


1. I, Andrew Parker, am the Director General of the Security Service, otherwise known as MI5.
2. I confirm that I have no personal knowledge of matters relating to, or connected with, Kincora Boys Hostel (Kincora).
3. I confirm that I have appointed a nominated officer from within the Security Service to assist the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry) with its investigation into Kincora.
4. I have also directed relevant staff within the Security Service to provide the HIA Inquiry with the Security Service's full co-operation.
5. I confirm that I have directed that all relevant material that touches on Kincora identified by the detailed searches conducted by the Security Service must be shown to the HIA Inquiry. I understand from my staff this has been done.
6. I confirm that I also directed that such of that material as the HIA Inquiry considered necessary to be put in the public domain in order for the HIA Inquiry to properly complete its work has been made available to the HIA Inquiry in a form that will allow that to happen. I understand from my staff that the documents so far requested by the HIA Inquiry have been made available for publication. I further understand that the HIA may make further requests, the Security Service will use its best endeavours to assist.
7. I confirm that I have also directed my nominated officer to provide to the HIA Inquiry with a detailed narrative statement setting out what the Security Service can say about allegations involving it relating to Kincora. I understand from my staff that this has been done.
8. I have directed that my nominated officer will attend the HIA Inquiry to speak to that statement as the HIA Inquiry considers necessary.
9. For operational reasons it is not possible for me to publicly name the nominated officer, however, I have provided the HIA Inquiry with a closed witness statement signed by me which sets out the full identity of the individual. I confirm that the individual is a senior manager within the Security Service with responsibility for investigations in Northern Ireland, who will give evidence on behalf of the Security Service in respect of matters relating to Kincora.
10. I confirm on behalf of the Security Service that it will continue to assist the HIA Inquiry to the best of its ability.

Signed.....



Dated.....

27 May 2016

HIAI (Hart) Inquiry – Security Service Witness Statement

Signed by:

9004

Date:

30 May 2016

Introduction

1. It is impossible in a single document to address the gamut of allegations surrounding the abuse at Kincora Boys' Home. Books have been written which have failed to encompass all of the related issues. This note aims to give a summary of what MI5 files record regarding the main claims relating to MI5's alleged involvement with Kincora; particularly those of **Brian GEMMELL**, a former Army intelligence officer.

2. The first MI5 knew of the allegations about child sexual exploitation at Kincora was when the stories emerged in the media in 1980 and the RUC investigation which led to the conviction of **William McGRATH**, the Kincora housefather, and two others (**Joseph MAINS** and **Raymond SEMPLE**). MI5 research undertaken at the time and subsequently has failed to find any papers to indicate that we had earlier knowledge of such abuse.

William McGRATH and MI5's investigation of Tara

3. It is clear from our examination of internal MI5 correspondence that when the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) investigation into Kincora began in 1980, MI5 had concerns about the security of some of its agents and covert operations, though these matters were unrelated to activities at Kincora itself. Such concerns were legitimate and understandable in the light of the organisation's national security responsibilities. However, MI5 documents also made clear that were police investigations to uncover criminality by any agent being run by MI5, the Service was perfectly content for the law to take its course.

4. Naturally, documents held by MI5 relating to **William McGRATH** have been carefully scrutinised. There is nothing amongst them to indicate that MI5 was aware of, or suspected, his involvement in child sexual exploitation at Kincora or that such abuse was permitted, condoned or encouraged in order to further any MI5 plan.

5. In June 1971, an MI5 Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) reported on a meeting he had attended earlier that month along with a large number of other loyalists. They had all been personally recommended by sponsors to join the Tara Brigade, a putative Loyalist paramilitary organisation. The CHIS reported that the assembly had been addressed by "*a man called McGRATH*" who explained the aims

of the organisation were the "*preparation of an effective defence force against the day when it would be required*". McGRATH "*emphasised that those joining would not be required to undertake offensive action but would be required to carry out drill and a certain amount of intelligence work*". (See MI5 CHIS Report, June 1971.)

6. An MI5 officer filed this intelligence report on a new file created for "The Tara Brigade". The officer also sent a copy of the report to MI5's Director of Intelligence (D of I) and stated that he would pass a copy to an RUC Assistant Chief Constable who was Head of Special Branch. At this point, MI5 did not know Mr McGRATH's first name, nor did they have any report about his alleged homosexuality. In April 1972, MI5 did receive information which stated that Mr McGRATH had been accused of 'assaulting small boys'. MI5 was still unaware at that point of any reporting on McGRATH's homosexuality, although we are very conscious that homosexuality did not – and does not – equate to paedophilia. We cover this accusation below. (See section on **James MILLER – McGRATH, Kincora and media misrepresentation**).

7. In November 1973, the RUC notified MI5 that they had received information that McGRATH was intending to visit Amsterdam at some future date for unknown reasons. The RUC letter included McGRATH's full name and occupation as a Social Worker at Kincora Hostel. Annotations on the RUC letter indicate that MI5 did not hold a file on McGRATH at the time. (See RUC Letter to MI5, June 1973.)

8. A Daily Intelligence Summary issued by the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence in January 1976 included a Comment about McGRATH which mentioned reporting from March 1975 having given his employment as warden of the Kincora Boys' Home. (See DCI Daily Intelligence Summary of 17 January 1976 - Extract.)

DCI Daily Intelligence Summary of 17 January 1976 - Extract

[Note: A crop from the original document will be placed here & the full redacted document in Annex B.]

WILLIAM MCGRATH WAS REPORTED IN MARCH 1975 TO BE WARDEN OF THE KINCORA BOYS HOSTEL. HE HAS PREVIOUS TARA TRACES AND IS SAID ***** TO BE A HOMOSEXUAL. ANOTHER REGULAR AND RELIABLE SOURCE HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT THE UDA, AND ALSO WILLIAM CRAIG, MAY BE AWARE OF THIS TARA / UVF ACTIVITY IN THE ARMS FIELD.

9. In April 1975, MI5 obtained *via* the Army a summary of allegations made to the RUC on an unknown date by Miss Valerie Shaw (PA to Dr Ian Paisley) during an RUC officer's investigation of Tara. Miss Shaw's information included details of

McGRATH and Tara. (See Report received by MI5 in April 1975 – originated 22 March 1975.)

10. In May 1975, MI5 received intelligence from a Merseyside Police Special Branch CHIS about efforts to establish a Tara presence there during 1970-71. Although McGRATH is not named in the report, it is likely that he was the person described as the 'instigator' of the Liverpool company of Tara who was 'strongly suspected' of being a homosexual. (See Merseyside SB Report to MI5 – March 1975.)

11. In April 1976, Robert Fisk published an article mentioning Tara in the *New Statesman*. Fisk claimed that an account of Tara's activity had been "*collated by an intelligence officer at Lisburn*". MI5 ASP Ian Cameron wrote to other MI5 officers about the Tara component of the article which he believed was almost certainly a draft on Tara held in the Army Information Service (AIS) records at HQNI. (See MI5 ASP Letter of 22 April 1976.)

12. Cameron felt that the AIS summary had undoubtedly been drawn from Army intelligence files. ASP noted that Colin WALLACE would have had access to the AIS file and he had little doubt that Wallace had been Fisk's source for the article. ASP attached the relevant AIS record for comparison with Fisk's article.

13. It is likely that Cameron had been able to recognise the similarity because in 1974 the NIO had sought assistance from MI5 in identifying the source of unauthorised disclosures of classified information. These inquiries had encompassed both Colin WALLACE and Robert FISK (see below for Colin WALLACE.).

14. A comparison of the Army Information Service record and the relevant extract of Fisk's article shows a strong resemblance, supporting Cameron's judgement that the latter derived from the former. (See AIS and Fisk extracts below.) A copy of Fisk's full article is provided as **Attachment A.**)

15. In January 1977, MI5 continued to seek information about McGRATH and Tara, enquiring about whether a source who had been able to report on McGRATH in early 1976 would still be able to do so.

16. It was only in May 1977 that MI5 created a permanent file on William McGRATH. Security Service policy requires two criteria to be met before a file may be opened on an individual. First, the individual must be fully identified. Secondly, the individual must meet an official Recording Category which, in the case of William

McGRATH, was on the basis that between 1971 and 1977 he had been an Irish Protestant extremist.

17. Inside MI5's file on McGRATH there is an envelope containing two index cards that at one time would have been used as a working aid to record brief notes about him. The earliest note is based on a report dated 18 April 1973, recording McGRATH as the leader of a 'refurbished' form of the Tara Brigade.

18. Another entry, based on a report dated 13 November 1973, gives his occupation as Boys Hostel warder (*sic*) at Kincora Boys Hostel and also states that he is reported to be homosexual. McGRATH's date of birth is shown citing a report dated 20 January 1976. An entry citing a report dated 13 February 1976 states that he "*has long made a practice of exploiting other peoples sexual deviations*". There is no entry reflecting the April 1972 report about Mr McGRATH having being accused of 'assaulting small boys'. (See Index Card Working Aid Cards 1 & 2 on William McGRATH.)

Brian GEMMELL – MI5 ASP and the Kincora investigation

19. Brian GEMMELL, a former Army intelligence officer, was interviewed by the RUC in relation to the allegations about Kincora. The RUC's intention to interview him was known to the Security Service. (See MI5 Loose Minute 29 June 1982.)

20. It is evident from MI5 documents that the Service was not conducting any intelligence operations linked to Kincora and had no concerns about the police investigations into the abuse at Kincora *per se*. Indeed, one MI5 document made the point that it was important to understand from RUC Special Branch "*how best [Caskey's] attention can be focussed on matters strictly relevant to Kincora...*". (See MI5 Telex of 01 July 1982 – Extracts.)

21. In this section, we consider how RUC Det Supt Caskey became aware of and dealt with MI5 ASP Ian Cameron, and how MI5 tried to reconcile providing what assistance it could to the Kincora investigation while protecting the security of its sensitive intelligence operations in NI.

22. MI5 documents do reveal that MI5 had security concerns that the investigation into Kincora might result in the public exposure of its legitimate intelligence operations in NI. In its efforts to highlight and deal with these concerns, MI5 met a number of key individuals associated in various ways with the Kincora

investigation. These included the RUC Head of Special Branch (HSB) and his Deputy (DHSB); lead Kincora investigators Det Supt George Caskey and Army Special Investigation Branch (SIB) investigator Capt B; the Attorney General (AG) and Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (DPPNI) as well as Sir George Terry himself.

23. We have seen nothing in the MI5 documents (or any other official record) to suggest that MI5 tried to impede or limit the Kincora investigation. MI5's actions to protect its operations whilst providing what assistance it could to the investigation are described below. These include MI5's former ASP, Ian Cameron, providing answers to a set of questions posed by Det Supt Caskey.

24. MI5's security concerns arose in connection with police interviews of Brian GEMMELL, which MI5 feared could stray into areas unrelated to Kincora and might thus place sensitive intelligence operations at risk. In this context, we note that the RUC Deputy Head of Special Branch (DHSB) told MI5 in July 1982 that there would almost certainly be a public inquiry during 1983, adding that Caskey's report would form the basis for the inquiry and might be made available to interested parties. (See MI5 Telex of 02 July 1982 – extracts.)

25. As we shall see later, MI5 discussed these concerns with the Attorney General (AG) and Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (DPPNI).

26. Accordingly, after broaching the subject with HSB and DHSB, some senior MI5 officers in NI met Det Supt Caskey at RUC HQ on 02 July 1982. They briefed Caskey on the existence of MI5's covert agent-running operation in NI, MI5's relationship with GEMMELL and an individual that GEMMELL claimed to have run as an agent. They also informed Caskey of GEMMELL's application to join MI5. (See section **Brian GEMMELL – applications to join the Security Service (MI5)** below).

27. The MI5 officers emphasised to Caskey that their sole concern was to ensure that interviews stayed focused on Kincora and not on any unrelated intelligence matters. Caskey told MI5 that he could do what was required "*without bending any rules*". MI5 emphasised, in turn, that their sole concern was to ensure that intelligence matters were not aired in public. (See MI5 Telex of 02 July 1982 – extracts.)

28. GEMMELL was interviewed by Caskey and Army Capt. B on 16 July 1982.

29. On 19 July 1982, Capt B described the GEMMELL interview to MI5, pointing out that at the start of the interview, Caskey had explained to GEMMELL that he was

primarily interested in GEMMELL's interview with Roy GARLAND in 1975, what he (GEMMELL) had learned and what he did with this information. When making arrangements for the interview, B had advised GEMMELL that he should restrict his comments and answers to Caskey's current investigation (ie Kincora). For the avoidance of doubt, it is clear that there that there was no impediment to GEMMELL speaking about paedophilia either in Kincora or elsewhere or involving others.

30. MI5 documents show that on 20 July 1982, Caskey met with MI5 officers at RUC HQ and read out extracts from GEMMELL's statement. Caskey expressed his intention to obtain the Military Intelligence Source Report (MISR) that GEMMELL said he had written (but which nobody had been able to find) and would want to interview MI5 officer Ian Cameron. MI5 therefore set in motion efforts to discover from Cameron what he did with GEMMELL's information and the MISR.

31. An MI5 lawyer was able to make telephone contact with Cameron, who was about to go abroad, and Cameron's initial responses were passed to an MI5 officer in NI to relay to Caskey. (See MI5 Telex of 23 July 1982)

32. We can see from Cameron's answer to Caskey's Question 9 (see **Attachment C**) that by "*line of enquiry*", Cameron means the allegation that McGRATH was a homosexual.

33. Cameron's recollections were passed to Caskey at a meeting on 04 August 1982. In response, Caskey said that they tied in with what GEMMELL had said, and went on to make a number of other points. These included that he (Caskey) would be prepared to meet MI5's Legal Adviser (LA) and provide a set of questions for Cameron to answer. Caskey said he would accept a written statement drawn up by the LA and Cameron. Caskey also made the "*obvious point*" that it was important to be honest with the DPP. He also made it clear that he had to have a statement from Cameron to complete his enquiry. (See MI5 Telex of 05 August 1982 – Extracts.)

34. Caskey went on to pose 30 questions for Cameron to answer which were set out in an attachment to a letter to the NIO dated 11 October 1982. A copy of Caskey's questions is provided as **Attachment B**.

35. MI5's LA managed to put Caskey's 30 questions to Cameron and recorded his (Cameron) answers in a note dated 03 November 1982. The text of the LA's note is provided as **Attachment C**. For security reasons, Cameron did not answer Caskey's first 5 questions because they related to his sensitive intelligence role and duties in NI and were unrelated to Kincora.

36. MI5's LA sent Cameron's answers to the DCI in NI as an attachment to a letter dated 03 November 1982. We have been unable to determine from our documents whether or not this set of answers was passed to Caskey. It is possible that they were not, perhaps for reasons associated with discussions that MI5's LA had already held with the AG and DPPNI, and the AG's view that Cameron's information would be "*hearsay upon hearsay*". (See below.)

37. Before receiving Caskey's 30 questions, MI5's LA had met with the Attorney General (AG) and the Director of Public Prosecutions for NI (DPPNI) and discussed with them various aspects of the Kincora investigation; in particular, MI5's concerns to protect its legitimate intelligence operations in NI. A copy of the LA's record of this meeting dated 01 October 1982 is provided as **Attachment D**.

38. It is evident from the LA's note that MI5 were not trying to impede the investigation into Kincora, about which it had no information, but were seeking a way to protect its quite proper intelligence operations.

39. The Inquiry may consider it significant that the AG expressed the view any information that Cameron could give would appear to be "*hearsay upon hearsay*". A few days after the MI5 LA's meeting with the AG and DPPNI, the AG's Legal Secretary (AGLS) contacted MI5's LA. The AGLS informed the MI5 LA that the DPPNI's view was that [Caskey's] questions "*did not properly arise on any investigation*", adding that the DPPNI himself had no knowledge of the questions and was not behind them. The DPPNI gave the AGLS to understand that he would not be concerned one way or another whether they were answered. A copy of the MI5 LA's note dated 03 November 1982 recording this conversation is provided as **Attachment E**.

40. MI5's views on this issue, and those of the AG, were also explained to the RUC Chief Constable Sir John Hermon on 11 November 1982 by a senior MI5 officer. The Chief Constable accepted that MI5 were seriously concerned that the intelligence effort could be impaired. He therefore agreed to look into stopping further inquiries into Cameron, while making it clear that his primary concern was to ensure that the RUC handled the inquiry "*in an entirely professional and competent way*". A copy of MI5 Note of 17 November 1982 recording this meeting is provided as **Attachment F**.

41. MI5's security concerns increased when they became aware that Caskey was interviewing Army intelligence officers overseas. It was judged that these posed further potential dangers to MI5 intelligence activities that were entirely unrelated to Kincora. This led to a meeting on 27 January 1983 between MI5's LA, Sir George

Terry and the latter's Staff Officer, DCI Flenley. The MI5 LA's record of their discussion dated 03 February 1983 is provided as **Attachment G**.

42. The LA described to Sir George Terry in detail the background to the Service's dealings with RUC Det Supt Caskey around Brian GEMMELL's claims; Caskey's attempts to interview ASP/Ian Cameron; MI5's security concerns and their meetings with the RUC Chief Constable, DPPNI and AG.

43. The note records that Sir George Terry expressed amazement that none of this had been reported to him by the RUC CC. DCI Flenley remarked that Caskey had been influenced by the fact that the prosecution of William McGRATH *et al* had been stimulated by press allegations, and now the press had made similar allegations about the involvement of civil servants and an Army cover-up. Caskey, he said, did not wish to appear before any judicial enquiry without having conducted a full investigation. Caskey had been informed by press sources that Colin WALLACE had told them years ago about "*homosexual goings on*" at Kincora. Apart from this, said Flenley, there was no actual evidence to establish the involvement of civil servants or any Army cover-up.

44. We are aware of criticism that Cameron was never subjected to a formal police interview and never answered questions to which Caskey wanted answers. It is clear from MI5's papers that Caskey was given Cameron's initial reply and he (Cameron) later responded to the detailed questions. And our records show that such an interview would have been of little value in any event given multiple hearsay, as well as presenting a risk to MI5's legitimate operations in NI.

Brian GEMMELL – confusion / conflation of cases

45. Cameron told an MI5 lawyer that he could not recall telling GEMMELL to break off contact [with GARLAND]. (See MI5 Telex of 23 July 1982.) This issue also seems to arise in Caskey's Questions 9 and 10 in November 1982, where Caskey cited GEMMELL's assertion that Cameron had told him to terminate his (GEMMELL) enquires concerning Tara (presumably relating to GARLAND) and later reversed this decision. In his response, Cameron expressed uncertainty about what the police were getting at. (See Attachment B: MI5/Cameron's Answers to Caskey.)

46. It is clear that GEMMELL had confused and conflated two individuals and the circumstances of each. We explain further below how MI5 records show that in April 1975 Cameron had indeed told GEMMELL that he should not pursue the issue of sexual deviancy when he conducting his interview with GARLAND. (See MI5 Telex of 19/20 July 1982 – extract in Brian GEMMELL - the 'missing' MISR below.)

47. However, in June 1975, Cameron did advise GEMMELL to restrict his contact with a different individual – not GARLAND. This advice was given purely on security grounds and was totally unrelated to Kincora. (See MI5/Cameron Note for File of 9 June 1975.)

Extract of MI5/Cameron Note for File of 9 June 1975

[Note: A crop from the original document will be placed here & the full redacted document in an Annex.]

I saw Capt Gemmell on the morning of 9 June in connection with his contacts with [REDACTED]. Gemmel will be sending us a complete report. From what he told me I concluded that we could be running into troubled waters. [REDACTED] while giving little if any real account away on his side is now beginning to ask Gemmel awkward questions. Moreover it is clear that there is a deal of gossip about Army contacts going on within Loyalist circles, [REDACTED]. I told Gemmel that he should try to get the contact gradually on to a purely social basis and when he could decently do so – to back off altogether. He expressed himself as being relieved [REDACTED].

48. MI5 records also show that later in 1975 GEMMELL told Cameron that this individual (not GARLAND) had obtained some valuable intelligence, whereupon Cameron approved renewed contact.

Brian GEMMELL – applications to join the Security Service (MI5)

49. Security Service records show that Brian GEMMELL unsuccessfully sought employment with the Service on two occasions. The first was in 1971 whilst still a student at Strathclyde University. On that occasion, he was advised that the Service preferred its officers first to have gained some experience in another form of employment. (See MI5 Note For File 25 February 1971.)

50. GEMMELL re-applied to join the Security Service in 1976 after leaving the Army but was rejected. (See MI5 Note for File for 26 November 1976.)

Brian GEMMELL – the ‘missing’ MISR

51. This section focuses on Brian GEMMELL’s allegation that, in his role as an Army Intelligence Officer, he had run CHIS who reported to him on McGRATH’s abuse of the boys at Kincora. GEMMELL publicly named his sources as **William McCORMICK, Roy GARLAND and James MILLER**. Despite extensive searches of

MI5's records, we have been unable to confirm GEMMELL's claims that he (GEMMELL) reported these allegations to MI5 ASP Ian Cameron.

52. In July 1982 an MI5 officer conducting research to assist with police inquiries into Kincora, reported finding in an Northern Ireland file a record of GEMMELL's interview with McCORMICK on 25 March 1975. The same MI5 officer wrote that GEMMELL and an Army colleague had been told on 04 April 1975 by ASP/Cameron and another MI5 officer that they could interview GARLAND on the strict understanding that it was to obtain information on Tara. The two MI5 officers emphasised that the Army had no interest in the investigation of "*deviant sexual activities or religious aspects of the group*" which was a matter for the RUC. Cameron had directed that their discussion with GARLAND should be steered away from this type of issue, by which we presume he meant homosexuality. (See MI5 Telex of 19/20 July 1982 - extract.)

53. We have confirmed that the NI local file seen by the MI5 officer which had contained GEMMELL's McCORMICK interview report has since been destroyed on an unknown date. The file in question did not relate to McCORMICK who, as far as we can tell, was never the subject of an MI5 file. GEMMELL's interview report has not been found elsewhere during any of the subsequent searches of MI5's records.

MI5 Telex of 19/20 July 1982 – extract
[VCSP: Will be crop of original in final version.]

GEMMELL's INTERVIEW WITH MCCORMICK ON 25 MARCH 1975 (WHICH INCLUDED A REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO APPROACH GARLAND) IS FILED ON [REDACTED] PF. RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST [REDACTED] WROTE A NOTE FOR FILE RECORDING THAT GEMMELL AND [REDACTED] WERE TOLD ON 4 APRIL 1975 BY ASP AND [REDACTED] THAT QUOTE IT WAS IN ORDER FOR GARLAND TO BE INTERVIEWED ON THE STRICT UNSTANDING THAT THE OVERT AND CLEARLY EXPRESSED REASON WAS A REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION ON TARA. IT WAS EMPHASISED THAT THE ARMY HAD NO INTEREST IN INVESTIGATION OF DEVIANT SEXUAL ACTIVITIES OR RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE GROUP WHICH WAS SOLELY THE FUNCTION OF A SPECIALIST SECTION OF THE RUC. THEREFORE THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD BE STEERED AWAY FROM THIS TYPE OF ISSUE.

54. Although GEMMELL claimed subsequently to have written a MISR (Military Intelligence Source Report) on this topic, we have been unable to find one in MI5's records during extensive searches conducted for the HIAI. Earlier efforts have also been unsuccessful, including those conducted by an MI5 officer in 1982. However, MI5 records do contain an Army letter written in January 1976 not by Captain GEMMELL, but by Army Major A, which we judge to be of some relevance and

discuss further below. A copy of Maj A's Letter Ref: 13912/2 is provided as **Attachment H**.

55. According to an MI5 officer's telex dated 31 January 1977, the Major's letter was amongst a number of papers that GEMMELL had given to him (the MI5 officer) on 15 October 1976. (See MI5 Telex of 31 January 1977: 'William McGATH (sic) and TARA'.)

56. According to a letter written by the same MI5 officer on 19 October 1976, GEMMELL also gave him two other documents. The first was described as "notes on an interview with Roy GARLAND which had been made by GEMMELL and an NCO after a "one off" debrief sanctioned by Ian CAMERON. A copy of the GARLAND interview notes is provided as Attachment H-2.

57. The GEMMELL/NCO debriefing notes on GARLAND open with the latter stating that he had been introduced to McGRATH twenty years earlier at the 'approximate' age of 15, in the context of a Christian evangelical crusade, and how at McGRATH's instigation, they formed "groups called cell". In the next paragraph, GARLAND – having now moved on to discussing Tara - described how McGRATH would single them out after meetings and attempt to seduce them and make them feel guilty by admitting to masturbation and showing up their guilt complex. GARLAND said this was important to emphasise as this was "*the very beginning of [McGRATH's] hold on them*".

58. The second document GEMMELL handed to the MI5 officer was a Note to File about Tara dated 14 October 1976 and notes on an interview. GEMMELL's Note to File made no mention of Kincora or paedophilia. (See MI5 Letter of 19 October 1976: 'TARA'.) A copy of GEMMELL's Note to File on TARA is provided as **Attachment I**.

59. The Note to File on Tara is unsigned, but according to the MI5 covering letter, it had been written by GEMMELL himself and was based on the contents of his (GEMMELL) file on Tara. (See MI5 Letter of 19 October 1976: 'TARA'.) We have seen nothing to cause us to doubt the veracity of this statement.

60. The references in the opening two paragraphs of the GARLAND debriefing note to him a) being aged approximately 15 when he was introduced to McGRATH, and b) McGRATH attempting to 'seduce' youngsters, may appear significant in hindsight. But it is unlikely that the MI5 officers at the time would have attributed

much significance to them at the time. We should bear a number of factors in mind, not least that in reality, 10 years were to pass between these two events.

61. The background references on GARLAND was marginal to the matter then under discussion between MI5 and the Army – which was in the context of a different case entirely unrelated to GARLAND and Kincora. But in relation to the 'seduction' issue, we note that Paragraph 6 of Maj A's letter of 28 January 1976 states that McGRATH "[made] a practice of seducing promising young men". However, unlike GEMMELL's interview note, the A letter goes on to identify two of those who were seduced. It would be inappropriate to name them here, but both of them were clearly adults.

62. This is consistent with what Mr GARLAND later wrote in the *Irish Times* on 13 April 1982. GARLAND explained how in 1965 McGRATH invited him to join 'cell', at which point GARLAND would have been about 25 years old. GARLAND described 'cell' as "a private ginger group of Orangemen chaired by a Church of Ireland minister". He further explains that "members of District, County and Grand Orange Lodges took part". He makes no reference to any involvement of young boys. A copy of GARLAND's *Irish Times* article is provided as **Attachment I-2**].

63. Although this level of detail is not provided in the GARLAND debriefing note written by GEMMELL and the NCO, if their note had been consistent with GARLAND's later public account, and had it been related to MI5, it is unlikely that they would have drawn any inference of paedophilia or child sexual exploitation from it.

64. In addition, GEMMELL's letter of 12 February 1976 had described the smears and propaganda of the time involving allegations of homosexuality. Separately, MI5 had already been informed in March 1975, via the Army, that GARLAND's complaints about McGRATH's behaviour to Valerie Shaw had been relayed by her to the RUC, although the letter itself lacked detail about the nature of the behaviour.

65. We are also aware that the *Irish Times* published an article about Kincora on 03 November 1983 in which they reported what they had been told by a man "well known in Belfast Protestant evangelical circles". This unidentified man was clearly Mr McCORMICK. He reportedly told the newspaper that he first heard about McGRATH and his job at Kincora in the early 1970s from Roy GARLAND, whom he described as "a former associate of McGrath's who was attempting to expose his homosexual activities". McCORMICK also said that he (McCORMICK) had first put GARLAND in touch with an RUC constable whom he knew as a devout Christian in

1972 or 1973. A copy of the *Irish Times* article of 3 November 1983 is provided as **Attachment I-3**.

66. If what McCORMICK told the *Irish Times* had been known to MI5, whether from GEMMELL's note of his debriefing of McCORMICK (which we have not been able to find) or through discussion with GEMMELL himself, MI5 might reasonably have assumed that any allegations by either McCORMICK or GARLAND against McGRATH were not just dated but were already known to the RUC. However, such allegations may still have constituted part of a smear exercise.

67. The only part of GEMMELL's Note to File of 14 October 1976 on Tara which touches on the issue of McGRATH's sexual proclivities comes in his Paragraph 4 where he wrote that a number members of Tara were 'sexually deviant', McGRATH was almost certainly bisexual and had homosexuals amongst his immediate circle of Tara associates. (See GEMMELL Note to File of 14 October 1976: 'TARA'.)

68. Major A's letter was found by an MI5 officer in 1989 whilst reviewing some Army records at the request of the MOD. The Major's letter reported information from three unnamed contacts about Tara and its membership. It stated *inter alia* that McGRATH was "a homosexual" and "made a practice of seducing promising young men". It added that he was described in the 'Belfast Street Directory' as a Welfare Officer and was "thought to be running some form of boys' home".

69. The MI5 officer who found the letter noted that in April 1975 GEMMELL had been given clearance by the Army to interview Roy GARLAND. And while the MI5 officer said that it was not clear exactly what information had been derived from the GARLAND interview, he judged it reasonable to suppose that the Major's letter from January 1976 was in part based upon it. We would agree with that judgement.

70. Although no copy of GEMMELL's alleged MISR has been found, it is likely that its essential content would have been the same as that found in the Major A's letter, perhaps combined with the information in GEMMELL's later Note to File of 14 October 1976. (See **Attachment I**.) We should also bear in mind that any decision on issuing a MISR, based on the content of the Major's letter at least, would have taken into account the 'F' grading given at his Paragraph 2, which indicates that the reliability of the source(s) of the intelligence was unknown.

