

# THE JOURNAL OF OROMO STUDIES

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# THE JOURNAL OF OROMO STUDIES

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**THE JOURNAL OF OROMO STUDIES**

**VOLUME 13, Numbers 1 & 2, July 2006**

**The Journal of Oromo Studies**

Department of Africana Studies  
The University of Michigan-Flint  
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**The Journal of Oromo Studies (JOS)** is multi-disciplinary, international journal of the Oromo Studies Association. JOS publishes original research papers and book reviews on the Oromo and northeast Africa. The journal welcomes contributions in all areas of Oromo studies and related fields. All manuscripts for publication are anonymously reviewed by peer referees in the appropriate field. Decision for publication is based on positive comments and recommendations of peer reviewers. Whether we publish or reject a manuscript, it is our commitment to respond to authors with appropriate comments and feedback.

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# The Journal of Oromo Studies

Volume 13, Numbers 1 & 2, July 2006

Editor: Guluma Gemedo

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## Editorial Overview

Despite regime changes, constitutional reforms and huge multilateral development aid it receives, Ethiopia is still bedeviled by political and economic crises. The livelihood of millions of people in the region is threatened by political repression, poor governance, corruption, famine and abject poverty. The Oromo, as a major population group in Ethiopia, continue face the blaze of these problems. This volume of the *Journal of Oromo Studies* brings together a collection of articles that analyze the various aspects of the economic and political quandary in the Oromia and the Horn of Africa. The volume also includes articles on the Oromo language, in *Afaan Oromo*, and a review article on Islam and Islamic fundamentalism in northeast Africa.

The first article by Abebe Adugna, an economist, compares and contrasts the welfare of Oromia with three major regions in Ethiopia—Amhara, Tigray, and the Southern Nationalities, Nations and Peoples (SNNP). In his analysis Adugna seeks to determine whether there are systematic welfare disparities among the regions in Ethiopia and to what extent the governance and budgetary policies of the government directly or indirectly contribute to such disparities across the regions. Although the data that Adugna uses are generated by the government and may not be as reliable as scholars may want them to be, they do reveal interesting contrasts between the four selected regional states.

The second piece by Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global Studies specialist, explores the relationship between the Ethiopia regime of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the Western governments, and the impact of their relations on the struggle for self-determination and democracy by larger population groups such as the Oromo. Jalata argues that, contrary to their official policy of promoting democracy, Western governments continue to support the undemocratic practices of the Meles regime. He

also points out how successive Ethiopian regimes have used different ideologies—Christianity, socialism and democracy—to receive financial, military and diplomatic assistance from the Western nations

Third, Begna Dugassa examines the discourse of Ethiopianness as an identity and its production and validation from a historical perspective. He argues that Ethiopia, originally a Greek term referring to black people of Africa, was appropriated by the Abyssinians and came to represent a specific culture. Although beneficial for Abyssinians to gain recognition and establish diplomatic ties with the western powers, the Ethiopian historical narrative and identity have attempted to obscure the cultures and heritages of the subjugated peoples in the region. In this case Dugassa compares the ideology of ‘Ethiopianness’ to the Eurocentric discourses that projected the cultural superiority of Europeans over other nations. The first three articles document the economic, political and ideological underpinnings that contribute to the continued crises in Ethiopia.

The fourth and fifth contributions to this volume focus on the situation outside Oromia. In his paper, Bizuneh Beyene, a lawyer, examines the causes of conflict in the Gambella regional state. Focusing on structural and political factors, he argues that the incessant violence in Gambella is rooted in the region’s history of conquest and contemporary political manipulations of the Ethiopian government. Beyene argues that the modern multi-cultural Ethiopia was created by wars of expansion and conquest that suppressed and marginalized the political, economic and social traditions of the subject groups. These conquests have created a fertile ground for ethnic contradictions, national liberation movements, and deep-rooted intra-state conflicts. The Gambella region is still witnessing violent clashes

Similarly, Fowsia Abdulkadir’s paper shows the problems in the Somali (Ogaden) Region of Ethiopia. Abdulkadir highlights the discrepancies between the officially stated

policy of the Ethiopian government on human rights and its wide spread abuses of the same rights by its agents. Using a gender-based analysis, she indicates the human rights predicament in the Somali region and the sufferings of women and children in particular. She attributes the failure of previous peace making efforts, in part, to lack of attention to gender issues and non-involvement of women in the process.

The last two articles deal with the development of *Afaan Oromo* and highlight the need for more research in this area. Professor Tilahun Gamta, a leading expert on *Afaan Oromo*, proposes an effective method for teaching the Oromo language to beginners. His purpose is to facilitate reading and writing in *Afaan Oromo* through a systematic presentation of the basic elements of the language.

The last piece by Tamane Bitima, a political scientist and Oromo language specialist, examines the question of the dialects of the Oromo language. He focuses on the Wallo Oromo dialect and compares it to dialects in other Oromo regions. As in any language, *Afaan Oromo* has various dialects. Even among the Wallo Oromo, Bitima identifies three types of dialects. But over all, speakers of the language share over 90 percent of the dialects and a speaker can very easily shift from one dialect to another. Thus, although the research in this area is limited, the problem of dialects of the Oromo language is apparently exaggerated. Collection and careful examination of the existing dialects would definitely contribute to better understanding of the Oromo language, history and culture.

Finally, I would like to thank all contributors and reviewers for their patience and collaboration in making this volume possible.

Guluma Gemedo, Editor  
University of Michigan-Flint

June 2006



# A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Ethiopian Regions: The Case of Oromia

*Abebe Adugna*  
*The World Bank*

## Introduction

The 1994 Constitution formally established a federal government structure, whereby Oromia was delineated as one of the eleven main states in Federal Republic of Ethiopia. But federalism so far exists only notionally; in practice, political power is still retained at the center and important policy decisions are made by the federal government. Although effective federal governance is yet to be established, existence of the concept of federalism has allowed for collection of some basic regional economic statistics in Ethiopia.

This paper uses such regional data to undertake a comparative welfare analysis of the four main regions. Ethiopia's population was estimated at 69 million as of 2002 (and 77.5 million as of 2005). According to the official statistics of 2002, Oromia, the largest state, accounted for 35.3 percent of the total population. The three other main regions or "states" are Amhara (25.6 percent), Southern Nationalities, Nations and Peoples/SNNP (19.8 percent) and Tigray (5.8 percent). Combined, the four main regions—Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, and Tigray—account for over 86 percent of the total population of Ethiopia (see Table 1 below).

This paper compares and contrasts these regions along some basic dimension of economic welfare such as poverty, education, and health care. In so doing, it would seek to document whether there are systematic welfare disparities among the regions in general. The paper would then attempt to link the welfare outcomes to some government policies. In particular, it would explore whether the governance and

budgetary policies of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Forces (EPRDF), the ruling party, directly or indirectly explain the welfare disparities across the regions.

Given their population share, the focus on these four regions is self-evident. However, it is important to note that in choosing to compare economic welfare across the four regions, seven other regions and administrative councils such as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are excluded. The welfare status of those excluded regions may be significantly better or worse than the four main regions analyzed in this paper.

But why focus on regional welfare comparisons in the first? While the political injustice against the Oromos is being explained in various forums, perhaps not enough is being done to expose the economic injustice and welfare disparities that continue to mirror, or are indeed the direct by-product of, the political suppressions against the Oromos. This paper bridges that gap. It also proposes future areas of research where the returns may be greatest in understanding Oromia as an economic, not just political, state.

The paper is organized as follows: first, it compares and contrasts Oromia with other “states” along some indicators of economic welfare such as poverty, health and education outcomes. It draws some conclusions about welfare disparities among the regions. Second, it discusses governance and institutional factors as well as government budget allocation policies that continue to bedevil the quest for improvements in welfare of Oromia. Finally, it provides some concluding thoughts on where future economic research should focus to better understand Oromia’s economy.

### **How Does Oromia’s Welfare Compare to Other Regions in Ethiopia?**

There is no doubt that Ethiopia as a whole is desperately poor. Its level of poverty and other indicators of human conditions such as education and access to health care clearly illustrate the country’s bleak situation. Poverty rate, currently at 44 percent, is high by any standard; life expectancy, at only 42 years, is one of the lowest in the world; and child mortality rate, at 170 deaths

per 1000 live births, is among the highest in the world (see Table 1). Yet, until recently, it was difficult to obtain an insight into internal regional disparities in poverty and human welfare across Ethiopia's main regions, or if they existed, how significant such disparities really were. There was simply no data that would allow such inference. In 1994, however, the EPRDF government set-up a federal structure of government, with nine main regions delineated along ethnic lines, and two autonomous administrative councils—Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. While federalism is still only a nominal concept mandated by the Ethiopian Constitution and exists only on paper, the institution of federalism has permitted the collection of some basic regional economic data, which for the first time can provide insights into the regional disparities in human welfare.

The insights offered by the regional data are quite striking. Contrary to the perception that a low-income economy cannot have much inequality, there is surprising disparity in poverty rates and health and education outcomes across the four main regions (Table 1). Official demographic statistics show that Oromia's population as of 2003 stood at 24 million, or 35 percent of the total population of Ethiopia. Oromia's fertility rate averaged 6.4 births per woman, the highest among the four regions considered. Its population growth, at 2.9 percent per year, is slightly higher than the growth rate for Amhara and Tigray. The table clearly shows Tigray is at advantage relative to the other regions with respect to health and education outcomes.

### Poverty

In 1999/2000, Ethiopia's overall poverty rate was 44.2 percent (Table 1). By region, poverty rate in Tigray was the highest at 61.4 percent, followed by SNNP (51 percent), Amhara (42 percent) and Oromia (40 percent). The fact that there is relatively low incidence of poverty in Oromia may not be all that surprising. One plausible explanation is that the basket of goods and services or consumption expenditure that defines the

**Table 1. Socio-Economic & Demographic Indicators of Ethiopia by Region**

	Tigray	Amhara	Oromia	SNNP	Ethiopia
<b>Demographic Characteristics</b>					
Population (millions), 2003	4.0	17.7	24.4	13.7	69.1
Percentage of Total Population	5.8	25.7	35.2	19.7	86.4
Annual Population Growth Rate (%), 2000-2005	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.7
TFR (births/woman) 2000	5.8	5.9	6.4	5.9	5.9
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR) (%), 2000	28.0	40.9	36.4	35.5	35.8
<b>Poverty Rate</b>	<b>61.4</b>	<b>41.8</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>50.9</b>	<b>44.2</b>
<b>Health Conditions</b>					
Infant Mortality rate (deaths per 1000 births), 2000	104.0	112.0	116.0	113.0	112
Under age 5 mortality (death/1000 births), 2000	170	180	195	190	169
% Children fully vaccinated, 2000	42	15	10	11	13
Malaria—% households possessing bed nets, 2000	3.1	0.7	0.3	0.2	1.1
Population-to-physician ratio	28,614	60,718	60,835	44,148	25,958
<b>Education</b>					
Gross Enrollment Ratios					
Primary education (Grades 1-8), 2001-02	77.6	58.1	62.5	67.5	61.6
Secondary education (Grades 9-12), 2001-02	24.8	9.1	11.6	10.7	13.1

*Sources:* "Population Profile of the National Office of Population and Demographic Health Survey 2000"; Government of Ethiopia and ORC Macro, 2001, "Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey 2000", Addis Ababa, Central Statistical Office; Government of Ethiopia, 2002, "Education Statistics Annual Abstract, 2001-02", Addis Ababa, Ministry of Education.



poverty line is likely to have a substantial share of food items. With a relatively better resource endowment and the dominance of subsistence agriculture, households in Oromia are more likely to meet their minimum food requirements from their own production (except of course for those households who could be net purchasers of food), thereby resulting in lower measured poverty rate. Yet, as we will point out below, Oromia's low poverty incidence has a negative re-distributive implication for the region as federal budget allocation to regions is directly related to their level of poverty rate.

### Health Conditions

Table 1 presents five key indicators of health conditions in the four main regions—infant mortality rate (IMR), Under-5 mortality rate (U5MR), percent of children fully vaccinated, percent of households with malaria bed nets, and population per physician. These are fairly standard indicators of health conditions, often used by the UN and other development agencies to measure health disparities across countries or regions.

In contrast to the ranking in overall poverty rate, Oromia comes last with respect to all of these indicators of health conditions. Infant and under-5 child mortality rates stood at 116 deaths/ thousand births, and 195 deaths/thousand births, respectively. Not only are both of these figures the highest relative to the other regions, but also they are higher than the average rates for Ethiopia as a whole. That means, more children in Oromia die before they see their fifth birthday than in any of the other three regions in Ethiopia.

In large part, explaining these worst health outcomes is Oromia's lowest access to child vaccination compared to the other regions, or to Ethiopia as a whole. Only about 10 percent of children aged between 12-23 months in Oromia receive full vaccination as compared to 11 percent for SNNP, 15 percent for Amhara, and 42 percent for Tigray. Tigray has more than four times the vaccination rate for Oromia. Thus more children in Oromia are likely to die of preventable childhood diseases than

in all other regions in Ethiopia

The health opportunities for adults in Oromia are only marginally better than for infants and children. Oromia's population-to-physician ratio—a rough indicator of people's access to doctors in times of need—is more than double when compared to Tigray (60, 835 people vs 28, 614 people/doctor in Tigray), but only marginally higher than that of Amhara (60, 718 people/doctor), with the SNNP lying in the intermediate range (44, 148 people). Similarly, the percentage of households with bed nets against malaria, a major health risk in Oromia and other regions, remains the lowest in Oromiya (0.3 percent).

Comparative data on other key indicators of health such as HIV/AIDS prevalence are not yet available, except for some towns. However, it is clear that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has spread quite rapidly during the 1990s. The adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is 6.6 percent in 2001 (MOH, 2002). The average prevalence rate for pregnant women for all urban sentinel sites is 13.2 percent while the rural prevalence rate is 2.3 percent. Addis Ababa's current prevalence rate is estimated to 15.6 percent. Among the urban sites surveyed, Bahir Dar, in Amhara region, has the highest HIV prevalence rate of 23.4 percent, followed by Jijiga in Somali (19 percent), and Adama in Oromia (18.7 percent). AIDS is the leading cause of death for those aged between 15 to 49 years old, and there are 650,000 AIDS orphans in Ethiopia.

### **Education**

Table 1 provides two key indicators of education across the four regions—gross enrollment ratios at primary and secondary school levels. The evidence shows that Oromia, at about 62.5 percent, has a slightly higher primary school enrollment ratio than Amhara, but lower enrollment ratio than Tigray (77.6 percent) and SNNP (67.5 percent). Secondary school enrollment ratio suggests a similar pattern, but a larger degree of disparity, with Tigray's enrollment ratio (25 percent) being more than double that of Oromia (11.6 percent).

Since the mid 1990s, Tigray appears to have made very large

gains, boosting its secondary school enrollment ratio from 44 percent in 1993-94 to nearly 25 percent between in 2001-02, and is now in the ranks of the leading regions for secondary school coverage. For other large regions—Oromia, Amhara and SNNPR—have comparable secondary school enrollment of around 10 percent. With abundant natural resources and larger population, Oromia contributes the share to federal economy. But it is at clear disadvantage in some key human welfare analysis, health and education sectors in particular.

### **Why Is Oromia Worse Off?**

In general, poverty continues to be unacceptably high, at around 44 percent, for Ethiopia. But the country's other socio-economic indicators also remain among the worst in the world. Worse still, Oromia's indicators of human welfare are among the worst of the four main regions within Ethiopia. The question is why such welfare disparity persists?

Attributing welfare disparities among Ethiopia's major regions to specific factors would be an enormously challenging task. Factors ranging from governance and institutions, to public policy in resource allocation, to household spending on health care and education services, to even tradition and culture, could potentially explain such differences. Therefore, the question "why significant welfare disparity among the regions" cannot be easily answered without much additional microeconomic research into the determinants of health and education outcomes across regions than is contained in this paper. This is an area where further economic research could provide more insights.

Without pretending to be comprehensive, two major factors—namely, governance and institutions, and public policy in budget allocation to regions—can be identified. These factors not only undermine aid effectiveness in Ethiopia, but also contribute to the worse human welfare conditions in Oromia relative to the other regions.

#### **Governance and Institutions**


Official aid per capita to Ethiopia increased from US\$15 in

1995 to US\$22 in 2003. In 2004, total development aid stood at US\$ 1.5 billion. Yet, the billions spent on combating poverty in Ethiopia throughout the 1990s have not achieved much in terms of reducing poverty and improving the human conditions. While recent development literature emphasizes the strong link between good governance and the ability of governments to effectively reduce poverty and improve human conditions, the international community seems to have ignored this fact when it comes to Ethiopia in the 1990s.

Evidence shows that Ethiopia's indicators of governance—voice and accountability, political stability, rule of law, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and government effectiveness—have all steadily deteriorated since 1998 (Figure 1). As shown below, community or citizens' voice and government accountability significantly worsened between 1998 and 2004, as did other indicators of institutional quality. The government arrested several prominent political figures on charges of corruption in 2001, but the corruption effort fizzled out by 2002. In the face of poor and worsening governance, the development community has responded with increased development aid to Ethiopia. Foreign aid has continued to provide a life support to what is clearly an undemocratic and unaccountable government.

Poor governance and institutions reduce the overall effectiveness of government in delivering public goods and services such as health, education, infrastructure, etc., to the people. As such, this is an important factor that may help explain the little non-improvements in poverty and other socio-economic conditions in Ethiopia in the 1990s, despite increasing aid and resource inflows. It is a cross-cutting factor relevant that can explain the poor socio-economic conditions not just in Oromia but also in other regions of Ethiopia as well.

Figure 1. Ethiopia: Trends in Governance, 1998-2004



Source: Kaufmann D., A Kraay, and M Mastruzzi 2005, *Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004*.

*Note:* The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators in no way reflect the official position of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. As discussed in detail in the accompanying papers, countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to margins of error that are clearly indicated. Consequently, precise country rankings should not be inferred from this data.

**Government's Re-distributive Policy**

The causes of welfare disparity, at least in part, lie with government policies. But what are these policies? The main ones appear to be: (a) a centralized power, and top-down policy decision making process; (b) the imbalance between Oromia's contribution to the national coffer, and what it receives by way of budget allocations from the federal government; and, (c) lack of implementation projects at the state level. These are discussed in turn below.

**(a) A Centralized, top-down Policy Decision-making Process**

The Ethiopian Constitution of 1994 and the subsequent legislative initiatives have, in theory, empowered the state governments to run their own affairs, including economic management. But, in practice, the federal government has sabotaged devolution of power and decision making, decentralization, except perhaps in Tigray. The 2001 US State Department report on human rights notes that "highly centralized authority, poverty, civil conflict, and unfamiliarity with democratic concepts combine to complicate the implementation of federalism" (US State Department 2002). There has been little empowerment of state governments, much less local communities, to run their own affairs.

To date, federalism is still only a notion, while policy decision making remains top-down, with very little fiscal decentralization. Overall, only about a third of the total budget—from domestic and external sources—gets transferred to the regions (Table 2). This gives an incredibly high degree of discretion in how the federal government spends the money.

**Table 2: Budget Transfers to the Regions , 1996-97-2002-03 (Current ETB billions)**

	96/ 97	97/ 98	98/ 99	99/ 00	00/ 01	01/ 02	02/ 03	03/ 04
Amount Budgeted	3.4	3.7	4.2	3.1	4.4	4.7	6.0	5.9
Share of Total Budget	34%	34%	28%	18%	28%	27%	31%	27%
Amount Actually Transferred	(3.0)	(3.2)	(3.4)	(2.7)	(3.6)	(3.8)	(4.5)	n/a
Source: World Bank, "Ethiopia Public Expenditure Review."								

### b) Budget allocation to regions

Improvements in human welfare depend on service delivery in health and education, which in turn depends, at least in part, on budget allocation from the federal government. At the core of the political struggle for self-determination of the Oromos is in fact the possibility that it would bring economic autonomy and greater control over one's economic resources. But what does the current budget allocation policy of EPRDF government look like, and in what way, if any, does it discriminate against Oromia? Let us examine some key indicators.

#### The budget allocation formula

Since 1996, the revenues collected from all sources are shared with the regions through a "block grant" formula which has three components—population, level of poverty, and development or expenditure needs (see Table 3 for a summary of the formula that has been used since 1994). The most recent budget allocation system, devised in 2001-02 and still in use, takes the following into account: population (55 percent), a composite development index (20 percent), an index of revenue effort (15 percent) and a poverty index (10 percent).

**Table 3. Ethiopia: Evolution of Revenue Sharing Formula, 1994-95 to 2001-02**

Indicators in weighting formula	Weights assigned to indicators (%)			
	1994/95	1996/97	1997/98	2001/02
Population	30	33.3	60	55
I-distance a/	25			
Own revenue to budget ratio	20	33.3	15	
Capital Budget allocation in 1993-94	15			
Area	10			
Level of development / expenditure needs		33.3	25	20
Level of poverty				10
Revenue raising effort and sectoral output performance				15
Total	100	100	100	100
a/ Refers to an index of development distance, computed on the basis of indices for education, health, road density, electric power sales, telephone line density and safe drinking water.				
Source: Govt. of Ethiopia, <i>The Federal Grant Formula in Ethiopia</i> , MOFED, (March 2000).				

The grants received by regions represent the bulk of their revenues, averaging nearly 80 percent of the total of regional states excluding external funds. At the regional level, these grants are supplemented by state revenues generated through a number of taxes for which the regions have the authority to collect, primarily on income from regional employees, land use and sales within regions. The grant from the federal government and the region's self-generated revenues, along with the regional allocation of foreign funds received by the federal government, add up to the regional budget.

Several elements of the current budget allocation formula are biased against Oromia. First, the federal government spends about two-thirds of the total annual government revenue on programs that it deems "federal." This not only accords the



federal government much discretionary power over spending, but the so-called federally financed development programs may not serve all regions equitably. Second, there is no fairness in the budget allocation rule, that is, the budget formula does not factor in the contribution that a region makes to the federal government revenue. It is focused mainly on equity and redistribution away from Oromia. Indeed, the larger the revenue collected by a region through taxes, the lower the region would receive by way of budget allocation from the federal government. Third, it is not clear whether the allocation of development aid, which accounts for a significant share of the total federal government budget follows the same formula. In an uncoordinated world of development aid, donors often choose to operate outside government budget, and often in a region where projects are easy to implement. To date, such operation favors regions like Tigray. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is no credible voice in the government or parliament representing the interest of Oromia in policy-making as well as reorienting resource allocation policies to ensure fairness. The apparent dichotomy between Oromia as the main contributor to the economy of Ethiopia on the one hand, and its worst socio-economic conditions on the other, is simply not politically tenable over the long-term without coming to grips with these biases in resource allocation towards the region.

### **(c) Budget Execution and Program Implementation at State Level**

Regional budget allocation is not fully spent in Oromia. Indeed, Oromia is the poorest in terms of budget spending and implementation of programs. While this could in part be due to lack of capacity and trained manpower to design and implement programs, the main factor seems to be the unpredictability of state budget that does not allow for sufficient planning.

**Table 4. Ethiopia: Budget Allocation and Execution by Region, 1996-2002**

Regional State	Total Actual Budget Allocation, 1996-2002	Expenditure/ Allocation, 1996-2002
Amhara	4,256.00	71.2
Oromiya	5,550.00	74.5
SNNPR	3,430.00	63.8
Tigray	1,580.00	92.0

*Source:* World Bank, 2003, Ethiopia Public Expenditure Review; and HDSP I Evaluation Report

Because of the time required to determine the size of the regional pool, regional governments do not know the amount of the federal transfer they are to receive with any certainty until late in the budget cycle. For example, in Fiscal Year 2003, the SNNP had to go through two rounds of budgeting (due to lateness in receiving ceilings) and in the end got notification of the final amount of the transfer from the Federal level only in June, at which time the actual ceiling was 10 percent less than the estimate Regional officials had been working with. Oromia has to go through similar processes from year to year. The unpredictability of budget coming from federal sources, which accounts for the bulk of the state budget, frustrates proper planning and implementation of programs.

Even without the overarching governance problems and policy biases against Oromia, there are enormous administrative and capacity challenges within the state. Further decentralization and increasing capacity at the local level, and lack of trained manpower capable of designing and implementing programs are among the key challenges to be confronted over the long haul.

## **Conclusions**

This paper has attempted to pull together, for the first time, evidence emerging from recent regional data in Ethiopia that provide insights to determine whether there are socio-economic welfare disparities among the four main regions—Amhara,

Oromia, SNNP, and Tigray. The evidence showed that there are indeed significant disparities in poverty, and access to health care and education services across these regions. Relative to the other regions, Oromia has the lowest poverty rate, in part because of the relatively better conditions for food production in the region. But Oromia has the worst access to health care and education services relative to the other regions. It has the highest infant and child mortality rate, and the lowest access to child immunization. For these reasons, more children in Oromia die before they see their fifth birthday than in any other region in Ethiopia. Oromia has the lowest percentage of households with bed nets against malaria, a major health risk in the state and in other regions. It also has the highest population-to-physician ratio, more than double that of Tigray. In education, the evidence shows that Oromia has a slightly higher primary school enrollment ratio than Amhara, but lower enrollment ratio than Tigray and SNNP. In secondary school enrollment, Tigray's enrollment ratio of 25 percent is more than twice that of Oromia (11.6 percent). Tigray raised its secondary school enrollment by more than six-fold in just a decade (from 4 percent in 1994 to 25 percent in 2004).

Oromos often feel that the political suppression against them translates into an economic injustice. Conversely, they hope political freedom will bring about economic freedom as well. While there is truth to this logic, it would be important to go beyond the general political rhetoric towards more clearly articulated analysis of how Oromia is systematically disadvantaged, especially in an economic sense. It is essential to understand how the federal or central economic policy-making discriminates against the state of Oromia and what needs to be done. This paper has started such an inquiry, but further research is obviously needed to understand these complex issues better.

Then, where do we go from here? Clearly, Oromia's dominant role in the Ethiopian economy doesn't tally well with its worst health and education conditions relative to the other regions. It points to the presence of economic injustice and unfairness. Understanding the nature of Oromia's economic reality better, including how big it is (in GDP), how much it

contributes to the federal treasury, and how much it receives from the latter will be key in making a stronger case for economic justice. While data have recently emerged on how much Oromia receives from the federal government, no good data exist on the size of Oromia's economy, nor how much it contributes to the economy of Ethiopia.

Despite the years of existence of the Oromo Studies Association, our knowledge about Oromia's economy has not yet made much headway. Some generally known facts indicated that Oromia's contribution to the Ethiopian economy is vital in agriculture—including in production of cereals, livestock, and cash/export crops. But no concrete estimates of these contributions are yet available. Subsistence agriculture is the main means of livelihood for more than 90 per cent of Oromia's population. The main cash crops are coffee and chat, a stimulant shrub. Coffee, a major cash earner for many countries, has its origin in the forests of Oromia and the neighboring areas. *Coffea arabica* contributes more than 50 per cent to Ethiopia's foreign exchange earnings, and available estimates suggest that Oromia produces about 65 percent of the coffee destined for exports (Oromia Coffee Farmers Cooperative Union Ltd. Website:

<http://www.greendevlopment.nl/progreso/ocfcu/>). The labor-intensive tree crop also provides much employment in rural areas and is the means of livelihood for over 15 million people in Ethiopia. But very little is known about its contributions in industrial production and services.

But future economic research should generate more specific and detailed knowledge on Oromia's economy. To be sure, the lack of regional data on production (agriculture, industry and services) and demands (consumption, investment, government expenditure, and exports) is a major hurdle, but one that can be overcome through dedicated research.

A useful starting point would be to use our best knowledge and data about the Ethiopian economy as a whole to guesstimate the size of Oromia's economy and its contributions. A cursory examination of the data available for Ethiopia suggests that there may be two ways to do this. First it is necessary to look at the structure of the economy on the supply side—agriculture, industry, services—by commodity group. One can use this data together with a best estimate of the commodity contribution of

Oromia to estimate the total output or value-added (GDP) generated by Oromia. Second, it is possible to use demand side data for Ethiopia as a whole—private consumption, government consumption, investment, exports and imports—by commodity group as a basis analysis, and guesstimate the expenditure share of Oromia with respect to each commodity group to arrive at a demand side estimate of the size of Oromia's economy.

While such data could be used to ask questions about the share of Oromia in either total output or demand, any credible estimate would have to bring other Oromia-specific data to bear upon such exercise. This may, for example, entail detailed supply side analysis of the contributions of Oromia by commodity group, or working with household budget surveys to extrapolate the share of Oromia's demand in total demand by commodity group. This is already a big research agenda, as it raises several questions: what is the contribution of Oromia in Ethiopia's agriculture? In industry (by commodity group)? In services, by commodity group? At this moment, the facts we know about Oromia are simply inadequate to give us a complete picture of the economy.

However, why do we need a complete picture of the economy? The quest for political freedom and self-determination in Oromia has its mirror image in the potentials for economic freedom of the Oromo people. But how big is this potential? Or alternatively, how unfair to Oromia are the redistributive economic policies of successive Ethiopian governments? What should an economic policy of a free Oromia look like? And where are the potentials for economic growth and transformation? These questions are unlikely to be answered without making significant progress in understanding the size and contributions of Oromia's economy than we do today. That effort should start sooner rather than later.

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# The Impact of Ethiopian State Terrorism and Globalization on Oromo National Movement\*

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## Introduction

Today the Oromo, the largest ethno-national group in Northeast Africa, are facing state terrorism, massive human rights violations, and hidden genocide from the Ethiopian government. They are targeted because of their economic resources, and their struggle for national self-determination and democracy. The Tigrayan-dominated government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is supported by global powers and the imperial interstate system that legitimize their political actions through the discourses of democracy and economic development. While the West, particularly the United State government, supports the Meles regime claiming it to be democratic, the Tigrayan-dominated government engages in state terrorism and gross human rights violations. It uses the state machinery to control the Oromo and transfer their resources to the Tigrayans, their collaborators, and to the transnational and global corporations. The regime also uses the discourse of democracy to cultivate foreign financial support and gain political legitimacy from the international community.

This paper, first explains the relationship between the West and the Meles regime, and the major role this relationship plays in undermining the hopes of the Oromo and the people in Ethiopia for social justice, national self-determination, and democracy. Second, it explores the difference between the legitimizing political discourse of democracy, as used by the West and the Meles government, and the actual political practices by the Ethiopian regime. Third, it demonstrates how hidden genocide and political violence are being committed by the Meles regime on the Oromo and other peoples. The paper

indicates how the regime destroys Oromo institutions and eliminates their political and community leaders, commits state rape, conducts economic expropriation, facilitates impoverishment, and massive human rights violations

### **The Ethiopian State and Global Powers**

Successive Ethiopian regimes used Christianity to link themselves to Europe and North America as a means of consolidating their power against fellow Ethiopians and the colonized population groups, such as the Oromo, Sidama, Ogaden Somali, and Walayita. Two decades ago, the *Derg*, a military regime under the leadership of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, utilized a “socialist” discourse to ally itself with the Soviet bloc and consolidated its power. Currently, the Meles government uses a “democratic” discourse to make its rule appear legitimate and acceptable, and to obtain financial and military support from the West. Hence, Christianity, socialism, and democracy have all been used as political tools by successive Abyssinian ruling elites to legitimate state power without changing the essence of the authoritarianism and terrorist nature of the state system. This state has different policies and practices within the empire. It practices authoritarianism on the Amharas and Tigrayans from which it emerged, and terrorizes the colonized population groups, such as the Oromo. Therefore, I characterize this state as an “authoritarian-terrorist” state.<sup>1</sup> Successive heads of the Ethiopian government have had the power to kill their subjects without any repercussions because they regarded themselves above the law. Militarization and repression on the one hand and tight control of information, foreign aid, and domestic financial resources on the other have characterized these authoritarian-terrorist regimes. They controlled all aspects of state power including the security, military, judiciary, and financial and other public institutions.

The current ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which is dominated by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), receives massive assistance from the United States government. The U.S., together with Israel, financed the flight of Colonel Mengistu



Haile Mariam in 1991, and endorsed the emergence of the Meles regime.<sup>2</sup> It still provides all necessary assistance to this government. U.S. foreign policy makers usually support regimes like Ethiopia for perceived strategic and economic reasons. As far as the U.S. self-interest is protected, these policy makers are not interested in having a deeper and critical understanding of the political context of the country they recommend for assistance. For this reason, currently, the main rationale of U.S. policy makers' involvement in Ethiopia is to maintain political order and to fight against "terrorism." But the major reason why the U.S. government cannot effectively deal with global terrorism is because of its practice of double standards—failure to acknowledge that the terrorism of friendly states such as Ethiopia is dangerous, but only committed to fighting other forms of terrorism.<sup>3</sup> As Eqbal Ahmad notes, as a global power, the U.S. "cannot promote terrorism in one place and reasonably expect to discourage terrorism in another place."<sup>4</sup>

During the early 1990s, scholars and political activists believed that the U.S., as the only superpower, would promote human rights and democracy in Oromia and Ethiopia, and in other peripheral countries. But the reality in Ethiopia challenges this assumption. Here, U.S. officials are more concerned with political stability, economic reform, and the existence of regimes such as Ethiopia at any cost. As the Economist notes, Meles Zenawi "is regarded as one of Africa's 'new leaders': he recently won an award in the United States for good government . . . . [Despite his regime's poor human rights practice, Western] governments tend to give priority to the Prime Minister's economic reforms rather than his record on human rights."<sup>5</sup> Even if the U.S. does support the principles of human rights and democracy in theory, these principles are not its priority in Ethiopia; it gives only lip service to them. However, the national interest of the U.S. would have been served better by promoting democracy and human rights, not dictatorship and ethnocracy in this troubled region.

By way of contrast, the Oromo are struggling to establish the rule of law, practice self-determination, and establish a multinational democracy. For them, democracy is not a new concept, but part of their tradition and cultural heritage. Until it was suppressed during the Abyssinia colonization, the Oromo

practiced a democratic political system called *gada*<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, the West is not interested in the political aspirations and the rights of the Oromo, their democratic traditions, and other dominated peoples. Sadly, the Meles regime is acceptable even when it suppresses popular opposition, because the same Western governments believe it can establish political stability and implement the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In his second inaugural address, President George Walker Bush promised that U.S. foreign policy would challenge political tyranny by supporting forces of democracy and freedom around the world. In his words, the President said: "the policy of the United States [is] to seek and support the growth of democratic movements in every nation and every culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world"<sup>7</sup> He emphasized that the freedom of the U.S. is connected to the freedom of others. Whether he asserted this noble political idea to justify his action in Iraq or to truly move the U.S. foreign policy away from supporting dictatorship to promoting democracy is to be seen in the near future.

Expecting such support, however, the Oromo continue their struggle to restore their democratic heritage and wounded peoplehood, and oppose the imposition of any dogmatic social or ideological system. Since they have been abused in the past in the name of Christianity, Islam, socialism, democracy, and free market economy, they take things pragmatically and practically. They are frustrated by the failure of the U.S. policy of "democracy promotion" or democratization of the polity in Ethiopia. Bonnie Holcomb asserts that the democratization of the Ethiopian polity or the promotion of elite democracy by the U.S. has failed because of the fundamental contradictions that exist between the Ethiopian colonizers and the colonized peoples.<sup>8</sup> Many scholars assume that the West and the U.S. promote elite democracy when they can be sure that those who come to state power through election are not against the capitalist world system.<sup>9</sup> The Oromo who are one of the impoverished peoples of the world have no desire to challenge this system. But, practically speaking, in the case of Ethiopia, the U.S. is not committed to implement even elite democracy.

In the early 1990s, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a political organization fighting for the freedom of the Oromo, and other independent Oromo organizations were ready to work within the Ethiopian political system if fair and free elections could take place. But global powers ignored their own policy of democracy promotion. When the Tigrayan-led ethnocratic regime declared war on Oromo organizations in 1992 and expelled them from the Ethiopian political process, the global powers raised no objections. Despite the fact that most international observers concluded that the June 21, 1992, snap elections "exacerbated existing tensions, reinforced the hegemonic power of the EPRDF while marginalizing other fledgling parties, and were a central factor in the withdrawal of the OLF from the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the return to war in the Oromo region," Western governments have continued to support the Tigrayan-led regime.<sup>10</sup> Particularly, the decision of the U.S. government to support the Tigrayan authoritarian-terrorist regime has emboldened the regime and frustrated the democratic forces.

