

# THE NEW STATE REPRESSION

By Ken Lawrence

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
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
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THE *NEW* STATE REPRESSION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>page</i>
Introduction .....	1
I. The Strategy of Permanent Repression .....	1
II. Frank Kitson in Theory and Practice .....	3
III. Louis Giuffrida: Ronald Reagan's Kitson .....	5
IV. Robin Evelegh's Alternative Strategy .....	8
V. Conclusion .....	11
References .....	12

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## Introduction

POLITICAL repression exists in three discernible forms: police brutality, which is widespread violence committed by armed agents of the state against members of oppressed communities, nationalities, and classes, usually of a diffuse and relatively random character; vigilantism, which is violence against the oppressed committed by ostensibly private (non-government) individuals and organizations, sometimes random but more typically aimed at explicit targets; and secret police activity, nearly always directed by elite government agencies against carefully chosen enemies considered to be political threats to established authority.

There is a definite relationship among these three forms of repression, and they are often employed in concert. Illegal acts of terror perpetrated by Ku Klux Klan or Nazi paramilitaries often turn out to have been planned and directed by the very law enforcement personnel who are supposed to be preventing them, and carried out against the same people and organizations deemed “subversive” by the authorities, all the while against a backdrop of escalating police brutality. It would therefore be futile to imagine struggling against one form of repression while ignoring the others.

Nevertheless, it is also necessary to understand the distinguishing features of each form of repression in order to devise adequate anti-repression strategies. For that reason, this booklet focuses mainly on the third form of repression, the activities and strategies of the secret police (the intelligence agencies), and concentrates on those aspects that are new. Readers should not interpret

the restrictions on the discussion here as any sort of suggestion that the other forms of repression or the struggles against them are less important. They must be understood as clearly and fought as vigorously as ever.

All three types of repression have undergone important changes in recent years. Police forces are not what they used to be. On the one hand, they have been militarized to a degree previously unknown in the United States; on the other hand, they are engaging in public relations campaigns to project the opposite image: the police as surrogate social workers and protectors of children. These developments, along with the introduction of “beat representatives” whose tasks range from lubricating relations between police and local businesses to low-level intelligence gathering, have necessarily changed the face of police brutality.

Racist vigilantes can no longer be safely relied on to serve as an extension of the state bringing “law and order” to areas that are difficult to govern, because they are increasingly under the sway of ideological fascists whose organizations — Ku Klux Klans, Nazis, Aryan Nations, Posse Comitatus, and many others — are in opposition to the government for their own reasons. Under these conditions, there are greater risks attached to employing these forces than in past years when such terrorists proclaimed themselves to be the most loyal Americans.

The most striking advances, however, have come in the functioning of the secret police. The resulting changes are on the most fundamental level: the way they view society and their role in it. That is our point of departure.

## The Strategy of Permanent Repression

STATE repression is about as old as what people generally call civilization. Ancient Egypt had armies and police to put down Pharaoh’s subjects who got uppity. Planter/General Wade Hampton led his militiamen and soldiers against the largest slave insurrection in U.S. history in 1811, in Louisiana’s St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes. And so on, to today. Repression isn’t

new, in this country or anyplace else.

But there are ways in which today’s political repression differs fundamentally from the repression practiced here and around the world in the past. The most basic difference is on the level of *strategy* — not just technology, though that is important also, but the general approach of the state, the outlook of the ruling class.



In the past, the rulers and their security forces believed that the normal condition of society was stability and calm, while insurgency was thought to be a quirk, an oddity, a pathology. Certainly they knew that rebellions would break out from time to time, and they would then have to slap them down, but only to return to "normal," where everything was quiet and peaceful.

The difference today is their belief that insurgency is not an occasional, erratic idiosyncrasy of people who are exploited and oppressed, but a constant occurrence — *permanent insurgency*, which calls for a strategy that doesn't simply rely on a police force and a national guard and an army that can be called out in an emergency, but rather a strategy of *permanent repression* as the full-time task of the security forces. This difference has been elaborated theoretically largely as a consequence of the Indochina war, which gave this strategy its name: *counterinsurgency*.

When the Black freedom movement erupted in the fifties and sixties, the state's traditional tool of repression, military violence, proved not to be as effective as in the past. The actions of Police Commissioner Eugene "Bull" Connor in Birmingham and Sheriff Jim Clark at Selma not only failed to stop the movement, they actually fanned the flames of insurgency. But as that insurgency spread to other sectors of the population, the main state response was more of the same, culminating in the police riot in Chicago against protesters at the 1968 Democratic National Convention.