71. Whether GEMMELL ever did produce a MISR or not, it is notable that his October 1976 Note, based on his Tara file and written at the end of his Army career, made no mention of McGRATH's involvement in paedophilia or his employment at Kincora Boys' Home.

Brian GEMMELL – allegations about MI5 blackmail

72. There have been a number of allegations about MI5 having blackmailed McGRATH or others involved in a paedophile ring involving Kincora. We have seen absolutely nothing in the Security Service records to support any of these allegations.

73. We are also aware of a separate allegation by Brian GEMMELL that during a visit to London in 1976, an MI5 officer told him that MI5 had film of John McKEAGUE, a well-known Loyalist paramilitary figure, involved in homosexual activities and asked for his (GEMMELL) views on how susceptible McKEAGUE would be to blackmail.

74. We have examined this allegation and established that MI5 had no compromising film of McKEAGUE and never made any attempt to blackmail him. However, one MI5 officer did put forward an operational proposal (which was never endorsed) which involved using McKEAGUE's homosexual activities in London in an attempt to recruit him. We describe the chronology of events below.

75. The MI5 records confirm that GEMMELL met two MI5 officers in London on 10 May 1976 in connection with the handling of an agent unrelated to McKEAGUE.

76. In June 1976 McKEAGUE visited London as part of a UVF arms procurement operation. At various times during his trip, he was under surveillance by MI5 who suspected the UVF's plans. The MI5 officers conducting surveillance of McKEAGUE did take some photographs of him in Central London. However, the photographs were not compromising or sexual in nature. All of them were taken in public areas, but some showed him in the company of young men.

77. It was apparent to those conducting surveillance that McKEAGUE's contact with these young men was to establish homosexual assignations rather than part of the Loyalist arms procurement operation.

78. On 07 September 1976 GEMMELL had lunch in London with an MI5 officer, following which he (GEMMELL) was to attend a formal meeting with another MI5 officer as part of his application to join MI5. No formal record of the lunchtime meeting exists. It is clear from MI5 records, however, that the meeting was held at the request of the MI5 officer who, having become aware of GEMMELL's intention to visit to London, wished to seize the opportunity to discuss with him how to move forward an existing CHIS case of which GEMMELL was aware, but which was unrelated to McKEAGUE.

79. It was not until November 1976 that this same MI5 officer suggested, in light of McKEAGUE's involvement in arms procurement, that "*serious consideration should be given to using [his] homosexual tendencies in an attempt to recruit him*". The MI5 officer accepted that McKEAGUE's colleagues already knew him to be a homosexual, but he doubted that they were aware of how McKEAGUE spent his time when visiting London. The MI5 officer also judged that McKEAGUE's conduct after returning to Belfast in June 1976 following his arms procurement visit to GB had all the indications of someone who was anxious to conceal his homosexual activities in London.

80. The MI5 officer's proposal was considered by other members of the Service including management. This ploy was, however, opposed for a variety of reasons and it was pointed out that MI5's Legal Adviser doubted that MI5's management would accept such a proposal.

81. Based on MI5's contemporaneous papers, the officer's intention would probably have been to exploit what McKEAGUE - as well as his terrorist associates - would have regarded as insecure conduct in London: picking up young men whilst engaged in a covert arms procurement operation. It is clear that MI5 knew that McKEAGUE's homosexuality was recognised by his associates in NI, and he was therefore not susceptible to pressure on that account. In other words, any pressure felt by McKEAGUE would not have been in relation to his homosexuality *per se* but to his lax tradecraft and consequential threat to the success of their arms procurement operation and those involved. As we have already indicated, MI5 neither took nor possessed any compromising photographs.

James MILLER – McGRATH, Kincora and media misrepresentation

82. There have been a number of claims that James MILLER was a CHIS and that he reported to his handlers on Kincora. Brian GEMMELL has claimed to have been one of MILLER's handlers.

83. Arguably, the most public of the allegations about MILLER came to light in March 1987. On 22 March 1987 the *Sunday Times* reported a number of MILLER's claims about work he had undertaken for MI5. These mostly related to the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike. However, on 23 March 1987 the *Irish Times* reported that the Army had asked MILLER to infiltrate Tara and compile information on William McGRATH; which he allegedly did in 1970, a year before McGRATH became warden at Kincora. The article also stated that MILLER would not say if the information he compiled related to McGRATH's "*homosexual or paedophilic activities*". The *Sunday Times* published a more detailed article about MILLER on 29 March 1987;

including the claim that the intelligence services had known about the activities at Kincora for a number of years. Copies of these articles are provided as **Attachments J, K and L.**

84. As a matter of government policy, MI5 can neither confirm nor deny publicly whether a particular individual was a CHIS. However, we are able to make a number of assertions about MILLER with confidence.

85. Following the publication of the *Sunday Times* articles in March 1987, an aggrieved MILLER made contact with government officials to make a number of claims. A note of his phone call was passed to the Cabinet Office at the time. (See Note to Cabinet Office of 30 March 1987.)

86. As a consequence, two officials interviewed MILLER about his various concerns in early April 1987. The record of this meeting states that MILLER said his only motive in talking to the Press had been to "*set the record straight about Colin WALLACE, whom he believed had betrayed British secrets to the UDA*". MILLER added that the journalists had ignored his information about WALLACE, instead they used his (MILLER) name to lend weight to their own inventions about MI5. He said the statements attributed to him that were published in the two *Sunday Times* articles were "*a mixture of pure fiction and gross distortion*".

87. We provide a number of relevant extracts from the interviewers' Official Minute which we judge to be significant. (See Extracts A-D from Official Minute of 06 April 1987 re interview with MILLER.) These touch on MILLER's claim of false representation in the *Sunday Times* articles and, significantly, his specific comments about what he is alleged to have told the journalists about Kincora (**Extract D** refers).

88. It seems clear from what MILLER told the officials that he had no information of any abuse being carried out at Kincora, no knowledge of McGRATH's paedophilia and no knowledge of his employment at Kincora Boys' Home. The account provided privately to officials by MILLER differs dramatically from what was published by journalists Clarke and Penrose.

89. Despite extensive searches of papers we have been able to find only a single document which provides any support to the allegation published in *the Sunday Times* article of 29 March 1987.

90. We located a letter written by Mr MILLER dated 07 April 1972 in which he reported having been told by an associate that the Tara Commanding Officer, whose

name was given as McGRATH, "*had been accused of assaulting small boys*". (See Mr MILLER's Letter of 07 April 1972 – Extracts.)

91. However, Mr MILLER did not provide McGRATH's first name. He did not indicate anything about McGRATH's sexuality or employment, and he did not expand on what was meant by 'assaulting'. Part of Mr MILLER's letter was reproduced almost verbatim in an MI5 report about 'Extreme Protestants'. The author of the MI5 document included the comment that reliability of the person who told MILLER about the accusation was "*open to doubt*". (See MI5 Report of 11 April 1972.)

92. We believe the MI5 officer would have taken into account a number of factors when assessing the information in Mr MILLER's letter at the time. These would probably have included, for example: when had the accusations had been made; by whom were the accusations made (by victims, police or others); against whom were the allegations had been made (the leader of Tara Mr McGRATH was not yet fully unidentified); when had the alleged assaults taken place (recently or in the past) and what kind of 'assault' had been carried out: physical (eg slap/punch) or sexual (or even 'verbal'). And at this point there had been no allegation about Mr McGRATH's homosexuality, although had there been any, the MI5 officer would have recognised that homosexuality did not – and does not – equate to paedophilia.

93. At the time that Mr MILLER's letter was passed to MI5 in April 1972, the Service was still uncertain about the identity of the Mr McGRATH who was the CO of Tara. Even his forename was in doubt. It was an RUC letter of 22 November 1973 that provided McGRATH's full name, Date of Birth and gave his occupation as 'Social Worker' at Kincora Hostel.

94. Also, we ought not to assume that 'assault' would have been interpreted at the time by the MI5 officer who read Mr MILLER's letter, or by anyone who read it, as being of a sexual type. McGRATH was, after all, running a paramilitary organisation, and physical abuse or rough handling of young recruits might have been anticipated. For example, MI5 CHIS reporting about the UDA prior to 08 July 1972 stated that there was "*a very bullying attitude by the leadership towards the rank and file*" which was not well received. In this context, we should also bear in mind that Loyalist paramilitaries, like their Republican counterparts, used youngsters in their cause.

95. The MI5 officer who drafted the April 1972 report did not give their reason for assessing the sub-source's reliability as "*open to doubt*". It may be that the officer based his judgement on information obtained from elsewhere, including discussions with others (eg Army intelligence and RUC SB officers). However, we do know that in October 1971 MI5 had reporting that there was some 'discord' within Tara, some of

whose members appear to have been defaming or insulting each other and McGRATH.

96. We should note too that the MI5 officers' focus in NI at that time would have been to obtain strategic intelligence on paramilitary capabilities, activities and intentions. The accusations against an as-yet unidentified McGRATH as reported in the 1972 letter would not have been passed to the police not just due to the factors we referred to above, and also because it could be judged to fall below the intelligence threshold. It was a generalised assertion and insufficiently robust. The MI5 judgement on Mr MILLER's letter would have been made at a particularly challenging time for the Security Forces. Terrorists had killed 180 people during 1971, and in 1972 up to the date of this letter they had already killed some 50 people. Therefore an accusation of dubious provenance about an unidentified person and ambiguous interpretation may well have been considered simply not to meet the threshold for dissemination.

97. MI5 did pass some of its reports, in whole or in part, to RUC HSB. However, this was somewhat discretionary and it is not possible to tell from MI5's 'Extreme Protestants' report whether or not RUC HSB was told about the accusation against McGRATH. Nor can we tell whether or not the RUC had received a copy of Mr MILLER's letter, which would have enabled them to form their own judgement.

98. So while the accusation made against the McGRATH cited in Mr MILLER's letter may be judged to be of some significance in hindsight, we are satisfied that it was not actionable.

99. We are also aware that MILLER's claim of misrepresentation by the journalists may appear to be undermined by a 15 July 2014 article by Liam CLARKE. CLARKE recalls his 1987 interview with MILLER and alleges that MI5 had paid-off MILLER so that he would stay silent about what he (and thus, allegedly, MI5) knew about Kincora. MILLER had reportedly spoken to CLARKE before his handlers made his financial problems 'disappear' to shut him up. MILLER allegedly told CLARKE that: he was to penetrate Tara for MI5; gave MI5 a dossier on Tara/McGRATH and was promptly told to leave Tara and "*leave McGRATH to us*", which MILLER assumed meant that his information on McGRATH's sexuality was used to recruit him. A copy of Liam CLARKE's article is provided as **Attachment M**.

100. MI5's records do not substantiate Liam CLARKE's allegation of MI5 paying off MILLER or anyone else to remain silent about Kincora or child abuse. There is nothing at all in MI5's records to suggest that MILLER ever had any knowledge of Kincora or child sexual exploitation that might have been taking place there.

Colin WALLACE – allegations by

101. Colin WALLACE has made many allegations about Kincora. We do not propose to address them in detail in this Witness Statement. We have seen nothing during the extensive searches of MI5's records to indicate that WALLACE had any involvement with or knowledge of any MI5 operation in Northern Ireland or elsewhere.

102. We are satisfied that at no time did WALLACE have any formal relationship, with MI5 or its staff. We cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that he may have encountered members of MI5 in their cover roles, on social occasions, for example.

103. The HIA Inquiry has been provided with a copy of the December 1989 Rucker Report on the WALLACE Case and its supplementary of March 1990. The Rucker Report includes MI5's responses to the wide-ranging issues raised by WALLACE.

Sir Maurice Oldfield

104. Sir Maurice Oldfield has been the subject of a number of serious allegations. These issues would have been of considerable significance during the inquiries conducted as part of his vetting. We have seen nothing amongst MI5 or MI6 papers to support these allegations.

105. Sir Maurice OLDFIELD was born in 1915. He served in the British Army between 1940 and 1947 and then joined the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). OLDFIELD was appointed Chief of SIS in 1973. He retired from SIS on 31 January 1978, taking up a Visiting Fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford, for the academic year 1978-79. OLDFIELD was appointed by the Northern Ireland Office as Northern Ireland Security Co-ordinator (NISC), based in Belfast, on 2 October 1979.

106. In early 1980, the Cabinet Office became aware of allegations that OLDFIELD might be homosexual. Homosexuality was viewed as a security vulnerability at the time, and consequently in March 1980 the Cabinet Office informed MI5 of the allegations and asked MI5 to review OLDFIELD's Positive Vetting. During the course of this review OLDFIELD admitted that he had engaged in homosexual activity over a number of years and that he had failed to declare this during

previous vetting interviews. As a result, MI5 concluded that OLDFIELD was unfit to hold Positive Vetting. OLDFIELD formally left the NISC post in June 1980.

107. Following the vetting review, MI5 undertook a thorough investigation in order to ascertain whether OLDFIELD's homosexuality may have been used to compromise him in a way which damaged national security at any point during his career. This investigation included several exhaustive interviews with OLDFIELD and with various contacts of OLDFIELD. The investigation concluded in February 1981 that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that national security had been compromised, and indeed that OLDFIELD had contributed notably to a number of security and intelligence successes which would not have been achieved had there been a breach of security. (Several years later, on 23 April 1987, the Prime Minister made a public statement to this effect, following the publication of a book revealing OLDFIELD's homosexuality.)
108. This vetting review and the subsequent investigation had no relation whatsoever to Kincora Boys Home. No mention of Kincora arose at any point during this process.
109. OLDFIELD died in London on 11 March 1981.
110. In January 1982 (after the above investigation had concluded and after OLDFIELD died) MI5 became aware of allegations by journalists linking OLDFIELD to alleged child abuse at Kincora Boys Home. The relevant media reports did not provide any basis for the allegations.
111. MI5 and the Cabinet Office concluded that the allegations were inherently unlikely because SIS records indicated that OLDFIELD had never travelled to Northern Ireland during his time at SIS (i.e. before October 1979) and because OLDFIELD was accompanied at all times by a police protection officer during his trips as NISC and would not have been left alone for any appreciable time.
112. In March 1982, MI5 became aware of an allegation in an Irish newspaper that OLDFIELD had conducted an investigation into allegations of child abuse at Kincora but had decided to take no further action. Again no basis was provided for this allegation. MI5 concluded that this was undoubtedly incorrect.
113. In February 1983, SIS was informed that a former SIS officer had claimed to an associate that the reason for the termination of OLDFIELD's position as NISC

was that there was evidence of OLDFIELD having engaged in homosexual activity with children during his time in Northern Ireland. This former officer had retired from SIS in the early 1970s and had no current access to SIS or Cabinet Office information. Furthermore, the specific claim was known to be false: MI5 recommended that OLDFIELD's Positive Vetting be revoked due to his homosexuality.

114. MI5 and the Cabinet Office concluded that the allegations linking OLDFIELD to Kincora were entirely unsubstantiated.

Personal Details

115. I am a Deputy Director of MI5. I have been a member of MI5 for 24 years, and have spent the majority of my career in investigative and agent running roles concerned with counter-terrorism. I worked as a London-based desk officer for Northern Irish-related terrorism investigations between 1994 and 1997, before moving into an agent running role concerned with international counter-terrorism. Following the July 2005 bombings I worked in international counter-terrorism roles until 2013. Since late 2014 I have been posted to the Service's Northern Ireland HQ in Palace Barracks as the officer in charge of MI5's Northern Irish-related counter-terrorist investigations and assessments work.

116. I have signed this statement with the personal identification number 9004. This is a unique number issued to me by MI5 for the purposes of identifying myself without disclosing my full identity. This is a necessary practice for security reasons, and the only publicly named individual within MI5 is the Director General. Records held by MI5 link my true identity to my personal identification number.

Some Background on MI5 in Northern Ireland

117. Since 2007, MI5 has had lead responsibility for counter-terrorist intelligence work in Northern Ireland, in close co-operation with PSNI. However, during the 1970s MI5's presence was much smaller. MI5 had a single liaison officer attached to the RUC in 1969. Following the imposition of Direct Rule in 1972 the post of 'Director and Coordinator of Intelligence' (DCI) was created within the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) at Stormont. Whilst the first incumbent of the DCI post was not from MI5, every subsequent post-holder was seconded from MI5 to

the NIO. DCIs never directed intelligence operations in Northern Ireland, but acted as the Secretary of State's main advisor on intelligence matters, and sought to provide strategic coordination of the intelligence effort. DCI also established an analytical staff comprised of seconded MI5 personnel who were responsible for the production of strategic intelligence summaries and assessments.

118. DCI also had senior liaison officers at RUC HQ and Army HQ Lisburn. This latter post was known as the Assistant Secretary (Political), or ASP. In the early 1970s, one of the functions of the ASP post was to provide some guidance for the Army's nascent efforts in gathering intelligence from human sources in a civil conflict. This was prior to the establishment of the Forces Research Unit (FRU) in 1982, after which the ASP role became less hands on and more advisory in nature.
119. Another related unit set up in 1972, although not under the direct control of DCI, was the Irish Joint Section comprising a small number of Security Service and SIS agent running officers focused on obtaining strategic and political intelligence about the plans and intentions of paramilitary organisations.

Annex A - Disclosure process

1. The preparation of this witness statement has followed a painstaking disclosure process conducted by MI5, the detail of which is set out below.

2. In November 2014 MI5 received a letter from the Northern Ireland Office containing a list of search terms provided by the Historical and Institutional Abuse inquiry. Those search terms were:

Bawnmore	Palmerstone
Bernados	Rathgael
Ravelstone Parade	Raymond Semple
"Boys Home" and abuse	Rubane
Brian Gemmell	TARA
"Child abuse" and "Northern Ireland"	Valetta
Colin Wallace	William McGrath
Hughes inquiry	Williamson House
Institutional abuse	Manor House, Lisburn
DL 509	Roy Garland
Joseph Mains	James Miller
Richard Kerr	John McKeague
Kincora	
Mike Taylor	

3. In addition, and with the agreement of the HIAI, MI5 conducted further targeted searches for information known to be of potential relevance. The product from these searches has been provided in a file list provided separately to the HIAI.

4. I confirm that to the best of my knowledge and belief that the file list is an accurate record of the documents produced as a result of these searches and revealed to the HIAI. I cannot provide further detail of the content of the files in this statement because of the damage that disclosure would cause to MI5's ability to protect the public from threats to national security.

5. The searches outlined at paragraphs 2 and 3 above produced many thousands of documents. The detail of these results has been supplied separately to the Inquiry and is not part of this statement as disclosure of the information would damage MI5's ability to protect the public from threats to national security. MI5 agreed with the HIAI that the HIAI would review the documents for relevance prior to their disclosure to the HIAI. The HIAI conducted this task and identified documents of relevance to its Inquiry.

6. MI5 then reviewed the documents identified as relevant by the HIAI and considered whether they contained information which, if disclosed, would damage the MI5's ability to protect the public from threats to national security. MI5 then removed from the documents information assessed to be damaging to national security.

7. The documents identified as being relevant are attached to this witness statement.

8. I am satisfied that the disclosure exercise conducted by experienced MI5 disclosure officers, researchers and lawyers has been conducted thoroughly, and to the best of my knowledge and belief all potentially relevant information was provided

to the inquiry for the purpose of the review it conducted which is described at paragraph 4.

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of where effective power lies and
 to what extent those with nominal control
 are exercising it. Thus effective power may lie
 with senior executives rather than with the
 board, and so for the large com-
 panies that possess itself an advisory, not
 managerial functions. The parallel with the
 relationship between ministers and civil
 servants may be apt - for the strength of
 civil service lies finally in its power to
 control the sources of information and to
 advise ministers from them.

It is clearer to distinguish (a) 'policy'
 boards, which may be supervisory boards
 in big companies, managing boards, and
 the body which exercises executive
 managerial responsibility. The TUC does
 not wish to have membership of the latter
 to avoid the conflict of interest. This is
 a contemporary example of one of the
 most of trade union problems, but also, for
 the future, of trade union dilemmas. The
 statement was joined many years ago when
 the shape of nationalised industries was
 debated within the trade union move-
 ment of the Labour Party. It is not an
 issue that will go away, for it concerns
 the functions of trade unions, their
 aims, and the basic question of whether
 they present or any future structure of
 capitalist society the interests of the work-
 ers are reconcilable with the interests of
 the company. For the moment at least, the
 TUC shows itself as primarily concerned
 with strengthening the processes of collective
 bargaining. The growth of industrial demo-
 cracy helps that strengthening. Possibly it
 may lead to other things but, on the TUC
 seems to be saying, one thing at a time.

What is abundantly obvious is that no one
 general to the present debate is talking about
 workers' control. Nor does anyone seriously
 suggest that the road can end with some
 form of liberal co-partnership, with its
 overriding paternalism and its thesis that
 the interests of workers and owners are really
 one and that only class prejudice blocks
 the way to the acceptance of this simple
 idea. It is the debate about whether
 workers' control, dreamed by the TUC
 as a human relations' approach. Nor is it
 believable that the City committee
 approach of not yet, maybe never, but let's
 keep talking, is anything other than tactical.
 What should the TUC and the Labour
 Party be trying to do in this situation? For
 one, anything which is not directed towards
 the achievement of workers' control is
 all out. But the road to workers' control
 is along a narrow path - on one side of
 which lives the hungry dragon of integra-
 tion and on the other the hungry dragon
 of collaborationism. Either is capable of
 eating the workers for breakfast unless they
 are very well armed. And the shareholders
 have great power on paper or that, if
 they use workers' control more influence
 as they like. They may ensure like some
 use of Loch's backwoodsmen to protect
 their investment.

For the real fight, then, is likely to come over
 provisions of a new Companies Bill. The
 real powers of shareholders are to great
 however infrequently used - that the pos-
 sibility of workers, even an advisory, and much
 to an supervisory, boards, would be hope-
 less. So the law would need to be

necessarily, to weaken the shareholders'.
 That fight will make the Industrial Relations
 Act affair look like a friendly difference of
 opinion.

The terms of the conflict began to emerge
 last week with the CBI rejecting worker
 directors, defining 'participation' so as to
 exclude 'interference with the executive
 function of management', and accusing the
 TUC of wanting trade union control of
 companies. Meanwhile news of these matters
 has reached even *The Times* where, quick

as a Irish, Ronald Bell drew attention
 11 March to 'what is now called "industrial
 democracy"' (his quotation marks). Just
 so O'Connell, Mr Levin, pursued by a war
 horse.

It is not easy to see worker directors
 as a threat to the stability of private capitalis-
 m: if the CBI truly believes they would
 be troublesome, then for the Labour move-
 ment set to support the policy of the TUC
 would, in this imperfect world, be an act
 of folly.

Robert Flak
 FILE REFERENCE
The Murder of Sammy Smyth

Four days before he was murdered, Sammy
 Smyth announced, with a slight air of self-
 importance, that he might be killed before
 the week was out. He was standing in the
 Heathrow departure lounge, waiting for the
 Belfast flight, when I caught sight of him,
 the same squat, beetle-like figure with his
 square head and salt-and-pepper hair that
 had graced a dozen UDA press conferences.
 "What're you doing?" he asked with that
 half-conscious smile that para-militaries
 adopt when they come across someone they
 know, far from home. I told him I was
 going to Belfast for the weekend and sug-
 gested he must have been ahead on some
 UDA business. "Ah, not at all," he said
 quickly; he had forgotten the pile of duty-
 free tobacco piled on his hand-trolley.

Sammy Smyth was the kind of man who
 would give you the genuine assurance
 when someone doubted his word; for he was
 until he died a man known for the chilling
 confidence and the apparently outright
 threat. He helped to found the Protestant
 vigilante groups in the Crossmaglen area in
 East Belfast in 1971 - they were the em-
 bryo Ulster Defence Association although
 few knew it then - and might have stayed
 on as leader if the first UDA chairman had
 not taken a dislike to the independence of
 his views and sent two months round to his
 home to beat him insensible on the front-
 door mat. Smyth's reply was the publication
 of a badly-typed broadsheet called *The
 Ulster Athlete* which made it clear that
 killing was in some circumstances an
 acceptable way of removing feckles and
 clearing political paths; true to the spirit of
 the times, Smyth cyclotyled across the
 front page of every issue a drawing of a
 machine clenched fist.

The UDA used Smyth. They supported a
 coexistence approach he helped to run in
 the Shankill because it helped to provide
 a non-sectarian front for the para-militaries
 - Smyth, in his way was interesting in the
 prospects of coexistence - while allowing
 him to act as press spokesman when it
 suited them. During the Ulster Workers'
 strike in May 1974 the UWC appointed
 Smyth Minister of Propaganda, a role upon
 which he bestowed some immortality by
 constantly telling journalists that he hoped
 for a bloody civil war to start Northern

Ireland the UDA leaders - particularly
 Andy Tyrin, the chairman - became embar-
 rassed, however, by the openness of Smyth's
 rhetoric. When told of the Dublin bomb-
 ings in 1974 in which 28 men and women
 died, he said he was happy. "There is a war
 with the Free State and we are laughing at
 them," he said. Smyth recovered after a few
 months to resume his role of self-styled in-
 telligence, issuing statements for the UDA,
 protesting about a planned urban road
 motorway and suggesting (most recently,
 that he felt like burning down Catholic
 chapels when he heard David O'Connell, the
 IRA chief of staff, talking on television.
 Sammy Smyth came to be thought of by
 journalists and para-militaries alike as more
 like a Hitler unbalanced.

That is why Smyth probably expected no
 reaction from me when he learned some-
 one was logging stories at Heathrow and said:
 "You'll read something of interest in the
Sunday News tomorrow." He paused, appar-
 ently for effect, before saying: "I may not be
 alive this time next week."

Smyth's article in the *Sunday News*, *Bel-
 fast's* third best newspaper Sunday paper,
 duly appeared next day. It was a long but
 by no means rambling appeal to the UDA
 to talk to the Provisionals now that the
 Northern Ireland Convention had failed.
 It recognized that political power lay more
 than ever with the men who have guns.

To some extent this has always been the
 case in Northern Ireland (the six-county
 province of Ulster was built on such a con-
 cept after the 1912 resistance to the Home
 Rule Bill) yet never before has the strength
 of the para-militaries seemed so relevant.
 And never before has it seemed, to so many
 people around Belfast, so acceptable. The
 Smyth theory of violence in open dis-
 political opinion seems to say that even
 multiparty men can wonder about the possi-
 bilities of sensible assassination. It's a won-
 der, the answer said at the airport in
 Belfast, that so one's that Paisley's yet.
 There is all agreement, he added: "That
 would certainly ease the situation."

Neither the police nor the army in North-
 ern Ireland are under any illusion about
 the freedom to "solve the situation" and
 about the armed political intentions of the
 para-militaries. Although the Royal Ulster

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privately, it is a fact that over one third of the RUC's extra complement of 4,000 policemen and policewomen are now employed at any one time guarding the province's politicians, judges and civil servants from assassination. The army have remarkably accurate figures for the weapons now held by Protestant groups and the details of their training, yet for so long have they been forced, through political circumstances, to accept para-militarism that their files are almost entirely of fact.

TARA, for example, the army's private report on Tara, a Protestant organisation founded in 1973 which is well-armed but has links with a Northern Ireland political party and is perfectly legal. The army's account of their activities, collected by an intelligence officer at Lisburn, reads:

Commanding Officer has no-existent operational mission as a front . . . TARA organised initially in platoons of 20 now probably in companies and drawn almost exclusively from members of the Orange Order, each platoon has a Sgt/OM (Quartermaster) and 10 (Intelligence Officer) constables - 50p per man per month - half to a central fund, half kept as pen (platoon) fund: was very able to draw on central fund if opportunity in buy stores areas: meetings held in Clifton Street Orange Hall about every two weeks under name of Orange Discusion Group: training in radio, weapons and lectures in guerrilla tactics.

Political assassination in Northern Ireland, once a horror made substantial only by the attacks on John Taylor when he was Home Affairs Minister in 1971 and on Senator Rannall, is now a nightmare which every public figure in the province has to live with. Garry Fin's election agent was stabbed to death in 1973, John Horne's life has been threatened. Ivan Cooper of the SDLP has twice escaped car-bomb attacks. Austin Curria's home in County Tyrone has been rased by machine-gun fire on several occasions. Earlier this year, the Provisionals tried to burn down Pitt's home although the Loyalists have found just the same, particularly the para-militaries Brian Elliott and Tommy Herron of the UDA, and Jim Hamish of the UVF have all been murdered by their own people in the past four years. Harding Lema, the UDA chairman, cleared out of Ulster in 1975 after two attempts to kill him.

Sammy Smyth knew, therefore, that hitting was an understandable form of doing business. He knew that some of the para-militaries wanted him out of the way when his embarrassing article appeared. It had not been approved in advance by the UDA. And he was no stranger to assassination attempts, only last year two members of the Red Hand group tried, vainly, to kill off Smyth.

But on Wednesday night he thought himself safe in his daughter's home. And he nearly escaped again when the two gunmen - operating under orders from the UDA's inner circle - stood at the house in Alliance Avenue to deal with him. He managed to run away from them towards the back of the building but failed to get through the kitchen door. Then as he lay on the carpet, wounded in the legs, one of

New Statesman

Peter Wilby

Education's Castaway

This report is about the education of English boys and girls aged from 15 to 18. Most of them are not being educated. This began the report of the government-appointed Crowther Committee 17 years ago. With astonishing optimism, Crowther thought that this would be 'the next great battleground of English education'. The committee recommended one day's compulsory release per week for all young people in employment.