Although the U.S. and other Western countries do not openly admit that the strategy of democracy promotion in Ethiopia has failed, they are gradually recognizing that the Ethiopian crisis is expanding. Nevertheless, they still continue to back the Meles regime, while apparently searching for the strategy of establishing another elite democracy in case the Tigrayan regime fails to maintain political stability. Stevens Trucker, USAID governance advisor to Ethiopia, says, "Ethiopia's prospects for long-term stability and sustainable long term-growth are dependent upon the sustained democratization of the polity. Indeed, in the absence of a progressively more accessible, participatory, and tolerant political environment, the future may come to resemble the past."<sup>11</sup> But, the same official refuses to recognize the crimes that the Ethiopian regime is currently committing against the people, and ignores the existence of political dissent. Instead, he suggests that even if this regime is not democratic now it will be one in the future. Trucker denies the existence of political conflict, endorses Tigrayan authoritarianism, and promotes the idea that this regime can stay in power for decades, and will establish democracy later. The U.S. seems to be committed to supporting

this regime to the extent that it is not a total embarrassment to the U.S. international image. In the rhetoric of democracy and good governance, the U.S. is generously financing the Tigrayan-led government. This is an unwise political and economic investment, and ultimately, it will not advance the American national interest.

The Tigrayan ruling elite and U.S. political operatives and theorists have conveniently convinced themselves that the majority population such as the Oromo and other peoples in the region do not understand the genuine meaning of democracy. Receiving the green light from the U.S., following his blind ambition for power and promoting Tigrayan ethnic interests, Meles Zenawi expelled all independent political organizations and liberation fronts from the Ethiopian political process through state terrorism, and has replaced them with puppet organizations that he and his group had previously created under the umbrella of the EPRDF. This is what democracy means for the EPRDF and its international supporters. To establish such democracy, Meles has sought the advice of Samuel Huntington, an American academic whose writings reflect Eurocentric views that harbor covert racism, and Christian chauvinism.

As a U.S. policy ideologue and consultant, Huntington visited Ethiopia in 1993 and advised Meles Zenawi to establish an ethnic party rule in the name of democracy.<sup>12</sup> Huntington's book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, indicates his neglect of the principles of democracy and cultural diversity while promoting Christian civilization at any cost. The U.S. foreign policy as articulated by such advisors as Huntington has intensified rather than solved the historical and contemporary contradictions between the Ethiopian colonizers and the colonized Oromo. As a result, the Oromo, who were willing to participate in a democratic process, have been forced to take up armed struggle to regain their cultural, intellectual, and national freedom. Just as the Meles regime rationalizes its political practices by asserting the existence of democracy in Ethiopia, the U.S. and Western nations are willing to accept the regime's pronouncements about the promotion of democracy, civil liberty, free market economy, and the rule of law.<sup>13</sup> For this reason, they have endorsed the regime's sham elections, which it uses to further legitimize its power, as satisfactory, fair and free.<sup>14</sup>

These Western countries and the OAU (currently called AU) are less interested to understand why the Meles government expelled opposition political organizations and made its party the major candidate standing for elections in 1995 and 2000, and denied the people any choice, except voting only for the ruling party. Of course, there are a few collaborators from all ethnonational groups who support the Meles regime and carry out its policies against the colonized nations for their own personal gains. The Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) is one such collaborating group.<sup>15</sup> It was created by the TPLF to do political dirty jobs in Oromia for the Tigrayan-led regime in exchange for money and luxurious life styles. Some members of the OPDO are Oromos who were forced to join the organization while they were prisoners of war in TPLF camps. Then the TPLF leaders convinced them that they would be made the leaders of the Oromo people if they fought on their side. Others joined the government to promote their personal interests or naively believed that they could do something to better the lot of their people.<sup>16</sup>

Recently, the resurgence of Oromo nationalism within the rank and file of the OPDO has created a serious crisis for the regime that fears the shadow of OLF and Oromo nationalism. Recognizing the damage that the Tigrayan elites were doing to the Oromo people, a few top officials of the OPDO have defected to the OLF and exposed the crimes the Tigrayan-led regime has committed against the Oromo in the name of revolution, democracy, and federalism. One of those defectors, Yonatan Dhibisa, former Minister of Justice of Oromia, for example, gave a series of interviews to the Voice of Oromo Liberation and exposed the magnitude of human rights violations of the EPRDF regime. Other defectors—Dirba Ariqo, former Security chief and Militia Commander in Oromia, and Yasin Hussein, former Administrator of Bale Zone and member of the Executive Committee of Arssi region—also provided similar information and authoritatively exposed the numerous crimes of the regime. After the defection of these officials, and when some Oromo elements in OPDO sought more power and more rights for themselves and the people, the Meles government replaced them with individuals who are Oromo speaking Amharas, Tigrayans, and members of other

ethnonational groups. These officials have strong interest in the continued subjugation of the Oromo people.

The main reason the Tigrayan-led regime is still in power is because of the financial and military assistance it receives from the U.S. and other Western industrialized countries. The U.S., other Western countries, and Israel have also used the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism to support a regime that suppresses the democratic aspirations of the people and their struggle for social justice and self-determination.<sup>17</sup> In the post 9/11 era, it has become easier for the Meles regime to accuse political opponents of being terrorists. Since some Oromos are Muslims, the regime has attempted to portray them as Islamic fundamentalists who are not entitled to democracy and national self-determination. In reality, the Oromo are not struggling to expand Islam or to suppress it. They do not have the luxury or the desire of fighting against the interests of the West, particularly the U.S. They are struggling only for the democratic rights that they have been denied by Ethiopian settler colonialism and its regional and global supporters. That is why the majority of Oromo—Christian, Muslim, and non-Christian and non-Muslim—support the OLF, a secular organization struggling for the freedom of the Oromo nation.

In the past, the colonization of the Oromo and others in Ethiopia was rationalized and justified by various ideological discourses. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was rationalized through Christianity and “civilizing” ideology similar to the European colonial project in Africa. The Abyssinian elite then argued that since these people were “pagans” and “uncivilized” they deserved to be colonized by the Abyssinians so that they could become Christians and “civilized”. Now Islamic fundamentalism has become another ideological tool for the rationalization, justification, and suppression of the same people by the Tigrinya’s and their Western supporters. The Oromo and other peoples in Northeast Africa are labeled as “Islamic fundamentalists” and their secular political organizations are labeled as “bandits” or “terrorists.”<sup>18</sup> Consequently, the violations of their human rights generate no sympathy from the world community. In this regard, Samuel Huntington’s attitude toward Islam has confused religion and the legitimate causes of some people like the Oromo

with fundamentalism. For example, he wrote: "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power."<sup>19</sup> Samuel Huntington's negative portrayal of Islam ignores the fate of Christian Oromo's who have Muslim sisters and brothers. Similarly, the Oromo national struggle is not supported by the Muslim world because some Oromo's are Christians and the Oromo national struggle is led by secular organizations.

Supporting a repressive regime is unproductive foreign policy for the U.S. and other Western countries. But they probably engage in these policies for two major reasons. First, the foreign policy experts of these countries have a superficial or distorted understanding of conditions in the Ethiopian empire. The policy experts prefer to side with the elites of one ethno-national group in politically complex, multinational society because they believe that it is easier to control and exploit various population groups through a single political party. The second reason is that these foreign policy experts do not have a single standard for humanity. In their thinking, the peoples of the world are hierarchically organized according to genes, cultures, and civilizations. Such policy practice ignores the consequences of the radicalization of state power. It is misguided and has resulted in state violence and global terrorism. State terrorism and massive human rights violations are used to keep the Oromo people subordinate and exploited.

The Human Right Watch has documented the denial of political and human rights to the Oromo people. "Expanding upon a pre-existing system of local government that was designed by the *Dreg*, primarily as a tool to maintain tight political control," Human Rights Watch writes, "regional authorities have created an entirely new set of quasi-government institutions that now monitor and control the activities, speech and movement of the rural population down to the level of individual households."<sup>20</sup> Ignoring these realities during the May 15, 2005, election, most observers from the international community testified that the election was close to fair and free. But how could the election that prevented the Oromo, the largest population group, from participating freely be close to

being fair and free? The election was meaningless because it ignored the fundamental political contradictions between the Abyssinians—the Amhara and Tigrayans—on one side, and the Oromo and other colonized nations on the other side. It was only a political contest between the Amhara elite and the Tigrayans and their collaborators. Others were not genuinely and freely able to participate in it.

As the Tigrayan elite, led by Meles Zenawi, struggle to maintain control of the Ethiopian state power, the Amhara strive to replace the present government with an Amhara hegemony by using the discourse of democracy without accepting it both in theory and practice. The Tigrayan-led regime intentionally excluded independent and legitimate Oromo political forces, such as the OLF. But there cannot be genuine democracy in this troubled empire without the free participation of the Oromo people as the largest population group along with other excluded ethno-national groups. Only after the Meles regime killed hundreds of peaceful demonstrators and imprisoned thousands of them in Oromia and Ethiopia, did some Western countries half-heartedly start to criticize the government. But even then, they have still failed to take a firm position. Some Western powers are also sympathetic to the Amhara opposition groups and their supporters while conveniently ignoring or glossing over on the killing and imprisonment of thousands of Oromo students and others. After claiming election victory, the Meles regime has continued its Oromia-wide campaign of terrorism and massive human rights violations. When Oromo students and others have staged peaceful demonstrations and demanded political rights and democracy for the Oromo people, the regime has responded with more violence, imprisonment and extrajudicial killings as usual.

### **State Terrorism and Gross Human Rights Violations**

Today, the Ethiopian regime and the descendants of the colonial settlers dominate the cities and towns in Oromia, and continue to marginalize the Oromo people both in urban and rural areas. They keep them under a repressive political system by using the army, modern weapons, the media, the telephone, the fax, the internet, and other communication networks and information



technologies, and global connections. Using political violence, the Meles government is dominating and controlling the Oromo and their resources. It has denied them the freedom of expression and organization as well as access to the media and all forms of communication and information networks outside government control. Consequently, the Oromo are denied the freedom of self-development and are forced to provide their economic and other resources to the Ethiopian state and their supporters and live under deplorable conditions in the twenty-first century. Despite several assurances to foreign supporters, the Meles regime has also continued the previous policy of settling armed northerners—Amhara and Tigrayans—in Oromia. In 2002, it was reported that the government has plans to settle 2.2 million people in the south within three years.<sup>21</sup> At the same time, in order to minimize Oromo influence in Finfinne (Addis Ababa), the capital city of the Ethiopian empire, it moved the capital city of Oromia to Adama (Nazareth). In 2002, it also started evicting Oromo farmers in the vicinity of the capital city (Addis Ababa) to appropriate land that could be leased to the Abyssinian elite.<sup>22</sup> But in late 2005, the Oromo resistance forced the Meles regime to return the capital of Oromia State to Finfinne. However, the Oromo people are still marginalized in the capital city and do not receive any benefits.

The Oromo have no protection from political violence since there is no rule of law in Oromia. They do not have personal and public safety in their homes and communities. They are exposed to massive political violence, human right violations, and absolute poverty. Because of the magnitude of the Oromo problem, it is impossible to provide numerical figures on the devastating effects of violence, poverty, hunger, suffering, malnutrition, disease, ignorance, alienation, and hopelessness. Since the Meles regime lacks legitimacy, accountability, and professionalism, it could not and cannot solve these massive and complex social, economic and political problems.

Most peripheral states such as Ethiopia “lack the capacity to meet the demands and rights of citizens and improve the standard of living for the majority of [the] population.”<sup>23</sup> Consequently, they engage in terrorism and genocide massacres in order to suppress population groups that struggle for political

and economic rights. State terrorism is a systematic governmental policy in which massive violence is practiced on a given population group with the goal of eliminating any behaviour which promotes political struggle or resistance by members of that group. Any state that engages in terrorism, however, cannot protect its citizens; rather, it violates their civil and human rights through assassinations, mass killings and imprisonments. The main assumption of such states is that they can control the population only by destroying their leaders and their culture of resistance.

States that fail to establish ideological hegemony and political order are unstable and insecure, and thus they engage in state terrorism.<sup>24</sup> Like these states, the Meles government uses state violence against the Oromo and others as a “legitimate” means of establishing political stability and order. It does this despite its constitution that incorporates the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenants on Human Rights.<sup>23</sup> As Lisa Sherlock attests, state terrorism and genocide occur when “a dominant group, frightened by what its members perceive as an onslaught of international and internal movements for democracy and socioeconomic change, harnesses the state apparatus to destroy the subordinate group together.”<sup>25</sup> State terrorism is associated with issues of control of territory and resources and the construction of political and ideological domination.<sup>26</sup> Annemarie Olive Rio explains two essential features of state terrorism.

First, the state reinforces the use of violence as a viable, effective, mitigating factor for managing conflict; second, such a view is reinforced by culturally constructed and socially organized processes, expressed through symbolic forms, and related in complex ways to present social interests. Within increasing economic and environmental globalization, gender politics, and the resurgence of nationalities within territorial boundaries, the discourse of terrorism, as a practice of statecraft, is crucial to the construction of political boundaries. As such, terrorism is invoked in the art of statecraft when multiple, often conflicting versions of

the past are produced and, at particular historical moments, become sites of intense struggles.<sup>27</sup>

The Tigrayan-led regime mainly targets the Oromo because of their economic resources and political resistance. According to the Oromia Support Group, "Because the Oromo occupy Ethiopia's richest areas and comprise half of the population of Ethiopia, they are seen as the greatest threat to the present Tigrayan-led government. Subsequently, any indigenous Oromo organization, including the Oromo Relief Association, has been closed and suppressed by the government. The standard reason given for detaining the Oromo people is that they are suspected of supporting the OLF"<sup>28</sup> In addition, the Meles regime has engaged in looting the economic resources of Oromia that it transfers to its political power base in Tigtay. While settling armed Tigrayans and Amharas in Oromia, and enriching Abyssinian elites and their collaborators, this policy is impoverishing the oromia region.<sup>29</sup> Omar Fatansa, an elderly Oromo, says: "We had never experienced anything like that, not under Haile Selassie, nor under the Mengistu regime: these people just come and shoot your son or your daughter dead in front of your eyes."<sup>30</sup> Ironically, in its constitution, this regime proclaims that democracy and human rights are "inviolable" and "inalienable"

In this empire, state terrorism manifests itself in different forms. The most obvious manifestation is through violence and war, which involves assassination and murder. Victims provide graphic and appalling descriptions of the state acts of terrorism. They include burying people alive, throwing them off cliffs, hanging, castration, torture, and rape. Large containers or bottles filled with water are fixed to their testicles, or in the case of women, bottles or sticks are pushed into their vaginas. Some prisoners have been locked up in empty steel barrels and tormented with heat in the tropical sun during the day and with cold at night. According to Trevor Trueman, Chairman of the Oromia Support Group, "Torture—especially arm-tying, beating of the soles of the feet, suspension of weights from genitalia and mock execution—is commonplace, at least in unofficial places of detention. Female detainees estimate that fifty percent [is] raped during their detentions, often by several soldiers [and] policemen

on several occasions. The Minnesota Center for Victims of Torture has surveyed more than 500 randomly selected Oromo refugees. The majority had been subjected to torture and nearly all of the rest had been subjected to some kind of government violence.<sup>30</sup>

The TPLF/EPRDF soldiers have openly shot thousands of people in rural Oromia. Sometimes, they left their bodies for hyenas to eat. At other times they buried the bodies in mass graves, or threw the corpses off cliffs. There have been other methods of killings, including burning, bombing, cutting throats or arteries in the neck, strangulation, and burying people to their necks in the ground. Mohammed Hassen notes that, between 1992 and 2001, about fifty thousand killings and sixteen thousand disappearances (euphemism for secret killings) were reported in Oromia.<sup>31</sup> Further, he mentions that ninety percent of the killings are not reported.<sup>32</sup> The Meles government hides its political crimes and “does not keep written records of its extrajudicial executions and prolonged detention of political prisoners.”<sup>33</sup> However, encouraged by the silence of the international community and the Western governments, the regime sometimes engages in open terrorism. In 1997, claiming that “they belong to an OLF cell which was responsible for the bombings in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa,”<sup>34</sup> government agents gunned down three prominent Oromos—Terfa Qumbi, Captain Gudissa Annisa, and T Kumisa—in daylight in Finfinne. The regime often kills Oromos who engage in a peaceful demonstration. For instance, on March 25, 1992, in the town of Watar, Hararge, government soldiers massacred ninety-two Oromos and wounded more than three hundred. Many of these people later died.<sup>35</sup> In 1995, again government soldiers burned houses and killed seventy Oromos in the two villages of Siree, Arssi, and in the same year, many Oromo communities were burned, and Oromo farmers and herders were either killed or imprisoned in Wabbie, a subdistrict of the Bale region.<sup>36</sup> The TPLF/EPRDF soldiers killed hundreds of Oromos at Awaday in Hararge and Meeta Robii in Shawa in the early 1995. In 1996, more than one thousand Oromos in Borana were summarily executed.<sup>37</sup> In November 2001, one hundred Oromos were executed in Borana and Bale region by government armed forces claiming that the victims were members of the OLF.

Hassan Ali, an Oromo collaborator and president of Oromia between 1992 and 1995, who later defected to the United States, exposed the contradiction between what the regime claimed through its democratic discourse and what it actually practiced with its army. After he settled in the U.S., Hassen Ali said:

The TPLF soldiers and its members are a law unto themselves. Only what they say and what they want is implemented in Oromia to the general exclusion of Oromo interests or wishes. . . . Although Oromia is autonomous in name, the government soldiers and secret service agents have total power to do whatever they want in Oromia. They imprison, torture, or kill anyone, including OPDO members and our government employees without any due process of law. They have established several secret detention centers, where thousands of innocent people are kept for years without trial or charge. Federal government soldiers, more appropriately the TPLF soldiers, are in practice above the rule of law in Oromia<sup>38</sup>

Prompted by an apparent hatred for the Oromo, the TPLF soldiers did not even spare pregnant women or the youth. They killed several pregnant women and hundreds of Oromo children between the ages of 12 and 16.<sup>39</sup> According to the Oromia Support Group, "A 7-month pregnant woman in Robe, Bale, was arrested and beaten. . . . She miscarried and later died in custody. When relatives went to claim her body, they were told to replace the remains with a living relative. When asked to explain, the TPLF soldiers said 'She died with OLF objectives still stuck in her brain and we could not get what we wanted from her'"<sup>40</sup>

The regime has targeted all sectors of Oromo society in order to destroy the foundation of Oromo nationalism and political struggles. After the May 2005 election, the Meles regime killed about eighty eight demonstrators and imprisoned thousands of them in Finfinne and other cities because they peacefully opposed vote rigging by the ruling party.<sup>41</sup> From November 9, 2005, to February 15, 2006, the regime also openly

killed more than three hundred and fifty nine Oromos and imprisoned tens of thousands of peaceful demonstrators in Oromia.<sup>42</sup> Since an Oromia-wide student protest is still going on the regime continues to kill and imprison peaceful demonstrators

***Property Confiscation, Repression and Destruction of Oromo Elite.***

The police and the army subject the Oromo to the confiscation of their properties. They are also forced into submission by intimidation and political violence. Former prisoners have testified that their arms and legs were tied tightly together against their backs and that their naked bodies were whipped.<sup>43</sup> The Tigrayan-led government has engaged in destroying the Oromo elites who are interested in the welfare of Oromo society by labelling them "narrow nationalists" and the enemy of "the Ethiopian revolution." The Meles regime believes that Oromo intellectuals, businessmen and women, community and religious leaders are the enemy of "the Ethiopian Revolution." In its organ known as *Hizbawi Adera*, the regime spreads the idea that these Oromo leaders have endangered the processes of peace, democracy, and development by promoting what it calls narrow nationalism. *Hizbawi Adera* asserts, "only by eliminating the educated Oromo elite and capitalist class will the Oromo people be freed from narrow nationalism."<sup>44</sup> To achieve these heinous goals, hundreds of Oromo business people have been harassed, killed or imprisoned and robbed of their properties. One prominent Oromo businessman, who was forced to run away from his family, property, and country and now lives an impoverished life in Djibouti, describes his predicament, "They stole 162,000 Birr in cash, took my cattle, and slaughtered my herd of goats, 150 animals. Both my vehicles, a land cruiser and a small lorry, were confiscated. Soldiers moved into my home, and my warehouse became the new prison in Kobbo, Hararge region."<sup>45</sup> *Sagalee Haara*, a publication of the Oromo Support Group (OSG), notes "Recent murders and disappearances of Oromo and the detention of members of the Macha-Tulama Association and the Human Rights League are part of the implementation of policies put

forward in this document [*Hizbani Adera*].”<sup>46</sup> Eliminating the educated elite through terrorism and failing to provide Oromo children with appropriate educational opportunities, the regime wants to deny the Oromo people any leadership in the future. On the other hand, it provides better education facilities to, and prepares, Tigrayan children for positions of leadership.

By limiting the education of Oromo children, the regime is creating a discriminatory division of labor. According to Mohammed Hassen,

Only fractions of the Oromo are educated. ‘By 1995 ... enrolment was only 20 percent for primary and 12 percent for secondary schools’ ... Out of an estimated population of thirty million in Oromia 0.1 percent received the third level education in 1994 ... By 2002, all secondary school students in Oromia will graduate from 10<sup>th</sup> grade instead of the usual 12<sup>th</sup> grade [Thus] Oromo students start learning English in the seventh grade and they take [high] school leaving exams in English in tenth grade. Students in Tigray start learning English in second grade and they take [high] school leaving exams in English in 12<sup>th</sup> grade. They have more chance for passing [high] school leaving examination than Oromo students, and to receive college and university level education.<sup>47</sup>

The government has used force to undermine the education of Oromo children; it has terrorized students to discourage them from learning. For instance, in April 2000, one student was shot dead and several others wounded.<sup>48</sup> Similarly, in April 2001, more than thirty students were killed and more than three thousand arrested.<sup>49</sup>

When the Oromo students demonstrated across Oromia, from March to May 2002, the government detained, interrogated, and tortured hundreds of Oromo business people, students, teachers, and members of the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association claiming, on state controlled radio and television programs, that they are supporters of the OLF.<sup>50</sup> Further, when several thousands of Oromo high school, college, and university students protested all over Oromia demanding self-

determination for the Oromo people, the abandonment of settling armed Abyssinians groups in Oromia, and the restoration of private Oromo newspapers, the government responded with brutal violence. Opposing the brutalities of the army and police, and rejecting the new educational policy that limited their education to tenth grade, the students continued the struggle against the policies and actions of the government. They also protested against the lack of adequate budget, books, and teachers for schools in Oromia; the imposition of higher taxes and the high fertilizer costs on farmers. These protests exposed the existence of the state-sponsored terrorist group called *Galla Gadayi* (“Oromo Killers”). Trying to undermine the human rights protests of the students and Oromo nationalist struggle, the group killed Oromo youth, particularly artists and journalists. But ignoring these peaceful and democratic demands of Oromo students and civic organizations, the regime responded by arresting, killing, and torturing the protesters.

The more the regime continued to suppress the democratic rights of the people, however, the more the Oromo are engaged in resistance. From January to May 2004, Oromo students across Oromia—from secondary schools and colleges—were galvanized to protest the dismissal of about three hundred eighty of their colleagues from Addis Ababa (Finfinne) University, and the change of Oromia capital from Finfinne to Adama (Nazareth). Following this incident, government forces killed at least eleven students, arrested more than 7,000 students and teachers, and disrupted both secondary and higher education in Oromia.<sup>51</sup> Saman Zia-Zarifi, Academic Freedom Director for Human Rights Watch says, “Shooting at unarmed students is a shameful misuse of government power,”<sup>52</sup> but Ethiopian government uses this means routinely. Oromo teachers are frequently detained on charges of instigating protests or supporting the OLF. During detention, some female students were raped by government forces in prisons.<sup>53</sup> Detained “students were forced to run barefooted and crawl on their knees on coarse gravel spending the night on bare concrete floors.”<sup>54</sup>

The Meles regime has also targeted officials and members of the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association, and has accused them of having links with the OLF and the protesting Oromo



students. Subsequently, government security agents closed the office of this civic organization in Finfinne, confiscated its documents and properties, and imprisoned its chairman, Diribi Demissie, vice-chairman, Gamachu Fayera, and other officers on May 18, 2004.<sup>55</sup> Finally, the association was banned again. According to Human Rights Watch, "In July 2004, the Ethiopian government revoked the license of the venerable Oromo self-help association Mecha Tulema [sic] for allegedly carrying out 'political activities' in violations of its charter. The police subsequently arrested four of the organization's leaders on charges of 'terrorism' and providing support to the OLF. The four were released on bail in August but were arbitrarily arrested a week later."<sup>56</sup> These Oromo leaders and other members are still languishing in prison.

The government has continued the elimination or imprisonment of politically conscious and self-respecting Oromos. The systematic destruction of Oromo nationalists and leaders can be characterized as genocide. Article II of the United Nations Convention defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."<sup>57</sup> Jonassohn explains genocide as the planned destruction of any economic, political or a social group.<sup>58</sup> According to Chalk and Jonassohn, "GENOCIDE is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator."<sup>59</sup> Chalk and Jonassohn identify two major types of genocide.<sup>60</sup> The first type is used to colonize and maintain an empire by actually terrorizing people perceived to be real or potential enemies. In this case, the main purpose of practicing genocide is to acquire land and other valuable resources.

The maintenance of colonial domination requires the establishment of cultural and ideological hegemony that can be practiced through a belief or a political or ideological theory to legitimate their state power by preventing the resistance of the dominated group. This is the second type of genocide known as ideological genocide. Jonassohn notes that ideological genocides develop "in nation-states where ethnic groups develop chauvinistic ideas about their superiority and exclusiveness."<sup>61</sup> The Ethiopian regime engages in genocide and terrorist acts that

fit in the Chalk and Johnassohn's definition, mentioned above, because its policies are intended to destroy part of the Oromo nation who happened to be nationalists and leaders. In the name of federalism, the Tigrayan-led government sees Oromia as part of its imperial domain, controls Oromian resources, practices terrorism and genocide on the people, and perceives them as its potential or real enemies. The Tigrayan state elites are imposing their political ideologies, such as "revolutionary democracy," "federalism," at the gunpoint with the intent of legitimizing and consolidating Tigrayan ethnocracy and state power. Of course, they claim to be democrats and revolutionaries, and deny practicing terrorism and genocide. But they also destroy the records of their political crimes. Here, Johnassohn's description of a conspiracy of "collective denial" of genocide is applicable to the conditions in the Ethiopian empire: "There are many reasons for this: (a) in many societies such materials are not written down, or are destroyed rather than preserved in archives; (b) many perpetrators have recourse to elaborate means of hiding the truth, controlling access to information, and spreading carefully contrived disinformation; and (c) historically, most genocides were not reported because . . . there appears to have existed a sort of conspiracy of 'collective denial' whereby the disappearance of a people did not seem to require comment or even mention."<sup>62</sup>

In this situation, where there is no freedom of expression and independent media, people choose to be quiet to save their lives even when the government eliminates their relatives. Like other criminal leaders in peripheral countries, the Ethiopian state elites who engage in gross human rights violations and genocide, "not only go unpunished . . . [but] are accorded all the respect and courtesies due to government officials. They are treated in accordance with diplomatic protocol in negotiations and are seated in the General Assembly of the United Nations. When they are finally ousted from their offices, they are offered asylum by countries that lack respect for international law, but have a great deal of respect for the ill-gotten wealth that such perpetrators bring with them."<sup>63</sup> Just as previous Ethiopian regimes engaged in terrorism and genocide, exploiting the resources of the Oromo, Afar, Ogaden Somali, Sidama and Walayita, so does the current Tigrayan-dominated government.

The massive killings and genocide committed against the Sheko, Mezhenger, Sidama, and Annuak peoples in the south and south west of the country demonstrate this fact. In 2002, when the Sheko and Mezhenger peoples demanded their political rights, the regime killed between one hundred twenty eight and one thousand people. Nobody knows exactly how many people were killed since the government and the victims give different numbers. One source “estimated 1,177 houses were burned down in the first days of the campaign,” and another said, “One village we visited was effectively razed to the ground. Scorch marks were on the trees where their houses had been burned. The villages we visited were empty.”<sup>64</sup> These tragic incidents have shocked some sections of the international community.

Similarly, on June 21, 2002, between thirty nine and one hundred Sidamas were killed when government soldiers fired on 7,000 peaceful demonstrators in Hawassa (Awassa) city.<sup>65</sup> Further, government forces and their collaborators committed genocide on the Annuak people of Gambella in December 2003 and early 2004; they killed four hundred twenty four people and displaced fifty thousand.<sup>66</sup> In a letter, sent to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, on January 8, 2004, the International Campaign to End Genocide noted that massacring people “because of their ethnic group membership are [sic] genocide. The Genocide Convention outlaws the intentional destruction of part of an ethnic group, not just the destruction of the whole group. We ask that you now arrest and try the perpetrators of the December massacre of Annuak in Gambella.”<sup>51</sup> Today the Tigrayan-dominated regime is engaged in similar terrorism and genocide. However, the international community is not paying much attention to these crimes against humanity.

### ***The Banning of Oromo Organizations***

The Meles regime has banned independent Oromo organizations and institutions. In 1992, it banned the OLF and other independent Oromo organizations and declared war on them and on the Oromo people. It even outlawed artistic, musical groups, and professional associations. It closed down independent Oromo newspapers, such as *Uyji*. By doing this, the Meles government, like the previous Ethiopian regimes, is

attempting to make the Oromo voiceless, bereft of any form of social and political organizations or institutions. Only organizations and media that are owned and controlled by the Tigrayan-led government are tolerated. But they serve mostly the interests of the government.

Even the Oromo Relief Association (ORA), which provided highly needed humanitarian relief to Oromos displaced by conflict and government repression, was banned. Realizing that the Ethiopian government and international organizations cared little about the welfare of Oromo society, a few Oromo leaders created the ORA, in exile, as an independent humanitarian Oromo relief association in the late 1970s. ORA's primary goal was to assist Oromo refugees in the Horn of Africa.<sup>67</sup> Assuming that the changed political situation would allow a peaceful operation in Ethiopia, ORA moved its head office to Finfinne in 1991, and shifted its program from relief work to rehabilitation, resettlement and development projects that included health, educational, agricultural, and forestation activities in Oromia.<sup>68</sup> The regime, however, closed ORA's regional offices in August 1995 and its headquarters in February 1996, and confiscated all its property. As a result, one thousand three-hundred and fifty-two orphans who were moved from Sudan to Oromia, when ORA decided to relocate its headquarters in 1991,<sup>69</sup> were mistreated by the TPLF soldiers. Some drowned while fleeing from government soldiers; others were captured and taken to the Dhidheessa concentration camp where they were beaten, tortured, and raped. Some died of hunger and malaria infection.<sup>70</sup> At the same time, ORA activities in Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya were banned as the result of Ethiopian government pressure on these neighboring counties.

The Meles regime has used its alliance with the West to frighten its neighbours, such as Djibouti, Kenya and Sudan, to curtail the Oromo struggle and repatriate Oromo refugees. Although forced repatriation of refugees contravenes international law, even the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) failed to provide reasonable protection for thousands of Oromo refugees in Djibouti. For example, on December 21 and 22, 2000, five thousand Oromo refugees were refouled back to Ethiopia. In this case, the UNHCR office in Djibouti denied any violation of its mandate.<sup>71</sup> Between 2000

and 2004, hundreds of Oromo refugees were forced to return to Ethiopia to face imprisonment or death<sup>72</sup> "The continuing refoulement of refugees from Djibouti," notes the Oromia Support Group, "especially the large scale refoulement of December 2000 and the 28 associated deaths by asphyxiation and shooting, should be publicly acknowledged by UNHCR and the Djibouti government."<sup>73</sup> Similarly, Oromo refugees in Kenya and Sudan faced security problems. Kenyan security forces and an Abyssinian terrorist organization called *Hagere Fiqir* (love of country) have harassed them. The harassment has taken place in Nairobi and Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya.<sup>74</sup> Sudan, which was sympathetic to refugees and the Oromo struggle until 1991, changed its policy after the EPRDF took power. The Ethiopian Political Prisoners Committee reported that, violating the UN Convention on Refugees, Sudan has forced some refugees to return to Ethiopia in January 2003, and one hundred and ten minors were sold in the Middle East and some European countries.<sup>75</sup>

The burden of Oromo women refugees is even heavier. Many of them are raped while crossing the border on their way to Djibouti or are forced to work as captives in Djibouti households or the Djibouti police. Sebida Musa asserts that, in Djibouti, "They take the women home and treat them as their personal property. If one of the women gets pregnant, she is mercilessly thrown out into the street, where she and her unwanted child have to try and survive by begging."<sup>76</sup> In addition to lack of food, Oromo children are denied education in Djibouti. Zeinaba Ibrahim, an Oromo woman refugee, says, "Our difficulty is that as Oromo we are threatened and endangered both at home in Ethiopia and as refugees in Djibouti ..."<sup>77</sup> Sadly, the UNHCR provides little material support to Oromo refugees in Djibouti. Fossati, Namarra and Niggli note that:

The Oromo council of elders told us they believed they were entitled to a small portion of the international aid available to refugees, but [we] did not even get a glass of water from the UNHCR and had been completely forgotten ... All the Oromo that we spoke to complained again and again that they were so poor that

it was even difficult to bury their dead properly. The community, they said, should at least be able to guarantee a burial, since it is the one thing a human being cannot do for himself.<sup>78</sup>

The Kenyan government has failed to protect its Borana Oromo citizens, let alone Oromo refugees from Ethiopia. Hussein Sora, a young Kenyan Oromo lawyer, accused the Meles regime of international terrorism and compiled a report on the criminal activities of the Ethiopian security forces in Kenya since 1992. According to this report, the TPLF forces assassinated prominent Oromo refugees, bombed the houses of some Kenyan Oromos and abducted civil servants, and shot some citizens in Kenya.<sup>79</sup> This lawyer died the same year he compiled and distributed the report to the Kenyan authorities and international organizations. The agents of the Ethiopian government were suspected of killing him by poisoning. The TPLF forces have continued to enter into Kenya murdering and looting the economic resources of some Kenyan Oromos by accusing them of harbouring the Oromo Liberation Army. The Tigrayan soldiers have been killing hundreds of Oromos by illegally entering into Kenya. In Somalia and Kenya, the Ethiopian government agents have assassinated prominent Oromo leaders, such as Jatani Ali, Mulis Abba Gada, Sheik Mohammed Saïdo, between 1991 and 2001. Mulis Abba Gada was one of the Oromo heroes who initiated the Oromo national movement, and a member of the Oromo Liberation Front National Council. A Tigrayan assassin squad in Somalia reportedly assassinated him in 2000.

Thus, neglected by the international organizations, the Oromo refugees and nationalists are denied sanctuary in neighbouring countries and are denied the right to be even refugees. Oromos who have been assassinated or murdered by the regime are some times denied even appropriate burial rights. Since they are not welcomed by neighbouring countries and international organizations, thousands are “internal” refugees in Oromia and Ethiopia. Fleeing from Ethiopian state terrorism, these internal refugees hide in the bushes and remote villages. Suspecting that these internal refugees support the Oromo national struggle, the regime attempts to control their

movements. And assuming that the Oromian forests provide sanctuary for the OLF guerrillas, the agents of the regime burned these forests and caused catastrophic environmental destruction in 2000. A letter written to Kofi Anan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, on April 17, 2000, by the Oromo communities in Diaspora, describes the environmental problem as follows:

Systematically set fires have been devouring virgin forests, coffee plantations, homes, and rare animals and plants in several regions of Oromia . . . The fires destroyed not only rare indigenous animals, such as the Red Fox, Mountain Nyala, and Bushbuck, and rare plant species, but also precious other resources on which the inhabitants depend for their existence. More than 100,000 hectares of virgin forest were burned down. In addition to the grave economic consequences, the destruction of these forests will lead to permanent loss of the unique flora and fauna, therein the degradation of the natural resources base that would accelerate soil erosion and desertification of an already fragile region

But this urgent appeal to the United Nations and its Secretary-General has yielded no relief, except funding a research project to study the problem of forest fires.