By the end of the sixties, it was clear to the ruling class that its traditional methods of social control were weakening and that its repressive apparatus was insufficient as a backup. A new approach was needed, one that started from scratch and challenged some of the bourgeoisie's most sacred beliefs about its social order. The person who answered the call was a British military commander, Brigadier Frank Kitson.

Frank Kitson's 1971 book, *Low Intensity Operations*, the basic manual of counterinsurgency method in Western Europe and North America, describes *insurgency* as growing through three stages. The first he calls The Preparatory Period; the second, The Non-Violent Phase; the third, Insurgency.

In elaborating The Preparatory Period, Kitson describes what earlier bourgeois theoreticians would have called normality: nothing's happening, all is calm. According to Kitson, just because you

can't see rebellion doesn't mean it isn't there. It really is happening. The state's enemies are gathering their forces, they're knocking on doors, they're plotting. Sooner or later they'll be out in the streets, so the police have to be ready for them. Right then, during The Preparatory Period when nothing seems to be happening, is the time that the police must get themselves together and start penetrating the opposition, because something will develop sooner or later for sure.

That argument is a substantial departure from earlier theories of repression, and its novelty is more recent than most people might think. A few years ago, I produced a booklet about who the FBI's political targets were at different times, called *J. Edgar Hoover's Detention Plan: The Politics of Repression in the United States 1939-1976*. It measured the FBI's politics of repression according to which groups Hoover had designated for internment in the event of a national emergency, a reactive model. Somebody would do something and Hoover would add them to the list. But until they actually engaged in political protest of some sort, they weren't on the list, and quite often the FBI didn't even know they existed.

That has changed. Kitson's model requires a different approach altogether. His notion is, we may not know who our enemies are, but they're out there plotting and organizing, so the police must go find them, infiltrate them, and plant provocateurs among them.

That doesn't mean they have junked everything they have done before, and some of the classical descriptions of secret police methods continue to be as pertinent as ever. One of the best is Victor Serge's book, *What Everyone Should Know About State Repression*, based upon the documents of the tsar's Okhrana which were captured by the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution. The most revealing of those documents was a manual on provocation — how the police should manage *agents provocateurs*. Nowhere has the method of employing provocateurs ever been theoretically elaborated as well as in this tsarist police manual, quoted extensively in Serge's book.

Despite the promise of high technology, principally computers and electronic surveillance equipment of great sophistication, human agents remain the essential vehicle of political repression. In order not just to know what political groups are thinking and doing, but to prevent momentum from developing that would make repression much



more costly, the police need people inside, not simply spying, but playing an *active* role – disrupting, discrediting, misdirecting, and neutralizing the state’s opponents.

Naturally the police do apply the new technologies. They don’t usually have to intercept couriers carrying messages any more; they have bugs and wiretaps and satellite surveillance, and equipment that enables them to record everything that is typed on an electric typewriter from a block away. *The Technology of Political Control* is a useful sourcebook on modern repression gadgetry; another is the collection of documents, pamphlets, and articles supplied in the United Methodist Voluntary Service packet titled *Repression and Resistance*.

But the application of any method of state repression is determined politically. The old assumption of the U.S. rulers was that the population is essentially loyal to the state, that the task was simply to identify insurgents and to expose them as disloyal. That was the method of the old House Un-American Activities Committee, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Senator Joseph McCarthy, and the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover’s book *Masters of Deceit* is a classic of the genre.

These methods failed miserably in the sixties. The more they tried to “expose” the Black movement as disloyal, the larger that movement grew and the more others adopted its methods and its

vision. Belatedly, the repressive agencies shifted to a different tack, mainly covert action designed to weaken the movements from within and to wage psychological warfare against them from without. The best-known examples are the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program, COINTELPRO, and the CIA’s domestic disruptions, Operation CHAOS and Project RESISTANCE.

For these, surveillance was not enough, no matter how sophisticated the technology. Only the presence of provocateurs within the movement could create factions and sow dissension, plant false evidence that could then be used to confuse and alienate supporters or create the basis for criminal frameups, and make certain that targeted leaders met their appointments with assassins’ bullets. But these methods also contained risks. The types of people who can be hired to carry out these tasks are usually psychologically unstable, often drawn from the criminal element. Sometimes they “defect” to the groups they are supposed to disrupt. Sometimes they feed their employers false information in order to keep their jobs.