The failure to make day release compulsory - or even to extend it to the majority of employed teenagers - is arguably the greatest educational scandal of the century, a brutal illustration of our political priorities. The promise has been made and broken so often that now pledges made about as much expectation as the Second Coming. There it was again in Labour's last election manifesto, the sort of thing that political parties throw into their programmes with the thoughtless abandon that advertising writers throw superlatives into their copy. Preceded by the TUC, Mr Fred Mulley, the Education Secretary, is convening a conference of interested parties in London next week in the hope of somehow rescuing the teenage work force from the political dumps of the 20th century.

Compulsory day release was embodied in legislation at the end of both world wars. The 1944 Education Act provided for the establishment of county colleges to give young persons who are not in full-time attendance such further education, including physical, practical and vocational training, as will enable them to develop their various aptitudes and capacities and will prepare them for the responsibilities of citizenship. The County Colleges Order of 1947 made it the duty of every local authority to establish and maintain the colleges - but no date was specified. R. A. Butler exhorted industry to extend day release in 1947, saying: "We cannot fail in this matter twice in 40 years . . . If we sit and let this matter drift no educational reformer in the country will be able to lift up his head in the future."

In 1956 a government White Paper proposed a doubling of day release in five years. The actual increase was well under 50 per cent, in a period when the age group was expanding rapidly. In 1964 a Ministry of Education committee proposed an extra 150,000 day release places in the following five years. The report was shelved and the number dropped by over 20,000. In 1963 the Robbins Committee proposed an extra 100,000 places in full-time higher education.

This report was accepted, on the day of publication, in a statement from Downing Street. The target was comfortably exceeded, thus providing more educational

are the working classes and tomorrow.


The raising of the age enforced without consideration of compulsory release for - has led to an insignificant number of 16, and 17 Two in every five years as further education of ing school. The prep- gons getting day release.

The education of 14 been left to the labour of voluntary effort had occasion. Industry's offer: adequate in every sense. the building and engineer: good records but day minimal in food, drink and footwear, insurance and 1 of all, the distributive: single employer of youth.

The present system: is and 1972 Industrial Train ing governing vocational 1563 Statute of Artificer: weakness is that it diverts training, with the credit: later, and serves em- people's needs, nor, for it: supported are the aim: acquisition of craft and some of them so narrow: obsolescent within a few: training that flourishes: do no more than social: into declining industries: comes with specific in-: unlikely to encourage: the advantage of the fluid: nimal colleges by trying: they find the right en-: interests and abilities: release students suggest: a quarter of those who: have been successful at: technician courses. And, and the same study, see: the students have other: their courses or repeat: course.

The inevitable objection: increasing day release: workers will rebel again: useful, and that liberal: nial colleges are night: day release students. Tri-: ability of curriculum that: is a measure of its nega: have found one third of a

Part 1 - Attachment B
 RUC Letter of 11 October 1982 & Attachment: Caskey's 30 Questions

Telex no BELFAST 660222		BROOKLYN KNOCK ROAD BELFAST NORTHERN IRELAND BT8 6LJ
		11 October 1982
		DUS/3854 11 OCT 1982 N.I.O. BELFAST
<p>See also:</p>		
<p>THE KINCORA ENQUIRY - IAN CAMERON, FORMER OFFICER IN THE SECURITY SERVICE, NOW RETIRED</p>		
<p>Further to your conversation last week with the Chief Constable about this subject I forward herewith a report by the officer conducting the police investigation into the Kincora Scandal, Superintendent George Caskey.</p>		
<p>The questions are all relevant and clearly define the area of police interest. It may be that if Mr Cameron answers certain questions in a certain way further unscripted questions may have to be asked in order to clarify some points so raised. I mention this lest there would be any misunderstanding about unscripted questions being asked.</p>		
<p>E - SIGNATURE</p> <div style="background-color: black; width: 100%; height: 30px;"></div>		
<p>J A WHITESIDE Assistant Chief Constable 'C'</p>		
<p>J Boarn Esq Northern Ireland Office Stormont House BELFAST BT8 3ET</p>		

Part 1 - Attachment B cont'd
 RUC Letter of 11 October 1982 & Attachment: Caskey's 30 Questions

Reference: _____

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH MR IAN CAMERON

Assistant Chief Constable 'C'

It is essential to the Kincora Enquiry that Mr Ian Cameron be interviewed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in relation to intelligence concerning Kincora Boys' Hostel allegedly passed to him by Military Intelligence Officers.

I hereby submit a list of questions to be put to Mr Cameron.

It will be necessary in the first instance to ask Mr Cameron to provide such personal details as full name, age, occupation, address or contact address.

Will it be intended to adhere to the list of questions now supplied answers to these questions any consequent follow-up questions or questions:

Q1 What was your period of service in Northern Ireland? - giving dates

Q2 In what capacity were you employed?

Q3 Where were you employed?

Q4 What did your duties entail?

Q5 Do you accept that you were attached to RUC at Lishburn?

Q6 In the course of your duties were you supplied with intelligence by Captain Brian S Gemmill who was the Officer Commanding (2) Intelligence Section 39 Infantry Brigade and later Staff Officer Grade III on the Brigade Headquarters Intelligence Staff?

Q7 Mr Gemmill has alleged that on a Saturday morning between December 1974 and December 1976 that he had a meeting with you in your office at RUC when he passed on information he had obtained from a Mr Roy Garland?

Q8 Mr Gemmill has also alleged that at this meeting he passed on to you, intelligence provided by Garland which included information that a William McGrath who headed an organisation named TARA was a homosexual and was employed in a boys' home?

Part 1 - Attachment B cont'd
 RUC Letter of 11 October 1982 & Attachment: Caskey's 30 Questions

Initials: _____

Q1 Mr Connell has told the police that you reacted very strongly when you were told of the homosexual involvement of various persons in IRA and that you directed him to terminate his enquiries concerning IRA?

Q2 Mr Connell said that you later reversed this decision?

Q3 Mr Connell has alleged that during the meeting that Saturday morning, he believes, the conversation was either tape recorded or that your secretary, a female, was taking notes?

Q4 If the meeting was tape recorded, is the recording available or can you indicate where it might be located?

Q5 Can you identify the person Mr Connell described as a female secretary who took notes during this meeting?

Q6 Where can this person be located?

Q7 If notes were taken can you assist with the whereabouts of these notes?

Q8 If Mr Cameron should state that these notes or tape recording are not available having been destroyed or otherwise disposed of it will be necessary to pursue this aspect.

Q9 Did Mr Connell identify to you the boys' home in which William McCreath was employed?

Q10 Were there allegations that McCreath had committed any homosexual offences?

Q11 To whom or to what Department did you pass the intelligence concerning homosexuality?

Q12 If this information was passed to the Northern Ireland Office to your knowledge was such information mis-used by anyone in that Department? This question is being asked of you because allegations have been made by the media that British Civil Servants

3.

Part 1 - Attachment B cont'd
 RUC Letter of 11 October 1982 & Attachment: Caskey's 30 Questions

employed in the Northern Ireland Office had been part of a homosexual prostitution ring involving boys in care at Rincora Boys' Hostel and other homes run by the Eastern Health and Social Services Board.

Q20 There have been reports circulating amongst journalists that the following people who were civil servants attached to the Northern Ireland Office in old capacities were believed to have been concerned in homosexual activity and that 3 of them were involved in homosexual offences against children:

Peter Ball
 Brian Watkins
 Leslie Iurie

and the late Peter England. To your knowledge could any of these persons have had access to any intelligence relating to Rincora or other boys' homes forwarded by you?

Q21 Do you know any of these persons?

Q22 Are you aware of any mis-use of any intelligence regarding homosexuality concerning boys in care in Northern Ireland?

Q23 Did you meet Mr Roy Farland?

Q24 Similar intelligence was provided by Major Neilford Macleod an Intelligence Officer attached to 3 Infantry Brigade from October 1974 until July 1976 - did you receive any such intelligence from him?

Q25 If so what action did you take?

Q26 Did you receive any such intelligence from any other source and if so what action did you take?

Q27 Are you aware, either through your own office or through any other source, if such information was passed to the police?

Q28 Had you any contact with an Army Prison Officer named John Colin Wallis who was employed at that time at Army HQ Lisburn in the Information Service?

Part 1 - Attachment B cont'd
RUC Letter of 11 October 1982 & Attachment: Caskey's 30 Questions

Reference

Q29 In a document purported to have been written by Wallace and sent to the Press he alleges that he complained to 3 Senior Army Officers in 1974 that a cover up of the Kinross Vice Ring was preventing the killers of ten year old Brian McDermott from being apprehended. Wallace also alleged that he named 3 people thought to be linked with the vice ring who were suspected of the killing (Brian McDermott was murdered between 2 and 8 September 1977) at Belfast). Do you have any information about or knowledge of the above allegation?

Q30 Do you have any knowledge or information in your possession that could assist the police in their investigations into what has been described as the Kinross Sex scandal or the murder of Brian McDermott?

E-SIGNATURE

G CASKEY
R/SUPERINTENDENT
11 October 1982

Part 1 - Attachment C
MI5 LA NFF of 03 November 1982

E - CLASSIFICATION

NOTE FOR FILE
E-FILE REFERENCE

1. Having received a message from Ian Cameron that he was about to go abroad for three weeks and wanted to know whether there were any matters I wished to discuss with him, I spoke to him on Monday 1 November about the questions which the RUC wished to put to him [REDACTED]

2. Cameron had no comments on the first five questions apart from pointing out that his duties were covered by formal terms of reference and agreeing that they illustrated the difficulties which I had anticipated. He had the following comments on the remaining questions:-

- Q6. He agreed that in the course of his duties he received intelligence from Gemmell.
- Q7. He remembered that on some occasion Gemmell had passed him information but his [REDACTED] recollection was that it came from [REDACTED]. He accepted that Gemmell was probably right.
- Q8. He agreed that Gemmell had informed him of an allegation that McGrath was a homosexual but had no recollection of any reference to a boys' home and did not agree that McGrath headed TARA.
- Q9. He agrees that he would have told Gemmell not to pursue the allegation of homosexuality. He was also clear that the Army should not handle investigations in this field which were designed to procure leads to Paisley.
- Q10. He does not accept that he reversed his decision but is not sure what the police are getting at.
- Q11. The conversation was not tape recorded and he has no recollection of a secretary being present.
- Q12. Not applicable.
- Q13. If a secretary was present it could have been any one of /number of girls - particularly if the meeting took place on a Saturday.

E - CLASSIFICATION

Part 1 - Attachment C cont'd
MI5 LA NFF of 03 November 1982

E - CLASSIFICATION

- 2 -

- Q14. Not applicable.
- Q15. No. Unless there is something in the files.
- Q16. No recollection of any reference to a boys' home.
- Q17. No recollection of any details and believes that the allegation was merely that McGrath was a homosexual.
- Q18. Believes that this report will have only been seen by his staff, [redacted] and [redacted].
- Q19. Has no recollection of the information being passed to any Northern Ireland Office staff apart from those in [redacted] in HQNI.
- Q20. Does not know Bell, Iurie or Watkins. Has never heard of the first two but Watkins' name is vaguely familiar. He met Peter England on two or three occasions but does not believe that any of the four could have had access to information provided to him. It was not their business.
- Q21. See Q20.
- Q22. No.
- Q23. No.
- Q24. Remembers Macleod whom he describes as something of a cowboy who needed to be held back. Has no recollection of receiving any information of this sort from him.
- Q25. Not applicable.
- Q26. Only recollects receiving information from Gemmill.
- Q27. Does not believe that information was passed to the police.
- Q28. He had no contact with Wallace either socially or at work.
- Q29. Has no knowledge of anything of the sort.
- Q30. No.

E-SIGNATURE

Bernard Sheridan

LA
3 November 1982

E - CLASSIFICATION

Part 1 - Attachment D
MI5 LA NFF of 01 October 1982

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION

NOTE FOR FILE
E-FILE REFERENCE

*Copy to J. B. ...
James ... 5/2/82*

At a meeting with the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (at which Mr Steel, the Acting Legal Secretary, was also present), I referred to the police investigations into Kincorra House. I had previously informed the Attorney General of my intention to do so and had given him a brief description of developments.

2. I said that SIS (acting in conjunction or on behalf of the RUC) had taken a statement from a former Army intelligence officer to the effect that one of his agents reporting on a different subject (TARA) had reported on his behalf that McGRATH of Kincorra House was engaged in homosexual activities. He said that he had made a report about this to Ian Cameron, a member of the Security Service on secondment to HQMI, who had told him to take no further action. I said that the RUC had wished to interview Cameron who of course required authority to make any disclosures which might involve his work. We had seen Cameron who had confirmed that, although he no longer remembered the details, he had received such a report from the Army officer and would have told him that he should cease collecting information of this sort upon the ground that it was not his business. We had asked Cameron whether he had made any report to the RUC and he had said that he would not have done so as neither he nor the Army officer had any direct information on the subject and had no means of knowing whether it was true. I said that this had been reported to the RUC but we had been unwilling to allow Cameron to make a formal statement. He had no personal knowledge which was relevant to any alleged offence and it also appeared that the RUC thought that they were collecting evidence for an enquiry as well as investigating criminal offences. If there were other factors which had not been declared to us, we would of course reconsider the position and equally if there should be a public enquiry we would discuss the handling of any relevant information which we might have (and I thought we had none) with those responsible for setting it up. We were not, however, willing to create statements which did not appear to assist in the criminal investigation and which might touch upon the organization of intelligence in Northern Ireland - particularly as we had no idea who would have access to the statements or whether their creation might not automatically lead to their disclosure in the event of an enquiry. I said that the Chief Constable had been informed of our position and that I wished the Attorney and the DPP to be aware of it also to facilitate discussions about the handling of any problems of which we were unaware. The Attorney General commented that any information which Cameron could give would appear to be "hearsay upon hearsay". The DPP, Barry Shaw, said that this problem had not been reported to him and he would ascertain the position.

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E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION

Part 1 - Attachment D cont'd
MI5 LA NFF of 01 October 1982E-CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]

- 2 -

3. After a meeting with the Attorney General on 24 September, Jim Nursaw and Henry Steel told me that Barry Shaw had raised the subject again with the Attorney in the interim and appeared to have obtained some sympathy for his attitude. Nursaw said that he had developed an argument that he needed to know whether Cameron had made a report to people in the Northern Ireland Office where there were some suspects. Their failure to take action in that event might be significant. Nursaw said he regarded this as very far fetched and had suggested that the police should set out a clear list of questions to which they wished to have answers. He thought that this advice would be followed. I said that we would consider any such request on its merits but the police would also have to come clean with us about their objectives. If there was a real as opposed to a fanciful problem we would certainly wish to find ways of helping

E-SIGNATURE
[REDACTED]

Bernard Sheilón

LA
1 October 1982E-CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]

Part 1 - Attachment E
MI5 LA NFF of 03 November 1982

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E-FILE REFERENCE

Ref:

3 November 1982

Jim Nursaw, the Legal Secretary to the Attorney General, spoke to Barry Shaw, the Northern Ireland DPP, last week about the questions which the RUC wished to put to Cameron. He told him that in his view these questions did not properly arise on any investigation. Shaw said he had no knowledge of them and made it plain that he was not behind them. He gave Nursaw to understand that he would not be concerned one way or another whether they were answered. Nursaw did not get an opportunity to speak to Philip Woodfield or Jack Hermon.

2. I have made it plain to Nursaw and to Barry Shaw and the Attorney General that our unwillingness to authorize Cameron to give a statement should not be taken as meaning that we have anything to hide in connexion with homosexual offences or that we wish to be obstructive. We believe that we have nothing to contribute to any criminal investigation and are unwilling to allow statements to be taken from Cameron which will disclose intelligence arrangements to those who have no need to know. We are conscious that once a statement has been taken we will have no control over who has access to it and that its very existence could cause problems if an enquiry is ordered. If an enquiry is ordered, we would of course be in touch with those responsible for arranging evidence for it (this would normally be the Treasury Solicitors) if it was thought that we had some contribution to make. Nursaw has suggested that it might be sensible to explain the position informally to the Chief Constable and to stress that we have no knowledge of criminal offences.

3. By chance Cameron phoned at the end of last week to enquire whether there were any questions I wanted to put to him before he went overseas for another ~~mission~~ or so. I spoke to him yesterday and attach for your information his comments on and answers to the RUC questions. I have also sent this to ~~them~~ and have asked them to let me know who was aware of the Gemmill report so that we can assess the issues. In logic the RUC would wish to put similar questions

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Part 1 - Attachment E cont'd
MI5 LA NFF of 03 November 1982

E-CLASSIFICATION	E-CLASSIFICATION
Ref: E-FILE REFERENCE	- 2 - 9 November 1982
to all those who were informed of these pieces of accurate gossip.	
D-MIS DIRECTOR	E-SIGNATURE Bernard Sheldon
DCI	Copied to D-PROTECTION OF IDENTITY
E-CLASSIFICATION	E-CLASSIFICATION

Part 1 - Attachment F
MI5 Note of 17 November 1982

E - CLASSIFICATION	E - ADMIN ANNOTATION
E - ADMIN ANNOTATION	
cc: LA (file copy) DCI	
- NOTE FOR [REDACTED]	
<p>I spoke to Sir John Hermon, Chief Constable RUC, on 11 November about the RUC's efforts to obtain a statement from Ian Cameron on Kinora. Initially it was clear that Hermon thought that our objections were bureaucratic but his attitude altered when I deployed the arguments set out in LA's letter of 3 November to DCI and made the point that this line had been cleared with the Attorney General and his Legal Secretary. I also told him that the Attorney General had described the information available to Cameron as "hearsay upon hearsay" and I stressed the fact that it was in no way specific. Hermon then said that it now appeared that we were seriously concerned that the intelligence effort could be impaired if the RUC were to continue down this road. I confirmed this and invited Hermon's attention to the opening questions in the proposed RUC questionnaire and the difficulty Cameron would have dealing with these, now that he was retired, and given his obligations under the OSA.</p>	
<p>2. Hermon then said that he was going to the USA on the following morning and would not be back in office until the first full week in December. He would then go into the whole matter again with a view to stopping these enquiries to Cameron. But he said that he did have difficulties. First his primary concern was to ensure that the RUC handled this enquiry in an entirely professional and competent way. The matter was politically controversial and he did not want there to be any apparent failing in the RUC's enquiries which could be used to support charges of a cover-up. In this connexion he said that he had not yet received the report of the Chief Constable of Sussex (George Terry) into the RUC's past enquiries. Secondly, although he anticipated no trouble with Whiteside or Caskie in discontinuing the Cameron sideline, there were other more junior detectives involved whose motives he suspected and who could possibly leak any apparent failure in this area to those with a malicious political axe to grind. It was left that Hermon now understood and sympathised with our position, that he would take the question up again on his return from the States and would almost certainly be in touch with me then.</p>	
... / ...	
E - CLASSIFICATION	E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

Part 1 - Attachment F cont'd
MI5 Note of 17 November 1982

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3. I told **D - MIS DIRECTOR** of this conversation and we later reported it to the PUS Mr Woodfield. The latter was entirely sympathetic to our position but was concerned at the delay in the Police enquiries and particularly over the delay in the Terry Report which he had been told by George Terry would be available some four months ago.

D - MIS OFFICER

17 November 1982

Part 1 - Attachment G
M15 Note of 17 November 1982

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E - CLASSIFICATION
<u>NOTE FOR FILE</u>
E - FILE REFERENCE
<p>I called on Sir George <u>TERRY</u> the Chief Constable of Sussex at the County Police Headquarters at Lewes at 12.30 on Thursday 27 January. I had previously warned him that we were getting into difficulties with the HCC about their conduct of the <u>KINJOORA</u> enquiries and would value his advice and if possible assistance in resolving these problems. The day after the arrangements had been made I was informed by MI that <u>WHITFIELD</u> and <u>Supt CASKEY</u> of the HCC were aware of my visit and of its general purpose. They had apparently heard from <u>TERRY</u>'s Staff Officer.</p> <p>2. <u>TERRY</u> had his Staff Officer Det Chief Insp <u>PIERLEY</u> standing by but we agreed that in the first instance I should explain the problem to him so that he could decide whether <u>PIERLEY</u> should join us.</p> <p>3. I opened the conversation by saying that I would give <u>TERRY</u> all the facts lying behind the difficulties which were known to me and would inform him of all the steps which we had taken in an attempt to resolve matters. I said that in doing so I was conscious that things might look different if seen through the eyes of <u>WHITFIELD</u> and <u>CASKEY</u> who were responsible for the investigations and that I would not attempt to influence <u>TERRY</u>'s own view. I said I was also conscious that it would be important to him in the discharge of the functions which he had been given to avoid putting him into a position where his impartiality might be called in question. I then detailed what had happened and covered the following points:-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. the <u>CASKEY</u> interview with <u>GENREL</u> in July 1982, b. <u>CASKEY</u>'s attempts to interview <u>CAMERON</u> and the reasons why we had been unwilling to authorise <u>CAMERON</u> to make a statement. I said that it was my understanding that the HCC had been informed that <u>CAMERON</u> agreed that he had received a report in general terms alleging that <u>McGRATH</u> was a homosexual, that he would have told <u>GENREL</u> that he should make no further enquiries in this field and that neither he nor anyone else in that part of the intelligence machine under our control had passed information to the police. <u>CAMERON</u> regarded the information as gossip and the
E - CLASSIFICATION
E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

Part 1 - Attachment G cont'd
MI5 Note of 17 November 1982

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search for information about TARA as too sensitive to be handled by the Army,

- c. I said that CAMERON was a senior officer of MI5 who had been seconded to HQMI to advise upon the conduct of Army intelligence operations. TERRY said that he personally had not previously been aware that he was anything other than a civil servant,
- d. DCI's meeting with the Deputy Chief Constable of the HUU,
- e. my discussions with the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions MI in October at which I informed them of the action we had taken and had stressed that if there were problems of which we were unaware we would wish to take part in discussions to resolve them,
- f. the list of questions prepared by the RUC which they wished to put to CAMERON. These confirmed our fears that, if permitted, they would lead to an unacceptable identification of UK intelligence officers and their functions,
- g. **D - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY** meeting with the Chief Constable in November 1982 and his belief that HERMON would sort matters out on his return from the United States,
- h. DG's meeting with HERMON on 13 January at a FBI party at which HERMON said that WHITESIDE had told him two days earlier that their enquiries were at an end,
- i. CASKEY's interview with **SSgt A** on 11 January and his references to a Security Service cover up. I said that I understood that there had now been a further interview with **Major C** at which CASKEY had made similar remarks,
- j. the meeting with Sir Philip Woodfield on 20 January at which it had been agreed that Woodfield would attempt to arrange a meeting in London to be attended by HERMON, NURSAW the Legal Secretary and myself. At the same meeting with Woodfield it had been agreed that I should seek a meeting with TERRY to see whether there was any part which he could take in the resolution of this matter and whether he would be prepared to do so,

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**Part 1 - Attachment G cont'd
MI5 Note of 17 November 1982**

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4. TERRY expressed amazement that none of this had been reported to him by Jack HERMON. With my agreement he then called in Chief Inspector FLENLEY to whom I repeated the story. FLENLEY made the following observations:-

- a. He had been aware of the RUC attempts to interview CAMERON and had inferred as had CASKEY even if he was unaware of the true position, that CAMERON was a member of the Security Service. He had not however understood the reasons for our reluctance to allow CAMERON to be seen.
- b. In making his enquiries Supt CASKEY had been influenced by the fact that the successful prosecution of McGRATH and others in connexion with KINCORA had been stimulated by allegations in the press. As the press had made similar allegations about the involvement of UK Civil Servants and about an Army cover up CASKEY did not wish to appear before any judicial enquiry without having carried out a full investigation. CASKEY had been informed by press sources that Colin WALLACE REFERENCE had told them many years ago about the homosexual goings on at KINCORA. Apart from this there was no actual evidence to establish the involvement of Civil Servants or of any Army cover up.
- c. CASKEY was being given a surprising degree of access to members of the Army some of whom had actually produced classified files for his inspection.
- d. CASKEY was in his view a very ambitious officer who took care to mix with the right people. He thought he was solely motivated by his own self-interest and by his desire to get on. He did not think that he was influenced by any anti-British or anti-intelligence sentiment. This might now be true of some other RUC officers.
- e. He implied that the relationship between RUC officers and their Chief Constable was such that they would not rely upon his support in moments of difficulty. He thought that CASKEY would be content however if the Chief Constable told him that there was no need to follow this line of enquiry.
- f. FLENLEY had interviewed Chris RYDER after the article in the Sunday Times of 5 December 1982. Although RYDER made no admissions that CASKEY had been a source, FLENLEY had little doubt that this was the position. He had learned that RYDER had had a meeting with CASKEY in the

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Part 1 - Attachment G cont'd
MI5 Note of 17 November 1982**E - CLASSIFICATION**

4.

week before publication (I gathered that meetings between these two were either unknown or very rare).

- g. FLENLEY did not believe that CASKEY thought that there had been any Security Service involvement in the affairs of KINCORA and stressed that he was pursuing his enquiries to protect his own position.
- h. FLENLEY explained how CASKEY had come to learn of the arrangements for my visit. His Chief Constable had asked him to expedite the delivery of a draft report from CASKEY which was expected the following week. CASKEY had expressed surprise at the urgency of this request as FLENLEY was due to visit Ulster on the following Monday. In the circumstances he had thought it better to tell him.
- i. In the course of our discussions I also referred to NURSAW's discussions with the DPP in Northern Ireland and to SHAW's unwillingness to give directions to the investigating officers. We had inferred that this was connected with his well known desire to maintain the integrity of his office. TERRY expressed great surprise at this reluctance and said that in his view the DPP ran the RUC and not the Chief Constable. FLENLEY also confirmed that RUC officers consulted the DPP on all sorts of matters which were not properly within his province.
- j. I asked TERRY whether he should attend the meeting with HERMON. He said he was willing to do so and that he had a part to play. When I returned to London I confirmed that Woodfield would welcome his presence and, as agreed with me, TERRY spoke to HERMON to tell him of my visit. He confirmed that HERMON too would welcome his presence.

E - SIGNATURE

Bernard Sheldon

LA
3 February 1983**E - CLASSIFICATION**

Part 1 - Attachment H
Major A Letter of 28 January 1976 Ref: 13912/2: Tara

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13912/2

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Lurgan 3691 Ext [redacted]

28 January 1976

See Distribution
EXTREMIST PROTESTANTS
SECRET ORGANISATION - TARA

Reference:

- 1. Your letter SF/704/INT dated 6 Jul 74.
- 2. Your letter SF/712/INT dated 5 Jun 75.

GENERAL

1. Very little is known about TARA, but some useful information has come to hand which may be of value to you. The following points will be covered:

- a. Personality of William McGrath.
- b. TARA.
- c. "Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303."
- d. Involvement of PAISLEY.

2. This information comes from three contacts. Our assessment is that it might be graded F3 and in parts F2.

+ WILLIAM McGRATH +

3. William McGRATH, 118 Upper Newtownards Rd, BELFAST, is the leader of TARA. He used to live at 5 Greenwood Ave, Upper Newtownards Rd, BELFAST and prior to that, at 75 Wellington Pk, BELFAST. He originally came from Earl St where his father had a Barber Shop. He had little formal education and worked as a young man in his uncle Joe's Barber Shop.

4. In 1941 when McGRATH was still in his mid-twenties, he formed a group called the Christian Fellowship Centre and Irish Emancipation Crusade. He then embarked on an evangelical preaching career around churches and mission halls. He operated from a large mansion at 25 Orpen Pk, BELFAST, but this is now Faith House, a Brethren Old Peoples Home. He had an office in DUBLIN thought to be connected with the organisation. Mention has been made of two politico/religious visitors whom it is believed had contact with McGRATH prior to 1969:

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS
[redacted]

Page 1 of 6

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Part 1 - Attachment H cont'd
Major A Letter of 28 January 1976 Ref: 13912/2: Tara

E - CLASSIFICATION

5. McGRATH joined the Orange Order around 1964 and widened his audiences by preaching at numerous Orange Lodge meetings. The tone of McGRATH's addresses was always concerned with the preparation of Northern Ireland Protestants for a coming conflict which would determine their future and that of countless millions of others. Roman Catholicism was allied with communism and Protestant ULSTER was the main stumbling block in the path of these twin evils.

6. McGRATH is a homosexual and makes a practice of seducing promising young men.

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

7. Two of the contacts gave distinct impressions that McGRATH was somehow associated with Communism. McGRATH is said to have attended a Revolutionaries Conference in DUBLIN in the mid-sixties at which 3 representatives from Eastern Bloc countries were present. This association may account for his financial position. Details are very obscure, but he managed to live in sizeable mansions in BELFAST even though his only visible means of support was the sale of second-hand carpets from his house. McGRATH is currently described from the 1975 BELFAST Street Directory as a Welfare Officer. He is thought to be running some form of boys' home.

TARA

8. One of the contacts stated that in about 1964, TARA first began to be mentioned in the context of a "ginger group" within the Orange Order, but it never really got off the ground until 1969 (presumably with the advent of the troutler), when a room in Clifton St Orange Hall was obtained. This was ostensibly for meetings of an "Orange Discussion Group," but was in reality to organise and train IRA.

9. One of the contacts felt that TARA might have had some weapons but it only ever saw one. McGRATH's policy was that officers did not handle weapons and should remain "clean." At one stage it talked about men having been in action.

10. The following have been named as TARA members:

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION

E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION

Page 2 of 6

E -
CLASSIFICATION

Part 1 - Attachment H cont'd
Major A Letter of 28 January 1976 Ref: 13912/2: Tara

E - CLASSIFICATION

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION

11. At Annex A is an article by David PARKER which makes mention of TARA.

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

IRELAND'S HERITAGE IOL 1303

12. McGrath has been instrumental in the formation of a New Orange Lodge, "Ireland's Heritage IOL 1303," the members of which number 39 and are currently learning Gaelic. The Lodge's banner depicts a Celtic cross and its title in Gaelic, "Oidhche na bSioreann."