Using its restrictive press laws and legal mechanisms, the TPLF-dominated regime closed down all private and free Oromo newspapers and magazines and imprisoned journalists. According to Mohammed Hassen,

These newspapers and magazines fostered tolerant political culture, which Ethiopia lacks, and they also cultivated the development of modern written literature in the Oromo language. The regime even closed down the Oromo Relief Association, a humanitarian organization that was established in 1979, and its property was confiscated without compensation and without due process of law. The goal of the suppression of all independent Oromo organizations

and the disappearance of the once vigorous private Oromo newspapers and magazines is to deprive the Oromo of any leadership and any voice in the affairs of their own country. The people of Oromia . . . do not have a single newspaper or magazine that expresses their legitimate voice . . . Today the Oromo . . . are not only oppressed but also handcuffed to move and mindcuffed to think and speak by a system that best thrives in darkness and misinformation.<sup>80</sup>

### **Rape and Violence against Women**

The repression and destruction of Oromo society have involved also state sanctioned rape. The use of sexual violence is a means of genocide that a dominant ethnonational group uses in destroying the subordinate groups. Genocide studies ignore “the full extent of the humiliation of the ethnic group through the rape of its women, the symbols of honor and vessels of culture. When a woman’s honor is tarnished through illicit intercourse, even if [it is] against her will, the ethnic group is also dishonored. The effects of rape—forced impregnation, psychological trauma, degradation, and demoralization—go beyond the victims themselves.”<sup>81</sup> What MacKinnon says about ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina applies to the sexual abuse of Oromo women. He writes: “It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make the victims wish they were dead. It is rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape to make you leave your home and never want to go back. It is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told to others: rape as spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, to destroy a people. It is rape as genocide.”<sup>82</sup> To demoralize, destroy, and to show that Tigrayans are a powerful group that can do anything to the Oromo, Tigrayan cadres, soldiers, and officials have frequently rape Oromo girls and women.

The Tigrayan forces have not only raped Oromo girls and women, and they have also imprisoned and physically tortured them. The way the Tigrayan soldiers have treated Oromo women and girls demonstrates widespread inhumane behavior. Bruna Fossati, Lydia Namarra and Peter Niggli report, “in prison



women are often humiliated and mistreated in the most brutal fashion. Torturers run poles or bottles into their vaginas connect electrodes to the lips of their vulva, or the victims are dragged into the forest and gang-raped by [interrogating] officers"<sup>83</sup> Similar conditions occur wherever genocide is practiced. Sharlack explains that as a campaign to commit genocide, the West Pakistan army raped thousands of the Bangladesh women, the Serbian army raped the women of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, and the Hutu men raped Tutsi.<sup>84</sup> In addition to mental and bodily harm, tortures through rape have been spreading diseases, such as syphilis, gonorrhea, and HIV/AIDS to the Oromo society. One study on HIV/AIDS in Ethiopian military personnel demonstrates that because of their frequent movements, causal sex with prostitutes, war, and social disorganization, soldiers put women at high risk for acquiring and spreading sexually transmitted diseases, such as HIV/AIDS.<sup>85</sup>

### *Economic Abuse*

Another form of Ethiopian state terrorism is economic violence. The regime is engaged in destroying the foundation of Oromo society through its economic policies and practices. The government confiscated the properties of some Oromos, including those who have been imprisoned. Those who were released from prisons paid a huge amount of 'ransom money' collected by relatives for TPLF soldiers and agents.<sup>86</sup> "The persecutions of suspected and real political opponents and the widespread campaigns of intimidation against the Oromo population," Fossati, Namarra and Niggli wrote, "produce a considerable booty which is pocketed by the government's representatives on the ground"<sup>87</sup> It seems that the TPLF leaders have implicitly decided to enrich themselves while regional and local officials and soldiers use violence and repression to loot and accumulate wealth.<sup>88</sup> Fossati, Namarra and Niggli noted that "some privileged members of the TPLF have managed in dubious circumstances to privatize and run former state enterprises and are now successful in business. They are considerably better off than their former little 'comrades in arms' who do the dirty work of repression."<sup>89</sup>

Thus the military and political leaders of TPLF have emerged as a new capitalist class and are poised to dominate the Ethiopian political economy for a while. Using state power, this new class has expropriated state corporations in the name of privatization and established joint businesses with either local investors or foreign corporations.<sup>90</sup> By looting and expropriation, the Tigrayan-dominated government elite and their satellite organizations have transferred to themselves the largest and fastest growing companies. “The control of the rapidly growing number of business companies forming part of the EPRDF-conglomerate is exercised through individual members/sympathizers of the different EPRDF-organizations” either directly by loyal shareholders or indirectly by ‘strategic Para-NGOs and Foundations run by them on behalf of the political parties of the EPRDF’ [These] companies . . . can be characterized as Parapartals.”<sup>91</sup>

The TPLF/EPRDF government has a close relationship with a business conglomerate controlled by the Ethio-Saudi Al-Amudi-family which is connected to Kuwaiti and Saudi private and government capital.<sup>92</sup> According to a source, “Within a short period of some years, the Ethio-Saudi Al-Amudi family headed by Sheikh Mehamed Hussein [sic] Ali Al-Amudi managed to build up from scratch within Ethiopia a huge conglomerate of interlinked companies second only to the one controlled by the ruling EPRDF. However, in spite of being one of the most powerful and most talked about actors within the Ethiopian economic area, within Ethiopia actually very little is known as to the background and social life of Sheikh Mehamed and the Al-Amudi family in general.”<sup>93</sup>

The plan of developing the Tigray region at the cost of Oromia and other regions is clear. Impoverishing the people by transferring their wealth and capital to Tigrayans, the Tigrayan society, and their local and international collaborators, is a form of economic violence. Because of the special favor that they enjoy, Tigrayan elite who depended on international aid in the 1980s is now very rich and powerful. But the Oromo, who rarely faced devastating famine in earlier time because of the better fertility of their land and good weather, are now facing famine and absolute poverty under the government of Meles Zenawi. Thousands of Oromos have lost their lands through eviction and

their cattle through looting. This regime's economic policy has impoverished and ruined the Oromo society.

### **Conclusion**

Successive Ethiopian authoritarian-terrorist regimes have used the discourses of religion and culture to link themselves to the Middle East, Europe, and North America. Earlier, Ethiopian kings used Christianity to consolidate their power against the citizens and the colonized populations, such as the Oromo, Sidama, Ogaden Somalis, and Walayita. Abyssinians rulers have also used the concepts of race and racism, which combine biological and cultural differences to justify unequal treatment of different population groups. Since the concept of race is a socio-political construct, it is essential to critically understand the *historical context* in which racism is produced and reproduced to denigrate colonized peoples and deny them access to state power. In the Ethiopian discourse, the so-called racial distinctions such as Semitic, Negroid (Shanqilla, bariya), and Cushitic are used to perpetuate the political objectives the domination of the colonized population groups. Globally, the Abyssinians used Semitic and Christian identities to mobilize assistance from Jews, Arabs, Europeans, and Americans, who regarded these identities closer to their own than the peoples whom they consider "real black".<sup>94</sup> Based on these claims, they considered Abyssinians closer to "the European race" or members of "the great Caucasian family."<sup>95</sup>

The Ethiopian state has obtained its political legitimacy and financed its engagement in terrorism and human rights violations through global connections. Just as Britain supported Ethiopia during the first half the twentieth century, the U.S. provided financial and military assistance to the Haile Selassie government from the 1940s to the mid-1970s. Based on socialist ideology, the former Soviet Union supported the Ethiopian military regime headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam, from the mid-1970s to 1991; this regime brought untold misery, war, famine, and terrorism to various population groups in Ethiopia. Currently, the U.S. and other Western countries support the Meles regime to "promote" democracy.

The legitimacy and financing provided from these external resources have enabled successive Ethiopian governments to engage in terrorism and massive human rights violations. According to Human Rights Watch/World Report, in 1999, "Ethiopia remained the second largest recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa" <sup>96</sup> As the largest donor of bilateral aid to Ethiopia, the U.S. considers the Meles regime as its "essential partner . . . in its 'war on terrorism' and . . . has generally been unwilling to apply meaningful pressure on the Ethiopian government over its human rights record" <sup>97</sup> With the increasing intensity of the Oromo national movement, the Tigrayan authoritarian-terrorist regime is determined to increase the level of mass killings and terrorism. The regime is concerned with the existence of the OLF and the support and the sympathy this organization enjoys from the majority of the Oromo people. What bothers the regime is that the more it terrorizes the Oromo people by killing or imprisoning thousands of them, claiming that they are the supporters of the OLF, the more the Oromo are determined to embrace Oromo nationalism and the OLF. As a result, the Oromo and the OLF have almost become synonymous. Therefore, it is impossible to destroy the OLF without destroying the Oromo people.

What is more disturbing for the Meles regime is that the Oromo people in general and Oromo students in particular have positively rallied to the side of the OLF and have started a coordinated nation-wide demonstration to demand self-determination, respect for Oromo dignity and basic freedom, immediate release of political prisoners, particularly the release of the leaders of the Macha-Tulama Self-help Association and the restoration of this association, the implementation of the rule of law through an impartial court. In response to these legitimate, legal and peaceful demands, the Tigrayan-led regime has killed or imprisoned hundreds; closed some schools, and expelled probably thousands of Oromo students from these schools temporarily or permanently. However, the Oromo protest movement is still in progress. Since the regime continues to engage in terrorism, mass killings and imprisonment, the confrontation between the Tigrayans and the Oromo is reaching a very dangerous point. In the Washington Post on April 23, 2006, Meles Zenawi was identified as one of the leaders that

President Bush forgot to put on his list of “axis of evil”<sup>98</sup> In the same source, Kenneth Roth, Director of Human Rights Watch, notes that, in Oromia “his systematic repression escapes meaningful scrutiny. In the vast Oromia region, thousands of alleged government critics have been harassed, imprisoned, tortured and killed .... Millions have been intimidated into silence.” One wonders for how long Western countries, particularly the U.S., will continue to support and finance this racist and terrorist minority regime to brutalize the Oromo and other peoples.

There is no way that the Tigrayan authoritarian-terrorist regime that relies on a minority population group, without any democratic tradition and culture, could promote democracy. The U.S. sponsored Ethiopian “democracy” has so far failed to resolve the principal contradiction of ethnicization of state power that has been built into Ethiopian body politics since the creation of the empire. Like successive Amhara-dominated regimes in the past, the Meles government has ethnicized the Ethiopian state by making Tigrayan ethnicity the core of its repressive state, and has prevented the construction of a legitimate, democratic state, accountable to its citizens. Further, the social and cultural systems that traditionally satisfied the social and material needs of these peoples have been broken up by the penetration of the world economy, state terrorism, and the intensification of globalization. Without an accountable, democratic and legitimate state, various population groups in this empire may soon face disastrous conditions similar to Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. If the current Ethiopian state terrorism and massive human rights violations are allowed to continue by the U.S. and other Western countries that support the regime, the situation may lead to disastrous social, economic and political crises in the region with far reaching effects.

Therefore, the world community needs to promote the principles of genuine self-determination and peaceful conflict resolution or encourage the formation of a democratic and legitimate multinational state that can prevent the transformation of a low-level conflict into a full-fledged genocide war. Since state terrorism and ethno-national challenges are increasing in the Ethiopian empire, the world community needs to develop

procedures and criteria by which to resolve these conflicts fairly and democratically before it is too late. Concerned scholars, democrats, activists, humanitarians and others have social and moral responsibility to expose the crimes that are committed in this empire in the name of democracy and search for just, durable and democratic ways of conflict resolution. The Oromo people because of their democratic tradition, demographic size, geographic location, political experiences, and cultural ties with other oppressed peoples should be encouraged and supported in their struggle to introduce genuine self-determination and multinational democracy in order to bring a just and durable peace to the region.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> For details, see Asafa Jalata, "State Terrorism and Globalization: The Cases of Ethiopia and Sudan," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 2005, Volt 46 (1-2): 79-102

<sup>2</sup> Asafa Jalata, *Fighting Against the Injustice of the State and Globalization Comparing the African American and Oromo Movements*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp 81-86.

<sup>3</sup> See Eqbal Ahmad, "Terrorism: Theirs and Ours (A Presentation at the University of Colorado, Boulder, October 12, 1998," p 7.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> *The Economist*, "Ethiopia: Federal Sham," August 16th-22nd, 1997, p. 36.

<sup>6</sup> Asafa Jalata, *Fighting Against the Injustice of the State and Globalization*, pp 62-69

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article>

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<sup>8</sup> Holcomb, Bonnie K , "The Tale of two Democracies: The Encounter Between US-Sponsored Ethiopian 'Democracy' and Indigenous Oromo Democratic Forms, *The Journal of Oromo Studies*, 1997, 4/1 & 2: 73-77

<sup>9</sup> See for example, William I Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

<sup>10</sup> National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and African American Institute, *An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992, Elections in Ethiopia*, (1992), p. 7

<sup>11</sup> Stevens Trucker, "Ethiopia's Democratic Transition Moves Forward Amid Challenges," *African Voices: A Newsletter on Democracy and Governance in Africa*, winter /spring, 1997, p 1

<sup>12</sup> See Samuel P Huntington, "Political Development in Ethiopia: A Peasant-based Dominant-Party Democracy," Report to USAID/ Ethiopia on Consultation with the Constitutional Commission, March 28 to April 1, 1993.

<sup>13</sup> See *Reuters Business Briefing*, July 5, 1994; *Reuters*, May 15, 1995.

<sup>14</sup> See *Reuters Business Briefing*, July 5, 1994; *Reuters*, May 15, 1995

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Almaz Meko, former Speaker of House of Federation of Ethiopia, June 2, 2002

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> See Asafa Jalata, "The Struggle for Knowledge: The Case of Emergent Oromo Studies," *The African Studies Review*, 39 (September), 1996: 95-123; A. Jalata, "Oromo Nationalism in the New Global Context," *The Journal of Oromo Studies*, 1997, 4/1 & 2: 83-114

<sup>18</sup> See *The Economist*, August 16, 1997: 36.

<sup>19</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 217.

<sup>20</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Suppressing Dissent, Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in Ethiopia's Oromia Region*, May 2005, Vol. 17, No. 7(A), p. 2.

<sup>21</sup> See the Oromia Support Group, "Press Release," December 2002, No. 38, p. 13.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> For details, see Annamarie Oliverio, "The State of Injustice: The Politics of Terrorism and the Production of Order," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 38/1-2: 48-63.

<sup>24</sup> Article 10 of this constitution proclaims: "Human rights and freedoms are inviolable and inalienable. They are inherent in the dignity of Human beings. 2 Human and democratic rights of Ethiopian citizens shall be respected.

<sup>25</sup> Lisa Sharlack, "State Rape," p. 107.

<sup>26</sup> Annamarie Oliverio, "The State of Injustice," *ibid.* p. 52.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *The Oromia Support Group*, Nov 1997, p. 1.

<sup>29</sup> Quoted in Bruna Fossati, L. Namarra, and Peter Niggli, *The New Rulers of Ethiopia and the Persecution of the Oromo: Reports from the Oromo Refugees in Djibouti*, (Dokumentation, Evangelischer Pressedienst Frankfurt amMain, 1996), 43

<sup>30</sup> Trevor Trueman, "Genocide against the Oromo People of Ethiopia? Western Influence," Paper Presented at the 44<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Houston, Texas, November 14-18, 2001, p. 3

<sup>31</sup> Mohammed Hassen, "Is Genocide against the Oromo in



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Ethiopia Possible? *ibid*” p 27.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p 30

<sup>34</sup> Quoted in Mohammed Hassen, *ibid.*, 30

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31 and 71

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p 31

<sup>38</sup> Quoted in Mohammed Hassen, *ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>39</sup> See The Oromia Support Group, August/September 1996.

<sup>40</sup> The Oromia Support Group, 1997, p 8.

<sup>41</sup> Marc Lacey, “Ethiopia’s Capital, Once Promising, Finds itself in Crisis,” *The New York Times*, November 14, 2005

<sup>42</sup> The Oromo Liberation Front, Foreign Relations Office, External Information Division, “Press Release: Popular Uprising in Oromia Reaches a Critical Stage,” ONA website, February 15, 2006

<sup>43</sup> For details, see Asafa Jalata, “State Terrorism and Globalization,” *ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> Hizbawi Adera, a IPLF/EPRDF Political Pamphlet, December 1996-February 1997, Vol 4, No 7.

<sup>45</sup> Quoted in Bruna Fossati, L. Namarra and Peter Niggli, *ibid.*, 34

<sup>46</sup> Sagalee Haara, a magazine of the Oromia Support Group, 1998, p. 6.

<sup>47</sup> Mohammed Hassen, *ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>48</sup> Amnesty International USA’s, “Urgent Action: Hundreds of School Students Arrested in Oromia Region,

<http://shaebia.org/wwwboard/messages/173.html>

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<sup>50</sup> The Oromia Support Group, "Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia: Press Release," December 2002, No. 38, pp. 3-6. The Oromia Support Group, "Press Release," July 2004, No. 40, p. 2.

<sup>52</sup> Saman Zia-Zarifi, "Ethiopia: Halt Crackdown on Oromo Students," Human Rights Watch, <http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/ethiopia052202.html>, (2004), p. 1.

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<sup>56</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Ethiopia: Overview of Human Rights Issues," <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/ethiop9833.htm>, (2005), pp. 1-2.

<sup>57</sup> Quoted in Kurt Jonassohn (with Karin Solveig Bjornson), *Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations: In Comparative Perspective*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998, p. 9

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990, p. 23

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> Kurt Jonassohn, *ibid.*, p. 23

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

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65 *Ibid*

66 Human Rights Watch, "Ethiopia," p. 2

70 *Ibid*

71 *Ibid*, "Press Release," December 2002, no. 38, p. 17

72 *Ibid*, July 2003, no. 39, pp. 16-18

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75 Cited in *ibid*, July 2003, no. 39, pp. 20.

76 Quote<sup>7d</sup> in Bruna Fossati, L. Namarra and Peter Niggli, *ibid*, p. 10

77 *Ibid*, p. 28.

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# Knowledge, Identity and Power: The Case of Ethiopia and Ethiopianess

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## Introduction

Ethiopia has a long history than any other country in Africa, except Egypt and Nubia. Christian Ethiopian traditions claim that its rulers descended from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba in the tenth century B.C. Abyssinians (as Ethiopians are also called) argue that they had been known and linked to ancient centers of civilization. They also take pride in the references to Ethiopia in the Bible, although whether those references coincide with the geographical location of modern Ethiopia is doubtful. In fact the ancestors of modern Ethiopians did not even call themselves as Ethiopian during the early biblical times.

But it is true that Ethiopians were one of the ancient peoples to accept Christianity in Africa. Briefly, in the sixteenth century, and more consistently, since the early nineteenth century, Ethiopian rulers attempted to use their Christian identity to establish alliance with European powers. Since the mid-nineteenth century, they had labored very hard to be recognized by European powers and to use their connections as political leverage over their neighbors. But their attitude legitimizes the Euro-centric discourse that assumes, to be known, one should be known to Europeans. This implies that Europe is the subject to know and others are objects to be known.

Knowledge and identity are affiliated with power. Identity can be part of the maintenance of a symbolic colonial order between the 'normal' and the 'deviant', binding together those who are part of the symbolic colonial communities (Arber, 2000). It would be difficult to understand the socio-political

disparities that colonial identity and knowledge impose on subject people without understanding the colonialist mindset in the construction of bound-identities and knowledge. Yet, we know that the Euro-centric ideology formulated the boundaries of nations, science, and law and framed the history of events for the subordination and exploitation of colonial peoples. Similarly, Ethiopian identity as constructed by its Christian rulers attempted to impose a single historical narrative that legitimized the power of a single group at the expense of the people who were conquered and subjugated since the late nineteenth century.

Cultural norms and idioms of the Oromo, one of the subjugated peoples, teach "*Namaati hindarbiin- namniis siit hindarbiin*" or "never trespass and never let the others trespass on you" According to the Oromo traditions, *nagaa* (peace) and *fayyaa* (health, wellbeing) are intertwined with the peace and health of neighbors and the natural environment.<sup>1</sup> Although not free from some negative practices, the Oromo culture encourages the individual to constantly seek peace and wellbeing for herself or himself as well as for others.

Studies in human rights, education and public health show how human rights are violated systemically, how and why violations are deliberately perpetrated. These studies indicate how the human rights violations are internalized, who is at risk to internalize, and how we can prevent individuals and groups from internalizing human rights violations. In this case, education has a major role in averting or perpetuating human right violations. To understand the framework of human rights violations, how they are internalized and their impacts, this paper examines knowledge, identity regarding Ethiopia and Ethiopianness. In addition, the paper will analyze how knowledge is constructed and legitimized, and how identities are framed. It argues that the contemporary socio-economic setting of the Ethiopian state and the undemocratic nature of the government are intertwined with the historical narrative of empire.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first part examines the identity discourse and interrogates its production and validation by examining historical narrative of Ethiopia.

Second, it looks at the ideology of Ethiopianness, and tries to identify its similarity with Euro-centric discourses. Third, it examines the burden of Ethiopian historical narrative and identity for the subjugated people and its link to slave trade and colonialism

### **Discourse in Colonial Knowledge and Identity**

Many people search and desire to understand the origin of their suffering. In some cases, the search for the past is also used as a strategy to interpret the present and predict the future. Paulo Freire wrote:

In my case it was enough to know the fabric in which my suffering had been born in order to bury it. In the area of socioeconomic structures, a critical perception of the fabric, while indispensable, is not sufficient to change the data of the problem, any more than it is enough for the worker to have in mind the idea of the object to be produced (Freire 1994: 31)

Searching the past does not necessarily lead to agreement or disagreement about the past history. But history can be used to synthesize what and how the past has been transformed to shape the present. In other words, the search helps to understand how events occurred in the past and how they are interpreted today (Said, 1994). The question is to understand whether or not the past is really over or redesigned and recreated to make the current situation fit into the past.

As Said (1994) illustrates, colonialism and imperialism are interwoven with the practice, theory and attitude of dominating a territory; hence, the struggle against it is not only about the soldiers and cannons, but is also about ideas, forms, images and imaginings. For domination, the imperial and colonial authority needed to mold, shape and reshape the mental attitude of the colonized through colonial education. Frantz Fanon (1996) argues that colonialism is not satisfied merely by holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all forms and contents of indigenous knowledge. It attempts to turn the past of the oppressed people upside down, distort, disfigure and

destroy their sense of history as well as their cultural knowledge. This project of devaluing pre-colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today.

Before I explore the colonial knowledge and identity issues, I would like to provide some definitions for these two concepts. The Webster's Dictionary defines identity as "the condition of being the same with something described and claimed." It also suggests that the word colony is derived from the Latin word for a farmer, cultivator, planter, or settler in a new territory. Then, the word colonial has the sense of "farm," "landed estate," "settlement", and was especially the proper term for a public settlement. Several English phrases also suggest that the word colony denote "to cultivate or become cultivated, civilize or become civilized, polished or become polished". Thus, colonial identity shapes a group to make it appropriate for colonial norms and values. In literature and real life, we encounter phrases such as 'colonial hotel,' 'colonial furniture,' 'colonial sandwich,' 'colonial salad'. All these phrases imply "the best" or high quality or high standard. For example, in his book on African history, Philip Curtin (1978) describes how Europeans justified their presence in Africa in positive terms. He wrote:

The European imperialists in Africa justified their presence by a self-imposed task, a civilizing mission, to civilize being . . . to improve the moral, intellectual, and industrial condition of the country or people. To improve means . . . to remake in the European mold . . . [described as] imperialism of the mind (Curtin, 1978)

Curtin suggests how the Europeans tried to justify their exploitation in Africa by a "civilizing" discourse. But for the people of Africa who were affected by colonialism, the presence of the Europeans was a "de-civilizing" project. For example, Albert Memmi (quoted in Turshen, 1989) describes the colonized as "disfigured", even "diseased" by their experiences under colonial rule. Said (1994) also argued that for the people who experienced colonialism, the colonizers are the enemy, disease and even evil.



Thus it is clear that the colonizers and the colonized have different concepts about history and colonial experiences. Long after Algeria was liberated from the French colonial rule, Said (1994) pointed out how Algerian intellectuals remembered French military attacks, torture, imprisonment and executions, while the French remembered the French colonizing missions—the schools they built, well planned cities, a pleasant life, and the forces of the liberation movement as "troublemakers". Through exploitation of human resources and appropriation of natural wealth of the colonized people, the colonizers were able to enjoy good standard of life and high quality services at the expense of the subjugated people. Hence, colonialism, colonial identity and knowledge were considered 'civilizing' for colonizers and 'de-civilizing' for the colonized. Similarly, in my inquiry about "Ethiopianness," I also found differences between the Abyssinians and non-Abyssinians in understanding the concept and reality being Ethiopian. For the Abyssinians, Ethiopianness is related to civilization and Orthodox Christian identity, while for non-Abyssinian people, it is related to subjugation.

### Colonial Schooling

Based cultural belief of the dominant group, colonial schooling legitimizes knowledge and determines what is valid and what is invalid. In this case, uncritical mind can be colonized. Such education in turn normalizes oppression and legitimizes the illegitimate. For example, colonial education system in Africa, that was supposed to be about choice, supported indoctrination and intellectual colonization. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o (1986), Kenyan novelist and literacy critic, tells how he learned the English language:

One of the most humiliating experiences [of learning English] was to be caught speaking Gikuyu in the vicinity of the school. The culprit was given corporal punishment . . . or was made to carry a metal plate around the neck with inscriptions such as 'I am STUPID' or 'I am a donkey' (Ngugi Wa Thiongo (1986).

While devaluing the indigenous language and culture, colonial education emphasized the relative superiority of Eurocentric knowledge, language and history. Separated from their histories, traditions and heritage; and forced to assume a new identity, value systems and norms, colonized people were offered to adopt the colonizers view of the world. Such education and knowledge diminished the colonized peoples' confidence in themselves as competent and proud people. The colonizers targeted the worldviews of the colonized to convince them that the dominant group is superior in all aspects of life. Such a deliberate manipulation of colonized peoples' minds is aimed at maintaining control through intellectual deprivation (Guy, 1992). Very often, the colonizers rewarded individuals and groups who embraced their ideological and cultural superiority, and punished those who opposed them.

Realities are socially constructed, and most of the time, these realities defined and influenced the way the laws and policies are written and interpreted. Even simple story telling can be a powerful means to destabilize the myths of the subordinate group and change their mind-set. Euro-centric knowledge and history have also an explicit connection with racial theory that justified the practice of slavery, slave trade, colonial and neo-colonial exploitations that affected Africa, Asia and other peoples of the world (UNESCO, 1980). The critique about such history is not only about the inaccuracy of the information but is also about misrepresentations.

The colonial discourse always refers to a civilizing mission which, of course, targeted the identity and minds of colonized peoples. In this case, Ethiopianness shares similarities with the European cultural superiority, racism, and imperialistic views. In my analysis of knowledge and identity, I have found Michel Foucault's view of history, power and knowledge very helpful. Foucault (Rainbow, 1984) writing about the process of historical archaeology and the archaeology of knowledge, suggests that we need to dig deep to uncover layers of archival fragments to understand the whole and to reconstruct lost civilizations. Foucault points out that the relations between power and knowledge in a society change when there is a new definition of

the conflict and the struggles for history. According to Foucault, once power-knowledge dynamics have changed, other changes will occur at the various archaeological levels. Foucault's histories, therefore, are histories of events understood through the restructuring of the archaeological layers of society, which, in their relationships to each other, regulate practices. Understanding history from a human rights perspective gives us such tools to go out and change things for the betterment of oppressed people.

It can be argued that during wartime enemies target the army, while, during peacetime, colonizers invade the knowledge of the cultural and national identity of the people. By renaming geographical locations and cultural land marks, the dominant group can significantly alter the identity of the oppressed people. Changing of names is one of the methods colonizers use to obliterate the identity of the oppressed peoples. For example, according to Welle-Strand (1996), European expatriates, organised by the British South African Company, invaded Zimbabwe and occupied Mashonaland in 1890. They renamed the place Salisbury, after the British Prime Minister of the time. The newly colonised country was called Rhodesia, after Cecil John Rhodes, the British colonial architect responsible for colonization and European settlements in Zimbabwe.

In response to worldwide demand for balanced historical and cultural studies, it is now time to interrogate old histories and replace them with history that is free from arrogance, prejudice and racism. In this regard, the history of the people of Northeast Africa (the Ethiopian Empire included), which has been constructed and reconstructed for centuries, is now subject to reexamination. For centuries Ethiopian history was presented from the perspective of imperial authorities (Hamesso, 1997), with unquestioned assumptions and supposed superiority of Christian Abyssinian culture over that of other communities. According to Ethiopian rulers, their chroniclers and European travelers, Ethiopia's civilization extends to 3000 years. For the colonized people, however, their association with Ethiopia is about 100 years old (Holcom & Ibsa, 1990) and it has nothing to do with civilization but domination. "Ethiopia" took away their identity and sovereignty and imposed "Ethiopianness" upon them. These differing interpretations of history are not the result

of simple mistakes, but are reflections of contradictory historical paths and ideological strategies. The Abyssinians chose to understand Ethiopian history through imperial lenses of the rulers that justified domination and set its ideological norms. In the next section, I will provide some analyses on this issue.

To decolonize knowledge and identity, therefore, we must critically examine how ideology reflects and distorts the social, and political reality, and its material and psychological bases, and the false consciousness that it represents. It is also essential to critically look into how colonial education is structured and the effect of educational curricula in molding the minds of colonized peoples. To understand the motives of such molding helps to facilitate the rejection of political oppression, and its codes of discipline, norms and regulations.

Abyssinian rulers appropriated external sources for their history, distorted the history of the dominated people, suppressed the development of their languages and cultural identities, and denied their rights. According to Abyssinian chroniclers, history began with the Queen of Sheba who bore a son to King Solomon of Israel in the tenth century B.C. Until recently, several Ethiopian and European scholars accepted this myth uncritically. This legendary story led to the rise of the Solomonic Dynasty which lasted until the end of the reign of the late Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. But other scholars argue that the Biblical Queen of Sheba was probably not even from the present day Ethiopia. Instead, she might have been from Saba, a thriving state across the Red Sea, and Yemen during the first millennium B.C. (Coughlan, 1966). Despite lack of historical certainty about her nationality, the myth of Queen of Sheba served as the foundation of Ethiopian Christian monarchy for many centuries.

There are several cases in human history where individuals claimed noble ancestry without any supporting evidence for their assertions. From a human rights perspective, it is important to examine the motives behind such claims, how they serve power relations, how they are used to silence other voices, and how they are finally internalized by the oppressed groups who are forced to compromise their rights and dignity. European

travelers and some of the missionaries who visited Africa in the nineteenth had deep prejudice towards Africans, and many believed that the Africans were physically and intellectually inferior. Their approach suggested that the lower socio-economic status of Africans was the will of "God," not the result of slavery and colonialism. Using such views they tried to construct an African identity that was morally inferior. The objective of their approach was to gain control of the people, and exploit their human and natural resources. The colonizers present themselves as having the right to govern the world because they are racially superior. They also claimed superior knowledge, morality, and most importantly, power.

The Africans, on the other hand, had never considered themselves as primitive, savage, or incompetent. But for the Europeans colonizers, their approach gave them the license to mistreat the African peoples. At the same time, the message to the Africans was that they did not deserve equal treatment. If enough African peoples were convinced of their own incompetence and that their own political, economic, and cultural systems were evil and backward, then they would reject their own heritages. And once the majority of Africans had rejected their own value systems and accepted the views of the colonizers, they could then be assimilated into the European civilization and be effectively controlled and manipulated. That was the ultimate objective of the colonial mission.

Similarly, the project of the Ethiopian rulers towards the conquered people of the south, including the Oromo, paralleled this European colonial approach towards Africans. Gemetchu Ruda (1993) argues that conversion of the Oromo people to Christianity and Islam mainly occurred through conquest. He further elaborates that "overcoming a people by force of arms and with superior military technology, the conquerors attempted to break the moral resistance of the conquered people." Dominant groups very often appropriate and re-appropriate the history, languages and identities of the subjugated people and theorize their subordination and exploitation. Smith (1999) describes this as disciplining the colonized. Whether or not Abyssinian elite believed in the literal truth of the narrative of Queen of Sheba and King Solomon mentioned above, it had greatly helped them to retain political power and had won them

the support of the Europeans. This myth facilitated the Abyssinian expansion during the time of the European scramble for Africa and helped King Menelik II to negotiate colonial borders with the Europeans.

### **Ethiopia and Ethiopianness**

In the previous section, I have discussed how the interpretation of history from the dominant group's perspective and the use of such history as basis of knowledge are used to legitimize the colonizer's agenda. Now I will examine the identity of Ethiopia or Ethiopianness as well as the ideology behind it. An ideology is a form of social or political philosophy in which practical elements are as prominent as theoretical ones. It is a system of ideas that aspires to explain the world and to present reasons for changing or not changing the situation. Paulo Freire, discussing the impact of ideology, said:

The dominant ideology lives inside us and also controls society outside. If this domination inside and outside was complete, definitive, we could never think of social transformation (Paulo Freire (1987)

Following Freire's line of thought, I argue that the legitimizing colonial knowledge and identity have social, political and ideological implications for those who were categorized as "others". The Euro-centric discourse is often presented as an identity "transmitter" and Africans as "receivers." This approach denies legitimacy to the identity of the people who were politically dominated.

In Ethiopia, the interaction between the Abyssinians and "others"—conquered peoples—was based on political domination and echoed racism that can be traced directly to the era of slave trade. Modern Ethiopia was not created naturally as political, cultural or economic entity (Holcom & Ibsa, 1990). Rather, it was formed by force as one of the colonial powers in the region, just as Russia expanded to swallow the lands of central Asia or people outside its historic borders (Said, 1994).

Historically, the boundaries of the Abyssinian Empire fluctuated depending on its political fortunes. But the modern boundaries were fixed only under King Menilek II (d. 1913) in various agreements with European powers. In all cases, the Abyssinians annexed free and independent nations as European colonizers did with the lands and peoples of Africa in the late nineteenth century. Most of the Oromo lands were incorporated into the Ethiopian empire between 1850 and 1900. After occupation, Menilek concluded boundary treaties with European colonial powers that created the modern political map of Ethiopia

Although Abyssinia became a colonizer, its economic conditions and organizational skills were no better than the people whom it occupied. But Abyssinians were able to dominate their neighbors because they had better access to European military weapons, technical skills and personnel. The diplomatic support of Western powers, such as Britain, France, Italy, and, later the USA was very important. These powers provided the Abyssinians with military weapons and advisors (Holcom and Ibsa, 1990). In fact, the European states were driven by their own self interest. Their colonial and neo-colonial ideology was designed to exploit the natural resources of the Africans. In the Ethiopian case, they did not control the land and exploit the resources of the region directly using their own armies, as they did with other Africans, but they relied on local agents to exploit the region

Colonialism is an ideology of domination rather than a simple act of accumulation of wealth and acquisition of territories. It is based on the notion that certain territories and people need to be dominated if their knowledge and worldviews are incompatible with dominant groups (Said, 1994). McClintock (1995) writes that the colonial map clearly embodied the contradictions of colonial discourse. Map making became the tool of colonial plunder, for knowledge and identity constituted by the map preceded and legitimized the conquest of territories. According to McClintock, a map is a technology of knowledge that professes to capture the truth about the place and the right of territorial control. Following McClintock's analogy, I will analyze how the term Ethiopia emerged in Greek vocabulary and was used, first to refer to black Africans, and particularly the

Kushites (Nubians), and then appropriated by the Abyssinians as an ideological tool to conquer others

The word *Ethiopia* came from the Greek word meaning "the land of burnt face people" The Greek word for 'burnt' was *Ethios* and the word for 'face' was *ops* (Catholic Encyclopedia). The Greeks reasoned that these people developed their dark skin because 'they' were closer to the sun than the fair skinned inhabitants of Europe. The actual residents of the land, however, did not call the land Ethiopia. What the ancient Greeks called Ethiopia was actually Nubia or Kush. As stated in the Old Testament, the great religious leader of the Jewish people, Moses, was married to a Kushite woman in Southern Egypt, or probably Nubia, also referred to as Ethiopia. Kush appears in the Bible in several places (Amos 9:7; Isaiah 43:3-45:14; Zephaniah 2:12; Jeremiah 46:9; Nahum 3:9; Psalms 68:32). But in non-Hebrew editions, Kush was replaced by Ethiopia. This evidence suggests that the names "Ethiopia" and "Kush" were interchangeable and referred to the same people in ancient times.