Kitson’s approach answered some of these problems, if only because, by institutionalizing repression as a permanent feature of capitalist society, his system furnishes more opportunities for the state to recruit, place, and test its agents long before they are called upon to perform the most extreme kinds of provocations.

## Frank Kitson in Theory and Practice

FRANK Kitson was the commander of the British counterinsurgency force in the North of Ireland for many years, and before that he was an officer in many of Britain’s lost colonial wars: Kenya, Aden, Cyprus. Most of his examples in *Low Intensity Operations* are drawn from Britain’s war in Ireland and the U.S. war in Indochina.

He says the police and the army have to take advantage of the first stage of popular struggle, The Preparatory Period, to deploy themselves, to infiltrate the enemy. That’s when people are not on their guard. That’s when the cops can get their spies and provocateurs “in place” so that when open rebellion develops, as he says it must, agents are already there. Later it might be difficult or impossible to get them in.

Certain critical decisions must be made during

The Preparatory Period, Kitson says:

An excellent example concerns the way the Law should work. Broadly speaking there are two possible alternatives, the first one being that the Law should be used as just another weapon in the government’s arsenal, and in this case it becomes little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public. For this to happen efficiently, the activities of the legal services have to be tied into the war effort in as discreet a way as possible which, in effect, means that the member of the government responsible for the law,



either sits on the supreme council or takes his orders from the head of the administration. The other alternative is that the law should remain impartial and administer the laws of the country without any direction from the government. . . . As a rule the second alternative is not only morally right but also expedient because it is more compatible with the government's aim of maintaining the allegiance of the population.

Despite the disclaimer, Kitson's critics have repeatedly shown that in the counterinsurgency campaigns he himself commanded, it was always the first option that was chosen.

If the counterinsurgency war is to succeed, Kitson says the police must have a grasp of the insurgents' politics; they must sort out the different categories of enemies in order to divide and weaken them. Here is what Kitson says to do in The Non-Violent Phase, the second stage of struggle when people are leafletting and marching, but before the Insurgency begins:

For the purposes of this study no account will be taken of the simplest method of all, which is to suppress the movement by the ruthless application of naked force, because although non-violent campaigns are particularly susceptible to this sort of action, it is most unlikely that the British government, or indeed any Western government, would be politically able to operate on these lines even if it wanted to do so. In practice the most promising line of approach lies in separating the mass of those engaged in the campaign from the leadership by the judicious promise of concessions, at the same time imposing a period of calm by the use of government forces backed up by statements to the effect that most of the concessions can only be implemented once the life of the country returns to normal. Although with an eye to world opinion and to the need to retain the allegiance of the people, no more force than is necessary for

containing the situation should be used, conditions can be made reasonably uncomfortable for the population as a whole, in order to provide an incentive for a return to normal life and to act as a deterrent towards a resumption of the campaign.

The raids in the Black community ostensibly searching for Assata Shakur were exactly this kind of harassment. This is an element of strategy: it is not a quirk, not an accident, and not something to be deferred until the Insurgency begins.

The third is to associate as many prominent members of the population, especially those who have engaged in non-violent action, with the government. This last technique is known in America as co-optation.

Kitson's final stage is Insurgency. Here he says intelligence is the critical element.

If it is accepted that the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding him, it is easy to recognize the paramount importance of good information.

Kitson's recipe calls for a technique he calls *pseudo-gangs* or *counter gangs*, which he claims to have invented in Kenya during the British war against the Mau Mau. (The term itself is an excellent example of the way repressive forces attempt to criminalize their political opponents. Kitson would call any liberation movement a "gang," hence its false counterpart under police control is a "pseudo gang.")

He says it's important for these phony opposition movements to develop credibility so that they can effectively confuse, divide, and undermine the authentic organizations, and so that they can eventually serve as paramilitary auxiliaries to the security forces. He adds,

There is some evidence to the effect that pseudo-gangs of ultra-militant black nationalists are operating now in the United States.

One FBI provocateur based in Tampa, Florida,



named Joe Burton created organizations all over the United States and Canada between 1972 and 1975. His home base group in Tampa was called Red Star Cadre. Most of its far-flung affiliates, but not all, presented themselves as Maoist; some were ostensibly pro-Soviet or pro-Cuba. The FBI used these front groups sometimes to disrupt legitimate revolutionary movements in the U.S., other times to unify with and spy on them.