13. Clifford SHYTHE and Frank MILLAR Jnr are members and there is clearly a number of cases of dual membership with TARA. When at Queen's University, BELFAST around 1970, Clifford SHYTHE, David LYLE and Frank MILLAR Jnr were instrumental in founding the "Ulster Protestant Information Bureau" which was to counter IRA propaganda. They also formed the "Williamites and Glorious Revolution Society" which, for example, brought Orange flute bands to perform in the Students Union.

14. At Annex B is an article on the "Ireland's Heritage IOL 1303."

INVOLVEMENT OF IAN PAISLEY

15. PAISLEY appears to fear McGrath, who is a member of his Martyr's Memorial Church and has on occasion used threats to make PAISLEY give him permission to speak in his halls. One of the contacts made the interesting point that William CRAIG had stated that PAISLEY did an about turn on the voluntary coalition issue after a meeting in the Martyr's Memorial Church. It hazarded a guess that pressure had been brought to bear on PAISLEY by McGrath. Contacts view certainly has an element of truth in it. For example, in 18 Oct 75, it is independently reported that PAISLEY was pressured in this way.

16. It would appear that PAISLEY himself is not a member of TARA but he is clearly surrounded by many men who are. It would seem that the following credentials are useful, if not mandatory, for membership:

- a. Membership of the Orange Order.
- b. Membership of DUP.
- c. Membership of PAISLEY's Martyr's Memorial Church.

CONCLUSION

17. The picture is confused. You are in a better position to assess the information to be. Perhaps the most interesting aspect is the many contradictions around the central figure, McGrath.

Page 3 of 6

Part 1 - Attachment H cont'd
Major A Letter of 28 January 1976 Ref: 13912/2: Tara

**E -
CLASSIFICATION**

- a. McGRATH would appear to have had little formal education and yet his views, though militant, are sophisticated enough to interest bright young men.
- b. McGRATH's message is designed to appeal to staunch Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, its enemy, is closely linked with leftist ideas and Communism and yet 2 of the contacts were Irish. This lingering impression of McGRATH's involvement with Communism. It is fair to ask whether McGRATH is a "sleeper" with the brief to keep the pot boiling whilst others organise. He certainly uses the classic communist tactics of the cell system, infiltration of an organisation, ie the Orange Order, and the introduction of divisive elements.
- c. There is no obvious indication of where McGRATH's income stems from, but he appears to be comfortable financially.
- d. One might ask why the apparently all powerful PAISLEY can be influenced by a McGRATH-sponsored pressure group from within his own church. PAISLEY himself is probably not a member, but many of his supporters are.
- e. There is an apparent contradiction between the aspirations of the "Ireland's Heritage LOL 1303," eg learning Gaelic, and its opposition to Roman Catholicism. This may be reconciled by the view held by many members of the Church of Ireland that certain churches, as direct descendants of the ancient Celtic Church predate their Roman Catholic rivals in Ireland and are therefore more authentic.

18. There is very little indication of TARA in the 3 Inf Bde Area, although it has been reported to exist in MURGAN, PORTADOWN and BANBRIDGE. It clearly also has sympathisers in North DORN. The most interesting figure is [REDACTED] F-RELEVANCE GROUNDS

19. There is only one recorded occasion when the SF came into contact with TARA in the 3 Inf Bde Area. This occurred on 12 Mar 75. [REDACTED] F-RELEVANCE GROUNDS [REDACTED] were stopped at the K7 border crossing. They had been in the Republic collecting information on the Irish Army and Garda. More recently, propaganda leaflets from TARA were received by 1RS and QDG. They had been posted in BELFAST.

REMARKS

20. Contacts are retaskable. We would be grateful for any direction that addressees might be able to give. It is hoped that this short paper will be the basis upon which future MISRs will be written.

E - SIGNATURE

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SEND TO A F L HALFORD-McGLSOD
Major
for Commander

Part 1 - Attachment H cont'd
Major A Letter of 28 January 1976 Ref: 13912/2: Tara

ORANGEMEN SEEK A SOUND OF GAELIC

By Telegraph reporter Ivan Little

A GROUP of Orangemen are making plans to fund their leaders' tour of the States which will leave many of their members unemployed.

For they're going to learn to speak Irish. And they've had no instruction of previous years.

But while the Orangemen are fast becoming the talk of the Gully the more Irish all the time, a number of them are still in the States.

They are the Irishmen who have been in the States since the 1950s. They are the ones who have been in the States since the 1950s.

Their names are listed in the Orange Book which was published in 1964. It was published in 1964.

They are the ones who have been in the States since the 1950s. They are the ones who have been in the States since the 1950s.

From their accounts, Mr. McKeown said, the Orangemen are fast becoming the talk of the Gully the more Irish all the time, a number of them are still in the States.

one thing, the way of life. "We feel it is wrong for us to be in the States. We feel it is wrong for us to be in the States. We feel it is wrong for us to be in the States."

"And that's why we want to learn Irish. We want to learn Irish. We want to learn Irish. We want to learn Irish."

The boys have received several letters from Irish friends asking to learn the language. They are the ones who have been in the States since the 1950s.

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Irish would be needed again - under the Union Jack. "We feel it is wrong for us to be in the States. We feel it is wrong for us to be in the States. We feel it is wrong for us to be in the States."

"And that's why we want to learn Irish. We want to learn Irish. We want to learn Irish. We want to learn Irish."

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APRIL 1 1976
1976
JANUARY 1976

RELEAST TELEGRAPH OF 76

Part 1 - Attachment I

GEMMELL & NCO notes of Roy GARLAND interview (undated)

(B)

Notes of an interview with Roy GARLAND ex TARA member left 1972
 - McCann (ex NCO)

Garland introduced to McG when he was approx 15 (20 years ago) McG at the time Christian/Evangelical crusader. Held meetings at McG's attended also by C.S. UDR Captain N. McG proposed they should form a group as these youngsters all had makings of becoming P.M.s etc. They first formed groups called "cell" however McG thought this sounded rather red and they decided on TARA (this was about 1965-67)

They held meetings between themselves and McG would single them out after meetings. McG attempted to seduce them by claiming to show them emotional freedom, to this end he made them feel guilty by admitting to masturbation, therefore showing up their guilt complex. This is important to emphasise as it is the very beginning of McG's hold on them.

Garland Smith & UDR Captain N members of Young Unionist (YU). At one (YU) meeting addressed by McG, attended by McLlroy merchant banker gave card to R.G. "INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION". R.G. believes McLlroy helps TARA with finance.

Also with finance Clarence Hogg, Capt Hogg (UDR) TARA one time treasurer arranged finance for printing machine. Current involvement of McLlroy & Hogg not known.

McG suggested to C.S., R.G., UDR Captain that they should join LOLs. R.G. joined Irish Heritage Lodge & became master (it had very few members). The idea was to put motions to the various lodges which would gain momentum when they reached the Grand Lodge. One such motion put by R.G., framed by McG, was that Ulster should prepare a Provisional Govt now "IRISH" flavour to lodge

The idea that TARA when it was first formed (early 70) was an elite, is laughable according to R.G. who claims to have been 2IC to McG. Recruits were accepted by personal recommendation, there was no vetting as such. Wpn training etc was talked about, but, R.G. never saw any weapons. Many people became disillusioned after joining either with McG's unsavoury reputation, or with all the talk and no action. The Christian overtones did not go down well with % of recruits.

* Thomas Clarke (FNK) is supposed to have carried out surveillance on McG for several months and concluded that he was a communist.

Amongst persons attended early meetings of TARA R.G. mentioned elderly man named Dickworth. (Presumably John Dilworth)

* Frank Pootsie Millar is amongst persons currently involved with TARA and is reported as being engaged to McG's daughter. (now married)

Worthington McG is still on TARA scene and is now also Sec ? of Irish Heritage Lodge. Robert MacFarland, Monkstown previously of Premier Dve is currently an official in TARA & claims to have been given info regarding IRA/PARA from SF at a meeting in Russell Court Hotel early this year. He is thought to own a business on the N'Ards Rd, and was an associate of J.W. McKeague.

R.G. claims that McG was responsible for spreading rumours of J.D. McKeague's homosexual activities, having posters posted around Belfast "NICE BOY McKeague". According to R.G., McK knows that McG was responsible for this.

R.G. believes that current aims of TARA will have moderated, as CS is close to McG also David Brown, but nevertheless, their basic aim remains to keep RCs down by force if necessary

R.G. believes that although I.P. knows of McG nefarious activities he would be better to take action because the expose would also effect CS therefore doing DUP no good. He further believes that McG has knowledge of Paisley's involvement with the UVF in early 70.

The present para militaries still regard TARA with degree of respect as they still have members like CS whose standing in society makes them privy to such info which would not ordinarily reach the para mils.

As IO of TARA CS seeks info on various aspects of mil Int i.e. Southern Irish Army. The does found on Bateson & Simpson were destined for CS. Among Names & tel Nos listed on

Part 1 - Attachment K
Irish Times article 3 November 1983

Scan from the *Irish Times* of 03 November 1983

Military interviewed man on Kincora

From Andrew Pollak,
 in Belfast

BRITISH military intelligence officers based in Northern Ireland interviewed a man well known in Belfast Protestant evangelical circles about the Kincora housefather, William McGrath, on a number of occasions in the mid-1970s. *The Irish Times* has learned. In at least one of these interviews the officers raised McGrath's position at the east Belfast boys' home.

The man, who said he would be willing to testify before a public judicial inquiry but did not want to be named at this stage, has told *The Irish Times* that he talked to at least half a dozen different such officers from British Army headquarters in Lisburn, Co Antrim, over a period of between 18 months and two years in 1974-75.

His testimony would appear to cast doubt on the claim by the former Sussex police chief, Sir George Terry, in the conclusion to his report on the Kincora affair published on Saturday, when he stated "quite clearly" that he had found no evidence of any awareness of goings-on at Kincora in

The man told *The Irish Times* he met at least six and perhaps more intelligence officers at his house over the next 18 months to two years. He said they asked questions about McGrath's paramilitary involvement with Tara and political involvement with the Young Unionists and the DUP, as well as his homosexual activities. Towards the end of this series of meetings — between three and five in all — he remembered them talking about "monitoring McGrath. I got the impression they were keeping a very close watch on him, and there was no doubt that at this stage they knew he was working in a boys' home."

He said that eventually he became puzzled and annoyed at their visits. "They seemed to be checking up on earlier information, going back over it, sometimes with a couple of new people taking up the thread."

He said they seemed less interested in McGrath's connections with Kincora than with "his other involvement as a string-puller, and the influence he had. They asked could he influence the DUP or the Young Unionists?"

military circles. Sir George said that military sources had been "very frank" with him and "perfectly open" during the RUC's own inquiries.

The man, who first heard about McGrath and his job at Kincora in the early 1970s from Mr Roy Garland, a former associate of McGrath's who was attempting to expose his homosexual activities, was also personally questioned last year by Sir George together with his principal assistant in the investigation, Superintendent Gordon Harrison.

He told *The Irish Times* that he had first put Mr Garland in touch with an RUC constable attached to the drug squad whom he knew as a devout Christian in 1972 or 1973.

Around two years later he said he was contacted by British military intelligence asking if he could arrange a meeting with Mr Garland. Both he and Mr Garland say that two intelligence officers attended that meeting, at the former's house outside Belfast, and that one of them was a Scotsman called Mr Brian Gemmill. The officers produced military identification.

Mr Garland, who in the early 1970s complained to prominent people, including the DUP leader, the Rev Ian Paisley, Orange Order leaders and clergymen, about McGrath's activities, said yesterday he had met British military intelligence officers on two occasions. He said that at the first meeting, in the house of the prominent Belfast evangelical, the intelligence officer called Mr Gemmill had expressed concern at McGrath's activities in both the Kincora Home and elsewhere.

Mr Garland said that a couple of weeks later he received a telephone call from the other intelligence officer present at that meeting asking him to come to the Army headquarters at Thiepval Barracks in Lisburn. This officer called for him and drove him to the barracks.

"The whole tone was different from the first meeting," Mr Garland told *The Irish Times* yesterday. "He was less concerned about sexual abuses, and more about Tara. He asked particularly about the involvement of a man prominent in Belfast business life, who was also a part-time officer in the UDR."

Earlier this week *The Irish Times* revealed that Mr Colin Wallace, an Army press officer in Thiepval Barracks who leaked information to a number of journalists about McGrath in the mid-1970s, had not given information to Sir George Terry's inquiry or the RUC because the British Defence Ministry had refused to allow a solicitor to be present during police questioning. It is also known that Mr Wallace was a member of the army's psychological warfare operation in the same period.

Mr Wallace's revelation, contained in a letter to a Northern Ireland legal figure, also appeared to throw doubt on Sir George's claim that he had sought evidence from all sources about whether military circles had been aware of events at Kincora.

McGrath was one of three Kincora housefathers jailed for between four and six years in December, 1981, for sexual offences against boys in their care. At their trial the Chief Justice, Lord Lowry, expressed surprise that the offences at the home were allowed to go undetected for so long.

Part 1 - Attachment L
 Brian GEMMELL Note to File 3350/18 of 14 October 1976: TARA

E - CLASSIFICATION	14 October 1976
Note to file 3350/18 Vol II	
<u>TARA</u>	
<u>HISTORY</u>	
<p>1. TARA first came to notice in 1964 as a ginger group, within the Orange Order, who campaigned for greater political action against Republicanism. A base for the organisation was established in 1969 when a room in Clifton Mt Orange Hall, Belfast, was obtained. This was ostensibly for meetings of an "Orange Discussion Group" but was in reality to organise and train TARA members. When the organisation was first set up it had support from the County Grand Lodge of Belfast and the Grand Orange Loyal Institution.</p> <p>2. The organisation was formed out of a small but militant fundamentalist Protestant movement devoted to political and religious opposition to Roman Catholicism. Its members argue the ascendancy of the Protestant faith over Catholicism and claim it to be the national religion.</p> <p>3. It first came to recent public notice in Jan 1972 with the issue to the press of an unsigned proclamation of intent. It was about this time that William McGRATH formed TARA on its present day lines. The choice of name is strange as it is the name of a set of ancient kings of Ireland, but it does symbolize the belief of TARA members that the whole of Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom - under a Protestant leadership.</p>	
<u>MEMBERS OF TARA</u>	
<p>4. Sources indicate that the TARA membership is small, possibly 300 Province wide and about 70 activists in Belfast. There is evidence that a number of the members are sexually deviant; William McGRATH the past OC almost certainly is bisexual and there were homosexuals in his immediate circle of TARA associates. The organisation has always relied on tight security and information regarding its members was closely guarded. Some members have been identified and it is believed that the organisation has members and contacts in positions of influence throughout the Province in local politics, the Orange Order and commercial life. A number of members are known to be in the UVF, UUCI and UDR.</p> <p>5. One ex-member of TARA, [REDACTED] claimed that membership had been falling drastically and the organization went public to create a myth about their size. (In 1977 a split had occurred within TARA and a lot of members who were opposed to the low-key profile left and joined the UVF). A senior member of TARA, [REDACTED] recently claimed that although not a large organisation, it was able to operate through pulling strings. This is believed to be factual.</p> <p>6. In 1975 it was reported that many of the older members of the UDA were anxious to join TARA. Some had been in TARA prior to the formation of the UDA but left to join the new organisation. They later considered TARA to be the more respectable of the two organisations, with a much stricter vetting procedure than the UDA and stronger ties with the Orange Order.</p>	
<u>CONDITIONS OF ENTRY</u>	
<p>7. Conditions for entry to TARA include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. Applicants must have no criminal record. B. They must be members of the Orange Order. C. They must be proposed by someone who is already a member. Applicants are carefully vetted and the time lapse between application and acceptance can be up to six months while the applicants background is negotiated. 	
Page 1 of 3	

Part 1 - Attachment L cont'd
 Brian GEMMELL Note to File 3350/18 of 14 October 1976: TARA

E -
 CLASSIFICATION

D. They must be of sober character and stable background.

E. Ownership of a personal weapon is desirable.

ROLE AND AIMS

8. In a civil war situation it is probably TARA leaders who would come to the fore and find their way into a Provisional Government, for no other reason than the calibre of personnel involved. One source has indicated that one of its aims is planning and preparation for Doomsday and its aftermath.

9. In 1973 they were believed to be bringing arms and ammunition into Ulster for purchase by the UVF. The influential businessmen of TARA were able to use their commercial contacts and expertise in bringing the arms in although they were not interested in using them themselves. It is possible that TARA has a procurement role for members of the UUAC (possibly from Europe).

10. TARA, unlike the other Protestant organisations does not issue many statements in the press but more recently they have been publicly supporting direct rule. They have stated that "As Unionists, we completely reject the suggestion that continued government by the Parliament of the United Kingdom is in any way unacceptable and we will oppose any attempt to render continued direct rule unworkable".

TARA is described as the "hard core of Protestant resistance". It is a defence and planning organisation for use only in a doomsday situation.

12. It is believed that the TARA current active role is that of intelligence gathering. They are known to operate contacts in the loyalist political parties, the Ulster Defence Force, possibly Provisional Sinn Féin, Ulster Defence Association, Ulster Volunteer Force, Red Hand Commandoes, Ulster Defence Regiment and the RUC. Intelligence is collated to assess the invasion potential of the Ulster Army, the Protestant and Catholic paramilitaries strengths and intention and left wing involvement in Ulster. The organisation is believed to have a resource system of sorts, probably located

WEAPONS

TARA members probably have access to a large quantity of personal legally held weapons and may have a sealed dump somewhere in the Province. It is believed they were considering an arms purchase in 1975 and members have discussed the possibility of obtaining arms from Israel and South Africa.

STRUCTURE

14. In addition to the units in Belfast, TARA has units in the following areas:-

- Armagh
- Lurgan
- Portadown
- South Derry
- and to a lesser degree Fermanagh and Coleraine.

The units sourced as operating in Belfast are platoons in Newtonabbey, Finaghy and East Belfast.

15. It was reported that the group was formed into platoons of approximately 20 men. Each platoon was believed to have an OC, a sergeant, a Quartermaster and an IO, but it is now thought that the organisation is run on a looser command structure. Dues of 50p per month (1974) were collected; one half of the dues go to a central fund and the other

Part 1 - Attachment L cont'd
Brian GEMMELL Note to File 3350/18 of 14 October 1976: TARA

E - CLASSIFICATION

half to the platoon. If the platoons require stores they draw from the central fund. Due to inflation the 50p was probably increased.

MAJOR PERSONALITIES

1a. OC - William McGRATH, 5 Greenwood Ave. May be stood down due to ill health.

B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

OC

IO

Admin Offr

Secretary

Military intelligence and RUC Special Branch records have about 30 names of members or former members of the organisation in the Belfast area.

The 'raison d'etre' of TARA seems to be the establishment and defence of a Protestant Ulster with the complete exclusion of the Roman Catholic Church. Their policy has always been based on the idea of the supremacy and purity of the Protestant faith and a change of direction is unlikely. Although Unionist, the greatest TARA driving force is Protestantism.

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Part 1 - Attachment O
Sunday Times article 29 March 1987

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION	E - ADMIN ANNOTATION
SUNDAY TIMES	
Extracted by PRESS SECTION from	Date: 29/3/87
Circulated to:	E - STAFF DESIGNATIONS
E - STAFF DESIGNATIONS	
E - FILE REFERENCE	
M15 - new claims of political interference	
REES CALLS FOR INQUIRY INTO 'DIRTY TRICKS' - By Barrie Penrose	
<p>MERLYN REES, the former home secretary, called last night for a royal commission or similar judicial inquiry into allegations that M15 attempted to destabilise the Wilson government in the mid-1970s.</p> <p>Last week James Callaghan, the former prime minister, and Rees increased pressure on Mrs Thatcher to investigate alleged "dirty tricks" operations which Callaghan's former intervention followed a Sunday Times report about James Miller, a former M15 agent who claimed that the security service helped to promote the "flour-wheeler" strike in 1974 as a plot to destabilise and undermine the Wilson government.</p>	<p>Miller has revealed that he first met for the intelligence services was to spy on William McGrath, a former housefather at the Kinross home.</p> <p>McGrath, who was jailed for his part in the abuse of 11 children in his care between 1911 and 1979, now headed the Tara Loyalist paramilitary organisation. Miller says that McGrath's sexual tendencies were common knowledge inside Tara.</p>
<p>Callaghan told The Sunday Times report broke new ground, outside the scope of the limited inquiry into M15 activities he had instituted in 1977. Rees told The Sunday Times: "In view of the allegations that are being made there is a real case for an urgent royal commission-style inquiry."</p>	<p>Miller said: "My 543 case officer later told me to leave McGrath in them and I understood they used the information to recruit him as an informer." Last night McGrath confirmed that he knew Miller but would not comment on any other aspect.</p>
<p>New claims by Miller this week are likely to add further weight to demands for an inquiry. Miller, an Englishman recruited by the security service in Northern Ireland in 1970, casts doubt on the conclusions of an official inquiry into the sexual abuse of prisoners at the Kinross boys' home in Belfast.</p>	<p>Miller's claims are borne out by an official army briefing paper signed by Colin Wallace, a former army intelligence officer who was attached to M15 operations in Ulster during the 1970s. The document is dated November 8, 1974, a period when McGrath was employed as housefather in Kinross.</p>
<p>The inquiry, chaired by Sir George Terry in 1981, who at the time was chief constable of Sussex, concluded "there is no evidence that army intelligence had knowledge of homosexual abuse at Kinross".</p>	<p>The paper makes clear that army intelligence had inside knowledge of young boys being sexually exploited at the home seven years before the Kinross scandal broke publicly. Wallace's detailed four-page report was sent by several senior officers to army headquarters.</p>
<p>It emerges that Kinross was a top "honeypot" used by M15 to compromise intelligence targets, including Loyalist politicians and paramilitary figures, since the early 1950s. The claims have always been dismissed by the authorities.</p> <p>However, Miller claims that the intelligence services had known about the activities of Kinross for a number of years, and believes the boys' home was used to exploit men who would be blackmailed into providing information.</p>	<p>Headed "Loy - Reports Regarding Criminal Offences Associated with the Home-based Community in Belfast", the report was submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Brian Dixon, then chief of army intelligence who worked closely with M15 at the Royal Ulster Constabulary headquarters at Kinross in west Belfast.</p>
	<p>According to the document, "allegations were made as early as 1947 and there is also evidence that reports may have taken place as early as 1971". It concludes "I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC has consistently failed to take action on such serious allegations unless they had specifically received some form of policy direction. Such direction could only have come from a very high political or police level."</p> <p>Despite Miller's and Wallace's specific warnings, McGrath was still employed as a housefather at Kinross between 1971 and 1979. And it was not until 1981 that he was jailed for four years on 11 counts of abusing boys.</p> <p>In Ireland, Wallace has claimed he was eventually instructed to use the Kinross information as part of a black propaganda operation against prominent Loyalist politicians under the codename "Clockwork Orange 2". It was this operation, says Wallace, which was widened to include smear tactics against national politicians in all three political parties.</p> <p>Last night, Rees, who was the Northern Ireland secretary in the mid-1970s, said he had no first-hand knowledge of Kinross. "But it does tie in with conversations I heard at the time. That whole affair must be investigated."</p>

Part 1 - Attachment P
Sunday Times article 29 March 1987

**E-
 CODEWORD** OPEN-SOURCE DOCUMENT SUMMARY

Title MI5 knew about it but did nothing, that much is certain

Source BBCNewsfile

Date Received 16/07/2014 01:13:01

Original Source Belfast Telegraph

Broadcast Time 15/07/2014 23:33:16

Belfast Telegraph, Liam Clarke, 2014-07-16

THERE is no doubt that MI5 knew about the Kincora sex abuse scandal and kept it quiet.

For evidence we have the testimony of a man described by MI5 itself as an energetic, reliable and brave source of intelligence who had proved himself on many occasions. This praise was heaped on the head of a man known as 'Observer B' at the Bloody Sunday tribunal.

"My case officer told me to leave McGrath to them and I have always believed they used the information (about his sexual activities) to recruit him as an informer," Observer B told me.

He was referring to William McGrath, the housemaster of Kincora Boys' Home and one of three men later jailed for abusing youngsters in his care. Observer B, who had supplied a dossier to MI5, was promptly told to leave McGrath's Tara paramilitary group and join the UDA.

The person praising Observer B to Lord Saville's tribunal was one of his former handlers, a career MI5 agent known as 'Julian'. His evidence, which was given in London in May 2003, is preserved in the National Archives and available online.

Julian made it clear that Observer B, although not a republican, was a prized security service informant in Londonderry at the time.

Observer B was a former British Army Sergeant Major, an Englishman married to a local woman. He died in 2003, but I spoke to him in 1987 about his efforts to alert the authorities to Kincora before his handlers made his financial problems disappear to shut him up.

There was immediate confirmation of his status when Admiral William Higgins, Secretary of the Defence Advisory Committee, warned me that giving the man's whereabouts or naming his handlers would be a breach of national security and punishable as such.

But he wasn't the operative who tried to raise Kincora.

In May 1987 I published the story of a former Field Intelligence Non Commissioned Officer (FINCO). Unlike Observer B this FINCO is still alive.

In 1976 he was posted to east Belfast and became aware of Tara and McGrath. He posted a report to senior officers who told him to take no action.

Part 1 - Attachment P cont'd
Sunday Times article 29 March 1987

McGrath had first come in contact with the intelligence community in the 1950s when he smuggled Bibles into Russia.

His handler was said to be an MI5 officer working in Old Hollywood Road who was later charged with an offence against a young boy.

Such issues cannot be let lie.

Belfast Telegraph

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I, 9347, say as follows to the Inquiry into Institutional Abuse 1922 to 1995 (the HIA Inquiry).

Background

1. I was an officer in the Security Service for 34 years.
2. During my service I was appointed between 1981 and 1983 to the role of Assistant Secretary Political (otherwise known as 'ASP') in Northern Ireland, where I served on secondment from the Security Service to the Northern Ireland Office.
3. I confirm that I was not involved in Northern Ireland in the mid 1970's, and did not know of anything to do with the Kincora Boys Hostel ('Kincora') until my role began in 1982.
4. The ASP was the Security Service representative who worked alongside the Army, based in Lisburn. That is where my office was located.
5. I reported to the Director and Coordinator of Intelligence (otherwise known as the 'DCI'), a Senior Security Service officer, seconded to the NIO, who was based at Stormont.
6. I have been asked to look at documents authored by me in my role as ASP in 1982. I have no personal recollection of the documents at this remove, save to confirm the contents of the documents were what I recorded at the time.

Note for File dated the 29th June 1982

7. I refer to a Note for File dated the 29th June 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Note for File') which can be found at Exhibit 1 to this statement. I confirm that I am the author of this Note for File. I am informed by the Security Service, and therefore believe, that the HIA Inquiry has seen the unredacted document.
8. This Note for File is based on discussions I had with **Captain L** of the Special Investigations Branch of the Army.
9. From my Note for File I can see that I had access to a number of documents. These included:
 - a. A record of Brian Gemmell's interview with Jim McCormack of the 25 March, 1975;

- b. The direction from Ian Cameron's assistant to Brian Gemmell of the 4th April 1975 as to the parameters of any interview he was due to have with Roy Garland; and
 - c. A record of Brian Gemmell's subsequent interview with Roy Garland.
10. I have been asked what I can remember about the content of the above documents. I cannot now remember the content of the documents. All I can say about their content is that which is recorded in my Note for File, and my subsequent telegram of the 19th July 1982.
 11. It is apparent to me that my Note for File indicates that the Security Service was concerned about the parameters of the RUC police investigation into Kincora and its potential to stray into matters concerning intelligence agents and intelligence generally, which were not related to Kincora, a possibility which the Security Service would have wished to avoid occurring.
 12. It is clear to me from current consideration of my Note for File that at that time I envisaged the possibility, subject to what Brian Gemmell said to the RUC, of RUC Superintendent Caskey asking me (as the then ASP) what Ian Cameron did with the results of Brian Gemmell's meeting with Roy Garland in 1975. In the Note for File I clearly stated that I could potentially show RUC Superintendent Caskey the 4th April 1975 direction from Ian Cameron's assistant, which laid out the parameters of the interview Brian Gemmell was permitted to conduct with Roy Garland. It is apparent from my consideration of this Note to File that I quoted from that direction in paragraph 8 of my telegram of 19th July 1982. It is apparent that, in quoting from that file, I did not refer to any intelligence that emerged from the meeting Brian Gemmell had with Roy Garland.
 13. It is clear that my Note for File was compiled with reference to, and direct reliance on documents that were contained in a Security Service file, which was held by the ASP locally at HQNI. I am advised by the Security Service that this file cannot now be located. I can confirm that it was not destroyed during my time serving as the ASP in Northern Ireland, as, to my knowledge, no files were destroyed during my time.

Captain L's memo of the 28th June 1982

14. I have been shown a 6 page memo signed by **Captain L** of the 28th June 1982 which can be found at Exhibit 2. I am informed by the Security Service and therefore believe that the HIA Inquiry has seen the unredacted document. I cannot recall the document at this remove.

Telegram of 19th July 1982

15. I have also been shown a telegram of the 19th July 1982 which can be found at Exhibit 3. I confirm I was the author of the telegram. I am informed by the Security Service and therefore believe that the HIA Inquiry has seen the unredacted document.
16. The telegram records my report back to London on what **Captain L** told me of the RUC interview with Brian Gemmell.
17. That telegram, amongst other things, at paragraph 8 demonstrates that I quoted directly from the direction of Ian Cameron's assistant to Brian Gemmell of the 4th April 1975 as to the parameters of any interview that was to be conducted with Roy Garland.