According to the Catholic Encyclopedia the territory comprising Ethiopia varied in the hands of different writers. However, in the early stages of Christianity and Biblical teaching, Ethiopia represented the lands inhabited by the sons of Kush and referred to all the regions inhabited by that family. Nubia (Kush) and ancient Ethiopia was virtually the same geographical location until the Abyssinian elite appropriated the Biblical name for themselves. When and how this appropriation took place is not clear. But it probably appeared between the eighth and the twelfth centuries when the Abyssinian Christians were cut-off from their co-religionists in North Africa and the Mediterranean region by the rising Islamic powers of the time. At that moment, they were probably inspired by a few positive references to Ethiopia in the Bible and came to imagine themselves as the people mentioned in the book. Then, they dropped the non-biblical name that did not help their survival and claim over the non-Christians in the region and christened themselves as Ethiopians.

Following Greek translation of the Bible, modern Europeans also called the Abyssinians as Ethiopians. According



to Greek travelers' imaginations, dark skin was not what the people were born with but what they became as the result of sun burn. Apparently, the modern assumptions of racism that associate dark skin with slavery and inferiority did not take root. Thus being Ethiopian or black did not have the negative connotation that developed in West during the era of the Atlantic slave trade. The Biblical references also influenced the Africans in the Diaspora to claim Ethiopianness. For example, enslaved Africans in North America sometimes identified themselves as Ethiopians. Marcus Garvey, founder of the United Negro Improvement Society (UNIA), who intended to unite all black people of African heritage, equated Ethiopia to Africa (Cashmore, 1984). Today, for the Rastafarian religious group, for example, Ethiopia and Africa mean the same thing.

Names, as part of culture, play a significant historical role in shaping the identity of a group. Names can also be appropriated to consolidate power and maintain domination of others. According to Martin Denis-Constant (2000) naming indicates the person's place in a system of social relations. Those who voluntarily adopt it may enjoy the benefits of wider networks and social acceptability that the new name provides, without losing the key elements of their culture. The adoption Ethiopia by the Abyssinians fits this pattern. For the Abyssinians, the use of a name associated with world religion—Christianity—provided a wider network, diplomatic and political support.

For those who were forced to accept a name, however, the change could be devastating because, in the process, they also lose their identity and their sense of history and belonging. For example, when slaves were stripped off their names and forced to take new names, it was intended to shatter their memories and remove them from their roots and heritages. According to Denis-Constant to name is to classify and, therefore, to assign a position. As such, individuals are situated in the order of the world and in the structure of the meaning in which the name-giver assigns. Therefore, for those who are stripped of their identity the battle for naming is the struggle for liberation.

Earlier in this paper, I mentioned that Abyssinians were influenced by Biblical teachings in their historical claims and in adopting Ethiopianness for themselves. The physical presence of the Greeks in Abyssinia may have also contributed to their

historical and identity claims. The name was widely used by ancient Greek historians. Herodotus, for example, described Ethiopians as "the tallest, most beautiful and long lived of the human races". Homer described them as "the most just men; the favorites of the gods." They were the objects of worship of all nations that appeared civilized at the dawn of history (Johnson, 1994). But what was the relationship between Greeks and ancient Abyssinians?

Early contact between the Greeks or Greek speaking communities of Eastern Mediterranean and the Abyssinia came through commerce and migration. In ancient times, they traded with communities in northeast Africa, including the Abyssinians. During the doctrinal controversies among early Christians, some persecuted Greek speaking missionaries settled in Axum. Later, during the expansion of Islam and the Ottoman Empire, Christian refugees from the Mediterranean region including Greeks came to Abyssinia. Thus, these contacts contributed to greater cultural influences (Muniro-Hay, 1999). The host accepted a new name voluntarily without losing its cultural heritage. But in the colonial context, the situation is different when a name is imposed to enforce power and domination.

### **The Burden of Colonial Knowledge and Identity**

Said (1994) argues that there was a kind of historical necessity by which colonial pressure created anti-colonial resistance. The struggle for decolonization is as complex as colonialism and it is necessary to problematize all colonial infrastructures and ideologies. The most important step for resisting ideological enslavement of colonialism is to interrogate knowledge and identities, and make it known that they are tools of servitude. Accordingly, I interrogate the Euro-Abyssinian knowledge and framed identities, using language and culture as archeological tools to unearth the hidden histories and buried civilization.

As with knowledge, language is a highly systematized and encoded system, which utilizes many devices to represent, express and signify messages. Regarding the Oromo, for example, Europeans and Abyssinians used the word "Galla" in a

derogatory manner to identify the culture and the people. Some sources have suggested that the word "Galla" came from the Arabic or Abyssinian language and they think that this identity was framed because of the Oromo people's refusal of a religious teaching. This means, outsiders framed "Galla" to designate "those who refused" or "refuted" religious conversion (Tefla, Bairu, 1987). One may also speculate that the word "Galla" may have come from the Greek language, as did Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the Greek language, "Galla" means milk; hence it is assumed that the word referred to the Oromo as a people who depended on drinking milk for their diet<sup>2</sup> For example, Herodotus, the Greek historian, believed that the ancient Nubians ate only milk and boiled meat. A Persian diplomat in Nubia also reported that the Nubians' main food was flesh and milk (Jenkins, 1995). The Greeks and the Romans had also recorded that the people whom they called as Ethiopians called themselves as Nubians. But the origin of the term Nubia is not clear. Arguably, the word Nubia may have come from two words *Nu* (our or for us) and *biyya* (country) If this was the case, when the Nubians said, "we are Nubians" they implied that it was their country and they were the citizens. The linguistic or historical association of the Oromo with ancient Nubians is not clearly established. So far only some tantalizing pieces of evidence and plausible explanations have been suggested<sup>3</sup> But future research and carefully examination of the similarities of the Nubian and Oromo languages may shed some light on assumption.

Another possible explanation for the origin of the word "Galla" is "Galaana" meaning the Sea or Lake. According to Oromo worldview the mother creator that they called "Ayyo Uume" or Abba Uuma created life including human beings in water. Blundell (1900) claims "the word Galla itself means 'emigrants' and their natural traditions bring them from a great sea toward the tenth century". The tradition that Blundell refers to as the Oromo worldview incorrectly concludes that the Oromo people migrated from a great sea. Possibly it was from such assumption that the identity known as "Galla" was formed. But this can be misrepresentation that many colonized peoples have experienced. Blundell himself witnessed that the people called themselves—"Ilmorma," Ilmaan or sons and daughters of Oromo

At any rate, the way we are represented and what identity bears in representing us transcends our social status. But identity is also related to power. As argued in this paper, for example, Europeans provided the Abyssinians with the political discourse and military hardware to colonize the Oromo and other peoples. For terribly uninformed Western agents, Abyssinians represented an intermediate position between the black people and themselves. For instance, an American Consul stationed in Aden, Arabia, wrote in his report to the Secretary of State, on Apr 23, 1919, that the "Abyssinians have a much higher form of intelligence than do the purely Negro people of Africa" (Starret, 1976).

For this reason, European colonialists endorsed and even facilitated the Abyssinian desire to be an empire builder in the Horn of Africa. Holcomb and Ibsa have elaborated on the theory of dependant colonialism as an exercise and experiment for neocolonialism (Holcom & Ibsa, 1990). Messay Kebede (2001) inadvertently acknowledges the rise of Abyssinia as an African colonial power, not as competitor, but as partner with the Europeans, European colonizers. He also indicates European expectations from Ethiopia which was very high. Messay quotes a French journal, *La Liberté*, which says "All European countries will be obliged to make a place for this new brother who steps forth ready to play in the dark ontinent the role of Japan in the Far East."

Abyssinian expansion brought political and social disaster to the conquered people. The wars of conquest intensified slave trade. Newman, for example, wrote:

The extent to which these areas have been depopulated is shown by the fact that prior to its conquest, the population of Kaffa was estimated at 1,500,000, but owing to the slave trade and removal of the population by [the] *gabar* system, it has been reduced to 20,000. In the same way, the slave trade in men, women and children has so reduced the population of Gimirra that it [has] dropped in five years from 100,000 to 20,000 inhabitants (Newman, 1936)

French missionary, Martial de Salviac estimated the Oromo population to about ten million before Abyssinian conquest. But by 1900 he reported that only half of them survived the wars of occupation (Kanno, 2005; Melba, 1991). Similarly, Abbas Haji Gnamo,<sup>4</sup> an Oromo scholar, reported indiscriminate killing of Oromos in the Arsi region by the soldiers of the Abyssinian King Minilik II. In the village known as 'Anolee', the forces of Menilek II had mutilated the hands of the Oromo men and the breasts of Oromo women indiscriminately. This event is known as "*Harkaa Muraa and Harmaa Muraa Anolee*." Several Europeans also recorded the involvement of Abyssinians in human trafficking like their European counterparts. According to Prouty and Rosenfeld (1981), between 1800 and 1850, Abyssinia supplied over 1,250,000 to the slave markets in the Middle East. Most of the people who were sold into slavery were those conquered by Abyssinians. On April 21, 1919, a US diplomat wrote:

Much of the present slave-raiding is said to occur among the Boran [Oromo] people in southern Abyssinia, in Kaffa province, and in the region of Lake Rudolph on both sides of frontier. The large and rich province of Kaffa is said to have been converted in a few years, from a land of industrious people producing great quantities of agricultural and pastoral products, into a land of wilderness with only a few people remaining, and these spending their time hidden in the jungle to escape the notice of raiding or marauding bands of so-called Abyssinian soldiers (Starret, 1976).

This document also reveals that human trafficking had caused several confrontations between the Abyssinians and the British colonial officers in British East Africa. In 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia, they claimed to have abolished slavery and reported that 125,000 slaves were freed and placed in the village of "Liberty."

One of the areas of conflict was the Moyale district on Ethio-Kenyan border. Another interesting episode occurred between the Abyssinian and the British forces in Sudan. In this

case, an Abyssinian army officer wrote a letter to the British border officer in Sudan,

May God show you justice The government is the protector of the poor and their properties The issue is that all the slaves of the Qabitia territory have run away towards Gedaref (in North Eastern Sudan). Accordingly, we, your poor men have become oppressed because it is difficult for us to continue living without slaves. ... I offer you my thanks ten times (Donaham, quoted in Bulcha, 2002).

There is no evidence about whether or not the Abyssinians got back these individuals. But the statement made by the Abyssinians that they are the poor men of the British and that they have become oppressed because it is difficult for them to live without slaves is revealing. Bulcha (2002) interprets the development that the slave trade in the Horn of African was a joint entrepreneurship between Christian Abyssinians and the Moslem merchants from the Islamic world. Elaborating further, Bulcha states that the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 brought northeast Africa nearer to Europeans who supplied the Abyssinian rulers with firearms and received payment from the revenue collected from the slave trade.

The modern legacy of this history of slavery is that Abyssinian individuals and their churches owned seventy five percent of the farmlands in Oromia until 1975 (Melba 1981; Lata, 2002). Consequently, the Oromo people were dispossessed of their land and became *gabbar* (serfs). As *gabbar*, in addition to taxation, they were obliged to give a quarter of their harvest to the rulers. In education, Amharic, the languages of the colonizing group became the medium of instruction. The court system, trade, and public health services were all conducted in the Amharic language. This has deprived the Oromos any chance of developing their own language, creating knowledge, maintaining their cultural heritage and achieving socio-economic transformation.

Currently, Abyssinians (Amharas and Tigrayans) constitute less than 30 percent of the population, but, politically, they occupy a dominant position. Over 65 percent of the populations of the empire are speakers of Cushitic languages and about 10 percent of them are Nilotic. Since the Oromo language is a member of the Cushitic language family, it shares common vocabularies and grammatical structures with other Cushitic languages. If the intention of the Ethiopian government's official language policy were to forge an inter-ethnic language *Afaan Oromo* as an official language could have served this purpose very well

Edward Said (1994), writing about culture and imperialism, stated that to the government bureaucrats who represented the British in India, the main thing was not whether something was good or evil, and therefore must be changed or kept, but whether it worked or not, whether it helped or hindered in ruling the alien entity. The colonizers exploited all available means to maintain the colonial power relation. Among the many tools they used to maintain their power was control of knowledge production and its legitimization. It was used to silence the voice of colonized peoples, for the indoctrination and mystification of identity. To emancipate themselves, as the theory of critical pedagogy suggests, colonized people we need to initiate self-consciousness by analyzing colonial power relations.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article # 1 states "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood" (UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights). But colonial education was contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The pedagogy of oppression that Paulo Freire (2002) referred as 'banking education,' was often used as a tool for molding students' mind and deny their identities. Instead of freedom, it perpetuates human rights violations against others. But Stuart (1997) argues that identity is a fluid concept and individuals and groups consciously or unconsciously internalize certain ideas and then identify themselves with it. Consequently, they distance themselves from their own cultural heritage and claim the identity of the dominant group

## Conclusions

This paper has raised five major points. First, it has argued that the historical claim of Abyssinian rulers to have genealogical ties to the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon was a mythical discourse aimed at consolidating power. Like Eurocentric colonial discourse, it promoted the assumption that some groups are superior to the others, and therefore, entitled to power. Second, for those who did not share the myth, this paper has interrogated Ethiopia and 'Ethiopianness' as an identity related to power. Although these terms are used to identify a modern nation and its citizens, in practice they meant different things to different groups of people who comprised the Ethiopian state. Third, this paper raised how Abyssinians created their identity and used it for the consolidation of power. Through this identity the Abyssinians attracted European colonial forces and, together with them, affected the socio-economic wellbeing of the people who rejected it. The paper discussed these historical concepts and identities, and how those who claimed such historical and other forms of colonial knowledge and identity were rewarded by the European colonial powers. As Messay Kebede reported, Europeans had great expectations from their Abyssinian brothers in Africa.

Fourth, colonial knowledge and identity indoctrinate the minds of individuals, and are then used as tools to perpetuate colonialism. The objective of colonial education is to penetrate the consciousness of the masses and, in so doing, render them powerless. As such, the maintenance of domination and subordinate relations is ensured. Through colonial education that attempts to destroy and destabilize kinship patterns, the family, communal structures and community bonds are weakened. The fragmentation of the family and the community made individual members vulnerable to colonial domination. Thus, colonial education victimized individuals and groups.

Finally, this paper agrees with Edward Said that colonialism is a complex system. It is more than the presence of the colonial army. Therefore, decolonization should include the elimination of colonial ideology as well as its administrative systems and



structures Colonial ideologies need to be destabilized and a critical understanding of the socio-economic status of the colonized people and their relationships with the colonizers need to be promoted.

## Notes

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1 Oromo elders blessing

<sup>2</sup> This is based on the author's speculation.

<sup>3</sup> For example, see Muhammad S Megalommmatis, "The Kushitic/Meroitic Origins of the Oromo People," paper present at the Oromo Studies Association Conference, Howard University, Washington, D.C., 2005.

<sup>4</sup> Electronic communication with A. H. Gnamo.

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# Historical and Political Origins of Conflict in the Gambella Region

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## Introduction

The successive centralized, unitary and authoritarian Ethiopian government structures did not address the fundamental aspirations of the suppressed peoples. The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which seized power in 1991, promised to democratize Ethiopia's multi-national society through a system of ethnic federalism. The constitution it sponsored in 1994 enshrines the unconditional rights of self-determination, including secession, for all nations, nationalities and peoples.

Despite this new federal system, conflicts among national groups continue to exacerbate. One of those experiencing continued crisis is the Gambella regional state, in the southwest, along the Sudan border. The conflict among the ethnic groups in Gambella was triggered and accentuated by internal and external factors. This paper analyzes the causes of violence in Gambella regional state. Focusing on structural, historical and political factors, it examines the struggle for resources and the role of the historical and the contemporary politics for the eruption of conflict in the region. The paper also shows how the policies of the Ethiopian government impacted local politics and complicate the clashes between the ethnic groups. Finally, the paper will address the regional dimensions of the internal conflicts and their impact on the relations with the neighboring state of Sudan.

The modern multi-cultural Ethiopia was created by wars of expansion and conquest that suppressed and marginalized the political, economic and social traditions of the subject groups. The conquest has created a fertile ground for ethnic contradictions, national liberation movements, and deep-rooted

intra-state conflicts. With the defeat of the *Derg*, the military regime that ruled the country from 1974 to 1991, there has been an attempt to manage the ethnic conflicts through political “decentralization” and ethnic federalism. However, despite the establishment of a federal constitution, the creation of ethnic based federal administration and the promise of the rights to self-determination for oppressed groups, nationalities and peoples, there are still heightened yearnings for greater autonomy or even for independence by various ethnic groups. This means the policies of democratization did not translate into mutual respect, unity, peace, social justice and economic development. Thus, ethnic conflicts are exacerbating rather than declining in many parts of the country. The competition among ethnic groups and their confrontation with federal government have polarized the country’s body politic (Merera, 2003:4). The conflict among the ethnic groups in the regional state of Gambella is a case in point.

Before the Ethiopian conquest in the late nineteenth century, the Gambella region was inhabited by the Anyuak, and the Nuer people. Since the early twentieth century and, particularly after the government sponsored resettlement program of the 1980s, many Ethiopian highlanders have also settled in the region. Lately, the Anyuak and the Nuer populations have also swelled by the migration of refugees fleeing from the protracted conflict in the Southern Sudan. The population migrations across international boundaries, the fluidity of the migrants’ life-style, and their double citizenship have contributed to regional instability. These ethnic groups intensively compete for resources. Moreover, the policies of the Ethiopian regime and the involvement of the neighboring state and non-governmental organizations have also fuelled the conflict and turned it into a regional problem that extends outside the boundaries of the Gambella State.

In recent years, conflicts among the ethnic groups and clashes with government forces have resulted in tragic consequences. The skirmishes have internal and external causes and long term repercussions. Notwithstanding various constraints on the sources due to the informants’ bias in a politicized situation, the paper attempts to provide an objective

and realistic assessment of the political conditions in the Gambella region.

### **Conflict: Theoretical Considerations**

The occurrence of conflict is quite common in human history, but its definition, classification and sources are not universally accepted by scholars. Some authors argue that violence is part of the aggressive behavior of human beings and can be attributed to biological factors (Galtung, 1996; 30; Jeong, 2000: 65). Galtung (1990) argues that conflict is naturally inherent to all living beings. Opponents of the genetic theory, however, believe that social experience plays a dominant role in the outbreak of conflict. They underline that human behavior is socially learned, and war is largely unknown in some pre-modern societies (Horowitz, 1985: 66). They believe that the perspective that traces the source of violence to the biological instinct of human beings ignores the social and organizational problems of the society. Moreover, they argue that the adversarial relationships among classes, nations, and states do not arise simply from an individual's psychological environment.

Defining conflict, Weeks (1998:3) believes that conflict is the result of mutually exclusive impulses, desires, tendencies, controversies, or disagreements in human interaction. The exclusive interests lead to a prolonged battle or collision and opposition between groups. Gove, however, defines conflict as "an act of striking together." It occurs because of competition and mutual interference between opposing or incompatible forces (Gove, 1976:477). Conflict is used "to resolve divergent dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity" (George Simmei, quoted in Mesfin, 1999:116). This definition is, however, a bit narrow to cover the level, magnitude, time and scope of conflict from the perspective of the involved parties. Besides, it limits the goal of conflicts to achieving unity. From the above summary, it can be concluded that there is no universally accepted definition of conflict.

Rationalizing the source of conflict, Regumamu (2001: 13) argued that conflict is triggered by structural factors such as political, economic and social conditions. State repression, lack of fair and equitable access to political power, poor governance,



unequal distribution of wealth, cultural identity and history of groups who share resources can contribute to conflict. Oppression constitutes structural violence (Wenden, 1995:3; Galtung, 1990: 21) The destruction of cultural identities, inequitable share of resources, unequal access to political power and cultural marginalization of certain groups are some of the major structural conditions for the emergence of social conflict (Jeong, 2000:33). Hence, the lack of legitimate structures and policies along with increasing inequality of opportunities could be a primary source of conflicts.

Fear of re-stratification and the loss of political dominance, an assertion of group worth and place, the existence of negative memories or images, determination to resist the dominant group's effort to spread its language, culture or religious and a sense of superiority over a minority group are some of the sources of conflict. Intractable conflicts involve intense demands for power, status, territory and the protection of cultural and physical identities of groups (Gurr, 1991:201). In most cases, the key actors of internal conflicts are agents of governments and rebel groups. Particularly when state structures are weak, various groups could fight among themselves to secure their interests (Zartman, 1989:82)

There is a growing academic consensus that elite competition for state power and resources is central to the rise and prevalence of ethnic conflicts across societies (Nnoli 1995 b; Markakis, 1999; Lemarchand, 1993; Merera, 2003:28). Without belittling the potency of ethnicity as a source of conflict, many scholars believe that the existence of many ethnic groups does not necessarily lead to ethnic conflict (Ryan, 1990; Merera, 2003: 28; Jeong, 2000:17). But the desire to defend or destroy group identity can indeed lead to deadly violence. However, scholars are also divided on theoretical explanation of identity. In this regard, there are at least two distinctly contending thoughts—constructionist and primordialist. Constructionists regard identity as manufactured rather than given (Jenkins, 1997:11). They do not consider ethnic identity as fixed; rather it is produced and reproduced by the social processes (Anderson, 1993, Sharp, 1983:80, Atkinson, 1999: 32).

### **Ethnic Conflict**

Several thinkers have attempted to explain ethnic conflicts based on the above theories—constructivist or primordialist. According to Geverk Ter-Gabrielian (2004:1) for instance, ethnic conflict is defined as a conflict which takes place between two or more ethnic groups, one of which possesses the actual state power. He assumes that ethnic conflict is essentially a struggle for power. Primordialist' paradigm gives more attention to the group bonds which is based on subjective and objective factors such as original ties, shared history, collective name, language, common family ties and blood bondages, common behavior patterns, common people-hood and kinship. The Instrumentalist or constructionist approach, on the other hand, argues that ethnicity is a creation of socio-historical, political, and ideological factors that is constructed by human imagination, mostly by elites to attain political power. But both approaches ignore the other side's views and tend to be less comprehensive.

### **Geophysical Features and Historical Background of Gambella**

Gambella is one of nine regional states of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, established in 1991. The region is located around the confluence of the Baro and Akobo River valleys in western Ethiopia bordering the republic of Sudan. It shares borders with Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNPR), Oromia and the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional States (Merewa, 1997/98: 22; Dereje, 2004: 5; Kurimoto, 1994: 798; The Revised Constitution of Gambella, 2002: 2) Gambella is located in an area that separates the western Ethiopian highland plateau from the lowlands by precipitous escarpments. In the early twentieth century, the strategic significance of Gambella was based on its geo-political and economic opportunities. Then, the region was considered crucial for the revenue that it generated from the Ethio-Sudanese trade (Shumet, 1985: 217; Bahru, 1982: 167). The region's access to rich coffee producing provinces of Illu Abbaa Boor, Wallagaa and Kafa also increased its importance. It was

also endowed with the Baro River system, the only navigable tributary of the White Nile (*Ibid*).

According to the 1994 census, the total population of Gambella was 228,000 with population growth rate of 4.1 per annum (Dereje, 2004: 4; Mehret, 2001: 128) The Region consists of two zones (Itang and Abobo) encompassing nine districts (weredas). Itang Zone includes: Akobo, Gambella, Itang and Jikawo districts. Abobo Zone consists of Abobo, Dimma, Godare, and Gog and Jor districts.




Figure 1: Gambella Peoples National Regional State

The total landmass of the Region is estimated to 34,580 square km. with the topographical feature varying in the elevation from 300 to 2300 meters above sea level. The temperature varies between 21.1 °C in January and 35.9 °C in April and May. The annual rainfall is about 615.9 mm per year (Merewa, 1997/8: 22)

The region is endowed with varieties of natural resources, diverse climatic conditions, fairly adequate annual rainfall, fertile soil, savannah grasslands, hot springs, waterfalls, and major

seasonal and perennial rivers. A variety of wild species also live in the area. The government is striving to save the precious wild lives and birds of the region by protecting and securing them in Gambella National Park. Moreover, the region has a promising potential for oil reserves, which, if discovered, could have a fundamental impact on the development of the region's economy. The main economic life in the region is based on agriculture, herding, hunting, fishing, forestry, logging, mining and quarrying for local consumption and exchange (CSA, 1994: 324). Pastoralism and agriculture are the leading preoccupations of the people. Cultivation of sorghum, bean, sesame, mango, banana, and other fruits and vegetables are also produced for livelihood (Stauder, 1996: 104; Fanta, 1998: 26).

Gambella is a home of five indigenous ethnic groups who speak language of Nilo-Saharan extraction: Nuer (40 percent), the Anyuak (27 percent), Majangier/Mezhenger (6 percent), Komo and the Opo/Opuo (3 percent). Besides, there are considerable number of people from other parts of the country inhabiting the region, notably Oromos, Amharas, Tigrayans, and other ethnic groups from the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) Regional State. These are commonly known as 'the highlanders' in the region (the Revised Constitution of Gambella, 2002; Gatwech, 2002: 23; Dereje, 2004:4).

The Anyuak are largely dependant on subsistent agriculture along the riverbanks, fishing, and hunting. Their settlements are located along the valleys of the major rivers such as Baro, Gillo, Akobo, and Aluro. They are riverine people. Therefore, they fiercely compete for control of the land of the riverbeds. Their settlements are based on group solidarity of tightly organized kinships and villages. The Anyuak are among the victims of the demarcation of the international boundary which separates them between the Upper Nile in the Sudan and the Gambella region of Ethiopia (Kurimoto, 1996:29-32; Shumet, 1985: 221; Dereje, 2004: 4). The majority of the Anyuak, however, live in Ethiopia in eight of the nine districts (*weredas*) of Gambella Region. They constitute the majority in the five districts—Abobo, Gambella, Gog-Jot, Itang, Jikawo and Akobo; and occupy seventy percent of the total landmass of the Region (Dereje, 2004: 4).

The Nuer practice transhumant pastoralism, but now they are steadily shifting into agro-pastoralism. They depend on their herds, for which they lead a nomadic life in search of water and grazing lands. They rely on cattle to pay dowry for marriage, make transactions and acquire social status (Shumet, 1985: 218; Dereje, *Ibid*). The Nuer are also victims of international boundary agreements between Ethiopia and Sudan. The majority of them live in two districts—Akobo and Jikawo—which cover 24 percent of the land size of Gambella region. A few also live in parts of Itang district and Gambella town (*Ibid*).

The Majangier are predominantly settled in Godare district and pockets of Abobo and Jor. They combine hunting and gathering economy with shifting cultivation based on a slash and burn and harvesting of wild honey for their livelihood. The Opuo and Komo are sedentary agriculturalists. They also engage in fishing and hunting. Opuo and Komo live in north and northeastern part of Gambella along the Ethio-Sudan border. Most of the Komo are settled in the Sudan and in Oromia Regional State (West Wollagaa), while a few live in Gambella district and town. The Opuo are found in Itang district.

The 'highlanders' live in the Gambella district as traders, civil servants and farmers since the early twentieth century. Some highlanders also came to Gambella as part of the settlement project of famine victims in the 1980s (Young, 1999: 26; Dereje, 2004: 4; Stauder, 1971).

According to oral traditions of the indigenous ethnic groups, the Majangier are said to be the earliest inhabitants of Gambella. They probably settled there before or in the seventeenth century. Since the seventeenth century, constant waves of peoples have migrated into the region from the southern part of today's Sudan (Tewodros, 2004: 4). The Anyuak are said to have established themselves in the lowlands by pushing the Majangier into the forest zone. The Nuer, Opuo and Komo are said to have come shortly before the advent of the Ethiopian Empire in the late nineteenth century from their original homeland called Chintang in the Southern Sudan. At the end of the nineteenth century, when most of the Anyuak had settled in the region, only two sections of the Nuer (Gajjak and Gajjok) settled in Jikawo and Akobo (*Ibid*).


The history of Gambella can be divided into six periods: pre-conquest (pre-1896); post-conquest (1897-1935); the Italian period (1936-1941); the imperial period (1941-1974); the *Derg* period (1974-1991), and the post-*Derg* period. Different writers argue that the Nilotic peoples had moved into the Gambella region due to diverse natural and human factors such as drought, famine, search for resources, and conflicts. The movements caused sustainable positive and negative contacts such as assimilations, mergers, integration, incorporations, coexistence, and cooperation among the different ethnic groups.

Inter-group social and economic transactions like trade and marital ties developed starting from the 1850s onwards. Then, came traders from distant places in the Sudan and the surrounding Oromo regions of Wallagaa and Illu Abbaa Boor to exchange iron, copper and cotton for ivory and gold dust (Bahru, 1982:227; Tewodros, 2004:7). Through the process of cultural and commercial transactions, they established peaceful relations with the Oromo in Qellem, Anfillo, Gidami, Sayo, and Bure and Goro highlands. Attracted to the potential natural resources like gold and ivory, the imperial Ethiopian government established the Goro and Sayo advance posts in 1883 and 1886, respectively, and subsequently conquered the Gambella region (Bahru, 1999: 15).

During the British colonial period, the Nuer and Anyuak territories in the Sudan were largely administered by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial officers. Earlier, the region was nominally under the Turko-Egyptian Empire, and then, became part of the Mahadist state (1884-98) (Bahru, 1982: 227; Young, 1999:20). Following the Ethiopian victory against the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, however, Emperor Menelik extended his authority over the lowlands of the Anyuak and the Nuer in the late 1890s. The emperor's decision to annex the Nilotes threatened the British colonial ambition in the Sudan, and its desire to control the Baro River that contributes significant amount of water to the White Nile. The river was pertinent for the agricultural scheme of the British in the Sudan and facilitated the transportation of coffee, gold, and ivory, other basic commodities from western Ethiopia to the British colony (Bahru, 1999: 15; Tewodros, 2004: 10).

Figure 2: Settlement Pattern of Ethnic Groups in the Gambella Region

E. KURIMOTO



Fearful of the emperor's plans, the British sent a reconnaissance team to the Baro Basin. The team was sent for three purposes: first, to assess the length and the navigability of the Baro River for trade with western Ethiopia; second, to analyze the position of Emperor Menelik's army in the region; and third, to observe the actual occupation of the land and the settlement pattern of the indigenous peoples and their relations with the surrounding people (*Ibid*).

After analyzing the report, the British proposed a joint Ethio-British conference to settle the boundary between the Anglo-Sudan and Ethiopia and acquire access to Gambella. Accordingly, the first conference took place in early April 1898. Then, after four years of diplomatic efforts, a boundary treaty was signed in May 1902. However, despite the fact that the boundary delimitation agreement was made after thorough negotiations and actual reconnaissance, it cut several ethnic groups and bisected them into two sovereign administrations—Ethiopia and Sudan. The agreement obviously ignored the ecological and traditional needs of the people on the ground. Realizing these social and economic problems, the signatories made another agreement which provided opportunities for pastoral people, specially the Nuer, to cross the border into Ethiopia during the rainy season (Bahru, 1982: 96; Stauder, 1970:108; Johnson, 1986: 241; Tewodros, 2004:12). Nonetheless, the pastoral people, who were granted the right of mobility across the border, were exposed to double taxation by the two powers. Thus, this treaty and other agreements neither resolved the problem of the people nor satisfied the desire of the British government to place the Anyuak and the Baro salient under their administration of the Sudan (Tewodros, 2004: 12).

Then, the British started another round of diplomatic effort to put the desired area under the Sudanese administration. Accordingly, they proposed to Menelik to either sell, lease, or cede the Baro Basin in return for compensation elsewhere along the border, possibly Zeila. The effort failed, although, Menelik eventually accepted the British request for the appointment of a British officer for the administration of the Gambella region on his behalf (Bahru, 1982: 112) and the lease of a piece of land at Itang, along the Baro River. The lease was later transferred to Gambella (Bahru, Tewodros, 2004: 12). Thus, the Gambella



enclave was established to facilitate British commercial link to western Ethiopia and serve as means of drawing the region into the economic orbit of British ruled Sudan. The enclave finally covered about 70 percent of Ethiopia's trade to the Sudan (Dereje, 2004; Bahru, 1982: 33)

On his part, conscious of British desires, Menelik attempted to attract local nobles to his side by offering feudal titles and providing them with a few firearms. Udiel, the chief of the Anyuak was, for example, given title of *balambaras*, and Akwai, Nuer chief, was given the title of '*fitawrari*' by *Dajazmach* (later *Ras*) Tesema, the governor of Gore. By doing so, Menelik established a sort of indirect rule over the Gambella region.

The trade, agriculture and mineral resources of Gambella attracted not only the European colonial power in the Sudan but expatriate concession hunter, mainly Syrians, Greeks and Armenians (Tewodros, 2004:15). Besides, governors such *Ras* Tesema of Gore and *Dejazmach* Jote Tulu of Sayo disputed the jurisdiction over Gambella region (Bahru, 1982: 134). But both were opposed by the fierce Anyuak warriors who, supported by the small arms they had acquired and by the terrain, challenged the external powers. The Anyuak frequently attacked the British and the Egyptians forces patrolling the border near Adogo. They even ambushed a gunboat which was sent in 1913 to protect the Gambella trade. The Nuer also confronted the superior technology of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan until the 1920s when they were finally defeated (*Ibid*: 112).

Another serious problem that affected the Gambella region in the early twentieth century was the slave raiding which was encouraged by poachers and Menelik's soldiers. The decline of the elephant herds forced the Nilotes and their neighbors to raid each other for subsistence and to acquire the commodity needed for the purchase of small arms (Johnson: 79; Dereje, 2004: 27-32). In the 1920s, the Ethiopian government issued a series of edicts that banned the slave trade and established bureaus for anti slavery courts to liberate slaves (Dereje: *Ibid*). In the 1930s, the Ethiopian government somehow succeeded to control the slave raids that caused serious dislocations and instability in the area.

After the Italian occupation of Gambella, in June 1936, there was clash of interests between the Italians and the British

in the region. The presence of the British consul at Gore, with a mandate to control the Gambella trade, irritated the Italians. Both European colonial powers were striving to possess Gambella by excluding one another. Political and diplomatic efforts were made by the British to keep Gambella and the Baro basin within the British sphere of influence. Thus, the British administration in of Sudan planned for the second diplomatic mission to take the Gambella region during the Italian occupation (Tewodros, 2004). Accordingly, the Anglo-Egyptian government offered a proposal to the Italians to amend the 1902 treaty. At a meeting on March 25, 1939, the British offered a memorandum in which they demanded the ceding of 11,000 square miles of territory in the west in exchange for 6,000 square miles from the Sudan to the south of Baro salient. According to the proposal, the British hoped to put the fertile western lowlands below the escarpment, encompassing the whole of the Baro River basin, under the Sudan government (Sabacchi: 303).

The Italians, aware of the British desire and themselves interested in exploiting the natural and commercial resources of the Baro basin, rejected the British proposal. Instead, to strengthen their position, they started the construction of the Gambella-Gore road, irrigation canals, tanning and cotton processing factories. They also hopes their interactions with the Nilotic groups to facilitate the integration of the border communities to the Ethiopia Empire (Tewodros, 2004).

Politically, unlike the policy of the Ethiopia government that favored an alliance with the Anyuak, the Italians pursued stronger relations with the Nuer people. However, their divide and rule policy caused great blood-shed between the two competing groups. Eventually, the Italian policy failed because the Nilotic groups cooperated with each other and turned against the Italians. At last, when the British troops arrived with soldiers from Kenya, the Italian forces were defeated and forced to surrender in 1941 (Pritchard, 1940: 73).

Immediately after the end of the Italian occupation, the region was left in a state of chaos. The firearms left behind by the Italians accelerated the disorder. To pacify the region and restore peace, the government of Emperor Haile Selassie was obliged to launch a campaign in Gambella. The reconstituted national army was given a special assignment to implement this

project. From 1941 to 1945, the Gambella administration was placed under military governors who enforced law, secured peace and collected taxes (Tewodros, 2004: 38). In 1942, Gambella became part of the Illu Abbaa Boor *awraja* (province). But when Illu Abba Bor became regional governorate, Gambella was granted an '*awraja*' status with *six weredas* (districts): Abobo, Itang, Akobo, Jikawo and Gog-Jor (Daniel, 1994: 93-99). In 1959, the *weredas* were restructured to balance their size for administrative management. In 1960, civil governors were appointed and chiefs—*qoros* and *balabats*—received titles and awards from the emperor. The administrative reforms opened new positions for civil servants from the highlands who, upon their arrival, pushed the local chiefs to lower echelons of the administration. Hence, the government failed to win the loyalty of the local rulers. As with the previous policies, the new plan alienated the local chiefs. But the police and the governors were unable to effectively control the population movement across the border without the participation of local elite. The domestic, intra-clan and inter-ethnic conflict also caused instability, tensions, looting, raiding, and population pressures.