One of the things his career teaches us is the political sophistication of the FBI. An FBI control agent would fly down to Tampa from Chicago to help Burton compose his political literature so its political line would closely match the line of the target organization, in order to achieve the credibility Kitson considers so important. Sometimes it was Maoist, sometimes Fidelista, and so forth.

That was when the purpose was to spy. Disruption operations were handled differently. When Burton's assignment was to interfere with UE's attempt to organize a union at the Westinghouse plant in Tampa, he attacked everyone: they were all denounced as "revisionists" no matter what their political lines happened to be. This versatility and familiarity with the minutiae of Marxist doctrine exhibits a degree of political sophistication that we do not often associate with the security

forces.

Another example was a bogus Black liberation organization in St. Louis which the FBI used to misdirect other Black organizations in the U.S. and, interestingly, to spy on Vietnamese revolutionaries also, during the sixties.

One irony of Kitson's nomenclature is that during the sixties the United States government used actual street gangs, funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, to perform some of the repressive functions assigned by Kitson to "pseudo gangs." Edward Lee's article, "The Lumpenproletariat and Repression: A Case Study," provides extensive documentation of the way this was accomplished using the Blackstone Rangers in Chicago.

More recently, other organizations have played comparable roles. In the seventies, the National Caucus of Labor Committees emerged as an ostensibly Marxist organization, then began a crusade to disrupt the left with physical violence. Only later did it shed its "Marxist" garb to reveal its actual neo-Nazi politics. Another vigilante organization, the Guardian Angels, still manages to confuse some leftists as a Kitsonian "pseudo gang," even though its corporate ties and reactionary aims are known.

## Louis Giuffrida: Ronald Reagan's Kitson

THE application of Kitson's strategy of repression to the United States has been modified to conform to the specific requirements of capitalist rule rooted in white supremacy. The degree to which this policy is class conscious and deliberately racist can be documented in the work of the man Ronald Reagan chose long ago to modernize his repressive apparatus: Louis Giuffrida.

On the next page is a map of a town called "Santa Luisa," a place that doesn't exist. Santa Luisa was created by the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI) in order to train police forces from all across the U.S. and from many other countries in counterinsurgency.

This map makes clear exactly what information they consider important for their repression plans. Trainees are given hypothetical insurgency scenarios as problems; they are then asked how they would deploy their forces in each instance. This is how counterinsurgency is actually taught and conducted.

The map shows not only the exceptional degree to which this is the conception of an imperialist power rooted in white supremacy, but also that the people who are in charge of state repression are fully aware of the basest implications of their own social order. There is no pretense here that the racial and class aspects are incidental; they are the determining factors. It is also clear from the map and the text that accompanied it that CSTI took for granted that people of color are to be permanently oppressed and, the corollary assumption, that the Black and Latin communities will be the usual source of insurgency. The largest share of counterinsurgency planning is directed against them.

CSTI was created when Ronald Reagan was the governor of California to carry out tasks that could not, at that time, be conducted at FBI headquarters or the International Police Academy, or other federal police training institutions. But the right wing of the security establishment felt the




need was urgent, so the tasks were done in California under Reagan, organized by Edwin Meese. The head of CSTI then was Louis Giuffrida, whom President Ronald Reagan appointed to head the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The text that Giuffrida approved for CSTI's course in "Civilian Violence and Terrorism: Officer Survival and Internal Security" is one of the most revealing documents to appear since Victor Serge

of government is capitalistic and class ridden and allows for the ready labeling of all: white, black, red, brown, rich, poor, middle class, Protestant, Catholic, Jew et al.

Students in America have contributed a long history of violence. This is not an unusual phenomenon as they,



published the Okhrana's manual on the use of provocateurs.

Here are excerpts:

[I]t is a fact that the most powerful weapon of a revolutionary is the silent, accumulating contempt and hatred of a people directed at the government or another segment of the class structure. This thesis is magnified considerably when the chosen form

representative of each generation, are more morally and politically serious than their parents and many of their leaders.

The racially separated segments of our society, as they have done repeatedly in the past, have emerged with periods of sporadic violence. A white man cannot ever be black, red, or brown and so long as the white man remains



superior in numbers he will be the represser and the constant target of the mad dog.