General

18. I can say to the HIA Inquiry, based on my recollections, that the Security Service in Northern Ireland did not concern itself with questions of investigating whether someone was a practising homosexual or not. Therefore, the guidance given to Brian Gemmell, that the army requirement was for information on TARA and that the army had no interest in the investigation of deviant sexual activities or religious aspects of the group, comes as no surprise to me.
19. I do not remember reading any document that would indicate that the Service had any knowledge of the abuse of children at Kincora, prior to the revelation in the media in 1980.
20. At this remove I cannot remember what I read in the files I had access to at the time, and after the period of over 30 years, it is difficult for me to speculate about what may be considered to be inferences or implications that arise from what I wrote. I accept the HIA Inquiry is entitled to do so.
21. I have provided this statement to the HIA on the understanding that my identity will be protected. I confirm that the pin number used to identify me above was unique to me and I am aware that the Director General of the Security Service will be confirming my true identity to the HIA Inquiry.

Signed: 9347 .

Dated: 8 June 2016

E - CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]

Annex A

1. Personal DetailsBrian Smart GEMMEL
[REDACTED]Subject of London's **E - FILE REFERENCES**
1969-72 Undergraduate Strathclyde University reading
Economics and Business Studies.2. Security History**B - SOURCE PROTECTION**
[REDACTED]b. Met by **D - MI5 OFFICER** in Feb 1971 in **F - IRRELEVANT** who
described him as "fascinated by agent work but is inclined
to take risks, shrewd ... and would like to join the
Security Service.c. 1972 interviewed by **D - MI5 OFFICER** as a possible office
candidate and was advised to get job experience. GEMMEL
took a SSC in the Int Corps.d. 1973 talent spotted **E -** [REDACTED]e. 1976 talent spotted. **D - MI5 OFFICER** [REDACTED]f. Nov 1976 interviewed and rejected as an office candidate.
Seen by **D - MI5 OFFICER** [REDACTED]

g. There is no OSA Declaration signed by GEMMEL on HO files.

B - SOURCE PROTECTION
[REDACTED][REDACTED]
INCORRECT NFF - PLEASE SEE KIN-105282,
KIN-105283 FOR CORRECT NFF DATED 29 JUNE
1982
[REDACTED]E - CLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]

E - CLASSIFICATION

we had no worries regarding criminal aspects. I accepted that there could be no question of a cover up, however, Caskey (the RUC investigating officer) was probably not PV'd and we did not wish him (if at all possible) to read any papers relating to the IJS's activities. A further complication was the likelihood that a number of these matters were subject to the OSA for this reason I needed to have the fullest details available for presentation to the DCI and that he would probably seek the views of Lk.

5. CLF gave the following orders:-

a. ^{MOD OFFICER L} was to provide GEMMEL's address in ^{F-2} ^{IRRELEVANT} if asked by Caskey.

b. He was to say that he had met GEMMEL but taken no statement. He was not to provide any details of this conversation.

c. ^{MOD OFFICER L} was to provide me with a full written report.

d. The matter was to be referred to the DCI for his advice.

e. Many of the papers relating to this case were ^{E-CLASSIFICATION} and in view of the possibility of this case affecting Police/Army/Security Service relations the matter was to be closely held.

6. I have kept ^{D - MIS OFFICER} fully briefed of developments in this case. He confirmed on the 29 June that ^{B-1} ^{CODEWORD} RD is not declared to the RUC.

E - SIGNATURE

D - MIS OFFICER

ASP

29 June 1982

INCORRECT NFF - PLEASE SEE
KIN-105282, KIN-105283 FOR CORRECT
NFF DATED 29 JUNE 1982

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - Classification

INCORRECT NFF - PLEASE SEE KIN-105282.
KIN-105283 FOR CORRECT NFF DATED 29
JUNE 1982

NOTE FOR FILE

E - File
Reference/Staff

cc 931

Brian Swart GEMMEL

DOE: [REDACTED]

1. ACOS [REDACTED] told me on the evening of the 28 June that GEMMEL had been interviewed [REDACTED] by Capt [REDACTED] (SIB). [REDACTED] report had been given directly to the CLF and was believed to contain information provided by GEMMEL about:-

- a. His activities as the case officer of [REDACTED] B - PROTECTION OF SOURCE
- b. That these activities were directed by the ASP (Cameron).

c. That he had been an [REDACTED] B - SOURCE PROTECTION

B - SOURCE PROTECTION

2. I passed this information to DCI who asked me:-

- a. To trace GEMMEL with London.
- b. To obtain a written account of GEMMEL's conversation with [REDACTED]

3. I phoned the NDO who fortuitously was [REDACTED] D - MI5 OFFICER. He was subsequently able to provide me with details of GEMMEL which are attached at Annex A.

4. On the morning of the 29 June I was called to a meeting with the CLF, COS [REDACTED], ACOS [REDACTED] and ACOS [REDACTED]. I summarised the [REDACTED] case emphasising that he was a current undeclared asset of the [REDACTED]. I confirmed that GEMMEL had been involved with Security Service activities in the early 1970s and that his role as controller of [REDACTED] had been co-ordinated by the ASP (Cameron). I explained that this was not a Security Service operation but because of the sensitive and unusual aspects of it the ASP had taken a close interest in the way it was conducted. ASP and the source advisers played a leading role in facilitating the transfer of this case from the Army to the [REDACTED]. I assured the CLF that our papers showed that the case was run in a proper fashion that as far as I could see

E - CLASSIFICATION

/...

Captain B

Received by hand from

(SI8) 29.6.82

E - CLASSIFICATION

of 02907/2

Copy No 1 of 2

Brief re Mr B Gemmell ex Capt Int Corps

Attended Strathclyde University where he became actively engaged in student politics. He was elected Chairman of the University Conservatives and

B - SOURCE PROTECTION

B - SOURCE PROTECTION

B - SOURCE PROTECTION

Gemmell became interested in security service work but on leaving University he applied for and was granted a regular commission in the

Intelligence Corps. B - SOURCE PROTECTION

B - SOURCE PROTECTION

His course at Sandhurst was DE/1 subsequent to which he commanded a Pl from 1 PWO (Inf att) on the streets of Belfast.

Gemmell was posted to 123 Int Sec, 39 Bde, in Nov 74. He initially worked gathering intelligence on Protestant Organisations and in this connection requested permission from HQNI to

B - SOURCE PROTECTION

(This source is now referred to as B - CODEWORD

Gemmell was investigating the 'TARA' organisation and he deduced through general conversation with that Clifford Smyth was the Intelligence Officer for TARA.

B - CODEWORD

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - CLASSIFICATION

This organisation involved a man called William McGrath (believed to be the leader) and the accepted aims of the unit were to take over NI in the event of total civil war.

Soon after Gemmell requested permission **B - SOURCE PROTECTION** and submitted information as a result of meetings, he was summoned to HQNI for a meeting with Asst Sec (Pol) Cameron (now retired). He was encouraged to continue the relationship and to involve his family. Gemmell at this time used a PR cover, He gained considerable information from **B - CODEWORD** on

1. TARA
2. Political Opponents of **B - CODEWORD**
3. IRA (TARA had an intelligence net).

Reports were usually typed, some verbal and some taped. **B - CODEWORD** also provided intelligence on Paisley which in the main was only passed to Cameron and NOT copies to 39 Bde files. Nearly all information of a political nature was given ONLY to Cameron. Gemmell believed (because of the info that **B - CODEWORD** had) that **B - CODEWORD** had a source in HQNI, or the Army. **B - CODEWORD** had possession of sectarian maps, a copy of Visor and details of unit moves **B - SOURCE PROTECTION**

B - SOURCE PROTECTION

NB This may have been WALLACE!

B - SOURCE PROTECTION**B - SOURCE PROTECTION**

McGrath was known

to be a homosexual.

At this point Gemmell experienced a spiritual change which resulted in him becoming a 'Committed Christian' and in furtherance of this through his family he became friendly with two men of similar persuasion in NI.

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - CLASSIFICATION

In general conversation Gemmell mentioned TARA and in the conversation which followed he was directed towards a man named McCormick who allegedly had info. Gemmell interviewed McCormick and it was obvious that McCormick wanted to expose McGrath because he was practising deviant sexual acts under the guise of christianity. McCormick also mentioned that McGrath had seduced a young missionary girl and committed some sexual act on a negro.

cont.....

E - CLASSIFICATION

McCormick suggested that Gremmell should interview a man called Roy Garland who was subsequently seen by Gremmell and SGT ^{MOD} OFFICER Q Int Corps (Believed ^{MOD} OFFICER Q had other meetings with Garland) (McCormick has given info to RUC and Garland has been interviewed by RUC he related this interview as being with a "Christian soldier".) The interview was under covert circumstances in Thiepval Bks and on one occasion in McCormick's home.

Garland outlined the following:-

For many years McGrath had been involved with children. When Garland was a boy McGrath had collected a number of young boys around him under a "Christian banner" Garland was one of these boys. His (McGrath's) method was to counsel the boys on sexual problems which he persuaded them to discuss with him (usually masturbation and Christian attitudes towards it) Garland related that McGrath was running a Boys' Home (not named) in Newtownards Rd, Belfast, and had recruited other known homosexuals to assist him. "A man like that doesn't run a Boys' home and not seduce boys" was a particular comment made by Garland. NB Wallace may have been involved in this boys circle as a youth. Gemmell summarises that this boys circle formed the nucleus of TARA and also believes that Garland was in the UDR.

Gemmell reported this information (McGrath and boys home) to Asst Sec (Pol) and he was summoned by Cameron who appeared angry and told him that homosexuality was dangerous and that he was to sever his connection with ^{B - CODEWORD}

Sometime later (weeks) ^{B - CODEWORD} rang Gemmell one lunchtime and insisted on a meeting. He passed information that ^{B - SOURCE PROTECTION} This was relayed to Cameron or ^{B - IDENTITY} (also Asst Sec (Pol)) who then in direct contradiction to previous orders encouraged continued contact with ^{B - CODEWORD} ^{B - CODEWORD} said that McGrath had hinted that he had connections with the SS. This was generally believed to be true and thought that he was being handled by RUC SB. According to Gemmell this would account for Cameron's instruction to forget the homosexual allegations against McGrath and to drop his connection with ^{B - CODEWORD}

however when it was apparent that [B-CODEWORD] was producing better information than their man (McGrath?) then it was expedient to continue working [B-CODEWORD] Gemmell can offer no other solution for the dramatic turn around by Cameron.

Gemmell understood that Paisley and a female secretary of DUP were aware of the homosexual activities but Paisley did not act because McGrath was politically useful to him. Also he held office in Paisley's church from which he should have been suspended. Gemmell was prevented from interviewing the Secretary by [B-IDENTITY]

Gemmell was sent to London by Cameron and interviewed at the [F-RELEVANCE GROUNDS] [B-IDENTITY] who spoke about the possibility of [B-CODEWORD] being handled from -- London. Also told Gemmell that they (SS) had film of John McKeague involved in homosexual activities (no detail) and how susceptible would McKeague be to blackmail? Gemmell was aware of McKeague having already being convicted for offences and therefore thought that he would not be that good a subject.

[B-CODEWORD] also related to Gemmell that he had a close friend in the RUC. PC or DC who in 75 was [B-PROTECTION OF IDENTITY] [B-SOURCE PROTECTION] Gemmell thinks he must have known something of the homosexual activities.

The following were aware of Gemmell's work for Cameron and of the details of his reports re McGrath and TARA:

- 1. Lt Col [MOD OFFICER M] Int Corps
- 2. Maj [B-Identity] (Int 39 Bde)
- 3. G3 HQNI (Prot) 1975-6
- 4. SGT [MOD OFFICER Q] Int Corps

A check of 123 Int Sec 102's for reports.

Q Was this information deliberately kept from RUC.

E - CLASSIFICATION

A Yes. On instruction all this was classified Sec UK Eyes 'A' ONLY

The RVC were not to be informed neither was the Br on the ground

Gemmell is actively engaged in furthering his interest in the work of the "Committed Christians" - He left Int work because he could not relate his new found Christian morals with the type of work with which he had been involved in NI.

MOD OFFICER L

28 JUNE 1982 - DISTINCTIVE SCRIPT

Capt
RMP

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - TRANSMISSION METHOD

FROM [E - SECTION REFERENCE]

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

DATED AND RECEIVED 19/20.7.82

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FOR DIR [E - SECTION REF] AND [E - SECTION REF]

BT

TO SNUFFBOX [E - DOC REF] IMMEDIATE DESK BY 0800

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E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

FILE:

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - SECTION REFERENCE

IN SNUFFBOX FOR DIRECTOR [E - SECTION REF]
IN [E - SECTION REF] FOR A/DCI AND DCI REP KNOCK
FM [E - SECTION REF]
RUC INVESTIGATION INTO KINCORA

MOD OFFICER L

E - STAFF DESIGNATION

1. SIB/[MOD OFFICER L] VISITED [E - STAFF DESIGNATION] ON 19 JULY. HE REPORTED IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE AND RUC/SUPT CASKEY INTERVIEWED (AND TOOK A STATEMENT FROM) GEMMEL ON 16 JULY. [MOD OFFICER L] HAD PREVIOUSLY SET THIS MEETING UP BY TELEPHONE. DURING THEIR CONVERSATION HE HAD ADVISED GEMMEL THAT HE SHOULD RESTRICT HIS COMMENTS/ANSWERS TO CASKEY'S CURRENT INVESTIGATION. HE HAD ALSO ADDED THAT QUOTE [B - SOURCE PROTECTION] WAS STILL OF USE UNQUOTE THUS INFERRING IT WAS A SUBJECT BEST AVOIDED.

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

2. AT THE START OF THE INTERVIEW CASKEY HAD EXPLAINED TO GEMMEL THAT HE WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN GEMMEL'S INTERVIEW WITH ROY GARLAND IN 1975, WHAT HE HAD LEARNED AND WHAT HE DID WITH THIS INFORMATION.

/3...

3. GEMMEL EXPLAINED THAT AS OC 123 INT SECT HQ 39 BDE HE HAD CARRE OUT NUMEROUS INTERVIEWS IN 1975 WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE MEMBERS OF VARIOUS LOYALIST GROUPS IN BELFAST. ONE ORGANISATION OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST HAD BEEN TARA. HE HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS BY CPL [REDACTED] MOD OFFICER O INT CORPS WHO WAS A MEMBER OF HIS INT SECT. THROUGH HIS OWN QUOTE EVANGELICAL CONTACTS IN BELFAST UNQUOTE GEMMEL HAD INTERVIEWED TWO PROMINENT LOYALISTS: FIRST W J MCCORMICK AND THEN THROUGH HIM, ROY GARLAND (NOTE BOTH OF THESE MEN HAVE RECENTLY GIVEN STATEMENTS TO CASKEY AND CONFIRMED THAT THESE INTERVIEWS TOOK PLACE.) GARLAND HAD TOLD GEMMEL THE FOLLOWING:

A. THAT WILLIAM MCGRATH WAS AN EVIL MAN, A SEXUAL DEVIANT WHO UNDOUBTEDLY CORRUPTED THE BOYS IN HIS CARE.

B. MCGRATH OWED GARLAND £2000.

C. GARLAND HAD MARRIED IN APPROX 1974 AND HIS PREVIOUS HOMOSEXUAL EXPERIENCES AS A JUVENILE WITH MCGRATH WERE CAUSING HIM EMBARRASSMENT GEMMEL COULD NOT ELABORATE ON THIS.

4. GEMMEL SAID THAT HE SAW GARLAND ON TWO OCCASIONS ALTHOUGH IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT CPL [REDACTED] MOD OFFICER O MIGHT HAVE SEEN HIM ONCE MORE.

5. FOLLOWING HIS INTERVIEW WITH GARLAND, GEMMEL HAD PRODUCED A FOUR PAGE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOURCE REPORT (MISR) WHICH HAD A RESTRICTED CIRCULATION OF 3 COPIES. HE WAS SURE THAT ONE COPY HAD GONE TO ASP (IAN CAMERON).

76...

PAGE THREE
E - DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

E - CLASSIFICATION

6.
B - Source
Protection

MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] CONFIRMED THAT NO REPEAT NO MENTION WAS MADE OF DURING THE INTERVIEW WITH GEMMEL.

7. MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEW GEMMEL HAD APPEARED RELAXED AND CO-OPERATIVE. HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO WIDEN THE DISCUSSION BUT REMAINED CONTENT TO CONFINE HIS ANSWERS TO CASKEY'S QUESTIONS WHICH WERE CENTRED ON GARLAND. AFTER THE INTERVIEW CASKEY TOLD MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] THAT HIS NEXT STEP WAS TO TRACE AND INTERVIEW IAN CAMERON AND CPL MOD OFFICER O [REDACTED] (NOW SSGT MOD OFFICER O [REDACTED]). CASKEY SAID THAT BEFORE DOING THIS HE PROPOSED DISCUSSING THE MATTER AT HQ RUC (MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] HAS CONFIRMED THAT HE SAW CASKEY WITH H/SB ON THE MORNING OF 19 JULY). HE ALSO WISHED TO FIND THE MISR PRODUCED FROM THE GARLAND INTERVIEW AND WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN ON IT.

8. GEMMEL'S INTERVIEW WITH MCCORMICK ON 25 MARCH 1975 (WHICH INCLUDES A REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO APPROACH GARLAND) IS FILED ON MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] B - CODEWORD [REDACTED]. RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST MOD OFFICER D [REDACTED] D - MIS OFFICER [REDACTED] WROTE A NOTE FOR FILE RECORDING THAT GEMMEL AND MOD OFFICER O [REDACTED] WERE TOLD ON 4 APRIL 1975 BY ASP AND MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] E - STAFF DES [REDACTED] THAT QUOTE IT WAS IN ORDER FOR GARLAND TO BE INTERVIEWED ON THE STRICT UNDERSTANDING THAT THE OVERT AND CLEARLY EXPRESSED REASON WAS A REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION ON TARA. IT WAS EMPHASISED THAT THE ARMY HAD NO INTEREST IN INVESTIGATION OF DEVIANT SEXUAL ACTIVITIES OR RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE GROUP WHICH WAS SOLELY THE FUNCTION OF A SPECIALIST SECTION OF THE RUC. THEREFORE THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD BE STEERED AWAY FROM THIS TYPE OF ISSUE. ANYTHING GARLAND MIGHT SAY ABOUT PERSONALITIES INVOLVING PARTICULARLY MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] B - CODEWORD [REDACTED].

PAGE FOUR

E - CLASSIFICATION

For page 4 of the document please
see KIN-105047

HIAI (Hart) Inquiry – Security Service Witness Statement

Signed by:

9004

Date:

20 June 2016

Part 1**Main Kincora Allegations****Introduction**

1. It is impossible in a single document to address the gamut of allegations surrounding the sexual exploitation at Kincora Boys' Home. Books have been written which have failed to encompass all of the related issues. This note aims to give a summary of what MI5 files record regarding the main claims relating to MI5's alleged involvement with Kincora; particularly those of **Brian GEMMELL**, a former Army intelligence officer.

2. The first MI5 knew of the allegations about child sexual exploitation at Kincora was when the stories emerged in the media in 1980 and the RUC investigation which led to the conviction of **William McGRATH**, the Kincora housefather, and two others (Joseph MAINS and Raymond SEMPLE). MI5 research undertaken at the time and subsequently has failed to find any papers to indicate that we had earlier knowledge of such abuse.


William McGRATH and MI5's investigation of Tara

3. It is clear from our examination of internal MI5 correspondence that when the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) investigation into Kincora began in 1980, MI5 had concerns about the security of some of its agents and covert operations, though these matters were unrelated to activities at Kincora itself. Such concerns were legitimate and understandable in the light of the organisation's national security responsibilities. However, MI5 documents also made clear that were police investigations to uncover criminality by any agent being run by MI5, the Service was perfectly content for the law to take its course.

4. Naturally, documents held by MI5 relating to William McGRATH, have been carefully scrutinised. There is nothing amongst them to indicate that MI5 was aware of, or suspected, his involvement in child sexual exploitation at Kincora or that such abuse was permitted, condoned or encouraged in order to further any MI5 plan.

5. In June 1971, an MI5 Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) reported on a meeting he had attended earlier that month along with a large number of other

loyalists. They had all been personally recommended by sponsors to join the Tara Brigade, a putative Loyalist paramilitary organisation. The CHIS reported that the assembly had been addressed by "a man called McGRATH" who explained the aims of the organisation were the "preparation of an effective defence force against the day when it would be required". McGRATH "emphasised that those joining would not be required to undertake offensive action but would be required to carry out drill and a certain amount of intelligence work". (See Figure 1: MI5 CHIS Report, June 1971.)



6. An MI5 officer filed this intelligence report on a new file created for "The Tara Brigade". The officer also sent a copy of the report to MI5's Director of Intelligence (D of I) and stated that he would pass a copy to an RUC Assistant Chief Constable who was Head of Special Branch. At this point, MI5 did not know Mr McGRATH's first name, nor did they have any report about his alleged homosexuality. In April 1972, MI5 did receive information which stated that Mr McGRATH had been accused of 'assaulting small boys'. MI5 was still unaware at that point of any reporting on McGRATH's homosexuality, although we are very conscious that homosexuality did not – and does not – equate to paedophilia. We cover this accusation below. (See section on James MILLER – McGRATH, Kincora and media misrepresentation).

7. In November 1973, the RUC notified MI5 that they had received information that McGRATH was intending to visit Amsterdam at some future date for unknown reasons. The RUC letter included McGRATH's full name and occupation as a Social Worker at Kincora Hostel. Annotations on the RUC letter indicate that MI5 did not

hold a file on McGRATH at the time. (See Figure 2: RUC Letter to MI5, November 1973.)

Figure 2

William McGrath (born 11 December 1916, occupation - Social Worker, Lisburn Hostel, Belfast; [redacted]) has been the subject of a number of reports as being the Officer Commanding, Tara Brigade in Northern Ireland.

Intelligence on this group, which is believed to have close links with the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Orange Order, show that it was dormant for some time prior to the 11 April 1973 when it made a public announcement in the form of its re-formation. Little threat is offered by this group at present and while it has claimed a large membership throughout Northern Ireland it is in fact a small group of people operating in Belfast with a very small membership.

RUC Letter to MI5, November 1973

8. A Daily Intelligence Summary issued by the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence in January 1976 included a Comment about McGRATH which mentioned reporting from March 1975 having given his employment as warden of the Kincora Boys' Home. (See Figure 3: DCI Daily Intelligence Summary, 17 January 1976 - Extract.)

Figure 3

EXTRACT FROM DIRECTOR AND CO-ORDINATOR OF INTELLIGENCE
DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, NORTHERN IRELAND, NO: 725A

COMMENT: WILLIAM McGRATH WAS REPORTED IN MARCH 1975 TO BE WARDEN OF THE KINCORA BOYS HOSTEL. HE HAS PREVIOUS TARA TRACES AND IS SAID, [redacted] TO BE A HOMOSEXUAL. ANOTHER REGULAR AND RELIABLE SOURCE HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT THE UDA, AND ALSO WILLIAM CRAIG, MAY BE AWARE OF THIS TARA/IVE ACTIVITY IN THE ARMS FIELD. [redacted] E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE

DCI Daily Intelligence Summary, 17 January 1976 - Extract

9. In April 1975, MI5 obtained via the Army a summary of allegations made to the RUC on an unknown date by Miss Valerie Shaw (PA to Dr Ian Paisley) during an RUC officer's investigation of Tara. Miss Shaw's information included details of McGRATH and Tara. (See Figure 4: Report received by MI5 in April 1975 - originated 22 March 1975.)

Figure 4

3. The following is a summary of information passed to [redacted] by Miss SHAW on Tara and personalities so far :

William McGrath : 188 Upper Newtonards Road - Warden of Kinsora Boys Hostel **EX-1070**
 He used to live in 'Faith House', 25, Orpen Park, Finaghy. This was the house he **REFERENCE**
 lived in before the "scandal broke". He then moved to 5, Greenwood Park, where Clifford SMYTH stayed with him until SMYTH got married.
 There was a Scottish matron type that worked in Faith House, who became disenchanted with McGrath's habits and packed up and went home. Source said she would know alot about his early activities.
 He is the Master of the Ireland Heritage Lodge, which meets in the John Knox Memorial Hall, 150, Cliftonpark Avenue, of which there is a suggestion that PAISLEY has some sort of control of.
 It was over the use of this hall that McGrath and PAISLEY had a disagreement. McGrath wanted to use the hall for a meeting, to which PAISLEY agreed. Source, on hearing this, went to PAISLEY with a set of letters and papers, written to one Roy GARLAND **PRO**

by McGrath when they were having an affair, to show PAISLEY what sort of man he was dealing with. PAISLEY then tried to prevent McGrath using the hall, to which McGrath replied by threatening to publicise PAISLEY's 'undemocratic usage of Orange Halls', and to organise a protest march, using the members of his Lodge, outside PAISLEY's church. **EX-1070**

In the late '60's early '70's, McGrath was collecting funds, reason not known. GARLAND had donated £4000 in good heart. Somewhere along the line McGrath went crooked, used the money for his own ends, and GARLAND found out and demanded his money back. When McGrath refused GARLAND sued him, the outcome of which McGrath had to sell Faith House to pay off the debt. **EX-1070**

Roy GARLAND : [redacted] He owns his own business, something to do with chemicals. He is the man who was, in source's words, influenced by McGrath, and who kept the letters and papers exchanged between themselves whilst the affair lasted.

Report received by MI5 in April 1975 -- originated 22 March 1975

10. In May 1975, MI5 received intelligence from a Merseyside Police Special Branch CHIS about efforts to establish a Tara presence there during 1970-71. Although McGrath is not named in the report, it is likely that he was the person described as the 'instigator' of the Liverpool company of Tara who was 'strongly suspected' of being a homosexual. (See Figure 5: Merseyside SB Report to MI5 - March 1975.)

Figure 5

Original in File No. E - FILE REFERENCE	..Vol.	Series	ANNOYATION	Receipt Date ... 8.5.75...
Original from: Merseyside	Under Ref.	E - ADMIN ANNOTATION		Dated ... 8.5.75...
Extracted on: 4.6.76	By:	E - STAFF DESIGNATION		E - SECTION REFERENCE
Ext. from Text from Special branch Merseyside re UVF Liverpool				
IN ION	1. ACCOUNT OF THE FORMATION OF THE UVF IN LIVERPOOL IS AS FOLLOWS:			
	<p>IN LATE 1970, A NUMBER OF LOYALIST SYMPATHISERS IN LIVERPOOL FORMED THEMSELVES INTO A LOOSELY ORGANISED COMPANY OF 'TARA'. THIS ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] IS A LOYALIST MILITANT ORGANISATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, OPERATING MAINLY IN THE BORDER AREAS. THE LIVERPOOL 'COMPANY' WAS FORMED AT THE INSTIGATION OF A MAN WHOSE NAME [REDACTED] CANNOT RECALL, BUT WHO HE BELIEVES TO BE FROM THE UPPER NEWTOWNARDS ROAD AREA OF BELFAST HE SAYS THAT THIS MAN CAME OVER AT THE BEGINING OF 1970, AND DESCRIBES HIM AS ABOUT 40 YEARS, APPARENTLY QUITE AFFLUENT, LIVING IN A LARGE HOUSE AND STRONGLY SUSPECTED OF BEING A HOMOSEXUAL [REDACTED] SAYS THAT THIS MAN IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF A BELFAST MAN NAMED [REDACTED] ON THE FORMATION OF THE TARA COMPANY, [REDACTED] MADE COMPANY COMMANDER WITH THE RANK OF SERGEANT, WHILE [REDACTED] WAS MADE A MEMBER OF THE TARA BRIGADE STAFF AND GIVEN THE JOB OF SUPERVISING THE ACTIVITIES OF [REDACTED] AND HIS COMPANY. [REDACTED] SAYS THESE ACTIVITIES CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF PUBLISHING 'PROPAGANDA MATERIAL'. [REDACTED] CLAIMS THAT THE BELFAST TARA 'QUEER' RETURNED TO BELFAST WHERE HE WAS INVESTIGATED BY LOYALISTS WHO DECIDED THAT BECAUSE OF HIS HOMOSEXUAL TENDENCIES HE CONSTITUTED A SECURITY RISK AND IN EARLY 1971, TWO MEN CAME OVER FROM BELFAST TO RE-ORGANISE THE 'TARA' COMPANY AS A UVF BRIGADE.</p>			
Merseyside SB Report to MI5 - May 1975				

11. In April 1976, Robert Fisk published an article mentioning Tara in the *New Statesman*. Fisk claimed that an account of Tara's activity had been "collated by an intelligence officer at Lisburn". MI5 ASP Ian Cameron wrote to other MI5 officers about the Tara component of the article which he believed was almost certainly a draft on Tara held in the Army Information Service (AIS) records at HQNI. (See Figure 6: MI5 ASP Letter, 22 April 1976.)

Figure 6

E - CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS NORTH IRELAND
British Forces Post Office 235

Army Message Centre 235
Post Office 235

E - FILE REFERENCE

For 500
Copied to: **D - MI5 DIRECTOR**

Type of message
On return
Date: **22 April 1976**

E - SIGNATURE

E - FILE REFERENCE

In an article in the *New Statesman* on 19 March 1976 about the extreme Loyalist organisation TARA (copy attached marked A) Robert FISK refers to "the Army's account of their activities collated by an intelligence officer at Lisburn".