Further, corruption and maladministration spread, while an exodus of refugees flocked into Gambella due to the civil war in the Sudan from 1955 to 1972. These refugees came mainly from Dinka, Nuer, Anyuak, Shilluk and Murle ethnic groups (Tewodros, 2004: 82). By the early 1960s, for instance, there were between 20,000 to 30,000 refugees settled at Udier and Adura in Jikawo, Itang, Tedo, Gillo in Gog-Jor, and near Gambella town. Gradually, with constant waves of forced migrants, the number of refugees exceeded the native population. The refugee situation intensified political pressure and aggravated the scarcity of resources. The tension between natives and refugees also exacerbated the conflict between the Anyuak-Nuer (*Ibid*). The influx of Southern Sudanese refugees had repercussions in the Ethio-Sudan diplomacy. The Nuer refugees were suspected of advocating greater autonomy over the territory south of Bure or separation from Ethiopia (*ibid*). Border areas of Gog-Jor, Akobo, and Jikawo were frequently disturbed and influenced the events in neighboring areas.

In the 1960s, the police stationed at several posts in the region were attacked, robbed and killed. In July 1959, a police

station in Itang was robbed and five policemen were killed. Between Jikawo and Gambella seven soldiers were ambushed and killed. Likewise, thirteen policemen were killed at Duyar, Jikawo, on February 24, 1966 (Report AGRC: 332). The retaliatory actions by the police had also contributed to the tension. It was in such political situation in Gambella that the Ethiopian revolution erupted in 1974 (Tewodros, 2004).

At the beginning of the revolution, basic the demands of the people of Gambella included self-administration, or at least a significant participation in the political life of the region, end of discrimination and ethnic oppression. But instead of properly addressing these demands, the military government replaced traditional leaders by some educated Anyuak and Nuer in six *weredas* in the late 1970s. The *Derg* also appointed two deputy *awraja* administrators from the Anyuak and Nuer communities. At lower administrative levels, the *kebeles* were organized and led by the local communities. In 1981, there were 118 peasant associations with 7,779 members, 91 youth, and 120 women's associations with 5,400 and 3,944 members respectively. Five farmers' cooperatives with 3,649 members were also organized. The natives were enabled to participate in various military, police, and civil service, including service outside their locality (*Ibid*: 96).

In the mean time, Gambella was selected for some agricultural development projects due to the region's natural endowments and strategic importance. One of the big projects, the Alwero Dam was completed in 1985. The dam has a capacity to irrigate over 10,000 hectares of land (*Ibid*: 102). At the same time, about 2000 farmers were settled in villages around Gambella and Abobo. Between December 1984 and February 1985, another settlement project was launched, and about 44,664 households from the highland were settled in selected sites in Abobo, Itang, Gambella and Gok-Jor, with separate and integrated villages with the Anyuak. With these settlements, social services such as schools, clinics and roads were built. Other projects include: the Baro Bridge and the Gore-Gambella highway. Feeder roads from Gambella to Gog, Akobo, Jikawo were maintained or built. A teachers' training institute was established in 1989. But while increasing the Anyuak and Nuer participation in political activities of the region, the projects and

the restructuring also helped the government to extend its influence into all aspects of the society and increase its political control.

For this reason the efforts failed because many Anyuak were hostile to the settlement project that the government sponsored. They assumed that the government's intention was to dispossess them by giving their land over to 'highlanders'. They believed that the settlements and the development projects in entire Baro basin were motivated by politics rather than the interest of the native people (Tewodros: 105). Secondly, the government policy ignored the traditional leaders because of ideological reasons. The elders were opposed to the government's plans. In the 1980s, the local people attacked police stations, burned down schools and killed some teachers from the highland. The youth were encouraged to migrate to the Sudan. For security reasons, farmers' associations were dispersed, and some *kebeles* fell under the virtual control of the rebel chiefs (Tewodros, 2004: 97; Alemneh: 176).

The government attempted to reestablish security by training militias, authorizing them to conduct surveillance, conducting campaigns and passing and executing severe penalties. Nevertheless, forced integration and consolidation of national unity through merger of diverse cultural groups again failed. Tensions, hostilities and confrontations among the ethnic groups, between refugees and the natives, and the highlanders and lowlanders continued. Group violence spread actually expanded and involved external political forces.

The reemergence of war in Southern Sudan, after 1983, further complicated the situation in Gambella. The influx of refugees and the settlement of the Nuer on core Anyuak territories was perceived by the latter as the continuation of the traditional Nuer expansion. The Nuer refugees were regarded as combatants of the Southern Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) which was supported by the Ethiopian government at the time (Kurimoto, 1994: 803). Following the establishment of the SPLA military base in Gambella in the 1980s, the Sudan army occasionally conducted mopping-up operations and hot-pursuits, up to fifty kilometers into the Ethiopian territory. Such operations encouraged looting and victimization of the population of Gambella. The people on the border were

susceptible to raids by the SPLA, the Sudanese and the Ethiopian soldiers. Although the *Derg* supported the SPLA, some of its members unofficially agitated against the *Derg*, and against the integration of the Nilotes into Ethiopia. They argued that Gambella ought to be part of the Southern Sudan and should be liberated from the Ethiopian rule (Tewodros, 2004: 123)

Thus, the SPLA recruited, trained, and armed Anyuak and Nuer youth and encouraged the ex-chiefs to support the SPLA campaign. To combat the SPLA, the Nuer, and the highlanders, the Gambella People Liberation Movement (GPLM) was established by the Anyuak in 1987 (Kurimoto, 1992: 222, 230). Offended by the action of the Anyuak elite who organized the anti-government political party, the *Derg* appointed loyal Nuer officials to senior government posts and removed the Anyuak officials from their positions. But the Anyuak movement gradually allied with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) in the Sudan and infiltrated into Gambella and launched surprise attack on government sponsored settlements (*Ibid*). In 1989, the GPLM allied with the EPRDF and participated in anti-government offensive in western Ethiopia. These alignments shaped the post 1991 political situation in Gambella (Dereje, 2004: 13).

Obviously, the policies of the *Derg* failed to bring the needed peace, security and prosperity to the people of Gambella. Instead, each group became more hostile towards the other. Historical experiences between the ethnic groups and government actions contributed suspicion, hatreds, violence, and instability. So far, the involvement of external non-governmental and governmental organizations did not help to reverse this trend. The influx of refugees from Southern Sudan and the migration of highland settlers further complicated the conflict.

### **Post 1991 Conflicts in Gambella**

The political changes in 1991 were first welcomed by the people in Gambella because the EPRDF initially promised to balance unity and diversity, through regional autonomy, accommodation and respect for the nationalist aspirations of the people. It also

promised to promote equality among majority and minority groups, and avert disintegration, and transform the century-old conflicts into mutual trust. The 1994 Constitution allowed the right to self-determination including the establishment of self government if necessary. It also established procedures for redrawing of internal boundaries, and constitutionally divided power between the federal government and the various regional states. The constitution declared the establishment of the federal state structure—federal government, nine regional member states, and the capital city. The basis for the delimitation of state boundaries was settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned (Articles 47, 49(1), 6 of FDRE Constitution). The constitution acknowledges juridical sovereignty of nations, nationalities or peoples.

The establishment of the Ethiopian Federation promised drastic changes in the political practice of the Ethiopian state. But the implementation of the rights declared by the constitution is yet to be accomplished. The Gambella region still continues to face ethnic conflicts. As suggested above, although conflict was prevalent in Gambella before 1991, during the post 1991 period, it exceeded the traditional local framework and became more deadly. The killing of numerous Nuer leaders by the Anyuak in 1991, the massacre of the highland farmers by the Anyuak, the mob-violence of the highlanders against the local people in 1992, the successive confrontations between the Nuer and the Anyuak from 1992 to 2002, and the massacre of the Anyuak in December 2003 are clear signs of the escalation of the tension since the EPRDF took power. Next, I will summarize the clusters of factors that contributed to conflicts in Gambella.

### **Political Factors**

For decades, ethnic groups in Gambella were subjected to divide and rule policies of political powers and participated in alignments to survive shifts in political circumstances. For instance, to gain loyalty, Emperor Menelik first extended friendship to some Anyuak chiefs, whom he believed would enable him to penetrate into the Nilotic society. While ruling the Sudan, the British also strived to place the Anyuak and the Baro basin under their direct or indirect control by offering alliance to

the Anyuak. Likewise, during their occupation of Ethiopia, the Italians allied with the Nuer to help them penetrate into the Nuer territory and ultimately navigate the Baro. After the Italian occupation, Emperor Haile Sellasie revived Menelik's strong alliance with the local Anyuak chiefs. Once again, during the *Derg* regime, the pattern of alliance formation shifted from the Anyuak to the Nuer with even stronger support to the highland settlers.

With each shift in alignment there was also a change in access to resources and small arms that privileged and empowered one ethnic group over the others. In 1991, the Gambella People's Liberation Movement (GPLM), which was dominated by the Anyuak, took control of the regional government, while the Nuer and the highland settlers were associated with the defunct regime. That means, when the dissident Anyuak group returned home with EPRDF in 1991 and took control of the regional administration, the Nuer officials who were loyal to the *Derg* fled to the Sudan (Kurimoto, 1994: 909).

Based on historical trends, the Nuer perceived the new EPRDF government as an Anyuak domination. The involvement of the Ethiopian government in the regional politics in favor of one group against the other perpetuated a discriminatory and exclusionist administrative practice. The policy lacked equity, fair and proportionate access to political power (Dereje, 2004: 13). A policy of political alliance was recklessly employed by the Ethiopian government and its partners at the regional level. But the policy did not pass unchallenged.

The political honeymoon of the Anyuak and the EPRDF was disrupted when the Nuer, who fled to the Sudan, started returning home. Clashes between the Anyuak (GPLM), the Nuer, the SPLA, EPRDF and the settlers were resumed (Kurimoto, 2002: 230). The challenge to the local power of the Anyuak and the EPRDF then intensified when the Nuer created their own political organization. In fact, the beginning of the Gambella People's Democratic Unity Party (GPDUP) was formed as early as 1992 (Kurimoto, 1994: 810). But the two parties began to operate under an atmosphere of mutual mistrust, tension, and conflict, and viewed each other as enemies.



The Federal Government tried to intervene by urging the two major parties to merge and form an umbrella party under the name of Gambella People Democratic Front (GPDF). Soon after an agreement was reached in 1998, however, the GPDUP complained that, despite the formation of a new umbrella party, the distribution of power and resources was still executed through the GPLM. Thus, even within the GPDF, the GPLM and the GPDUP continued to function as separate and independent parties. In 1999, GPLM members who felt isolated from the power structure established an opposition party called Gambella People's Democratic Congress (GPDC). This latest party was created because the GPDUP was unable to solve the major problems of the region (Dereje, 2004: 18)

At this moment, the EPRDF took side with the GPDF to suppress the GPDC. However, the GPDF was soon fractured into rival units and ultimately dissolved in 2003 in the wake of the deadly conflict between the Anyuak and the Nuer. It was replaced by a new coalition called the GPDM (Gambella People's Democratic Movement), consisting of the new ethnically delineated parties representing APDP (Anyuak People Democratic Party), NPDP (Nuer People Democratic Party) (Ibid).

Often times, the political exclusions were tactless and openly provocative. For example, as noted by Chan (2004:30), the 1992 election was conducted only in three Anyuak *weredas*—Gambella, Gok-Jor and Abobo—excluding Itang, Akobo, Jikawo *weredas* where the Nuer are dominant. The power sharing which resulted from the election shows seven Anyuak, three Majangier, one Komo, and one Amhara, in a twelve person regional executive council. Furthermore, in the nineteen person cabinet the Anyuak took fourteen seats. But in an effort to cool down the tension, six Nuer were co-opted to the regional executive council in 1993.

During the 1995 general election, the top posts—the president, vice president, and vice-secretary-general positions—were claimed by the Anyuak, Nuer and Majangier, respectively. But other key posts of the security chief, the police commissioner, the attorney general, and the supreme court presidency were taken by the Anyuak, pushing the Nuer to the deputy posts (Kurimoto, 194: 810). The 2000 election brought

no satisfactory changes. The balance of power and the status quo remained unchanged. The ethnic chemistry of the local administration remained virtually the same. Consequently, Nuer party leaders appealed to the federal government, requesting rectification of power sharing. However, conflict had exploded before the federal government provided any solution.

**Table 1: Power Sharing in the Council of Gambella Regional State (1992--2000)**

Ethnic Groups	Year			Population
	1992	1995	2000	
Anyuak	9	24	28	44581
Nuer	7	10	19	64473
Majangier	3	5	4	9350
Opo	-	1	1	4802
Komo	1	1	1	
Highlanders	1	-	1	39191

Source: Gambella Population Office

**Table 2: Allocation of Managerial Posts in the GPNRS Administrative Agencies**

Year	Admin Agencies	Anyuak	Nuer	Majangier	Opo	Komo	High-lander
1992	20	15	3	1	-	1	-
1995	19	14	4	-	-	1	-
2000	19	13	5	-	-	1	-

Source: Gambella Population Office

**Table 3: Ethnic Distribution of the Civil Servants in the GPNRS**

Ethnic group	Anyuak	Nuer	Majangier	Opo	Komo	High-landers
Civil Servants	1397	243	34	10	1	2160
Population	44581	64473	9350	4802		39191

Source: Gambella Population Office

In addition to the contending political strategies of each ethnic group, entitlement to resources has further exacerbated the conflict in the region. Each group claimed entitlements invoking demographic status, 'first comer ideology', or special privileges for contribution to the armed struggle that toppled the *Derg* regime. To guard their interests, some ethnic groups also invoke the history of prior migration by categorizing the population as 'natives', 'outsiders', 'foreigners', 'latecomers', 'guests'. However, the Nilotes, who generally regard themselves as 'natives' when compared to 'highlanders', whom they call 'guests', discriminate among themselves as 'indigenous first comers', the 'sons of the soil', the 'latecomers' or the 'junior partners'. For instance, the Anyuak request for exclusionary group entitlement to power and wealth by invoking either the 'land based strategy', 'first comer ideology' or their role in the armed struggle when toppling the former *Derg* regime. On the other hand, the Nuer revoked the position of the Anyuak by invoking their demographic political strategy as entitlement to power and resources.

In addition to the above factors, the destruction of traditional institutions during the *Derg* regime also contributed to the conflicts. The diminished role of indigenous traditions, the destruction of established codes of conduct, poor mobilization of elders who are capable making peace, and the leadership vacuum created by the attempts to superimpose northern traditions fueled and escalated the conflict in the region.

The international border between Ethiopia and Sudan, that separates the Anyuak and the Nuer from their kin adds another complex dimension to the conflict in the Gambella region. A significant number of these trans-national ethnic groups are pastoralists, and by default, dual citizens. Mobility across the international border was legitimized by the 1902 treaty between Ethiopia and the Anglo-Egyptian colonial government. This has resulted in continuous migration of the Nuer into the traditional possession of the 'sons of the soil' (the Anyuak). Thus, the political strategies of group entitlement to resources have contributed to chaos and misperceptions thereby creating tension, anxiety, fear and suspicion among the ethnic groups. Other factors like the direct and indirect external interventions such as the SPLA and EPDRF will be assessed below.

## Economic Factors

Despite its economic and political significance, the socio-economic linkage and political integration of the Gambella region with the Ethiopian state have been weak. The recent prospect for the discovery of oil in the region and the potential for immediate drilling have generated new interests and attracted larger stake holders. As a result, the Anyuak, on whose territory the oil is being prospected, have exhibited a growing sensitivity to entitlement issues. Their apprehension, however, does not allow business confidence for investment. For example, after signing a concession agreement in 2001, the Gambella Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of Pinewood Resources Ltd. of Canada, cancelled the deal and ceased its Gambella operations, apparently for the tense political situation in the region. Later on, Petronas, a Malaysian state owned petroleum corporation, and China's National Petroleum Corporation announced a 25 year exclusive right for oil exploration and production sharing agreement with the EPRDF government (Genocide Watch: 9). This deal further polarized the competing parties. After the agreement was signed, sharp disagreements emerged between the federal and the local governments. Following this incident, the regional administrators and ethnic leaders threatened to invoke Articles 39 and 40 of the constitution for more control of their resources. Hence, the weak infrastructure, the absence of equitable economic relationship between the region and the center, lack of defined and mutually acceptable resource sharing plan among the ethnic groups and the federal government, the gap between social expectations and poor administrative performances, the existence of serious poverty, and aggressive ambitions for resource entitlement by local leaders are some of the crucial economic causes of conflict in Gambella.

## Cultural Factors

In conflict situation, culture often plays a powerful emotional element for claiming resource entitlement strategies. In Gambella, historical relationships between the population in

the region and the highlanders, even the minor distinctions in physical appearance and skin pigmentations are generating sensitive issues. The natives are looking at the “highlanders” as representatives of the successive repressive regimes who were responsible for discrimination, marginalization, and destruction of their cultural identities. Suspicion, fear, mistrust, and retaliatory tendencies have created deep resentment between the ethnic groups and the government. Besides, due to fear of losing their jobs, the highlanders, who constitute fifty seven percent of the government work force in the region, tend to be loyal to the regime and indifferent to the needs of the local population (Dereje, 2004:17).

Thus, a triangular power structure emerges out of the Gambella conflict. At the local level the Anyuak and the Nuer, the two major ethnic groups, compete for resources. In their rivalry, they often perceive each other as enemies, creating the two corners of the triangle. On the other hand, all the Nilotes consider the ‘highlanders’ as occupiers responsible for political domination and marginalization the Gambella region. This places the highlanders at the third corner of the triangle. The struggle against the ‘highlanders’ is also an expression of opposition to the central government, which sustains an old and ominous memory of conquest and occupation. The history of conquest is perceived differently by the indigenous population and the highlanders. For example, the Nilotes consider King Menelik as conqueror who captured their ancestors and reduced them to the status of slaves. On the other hand some of the highlanders consider Menelik as their hero who expanded the Ethiopian empire. The more recent highland settlers became the mirror images of the conquerors and slave owners of last century. Thus their settlement touched a powerful emotional tone that is generating animosity against the “outsiders”

Thus, the inter-ethnic conflicts grew sharper in time as a result of perceived or real collaboration of one ethnic group with the central government against the other. For instance, during the era of Emperor Menelik, the Nuer regarded the Anyuak as agents of the imperial government. Later, the Anyuak associated the Nuer to the Italian colonial rule, while the Nuer associated the Anyuak to the British trading post in Gambella. The Nuer also associated the Anyuak to Emperor Haile Selassie, while the

Anyuak associated the Nuer to *Derg*. The EPRDF government was perceived as an ally of the Anyuak during the early transitional period. This has changed during the course of the EPRDF's rule in the 1990s, and currently the Anyuak associate the Nuer with the central government. Thus, any policy shift by the federal government is interpreted as a political statement—an alliance with one side is equivalent to a political divorce with the other side. Yet both ethnic groups regard the 1984/85 settlement project of the *Derg*, which brought large number of the 'highlanders' to the Baro basin, as an aggressive form of assimilation, domination and cultural genocide. After the resettlement project, therefore, the trust between the two ethnic groups eroded further, as each group suspected the other of loyalty to the highlanders while maintaining animosity to the same group.

## Conclusion

Social, economic, and political problems of today's Ethiopia emanated from and are directly or indirectly linked to its past history. These historical experiences are complicated by internal ambitions and intervention of international powers that attempted to impose their own self-interests. The Ethiopian government's policies were/are traditionally designed for expansion and centralized governance through incorporation of diverse cultural groups. To achieve these goals, they promote a policy of cultural domination, marginalization, exploitation, and forced assimilation. This paper has traced the root causes of conflicts in Gambella to the political dynamics in the region since its incorporation into the Ethiopian Empire state. The policy of integration has been less considerate to the interests of the indigenous population. For this reason, despite the attempts of successive Ethiopian governments to pacify, diffuse, or suppress the sense of nationalism, the quest for distinct cultural identity, greater autonomy or even secession have remained strong.

The long and bloody wars of domination have resulted in the collapse of aggressive and dictatorial regimes including the *Derg*. Learning a lesson from the past, the EPRDF has

established a somewhat accommodative political structure since 1991. This resulted in the creation of ethnic federal state system, a shift from a tradition that glorified destruction of cultures and languages. Initially, the new government promised to usher in pluralist decision making, promotion of democracy, balance between unity and diversity, ensure justice, develop the economy, manage and transform conflicts, secure peace and peaceful coexistence. The principles of regional autonomy and self determination up to and including secession were enshrined in the 1994 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Nonetheless, conflicts in some parts of the country such as the Gambella region have only increased in magnitude and scope, and seem to rise in the foreseeable future.

Discriminatory and exclusionary policies of the government are the root causes of political conflicts in the region. Access to power is granted on the basis of discriminatory political partnership of a particular ethnic group with the federal government. Alliance of ethnic leaders with the central government, however, divided the people and perpetuated fear and suspicion among the ethnic groups. Traditionally, political alliances between the central government and the ethnic groups usually lasted as long as that government was in power. But what makes the current political situation unique is the flexibility and frequent shift in alliance formations. For example, first, the Anyuak, through the GPLM, had allied with the TPLF, and later, with EPRDF to participate in the armed struggle against the *Derg*. With fall of the *Derg*, they grabbed the regional power in 1991. Later, because the Nuer were the major contributors and combatants of the SPLA in the armed struggle against the government of the Sudan, the federal government of Ethiopia thought their exclusion from the Gambella Regional State power was a reckless political strategy. This led to the formation of a new political alliance with the Nuer. They were invited to the regional government, alienating the Anyuak and opening the doors for new conflict. New alliance of the federal government with the Nuer curtailed Anyuak free access to the regional power structure. Inadequate performance of a poorly trained civil service, inexperience, corruption, political manipulations, insufficient checks and balances, ill-advised ethnic settlement patterns, poor structuring of the *weredas*, the destruction of

traditional institutions, and the absence of neutral conflict mediating body politic have contributed to the escalation of the conflicts in Gambella. The loose boundary demarcation treaty of 1902 which did not account for the lifestyle of the pastoral community and the settlement patterns of the Anyuak and the Nuer ethnic groups, the mobility and continuous migration of the Nuer into the traditional Anyuak territories and the dual citizenship practices, the settlement history, and the incompatible and contending political strategies of resource entitlement of the ethnic groups in the absence of fair standard at national level are also serious contentious issues that continue to fuel the conflict.

Unabated access to small arms and their use as a legal tender with the neighbors including the Ethiopian monarchs' and colonial powers' of use of small arms as a political leverage in exchange for political loyalty, and the presence of armed groups in the region further exacerbated the conflict. Economically, competition over scarce resources, deficient economic integration and weak linkage to the center, underdeveloped infrastructure, poverty, incompatibility between popular expectations and national goodwill capacity, the prospect of the discovery of oil, and the unfair distribution of the regional wealth further added fuel to the previously enumerated causes of conflict.

The conflict is also rooted in cultural factors. Emperor Menelik's occupation during the late nineteenth century led to enslavement of many of the captured Nilotic groups. Although the event happened over a century ago, the memory of victimization still survives in the minds of the indigenous people whose ancestors lived through those years. For them Emperor Menelik is not a national hero, but the enemy. The more recent highland settlers are also seen as agents of the central government and descendants of the former slave raiders. The Nilotes, probably like many of their neighbors, believe in justice through revenge if equity by any other means is out of their range. This encourages more violence because the cultural legal options have been undermined by external intervention. It also complicates the process of conflict resolution.

The mass influx of refugees and the migration into and out of the Gambella region due to diverse natural and man-made



problems in both Ethiopia and Sudan also put a heavy burden on the resources of the region. The movement of refugees in and out of the region across the border helped the ethnic kinship to mingle with each other freely. But the process is radicalizing the population and is generating irredentist feelings. Dissidents sometimes use refugee camps for rest, recuperation, recruitment, and reorganization of their forces. But claiming to control the situation, the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan also engage in military reprisal and proxy-wars, mopping up operations and hot pursuits of dissidents. Thus, the Gambella region still remains a violent place.

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# **Human Rights Predicament: A Critical Gender-Based Analysis of the Somali Region (Ogaden) in Ethiopia**

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Today, despite the official pronouncements by states, most of the human rights violations are committed by governments who ignore or only pay lip service to democracy and the basic liberties of citizens. The Ethiopian government clearly falls within this category. Its 1994 constitution, at least on paper, is quite comprehensive and explicit in the declaration of human rights. The constitution proclaims respect for the fundamental human rights, but in practice the government continues to violate the very constitution it has decreed (Kalif and Doornbos 2002). Reports by various local and international human rights organizations indicate the existence of serious human rights violations in all parts of Ethiopia. The root causes of these violations can be attributed, among other things, to the protracted ethnic conflicts and the government's unwillingness to implement the human rights principles. Conflict resolution efforts and the analysis of political crises in the region also lack adequate gender sensitivity. Women from the Somali Region in Ethiopia, for example, have not been included in any of the attempts that were made to resolve the ethnic conflicts in this area.

Using the case of the Somali Regional State, also known as the Ogaden, this paper shows the discrepancy between the declaration of human rights principles by the Ethiopian government and the extensive abuses of the same rights. The paper will analyze the human rights situation in the Somali Region through the lenses of gender perspective to highlight the vital role that women could play in attaining a lasting peace in the region. The paper argues that the absence of women's

perspective from all the attempts that were made for peace in this region exacerbated the violations of human rights and the suffering of the population.

### **Human Rights and Africa**

In a broader context, the purpose of this paper is to initiate a thought provoking analysis on and around the notion of human rights within Africa, particularly regarding the human rights situation in the Horn of Africa. Human rights discourse needs to be re-conceptualized with regards to the continent of Africa. According to I. G. Shivji, (1998) this re-conceptualization is essential because: human rights discourse is backward in so far as it is entrenched in colonial era thinking, and as far as the discourse is not ideologically neutral. For the people of Africa, human rights struggles sum-up their daily lives. But as a 'western' concept, it may not necessarily work in Africa because "cultural relativism" permeates some levels of the debate on human rights. At another level, the debate also shows the universal validity and applicability of the concepts of human rights. Shivji (1989) argues that human rights concepts have universal validity and applicability. Furthermore, Shivji states:

To the extent the Western model of the state has spread to other parts of the world, the factors which gave rise to the need for constitutional guarantees and led to the evolution of the philosophy of human rights in the West become equally relevant in other parts of the world (Kannyo quoted by Shivji, 1989:11)

I agree with Shivji's views and believe in the universal applicability of human rights concepts. In fact, these rights do apply and need to be fully implemented in Africa and elsewhere in the world. But we also need to be critical, not only in establishing whether or not these concepts are applicable, but also about how they are applied, how they are defined as well as who defines them. For human rights concepts to become

relevant, the concepts need to be rooted in the real context of Africa and within its complex historical legacies of colonialism.

According to Okoth Ogendo (cited by Shivji), there ought to be a minimum content of human right which should include, but not be limited to:

“Life in the biological sense; liberty including the security of the person or group; freedom of conscience, expression, assembly and association; freedom from discrimination; [and] self-determination” (Shivji, 1998:11)

Shivji, however, argues that regarding Africa the dominant human rights discourse fails to contextualize the debate within the imperialist domination of Africa. For instance, in the human rights literature we see frequent references to Bokassa of Central Africa and Idi Amin of Uganda as cruel perpetrators of human rights violations, but we never see critical reflections on the fact that Bokassa was France’s protégé, and we hardly come across any critical analysis of the question of who installed Amin into power in Uganda in the first place (Shivji 1998). In addition to lacking critically relevant analysis of how certain African leaders such as Bokassa and Amin, who were notoriously known for committing human rights violations, came to power, the human rights discourse in Africa is often flawed because it does not take into account the continent’s colonial context and the desire of its people to overcome the historical and contemporary problems

In the context of capitalist system, the ‘right to private property’ is central to the discourse of rights, and right to property often takes priority over other rights of humans. In the case of Africa, however, the ‘right to self-determination’ and the ‘right to organize’ are also central to human rights debate (Shivji). It is important to emphasize that, the right to self-determination is still valid even after the people have chosen some form of government. In other words, it is a right that needs to be continuously guarded as the people pursue their rights for good governance. Equally important is the right to organize. The right to organize is essential in Africa because it

helps to mobilize and revitalize the people's capacity for positive social change (Shivji 1998).

The debate about human rights also needs to pay special attention to gender issues. Studies have shown that women and girls suffer disproportionately higher risks than men in conflict situations. In other words, men and women experience conflicts in dramatically different ways because of their established social roles in society and their traditional commitments to the family. For example, while women endure the same trauma as the rest of the population when conflict occurs, they also face specific forms of violence. For this reason, the impact of gender specific issues in conflict situation and the sufferings of women and girls need to be recognized and fully analyzed in the wider context of human development strategies. Evaluating aspects of gender issues is also necessary to understand the underlying causes of political conflicts and social instabilities. Gender based analysis is central to conflict resolution efforts, the implementation of fundamental human rights and principles, and to end the cycle of violence in the developing nations. More specifically, it is important to recognize that resolving conflicts and addressing their root causes will not be successful without the full and equal participation of women. Building the foundations of enduring peace, which is crucial to the development of just society, good governance, and upholding human rights (UN, "Women, Peace and Security," 2002) can only be achieved by involving those who suffered most.

Here, I would like to focus on the case of the Somali case in Horn of Africa by taking a glimpse at Ethiopia's poor human rights record. I would also like to underline the words 'taking a glimpse', because this short paper can not capture all aspects of human rights violations that have been recorded and documented by human rights and civic organizations such as Oromo Support Group, Ogaden Human Rights Committee and Sidama Concern. As we are all aware, most human rights violations in the world unfortunately occur within states which have signed the covenants of United Nations human rights. Ethiopia is one good example.

Reports on human rights violations are full of body counts,

torture practices, an endless list of horrors, and cruelties. These violations are beyond comprehension because they are acts of 'madmen' without reason. David Matas posits that "the reports seem to be written by someone with the stomach of a physician and the mind of a statistician" (Matas, 1994:3). The poignant relevance of this author's point to the human rights situation in Ethiopia is clear. The suffering of the people of Ethiopia in the hands of autocratic and dictatorial regimes is well documented. The human rights problem in Ethiopia requires urgent response and dialogue to end the suffering of the people.

Unfortunately, according to Matas (1994), human rights violations occur for a purpose. The heinous acts do not take place in an ideological vacuum. Human rights violations in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere are acts that represent manifestations of ideologies and deep divisions in the society. Matas further argues that, human rights violations are done on purpose, and at times can be the consequence of an ideology (UN 2002). For instance, in Hitler's Germany, the ideology of racism took a totalitarian form. Most of us may wonder what leads to acts of human rights violations. In an attempt to understand the root causes of human rights violations, David Matas, looks at four ideologies as examples of the causes of human rights violations. These are: "The national security; state religion; communism; and apartheid." I would add colonialism as one of the ideologies as a root cause of human rights violations. The ideology of colonialism is wrong at many levels; there is not enough space in this paper to get into an in-depth analysis of colonialist ideology and its impact on human rights issues. However, it is important to point out that Africans have been subjected to cruel and gross human rights violations under colonialism. Indeed, its legacy still contributes to present sufferings in Africa.

### **A critical glance at the human rights abuses in the Somali Region**

The Somali region, which is the focus of this paper, is located in the eastern region of Ethiopia. It lies between Oromia to the

west, Afar land to the northwest, the Republic of Djibouti to the north, Kenya to the South, and the Somali Republic to the east (History Centre) The history of this region is very complex, and it is recorded and accounted for in a number of studies. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight a few important historical dates. The Somali Region was incorporated into the Abyssinian (Ethiopian) Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. This event coincided with the initial stages of European colonization of the continent of Africa. At the height of colonial competition, the Somali Region was partitioned by different powers, both European and African. When the British, the French and the Italians occupied parts of Somalia, Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia annexed the Ogaden. This annexation highlights an important historical fact—that Abyssinia/ Ethiopia was a player in the colonial scramble and played a powerful role of divide and conquer in the region. The conquest and complex chain of historical events related to it have contributed to the current political situation in the region.

The control of the Ogaden was contested between Ethiopia and Italian colonial powers. In the 1930s, the control of the strategic water wells of the Ogaden triggered the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. In 1941, with the defeat and departure of the Italians, the Ogaden came under British rule and remained subject to British military administration until 1948. On September 23, 1948, the British government decided to cede a large portion of the Ogaden region to Ethiopia without the knowledge and consent of the Somali people. The peaceful demonstrations and protests of the people against this decision were brutally suppressed and scores of people were killed, in Jigjiga and other places. On February 28, 1955, the British authorities handed over the Haud Reserved areas of the Ogaden to Ethiopia (Ogaden Human Rights Committee, January 22, 2004, OHRC/D15/04).

As the administration of the region passed from one colonial power to another the interest of the people were neglected. Louis FitzGibbon, M. H. Khalif & M. Doornbos in their article “The Somali Region: A Neglected Human Rights Tragedy”

(2002) provide an essential synopsis of the region's historical trajectories

In fact the Somali region is not unique in this regard. The people in other regions who were conquered at the same time faced brutal treatment and exploitation by the Abyssinian state. One thing common to all regimes of Ethiopia has been the fact that they have violated every aspect of the fundamental human rights of the people. For instance, the monarchy, under Emperors Menelik and Haile Selassie, exploited and oppressed the subject people through traditionally institutionalized feudal system. The customs, laws and institutions of the monarchical regimes that regulated the relations between the ruling elite and the mass of the conquered subjects disregarded the basic rights of the people. Based on these traditions, the Ethiopian socio-political establishment was devoid of basic human rights considerations (Khalif & Doornbos, 2002).

When the Ethiopian monarchy was abolished and a military regime or the *Derg* took power under the leadership of Mengistu H. Miriam, in 1974, the human rights violations and atrocities in the country surpassed that of its predecessor's records. Then, the cries of the different peoples of Ethiopia and the international community fell on deaf ears. Torture, disappearances and random detentions marked the gory and unstable period of terror during which several thousand of civilians were massacred.

In 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power after fighting the military regime for several years, and promising respect for human rights and the rule of law. Re-writing the Ethiopian constitution, the EPRDF also declared economic liberalization, multi-party system, and endorsed the existence of freedom of the press. Chapter three of the new constitution enshrined the fundamental human rights principles. The new Ethiopian constitution is notably comprehensive and its human rights provisions are clearly stated.

But so far, they remain only on paper. Contrary to its own constitution, the EPRDF went down the path of its predecessors, a path fraught with gross human rights violations and brutal suffering of the people of Ethiopia at the hands of their government. To the disappointment of all Ethiopians the EPRDF failed to respect human rights. For this reason, local and international human rights organizations continue to report on the violations of basic constitutional rights that this regime has sponsored and vowed to protect (Khalif & Doornbos 2002)

Human rights violations by the current regime have been widely reported. As quoted by Khalif and Doornbos, *The Economist* shockingly stated a huge gap between Ethiopia's constitution on human rights and its practice:

In the Oromia and Somali regions, the parties that had established strong local identities by fighting the Mengistu regime, such as the Oromo Liberation Front and Ogaden National Liberation Front, have been suppressed as 'terrorists'. Indeed, both of these parties grew out of guerrilla movements. But the government also accuses the All Amhara People's Organization and Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Coalition of waging war, without producing much evidence that these parties use or advocate violence. People unwilling to join EPRDF, let alone those known to favour secession, are described as 'narrow nationalists'. They are often imprisoned and their meetings banned. In Oromia and Somali regions, human rights groups have documented hundreds of disappearances (Khalif & Doornbos, 2002:76)

According to *The Washington Post* (April 13, 1998), during the three year period, from 1995 to 1998, the Ethiopian regime has arrested and kept in detention more journalists than any other government on the continent of Africa. The people of the Somali Region and many other regions of Ethiopia have witnessed and suffered more than their share of violent aggressions by the state machinery.