It is the interaction between these desperately separate segments of society – between protesters and responding authorities – which has resulted in violence. For these minority elements, any steps to prevent violence which do not address the issues of fundamental social and political change are destined to be irrelevant and fated to failure.

The single most violent force in American history, inside and outside of war, has been a small group of militant whites; . . . ethnic minorities within the system become the target.

What we have discussed thus far depicts the classic struggle for social reform.

CSTI borrows from Kitson:

Most students of the revolution would agree that “peaceful dissent” is the first step toward revolution and that this new trend signals the opening phases of the “new revolution.”

These issues, be they social, cultural, political, or economic, snowball and often appear to the casual observer as being full of truth and at least justified.

In short – it is fashionable to direct sneers, threats, and even open hostility toward the policeman. He is, symbolically at least, everything that is wrong with our society.

**WHEN THE NECESSARY RESPECT AND REVERENCE ARE DESTROYED, VIOLENCE, AS WE KNOW IT, WILL BE HEROISM.**

[T]he remainder of our exploration on this subject will be limited to

“illegal violence” directed at us, officials of responsible government agencies.

The truth is that expansionist whites in a quest for power and wealth, largely in the name of the government, systematically annihilated thousands of Indians and claimed their heritage, the land, in the name of national progress. . . . the winners incarcerated the losers and have kept them incarcerated for more than 100 years.

With the exception of the mentally deranged or the intoxicated person, all acts of illegal and criminal violence have roots somewhere in our present social, economic, or political environment.

[Our] mission can be accomplished only if we fully understand that . . . legitimate violence is integral to our form of government for it is from this source that we can continue to purge our weaknesses . . . [and] illegal violence has roots which are attached to emotional situations of political, economic, or social inequality.

It is necessary for the police executive to treat his occupation like all other executives. He must do it well but not so well that he puts himself out of a job. He must reduce crime but not stop it.

He faces an impossible task of being required by law (actually or by his own interpretation) to preserve a free and democratic society and at the same time he must eliminate crime and violence. These tasks are totally incompatible. . . .

It is not an accident that the man who took charge of indoctrinating police with these concepts more than 15 years ago under Governor Reagan has been brought to Washington by President Reagan to carry on his work. Yet, aside from charges of misusing funds that led to a small scandal,



Giuffrida has received scant scrutiny from the press, even after he made blatantly racist remarks

on national television.

## Robin Evelegh's Alternative Strategy

DESPITE the widespread and continuing application of Kitson's strategy on both sides of the Atlantic, it has failed to stem the tide of insurgency in the place where it has been applied most diligently and for the longest time – Ireland – and it has suffered setbacks elsewhere. It is fitting that the person who entered the debate with the most persuasive critique and proposals to modify Kitson's basic strategy cut his teeth on the same Belfast battlefield.

Robin Evelegh has written a book which is the basis of the revised British strategy in Ireland. His approach, together with Kitson's, has become one of the standard choices available to secret police in the United States, and the issues he has raised are a matter of concern in the ongoing ruling class debate over the various methods of repression.

In *Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society: The Lessons of Northern Ireland*, Evelegh disagrees with Kitson that the government has a choice on how to use the legal system. If the security forces are so cynical about the law that they use it purely as a device to manipulate people, they will inevitably disgrace and discredit it, and if people lose respect for the law, all is lost, he says.

Kitson wants nearly every police activity to be conducted secretly, but Evelegh argues for openness as much as possible, so that what the police really do need to do in secret they can. There's no need to skulk around in the shadows to obtain information the police can force people to provide, he reasons.

A community that does not support the Police can be policed effectively, but it is markedly different from policing a community that helps its Police. The case is therefore made for the two fundamental measures necessary to achieve detection in a population affected by terrorism. These are: to provide for the compulsory registration and identification of the population so that the Security Forces can know who is who, what they look like and where they live; and to make

the active development of informers inside the terrorist ranks by the Security Forces not only lawful but as easy as possible.

Although Parliament has given the security forces draconian powers, Evelegh wants a different emphasis, one that is often echoed in our country.

What it has not approved are measures that really would make the Security Forces more effective, but which carry a much lower political price, such as introducing identity cards or giving the soldier the right to demand the production of driving licenses and vehicle documents.