2. The reference is almost certainly to a summary on TARA (copy attached, marked B) held in the AIS records at EIGHT. The information in the summary was no doubt drawn from G (Int) files at a time when the IP element within the AIS was working closely - too closely! - with G (Int).

3. WALLACE would have had access to the AIS file and I do not think there is much doubt that, also in this instance, he was FISK's source.

4. The passages which have been underlined had been published in the former another, previously.

E - SIGNATURE

E - FILE REFERENCE

MI5 ASP Letter, 22 April 1976

12. Cameron felt that the AIS summary had undoubtedly been drawn from Army intelligence files. ASP noted that Colin WALLACE would have had access to the AIS file and he had little doubt that Wallace had been Fisk's source for the article. ASP attached the relevant AIS record for comparison with Fisk's article.

13. It is likely that Cameron had been able to recognise the similarity because in 1974 the NIO had sought assistance from MI5 in identifying the source of unauthorised disclosures of classified information. These inquiries had encompassed both Colin WALLACE and Robert FISK (see below for Colin WALLACE.).

14. A comparison of the Army Information Service record and the relevant extract of Fisk's article shows a strong resemblance, supporting Cameron's judgement that the latter derived from the former. (See Figures 7 & 8: AIS and Fisk extracts below.) A copy of Fisk's full article is provided as Attachment A.)

Figure 7

Reference TARA . (new right-wing organisation reported in press 11/4/75)

NOTE: TARA. one word- individual letters have no significance.

Q.2. William McGrath, 3 Greenmount Ave. Upper Newtownards Rd. Belfast.

B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

Main Office-David Strauss Manager, deputy editor - Protestant Telegraph

Q.2.1a assistance, (S)

Details - C.O. uses non-existent evangelical mission as a front; homosexual; said to have attended a meeting in Dublin, prior to troubles where three representatives of eastern bloc countries were present; thought to have made allegiance to his flag then Union Jack or Tricolour and has caused many genuine people into membership; keeping them enamored by threatening to reveal homosexual activities which he had initiated.

Details - TARA organized initially in platoons of 20, now probably in Coys and drawn almost exclusively from members of the Orange Order; each pln has 600, 650, and 700 contributions - 30p per man per month - half to a central fund, half kept at pln level; plns were able to draw on central fund if opportunity to buy stores arose; meetings held in Clifton St. Orange Hall about every two weeks under name of Orange Discussion Group; training in radio, weapons and lectures in guerrilla tactics.

Reference: Leo Drinley, Colymbour (12), Rev. Martin Smith, and Sir Knox Cunningham all said to have McGrath, and to have been told of his activities. So far as is known no notice has been taken by any of them.

AIS record extract attached to MI5 ASP Letter, 22 April 1976

Figure 8

Robert Flak. (A)

The Murder of Sammy Smyth

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privately, it is a fact that over the third of the RUC's entire complement of 4,000 policemen and policewomen are now employed at any one time guarding the province's politicians, judges and civil servants from assassination. The army have remarkably accurate figures for the weapons now held by Protestant groups and the details of their training; yet for so long have they been forced, through political circumstances, to accept para-militarism that their own are almost matter-of-fact.

Take, for example, the army's private report on Tara, a Protestant organisation founded in 1973 which is well-armed but has links with a Northern Ireland political party and is perfectly legal. The army's account of their activities, collated by an intelligence officer at Lurgan, reads:

Commanding Officer uses non-existent evangelical mission as a front . . . TARA organized initially in platoons of 20 now probably in companies and draws almost exclusively from members of the Orange Order; each platoon has a Sgt/COA (Quartermaster) and 10 [intelligence Officer]; contributions - 30p per man per month - half to a central fund, half kept as pln (platoon) level; plns were able to draw on central fund if opportunity to buy stores arose; meetings held in Clifton Street Orange Hall about every two weeks under name of Orange Discussion Group; training in radio, weapons and lectures in guerrilla tactics.

Extract from New Statesman 19 March 1976

15. In January 1977, MI5 continued to seek information about McGRATH and Tara, enquiring about whether a source who had been able to report on McGRATH in early 1976 would still be able to do so.

16. It was only in May 1977 that MI5 created a permanent file on William McGRATH. Security Service policy requires two criteria to be met before a file may be opened on an individual. First, the individual must be fully identified. Secondly, the individual must meet an official Recording Category which, in the case of William McGRATH, was on the basis that between 1971 and 1977 he had been an Irish Protestant extremist.

17. Inside MI5's file on McGRATH there is an envelope containing two index cards that at one time would have been used as a working aid to record brief notes about him. The earliest note is based on a report dated 18 April 1973, recording McGRATH as the leader of a 'refurbished' form of the Tara Brigade.

18. Another entry, based on a report dated 13 November 1973, gives his occupation as Boys Hostel warder (*sic*) at Kincora Boys Hostel and also states that he is reported to be homosexual. McGRATH's date of birth is shown citing a report dated 20 January 1976. An entry citing a report dated 13 February 1976 states that he "*has long made a practice of exploiting other peoples sexual deviations*". There is no entry reflecting the April 1972 report about Mr McGRATH having been accused of 'assaulting small boys'. (See Figures 9A & 9B: Index Card Working Aid Cards 1 & 2 on William McGRATH.)

Figure 9B

Index card Working Aid for William McGRATH - Card 2 (Front)

McGRATH, William

He has long made a practice of exploiting other people's moral deviations and IRA loyalty towards him on their account. He has exercised strong influence towards subject.

E-DOCUMENT REFERENCE [redacted] of 13 Feb 76 - [redacted] REFERENCE

He is strongly anti-communist & has accused the IRA of being communist tendencies.

Bill was to be secretary of George Lodge (IOI) 1904 named "Lodge's Heritage". He is looking for a Gaelic teacher for the lodge.

Alister (ref. to ref) from subject was published in the Newsletter in "on 7" attacking the IRA, Catholics & the British as all trying to end Protestant faith in Ireland.

E-DOCUMENT REFERENCE [redacted] of 2 Feb 76 - [redacted] REFERENCE

See ref. for write-up on subject & The Tara Brigade.

E-DOCUMENT REFERENCE [redacted] of 19 Oct 76 - [redacted] REFERENCE

The Tara E. Belfast CO said that subject had promised the E. Belfast group a consignment of guns so far back as 1966.

Index card Working Aid for William McGRATH - Card 2 (Reverse)

but it never materialised. He added that he knew that subject still owed £2,000 for the purchase of weapons now in possession of the CO.

E-DOCUMENT REFERENCE [redacted] of 11 Feb 77 - [redacted] REFERENCE

Index Card 2 – Working Aid for William McGRATH

Brian GEMMELL – MI5 ASP and the Kincora investigation

19. Brian GEMMELL, a former Army intelligence officer, was interviewed by the RUC in relation to the allegations about Kincora. The RUC's intention to interview him was known to the Security Service. (See Figure 10: MI5 Loose Minute, 29 June 1982.)

Figure 10

E - CLASSIFICATION	E - ADMIN ANNOTATION
LOOSE MINUTE	
cc: C - FILE REFERENCE	
E - SECTION REFERENCE	
Brian Smart GEMMEL @ GENEL Born: 15.8.50 E - FILE REFERENCE	
<p><u>Background</u></p> <p>2. According to HQNI [redacted] GEMMEL was shortly to be interviewed by an RUC Inspector in the course of their criminal enquiries into homosexual activities at the Kincora Boys Home, the subject of a recent Protestant scandal in the Northern Ireland newspapers. GEMMEL himself was not accused of any illegal activity, but a source he ran while in the Intelligence Corps in 1976 was alleged to be involved.</p>	
MI5 Loose Minute, 29 June 1982	

20. It is evident from MI5 documents that the Service was not conducting any intelligence operations linked to Kincora and had no concerns about the police investigations into the abuse at Kincora *per se*. Indeed, one MI5 document made the point that it was important to understand from RUC Special Branch "*how best [Caskey's] attention can be focussed on matters strictly relevant to Kincora...*". (See Figure 11: MI5 Telex of 01 July 1982 – Extracts.)

Figure 11

<p>Subject: RUC Investigation into KINCORA</p> <p>[redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] discussed the issues raised in tur and in the papers referred to above on 1 July. Our view is that an early meeting should be sought with RUC and that the appropriate level, initially, would be MSD and D/MSD. The involvement of the latter is regarded as important in view of his recent CID experience and close working relationship with Supt CASKEY. We think that our team should consist of A/DCI, [redacted] and [redacted]. We are quite clear that GEMMEL should not repeat not be approached by us with a view to dissuading him from talking about aspects of his past working relations with us. The indications are that he is not</p> <p>c. CASKEY</p> <p>It will be important to get a view of CASKEY, a steer on how he should be approached and by whom, and some indication of how best his attention can be focussed on matters strictly relevant to KINCORA and away from [redacted] issues.</p> <p>f. RELEVANCE GROUNDS</p> <p>d. The Enquiry</p> <p>We need to know more about the mechanics of the Enquiry. To whom will CASKEY's reports go, for instance, and is he likely to ask for papers?</p>
MI5 Telex of 01 July 1982 - Extracts

21. In this section, we consider how RUC Det Supt Caskey became aware of and dealt with MI5 ASP Ian Cameron, and how MI5 tried to reconcile providing what assistance it could to the Kincora investigation while protecting the security of its sensitive intelligence operations in NI.

22. MI5 documents do reveal that MI5 had security concerns that the investigation into Kincora might result in the public exposure of its legitimate intelligence operations in NI. In its efforts to highlight and deal with these concerns, MI5 met a number of key individuals associated in various ways with the Kincora investigation. These included the RUC Head of Special Branch (HSB) and his Deputy (DHSB); lead Kincora investigators Det Supt George Caskey and Army Special Investigation Branch (SIB) investigator Captain B; the Attorney General (AG) and Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (DPPNI) as well as Sir George Terry himself.

23. We have seen nothing in the MI5 documents (or any other official record) to suggest that MI5 tried to impede the Kincora investigation. MI5's actions to protect its operations whilst providing what assistance it could to the investigation are described below. These include MI5's former ASP, Ian Cameron, providing answers to a set of questions posed by Det Supt Caskey.

24. MI5's security concerns arose in connection with police interviews of Brian GEMMELL, which MI5 feared could stray into areas unrelated to Kincora and might thus place sensitive intelligence operations at risk. In this context, we note that the RUC Deputy Head of Special Branch (DHSB) told MI5 in July 1982 that there would almost certainly be a public inquiry during 1983, adding that Caskey's report would form the basis for the inquiry and might be made available to interested parties. (See Figure 12: MI5 Telex of 02 July 1982 – Extracts.)

Figure 12

TITLE: RUC INVESTIGATIONS INTO KINCORA	■ - ADDRESS ANNOTATION
<p>3. HSB TOOK A MOST HELPFUL LINE. HE SAID CASKEY WAS SELECTED FOR THE JOB OF HEADING THE FOLLOW-UP ENQUIRY INTO ANY OUTSTANDING CRIMINAL MATTERS CONNECTED WITH KINCORA BECAUSE OF HIS ABILITY AND HIS DISCRETION. HSB HAD ALREADY FOUND HIM HELPFUL IN CERTAIN MATTERS BUT DOES NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE HIM AS HE IS NOT IN HIS BRANCH (THOUGH AT THE MOMENT HSB IS ACTING HEAD OF CID IN</p>	
<p>4. HSB SAID THERE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE A PUBLIC ENQUIRY NEXT YEAR AND CASKEY'S REPORT WHICH SHOULD BE READY BY THE END OF JULY WOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR THIS ENQUIRY AND MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED PARTIES. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT CASKEY'S REPORT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE THINGS WHICH CONCERN US. THE ONE PROBLEM IS GEMMEL WHO MIGHT INSIST ON BEING UNNECESSARILY FRANK IN HIS WRITTEN STATEMENT. HSB CONSULTED DCC THERE AND THEN AND SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ERASE THESE REFERENCES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY HARMED NATIONAL SECURITY.</p>	
<p>5. IT WAS DECIDED THAT PROVIDED DCI AND DIRECTOR [REDACTED] AGREED [REDACTED] DCI REP KNOCK AND I SHOULD SEE CASKEY THAT SAME AFTERNOON.</p>	
<p>6. THIS AGREEMENT WAS OBTAINED AND WE MET CASKEY IN HSB'S OFFICE. HE WAS SENSIBLE AND CO-OPERATIVE. HE WILL INTERVIEW GEMMEL HIMSELF AND ENDEAVOUR TO KEEP EXTRANEIOUS MATTERS OUT OF THE STATEMENT. HE WILL KEEP HSB INFORMED AND WE WILL ALL CONSULT AGAIN AFTER THIS INTERVIEW. MEANWHILE, ASP WILL TELL CLF THAT [REDACTED] CAN GIVE CASKEY GEMMEL'S ADDRESS BUT THE OTHER QUESTIONS WILL NOT BE PURSUED FOR THE MOMENT.</p>	
<p>8. WE WERE OBLIGED IN CONVERSATION TO SAY RATHER MORE TO CASKEY ABOUT GEMMEL THEN WE HAD INTENDED AND HE KNOWS OF HIS [REDACTED] ACTIVITIES AND HIS APPLICATION TO THE SERVICE. WE DID NOT MENTION [REDACTED] BUT REFERRED TO SECURITY SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. WE WERE ALL IMPRESSED BY CASKEY WHO IN TURN ABVIOUSLY RESPECTED HSB. WITHOUT BENDING ANY RULES CASKEY WILL DO WHAT HSB WANTS. WE EMPHASISED THAT OUR SOLE CONCERN WAS TO ENSURE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS DID NOT RECEIVE AN AIRING IN PUBLIC.</p>	
MI5 Telex of 02 July 1982 - Extracts	

25. As we shall see later, MI5 discussed these concerns with the Attorney General (AG) and Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (DPPNI).

26. Accordingly, after broaching the subject with HSB and DHSB, some senior MI5 officers in NI met Det Supt Caskey at RUC HQ on 02 July 1982. They briefed Caskey on the existence of MI5's covert agent-running operation in NI, MI5's relationship with GEMMELL and an individual that GEMMELL claimed to have run as an agent. They also informed Caskey of GEMMELL's application to join MI5. (See section **Brian GEMMELL – applications to join the Security Service (MI5)** below).

27. The MI5 officers emphasised to Caskey that their sole concern was to ensure that interviews stayed focused on Kincora and not on any unrelated intelligence matters. Caskey told MI5 that he could do what was required "*without bending any rules*". MI5 emphasised, in turn, that their sole concern was to ensure that intelligence matters were not aired in public. (See Figure 12: MI5 Telex of 02 July 1982 – Extracts.)

28. GEMMELL was interviewed by Caskey and Captain B on 16 July 1982.

29. On 19 July 1982, Captain B described the GEMMELL interview to MI5, pointing out that at the start of the interview, Caskey had explained to GEMMELL that he was primarily interested in GEMMELL's interview with Roy GARLAND in 1975, what he (GEMMELL) had learned and what he did with this information. When making arrangements for the interview, B had advised GEMMELL that he should restrict his comments and answers to Caskey's current investigation (ie Kincora). For the avoidance of doubt, it is clear that there that there was no impediment to GEMMELL speaking about paedophilia either in Kincora or elsewhere.

30. MI5 documents show that on 20 July 1982, Caskey met with MI5 officers at RUC HQ and read out extracts from GEMMELL's statement. Caskey expressed his intention to obtain the Military Intelligence Source Report (MISR) that GEMMELL said he had written (but which nobody had been able to find) and would want to interview MI5 officer Ian Cameron. MI5 therefore set in motion efforts to discover from Cameron what he did with GEMMELL's information and the MISR.

31. An MI5 lawyer was able to make telephone contact with Cameron, who was about to go abroad, and Cameron's initial responses were passed to an MI5 officer in NI to relay to Caskey. (See Figure 13: MI5 Telex, 23 July 1982)

Figure 13

2. WE WERE FORTUNATE IN BEING ABLE TO CONTACT IAN CAMERON. HE WAS ABOUT TO GO ABROAD ON BUSINESS UNTIL THE END OF AUGUST. HIS MOVEMENTS THEREAFTER ARE UNDECIDED. ■ - SOURCE PROTECTION
■ - SOURCE PROTECTION

3. WE SUGGEST THAT YOU INFORM CASKEY IN CONFIDENCE THAT CAMERON A. RECALLS BEING AWARE OF ALLEGATIONS OF MCCRATH'S HOMOSEXUALITY, BUT NOT THAT CHILDREN WERE INVOLVED, B. STATES THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE PASSED VAGUE SECOND OR THIRD HAND HEARSAY ALLEGATIONS OF THIS NATURE AND FOR WHICH HE HAD NO RESPONSIBILITY TO RJC. HE CANNOT RECALL TELLING GEMMELL TO BREAK OFF CONTACT IN THIS CASE, BUT ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO RECOLLECTION OF THE MATTER THINKS IT LIKELY THAT HE WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM NOT TO PURSUE THIS PARTICULAR LINE OF ENQUIRY, C. CANNOT RECALL THE MISR IN QUESTION BUT WOULD NOT HAVE, AND DID NOT, DESTROY ANY MISR'S.

4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK CASEY IF HE WOULD CONSULT FURTHER ONCE HE DECIDES WHAT USE HE WISHES TO MAKE OF THIS INFORMATION.

MI5 Telex, 23 July 1982

32. We can see from Cameron's answer to Caskey's Question 9 (see **Attachment B and C** for questions and answers respectively) that by "line of enquiry", Cameron means the allegation that McGRATH was a homosexual.

33. Cameron's recollections were passed to Caskey at a meeting on 04 August 1982. In response, Caskey said that they tied in with what GEMMELL had said, and went on to make a number of other points. These included that he (Caskey) would be prepared to meet MI5's Legal Adviser (LA) and provide a set of questions for Cameron to answer. Caskey said he would accept a written statement drawn up by the LA and Cameron. Caskey also made the "obvious point" that it was important to be honest with the DPP. He also made it clear that he had to have a statement from Cameron to complete his enquiry. (See Figure 14: MI5 Telex of 05 August 1982 – Extracts.)

Figure 14

KIRCORA AND CAMERON
2. I HEARD NO MORE UNTIL 4 AUGUST WHEN CASKEY PHONED FROM DMSB'S OFFICE. HSB WAS AWAY FOR THE DAY AND CASKEY WAS TO START LEAVE ON 5TH. I ESTABLISHED THAT HSB HAD NOT SPOKEN TO CASKEY SO I WENT OVER TO KNOCK, EXPLAINED THE PROBLEM TO DMSB (WHO SAW THE DIFFICULTY) AND HE CALLED IN CASKEY TO WHOM I EXPLAINED YOUR PRINCIPLE - THAT NO SERVING OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE SECURITY SERVICE SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED BY THE POLICE. I THEN GAVE HIM CAMERON'S RECOLLECTIONS AS IN PARA. 3 OF YOUR TEL.
D. CAMERON'S RECOLLECTIONS TIE IN WITH WHAT GEMMEL SAID:
G. CASKEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET LA, EXPLAIN TO HIM WHAT QUESTIONS HE WANTED CAMERON TO ANSWER AND THEN RECEIVE A WRITTEN STATEMENT DRAWN UP BY LA AND CAMERON. CASKEY RETURNS FROM LEAVE ON 23 AUGUST AND WOULD LIKE TO MEET LA SOON AFTERWARDS IF THIS IDEA IS ACCEPTED
H. CASKEY MADE THE OBVIOUS POINT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE HONEST WITH DPP. IF HE KNOWS THE FULL STORY HE
4. CASKEY WAS PLEASANT AND UNDERSTANDING THROUGHOUT, BUT HE DID MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD TO HAVE A STATEMENT FROM CAMERON TO COMPLETE HIS ENQUIRY. DCI AND I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE TO HIS PROPOSAL IN 36 ABOVE WHICH SEEMS A SENSIBLE COMPROMISE.
MI5 Telex of 05 August 1982 - Extracts

34. Caskey went on to pose 30 questions for Cameron to answer which were set out in an attachment to a letter to the NIO dated 11 October 1982. A copy of Caskey's questions is provided as **Attachment B**.

35. MI5's LA managed to put Caskey's 30 questions to Cameron and recorded his (Cameron) answers in a note dated 03 November 1982. The text of the LA's note is provided as **Attachment C**. For security reasons, Cameron did not answer

Caskey's first 5 questions because they related to his sensitive intelligence role and duties in NI and were unrelated to Kincora.

36. MI5's LA sent Cameron's answers to the DCI in NI as an attachment to a letter dated 03 November 1982. We have been unable to determine from our documents whether or not this set of answers was passed to Caskey. It is possible that they were not, perhaps for reasons associated with discussions that MI5's LA had already held with the AG and DPPNI, and the AG's view that Cameron's information would be "*hearsay upon hearsay*". (See below.)

37. Before receiving Caskey's 30 questions, MI5's LA had met with the Attorney General (AG) and the Director of Public Prosecutions for NI (DPPNI) and discussed with them various aspects of the Kincora investigation; in particular, MI5's concerns to protect its legitimate intelligence operations in NI. A copy of the LA's record of this meeting dated 01 October 1982 is provided as **Attachment D**.

38. It is evident from the LA's note that MI5 were not trying to impede the investigation into Kincora, about which it had no information, but were seeking a way to protect its quite proper intelligence operations.

39. The Inquiry may consider it significant that the AG expressed the view any information that Cameron could give would appear to be "*hearsay upon hearsay*". A few days after the MI5 LA's meeting with the AG and DPPNI, the AG's Legal Secretary (AGLS) contacted MI5's LA. The AGLS informed the MI5 LA that the DPPNI's view was that [Caskey's] questions "*did not properly arise on any investigation*", adding that the DPPNI himself had no knowledge of the questions and was not behind them. The DPPNI gave the AGLS to understand that he would not be concerned one way or another whether they were answered. A copy of the MI5 LA's note dated 03 November 1982 recording this conversation is provided as **Attachment E**.

40. MI5's views on this issue, and those of the AG, were also explained to the RUC Chief Constable Sir John Hermon on 11 November 1982 by a senior MI5 officer. The Chief Constable accepted that MI5 were seriously concerned that the intelligence effort could be impaired. He therefore agreed to look into stopping further inquiries into Cameron, while making it clear that his primary concern was to ensure that the RUC handled the inquiry "*in an entirely professional and competent way*". A copy of MI5 Note of 17 November 1982 recording this meeting is provided as **Attachment F**.

41. MI5's security concerns increased when they became aware that Caskey was interviewing Army intelligence officers overseas. It was judged that these posed further potential dangers to MI5 intelligence activities that were entirely unrelated to Kincora. This led to a meeting on 27 January 1983 between MI5's LA, Sir George Terry and the latter's Staff Officer, DCI Flenley. The MI5 LA's record of their discussion dated 03 February 1983 is provided as **Attachment G**.

42. The LA described to Sir George Terry in detail the background to the Service's dealings with RUC Det Supt Caskey around Brian GEMMELL's claims; Caskey's attempts to interview ASP/Ian Cameron; MI5's security concerns and their meetings with the RUC Chief Constable, DPPNI and AG.

43. The note records that Sir George Terry expressed amazement that none of this had been reported to him by the RUC CC. DCI Flenley remarked that Caskey had been influenced by the fact that the prosecution of William McGRATH *et al* had been stimulated by press allegations, and now the press had made similar allegations about the involvement of civil servants and an Army cover-up. Caskey, he said, did not wish to appear before any judicial enquiry without having conducted a full investigation. Caskey had been informed by press sources that Colin WALLACE had told them years ago about "*homosexual goings on*" at Kincora. Apart from this, said Flenley, there was no actual evidence to establish the involvement of civil servants or any Army cover-up.

44. We are aware of criticism that Cameron was never subjected to a formal police interview and never answered questions to which Caskey wanted answers. It is clear from MI5's papers that Caskey was given Cameron's initial reply and he (Cameron) later responded to the detailed questions. And our records show that such an interview would have been of little value in any event given multiple hearsay, as well as presenting a risk to MI5's legitimate operations in NI.

Brian GEMMELL – confusion / conflation of cases

45. Cameron told an MI5 lawyer that he could not recall telling GEMMELL to break off contact with GARLAND. (See Figure 13: MI5 Telex of 23 July 1982.) This issue also seems to arise in Caskey's Questions 9 and 10 in November 1982, where Caskey cited GEMMELL's assertion that Cameron had told him to terminate his (GEMMELL) enquires concerning Tara (presumably relating to GARLAND) and later reversed this decision. In his response, Cameron expressed uncertainty about what the police were getting at. (See Attachment C: MI5/Cameron's Answers to Caskey.)

46. It is clear that GEMMELL had confused and conflated two individuals and the circumstances of each. We explain further below how MI5 records show that in April 1975 Cameron had indeed told GEMMELL that he should not pursue the issue of sexual deviancy when conducting his interview with GARLAND. (See Figure 18: MI5 Telex of 19/20 July 1982 – Extract in Brian GEMMELL - the 'missing' MISR below.)

47. However, in June 1975, Cameron did advise GEMMELL to restrict his contact with a different individual – not GARLAND. This advice was given purely on security grounds and was totally unrelated to Kincora. (See Figure 15: MI5/Cameron Note for File, 9 June 1975.)

Figure 15


I saw Capt Gemmel on the morning of 9 June in connection with his contacts with B-CODEWORD. Gemmel will be sending us a complete report. From what he told me I concluded that he could be running into troubled waters. B-CODEWORD while giving little if any real account away on his side is now beginning to ask Gemmel awkward questions. Moreover it is clear that there is a deal of gossip about Army contacts going on within Loyalist circles. F-RELEVANCE-GROUNDS I told Gemmel that he should try to get the contact gradually on to a purely social basis and when he could decently do so - to back off altogether. He expressed himself as being relieved. F-RELEVANCE-GROUNDS

MI5/Cameron Note for File, June 1975


48. MI5 records also show that later in 1975 GEMMELL told Cameron that this individual (not GARLAND) had obtained some valuable intelligence, whereupon Cameron approved renewed contact.

Brian GEMMELL – applications to join the Security Service (MI5)

49. Security Service records show that Brian GEMMELL unsuccessfully sought employment with the Service on two occasions. The first was in 1971 whilst still a student at Strathclyde University. On that occasion, he was advised that the Service preferred its officers first to have gained some experience in another form of employment. (See Figure 16: MI5 Note For File, 25 February 1971.)



50. GEMMELL re-applied to join the Security Service in 1976 after leaving the Army but was rejected. (See Figure 17: MI5 Note for File, 26 November 1976.)



Brian GEMMELL – the ‘missing’ MISR

51. This section focuses on Brian GEMMELL's allegation that, in his role as an Army Intelligence Officer, he had run CHIS who reported to him on McGRATH's abuse of the boys at Kincora. GEMMELL publicly named his sources as William McCORMICK, Roy GARLAND and James MILLER. Despite extensive searches of MI5's records, we have been unable to confirm GEMMELL's claims that he (GEMMELL) reported these allegations to MI5 ASP Ian Cameron.

52. In July 1982 an MI5 officer conducting research to assist with police inquiries into Kincora, reported finding in a Northern Ireland file a record of GEMMELL's interview with McCORMICK on 25 March 1975. The same MI5 officer wrote that GEMMELL and an Army colleague had been told on 04 April 1975 by ASP/Cameron and another MI5 officer that they could interview GARLAND on the strict understanding that it was to obtain information on Tara. The two MI5 officers emphasised that the Army had no interest in the investigation of "*deviant sexual activities or religious aspects of the group*" which was a matter for the RUC. Cameron had directed that their discussion with GARLAND should be steered away from this type of issue, by which we presume he meant homosexuality. (See Figure 18: MI5 Telex, 19/20 July 1982 - Extract.)

Figure 18

8. GEMMELL'S INTERVIEW WITH MCCORMICK ON 25 MARCH 1975 (WHICH INCLUDES A REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO APPROACH GARLAND) IS FILED ON [REDACTED] FF. RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST [REDACTED] MI5 OFFICER [REDACTED] WROTE A NOTE FOR FILE RECORDING THAT GEMMELL AND [REDACTED] WERE TOLD ON 4 APRIL 1975 BY ASP AND [REDACTED] THAT QUOTE IT WAS IN ORDER FOR GARLAND TO BE INTERVIEWED ON THE STRICT UNDERSTANDING THAT THE OVERT AND CLEARLY EXPRESSED REASON WAS A REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION ON TARA. IT WAS EMPHASISED THAT THE ARMY HAD NO INTEREST IN INVESTIGATION OF DEVIANT SEXUAL ACTIVITIES OR RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE GROUP WHICH WAS SOLELY THE FUNCTION OF A SPECIALIST SECTION OF THE RUC. THEREFORE THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD BE STEERED AWAY FROM THIS TYPE OF ISSUE. ANYTHING

MI5 Telex, 19/20 July 1982 - Extract

53. We have confirmed that the NI local file seen by the MI5 officer which had contained GEMMELL's McCORMICK interview report has since been destroyed on an unknown date. The file in question did not relate to McCORMICK who, as far as we can tell, was never the subject of an MI5 file. GEMMELL's interview report has not been found elsewhere during any of the subsequent searches of MI5's records.

54. Although GEMMELL claimed subsequently to have written a MISR (Military Intelligence Source Report) on this topic, we have been unable to find one in MI5's records during extensive searches conducted for the HIAI. Earlier efforts have also been unsuccessful, including those conducted by an MI5 officer in 1982. However, MI5 records do contain an Army letter written in January 1976 not by Captain GEMMELL, but by Army Major A, which we judge to be of some relevance and discuss further below. A copy of Major A's Letter Ref: 13912/2 is provided as **Attachment H**.