### The plight of Somalis in Ethiopia: A Gender-based analysis

Under undemocratic system, women particularly suffered most. Women from the Somali Region have recounted horror stories. They were unable to protect themselves or their families. Pregnant women were afraid to visit a doctor's office for medical treatment and prenatal check up and delivered their babies at home because it was not safe to go a hospital. It is challenging enough to have to walk for miles to get to any type of health care facility for these women, but it is even more dangerous for them to go to a hospital because government agents decide when to turn-off the power, and they had shut the power off while some women were having babies. So the women risk their lives by delivering their babies at home with traditional midwives (Unpublished interviews documented by OHRC 1999).

While doing this research, I kept thinking about the plight of Somalis and particularly the women I personally knew from the region. Indeed, these women had always endured the brunt of all state sponsored violence. Women and girls suffered disproportionately higher in armed conflicts than men. 'Violence against women and girls'<sup>1</sup> has been recognized as severe human rights violation because of the wide range of rights it involves at the same time (Amnesty International Report, Oct. 2004). In a situation of armed conflict, the lack of stability inevitably leads to the escalation of all kinds of violence, especially rape and other forms of sexual violence against women. While fleeing from conflict areas, women and girls very often face, not only hunger and starvation, but other forms of risks such rape and physical abuse. Generally, in conflict situations, violence against women is used as a weapon of war, for the purposes of persecuting the community that is deemed to be "the enemy".

The Somali Region in Ethiopia is one of the most heavily militarized zones in the Horn of Africa. Because of the long standing ethnic conflicts, this region barely had a stable peaceful period that was violence free. During the last two decades, most of the residents of the region have been accused of collaborating with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an armed

group which has been fighting the Ethiopian government for the freedom of the Ogaden Somalis. In this long standing conflict, Somali women had been subjected to arbitrary detentions, disappearances, killings and rape. The perpetrators of such violence against unarmed civilians and women in this region were usually government forces who were supposed to protect them from such abuses.

According to the OHRC report (OHRC/D15/04) the EPRDF army detained, tortured and raped. Rape is commonly used to exercise power even over young girls who are running errands for the family. The OHRC report has documented more than 297 cases of rape in 2000. Apparently, there are many other unreported rape cases in the rural areas. "In March 2002, in Harar, Ethiopian security agents detained Samira Abdosh. Samira later described her ordeal in the following terms: "I was arrested on a Saturday, and detained at Harar township Police Station. After ten days I was transferred to 13 Kifle Dor military barracks, which is not far from Hiwot Fana Hospital. They accused me of being ONLF supporter. I was subjected to daily interrogation under torture in the form of extensive indiscriminate beatings. Alemayu, the officer, who was in charge of my interrogation and torture, raped me. On September 4, 2002 I escaped from the torturers." (OHRC/D15/04: p 19). Similarly, "On August 20, 2002, Roda A. Ahmed, an underage nomad girl, was gang raped by members of the Ethiopian armed forces. She was transferred to Qabridaharre hospital for treatment. Her sexual organ was severely damaged." (OHRC/D15/04: p. 19) "In December 2003, in Daacadhuur, Sahra B. Abdulahi and Zeinab I Hussein, two young nomad girls, were abducted by Ethiopian soldiers who took them to the military barracks where they were gang raped" (OHRC/D15/04: p. 20)

Women and girls from this region are jailed, tortured, raped and harassed on a daily basis by government military personnel. Women have no access to basic health care and education. They live in constant fear, fear of being accused of something that will land them in jail, where they are raped by soldiers. One of the horror stories that women faced when they were jailed, without trial, was rape by the prison guards. If a woman was released, she

will be confined to her village, because government agents who violated her body do not want the story of their abuse to spread widely. If the woman became pregnant, she was not allowed to go even to the nearest town for medical treatment. She was further ostracized by others in her community. Thus, the physical abuse, the psychological trauma and social isolation could totally destroy a woman's life. But living in a state of fear, abused women bear children and raise their children in the middle of violence. If they are lucky, they may watch their children grow-up in this conflict, and when they grow up, they are either killed or kill to survive.

Although the underlying factors of violence against women are inherent in the lack of equality with men, often times, these acts of violence further perpetuate gender-based discriminations. The plight of women in the Somali Region of Ethiopia is so brutal, but most of what they face daily are hidden from outsiders and the international community. For this reason, the purpose of this paper is partly to document the plight of women and provide them some voice. By writing about them and raising their issues in conferences, eventually, I hope, their plea will be heard and their burden may be lifted. I would argue that focusing on gender-based analysis in resolving conflict/crisis is very essential to understand and promote human rights, and establish peace and stability. Efforts to address the root causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Ethiopia, will not succeed unless women are fully involved and play equal role in building the foundations of enduring peace. So far, women from the Somali Region in Ethiopia have been excluded from all the attempts that were made in resolving the protracted ethnic conflict. But such exclusion of women negates all the evidence from the literature on the gender dimensions along the continuum of conflict, peace negotiations, peacemaking, peacekeeping and reconstruction.

### **Black Feminist Thought**

Gender-based analysis, Black Feminist Thought and Feminist Intersectional Theory are all relevant frames of analysis when

reflecting on the plight of the women of the Somali Region of Ethiopia. Black feminist thought in a trans-national context would provide an appropriate frame of analysis. Black feminist thought lies within the context of critical social theory in its commitment to justice for all oppressed groups. Moreover, as an approach to human rights, black feminist thought provides a particular kind of knowledge that is gained from the intersection of oppressions of race, class, gender and nationality (Collins 2002) I would argue that extending this frame of analysis to the intersecting oppressions of gender and ethnicity can be useful in the context of this region. There could be tremendous knowledge which can be gained from such analysis with regards to the plight of women of the Somali region.

To conclude, I emphasize the need for genuine efforts to reach out to the women of the Somali Region to end conflict and to bring a lasting peace. Evidence abounds in the literature that, lasting peace will not be attained if women are not participating in the processes. In addition, all the basic steps to “gender-dimensions of reconstruction” are essential to be appropriately covered. These include: interventions focussing on women’s needs; gender-based approach to programming which consciously includes women and attempt to eliminate all gender related barriers; and putting into practice “substantive” gender-equity strategies (Zuckerman & Greenberg)

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<sup>1</sup> “According to Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, “the term ‘violence against women’ means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life” Further more in Article 2, the Declaration stipulates that “violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:

a) Physical , sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household,

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dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;

b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution

c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the state, wherever it occurs.”

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# Jalqabdoota Bifaa fi Sagalee Qubee Afaan Oromoo (*Qubee* for Beginners)

*Tilabun Gamta*

## Introduction

*Afaan* Oromo, the Oromo language, is one of the major languages in Africa<sup>1</sup> It is used by over forty million speakers as first language (mother tongue) or as second or third language in Northeast and East Africa. In Oromia state, in Ethiopia, it is the official language of about thirty to thirty five million people, and is used in courts, schools and for administration. But until recently, *Afaan* Oromo remained an oral rather than a literary language. In the past, the transition from oral to literary language was hindered largely by political factors. With occupation of Oromoland by the Abyssinian state in the nineteenth century, the development of *Afaan* Oromo was suppressed along with the culture, traditions, history and the political system of the Oromo people. Instead of promoting the development of the language, Ethiopian rulers in the twentieth century invested much in Amharic as the official, state sponsored language. While Amharic served as the language of administration, the court system and the medium of instruction in schools, the use of *Afaan* Oromo was discouraged even in private conversations.

Despite these political and cultural factors, *Afaan* Oromo remained vibrant and very strong, particularly in Oromo inhabited areas of Northeast Africa. Since the early 1970s, Oromo nationalists and scholars have made tremendous efforts to develop it as a literary language. In this regard, one of their major successes was the establishment of a Latin-based alphabet called *qubee*. After hindering the development of the language for many years, the Ethiopian government during the *Derg* (military) regime (1974-91) attempted to impose the *Geez* script for the writing in *Afaan* Oromo. But the effort failed because the government's policy was noncommittal, and more important,

linguistically, the *Geez* script was unsuitable for the Oromo language. Following the fall of the *Derg* in 1991 and a brief period of the participation of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in 1991-92, *qubee* was established as the official alphabet of the Oromo language.

The decision proved to be a major success for the development of *Afaan Oromo*. Since the early 1990s, *qubee* is used for writing and translating school textbooks, transcribing and recording court proceedings, exchanging administrative memoranda and personal correspondences in the state of Oromia and among Oromos at home in the diaspora. The use of *qubee* during the last two decades has facilitated scholarly research and the emergence of *Afaan Oromo* as a literary language. Within a short time, scholars have produced several major dictionaries, books of poetry, novels and translated texts in *qubee*. While it has been very rare to find texts in *Afaan Oromo* three decades ago, now several books are published every year. Such fast transition from oral to a literary language is a testimony to the appropriateness of the alphabet for the writing system of *Afaan Oromo*. The success also indicates the commitment and hard work of Oromo scholars.

But as an emerging literary language, *Afaan Oromo* needs simple and clearly written text books, especially for beginners. This article: “**Jalqabdoota Bifaa fi Qubee Afaan Oromoo,**” is written with the needs of beginners in mind who want to learn the language within a very short time. It is intended to help school children in Oromia and Diaspora, adult Oromos who need to improve their reading and writing skills and non-Oromos who desire to learn the language and do research on Oromo culture and history.

*Afaan Oromo* has thirty three sounds, and each sound is represented by a letter. The thirty three characters are referred to as *qubee*, the Oromo alphabet. After recognizing the letters and mastering how to produce the sounds, a beginning learner can easily enunciate almost all the words in the Oromo language (Gamta 2005: 12-15).<sup>2</sup> *Afaan Oromo* has ten vowels, divided into short—*a, e, i, o, u*—and long vowels—*aa, ee, ii, oo, uu*. The



consonants are twenty three: *b, c, ch, d, dh, f, g, h, j, k, l, m, n, ny, ph, q, r, s, sh, t, w, x, y.*

Here, I propose four steps that an instructor can use to teach *Afaan Oromo*. First, he/she can read the ten short (a, e, i, o, u) and long (aa, ee ii oo uu) vowels. Then, the entire class, or each group (if the students are divided into groups), and each student respectively says the vowels. Second, the teacher writes and displays the twenty three consonants. Third, since the consonants cannot be enunciated without vowels, the student, with the instructor's guidance, can prefix the vowels to the consonants and start producing the sounds that represent the consonants. For example:

*ab aab eb eeb ib iib ob oob ub uub*  
*ac aac ec eec ic iic oc ooc uc uuc, etc.*

Fourth, the student can add vowels as suffixes to the consonants to learn the appropriate sound of each consonant. For example, start with **b, c, ch, and d**, as follows, and continue the same with the remaining consonants.

*ba baa be bee bi bii bo boo bu buu*  
*ca caa ce cee ci cii co coo cu cuu*  
*cha chaa che chee chi chii cho choo chu*  
*chuu*  
*da daa de dee di dii do doo du duu dbu*  
*dbu*

After learning how to enunciate each consonant with all the short and long vowels, the student can begin combining the consonants with vowel prefixes and suffixes to create meaningful words. For example:

*ab baa (abbaa = father)*  
*ar ba (arba = elephant)*  
*ar ka (arka = hand)*  
*an tuu ta (antuuta = mouse or rat)*  
*ar ge (arge = saw)*  
*aa<sup>s</sup> yoo (aayyoo = madam)*  
*baa te (baate = carried)*

*ba ra na* (*barana* = *this year*)  
*bi ti* (*biti* = *You, singular, buy*)  
*bi taa* (*You, pl. / honorific, buy*)  
*bu na* (*buna* = *coffee*)

*ca baa* (*cabaa* = *broken*)  
*cuu cii* (*cuucii* = *chick*)

*dha dhaa* (*dhadhaa* = *butter*)  
*dbu gaa* (*dhugaa* = *truth; You, Pl/Hon, drink*)  
*dbu gi* (*dhugi* = *drink / sig*)

Then, add two or more words to form simple sentences. For example:

*Bu na bi ti* (*buna biti* = *you/ sing / buy coffee*)  
*Bu na dbu gi* (*Buna dhugi* = *Drink coffee / you, sing.*)  
*Dha dhaa nyaate* (*dhadhaa nyaate* = *He ate butter*).  
*Nu ga na(n)* (*nu ganana* = *They betrayed us*).

I believe this teaching model will be a useful tool for those who are beginning to learn *qubee Afaan Oromo*. Of course, teachers may have already developed a method that has worked well for them, but it doesn't harm to try different techniques. My desire is: "let those who know *qubee* teach, and let those who don't know, learn" It is the only way we can develop *Afaan Oromo* as a literary language and eradicate illiteracy from Oromia

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Waraqaan kun karaa yookin akka qubeen Afaan Oromo itti barsiifamuu danda'u hubachiisa. Barsiisaan tokko waa lama sirriitti beekuu qaba. Tokko, waan barsiisuu qajeelchee beekuu dha. Yoo waan barsiisuu sirriitti hin beekne, barattoota isaa dogoggorsa; waan dhugaa hin taane barsiisa. Waan sirrii hin taane barsiisuun ammoo balleessa guddaa dha. Lama, waan barsiisu beekuu qofa osoo hin ta'in, akka itti barsiisu beekuunis

hedduu barbaachisaa dha. Egaa, barsiisaan tokko utuu barattoota isaa fuul dura hin dhaabatin, dura waan barsiisuu fi akka itti barsiisuu sirriitti qopheeffachuu qaba.

Qubeewwan Afaan Oromo 33 dha. Mal'attoonni soddomii sadan kun ammoo sagaleewwan 33 bakka bu'u. Awuu mal'atoon tokko sagalee tokko iddoo bu'u, waan qubee akkanaatiin qubeeffame dubbisuun tasa nama hin dhibu. Mal'atoon Afaan Oromo ittiin fayyadamu, Afaan Ingiliiziitiin "phonics" jedhama. "Phonics" jechuun qubee tokko bakka sagalee tokkoo buusanii qubeessuu dha. Waan "phonics" dhaan qubeessame dubbisuunis nama hin rakkisu.

Qubeewwan Oromo 33 barsiisuu osoo hin jalqabin, waanti barsiisaan barattoota hubachiisuu qabu hedduu dha. Fakkeenyaaf, waanti qubeeffamuu isuma haasa'amu sana ta'uu isaa, awuu qubeessinu ykn awuu dubbifnu harkii fi iji keenya gara bitaatii ka'anii gara mirgaatti akka sosocho'anu faa itti himuun gaarii dha. Qubee baruun bu'aawwan ciccimoo addaa addaa akka qabu itti himuunis barbaachisaa dha. Warri dubbisuu fi qubeessuu beeknu ijaa dura qubee baraniif. Waan beeknu, waan itti amannu, waan yaadnu, waan nutti dhagayamuu waraqaa irra keenyee nama alaala jirutti erguu akka dandeenyu, dura qubee baruun dirqama

Barsiisaan kitaabolee/qubeessota addaa addaa barattootaaf yoo dubbise, barattotni qubee baratani akkuma barsiisichaa dubbisuu danda'uu akka hawwan godha. Kitaaba/Qubeessa dubbisuufii qofa osoo hin ta'in, barsiisaan barattoota waa jechisiisee, isuma jarri dubbatan sana jara fuul duratti qubeessee, nama dubbisuu beeku alaa fidee akka inni/isheen dubbisu/dubbiftu gochuun faan barattootnii qubee baruuf onnatani akka kaka'anu godha.

Qubee baruuf kan barattoota kakaasuu danda'u sababiin biraas jira. Dhaamsi waraqaa irra kaayame amma waraqaan sun jirutti hin badu; hin irraanfatumus. Seenaan, beekumsinii fi muuxannoon Oromo caalaan isaa irraanfatumuun isaa osoo hin qubeeffamin gatii hafeef. Akka qoratamee barametti, waan dhageenye keessaa, guyyaa kudha shan booddee, harka dhibba keessaa akka harka digdamaa qofa yaadanna. Ji'a tokko booddee ammoo, yoo jabaannee jabaanne harka dhibba keessaa, harka

shan qofa yaadanna Namooti tokko tokko awuu umuriin isaanii dheerachaa deemuu ammoo isa kaleessa dhagayan har'a hin yaadatanu. Gabaabaatti, waan arginuu fi waan dhageenyu faa qubeessinee ol kaawu kan dandeenyu yoo dura qubee barte duwwaa dha.

Waan akkanaa faa itti himee, barattotnii qubee baruuf onnatanii kaka'uu isaanii eega hubatee booda kan barsiisaan qubee barsiisuutti seenu. Dura qubeewwan soddonii sadanu barattoota warra fagoo taa'anutti akka mul'atanutti guguddisee qubeessuu qaba. Barattootni warri iji isaanii fagoo dhaa hin hubanne ammoo, qubeetti dhiyaatanii akka taa'anu gochuun faa irranfatamuu hin qabu

Qubeewwan soddonii sadan bifaa afuriin qopheessee dhiyeessuu ni danda'a. Bifi tokko warra **dubbachiiftuu** yookaan "vowels" jedhamanii mooggaafaman. Jarris kudhan: **a, aa, e, ee, i, ii, o, oo, u, uu** dha. Jarri kurdhan kun ammoo warra **gabaabaa "a, e, i, o, u"** fi warra **dheeraa "aa, ee, ii, oo, uu"** jedhamanii iddoo lamatti hiramani barsiifamu. Dubbachiiftota kurdhan kana rakkoo tokko malee qofaa isaanii jechuun nama hin rakkisu; kun kan ta'uu danda'e ammoo dubbachiiftoonni osoo hin gufatamin ykn utuu karaan itti hin cufamin laagaa keessa darbuu ijaa danda'annuuf.

Dubbachiiftuun dubbifamaa hordofuu ykn fuul dura bu'uu ni danda'a. Dubbachiiftuun awuu dubbifamaa hordofu kana fakkaata:

**ab, aab, eb, eeb, ib, iib, ob, oob, ub, uub**

**ac, aac, ec, eec, ic, iic, oc, ooc, uc, uuc**

**ach, aach, ech, eech, ich, iich, och, ooch, uch, uuch**

**ad, aad, ed, eed, id, iid, od, ood, ud, uud**

**adh, aadh, edh, eedh, idh, iidh, odh, oodh, udh, uudh**

af, aaf, ef, eef, if, iif, of, oof, uf, uuf

ag, aag, eg, eeg, ig, iig, og, oog, ug, uug

ah, aah, eh, eeh, ih, iih, oh, ooh, uh, uuh

aj, aaj, ej, eej, ij, iij, oj, ooj, uj, uuj

ak, aak, ek, eek, ik, iik, ok, ook, uk, uuk

al, aal, el, eel, il, iil, ol, ool, ul, uul

am, aam, em, eem, im, iim, om, oom, um, uum

an, aan, en, een, in, iin, on, oon, un, uun

aph, aaph, eph, eeph, iph, iiph, oph, ooph, uph, uuph

aq, aaq, eq, eeq, iq, iiq, oq, oooq, uq, uuq

ar, aar, er, eer, ir, iir, or, oor, ur, uur

as, aas, es, ees, is, iis, os, oos, us, uus

at, aat, et, eet, it, iit, ot, oot, ut, uut

aw, aaw, ew, eew, iw, iiw, ow, oow, uw, uuw

ax, aax, ex, eex, ix, iix, ox, oox, ux, uux

ay, aay, ey, eey, iy, iiy, oy, ooy, uy, uuy

Dubbachiiftuun dubbifamaa fuul dura bu'uu ni danda'a. Warra  
(4) jala jiranu ilaali.

Dubbachiiftuun warra (4) jala jiranu ordofus ni danda'a:  
Fakkeenyoota armaa gadii ilaali:

(1) + warra (4) jala jiranu:

a + boo = aboo

aa + duu = aaduu

e + da = eda

ee + boo = eeboo

i + fa = ifa

ii + xa + chuu = iixachuu

o + daa = odaa

oo + duu = ooduu

u + lee = ulee

uu + muu = uumuu

Dubbachiiftuun dheeraan ykn gabaabaan jecha gidduu ni seena;  
alii al hiikas ni jijjira  
Fakkeenyoota armaa gadii ilaali:

dhaabuu

dhaaluu

dhiibuu

cooruu

Hiikii jechoota armaa oliitii fi jechoota armaa gadii qofa qofaa  
dha mitii?

dhabuu

dhaluu

dhibuu

coruu

Bifaa fi sagalee dubbachiiftota armaa olii eega sirriitti baranii  
booda, kan barattootni dubbifamtoota "consonants" baruutti  
darbanu.

### (3) Dubbifamaa

Dubbifamtooti digdamii sadii dha Jarris **b, c, ch, d, dh, f, g, h, j, k, l, m, n, ny, ph, q, r, s, sh, t, w, x, y** jedhamu. Osoo dubbachiiftuu itti hin dabalín, dubbifamaa qofaa isaa jechuun

nama rakkisa. Mee osoo dubbachiiftuu dubbifamaa duuba ykn fuul dura hin buusin, " b, c, ch, d, dh, ... y" jedhaa ilaalaa. Jechuu hin dandeenye mitii? Qofaa isaa jechuun kan hin danda'mne dubbifamaan awuu laagaa keessa darbu ijaa iddoo iddootti gufatamu ykn karaan itti cufamuuf. Akkan dhagawutti, warri qubee barsiisanu, dubbifamaatti **"aa"** dabalani, **"aa, baa, caa, daa, ee, faa, gaa, ... yaa"** jedhani qubee barsiisuu jalqabu jedhu Kana kan godhanu ijaa dubbifamaa qofaa isaa jechuu hin dandeenyeef natti fakkaata.

Ani Oromiyaa dhaqee, mana barnootaa tokko tokko keessaatti qubeen akka itti barsiifamuu utuun ilaalee, yaadi an asitti kennu waan qoratame irratti kan hundaaye ta'a ture. Ijaan kana gochuu daxxabeef, yaadni an armaa gaditti kennu akka karaa tokkotti ha fudhatamun jedha malee, barsiisotni karaa isa baran dhiisanii isa kana ha fudhatanu hin jedhu.

Yaadni haaraan ani kenuu fedhu lama. Tokko, dura dubbachiiftoota eega barsiisanii booda, akkan armaa olitti agarsiise, jechoota dubbachiiftootaan jalqabamanu fakkeenya kennuu wayyan jedha. Lama, warri amma dubbachiiftuu dheeraa isa kana **"aa"** duwwaa dubbifamtootatti qindeessanii barsiisanu, maaliif dubbachiiftota kurdhanuu dubbifamtoota booda ykn fuul dura buusanii hin barsiifne?

Yaadi koo inni lammaffaa, inni haaraan, qubeewwan Oromo akka armaa gadiitti **(3)** fi **(1)** walitti qindeessanii barsiisuu wayya kan jedhu. Isa armaa gadii barsiisuuf yeroon dheeraan yoo ramadame wayya.

**(4) ba, baa, be, bee, bi, bii, bo, boo, bu, buu**

**ca, caa, ce, cee, ci, cii, co, coo, cu, cuu**

**cha, chaa, che, chee, chi, chii, cho, choo, chu, chuu**

**da, daa, de, dee, di, dii, do, doo, du, duu**

dha, dhaa, dhe, dhee, dhi, dhii, dho, dhoo, dhu,  
dhuu

fa, faa, fe, fee, fi, fii, fo, foo, fu, fuu

ga, gaa, ge, gee, gi, gii, go, goo, gu, guu

ha, haa, he, hee, hi, hii, ho, hoo, hu, huu

ja, jaa, je, jee, ji, jii, jo, joo, ju, juu

ka, kaa, ke, kee, ki, kii, ko, koo, ku, kuu

la, laa, le, lee, li, lii, lo, loo, lu, luu

ma, maa, me, mee, mi, mii, mo, moo, mu,  
muu

na, naa, ne, nee, ni, nii, no, noo, nu, nuu

nya, nyaa, nye, nyee, nyi, nyii, nyo, nyoo, nyu,  
nyuu

pha, phaa, phe, phee, phi, phii, pho, phoo,  
phu, phuu

qa, qaa, qe, qee, qi, qii, qo, qoo, qu, quu

ra, raa, re, ree, ri, rii, ro, roo, ru, ruu

sa, saa, se, see, si, sii, so, soo, su, suu

sha, shaa, she, shee, shi, shii, sho, shoo, shu,  
shuu

ta, taa, te, tee, ti, tii, to, too, tu, tuu

wa, waa, we, wee, wi, wii, wo, woo, wu,



wuu

**xa, xaa, xe, xee, xi, xii, xo, xoo, xu, xuu**

**ya, yaa, ye, yee, yi, yii, yo, yoo, yu, yuu**

Qubeewwan akka (4) armaa oliitti eega qopheeffatee booda, lafa ijoolleen hundi qubee arguu danda'nu ijaajjee, waan akka uleetiin qubeewwanitti bububbu'aa, sagalee qubeen iddoo bu'u deddeebisee jedha. Yoo teeppii qabaate ammoo, dhiirri nii fi dubartiin qubeewwan akka teeppii irratti jedhanu eega godhee booda, teeppicha dhageessisa. Isuma jedhe ykn dhageesise sana, dura ijoollee hunda jechisiisa. Asi irratti wacinii fi nuffiin akka hin baay'anne of eeggachuun barbaachisaa dha. Itti aansee barattoota/ijoollee garuu **B**, garuu **C**, garuu **D** faa jedhee moggaasee, garuwwan hunda jechisiisa. San booda, amma hunda isaanii wal gawutti tokko tokkoon isaanii akka jedhanu godha. Waan tokko deddeebifnee yoo dhageenye sammuu keenyaatti qabata jedhu mitii?

Barsiisaan qubeewwan jecha uumuu danda'nutti ulee qabaa, barattootni biffaa fi sagalee baraa, waluma faana ammoo jecha uumuu akka danda'anu gochuu ni danda'a. Fakkeenyaaf, dura dubbachiiftootaan jalqabee, warra (1) fi warra (4) jala jiranutti ulee qabaa, daddafanii akka jedhanu yoo godhe barattootnii jechoota akka **a + boo, aa + daa, aa + duu, a + daa, a + duu (aboo, aadaa, aaduu, adaa, aduu)** faa uumuu danda'u.

Warra (4) jala jiranu warra akka "**ba + duu, baa + duu, dha + dhaa, bu + daa, bu + luu, dha + quu, ga + nuu, nyaa + ra, qa + luu, so + daa + chuu, ta + kaa + luu**" faa yoo daddafanii akka jedhanu godhe jechoota akka (**baduu, baaduu, dhadhaa, budaa, buluu, dhaquu, ganuu, nyaara, qaluu, sodaachuu, takaaluu**) uumsisuu danda'a. Yoo ammoo warri (4) fi (3) jala jiranu seeraan walitti qabaman, jechoota akka **bi + shaa + n, bo + r, foo + n, ka + m, ku + n, loo + n, (bishaan, bor, foon, kam, kun, loon)** uumu.

Suuta, suuta ammoo qubeewwan hima (sentence) uumuu danda'anutti ulee qaba. Fakkeenyaaf, "**bu + na; bi + ta; ma + na; qa + ba; ta + pha; ji + ra**" yoo daddafanii jedhanii,

himoota shan, jechuun, "**buna bita; buna qaba; mana jira; mana qaba; tapha jira**" uumu. Turanii turanii ammoo hima isa dheeraa armaa gadii kana faas daddafanii akka dubbisanu gochuun gaarii dha: na + moo + tii + ok + si + ji + nii, dhu + gaa + tii + fi + nyaa + taa, ma + lee + hin + ji + raa + ta + nu. ma + naa + fi + uf + fa + ta as + ar + ga + chu + qa + bu (Namootii oksijinii, dhugaatii, fi nyaata malee hin jiraatanu. Manaa fi uffatas argachu qabu). Hubadhu: Jechoota tokko tokkoon lakkaawun dubbisuu miti.

Akkanaan, barattootnii biffaa fi sagalee qubee qajeelchaniid eega barataniid booddee dha kan barsiisaan qubeessuu jalqabsiisuu. Qubeewwan hunda, jechootaa fi himoota dabalatee, ijoollummaa eegalanii sirriitti qubeessuu akka baranu gochuun dirqama barsiisaati. Jechooti nii fi himootni jarti qubeessanu ammoo warruma ofii isaaniitii uummatanu ta'uus ni danda'a. Kana gochuu gaafa danda'anu, barattootni jechi nii fi himii akka itti uumamanu baruu danda'aniiru jechuu dha.

Kana jechuun, dandeettiin barattootaa wal qixxee dha jechuu miti. Daa'imman tokko tokko dafanii lafaa ka'anii adeemu; dafanii afaan hiikkatu. Kaan kaan ammoo, eega haadhoolii fi abbootii isaanii yaaddeessanii booddee, turanii turanii adeemu; afaanis hiikkachuu eegalu. Barattootis akkanuma. Barattooti tokko tokko qubeewwan soddonii sadan yeroo gabaabaatti qulqulleffatanii jechootaa fi himoota qubeessuu jalqabu. Warra akkanaatiif barsiisaan qubeewwan warra fuul duratti barsiifamuuf yaalaman akka baran gochuu faa qaba. Barataa fuul durattan deema jedhuu gara duubaatti harkisuun gaarii miti. Barattootni tokko tokko yeroo dheeraa fudhatanii suuta suuta baruu. Barattooti yartuun ammo gatii rakkina afaan ingliziitiin "dyslexia or word blindness" jedhamu qabaachuu danda'nuuf, salphaatti dubbisuu baruu hin danda'nu. Barattooti akkanaa addaa addummaa qubee gidduu jiru hubachuun jara ha rakkisu malee, sammuu qaroo qabu.

Akki barsiisaan tokko barsiisu garuu, yeroo barattootni qubee baranii fixanu gabaabsuu yookaan dheeressuu ni danda'a. Barsiisaan karoora baafatee si'aan barsiisu yeroo gabaabaatti akka baranii qulqulleffatanu godha. Inni akka itti barsiisuu fi waan barsiisuu sirriitti qopheessee barattoota fuul dura hin

dhaabannee, yeroo dheeressa Inni barattoota (keessumattuu ijoollee) dhiphisu, ifatu, naasisu, sodaachisu, arrabsuu, rukutu, yeroo dheeressuu qofa osoo hin ta'in, barattooti tokko tokko gaafachuu, waan itti fakkaate dubbachuu faa akka sodaatanu godha. Kaan kaan ammoo abdi kutatanii mana barnootaa dhufuu akka dhiisanu gochuu ni danda'a Ijoolleen ijoollummaatti sodaachaa guddatanu ammoo fuul durattis mirga isaaniitii mormuu hin baranu ta'a.

Akkuma armaa olitti argine, jechootii dubbifamaan jalqabamanu gaaf hundumaa dubbifamaa tokko qofaan eegalamu. Warri dubbachiiftotaan jalqabamanu garuu, dubbachiiftuu gabaabaa yookaan dubbachiiftuu dheeraa dhaan jalqabamu. Armaa gaditti ammoo, dubbifamaa isa dacha'ee lama ta'ee jecha gidduu seenuu fi dubbifamaa addaa addaa lama ta'ee walitti qindaayee jecha gidduu seenu hubanna

(a) Dubbifamtooti dacha'anii lama ta'anii jecha gidduu seenanu kudha torba. Jarris **bb, cc, dd, ff, gg, jj, kk, ll, mm, nn, qq, rr, ss, tt, ww, xx, yy** dha. Kudha torbanuu gaaf hundumaa jabaa dha; gaaf hundumaas jecha gidduu qofatti mul'atu Dubbifamaan tokko qofni laafaa jedhama. Dubbifamaan awuu jecha gidduu seenu garuu, tokko yookiin lama ta'ee walitti aanee mul'achuu ni danda'a. Awuu tokko ta'ee jecha gidduu seenu fakkeenyaaf kana fakkaata: **gubaa, obaafachuu, rimaawuu**. Awuu dacha'ee lama ta'ee jecha gidduu seenu ammoo fakkeenyaaf kana fakkaata: **gubbaa, obbaafachuu, rimmaawuu**. Jabaachuu qofa osoo hin ta'in, dubbifamaan dacha'ee lama ta'ee alii al hiikas ni jijjira.

Awuu (2) fi (4) walitti qindeessinu, dubbifamaa dacha'ee jechoota dubbachiiftotaan eegalmanu gidduu seenu uumna. Fakkeenyoota kana ilaali: **ab + baa, af + fee + luu, ag + ga + achuu, ak + koo, eeb + ba, ib + boo, ob + boo, ur + raa, am + moo, (abbaa, affeeluu, aggachuu, akkoo, eebba, ibboo, obboo, urraa)** Warra (4) fi (4) gidduu jiranutti yoo dubbifamaa isa dacha'uu danda'u daballe ammoo jechoota kana uumna: **ja + b + bii, qa + c + cee, ga + d + da, re + f + faa, wa + g + gaa, ba + j + jii, to + k + ko, tuu + l + laa, ri + m + ma (jabbii, qaccee, gadda, reffa, waggaa, bajjii, tokko, tuullaa, rimma)**.

(b) Dubbifamaan addaa addaa lama ta'ee walitti qindaayee, jecha gidduu seenu hedduu dha. Inni akkanaa gaafa hundumaa laafaa dha Warri akkanaa akka itti uumamanuu kan agarsiisuu seerri hin qoratamne Garuu, yoo warra (2) fi (4) jala ykn warra (4) fi (4) jala jiranu giddutti (3) dabballe, dubbifamaa addaa addaa lama walitti aanee jechoota dubbifamaan eegalamanu gidduu seenu agarsiisuu ni dandeenya. Fakkeenyoota kana xiinxali: (4) + (3) + (4) bu + l + tii, cu + n + qu + r + suu, da + f + qa, du + r + ba, so + n + dii (bultii, cunqursuu dafqa, durba, sondii) uumna. Awuu (2) fi (4) walitti qindeessinu ammo jechoota dubbachiiftuun eegalamanu warra akka ar + ba, ar + ma, ar + ka, il + ma, or + ma (arba, arma, atka, ilma, orma) faa uumna Awuu warra (2) fi (4) gidduu jiranutti (3) daballu, jecha isa akka ur + gee + f + fa + chuu (urgeeffachuu) faa uumna **Hubadhu**: Dubbifamaan sadii walitti aanee jecha gidduu hin seenu! Fakkeenyaaf, harkka miti; harka malee.

(c) Dubbifamtooti jaha hin dachaafamanu Jarris: **ch, dh, h, ny, ph, sh** dha. Yoo dubbachiiftuun jara ordofo, **ch** nii fi **ny** ni jabaatu. **shn** gara caalu laafaa dha. Warri hafan, jechuun, **dh** nii fi **phn** jabaachuus laafuus ni danda'u. Akka itti jabaatanu kan agarsiisanu mal'atootni addaa addaa jiru Garuu, amma har'aatti kana wayya jennee hundi keenya walii galtee kan filatne hin jiru.

(d) Dubbifamaan hudhaa jedhamus jira. Mal'atoon isaa " ' " kana fakkaata. Akkan amma yaaduutti hudhaan " ' " iddoo **h** yookaan iddoo **dh** bu'a. Fakkeenyoota kana hubadhu:

hoolaa ykn 'oolaa  
 hooduu ykn 'ooduu  
 hardha ykn har'a  
 baldhaa ykn bal'aa

Warra (a), (b), (c), (d), lakkofsota ( 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) fi qubeewwan gurguddoo (A, B, C, D, Y) ol kaayanii eger barsiisuu wayya jedheen yaada Garuu, murtiin kan barsiisaati.

Barattootii qubeewwan soddomii sadan kana sirriitti baruu fi dhiisuu isaanii xiinxaluuf jecha, gaaffilee addaa addaa gaafachuun barbaachisaa dha. Gaaffilee addaa addaa barsiisaan tokko gaafachuu danda'u hundaa fi akka itti gaafatu asi irratti

qubeessuun hin danda'amu. Fakkeenyaaf, barattooti iddoo duwwaatti qubee isa barbaachisaa ta'e guutani jechootaa fi himoota akka uumanu gochuun karaa tokko. Fakkeenyota armaa gaditti kennaman ilaali:

Iddoo duwwaatti dubbifamaa guutii jechoota uumi:

- a) a ... a (deebii: akka, ala, amma, ana, aqa, arba, arka, arma, ...)
- b) aa ... aa (deebii: aadaa, aagaa, aajaa, aamaa, aanaa, aaraa, aasaa...)
- c)

Iddo duwwaatti duubbachiiftuu guutii jechoota uumii:

- a) b ... nuu (deebii: banuu, boonuu ...)
- b) q ... uu (deebii: qaaruu, qaruu, qooruu, qoruu...)