Methods currently in use in the U.S. have reduced the "political price" even further than Evelegh envisioned. Media campaigns to frighten parents about the possibility that their children might be kidnapped are followed quickly by a concerted police/school/corporation (usually McDonald's) offer to help protect the kids by fingerprinting and photographing them; thus they are registered with the police long before they have any idea of the possible consequences. And Selective Service has purchased lists of young men who signed up long ago at an ice cream store to receive free treats on their birthdays; the government uses the lists to find 18-year-olds who haven't registered for the draft.

The United States has managed to pursue a "two track" strategy, employing both Evelegh's and Kitson's proposals simultaneously. At the same time as apparently benign Evelegh-type policies are being implemented, such as requiring every child on welfare to have a Social Security number, the more draconian Kitson methods are also advancing, mostly under the banner of counter-terrorism.

One can only marvel at the skill with which this campaign was orchestrated, from the very first days of the Reagan administration when Secretary of State-designate Alexander Haig announced the



policy. Since FBI figures showed a steady decline in the number of domestic terrorist incidents, the pretext was initially international terrorism. Reports of a Libyan hit team planning to assassinate the president were widely circulated; proof that this story was a hoax received little attention. As Congress obediently furnished the money to establish the new super-secret counter-terrorist units in various branches of the military, Secretary of State George Schultz announced the government's new policy of preemptive strikes against suspected terrorists. Gradually since then, the rhetoric of government officials has obliterated any distinction between domestic and international terrorism, and strange military forces have begun making their appearance every time a militant anti-war protest is held anywhere in the United States.

Ironically, the stoutest resistance to these developments has come from the upper echelons of the U.S. military who cling to their traditional view of their mission. They want to fight wars, not "low intensity operations." They do not want to become police. But they grudgingly obey; officers from all over the world, not just U.S. military brass, receive training in "low intensity conflict" at Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff College. Meanwhile, every police force worthy of the name has been thoroughly militarized with SWAT teams, tactical squads, helicopter patrols, and the like.

One important difference between Kitson and Eveleigh concerns the quality and importance of intelligence. Kitson says:

If it is accepted that the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding him, it is easy to recognize the paramount importance of good information.

In a lengthy chapter, he provides a long list of suggested ways to gather intelligence. One example has the policeman or soldier in charge

appoint one local inhabitant to be responsible for each street who would be instructed to appoint an individual to be responsible for each block and so on down to one individual responsible for each family.

The "beat rep" programs mentioned earlier bear a

striking resemblance to this suggestion. The most significant point is so subtle that it could easily be missed, so Kitson emphasizes the point in his conclusion: *quality* of intelligence is unimportant; *quantity* is what counts.

It has already been mentioned that peace-time intelligence organizations prefer using a few high grade sources to a large number of lower grade ones. But it is evident from the scenario that the system for developing background information works if there is a lot of it to develop. It is not important that it should be immensely reliable because all that is necessary is something on which to build.

Eveleigh's view is a pole apart. For him, *quality* is paramount:

It is difficult for those who have not been concerned personally with countering terrorism to understand the complete difference in quality and value between general information from the public and inside information from within the terrorist movement. . . . Once their intentions are known to the Security Forces, the terrorists have lost the initiative; the Security Forces can then arrange reception committees for the perpetrators of acts of terrorism. It is only through inside informers that a terrorist organization can be exposed to this extent, and once so exposed it is helpless until it has discovered and removed the informers.

He then gives a detailed prescription for recruiting informers.

What is needed is the ability within the law to induce a terrorist to defect to the Government's side without his former colleagues knowing that he has done so, in return for indemnity for his crimes. We should consider briefly the effect on a terrorist organization of widespread publicity being given to official encouragement of defection in



return for an indemnity. Any arrested terrorist will have this "easy way out" at the back of his mind if the pressures on him seem too strong. Whenever a terrorist is arrested, his colleagues will fear that he will defect and must take steps to protect themselves from the consequences of this with all the disruption that such hurried and unforeseen changes must cause. . . .

Inside informers seldom appear of their own volition. They have to be consciously created, usually from among members of the terrorist organization who have been arrested. . . .

Persuading a terrorist to defect is akin to the wooing of a woman — with persuasive and even glib arguments on one side and, on the other initial resistance and vacillation between the urge to consent and the urge to refuse, and if all goes well, the development of confidence. Indeed, the interrogator is seeking to achieve a seduction rather than a rape or a rebuff. . . .

There seem to be five reasons why suspects are induced to think that it is in their own interests to inform and defect: because they are tortured, because they are induced to do so by cash, because they are blackmailed into it as the lesser of two evils, because they lose their nerve, and because they are genuinely converted from their terrorist beliefs to supporting the Government cause.