55. According to an MI5 officer's telex dated 31 January 1977, the Major's letter was amongst a number of papers that GEMMELL had given to him (the MI5 officer) in October 1976. (See Figure 19: MI5 Telex of 31 January 1977: 'William McGATH (sic) and TARA - Extracts'.)

Figure 19

DATED 31.1.77 RECEIVED 01.2.77

BY SHUFFROX [REDACTED] E - CLASSIFICATION
WILLIAM MCGATH AND TARA

1. IN OCTOBER 1976 BRIAN GEMMELL GAVE US VARIOUS PAPERS ON THE ABOVE WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM HIS ARMY FILES. ONE OF THESE WAS A COPY OF A LETTER FROM HQ 3 INFANTRY BDE LURGAN (REF 13912/2 DATED 26 JANUARY 1976) SIGNED BY [REDACTED] GEMMELL'S COPY WAS ADDRESSED TO G INT HQ

3. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO GEMMELL WHO HAS CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO [REDACTED] DISCUSSING THIS LETTER WITH THE ARMY.

Mi5 Telex of 31 January 1977: 'William McGATH (sic) AND TARA' - Extracts

56. According to a letter written by the same MI5 officer on 19 October 1976, GEMMELL also gave him two other documents. The first was described as "notes on an interview with Roy GARLAND which had been made by GEMMELL and an NCO after a "one off" debrief sanctioned by Ian CAMERON. A copy of the GARLAND interview notes is provided as Attachment I.

57. The GEMMELL/NCO debriefing notes on GARLAND open with the latter stating that he had been introduced to McGRATH twenty years earlier at the 'approximate' age of 15, in the context of a Christian evangelical crusade, and how at McGRATH's instigation, they formed "groups called cell". In the next paragraph, GARLAND – having now moved on to discussing Tara - described how McGRATH would single them out after meetings and attempt to seduce them and make them feel guilty by admitting to masturbation and showing up their guilt complex. GARLAND said this was important to emphasise as this was "*the very beginning of [McGRATH's] hold on them*".

58. The second document GEMMELL handed to the MI5 officer was a Note to File about Tara dated 14 October 1976 and notes on an interview. GEMMELL's Note to File made no mention of Kincora or paedophilia. (See Figure 20: MI5 Letter, 19 October 1976: 'TARA'.) A copy of GEMMELL's Note to File on TARA is provided as Attachment I.

Figure 20

From **E-STAFF DESIGNATION** No. [redacted] Date 19 October 1976 ✓

Date received 21 Oct 76 E-FILE REFERENCE [redacted]

Action taken [redacted] E-ADMIN ANNOTATION [redacted]

E-ADMIN ANNOTATION [redacted]

E-ADMIN ANNOTATION [redacted]

Addressed to [redacted]

Copied to [redacted]

References - ✓

No. of enclosures 5 ✓

Subject

TARA

1. We attach copies of papers handed to [redacted] by GEMMELL on 15 October, which he obtained from his Army files. He made the following comments on these papers:-

- a. TARA - Not to File 3150/1B Vol II - This paper was written by GEMMELL and is based on the contents of his file on TARA.
- b. Notes on interview with Roy GARLAND. These were made by GEMMELL and an SOO after a "one off" debrief sanctioned by Ian CAMERON.
- c. Proclamation - GEMMELL believes that [redacted] may have had a hand in the drafting of this (and we would agree).

2. These papers provide useful material [redacted]

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

MI5 Letter, 19 October 1976: 'TARA'

59. The Note to File on Tara is unsigned, but according to the MI5 covering letter, it had been written by GEMMELL himself and was based on the contents of his (GEMMELL) file on Tara. (See MI5 Letter of 19 October 1976: 'TARA'.) We have seen nothing to cause us to doubt the veracity of this statement.

60. The references in the opening two paragraphs of the GARLAND Debriefing Note to him a) being aged approximately 15 when he was introduced to McGRATH, and b) McGRATH attempting to 'seduce' youngsters, may appear significant in hindsight. But it is unlikely that the MI5 officers at the time would have attributed significance to them at the time. We should bear a number of factors in mind, not least that in reality, 10 years were to pass between these two events.

61. The background reference to GARLAND was marginal to the matter then under discussion between MI5 and the Army – which took place in the context of a different case entirely unrelated to GARLAND and Kincora. In relation to the 'seduction' issue, we note that Paragraph 6 of Major A's letter of 28 January 1976 states that McGRATH "[made] a practice of seducing promising young men". The Major A letter goes on to identify two of those who were seduced. It would be inappropriate to name them here, but both of them were clearly adults.

62. This is consistent with what Mr GARLAND later wrote in the *Irish Times* on 13 April 1982. GARLAND explained how in 1965 McGRATH invited him to join 'cell', at which point GARLAND would have been about 25 years old. GARLAND described 'cell' as "a private ginger group of Orangemen chaired by a Church of Ireland minister". He further explained that "members of District, County and Grand Orange Lodges took part". He made no reference to any involvement of young boys. A copy of GARLAND's *Irish Times* article is provided as **Attachment J**.

63. This level of detail is not provided in the GARLAND debriefing note written by GEMMELL and the NCO. Had their Note been consistent with GARLAND's later public account, and had it been relayed to MI5, it is unlikely that the Service would have drawn any inference of paedophilia or child sexual exploitation from it.


64. In addition, GEMMELL's letter of 12 February 1976 had described the smears and propaganda of the time involving allegations of homosexuality. Separately, MI5 had already been informed in March 1975, via the Army, that GARLAND's complaints about McGRATH's behaviour to Valerie Shaw had been relayed by her to the RUC, although the letter itself lacked detail about the nature of the behaviour.

65. We are also aware that the *Irish Times* published an article about Kincora on 03 November 1983 in which they reported what they had been told by a man "well known in Belfast Protestant evangelical circles". This unidentified man was clearly Mr McCORMICK. He reportedly told the newspaper that he first heard about McGRATH and his job at Kincora in the early 1970s from Roy GARLAND, whom he described as "a former associate of McGrath's who was attempting to expose his homosexual activities". McCORMICK also said that he (McCORMICK) had first put GARLAND in touch with an RUC constable whom he knew as a devout Christian in 1972 or 1973. A copy of the *Irish Times* article of 3 November 1983 is provided as **Attachment K**.

66. If what McCORMICK told the *Irish Times* had been known to MI5, whether from GEMMELL's note of his debriefing of McCORMICK (which we have not been

able to find) or through discussion with GEMMELL himself, MI5 might reasonably have assumed that any allegations by either McCORMICK or GARLAND against McGRATH were not just dated but were already known to the RUC. However, such allegations may still have constituted part of a smear exercise.

67. The only part of GEMMELL's Note to File of 14 October 1976 on Tara which touches on the issue of McGRATH's sexual proclivities comes in his Paragraph 4 where he wrote that a number members of Tara were 'sexually deviant', McGRATH was almost certainly bisexual and had homosexuals amongst his immediate circle of Tara associates. (See Figure 21: GEMMELL Note to File of 14 October 1976: 'TARA'.)



68. Major A's letter was found by an MI5 officer in 1989 whilst reviewing some Army records at the request of the MOD. The Major's letter reported information from three unnamed contacts about Tara and its membership. It stated *inter alia* that McGRATH was "a homosexual" and "made a practice of seducing promising young men". It added that he was described in the 'Belfast Street Directory' as a Welfare Officer and was "thought to be running some form of boys' home".

69. The MI5 officer who found the letter noted that in April 1975 GEMMELL had been given clearance by the Army to interview Roy GARLAND. And while the MI5 officer said that it was not clear exactly what information had been derived from the GARLAND interview, he judged it reasonable to suppose that the Major's letter from January 1976 was in part based upon it. We would agree with that judgement.

70. Although no copy of GEMMELL's alleged MISR has been found, it is likely that its essential content would have been the same as that found in the Major A's letter, perhaps combined with the information in GEMMELL's later Note to File of 14

October 1976. (See **Attachment L**.) We should also bear in mind that any decision on issuing a MISR, based on the content of the Major's letter at least, would have taken into account the 'F' grading given at his Paragraph 2, which indicates that the reliability of the source(s) of the intelligence was unknown.

71. Whether GEMMELL ever did produce a MISR or not, it is notable that his October 1976 Note, based on his Tara file and written at the end of his Army career, made no mention of McGRATH's involvement in paedophilia or his employment at Kincora Boys' Home.

Brian GEMMELL – allegations about MI5 blackmail

72. There have been a number of allegations about MI5 having blackmailed McGRATH or others involved in a paedophile ring involving Kincora. We have seen absolutely nothing in the Security Service records to support any of these allegations.

73. We are also aware of a separate allegation by Brian GEMMELL that during a visit to London in 1976, an MI5 officer told him that MI5 had film of John McKEAGUE, a well-known Loyalist paramilitary figure, involved in homosexual activities and asked for his (GEMMELL) views on how susceptible McKEAGUE would be to blackmail.

74. We have examined this allegation and established that MI5 had no compromising film of McKEAGUE and never made any attempt to blackmail him. However, one MI5 officer did put forward an operational proposal (which was never endorsed) which involved using McKEAGUE's homosexual activities in London in an attempt to recruit him.. We describe the chronology of events below.

75. The MI5 records confirm that GEMMELL met two MI5 officers in London on 10 May 1976 in connection with the handling of an agent unrelated to McKEAGUE.

76. In June 1976 McKEAGUE visited London as part of a UVF arms procurement operation. At various times during his trip, he was under surveillance by MI5 who suspected the UVF's plans. The MI5 officers conducting surveillance on McKEAGUE did take some photographs of him in Central London. However, the photographs were not compromising or sexual in nature. All of them were taken in public areas, but some showed him in the company of young men.

77. It was apparent to those conducting surveillance that McKEAGUE's contact with these young men was to establish homosexual assignations rather than part of the Loyalist arms procurement operation.

78. On 07 September 1976 GEMMELL had lunch in London with an MI5 officer, following which he (GEMMELL) was to attend a formal meeting with another MI5 officer as part of his application to join MI5. No formal record of the lunchtime meeting exists. It is clear from MI5 records, however, that the meeting was held at the request of the MI5 officer who, having become aware of GEMMELL's intention to visit to London, wished to seize the opportunity to discuss with him how to move forward an existing CHIS case of which GEMMELL was aware, but which was unrelated to McKEAGUE.

79. It was not until November 1976 that this same MI5 officer suggested, in light of McKEAGUE's involvement in arms procurement, that "*serious consideration should be given to using [his] homosexual tendencies in an attempt to recruit him*". The MI5 officer accepted that McKEAGUE's colleagues already knew him to be a homosexual, but he doubted that they were aware of how McKEAGUE spent his time when visiting London. The MI5 officer also judged that McKEAGUE's conduct after returning to Belfast in June 1976 following his arms procurement visit to GB had all the indications of someone who was anxious to conceal his homosexual activities in London.

80. The MI5 officer's proposal was considered by other members of the Service including management. This ploy was, however, opposed for a variety of reasons and it was pointed out that MI5's Legal Adviser doubted that MI5's management would accept such a proposal.

81. Based on MI5's contemporaneous papers, the officer's intention would probably have been to exploit what McKEAGUE - as well as his terrorist associates - would have regarded as insecure conduct in London: picking up young men whilst engaged in a covert arms procurement operation. It is clear that MI5 knew that McKEAGUE's homosexuality was recognised by his associates in NI, and he was therefore not susceptible to pressure on that account. In other words, any pressure felt by McKEAGUE would not have been in relation to his homosexuality *per se* but to his lax tradecraft and consequential threat to the success of their arms procurement operation and those involved. As we have already indicated, MI5 neither took nor possessed any compromising photographs.


James MILLER – McGRATH, Kincora and media misrepresentation

82. There have been a number of claims that James MILLER was a CHIS and that he reported to his handlers on Kincora. Brian GEMMELL has claimed to have been one of MILLER's handlers.

83. Arguably, the most public of the allegations about MILLER came to light in March 1987. On 22 March 1987 the *Sunday Times* reported a number of MILLER's claims about work he had undertaken for MI5. These mostly related to the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike. However, on 23 March 1987 the *Irish Times* reported that the Army had asked MILLER to infiltrate Tara and compile information on William McGRATH; which he allegedly did in 1970, a year before McGRATH became warden at Kincora. The article also stated that MILLER would not say if the information he compiled related to McGRATH's "homosexual or paedophiliac activities". The *Sunday Times* published a more detailed article about MILLER on 29 March 1987; including the claim that the intelligence services had known about the activities at Kincora for a number of years. Copies of these articles are provided as Attachments M, N and O.

84. As a matter of government policy, MI5 can neither confirm nor deny publicly whether a particular individual was a CHIS. However, we are able to make a number of assertions about MILLER with confidence.

85. Following the publication of the *Sunday Times* articles in March 1987, an aggrieved MILLER made contact with government officials to make a number of claims. A note of his phone call was passed to the Cabinet Office at the time. (See Figure 22: Note to Cabinet Office, 30 March 1987.)



86. As a consequence, two officials interviewed MILLER about his various concerns in early April 1987. The record of this meeting states that MILLER said his only motive in talking to the Press had been to "set the record straight about Colin WALLACE, whom he believed had betrayed British secrets to the UDA". MILLER added that the journalists had ignored his information about WALLACE, instead they used his (MILLER) name to lend weight to their own inventions about MI5. He said the statements attributed to him that were published in the two *Sunday Times* articles were "a mixture of pure fiction and gross distortion".

87. We provide a number of relevant extracts from the interviewers' Official Minute which we judge to be significant. (See Figures 23A-23D: Extracts A-D from Official Minute of 06 April 1987 re interview with MILLER.) These touch on MILLER's claim of false representation in the *Sunday Times* articles and, significantly, his specific comments about what he is alleged to have told the journalists about Kincora (Extract D refers).

Figure 23A

He insisted that his only motive in talking to the press was to set the record straight about Colin WALLACE whom he believed had betrayed British secrets to the UDA and [REDACTED] B - SOURCE PROTECTION He had acted in what he thought to be MI5's best interests. He now recognised his efforts had sadly backfired. The journalists to whom he had spoken (Barrie PENROSE and Lian CLARRIN) had simply ignored his information about WALLACE; instead they had used his name to lend weight to their own inventions about MI5's saviour role in Northern Ireland. The statements attributed to [REDACTED] which eventually appeared in the *Sunday Times* (22 March and 24 March 1987) were a mixture of pure fiction and gross distortion. [REDACTED] INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

Contact with PENROSE *the Sunday Times*
 5. In February 1987 [REDACTED] published the first of several articles based on interviews with WALLACE and NOLROYD. [REDACTED] accordingly contacted PENROSE, thinking that he would be interested in hearing another side of the WALLACE story. They had several conversations, all on the telephone [REDACTED] never had face to face contact with any journalist. These conversations broadened out into a discussion not only of WALLACE, but of the Loyalist Workers strike, MI5 operations in Northern Ireland, Harold WILSON, [REDACTED] relationship with MI5, his present situation and other issues. [REDACTED] continued to talk to PENROSE because he believed, naively, that PENROSE shared [REDACTED] interest in exposing WALLACE. [REDACTED] F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

Extract A from Official Minute of 06 April 1987 re interview with MILLER

Figure 23B

The 22 March Article

6. Matters came to a head on 22 March when PENROSE contacted MILLER to say that he wished to use MILLER material in an article on WALLACE due to appear in the 22 March edition of the Sunday Times. MILLER demurred but under pressure from PENROSE and subsequently Lian CLARKE (a colleague of PENROSE and a Belfast Catholic, from his accent), he relented. MILLER did so, he said, only (a) after receiving a categorical assurance from CLARKE that his contribution, albeit attributed to him, would form a very small part of a long article devoted to WALLACE;

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

F Unwisely, but did not insist on having the article removed to him before giving his go-ahead.

MILLER's Reaction to the 22 March Article

7. MILLER was awakened on 22 March by a relative brandishing a copy of the Sunday Times and announcing that he had hit the headlines. MILLER was horrified by what he read. He discovered that his adversions on WALLACE had been entirely omitted and that his comments on HIS, WILSON, the Loyalist strike etc had been twisted beyond recognition. When he telephoned CLARKE to protest at these misperpetrations he was told that PENROSE had written the article but that he (CLARKE) was not to blame. Later in the day a relative telephoned

Extract B from Official Minute of 06 April 1987 re interview with MILLER

Figure 23C

8. However CLARKE and PENROSE have not given up/the aftermath of the 22 March article they pressed MILLER for further "cooperation" and on getting a dusty answer from a relative threatened that they would arrange for the media to besiege them in their house. They have also incidentally tried to elicit MILLER's address from a relative

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

9. PENROSE and CLARKE followed up with an article on 22 March which was, if anything, even more far fetched than their previous concoctions

Extract C from Official Minute of 06 April 1987 re interview with MILLER

Figure 23D

c. Kincora Boys Home (29 March article). The reference to "new claims" by [REDACTED] about the Kincora Boys Home was pure fabrication. The implication that [REDACTED] had made further revelations to PENROSE since the 22 March article was false. 604 had indeed been questioned by PENROSE about the Kincora scandal but had told him honestly that he knew nothing about this episode except what he had read in the newspapers. His OFFICIALS had never given him any reason to suppose that [REDACTED] were interested in the place. He told PENROSE that he had fleeting contact with William McGRATH in the latter's capacity as a leader of the TARA Brigade. But [REDACTED]'s membership of TARA was short-lived; he resigned from the organisation when it became clear that he was under suspicion as possible Security Forces infiltration agent. Though there had been speculation in Loyalist circles that McGRATH was a homosexual, [REDACTED] did not know him well enough to comment on these allegations, and was unaware at the time of his "housefather" role at Kincora. The reference to Lt Col Brian DIXON, described as Chief of Army Intelligence at Knock KOC headquarters, meant nothing to [REDACTED]. He had never known anyone of that name.

Extract D from Official Minute of 06 April 1987 re interview with MILLER

88. It seems clear from what MILLER told the officials that he had no information of any abuse being carried out at Kincora, no knowledge of McGRATH's paedophilia and no knowledge of his employment at Kincora Boys' Home. The account provided privately to officials by MILLER differs dramatically from what was published by journalists Clarke and Penrose.

89. Despite extensive searches of papers we have been able to find only a single document which provides any support to the allegation published in *the Sunday Times* article of 29 March 1987.

90. We located a letter written by Mr MILLER dated 07 April 1972 in which he reported having been told by an associate that the Tara Commanding Officer, whose name was given as McGRATH, "had been accused of assaulting small boys". (See Figure 24: Mr MILLER's Letter, 07 April 1972 – Extracts.)


Figure 24

Have been told by the TARA C.O. Mcgrath had been accused of assaulting small boys and that he could not account for [REDACTED] that had been handed to him over a period of twelve months.

Mr MILLER's Letter, 07 April 1972 - Extracts

91. However, Mr MILLER did not provide McGRATH's first name. He did not indicate anything about McGRATH's sexuality or employment, and he did not expand

on what was meant by 'assaulting'. Part of Mr MILLER's letter was reproduced almost verbatim in an MI5 report about 'Extreme Protestants'. The author of the MI5 document included the comment that reliability of the person who told MILLER about the accusation was "*open to doubt*". (See Figure 25: MI5 Report of 11 April 1972 - Extracts.)



92. We believe the MI5 officer would have taken into account a number of factors when assessing the information in Mr MILLER's letter at the time. These would probably have included, for example: when had the accusations had been made; by whom were the accusations made (by victims, police or others); against whom were the allegations made (the leader of Tara Mr McGRATH was not yet fully unidentified); when had the alleged assaults taken place (recently or in the past) and what kind of 'assault' had been carried out: physical (eg slap/punch) or sexual (or even 'verbal'). And at this point there had been no allegation about Mr McGRATH's homosexuality.

93. At the time that Mr MILLER's letter was passed to MI5 in April 1972, the Service was still uncertain about the identity of the Mr McGRATH who was the CO of Tara. Even his forename was in doubt. It was an RUC letter of 22 November 1973 that provided McGRATH's full name, Date of Birth and gave his occupation as 'Social Worker' at Kincora Hostel.

94. Also, we ought not to assume that 'assault' would have been interpreted at the time by the MI5 officer who read Mr MILLER's letter, or by anyone who read it, as being of a sexual type. McGRATH was, after all, running a paramilitary organisation, and physical abuse or rough handling of young recruits might have been anticipated. For example, MI5 CHIS reporting about the UDA prior to 08 July 1972 stated that there was "*a very bullying attitude by the leadership towards the rank and file*" which

was not well received. In this context, we should also bear in mind that Loyalist paramilitaries, like their Republican counterparts, used youngsters in their cause.

95. The MI5 officer who drafted the April 1972 report did not give their reason for assessing the sub-source's reliability as "*open to doubt*". It may be that the officer based his judgement on information obtained from elsewhere, including discussions with others (eg Army intelligence and RUC SB officers). However, we do know that in October 1971 MI5 had reporting that there was some 'discord' within Tara, some of whose members appear to have been defaming or insulting each other and McGRATH.

96. We should note too that the MI5 officers' focus in NI at that time would have been to obtain strategic intelligence on paramilitary capabilities, activities and intentions. The accusations against an as-yet unidentified McGRATH as reported in the 1972 letter would not have been passed to the police not just due to the factors we referred to above, but also because it could be judged to fall below the intelligence threshold. It was a generalised assertion and insufficiently robust. The MI5 judgement on Mr MILLER's letter would have been made at a particularly challenging time for the Security Forces. Terrorists had killed 180 people during 1971, and in 1972 up to the date of this letter they had already killed some 50 people. Therefore an accusation of dubious provenance about an unidentified person and ambiguous interpretation may well have been considered simply not to meet the threshold for dissemination.

97. MI5 did pass some of its reports, in whole or in part, to RUC HSB. However, this was discretionary and it is not possible to tell from MI5's 'Extreme Protestants' report whether or not RUC HSB was told about the accusation against McGRATH. Nor can we tell whether or not the RUC had received a copy of Mr MILLER's letter.

98. So while the accusation made against the McGRATH cited in Mr MILLER's letter may be judged to be of some significance in hindsight, we are satisfied that it was not actionable.

99. We are also aware that MILLER's claim of misrepresentation by the journalists may appear to be undermined by a 15 July 2014 article by Liam CLARKE. CLARKE recalls his 1987 interview with MILLER and alleges that MI5 had paid-off MILLER so that he would stay silent about what he (and thus, allegedly, MI5) knew about Kincora. MILLER had reportedly spoken to CLARKE before his handlers made his financial problems 'disappear' to shut him up. MILLER allegedly told CLARKE that: he was to penetrate Tara for MI5; gave MI5 a dossier on Tara/McGRATH and was promptly told to leave Tara and "*leave McGRATH to us*", which MILLER

assumed meant that his information on McGRATH's sexuality was used to recruit him. A copy of Liam CLARKE's article is provided as **Attachment P**.

100. MI5's records do not substantiate Liam CLARKE's allegation of MI5 paying off MILLER or anyone else to remain silent about Kincora or child abuse. There is nothing at all in MI5's records to suggest that MILLER ever had any knowledge of Kincora or child sexual exploitation that might have been taking place there.

Part 2

Sir Maurice Oldfield

101. Sir Maurice Oldfield has been the subject of a number of serious allegations. These issues would have been of considerable significance during the inquiries conducted as part of his vetting. We have seen nothing amongst MI5 or MI6 papers to support these allegations.

102. Sir Maurice OLDFIELD was born in 1915. He served in the British Army between 1940 and 1947 and then joined the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). OLDFIELD was appointed Chief of SIS in 1973. He retired from SIS on 31 January 1978, taking up a Visiting Fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford, for the academic year 1978-79. OLDFIELD was appointed by the Northern Ireland Office as Northern Ireland Security Co-ordinator (NISC), based in Belfast, on 2 October 1979.

103. In early 1980, the Cabinet Office became aware of allegations that OLDFIELD might be homosexual. Homosexuality was viewed as a security vulnerability at the time, and consequently in March 1980 the Cabinet Office informed MI5 of the allegations and asked MI5 to review OLDFIELD's Positive Vetting. During the course of this review OLDFIELD admitted that he had engaged in homosexual activity over a number of years and that he had failed to declare this during previous vetting interviews. As a result, MI5 concluded that OLDFIELD was unfit to hold Positive Vetting. OLDFIELD formally left the NISC post in June 1980.

104. Following the vetting review, MI5 undertook a thorough investigation in order to ascertain whether OLDFIELD's homosexuality may have been used to compromise him in a way which damaged national security at any point during his career. This investigation included several exhaustive interviews with OLDFIELD and with various contacts of OLDFIELD. The investigation concluded in February 1981 that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that national security had been compromised, and indeed that OLDFIELD had contributed notably to a number of security and intelligence successes which would not have been achieved had

there been a breach of security. (Several years later, on 23 April 1987, the Prime Minister made a public statement to this effect, following the publication of a book revealing OLDFIELD's homosexuality.)

105. This vetting review and the subsequent investigation had no relation whatsoever to Kincora Boys' Home. No mention of Kincora arose at any point during this process.

106. OLDFIELD died in London on 11 March 1981.

107. In January 1982 (after the above investigation had concluded and after OLDFIELD died) MI5 became aware of allegations by journalists linking OLDFIELD to alleged child abuse at Kincora Boys' Home. The relevant media reports did not provide any basis for the allegations.

108. MI5 and the Cabinet Office concluded that the allegations were inherently unlikely because SIS records indicated that OLDFIELD had never travelled to Northern Ireland during his time at SIS (i.e. before October 1979) and because OLDFIELD was accompanied at all times by a police protection officer during his trips as NISC and would not have been left alone for any appreciable time.

109. In March 1982, MI5 became aware of an allegation in an Irish newspaper that OLDFIELD had conducted an investigation into allegations of child abuse at Kincora but had decided to take no further action. Again, no basis was provided for this allegation. MI5 concluded that this was undoubtedly incorrect.

110. In February 1983, SIS was informed that a former SIS officer had claimed to an associate that the reason for the termination of OLDFIELD's position as NISC was that there was evidence of OLDFIELD having engaged in homosexual activity with children during his time in Northern Ireland. This former officer had retired from SIS in the early 1970s and had no current access to SIS or Cabinet Office information. Furthermore, the specific claim was known to be false: MI5 recommended that OLDFIELD's Positive Vetting be revoked due to his homosexuality.

111. MI5 and the Cabinet Office concluded that the allegations linking OLDFIELD to Kincora were entirely unsubstantiated.

Sir Howard Smith

112. In its research for the purposes of this Inquiry, the Security Service has been unable to find any evidence that Sir Howard Smith was aware of or involved in abuse at the Kincora Boys' Home. In March 1982 MI5 became aware of an allegation in an

Irish newspaper article that a 'cover up' had taken place in relation to Kincora in order to protect a described but unnamed senior British intelligence official. No basis for the allegation was provided. Reference is made in an internal MI5 document to the possibility that the unnamed individual might be Sir Howard Smith, former Director General of MI5. MI5 did not definitively identify whether they were one and the same.

Part 3

Colin WALLACE – allegations by

113. Colin WALLACE has made many allegations about Kincora. We do not propose to address them in detail in this Witness Statement. We have seen nothing during the extensive searches of MI5's records to indicate that WALLACE had any involvement with or knowledge of any MI5 operation in Northern Ireland or elsewhere.

114. We are satisfied that at no time did WALLACE have any formal relationship with MI5 or its staff. We cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that he may have encountered members of MI5 in their cover roles, on social occasions, for example.

115. The HIA Inquiry has been provided with a copy of the December 1989 Rucker Report on the WALLACE Case and its supplementary of March 1990. The Rucker Report includes MI5's responses to the wide-ranging issues raised by WALLACE.

9004 Personal Details

116. I am a Deputy Director of MI5. I have been a member of MI5 for 24 years, and have spent the majority of my career in investigative and agent running roles concerned with counter-terrorism. I worked as a London-based desk officer for Northern Irish-related terrorism investigations between 1994 and 1997, before moving into an agent running role concerned with international counter-terrorism. Following the July 2005 bombings I worked in international counter-terrorism roles until 2013. Since late 2014 I have been posted to the Service's Northern Ireland HQ in Palace Barracks as the officer in charge of MI5's Northern Irish-related counter-terrorist investigations and assessments work.

117. I have signed this statement with the personal identification number 9004. This is a unique number issued to me by MI5 for the purposes of identifying myself without disclosing my full identity. This is a necessary practice for security reasons, and the only publicly named individual within MI5 is the Director General. Records held by MI5 link my true identity to my personal identification number.

Some Background on MI5 in Northern Ireland

118. Since 2007, MI5 has had lead responsibility for counter-terrorist intelligence work in Northern Ireland, in close co-operation with PSNI. However, during the 1970s MI5's presence was much smaller. MI5 had a single liaison officer attached to the RUC in 1969. Following the imposition of Direct Rule in 1972 the post of 'Director and Coordinator of Intelligence' (DCI) was created within the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) at Stormont. Whilst the first incumbent of the DCI post was not from MI5, every subsequent post-holder was seconded from MI5 to the NIO. DCIs never directed intelligence operations in Northern Ireland, but acted as the Secretary of State's main advisor on intelligence matters, and sought to provide strategic coordination of the intelligence effort. DCI also established an analytical staff comprised of seconded MI5 personnel who were responsible for the production of strategic intelligence summaries and assessments.

119. DCI also had senior liaison officers at RUC HQ and Army HQ Lisburn. This latter post was known as the Assistant Secretary (Political), or ASP. In the early 1970s, one of the functions of the ASP post was to provide some guidance for the Army's nascent efforts in gathering intelligence from human sources in a civil conflict. This was prior to the establishment of the Forces Research Unit (FRU) in 1982, after which the ASP role became less hands on and more advisory in nature.