## Xumura

Ijoolleen dandeettii dhaan addaa addaa ijaa ta'aniif, karaan ittiin baruu danda'anus addaa addaa ta'un ni mala Tokko tokko fakkeenyota hedduu xiinxalanii, ofuma isaaniitiin seera afaanii hubatu. Tokko tokko ammoo darbee darbee seerri afaanii eega itti himamee booda, fakkeenyoiti hedduun akka kennamanuuf fedhu Barsiisaan tokko akka itti barsiisuu, jechuun karaa isaa fi barattoota isaatii mijaawuu filachuuf mitga qaba jedheen yaada. Barsiisoti karaa kamiyyuu haa barsiisanu kaayyoon, qubeewwan soddonii sadan kana arattootii/ijoolleen yeroo gabaabaatti qulqulleefatanii baranii, dubbisuu fi qubeessuu akka danda'anu gochuu dha. Kana goonaan, sabni Oromo doofummaa keessaa bayee, saba dubbisuu fi qubeessuu beeku ta'ee, dubbisuu fi qubeessuu aadaa isaa godhatee dhalootaa fi dhalootatti dabarfata jedheen yada

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<sup>1</sup> Although accurate statistical data are not available, the language is the third or fourth largest language in Africa

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# Looga Oromoo Walloo (Wallo Oromo Dialect)

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## Seensaa

Barreessaan kun qorannoo sadaasa bara 1999 keessa naannoo Oromiyaa, Wallo keessatti godhame irratti hundawe Qorannoon kunis Unibarsitii Humboldt kan Barliin keessatti afaan, barreessumsaa (ogbarruu) fi afoolaa (*oral literature*) Oromoo irratti adeemsifamu Karaa horiitiin dhaabbata qorannoo kana gargaare: "German Research Foundation- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" jedhamuuf galata addaan qaba.

## Guddina Afaan Oromoo

Afaan Oromoo hortee afaanota Afro-Asiyaa (Afro-Asian) jedhaman keessaa tokko yoo tahu, ramaddiin isaa afaanota Kuush keessatti gala. Afaanonna Kuushii kun biyyoota Afrikaa saddeet jechuun: Sudaan, Misira (Gibxii), Ertiraa, Itooppiyaa, Jibuutii, Somaaliyaa, Keeniyaa fi Taanzaniyaa keessatti kan dubbataman gara afurtamaa olii tahu. Afaan Oromoo afaanota Kushii kan tahan: Somaalee, Afaar, Koonsoo, Sidaamaa, Hadiyyaa, Beejaa fi Agawoo faa wajjin obbollummaa qaba. Hunda isaanii keessaas afaanota Somaalee, Afaar, Saahoo, Koonsoo fi Gidoollee faa wajjin sirriitti walitti aana.

Afaan Oromoo biyyoota Gaafa Aftikaa sadii, jechuunis: impaayera Tooppiyaa, Keeniyaa fi Somaaliyaa keessatti namootaa hedduun akka afaan dhalootatti (afaan abbaahadhaatti) dubbatama. Kunis Tigraay kibbaa hara Ashangee irraa kaasee hamma maanya Hindiitti (Indian Ocean), daangaa Sudaan irraa kaasee hamma Jijjigaa cinaattii dubbatama. Uumaata miliyoonii soddoonii shan (35,000,000) ol tahuutu akka afaan dhalootaatti isaan tajaajilama Akka afaan lammaffaa yookaan sadaffaatti immoo namoota miliyoonii saddeetitu (8,000.000) isa

dubbata. Keeniyaa kaaba fi impaayera Itoopphiya gara kibbaa fi lixaattii warra Oromoo hin taane, hedduuf afaan qunnamtii (lingua franca) ti. Afaan kun ardii Afrkaa keessatti afaan Arabaa, afaan Iswaahilii fi afaan hawusaatti aanee sadarkaa afraffaa irratti argama.

Haatahu malee, afaan Oromoo afaan miliyoonotaa tayee otoo jiruu, miiddhaa fi roorroo saba Oromoo irra gayeen kan ka'e, hamma dhiyeenya kanaattii (hamma bara 1992-tti) afaan haasawaa callaa ture. Erga mootummaan Habashaa (Abyssinia) meeshaa waraanaa, ogeeyyii waraanaa, gorsituu waraanaa fi gargaarsa barbaachisaa tahe humnoota Ortoppaa irraa argachuun bardhibba dabre keessa biyya Oromoo cabsuun koloneeffatee asii, bakka afaan, aadaa, seeraa fi sirna Oromoo kan watta Amaaraa bu'uun isaa waan nama falmisiisuu miti. Koloneeffattoonni Habashaa mooticha Minilik irraa kaasee hamma Mallas Zeenawiitti qawween Biyya Oromoo seenanii, qawwee boraafatanii uummata kana bituun isaanii dhugaa ifa jiru. Marti isaanii leccaloo fi qabeenya saba Oromootiin: aadaa, afaani fi biyya isaanii ijaarrachuun isaanis waan beekame.

Ammoo, uummanni Oromoo hacuuccaa fi roorroo hamaa kana tolaan baatetoo hin teenye. Akka yeroo fi humni isaa hayyameefitti ofirraa faccisaa ture Ammas ofuma irraa faccisaati jira. Bakka akeeka isaa gayuu baatullee, qabsoo hadhooftuu bara dheeraaf adeemsise irraa kan ka'een, humnuma ofitiin bu'aalee tokko tokko argatee jira. Kunoo amma Afaan Oromoo Oromiyaa keessatti afaan hojii tahuudhaan: afaan manneen barumsaa, afaan manneen seeraa, afaan piresii (presse) fi miidiyaa tayeetoo jira. Kunis akka jarri motummaa, isaan biyya bitaa jiran odeessan san keennaa isaanii otoo hin tayin, gumoo (firii) qabsoo uummata saba ti. Dabalees, rifoormii (bu'aa) qabsoo uummata Oromootiin argame kana sababeeffachuun: "bilisummaan argameeraa amma misoomaaf socho'uu dha" warra jedheetoo olola oofaa jirus saaxila baasuun barbaachisaa taha.

Rifoormii karaa Afaan Oromoo tahe kanas ibsuun gaarii dha. Har'a ijoolleen Oromoo Finfinnee (Shaggar) irraa kan hafe, kutaa tokkoffaa hamma sadeetiitti barumsa mara Afaan Oromootiin baratu. Afaan Amaaraa kutaa shanaffaa irraa hamma kudhalamaffaatti akka afaan tokkoo duwwaatti barsiifama. Kutaa saglaffaa irraa hamma kudhalamaffaatti Afaan



Oromoo akka barumsa tokkoottis ni kennama. Bara 1998 fi 1999 bartoonni Oromoo qormaata kutaa kudhalamaffaa (maatrikii), yeroo jalqabaaf afaan isaanitiin fudhatanii jiru. Kanaafuu, erga Afaan Oromootiin qormaata fudhatanii booda, maatrikii warri dabran lakkoofsaan kan durii irra caalu

Ijoolleen nafxanyootaa isaan Oromiyaa keessa jiran, akka Afaan Oromoo hin baramnee, akka qubeen hin fudhatamneef qabsoo duubatti-hafaa kan haqa fi mirga ilmoo namaa dura dhaabatu gochuun isaanii waan beekame. Ammoo, uummanni fi ijoolleen Oromoo ammas qabsoo kana itti fufanii, yaada kana dura dhaabachaa jiru. As irratti jaalallii fi fedhiin ijoollee Oromoo afaan ofiitii qabani baay'ee nama gammachiisa. Akkunuma barsiisotnii fi barattootin Oromoo afaan ofii guddisuu fi misoomsuuf, gochi isaan gochaa jiran abdii guddaa namaa kenna. Kanaafi, manneen barumsaa gara caalaan keessatti kilabiin Afaan Oromoo lalisaa kan jiru. Fakkeenyaaf, Magaalaa Walisoo mana barumsaa sadarkaa lammaffaa tokko keessatti barattoonni dhibba keessaa jaatamii jaha (66%) kilabii Afaan Oromoo keessatti qooda fudhachaa jiru. Barattoonni sabeewwan biraas akka mana barumsaa kana keessa jiran yoo hubatame, lakkoofsi kun hedduu nama raajeffachiisa.

Ijoolleen Oromoo kitaabota malee, afaan isaanii barachaa jiru jechuun ni dadayama. Hanqinni kitaabotaa kan Afaan Oromoo duwwaa otoo hin tayin, kan barumsa biraas ni jira. Barattoota kudhan faatu kitaaba tokko duwwaatti dhimma baha. Qabeenyi saba Oromoo dabales, gibirrii fi qaraxni uummanni kun baasu walbira qabameetoo yoo ilaalame, bu'aan mootummaa irraa uummanni Oromoo argatu yartuu dha. Kun roorroo roorroo caalu jechuun ni dandayama.

Uummanni Oromoo afaan ofiitiin dubbisuu fedha. Gaazexoonni fi kitaabawwan Afaan Oromootiin bayaa turan, *midhhaa addaddaa irraa kan ka'een amma tokkollee hin jirani*. Mootummaan ammaa kan Dargii irraa dhaale, gaazexaan Bariisaa torbanitti gaaf tokko duwwaa maxxanfamee baya. Garuu, gaazexaa mootummaan baasuu uummanni akka gaazexaa ololaatti ilaalla. Namni isa dubbisuuf fedhuyyuu akka laayyootti argachuu hin dandayu. Kana baafne akka jedhamuufi malee, gabaa irratti hin argamuu.

Daddhabbiin, gufuun, hakuuccaa fi roorroo baay'een ammas Afaan Oromoo irra jiraatullee, har'a akka durii Afaan Oromoo

afaan haasaa (oral language) duwwaa miti. Akkuman kanaa olitti ibse, qabsoo ijoollee Oromoo irraa kanaa ka'een amma afaan barreessii (literary language) tayeetoo argama Ogbarruun (literature) isaas harra kan durii caala ida'amaa jira.

Rifoormiin armaa olitti kaase irraa kan ka'aneen, akka waan Afaan Oromoo hacuuccaa fi roorroo jalaa bayeetti fudhachuun hin dandayamu Hanga Oromiyaan harkoota koloneeffattootaa jala jirtutti afaan saba kanaas harkootuma san jala jirata Kanaaf, uummanni rifoormii qabsoo ofiitiin argate kanatti dhimma bayaa, tokkummaa isaa jabeessuun bilisummaa isaatii walqabateetoo gara fuul duratti tarkaanfachuu qaba.

### Oromoo Walloo

Akka mootummaan amma impaayera Itoopphiya itti qoodetti, Oromoon Walloo Oromiyaa jala hin jiru. Godinni Oromoo kun kan ramadame naannoo Amaaraa jalatti. Dhimmi isaas kan ilaalamu gara magaalmetaa Oromiyaa, gara Finfinnee dhaqee otoo hin ta'in, gara Biyya Habashaa Baar Daaritti dabree ti. Naannoo Wallo jedhamu keessaa Wallo inni Afaan Oromoo dubbatu godina tokko kan mataa isaa dandaye, "Godina Oromiyaa" jedhamu jalatti ramadame. Oromoonni Walloo warri afaan Amaaraa dubbatan, kan afaanuma Oromoo dubabatan keessaas gatiin Wallo Kaabaa fi Wallo Kibbaa jedhameeti warra Amaaraa wajjin jira. Egaa, godinoonni sadanuu "Naannoo Amaaraa" jala jiru Har'a Oromoonni Walloo karaa afaanitiin bakka lamatti qoodamu. Warra Afaan Oromoo dubbatanii fi warra Afaan Oromoo irraanfatanii Afaan Amaaraatiin dhimma bayaa jirani.

Ammaan tana yaadundeen (*concept*) Oromoo Afaan Oromoo dubbatuu fi Oromoo Afaan Amaaraa dubbatu kan jedhamu, Oromoota Walloo keessumaayyuu warra baratan keessatti fudhatamaa jira. Warri Afaan Amaaraa dubbatan garri hedduu caalan naannoo baddaa keessa jiraatu Karaa amanti warri afaan lachuu dubbatan muslimoota Warrumti Afaan Amaaraa dubbatanis "nuti Amaaraa" ofiin hin jedhani. Yoo namni gaafate "nuti Walloyyee dha" jedhu. Ammoo, oggaa itti hiqanii gaafatan, "sanyiin keenya Oroma" jedhu. Oroma jechuun Wallootti Oromoo jechuu dha. Namni tokko yoo isaaniin Amaaraa jedhe, baay'ee hin jaalatani. Amaaraa jechuun akkuma naannoo Harargee, "Kiristaana" jechuus waan dabalatuuf, kun hedduu isaan rifaachiisa. Hayyoolëyyiin Walloo warri Afaan Amaaraa

dubatan, “nuti Afaan Amaaraa dubbanneef, Amaaraa hin taane, hin taanuus! Dhaloota, seenaa, aadaa fi dammaqiinsa keenyatu Oromummaa keenya agarsiisa. Kanaaf, Oromoota naannoo biraatii kun galuufii qaba” jedhu.

Oromoota Walloo warra amma har’aattuu Afaan Oromootiin dhimma bayan yoo ilaalle immoo, naannoo baddadarree fi gammoojjii jiraatu. Dammaqiinsi isaan Oromummaaf qaban kan Oromoota naannoo Oromiyaa jiraatani irra yoo caale amaltee, sanaa gadii miti. Fedhiin bilisummaaf qabanis sonaan nama raajeffachiisa Erga ijaarsoni Oromoo warri mootummaa fi caffee Itooppiyaa keessaatti qooda fudhatan gadi dhiisanii bayanii booda, waraana cimaatu Oromoota Walloo fi waraana Wayyaanee jidduutti godhame Oromoonni Walloo warri Afaan Oromoo dubbatan akka nama tokkootti ka’uudhaan, akka Oromiyaa jalatti ramadaman, akka manneen barumsaa fi hojii Afaan Oromootiin adeemsifaman gaafatani Isaan irraayyis, warra Wayyaanee irraayis nama danuutu miidhame Warra Wayyaanee irraa abbaa duulaa isaanii kan beekametu du’e. Booda haalli sun warra biyya keenya bituuf, sodaachisaa waan tureef, Mallas ofii isaatiin dhaqee jaarsa biyyaa walitti qabee gaafate. Kanaaf, gaafiiwwan uummataa keessaa akka inni afaanii mirkanaawuuf, godina tokko godhaame.<sup>1</sup>

Godinni Walloo inni “Oromiyaa” jedhamee waamamu kun aanolee sadiitti qoodama. Isaanis: 1) Arxummaa fi Jillee, magaalaa mataa: Sambatee 2) Dawwaa fi Caffaa, magaalaa mataa: Kamisee fi 3) Baatii, magaalaa mataa: Baatii dha. Dabalees magaalaa mataa kan “Godina Oromiyaa Walloo” kun Kamisee dha. Miiddhaa fi roorroon warra kana irra ture, naannolee Oromiyaa keessaa Harargee fi Arsiin walfakkaata. Manneen barumsaa naannoo kanatti waan xinnoo turaniif, namoonni barachuuf carraa hin arganne. Kanaaf, naannoon kun hanqina namoota baratani hedduu qaba. Naannoo kanatti afaan hojii Afaan Oromoo ti. Kutaa tokkoo hamma kutaa sadeetiitti barumsi Afaan Oromootiin keennamu jalqababamee jira. Waajjiri mootummaas Afaan Oromootiin adeemsifamaa jira. Oromoonni Walloo obbolaa isaanii irraa “addaan baafamanii” gara Biyya Amaaraatti dabalamuun, daran isaan aarsaa jira “Sidaamnillee [Amaarillee] biyya keenya cabsee qabate malee, Gondor jala nu hin galchine Wayyaaneen garuu, obbolaa keenya irraa nu qooddee Gondor [Baar Daar] nu geessite”; jedhu

Oromoonni Walloo! Naannoo kaanitti aadaan, afaan, seenaa fi dammaqiisni Oromummaa hedduu cimaa dha.

### Looga Oromoo Walloo

Loogawwan Afaan Oromoo irratti qorannoon hedduu hin godhamne, jechuun ni dandayama. Akka beektonni loogawwanii ibsanitti Afaan Oromoo loogawwaan guguddaa afuritti qoodama. Kunis: 1) Macca (looga Lixaa 2) Tuulama (looga Jiddu-galeessaa) 3) Hararii fi Karrayyuu (looga Bahaa) 4) Arsii, Boorana, Gujii, Orma, Gabra, Ajuraan, Waata faa (looga Kibbaa). Qoodamni loogawwan Afaan Oromoo kun dimshaashumatti kan jedhame malee, qorannoon baldhinaan irratti godhame miti. Fakkeenyaaf, loogni Arsii kan Hararii fi kan Tuulamaa wajjin walbira qabameetoo hin qoratamne. Kan Walloo fi Raayyaa ramaddiin isaani hin beekamne (Gregg, 1982; Stroemer, 1987; Owens, 1985).

Loogawwan kana irratti qorannoon godhame Booranaa fi Macca keessaa kan Wallaggaa irratti yoo tahu, warra hafan irratti kan adeemsifame hedduu xiqqaa dha. Looga Arsii, Tuulamaa, Raayyaa fi Walloo irratti wanni qoratame hin jiru jechuun ni dandayama. Ani akkan argetti Wallo looga Arsii, kan Tuulamaa fi kan Hararitti dhiyaata. Keessumaayyuu kan Harar wajjin ramadamuun isaa ni mala. Garuu, kun qorannoo cimaa waan barbaachisuuf amma irra dabrame.

Loogni Oromoo Walloo garaagarummaa hedduu xixiqqoo of-keessaa qaba. Garaagarummaan kunis waanuma loogawwan cufa keessatti argamu. Loogni Oromoo Walloo bakka sadiitti qoodamu dandaya Isaanis: 1) Jillee 2) Daawwee fi 3) Baatii jedhamu. Jilleen karaa tokko tokko looga Tuulamaatti yoo aanu, Baatiin immoo irra-caalaa looga Hararitti aana. Warri Jillee akkuma Tuulamaa fi Maccaa lakkoofsa tarree “\_ffaa”-n ijaaaru. Fakkeenyaaf: tokko – tokkoffaa, lama – lammaffaa, sadii – sadaffaa, ... jedhu. Warri Baatii immoo akkuma Oromoo Harar, “\_\_eessaa” –n lakkoosfa tarree ijaaru. Jechuun: lama – lammeessaa, sadii – sadeessaa, afur – afreessaa, .. jedhu. Kana malees, warri Jillee fi Daawween lakkoofsa kudha-tokko irraa hamma kudha- sagaliitti (11-19), akkuma Tuulamaa, Maccaa, Hararii fi Arsiitti dubbatu. Jechuun: kudhan, kudha takka/tokko, kudha lama, kudha sadii . . . jedhu. Warri Baatii garuu, akka

Oromoo Booranaatti lakkaawu Jechuun kudhan: kudhanii takka, kudhanii lama, kudhanii sadii, . . . jedhu. As irratti “\_ji”-n “fi” tahuun isaa yaadatamuu qaba. “Kudhanii takka” jechuun ‘kudhanii fi takka/tokko’ jechuu dha. Eebba Oromoo kan Oromiyaa Wiirtuu keessatti, fakkeenyaaf: “Namaa s’aa nagaa!” jechuun “Namaa fi sa’aa nagaa” jechuu dha.

Dabalees, loogni Oromoo Walloo (sadanuu) akkuma Oromoota Harar jidduu jechayyaalee gariitti “h” galchu. Fakkeenyaaf: bahuu, nagaha (warri Harar garuu: nagaya) nuhi, faa. Oromoonni Walloo akka Oromoota Wallaggaa bakka tokko tokkotti iddoo “cha” “sh” buusu. Fakkeenyaaf: “bushuu – bulchuu; oolshuu – oolchuu; galshuu – galchuu faa Karaa bakka maqaa qabeenyaa (*possessive pronoun*) loogni Walloo kan Tuulamaa, kan Arsii, kan Booranaa fi kan Harar faa wajjin tokkummaa qaba Loogawwan Afaan Oromoo keessaa kan bakka maqaa qabeenyaa, kan dhiiraa fi dhalaa addaan hin baafne looga Maccaa duwwaa dha. Loogni Maccaa dhiiraanis, dubartiinis “koo” jedha. Loogawwan Oromoo hundi garuu, “koo/kiyya, too/tiyya, keenya/teenya, kan/tan” jedhu Egaa, loogni Walloos kana sirriitti addaan baasa. Fakkeenyota: “Abbaa koo/kiyya, obboleessa koo/kiyya.” Akkasumas, “haadha tiyya/too, obboleettii tiyya/too.” Oromoon Maccaa garuu: abbaa koo, haadha koo, obolleessa koo, obboleettii koo” jedha.

Loogni Oromoo Walloo kan ani qoraddhe warra kanaa olii qofaa dha; jechuun: Jillee, Dawwee fi Baatii Oromoota Wallo warra baddaa keessa jiraatanii fi warra Afaan Amaaraa dubbatan keessas dabree dabree qoraddheen jira. Isaan keessaas gatiin Afaan Oromoo ni dubbatu Fakkeenyaaf: Warra Qaalluu faa. Otoo warri kun hunduu afaan Oromoo hin irraanfatin atattamaan qorannoon godhamuutu barbaachisa dha.

### **Walbira Qabiisa Loogawwan Oromoo Tokko Tokko**

Ogeeyyiin afaanii afaanonni walfakkaattii isaanii, yookaan loogawwan afaan tokko keessa jiran hammam akka walitti dhiyaatan hubachuuf, malawwan ittiin dhimma bayan keessaa inni tokko jechayyaalee hundee ti (*basic words*). Jechayyaaleen tun lakkoofsaan dhibba tokko tahu. Afaanonni lama walbira qabamaniitoo, yoo jechayyaalee hundee kana keessaa torbaatamni yookaan sanaa gadi walfakaatan afaanni sun afaan

tokko jedhamaniiti ramadamu. Yoommoo torbaatamaa ol tahan afaanota garaagaraati jedhamu. Dhugaa dha; afaanonni tokko tokko kan jechayyaalee isaanii keessaa torbaatama (70) ol walfakkaatan ni jiru. Garuu, dubbii polotikaa-tiif akka afaan lamaatti warri ramadamanis jiru. Fakkeenyaaf: 1) Afaan Ispaanyaa fi Afaan Portugaalii 2) Afaan Noorwee fi Afaan Iswiidini 3) Afaan Cheekii fi Afaan Islobaakiyaa

Loogawwan Afaan Oromo hedduu akka walitti dhiyaatan ogeeyyiin afaanii ni dubbatu. Hammam akka walitti dhiyaatan garuu sirriitti wanni qoratame hin jiru. Mee amma looga Oromoo Walloo fudhanne loogawwan Oromoo kan—Harar, Tuulamaa fi Macca Boruu (Macca “Shawaa”)—wajjin walbira qabnee haa ilaallu!

Wallo	Tuulama	Macca Boruu	Harar	Afaan Ingilizii
aara	haara	haara	haara	smoke
adii	adii	adii	adii	white
aduu	aduu	aduu	aduu	aduu
afaan	afaan	afaan	afaan	mouth
ajjeesuu	ajjeesuu	ajjeesuu	ajjeesuu	kill
ani	ani	ani	ani	I
arguu	arguu	arguu	arguu	see
arongaadee	magariisa	magariisa	magariinsa	green
arraba	arraba	arraba	arraba	tongue
ati	ati	ati	ati	you
baala	baala	baala	baala	leaf

baallii	baallee	baallee	baallii	feather
baatii	ji'a	ji'a	baatii	moon
beekuu	beekuu	beekuu	beekuu	know
bicaa	boora	boora	boora	yellow
biriruu	bararuu	bararuu	bararuu	fly
bishaan	bishaan	bishaan	bishaan	water
bishaan- daakuu	bishaan- daakuu	bishaan- daakuu	bishaan- daakuu	swim
biyyee	biyyee	biyyoo	biyyee	earth, soil
boquu	morma	morma	morma	neck
ciisuu	ciisuu	ciisuu	ciisuu	lie down
ciniinu	ciniinu	ciniinu	ciniinu	bite
cirracha	cirracha	cirracha	cirracha	sand
cooma	cooma	cooma	cooma	fat/grease
daaraa	daaraa	daaraa	daaraa	ash
deemuu	deemuu	adeemuu	deemuu	walk/go
diimaa	diimaa	diimaa	diimaa	red
duumessa	duumecha	duumessa	duumeysa	cloud
du'uu	du'uu	du'uu	du'uu	die
dhaabachu	dhaabachu	dhaabachu	dhaabachu	stand
dhagawuu	dhagawuu	dhagawuu	dhagayuu	hear

dhakaa	dhakaa	dhagaa	dhakaa	stone
dheeraa	dheeraa	dheeraa	dheeraa	long
dhiiga	dhiira	dhiira	dhiira	man/male
dhiira	dhiiga	dhiiga	dhiiga	blood
dhufuu	dhufuu	dhufuu	dhufuu	come
dhuguu	dhuguu	dhuguu	dhuguu	drink
ecgee	eegee	eegee	ecgee	tail
eenyu?	eenyu?	eenyu?	eenyu?	who?
foon	foon	foon	foon	flesh
funyaan	funyaan	funyaan	funyaan	nose
gaafa	gaafa	gaafa	gaafa	horn
garaa	garaa	garaa	garaa	belly
gogaa	gogaa	gogaa	gogaa	skin
goggogaa	goggogaa	goggogaa	goggogaa	dry
gubuu	gubuu	gubuu	gubuu	burn
guddaa	guddaa	guddaa	guddaa	big
gurra	gurra	gurra	gurra	ear
gurraacha	gurraacha	gurraacha	gurraacha	black
guutuu	guutuu	guutuu	guutuu	full
haarawa	haaraa	haaraa	haarawa	new



halkan	halkan	halkan	halkan	night
harka	harka	harka	harka	hand
harmee	harma	harma	harma	breast
hedduu	baay'ee	baay'ee	hedduu	many
hunda	hunda	hunda	hunda	ali
hundee	hundee	hundee	hundee	root
ibidda	ibidda	ibidda	ibidda	fire
ija	ija	ija	ija	eye
ilkaan	ilkaan	ilkaan	ilkee	tooth
injiraan	injiraan	injiraan	injiree	louse
jechuu	jechuu	jechuu	jechuu	say
jilba	jilba	jilba	jilba	knee
kana	kana	kana	kana	this
karaa	karaa	karaa	karaa	road
kennuu	kennuu	kennuu	kennuu	give
killee	buupphaa	inqaaquu	killee	egg
lafee	lafee	lafee	lafee	bone
lama	lama	lama	lama	two
maal?	maal?	maal?	maal?	what?
maqaa	maqaa	maqaa	maqaa	Name

mataa	mataa	mataa	mataa	head
miila	miila	miila	miila	foot
mishaa	gaarii	gaarii	gaarii	good
miti	moti	miti	miti	not
muka	muka	muka	muka	tree
naannahaa	naannoo	naannoo	naannawaa	round
naddhoo	naddheen	naddheen	naddhoo	woman
nama	nama	nama	nama	person
nuhi	nuti	nuti	nuti	we
nyaachuu	nyaachuu	nyaachuu	nyaachuu	eat
onnee	onnee	onnee	onnee	heart
oo'aa	hoo'aa	hoo'aa	hoowwaa	hot
qabbanaahaa	qorraa	qorraa	qabbanaawaa	cold
qeensa	qeensa	qeensa	qeensa	finger-nail
qolloffee	quncee	quncee	quncee	bark
qurxummii	qurxummii	qurxummii	qurxummii	fish
rafuu	rafuu	rafuu	rafuu	sleep
rifeensa	rifeensa	rifeensa	rifeensa	hair
rooba	rooba	rooba	rooba	rain
san	san	sana	san	that

sanyii	sanyii	sanyii	shanyii	seed
saree	saree	saree	saree	dog
shimbirroo	simbirroo	simbirroo	shimbirroo	bird
taa'uu	taa'uu	taa'uu	taa'uu	sit down
takka/tokko	tiruu	tiruu	tiruu	liver
tiruu	takka/tokko	tokko	takka/tokko	one
tulluu	tulluu	tulluu	tulluu	mountain
urjii	urjii	urjii	urjii	star
xinnaa	xiqqaa	xinnaa	xiqqaa	small

Mee dhugaa kanaa olii irraa kaanee, loogawwan sadan kanaa olitti kennaman keessaa isa kam looga Oromo Wallootti akka dhiyaatuu haa xiinxallu. As irratti waan ka'uu qabaatutu jira. Jechayyaaleen gariin tokkuma tayanii unkaa (form) garagaraa qabaachuu dandayu Fakkeenyaaf: "biyyee" fi "biyyoo" –n sagaleedhuma tokko. Akkanumas, "miti" fi "moti", "Shimbirroo" fi "simbirroo", "haarawa" fi "haaraa" –n akkuma jechayyaalee tokkootti lakkaawamuu qabu.

Jechayyaalee dhibban kanaa olii keessaa: 1) Walloo fi Tuulamni jechayyaalee 92 2) Walloo fi Macci Boruu jechayyaalee 92 3) Walloo fi Harar jechayyaalee 96 wajjin qabu. Kana irraa ka'uun, dabaleesoo sagaleewwan hedduu anaan walitti qabamanii fi caasaa hirmaata-duubbii irraa ka'ameetoo loogni Walloo fi kan Harar caalaa akka walitti aanan hubachuun ni dadayama Jechayyaalee Oromoo Walloo Keessaa Tokko Tokko

Jechayyaaleen Afaan Oromoo sonaan danuu dha. Loogawwan Oromoo kan wajjin qaban malee, kan mataa isaani sagaleewwan akkaan hedduu qabu Kunis guddinaa fi misooma Afaan Oromoo agarsiisa Mee ammaaf jechayyaaleen godina Walloo irraa walitti qabe keessaan, tokko tokko isiniif dhiyeessa. Hiikkoon isaaniis Afaan Ingiliziitiin kennamaniitoo jiru Haatahu malee, akka beekumsa jechoota keenya gabbifannuuf, cuftoo keessatti kanin moggoyyaalee (*synonyms*) isaani beeku itti dabaleen dhiyeessa.

- 1) baxxeessa = palm of hand (barruu, shanacha).
- 2) dakkara = incense (dakkarroo, libaanata)
- 3) dibboora = mat (gaaddetta, jibbaa).
- 4) duduba = mud (kan biyyee irraa bayu, “dhoqqee” – n isaan biratti kan loonii duwwaa dha)
- 5) dhugoo = limon (xuuxxoo, loonii).
- 6) feellaa = safety razor (shiggiree)
- 7) halkoo = silver (meeta, meetii) ; money (maallaqa).
- 8) jaratee = eelee sibiilaa, qibaabaa.
- 9) kaquu = to create (uumuu)
- 10) kontoo = wax (gagaa).
- 11) kuyyubboo = termite hill (koobii).
- 12) laahuu = bow (gooboo, futtaasee).
- 13) madhawa = rope (isaan "funyoo", "haada" ni beeku. dabalees “akata” ni jedhu).
- 14) murrii = direction (faallee)
- 15) namayyoo = relative ("fira" jechuun isaaniif "lammii" jechuu dha).
- 16) qartee = dwarf (gaagee).
- 17) qanyisuu = to be angry (aaruu).
- 18) qoyyee = vulture (ruumicha, joobira).
- 19) saggoda = common cold (utaaloo, dufkaka).
- 20) xulubuu = to jump (“utaaluu” –s ni beekuu).

## XUMURA

Kanaa olitti loogawwan Oromoo keessaa kan Walloo irratti yaada tokko toko isinii dhiyeesseen jira. Akkuman jalqaba irratti jedhe, qorannoon Afaan Oromoo irratti godhame xiqqoo dha.

Hamma ammaatti haalli polotikaa, Oromoonni afaan isaanii akka guddifataniif fi misoomfatan isaanii hin mijooftu. Haalli kun bara dheeraa danqaraa itti tayee tureera. Haalli polotikaa kun ammas danqaraa itti tahaatuma jira Kana ibsuuni fi saaxila baasuun hedduu barbaachisaa dha. Afaan Oromoo guddisuu fi misoomsuuf Oromoonni hundumtuu hidhatanii ka'uu qabu! Kan nama gammachiisu garuu, harra Oromoota biratti sagaleewwan: Oromiyaa, qubee fi bilisummaa jedhaman hedduu jaalatamoo dha Ammaan tana Oromoonni baay'een bilisoomuuf qubee isaanii akka barachuu qaban; kana barachuunis bilisummaa isaanii akka gonfachuu qaban jabeessaniitoo dhaammatu.

Fedhii saba Oromoo gargaaruu fi qabsoo isaa fiixaan gawuuf, Oromoonni baratan hedduun qubee barsiisuu qabu Dubbii kana cimsanii hordofuuf, as irratti yaada tokko tokko dhiyeesuun mishaa taha. Mee innis kunoo:

- 1) Waldaan Qorannoo Oromoo (OSA-n) kora isaa kan waggaa irratti bakka guddaa Afaan Oromootii kennuu qaba Waraqatoota waggaa waggaan kora kana irratti Afaan Oromootiin dhiyaatanis maxxansee baasuu qaba
- 2) Oromoonni xinqooqa (saayinsii afaanii) akka barataniif ijoollee Oromoo jajjabeessuu
- 3) Warra Afaan Oromoo irratti qormaata gaggeessaa jiraniif, gargaarsa barbaachisaa taye hunda kennu.
- 4) Afaan kana waaltessuuf daran tattaaffii gochuu
- 5) Shaneen Afaan Oromoo akka hundeeffamuuf, Oromoonni hundumtuu carraaquu.
- 6) Afaan Oromoo baruu fi walbarsiisuuf, hidhataniitoo ka'uu
- 7) Warri baratee biyya alaa jiru, yoo xiqqaate gaazexaa tokko ji'a ji'aan Afaanuma Oromootiin baasuu.
- 8) Kitaabota afaanota biiroo irraa gara Afaan Oromooti deebisuu, hiikuu; kan Afaan Oromoos gara Afaanota birootti, keessumaa gara Afaan Ingiliziitti geeddarruu

Egaa yoo kana goone, Afaan Oromoo baldhachuu fi dafeetoo kana caalaa dagaaguu dandaya. Achumaanis hawwii fi qabsoon saba Oromoo fiixaan nuuf baha jechaa dha.

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<sup>1</sup> Kana manguddoota Oromoo Walloo irraan qorachuun dhagaye. Ammaaf, maqaa isaanii kaasuu hin barbaadu.

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## Review Essay:

*Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Alex de Waal. London: Hurst & Company, 2004. 279 pp. Paper.

This interesting book discusses not only Islamic radicalism in northeast Africa, but also military adventurism by the leaders of the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda, resulting in destabilization and massive human rights violations in the region. The book also brings to light how governments in the Horn of Africa partnered with insurgent movements to weaken or defeat their own opposition groups. For example, the Ethiopian regimes used the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). To stop the Ethiopian government's support for the SPLA, the Sudanese regime was forced to close down OLF base within its territory and cut off the organization's supply lines.

The geopolitics of the Horn of Africa affected the Oromo liberation struggle in more ways than one. Without any financial and military support from the outside world and without any friendly governments in the Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya, it is amazing how the OLF has continued to conduct armed struggle even intermittently. This reflects the determination of the Oromo to free themselves from the long colonial oppression and their unwavering support for the OLF, all of which will be mentioned briefly in the last section of this review. The first section of this review focuses on the factors that gave birth to militant Islamic ideology in the Nile Valley.

The crisis in the Muslim world, especially in the Middle East, started at the beginning of the nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup> This was dramatically demonstrated by Napoleon Bonaparte's conquest and occupation of Egypt in 1798. The rapid conquest of Egypt, the key province of the Ottoman Empire and the center of Islamic learning at the time, sent a shockwave throughout the Muslim world. This crisis resulted in European domination of the Muslim world during the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire itself was defeated and dismembered by



1918, completing the humiliation of Muslim power by European imperialism.

