Man is impelled by the same general wish [as are the lower animals] to aid his fellows; but has few or no special instincts."³⁴ (My emphasis). Habit—by Dewey's own claim—certainly doesn't involve ontologism. ". . . The first foundation or origin of the moral sense lies in the social instincts, including sympathy; and these instincts no doubt were primarily gained, as in the case of the lower animals, through natural selection."³⁵ These quotations seem to me to indicate—within the confines of Dewey's philosophy—the continuity of causes of innate behaviour through the lower species to man, as well as pointing the way to the grounding of ethics in evolution.

One final caution from the pen of Dewey:

In the first place, it is unscientific to try to restrict original activities to a definite number of sharply demarcated classes of instincts. When we assume that our clefts and bunches represent fixed separations and collections in *rerum natura*, we obstruct rather than aid our transactions with things Our thought is hard where facts are mobile; bunched and chunky where events are fluid, dissolving.³⁶

This is something against which Kropotkin-type philosophies must be constantly on guard. If they stick with Darwin's "general" as against "special" instincts (*supra*), though, they may still be methodological Deweyans.

³³ Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935) p. 39.

³⁴ Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (pp. 1-386) and *The Descent of Man* (pp. 387-924) (New York: The Modern Library, n.d.) p. 913.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 914.

³⁶ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: The Modern Library, 1930) p. 131.

(To be continued)

RICHARD DEHAAN.

²⁷ *Co-operation Among Animals*, op. cit., pp. 212-213.

²⁸ Tinbergen, op. cit., p. 13.

²⁹ *The Social Life of Animals* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1938) p. 725.