Then he tells precisely how to use each of these five methods — torture, bribery, blackmail, induced cowardice, and conversion. He says they all work. Eveleigh's appeal was obviously heard in Westminster, judging by the trials conducted in Belfast and Derry for the past few years based upon the evidence provided solely by paid perjurers induced to testify in these very ways, the so-called "supergrasses."

But that strategy has begun to unravel in the

Irish context; even British judges have refused to accept some of the most important "supergrass" trial evidence as credible, and have released the defendants. In Italy, however, the induced testimony of the so-called *penitenti* has had a devastating effect on the armed revolutionary movement in that country. It is still too early to know whether its application in the United States will prove to be significant.

One important weakness in this aspect of Eveleigh's strategy is that once activists are induced or coerced to betray their cause, they must be given permanent lifetime protection by the state, not an easy task at best, and especially complicated when the informer has become a recognized personality in the media. A chronic problem for the U.S. Witness Security Program is that, because so many of the informers are criminals, the effect of the program is to put the Justice Department in the position of indemnifying felons, even murderers, in exchange for testimony against others whose alleged "crimes" are minor by comparison, even to a public which supports the government and believes the witness.

Eveleigh's strategy of repression, like Kitson's earlier, is being internationalized. A 1978 FBI document titled *Proceedings of FBI International Symposium on Terrorism* is especially interesting in this regard. Page two says,

Those who made presentations at the FBI International Symposium on Terrorism request that you do not duplicate this document in any way. Moreover, they request that information contained in their presentations not be disseminated outside your agency.

This admonition was taken so seriously that the FBI violated federal laws and its own regulations in a futile attempt to keep it secret. When Monica Andres of the Center for National Security Studies filed a Freedom of Information request for this document, the FBI replied that no such thing exists. Fortunately it had already been captured and was in the hands of the dreaded "terrorists" by the time Andres asked for it.

The contents would surprise no one, so I won't quote a line of it here; the significance is in the attendance. Not only did this symposium convene high-level security officers from West



Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Israel, and Great Britain, but it reached down into every village and hamlet throughout the United States. Nearly every FBI field office, state police department, and the chiefs or assistant chiefs of police from the hundred largest cities and towns in the U.S. were represented; a similar symposium was held in Puerto Rico.

That is new. Never before have the political duties of police on every level been so explicitly articulated, so broadly connected, so well organized. It is not just high technology that has made this possible; it is also the new strategies of permanent repression as articulated by Kitson and Eveleigh.

## Conclusion

IT is important for those of us who understand that we must fight repression not to skip any beats addressing the new realities, but we must adopt new strategies of our own to defend ourselves. It is not going to be an easy task. If we limit ourselves simply to having meetings and rallies and leafletting, we are going to see the Santa Luisa Five and the Other City Ten endlessly, until we're all safely packed away in concentration camps. We must help groups understand the new repression and train themselves to combat these incursions of the state while we continue to fight the political battles we all consider to be so important.

To begin, we must discard some of the left's conventional wisdom, particularly the assumption that the state's relatively tolerant attitude toward protest is permanent and the companion assumption that the defense of constitutional legality is sufficient to protect the political space required for the next mass insurgency to develop. Our assumptions about the potential of our movement must become at least as radical as those of the state, that there does exist an objective basis for insurgency, and that it can and must emerge.

The tasks that face us are complicated and difficult. We must recognize that we cannot hope to free today's grand jury resisters, political

prisoners, and prisoners of war unless we can go on the offensive against the new forms of repression; at best we will tread water, possibly freeing an occasional comrade as even more are carried off.

In an age when the police can hunt down revolutionaries by tracing their children's medical prescriptions, our opposition must be even more innovative. We do not claim to have all the answers, but we do believe we have identified the essential problem.

We urge activists to be in touch with us; we are eager to share what we have learned in the most constructive way we can.

We also need to understand that we cannot rely upon the traditional civil liberties organizations to help in this regard, because their strategies are too defensive, too little, too late. We've got to become the builders of a new movement, not simply a proliferation of *ad hoc* defense organizations each time we've got more prisoners of war or political prisoners to defend, but at least the beginnings of an organized response that views thwarting the political police as a permanent task of our political work, in the same way that the bourgeoisie now views permanent repression as essential to its continuing rule.



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