It was Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of secular modern Turkey, who abolished the Caliphate, the symbol of Muslim unity, in 1924. The unceremonious disappearance of the symbol of Muslim unity inspired Hassan al Bonna, a school teacher, to launch the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt in 1928. It was that society which gave birth to the phenomenon of political Islam, which was radicalized by a combination of factors including but not limited to authoritarian state power, prolonged warfare in northeast Africa, defeats and humiliations of Muslim societies, economic hardship and rapid pace of modernization, which threatened cherished Muslim values. This means, "Northeast Africa has been a laboratory for political Islam. The Nile Valley has been the incubator of radical Islamist theory and practice" (p. 1), resulting in great human tragedy including the ongoing genocide in the Darfur region of the Sudan.

Although the rise of political Islam and its radicalization has been discussed by several scholars previously, *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* is truly a major work. It is an excellent book that depicts the political and intellectual background out of which political Islam grew, the ramification of its radicalization, its key theoreticians, the strengths and weaknesses of their ideas, the successes and failures of Islamism, and its enemies, the callous disregard with which Islamist extremism was practiced in the Sudan, the folly with which Islamism discredited its moral grounding, bankrupted its ideological foundation and exhausted its political and spiritual resources, and the lessons to be drawn from the tragic experience. Anyone who is interested in understanding the mind-set of the authors of the tragedy of September 11, 2001, including Usama bin Laden, supporters of his banner, the American war on terror, and how despotic African leaders exploit terrorism to detain or eliminate their opponents will be rewarded by reading this book. It is a welcome and timely addition to the growing literature on political Islam and the ramification of its radicalization. Alex de Waal, the editor of the book under review, and the three other contributors are activist scholars, who have grounding in and an excellent grasp of the

economic and political dynamics of the countries of the Horn of Africa. The four contributors explore and examine "the phenomena of extremist Islamism, which claims that through the use of the revelation of Allah's will in politics, economics, and philanthropy all problems will be solved" (Preface V). Indeed, what the contributors to this book demonstrate is the exact opposite. Religious piety and divine intervention do not solve political and economic problems of the societies of the Horn of Africa. Instead, extremism in all forms, shapes, and ideological manifestations results in human misery and tragedy. Islamic extremism is the latest addition to the sickening phenomena born from the totalizing ideologies of the twentieth century.

The main concern of the book under review is "... a particular strand of militant Islamism that developed out of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt which has repeatedly incubated a violent jihadist fringe, and ... took control of the Sudanese state in 1989" (p. 3). Three individuals played a prominent role in this process. They were Hassan al Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Turabi. It was Hassan al Banna, who founded the Muslim Brothers, an organization that stresses voluntarism and provides "simple, tangible material assistance" to its members, who swear loyalty to God (p. 55). Ever since its foundation, Muslim Brothers has been serving as a key mechanism for Islamist political mobilization. Another major figure was Sayyid Qutb, an accomplished scholar, well-versed and all round intellectual, who wrote *Milestone* in 1964. His book was a masterpiece of historical scholarship, which provided the Islamists with "... a universal manifesto for jihad and a theorization of why national liberation was not enough."

*Jihad* is a concept that has been repeatedly misused by Muslim intellectuals and leaders against their opponents, both Muslims and non-Muslims. The term *jihad* has a double meaning. The first and most common surface meaning is a holy war conducted by Muslim community leaders against their enemies both non-Muslims and sometimes against other Muslims on ideological grounds. However, the second and the most profound meaning of *jihad* is the struggle within ourselves, the struggle to control our basic animal instincts, the struggle for purity of the heart and soul, the struggle to lead a moral and an

uplifting life, the struggle to be good human beings. From this perspective, *jihad* has nothing to do with conducting war against others.

What the learned Sayyid Qutb did was to ignore the real meaning of the *jihad* and exaggerate its surface meaning. As a result, he transformed the *jihad* into a powerful ideological weapon in the struggle for the creation of a new Islamic order. To do this, Qutb took "jihad out of political or historical context, and [created] it as a universal. This is a fascinating and important example of the impact of a pure idea on political life: these universalized components become the foundation of the 'global' jihad of a succeeding generation" (pp. 30-31). Sayyid Qutb's concept of *jihad* was further developed by Abdel Salam Farag and Abdalla Azzam, and was crudely implemented by Usama bin Laden in the name of "a defensive jihad, against the occupation of Palestine by Israel, and presence of the Americans in the holy places" (p. 49).

Of all Islamic theoreticians of the twentieth century, Hassan al-Turabi<sup>2</sup> is the most outstanding intellectual, whose scholarship is widely admired and greatly respected. This respect is based not only on the intellectual abilities of the learned Turabi, but also on his encyclopedic knowledge of Islamic philosophies and his attempt to broaden the horizon and widen the vision of Islamists

Hassan al-Turabi is one of the most outstanding thinkers and practitioners of political Islam. . . . Turabi is credited with having revolutionized Islamist thinking, making it compatible with the rights of women, democracy, and arts, and uniting together Sunni, Shia and Sufi philosophies. Turabi's experiment is an important and instructive exercise in broadening the Islamist political imagination. But it too has been shipwrecked on the rocks of reality, in part because of its inescapable embrace of violence (p. 75.)

Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim Brothers since 1964, dominated the Sudanese political landscape for over the last three decades. After the 1989 coup engineered by his cadres, Hassan al-Turabi transformed the Muslim Brothers into the

National Islamic Front (NIF) which controlled power in the Sudan. From 1964 to 1989, Hassan Turabi built his power base by capitalizing “... on the failures of his secular and leftists adversaries and on the polarization brought by the [Sudanese] civil war” (p. 81). During this period successive Sudanese regimes waged merciless war on the non-Arab population of the Southern Sudan. However, despite a huge loss of lives and greater devastation, the civil war turned out to be unwinnable. “The SPLA has proven that the people of Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile cannot be ruled against their will” (p. 106). It was this realization, which forced the Sudanese regime to search for a peaceful settlement. In 1989, Turabi’s cadres “... mounted a military coup, preempting by just a few days a peace settlement between Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi and SPLA leader John Garang” (p. 81). Once the NIF regime seized power in the Sudan, Hassan al Turabi cast his net wider.

Turabi’s ambitions were wider than the Sudan. He saw the Muslim world as an integral whole and positioned the Sudan as leader of radical Islam. By supporting Saddam Hussein in 1990, Turabi earned the wrath of the west... Most Muslim extremist groups converged on Khartoum including, famously, Usama bin Laden (p. 82)

Thus Turabi was the only theoretician, whose organization was able to capture state power through which “the NIF soldiers and businessmen plundered state assets” (p. 83) in the name of privatization.<sup>3</sup> The plunder of state assets which the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) members and cadres in Ethiopia carried out in the name of privatization was very similar, if not identical with that of the NIF regime in the Sudan. The only difference is the ideology each employed to achieve this goal. In the Sudan, the NIF regime used radical Islam for its plunder, while in Ethiopia, the TPLF used the cover of “democracy” to plunder the resources of southern Ethiopia for the double purpose of building Tigray and enriching TPLF leaders and their cadres. The NIF ruled Sudan conducted a brutal war in southern Sudan, in the Nuba Hills, Kordofan and

Darfur regions that led to a considerable loss of lives, destruction of property and uprooting of tens of thousands of people. The worst atrocities have been committed in the Darfur region, where genocidal war has been conducted.

The reality of war and the brutalities of suppression of dissent led to the thorough discrediting of the moral values that NIF claimed to uphold . . . The jihad has not led to the moral purification of the country and the mujahediiin: on the contrary, Sudan has seen the extreme degree of prostitution, corruption, and moral degradation (p. 106).

Three important points emerge from *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*. First, during the 1990s Usama bin Laden lived in the Sudan protected by the NIF regime. Usama used his wealth for establishing factories and creating jobs around Khartoum, the Sudanese capital. However, in 1996 when the United States administration attempted to take him into custody, it appears that the military leaders of NIF secretly offered to handover Usama bin Laden to the Americans

On 3 March [1996] General El Fathi Erwa (then serving in Khartoum, subsequently Sudanese ambassador to the UN) met with [two officials] and reportedly made an offer to hand over Usama bin Laden to the Americans. More contacts followed. However, the State Department and NSC did not consider the “offer” real. Indeed senior members have denied any knowledge of it . . . , instead they reportedly proposed that Usama be returned to Saudi Arabia . . . The Saudis had their own domestic reasons for not wanting to receive Usama back home; he was too much of a threat. In May, Sudan withdrew its “offer” and instead Usama departed for Afghanistan with several plane loads of militants, to assist the Taliban to prepare for their final assault on Kabul. It appears that the Sudan government and its senior officials helped themselves to many of his assets left behind (p. 221)

It is idle to speculate whether taking Usama into custody in 1996 would have averted the tragedy of September 11, 2001. What is for certain is that by early 1996 the U.S. administration had not yet fully grasped the danger posed by Usama's ideology of defensive *jihad* and the wide reach of his *Al Qaida* organization. What is more, pressuring Usama to depart for Afghanistan had provided him with an open political space from where he was able to touch "the nerve of the Muslim world" and articulate "... the rage of a generation of young Muslims that felt humiliated by America, Israel and the bankrupt autocracies that rule across the Arab world" (p. 9).

The second important point that emerges from the book under review is that political Islam has failed to capture state power, and even where it captured it in the Sudan, it miserably failed to deliver the people from the scourge of brutality, massive poverty, misery, lack of democratic governance, corruption and moral degradation. "As a method of building a real Islamic state and society in a real country, jihad has exhausted itself. The pure Islamist theory of transcendental struggle and divinely sanctioned violence to achieve the kingdom of God is theoretically bankrupt and politically impossible" (p. 22). But the enemies of Islamism in northeast Africa also failed to offer anything better.

The third important point that this book makes is the politics of destabilization in the Horn of Africa. In 1996, the United States administration described Isais Afeworki of Eritrea, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Yerwari Museveni of Uganda and Paul Kagame of Rwanda as the "new generation of African leaders" and the hope for "African renaissance". Such a description was dangerously misleading as some of these leaders are presiding over the destruction of large populations. Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia in particular has subjected the Oromo people and others to plunder and repression. These leaders have "formed an axis that looked as though it would reshape half the African continent" (p. 183). The first goal of this axis was to overthrow the NIF regime in the Sudan, spearheaded by Isais Afeworki who,

... saw himself as the most effective political leader in the region, and recognized a natural ally in Rwanda's

Paul Kagame. In 1996-97 Eritrea became deeply involved in Rwanda's Zaire campaign and subsequent political attempt to reconstitute the Democratic Republic of Congo (p. 202).

Interestingly, Eritrean military played a significant role in putting in power the late Laurent Kabila, who became the president of the democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 (p. 208). However, Alex de Waal forgot to add that it was also with the support of Eritrean military force, that the TPLF leaders were also able to destroy OLF military power in 1992 and consolidated their hold on power in Ethiopia. In February 1997, the TPLF "mechanized brigade launched a joint military operation in Sudan alongside the SPLA into southern Blue Nile and captured Kurmak and Geissan in a single day" (p. 209). The purpose was to deprive the OLF of its rear base and supply lines as "the Sudan government removed the OLF from the area and invited Ethiopian security to inspect the evacuated bases" (p. 210). As if that was not enough, in 1998, the TPLF troops crossed into Somalia and fought against Ogaden National Liberation front (ONLF) and the OLF "They also crossed into Kenya and attacked the OLF forces" (p. 213), killing many innocent Oromo speaking Kenyan citizens. Since 1992, Meles Zenawi has claimed time and again that his forces have destroyed the OLF. It is truly amazing how the OLF has survived the trials and tribulations of the past decade and a half. This proves that an organization that enjoys the support of the people can not be destroyed.

In 1998, with American support, Eritrea and Ethiopia would have overthrown the NIF regime in the Sudan, "had it not been for the decision of the leaders of both countries to fight against each other" rather than fighting on behalf of American interests. That decision was a gift from heaven for the NIF regime in the Sudan.

On 12 May 1998 the entire political landscape in the Horn changed when Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war over the disputed border area of Badme, a piece of rocky territory scarcely big enough to serve as a cemetery for the tens of thousands of young people

who were killed on both sides over the following 26 months. The war was a political gift for which Khartoum could never have dreamed. Hassan al Turabi was jubilant, saying that Allah had intervened and the weapons supplied by the Americans to Ethiopia and Eritrea were now being used by these countries against each other (p. 211).

Despite their differing religions and ideological perspectives, this book shows how leaders made constantly shifting alliances to defeat their opponents and retain power. For example, Eritrea supported the TPLF leaders to defeat the OLF military forces and consolidate their hold on power in Ethiopia in 1992. Both also collaborated to topple the NIF government of the Sudan in the 1990s, but failed. Eventually, the two regimes turned against each other in 1998. In May 2000, the Sudanese government supplied fuel to the 'TPLF army' to undertake a "... decisive offensive against Eritrea" (p. 212). It is amazing how the TPLF leaders managed to use both Eritrea and Sudan to win their own battles ensuring their hold on to power in Ethiopia. For over a decade and a half under different alliances of convenience in the Horn of Africa, the one constant in Ethiopia is Meles Zenawi, a Machiavellian who has perfected the art of deception and of divide and conquer. Currently, Meles Zenawi is presiding over the destruction of the Oromo society without provoking any international outrage.

A major weakness of the book under review is its neglect of the Oromo issue. The Oromo who constitute the single largest national group in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, whose territory is the most fertile in the region, who are destined to play a balancing role in the political landscape of the Horn of Africa should have received the attention they deserve in this book. The book also suffers from a number of factual errors. Let me just mention only a few of them. First, Alex de Waal claims that the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) founded by Sheikh Jarra in 1985 received assistance from Somalia (p. 205). The IFLO which was founded in 1980 did not receive any assistance from Somalia. On the contrary, Sheikh Jarra (whose real name is Abdulkarim Haji Ibrahim) was imprisoned by the government of Somalia for five years.



It may be helpful to point out that Jarra has been a long standing Oromo nationalist. His political activism and concern for Oromo issues go back to his early school years. In 1961, as high school student, he organized the first union of Oromo students in the city of Harar. Then, when the Oromo were officially called by the derogatory name of 'Galla', it was remarkable that Jarra was a politically conscious student and had realized the importance political organization for the freedom of the Oromo. Jarra was the chairman of the student union he established, while Ahmed Mohammed Yusuf was its secretary. Taha Ali Abdi, one of the founders of the OLF, Jamal Ali Abdi and the writer of this article were some of its members. Jarra also participated in the armed struggle in Bale region in 1966 and 1967 before he went to the Middle East, to receive a year long military training with several other Oromo nationalists. However, Jarra and his group were captured in northern Somalia by the military force of General Said Barre, in November 1969, while trying to return to Ethiopia to launch a guerrilla war against the Ethiopian regime. They were detained by the government of Somalia until 1975. Following the military take over in Ethiopia, Jarra was released from prison and taken to Mogadishu, the Somali capital, where he was asked by General Said Barre personally to join the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). Jarra refused to join the WSLF and secretly returned to Hararge where he started the first OLF military activities in 1976. It was during his five years detention in Somalia that Jarra realized that the government of General Said had its own ambition for colonizing the eastern part of Oromia. It was such realization which made Jarra a reflective and staunch Oromo nationalist. In the late 1970s, Jarra fought against the Somali forces who were attempting to occupy eastern Oromia, and the Ethiopian army who attempted to crush the insurgent Oromo movement. His participation in Oromo struggle since 1966 confirms his prominent role in the Oromo nationalist movement. In short, Jarra represents the spirit of Oromo determination to free themselves from a century long domination.

Second, the book also confuses some facts related to the military incidents along the Ethio-Sudanese border. In early 1990, the Oromo Liberation front (OLF) was encircled by the

Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Ethiopian soldiers around the town of Assosa in western Ethiopia. To save the OLF from destruction, the Eritrean People's Liberation Force (EPLF) attacked and routed both the SPLA and the Ethiopian soldiers and captured "heavy weapons, which the EPLF handed over to the Sudanese," (p. 188). The EPLF did not hand over those weapons to the Sudanese army. On the contrary, it was with those weapons that the EPLF attacked and captured the port of Massawa later that year. Third, Alex de Waal also claims that it was EPLF, which inserted in 1990 a small contingent of the OLF fighters "in the areas of Begi and Dembi Dolo" in western Ethiopia, (p. 188). The OLF started operating in Western Oromia (Western Wallaga) in 1982. In 1984, I personally observed the OLF activities in the region of Begi. Then, for the first time in my life, I visited a number of bush schools established by the OLF and Oromo Relief Association (ORA) teaching various subjects in the Oromo language using *Qubee*, Latin-based Oromo alphabet. By 1990, the OLF had already operated in Western Oromia for eight years. Fourth, Alex de Waal and A.H. Abdel Salam, rightly claim that President Isais Afeworki of Eritrea, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Yoweri Musevin of Uganda "have tried to utilize the threat of terrorism for their own internal ends" (p. 238). Indeed, this is very true. However, they forgot to add to their list, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, who repeatedly branded human rights organizations, Ethiopian Teachers Association, trade unions, and the Oromo Liberation front as "terrorist" organizations. So many individuals were killed and thousands are still in detention without any due process of law in Ethiopia because Prime Minister Meles Zenawi utilizes the threat of terrorism to terrorize those who oppose his minority rule. This is an important omission by Alex de Waal and A.H. Abdel Salam in this book. I am also a little disappointed in that none of the contributors to this volume consulted Okbazghi Yohannes's *Political Economy of An Authoritarian Modern State and Religious Nationalism in Egypt*, which is original in its scholarship, a path-breaking work on its focus, among others, on economic exploitation and political subjugation of Egyptian masses, thus giving birth to the Muslim fundamentalist movement in Egypt.

Consulting such a treasure would have enriched and added new dimensions to the arguments of the contributors to this book.

Finally, despite some of the weaknesses, particularly relating to the Oromo issues and a few other shortcomings, *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* is an excellent book that provides much needed information and will remain a very useful work for years to come.

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### Endnotes

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1. Okbazghi Yohanne's *Political Economy of An Authoritarian Modern State: Religious Nationalism in Egypt* provides an excellent analysis about crises generated by European domination of Egypt during the nineteenth century.
2. From his writings, Hassan al-Turabi appears to be a very progressive intellectual on several issues including the rights of women in Muslim societies. However, in reality after his NIF seized power the Sudan in 1989, the rights of women were curtailed
3. There is a growing literature which shows how, in the name of privatization, the TPLF leaders have enriched themselves and their cadres. Today, the TPLF leaders control huge resources, make up the cream of an emerging wealthy class in Ethiopia. It is amazing how power has transformed some penniless guerilla fighters of 1991 to the multi-millionaires of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century

**Camilla Gibb.** *Sweetness in the Belly*. Canada: Doubleday, 2005. 415 pp. \$32 95 (Canadian).

Camilla Gibb's two maiden ventures into a life of literary imagination were very successful. They were widely accepted and have transformed her into an accomplished writer. Her novels have been translated into more than 14 languages,<sup>1</sup> making her one of the young Canadian writers to have received numerous awards, including the prestigious Orange Prize which named her as one of the twenty one writers to watch in the twenty-first century.<sup>2</sup> Her third novel, *Sweetness in the Belly*, won Ontario's 2006 Trillium Award, "[t]he province's highest literary honour".<sup>3</sup> Camilla Gibb currently holds the distinguished 2006 Jack McClelland writer-in-resident position at the University of Toronto.

*Sweetness in the Belly* is a truly magisterial work. It is a fictional *tour de force* which captivates the reader with an impressive narrative that has "an admirable and flexible rhythm and pace" The story is based on Lilly's journey from Europe to Morocco, Harar, Ethiopia and London. With incredibly beautiful language, Camilla Gibb gives us the story of Lilly's early nomadic life in Europe, her experience at *Sufi* shrine in Morocco, and her visit to the palace of Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The book also depicts Lilly's life in the city of Harar and her prayer at the shrine of Bilal al Habash, one of the earliest converts to Islam. In the process Camilla created a fascinating, deeply educational and path breaking book, which was inspired by her research (p. 411) in Harar (1994-1995) as well as among the Hararis and Oromos in diaspora, mainly in London and Toronto. It is a historical fiction based on real events. It depicts how the 1974 Ethiopian revolution affected the walled city of Harar, its inhabitants—the Hararis, and their neighbors, the Oromos, who suffered "... backbreaking servitude and drifting poverty" (p. 42) under the regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam. In fact, to this reviewer's knowledge, this is the first widely read historical novel that brings the sufferings of the Oromo and the plight of refugees from Ethiopia to the literary imagination of the Western world. Camilla Gibb was first introduced "to the idea" of Ethiopia and

Oromo issues fifteen years ago “by her dear friend Agitu Ruda” (p. 412). Expanding her research on the Oromo, she has consulted many Oromos and their friends, including this reviewer (p.414).<sup>4</sup> Gibb has a great understanding of Ethiopian history, culture and geography. She has also an immense knowledge of Harar, the city of ninety-nine mosques and three hundred saints, the center of trade and Islamic civilization for centuries, the city that was founded most probably in the eighth century<sup>5</sup> by the legendary saint, locally known as Abadir, who is supposed to have surrounded the city with its seven impregnable walls of saints thus protecting it across centuries.

Camilla's literary expression and vivid imagery capture the beauty of Harari houses, their customs, traditions, legends, religious worships, and superstitions. The book describes the food the city dwellers eat, the tea they drink, the *qat* they chew, their Saturday afternoon *bercha* (social leisure time), the relationship between women, between the Hararis, the Oromo, the Somali and the Amhara, and the conflicts among them. It shows the grinding poverty and the famine of 1973. The Ethiopian revolution of 1974 and its aftermath, the exodus of refugees and their plight are all beautifully depicted in this lucid and compelling book. *Sweetness in the Belly* has several characters, four of which are individuals of Oromo origin. The story is told through Lilly, a white Muslim girl whose British parents were killed in Morocco. Lilly was brought up at the *Sufi* shrine of Bilal al Habash<sup>6</sup> by the Great Abdal on the spiritual diet of love and Islam. At the age of 16, in 1969, she went on a pilgrimage to the city of Harar, where she fell in love with Dr. Aziz, from whom she was forcibly separated in 1974. The story begins in London in the 1980s where Lilly met Amina, “. . . the youngest child of Oromo tenants who cultivated green fields beyond the Harar city walls. Amina was the only one in her family to attend school. She “became educated in the urban ways, adopted the language and culture of the Hararis as many Oromos did, aspiring to become Harari. . . . She found a like-minded man in Yusuf, married and bore a son, before the three of them were forced to flee to Kenya” (p. 23).

Lilly and Amina developed a strong bond, not only because of their past connection to Harar, but also for their longing to find the men they were involuntarily separated from. In a refugee camp in Kenya, Amina was raped by two Kenya policemen; her

husband, Yusuf, was deported to Ethiopia, where he was severely tortured and detained for many years for being a member of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Although the characters of Amina and Yusuf are fictional, the story of their torture is not. "Ethiopian prisons are notorious as houses of torture where men were hanged by their testicles and women were raped and sodomized with red, hot rods in order to elicit confessions" (pp. 21-22). There are numerous documented cases of raped women in the refugee camps in the Horn of Africa, while thousands of Oromo refugees, who were suspected of supporting the OLF continue to be deported from Djibouti, Kenya and the Sudan. As recently as May 2006, it was reported that around eighty Oromo refugees were deported from Kenya to Ethiopia where they will surely face torture in prison and even death. The story of Amina and Yusuf took place in the 1980s, but it parallels the attack on OLF supporters in Ethiopia since 1992 as well as the sufferings of Oromo refugees in Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia and even in South Africa.

As refugees, both from Harar, Lilly and Amina established a community association<sup>7</sup> in London in 1984. Lilly describes "our work is not as altruistic as it sounds. We are each looking for someone. Amina's husband Yusuf. My friend Aziz" (p.25). The rest of the epic switches in a series of flashbacks between Lilly's experiences in London as a white Muslim nurse and her experiences in the city of Harar, where she arrived on her pilgrimage in February 1969. There, Lilly was seen with suspicious eyes (pp. 48, 129) as a *farenji* (a stranger) who was ignorant of Harari way of life. But Lilly quickly adapted to Harari custom of "preparing food, interacting with people, bargaining for goods" and learning their language and their way of life and even became a Quranic teacher for children. She lived with Nouria, a poor woman of Oromo origin, struggling with everyday drudgery and the pain of poverty. When Bortucan, Nouria's daughter's infibulation was botched up, Dr. Aziz Abdal Nassar was called upon to visit the sick girl at home. It was this chance incident which brought Lilly and Aziz together. From their encounter developed strong friendship and love. Lilly attended Saturday afternoon *berchas* with Aziz and his friends, who discuss the burning political and economic issues of the day including the famine of 1972/73. Lilly had never felt more excited and happy

than in the presence of Aziz. In his absence, her *Sufi* love of God is overshadowed and replaced by her longing for him ( pp. 98-99). Armed with the wealth of knowledge of Harari culture and steeped in the arcane of Harari women's universe, Camilla Gibb provides a vivid imagery of Lilly's moment of joy in Nouria's poor place( p. 67).

In 1973, with the background of the unfortunate famine tragedy in Wallo and Tigray, Aziz and his friends argued that the famine was caused not by drought and crop failure, but by greedy landlords who forced the peasants to give up the very little that they had (p. 285) On September 12, 1974, the *Derg* removed from power the senile and delusional emperor, who was reported to have said, "If the revolution is good for the people then, I, too, support the revolution" (p. 372). That revolution destroyed the old order, but it also caused a lot of dislocation and pain in the country. It forcibly separated Lilly and Aziz from each other. Like the educated Ethiopians of his time, Dr. Aziz felt the plight of the oppressed and joined the revolution. Because of her earlier connection with Emperor Haile Selassie, Aziz told Lilly to leave the country for her own safety. She reluctantly agreed and left for London, where she longed for the news of Aziz, the man she characterizes as "*Kuday*, my liver, he is like *rrata*, a piece of meat stuck between my teeth" (p. 30) For seventeen years, she lived through intense pain of not having any news about Aziz.

*Sweetness in the Belly* is the finest account of the strength and resilience of the human spirit, the story of incredible love gained and the pain of its loss, a gripping and an insightful account of the last years of Emperor Haile Selassie's reign and the seventeen years of the *Derg's* cruel and brutal rule, when Ethiopia was "a field of fire; an infernal blaze leaving a trail of charred bodies and scorched earth" (p. 248). It would be hard to find a more succinct description which vividly brings to life the horror of military rule in Ethiopia.

Camilla Gibb has once more proved herself as a wonderful story teller, an exceptionally gifted writer, "a linguistic polyglot", who emits out Harari, Arabic, English and French idioms not to mention a few Oromo and Amharic phrases, and in the process creates not only a heart wrenching love story but also an inside look into the universe of Islam. Her approach to Islam is based on knowledge, deep perception and respect. Gibb is generous beyond

measure in depicting *Sufi* mysticism which is based on renunciation of individual will of worldly concerns for everything except God. The Sufis “. . . have one thought and one thought alone—that of eliminating the self, erasing the ego through devotion, seeking grace, seeking unity with the divine” (p. 207).

*Sweetness in the Belly* gives a rarely seen look into an aspect of Oromo culture. “In a clear and penetrating prose”, Camilla displays the generosity of Oromo spirit, through the words of Yusuf, the victim of torture in an Ethiopian prison and whose wife was raped in a Kenyan refugee camp. “For all the brutality that is inflicted upon us, we still possess the desire to be polite to strangers. We may have blackened eyes, but we still insist on brushing our hair. We may have had our toes shot off by a nine year-old, but we still believe in the innocence of children. We may have been raped repeatedly by two men in a Kenyan refugee camp, but we still open ourselves to the ones we love. We may have lost everything, but we still insist on being generous and sharing the little that remains. We still have Dreams” (p. 407)

Camilla Gibb impresses upon the reader the “emotional pain and torment” of refugees making them visible and their problems real. The author also enables the reader to see beyond the propaganda associated with *jihad*. Through the fictional speech of Hussein, Camilla makes holy war only a surface meaning of *jihad*

This is not the true meaning of jihad”, he spoke into the statless dark “jihad is the holy war we have within ourselves. That is the meaning below the surface. Our internal struggle for purity”, he said with emphasis, pressing his forefinger into his chest” It is the war of ascendance over our basal instincts. It has absolutely nothing to do with others. The only thing we can have control over is ourselves (p. 56).

This paragraph, which moves the heart, uplifts the spirit and touches the soul of the reader with an open mind, demonstrates Camilla Gibb’s profound knowledge of Islam and her respect for that religion. In another beautiful paragraph Camilla shows the compatibility of Islam with modernity

My religion is full of colour and possibility and choice; it is



a moderate interpretation that Aziz showed me was possible, one that allows you to use whatever means allow you to feel closer to God, bet it saints, prayer beads, or qat, one that allows you to have the occasional drink, work alongside men, go without a veil when you choose, sit alone with an unrelated man in a room, even hold his hand, or even, dare I say it, to feel love for a Hindu( p. 404).

Finally, *Sweetness in the Belly* is a wonderfully written book. This profoundly gripping story carried this reviewer on the wings of joy from Atlanta to London, Addis Ababa and Harar, the three cities where he lived for two decades of his life. It would be hard for this reviewer to imagine another book that would transport him across three continents. *Sweetness in the Belly* is the richest, the best and most fascinating account that provides “an amazingly clear and comprehensive tour” of the changes that took place in Ethiopia during the 1970s and 1980s. When this reviewer finished this most charming book it seemed far too short. We long for a sequel in which, we hope, the main character will be an Oromo.

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## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/camilla\\_gibb](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/camilla_gibb)

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.camillagibb.ca>

<sup>3</sup> *The Toronto Star*, April 26, 2006

<sup>4</sup> The author acknowledges the following individuals for helping her: Professor Mohammed Hassen of Georgia state University, Dr. Trevor Trueman, Oromia Support Group, Lydia Namatta and Taha Ali Abdi, Oromo Relief Association in London, Tesfaye Deressa Kumsa in Toronto and Bonsa Waltajji in London.

<sup>5</sup> Archeological evidence indicates that the city of Harar was founded in the 8<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>6</sup> Bilal was a slave from the Axumite empire who lived in the city of Mecca and was among the first convert to Islam around 615. He was a famous poet in early Islam.

<sup>7</sup> This parallels the Oromo Relief Association branch which this reviewer chaired in London from 1980-1983.

**Leenco Lata.** *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland. The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization.*

Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2004 xi + 219 pp Maps References Index. \$24.95. Paper

Nothing seems to be quite as difficult or as complicated to talk about as nationalism, nation building, sovereignty, and self-determination. The very words drift out of focus with every attempt to make them clear and definite rather than murky. This problem is even more complicated in studies of the same issues in the Horn of Africa. Part of the problem is the tendency on the part of scholars to theorize about real issues rather than proposing practical solutions. Leenco Lata is not a trained specialist of the politics of the Horn, but a chemical engineer and an activist whose worldview was shaped at the crucible of the bitter struggle for the right to self-determination of the Oromo people in which he participated directly from 1978 to 1991. Based on his experience as a freedom fighter and careful reading of theories of state and self-determination, he has produced a truly important scholarly book that should henceforth be a must read for anyone even remotely interested in the Horn of Africa.

The book has two parts. Part 1, entitled "Self-Determination and History," discusses the origins of the concept of self-determination, its ill-conceived implementation in the form of decolonization in Africa, and the nature of the state as well as conceptions of self-determination in the post-Cold War world. In the first chapter, Lata traces the long history of self-determination and highlights fundamental considerations that are critical to the arguments presented in Part 2. First, self-determination is not a Stalinist cliché that the proponents of the status quo in the Horn have disparaged and dismissed. Conceived during the Enlightenment and the French Revolution as popular sovereignty, self-determination has been the leitmotif of world history that served as an instrument to create correspondence between *people, nation, state, territory,* and

*sovereignty*. Since the First World War, it has been the foundation of the architecture of peace among states and stability within states. In all of its incarnation, the linguistic community has always been the principal social group that deserved the right to self-determination. Though an enduring principle, self-determination is not a static concept. Lata posits that the age of heightened globalization has imposed limitations on the degree of independence of existing and potential states. Accordingly, contemporary versions of self-determination have come to rest on recognition of two fundamental considerations: the right of self-definition of individuals and collectives and the legitimacy of states (external self-determination) is conditional on the periodic change of governments through democratic elections (internal self-determination).

In part 2, "Resonance of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," Lata focuses on the process of construction of states in five countries in the Horn and on the temporal and spatial ramifications of the way these states were created. Two of these Horn states, Abyssinia and Mahadist Sudan, were created as the result of religion-inspired imperial expansion. Both states soon started the task of creating a nation-state based on a single national identity. The result was a hierarchy of privileges and classes, with the Arabized Muslims in the Sudan and the Amharic-speaking Orthodox Christians in Ethiopia at the top of that hierarchy. Those who did not belong to these privileged groups were branded as enemies of the state and subjected to untold misery and suffering. In Somalia, the drive to achieve a linguistically and culturally homogeneous political entity was expressed in its irredentist dream of creating a Greater Somali nation-state. According to Lata, the major factor that accounts for the indissolubility of conflicts in Ethiopia, the disintegration of Somalia, the intractability of the southern problem in the Sudan, and the endemic interstate conflicts in the region has been the ever-elusive goal of constructing a nation-state which the states of the Horn Africa have pursued zealously.

Lata argues convincingly that the political problems of the Horn require a holistic approach. However, he worries that lessons of the past "are sadly escaping the concerned state actors and their opponents" because of dogmatic conceptions of the state, nation, sovereignty, and self-determination. Lata decries

Eritrea's anachronistic pursuit of nation building "at a time when this project's futility is increasingly being recognized," Sudan's search for peace based on its dream "to successfully coalesce into a *nation*," and the fact that the southern Sudanese movement continues to "equate the achievement of self-determination with gaining independent nation-statehood" (p. 117). In Ethiopia, the ruling party "continues to practice the failed USSR policy of federalism" while its old antagonists work tirelessly "to revive the practically discredited agenda of shaping a monocultural nation out of the Empire" (p. 117). On the other hand, some self-determination movements (apparently the Oromo Liberation Front) cling to their old ways, "convinced that nothing short of independence would restore their constituencies' right to self determination" (p. 117).

Given the fact that the Horn's contemporary problems are rooted in the interactive process that created the states and the continued denial of the right to self-determination, Lata insists that the only workable and lasting response to the Horn's persistent conflicts depends on implementing simultaneous solutions and cultivating interstate and intrastate cooperation. This means the *just recognition* of the multidimensional right of self-determination of individuals and nations at the sub state, state, and regional levels. It also means the concept of self-determination needs to be rearticulated based on the innovative solutions that some grassroots communities have designed and applied to real and immediate problems. Examples of such practical solutions abound in the Horn region, ranging from the quasi parliament of the Nuba, to the the Somaliland Guurti and treaty making mechanisms of the Borana Oromo

Lata has an important warning for those who advocate direct transplantation of liberal democracy with its cutthroat, winner-take-all competitiveness, which, in the Horn of Africa, might lead to the use of lethal weapons to solve political conflicts. Even Western intellectuals are offering deliberative or communicative democracy which favors consensus-building as an alternative to the *laissez-fair* politics that operates on Darwinian principles. Fortunately, the variant of democracy that Western intellectuals are warming up to "happens to be almost identical to the kind of democracy practiced by many African societies, particularly the *Gada* democratic system of the Oromo

people” (198). Put simply, political actors in the Horn have no alternative to employing the principle of self-determination in constructing a “Horn-wide edifice of consensus and cooperation.” This task requires commitment, determination, and willingness to view self-determination as a process, not as a one-day event, that gradually expands the boundaries of individual and community rights.

In all, this book is an important contribution to our understanding of the political problems facing the states of the Horn of Africa and the best attempt by an Oromo liberation fighter to reconceptualize the Oromo struggle for self-determination, taking into account the weight of the past and changing contemporary circumstances. The text flows smoothly and is written without cumbersome social science jargon. The cover photograph, a guerilla fighter with his heavy machinegun sitting under a picture depicting a repudiation of the Kalashnikov rifle, neatly captures the dilemma and choices of state leaders and their opponents in the Horn of Africa. Those who fail to recognize the powerful principle of self-determination, in Woodrow Wilson’s words, “ignore it at their own peril” (p. 25). *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland* is recommended for the specialist and the general reader as a standard reference on Horn politics and stimulus for further debate on the quest for political stability and better life for peoples, nations, and states in the Horn of Africa.

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