120. Another related unit set up in 1972, although not under the direct control of DCI, was the Irish Joint Section comprising a small number of Security Service and SIS agent running officers focused on obtaining strategic and political intelligence about the plans and intentions of paramilitary organisations.

Annex A - Disclosure process

1. The preparation of this witness statement follows a painstaking disclosure process conducted by MI5 the detail of which is set out below.

2. In November 2014 MI5 received a letter from Sir Jonathan Stephens containing a list of search terms provided by the Historical and Institutional Abuse Inquiry (HIAI). Those search terms were:

Bawnmore	Palmerstone
Bernados	Rathgael
Ravelstone Parade	Raymond Semple
"Boys Home" and abuse	Rubane
Brian Gemmell	TARA
"Child abuse" and "Northern Ireland" Valetta	
Colin Wallace	William McGrath
Hughes inquiry	Williamson House
Institutional abuse	William McGrath
DL 509	Williamson House
Joseph Mains	Manor House, Lisburn
Richard Kerr	Roy Garland
Kincora	James Miller
Mike Taylor	John McKeague

3. In addition, and with the agreement of the HIAI, MI5 conducted further targeted searches for information known to be of potential relevance. The product from these searches has been provided in a file list separately to the HIAI.

4. I confirm that to the best of my knowledge and belief that the file list is an accurate record of the documents revealed to the HIAI. I cannot provide further detail of the content of the files in this statement because of the damage that disclosure would cause to MI5's ability to protect the public from threats to national security.

5. The searches outlined at paragraphs 2 and 3 above produced many thousands of documents. The detail of these results has been supplied separately to the Inquiry and is not part of this statement as disclosure of the information would damage MI5's ability to protect the public from threats to national security. MI5 agreed with the HIAI that the HIAI would review the documents for relevance prior to their disclosure to the HIAI. The HIAI conducted this task and identified documents of relevance to its Inquiry.

6. MI5 then reviewed the documents identified to it as relevant and considered whether they contained information which, if disclosed, would damage the MI5's ability to protect the public from threats to national security. MI5 then removed from the documents information assessed to be damaging to national security.

7. The documents identified as being relevant are attached to this witness statement.

8. I am satisfied that the disclosure exercise conducted by experienced MI5 disclosure officers, researchers and lawyers has been conducted thoroughly, and to the best of my knowledge and belief all potentially relevant information was provided

to the inquiry for the purpose of the review it conducted which is described at paragraph 4.

E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

B - PROTECTION OF
IDENTITY

Plone been told by the TARA C.O. Mcgrath had been accused of assaulting small boys and that he could not account for any cash that had been handed to him over a period of twelve months.

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION**E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION****E - FILE REFERENCE****NOTE FOR FILE**

I saw Capt Gemmel on the morning of 9 June in connection with his contacts with **B - CODEWORD**. Gemmel will be sending us a complete report! From what he told me I concluded that we could be running into troubled waters. **B - CODEWORD** while giving little if any real account away on his side is now beginning to ask Gemmel awkward questions. Moreover it is clear that there is a deal of gossip about Army contacts going on within Loyalist circles, **F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS** I told Gemmel that he should try to get the contact gradually on to a purely social basis and when he could decently do so - to back off altogether. He expressed himself as being relieved **F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS**

E - SIGNATURE

I D Cameron

9 June 1975

RESTRICTED

McG introduced to McG when he was approx 15 (20 years ago) McG at the time Christian/Political crusader. Held meetings at McG's residence with C.S. UDR Captain N. Proposed they should form a group as these youngsters all had makings of becoming P.M.s etc. They first formed groups called "cell" however McG thought this sounded rather [redacted] they decided on TARA (this was about 1965-68).

They held meetings between themselves and McG would single them out after meetings. McG attempted to seduce them by claiming to show them emotional freedom. To this end he made them feel guilty by admitting to masturbation, therefore knowing up their guilt complex. This is important to emphasise as it is the very beginning of McG's hold on them.

Farland Smith & [redacted] UDR Captain N members of Young Unionist (YU). At one (YU) meeting addressed by McG, attended by McIlroy merchant banker gave card to R.G. 'INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION'. R.G. believes McIlroy helps TARA with finance.

Also with finance Clarence Hogg, Capt Hogg (UDR) TARA one time treasurer arranged finance for printing machine. Current involvement of McIlroy & Hogg not known.

McG suggested to C.S., R.G., [redacted] UDR Captain N, that they should join LOs. R.G. joined Irish Heritage Lodge & became master (it had very few members). The idea was to put motions to the various lodges which would gain momentum when they reached the Grand Lodge. One such motion put by R.G., framed by McG, was that Ulster should prepare a provisional Govt now "IRISH" hour to lodge.

Idea that TARA when it was first formed (early 70) was an elite, is laughable according to R.G. who claims to have been 2IC to McG. Recruits were accepted by personal recommendation, there was no vetting as such. Wpn training etc was talked about, but, R.G. never saw any weapons. Many people became disillusioned after joining either with McG's disreputable reputation, or with all the talk and no action. The Christian overtones did not go down well with % of recruits.

Thomas Clark (FRANK) is supposed to have carried out surveillance on McG for several months and concluded that he is a communist.

Amongst persons attended early meetings of TARA R.G. mentioned elderly man named Dickworth, presumably John Dilworth.

Frank Pootsie Millar is amongst persons currently involved with TARA and is reported as being engaged to McG's daughter. (Pootsie Millar)

Orthington McG is still on TARA scene and is now also Sec ? of Irish Heritage Lodge. About MacFarland, Monkstown previously of Premier Dve is currently an official in TARA. He is thought to have been given info regarding IRA/PIRA from SF at a meeting in Russell Court early this year. He is thought to own a business on the N'Ards Rd, and was an associate of J.W. McKeague.

R.G. claims that McG was responsible for spreading rumours of J.D. McKeague's homosexual activities, having posters posted around Belfast "NICE BOY McKeague". According to R.G., R.G. knows that McG was responsible for this.

R.G. believes that current aims of TARA will have moderated, as CS is close to McG also David Brown, but nevertheless, their basic aim remains to keep RCs down by force if necessary.

R.G. believes that although I.P. knows of McG's nefarious activities he would be better to take no action because the expose would also effect CS therefore doing DUP no good. He further believes that McG has knowledge of Paisley's involvement with the UVF in early 70.

The present para militaries still regard TARA with degree of respect as they still have members like CS whose standing in society makes them privy to such info which would not normally reach the para mills.

IO of TARA CS seeks info on various aspects of mil Int i.e. Southern Irish Army. The [redacted] found on Bateston & Simpson were destined for CS. Among names & tel Nos listed on [redacted]

E - CLASSIFICATION

Note to file 3350/18 Vol II

14 October 1976

TARAHISTORY

1. TARA first came to notice in 1964 as a ginger group, within the Orange Order, who campaigned for greater political action against Republicanism. A base for the organisation was established in 1969 when a room in Clifton St Orange Hall, Belfast, was obtained. This was ostensibly for meetings of an "Orange Discussion Group" but was in reality to organise and train TARA members. When the organisation was first set up it had support from the County Grand Lodge of Belfast and the Grand Orange Loyal Institution.
2. The organisation was formed out of a small but militant fundamentalist Protestant movement devoted to political and religious opposition to Roman Catholicism. Its members argue the ascendancy of the Protestant faith over Catholicism and claim it to be the national religion.
3. It first came to recent public notice in Jan 1972 with the issue to the press of an unsigned proclamation of intent. It was about this time that William McGRATH formed TARA on its present day lines. The choice of name is strange as it is the name of a seat of ancient kings of Ireland, but it does symbolise the belief of TARA members that the whole of Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom - under a Protestant leadership.

MEMBERS OF TARA

4. Sources indicate that the TARA membership is small, possibly 300 Province wide and about 70 activists in Belfast. There is evidence that a number of the members are sexually deviant; William McGRATH the past OC almost certainly is bisexual and there were homosexuals in his immediate circle of TARA associates. The organisation has always relied on tight security and information regarding its members was closely guarded. Some members have been identified and it is believed that the organisation has members and contacts in positions of influence throughout the Province in local politics, the Orange Order and commercial life. A number of members are known to be in the TAVR, RUCR and UDR.
5. One ex-member of TARA, [REDACTED] B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY claimed that membership had been falling drastically and the organisation went public to create a myth about their size. (In 1973 a split had occurred within TARA and a lot of members who were opposed to the low-key profile left and joined the UVF). A senior member of TARA, [REDACTED] B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY recently claimed that although not a large organisation, it was able to operate through "pulling strings". This is believed to be factual.
6. In 1975 it was reported that many of the older members of the UDA were anxious to join TARA. Some had been in TARA prior to the formation of the UDA but left to join the new organisation. They later considered TARA to be the more respectable of the two organisations, with a much stricter vetting procedure than the UDA and stronger ties with the Orange Order.

CONDITIONS OF ENTRY

7. Conditions for entry to TARA includes:
 - A. Applicants must have no criminal record.
 - B. They must be members of the Orange Order.
 - C. They must be proposed by someone who is already a member. Applicants are carefully vetted and the time lapse between application and acceptance can be up to six months while the applicants background is negotiated.

E - CLASSIFICATION

Restrictive/Privacy Markers (if any)

From E - STAFF DESIGNATION

No. E-DOC REFERENCE Date 19 October 1976

Date received

21 Oct 76

E - FILE REFERENCE

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

Action taken

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

Addressed to

Copied to

References -

No. of enclosures 5

Subject

TARA

E-STAFF DES

1. We attach copies of papers handed to [redacted] by GEMMEL on 15 October, which he obtained from his Army files. He made the following comments on these papers:-

- a. TARA - Not to File 3350/18 Vol II - This paper was written by GEMMEL and is based on the contents of his file on TARA.
- b. Notes on interview with Roy GARLAND. These were made by GEMMEL and an NCO after a "one off" debrief sanctioned by Ian CAMERON.
- c. Proclamation - GEMMEL believes that [redacted] may have had a hand in the drafting of this (and we would agree).

B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

2. These papers provide useful material [redacted]

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

V

FOLLOWING RECEIVED VIA DEPARTMENTAL CHANNELS

FROM [E - SECTION REFERENCE]

DATED 2.7.82 RECEIVED 5.7.82

PRIORITY

E - CLASSIFICATION

NUMBER: [E - DOC REF]

FOR: DIRECTOR [E - SECTION REF]

FILE REF: [E - FILE REFERENCE]

BT

TO: SNUFFBOX [E - ADDRESS] PRIORITY
RP [E - ADDRESS] PRIORITY
RP [E - ADDRESS] PRIORITY BY DIRECT

INFO: [E - STAFF DESIGNATION]

E - CLASSIFICATION

IN SNUFFBOX FOR DIRECTOR [E - SECTION N REF] AND [E - SECTION REF] DISTRIBUTION FROM A/DCI

TITLE: RUC INVESTIGATIONS INTO KINCORA [E - ADMIN ANNOTATION]

REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM ADDSD [E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE] OF 01.07.82.

1. [E - STAFF DESIGNATION] AND I SAW HSB THIS MORNING, WE WERE JOINED AFTER A WHILE BY DCI REP KNOCK.

2. [E - STAFF DESIGNATION] DECLARED [B - SOURCE PROTECTION] (HE WILL REPORT THIS IN MORE DETAIL SEPARATELY) AND WE TOLD HSB ABOUT GEMMEL. INITIALLY WE AVOIDED MENTION OF HIS [E - SECTION REF] WORK BUT WE WERE OBLIGED TO TELL HSB OF THIS EVENTUALLY.

3. HSB TOOK A MOST HELPFUL LINE. HE SAID CASKEY WAS SELECTED FOR THE JOB OF HEADING THE FOLLOW-UP ENQUIRY INTO ANY OUTSTANDING CRIMINAL MATTERS CONNECTED WITH KINCORA BECAUSE OF HIS ABILITY AND HIS DISCRETION. HSB HAD ALREADY FOUND HIM HELPFUL IN CERTAIN MATTERS BUT DOES NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE HIM AS HE IS NOT IN HIS BRANCH (THOUGH AT THE MOMENT HSB IS ACTING HEAD OF CID IN WHITESIDE'S ABSENCE ON LEAVE - IN AN ASIDE HSB SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS CONFIDENT OF CASKEY'S CO-OPERATION HE WOULD NOT WISH TO PUT WHITESIDE INTO THE PICTURE). THE ENQUIRY IS BEING OVERSEEN BY SIR GEORGE TERRY (WHO IS ALSO DIRECTING THE ENQUIRY INTO ANY RUC FAILURES OVER KINCORA). (IT IS WORTH RECORDING THAT COLIN SMITH, FORMERLY /OF SUSSEX

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

PAGE TWO

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - SECTION REFERENCE

OF SUSSEX AND NOW A DAC IN THE MET WHO WAS IN BELFAST EARLIER THIS YEAR ON THE SECOND ENQUIRY IS A PERSONAL FRIEND OF DCI REP KNOCK.)

4. HSB SAID THERE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE A PUBLIC ENQUIRY NEXT YEAR AND CASKEY'S REPORT WHICH SHOULD BE READY BY THE END OF JULY WOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR THIS ENQUIRY AND MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED PARTIES. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT CASKEY'S REPORT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE THINGS WHICH CONCERN US. THE ONE PROBLEM IS GEMMEL WHO MIGHT INSIST ON BEING UNNECESSARILY FRANK IN HIS WRITTEN STATEMENT. HSB CONSULTED DCC THERE AND THEN AND SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ERASE THESE REFERENCES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY HARMED NATIONAL SECURITY.

5. IT WAS DECIDED THAT PROVIDED DCI AND DIRECTOR ^{E - SECTION DES} AGREED ^{E - STAFF DESIGNATION} ^{E - STAFF DESIGNATION} DCI REP KNOCK AND I SHOULD SEE CASKEY THAT SAME AFTERNOON.

6. THIS AGREEMENT WAS OBTAINED AND WE MET CASKEY IN HSB'S OFFICE. HE WAS SENSIBLE AND CO-OPERATIVE. HE WILL INTERVIEW GEMMEL HIMSELF AND ENDEAVOUR TO KEEP EXTRANEIOUS MATTERS OUT OF THE STATEMENT. HE WILL KEEP HSB INFORMED AND WE WILL ALL CONSULT AGAIN AFTER THIS INTERVIEW. MEANWHILE, ASP WILL TELL CLF THAT ^{MOD OFFICER L} CAN GIVE CASKEY GEMMEL'S ADDRESS BUT THE OTHER QUESTIONS WILL NOT BE PURSUED FOR THE MOMENT.

7. IT APPEARS THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP CASKEY'S REPORT 'CLEAN' BUT THE PROBLEM WILL BE THE PUBLIC ENQUIRY - IF THAT IS WHAT IS DECIDED (CASKEY DOES NOT THINK THIS NECESSARY AS THERE IS NOTHING MUCH TO BE REVEALED BUT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE MAY REQUIRE IT).

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

PAGE THREE

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - SECTION REFERENCE

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

8. WE WERE OBLIGED IN CONVERSATION TO SAY RATHER MORE TO CASKEY ABOUT GEMMEL THEN WE HAD INTENDED AND HE KNOWS OF HIS ACTIVITIES AND HIS APPLICATION TO THE SERVICE. WE DID NOT MENTION BUT REFERRED TO SECURITY SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. WE WERE ALL IMPRESSED BY CASKEY WHO IN TURN ABVIOUSLY RESPECTED HSB. WITHOUT BENDING ANY RULES CASKEY WILL DO WHAT HSB WANTS. WE EMPHASISED THAT OUR SOLE CONCERN WAS TO ENSURE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS DID NOT RECEIVE AN AIRING IN PUBLIC.

9. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

BT

07 /

E - SECTION REFERENCE

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

E - TRANSMISSION METHOD

FROM [E - SECTION REFERENCE]

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

DATED AND RECEIVED 19/20.7.82

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IMMEDIATE DESKBY 200800

E - SIGNATURE

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FOR DIR [E - SECTION REF] AND [E - SECTION REF]

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TO SNUFFBOX [E - DOC REF] IMMEDIATE DESK BY 0800

E - ADDRESSEES

E - ADDRESSEES

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

FILE:

E - CLASSIFICATION

IN SNUFFBOX FOR DIRECTOR [E - SECTION REFERENCE]
IN [E - SECTION REF] FOR A/DCI AND DCI REP KNOCK
FM [E - SECTION REFERENCE]
RUC INVESTIGATION INTO KINCORA

1. SIB/[MOD OFFICER L] VISITED [E - STAFF DESIGNATION] ON 19 JULY. HE REPORTED IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE AND RUC/SUPT CASKEY INTERVIEWED (AND TOOK A STATEMENT FROM) GEMMEL ON 16 JULY. [MOD OFFICER L] HAD PREVIOUSLY SET THIS MEETING UP BY TELEPHONE. DURING THEIR CONVERSATION HE HAD ADVISED GEMMEL THAT HE SHOULD RESTRICT HIS COMMENTS/ANSWERS TO CASKEY'S CURRENT INVESTIGATION. HE HAD ALSO ADDED THAT QUOTE [B - SOURCE PROTECTION] WAS STILL OF USE UNQUOTE THUS INFERRING IT WAS A SUBJECT BEST AVOIDED.

2. AT THE START OF THE INTERVIEW CASKEY HAD EXPLAINED TO GEMMEL THAT HE WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN GEMMEL'S INTERVIEW WITH ROY GARLAND IN 1975, WHAT HE HAD LEARNED AND WHAT HE DID WITH THIS INFORMATION.

/3...

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

3. GEMMEL EXPLAINED THAT AS OC 123 INT SECT HQ 39 BDE HE HAD CARRE OUT NUMEROUS INTERVIEWS IN 1975 WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE MEMBERS OF VARIOUS LOYALIST GROUPS IN BELFAST. ONE ORGANISATION OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST HAD BEEN TARA. HE HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS BY CPL [REDACTED] MOD OFFICER O INT CORPS WHO WAS A MEMBER OF HIS INT SECT. THROUGH HIS OWN QUOTE EVANGELICAL CONTACTS IN BELFAST UNQUOTE GEMMEL HAD INTERVIEWED TWO PROMINENT LOYALISTS: FIRST W J MCCORMICK AND THEN THROUGH HIM, ROY GARLAND (NOTE BOTH OF THESE MEN HAVE RECENTLY GIVEN STATEMENTS TO CASKEY AND CONFIRMED THAT THESE INTERVIEWS TOOK PLACE.) GARLAND HAD TOLD GEMMEL THE FOLLOWING:

A. THAT WILLIAM MCGRATH WAS AN EVIL MAN, A SEXUAL DEVIANT WHO UNDOUBTEDLY CORRUPTED THE BOYS IN HIS CARE.

B. MCGRATH OWED GARLAND £2000.

C. GARLAND HAD MARRIED IN APPROX 1974 AND HIS PREVIOUS HOMOSEXUAL EXPERIENCES AS A JUVENILE WITH MCGRATH WERE CAUSING HIM EMBARRASSMENT GEMMEL COULD NOT ELABORATE ON THIS.

4. GEMMEL SAID THAT HE SAW GARLAND ON TWO OCCASIONS ALTHOUGH IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT CPL [REDACTED] MOD OFFICER O MIGHT HAVE SEEN HIM ONCE MORE.

5. FOLLOWING HIS INTERVIEW WITH GARLAND, GEMMEL HAD PRODUCED A FOUR PAGE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOURCE REPORT (MISR) WHICH HAD A RESTRICTED CIRCULATION OF 3 COPIES. HE WAS SURE THAT ONE COPY HAD GONE TO ASP (IAN CAMERON).

76...

PAGE THREE
E - DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

E - CLASSIFICATION

6.
B - Source
Protection

MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] CONFIRMED THAT NO REPEAT NO MENTION WAS MADE OF DURING THE INTERVIEW WITH GEMMEL.

7. MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT THROUGHOUT THE INTERVIEW GEMMEL HAD APPEARED RELAXED AND CO-OPERATIVE. HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO WIDEN THE DISCUSSION BUT REMAINED CONTENT TO CONFINE HIS ANSWERS TO CASKEY'S QUESTIONS WHICH WERE CENTRED ON GARLAND. AFTER THE INTERVIEW CASKEY TOLD MOD OFFICER L [REDACTED] THAT HIS NEXT STEP WAS TO TRACE AND INTERVIEW IAN CAMERON AND CPL MOD OFFICER O [REDACTED] (NOW SSGT MOD OFFICER O [REDACTED]). CASKEY SAID THAT BEFORE DOING THIS HE PROPOSED DISCUSSING THE MATTER AT HQ RUC (MOD OFFICER O [REDACTED] HAS CONFIRMED THAT HE SAW CASKEY WITH H/SB ON THE MORNING OF 19 JULY). HE ALSO WISHED TO FIND THE MISR PRODUCED FROM THE GARLAND INTERVIEW AND WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN ON IT.

8. GEMMEL'S INTERVIEW WITH MCCORMICK ON 25 MARCH 1975 (WHICH INCLUDES A REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO APPROACH GARLAND) IS FILED ON [REDACTED] B - CODEWORD
FF. RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST MOD OFFICER D [REDACTED] WROTE A NOTE FOR FILE RECORDING THAT GEMMEL AND MOD OFFICER O [REDACTED] WERE TOLD ON 4 APRIL 1975 BY ASP AND MOD OFFICER DES [REDACTED] THAT QUOTE IT WAS IN ORDER FOR GARLAND TO BE INTERVIEWED ON THE STRICT UNDERSTANDING THAT THE OVERT AND CLEARLY EXPRESSED REASON WAS A REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION ON TARA. IT WAS EMPHASISED THAT THE ARMY HAD NO INTEREST IN INVESTIGATION OF DEVIANT SEXUAL ACTIVITIES OR RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE GROUP WHICH WAS SOLELY THE FUNCTION OF A SPECIALIST SECTION OF THE RUC. THEREFORE THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD BE STEERED AWAY FROM THIS TYPE OF ISSUE. ANYTHING GARLAND MIGHT SAY ABOUT PERSONALITIES INVOLVING PARTICULARLY [REDACTED] B - CODEWORD
B - CODEWORD . . .

PAGE FOUR

E - CLASSIFICATION

PAGE FOUR

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - DOCUMENT
REFERENCE

B - CODEWORD

WOULD BE OF INTEREST UNQUOTE. THE GARLAND TRAILS ENDS THERE. WE HAVE NO OTHER PAPERS ON HIM NOR DO WE (OR [E - SECTION REF] KNOW WHERE THE MISR WAS FILED. THE ARMY ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THIS DOCUMENT

9. WE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED ^{CASKEY} [E - SPELLING ERROR] /SSGT [MOD OFFICER O] INTERVIEW WITH ACOS G2 ([B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY]). ALTHOUGH [MOD OFFICER O] IS AWARE OF THE [E - SOURCE PROTECTION] CASE ACOS FELT THAT OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE BEST SERVED BY NOT SPEAKING TO HIM PRIVATELY BEFOREHAND. HE ASSESSED CASKEY AND [MOD OFFICER L] TO BE WELL AWARE OF OUR INTERESTS IN THIS MATTER AND THOUGHT IT BEST TO LET MATTERS TAKE THEIR COURSE.

10. HSB HAS ASKED ADCI, DCI REP KNOCK AND [E - STAFF DESIGNATION] TO DISCUSS THE STATE OF PLAY AT 1000 20 JULY. [E - STAFF DESIGNATION] WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO ATTEND:-


E - STAFF
DESIGNATION

WILL THEREFORE REPRESENT HIS INTERESTS.


BT

E - SECTION REFERENCE

E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION



E - ADMIN ANNOTATION



CC: E - FILE REFERENCE
E - STAFF DES

CHANNEL: DEPARTMENTAL

DATE: 23.7.82.

FROM: E - STAFF DES
E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

TO: DCI, E - ADDRESS IMMEDIATE
INFO: DIR, E - ADDRESS IMMEDIATE
INFO: E - ADDRESS ROUTINE

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

BT

1. REFERENCE YOUR E - DOC REF OF 20.7.82.

2. WE WERE FORTUNATE IN BEING ABLE TO CONTACT IAN CAMERON. HE WAS ABOUT TO GO ABROAD ON BUSINESS UNTIL THE END OF AUGUST. HIS MOVEMENTS THEREAFTER ARE UNDECIDED. B - SOURCE PROTECTION
B - SOURCE PROTECTION



3. WE SUGGEST THAT YOU INFORM CASKEY IN CONFIDENCE THAT CAMERON A. RECALLS BEING AWARE OF ALLEGATIONS OF MCGRATH'S HOMOSEXUALITY, BUT NOT THAT CHILDREN WERE INVOLVED, B. STATES THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE PASSED VAGUE SECOND OR THIRD HAND HEARSAY ALLEGATIONS OF THIS NATURE AND FOR WHICH HE HAD NO RESPONSIBILITY TO RUC. HE CANNOT RECALL TELLING GEMMEL TO BREAK OFF CONTACT IN THIS CASE, BUT ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO RECOLLECTION OF THE MATTER THINKS IT LIKELY THAT HE WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED HIM NOT TO PURSUE THIS PARTICULAR LINE OF ENQUIRY, C. CANNOT RECALL THE MISR IN QUESTION BUT WOULD NOT HAVE, AND DID NOT, DESTROY ANY MISR'S.

4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK CASEY IF HE WOULD CONSULT FURTHER ONCE HE DECIDES WHAT USE HE WISHES TO MAKE OF THIS INFORMATION.

BT


E - SECTION REFERENCE

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION



E - TRANSMISSION METHOD

FROM STORMONT
DATED AND RECEIVED 5.8.82
IMMEDIATE



E - CLASSIFICATION

E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE

FOR LA AND **E - STAFF DES**

BT

TO SNUFFBOX **E - ADDRESS** IMMEDIATE
RP **E - ADDRESS** IMMEDIATE
RP **E - ADDRESS** IMMEDIATE

IN SNUFFBOX **E - STAFF DES** FOR LA AND **B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY**
IN HQNI FOR **B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY**
IN RUC HQ KNOCK PERSONAL FOR **D - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY**
FROM **D - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY**

KINCORA AND CAMERON

REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM ADDSD **E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE** OF 23 JULY 1982.

E - TRANSMISSION METHOD

1. FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSION ON 26 JULY I GAVE YOUR VIEWS TO HSB WHO SAID HE WOULD HAVE A WORD WITH CASKEY AND THEN ASK ME TO REPEAT PARAGRAPH THREE OF YOUR TUR TO CASKEY.

2. I HEARD NO MORE UNTIL 4 AUGUST WHEN CASKEY PHONED FROM DHSB'S OFFICE. HSB WAS AWAY FOR THE DAY AND CASKEY WAS TO START LEAVE ON 5TH. I ESTABLISHED THAT HSB HAD NOT SPOKEN TO CASKEY SO I WENT OVER TO KNOCK, EXPLAINED THE PROBLEM TO DHSB (WHO SAW THE DIFFICULTY) AND HE CALLED IN CASKEY TO WHOM I EXPLAINED YOUR PRINCIPLE - THAT NO SERVING OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE SECURITY SERVICE SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED BY THE POLICE. I THEN GAVE HIM CAMERON'S RECOLLECTIONS AS IN PARA. 3 OF YOUR TUR.



3. CASKEY MADE A NUMBER OF POINTS:

A. ONE OF THE ASPECTS OF THE ENQUIRY THAT HE IS PURSUING IS THAT 'MILITARY INTELLIGENCE' WAS AWARE THAT MCGRATH WAS COMMITTING CRIMINAL OFFENCES BUT THEY CONCEALED THIS OR DID NOT REPORT IT FOR THEIR OWN REASONS: THIS, IF TRUE WAS A CRIMINAL OFFENCE. GARLAND HAS ALLEGED THIS AND WALLACE HAS HINTED AT IT TO CASKEY SEMI COLON

/ B.



PAGE TWO

STORMONT

E - SECTION
REFERENCE

E - CLASSIFICATION

B. WALLACE HOWEVER HAS NOT YET GIVEN A STATEMENT. ALTHOUGH GRANTED LIMITED IMMUNITY BY DPP HE WANTS MOD TO ABSOLVE HIM FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER OSA. (HE ALSO SAYS THAT WITHOUT RETURNING TO LISBURN TO EXAMINE THE RECORDS (WHICH HE THINKS WOULD TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS) HE CAN'T BE MUCH HELP EXCLAMATION MARK CASKEY FORESEES DIFFICULTIES FOR MOD AND NIO) SEMI COLON

C. ACC WHITESIDE HAS AGREED THAT ALL ASPECTS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THAT CASKEY HAS TOUCHED ON IN HIS ENQUIRY (GEMMELL, WALLACE, CAMERON ETC) WILL BE IN A SEPARATE SECRET REPORT TO DPP SEMI COLON

D. CAMERONS RECOLLECTIONS TIE IN WITH WHAT GEMMEL SAID:

E. GEMMELL MADE IT CLEAR TO CASKEY THAT DID NOT PROPOSE TO SHOULDER THE BLAME FOR HIS PART IN THIS AFFAIR. HE STATED CLEARLY THAT CAMERON ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION ON GEMMELL'S REPORT SO IF AT ANY PUBLIC ENQUIRY CAMERON DOES NOT APPEAR GEMMELL COULD EMBARRASS US. SEMI COLON

F. CAMERON COULD BE SUBPOENA'D TO APPEAR AT A PUBLIC ENQUIRY SEMI COLON

G. CASKEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET LA, EXPLAIN TO HIM WHAT QUESTIONS HE WANTED CAMERON TO ANSWER AND THEN RECEIVE A WRITTEN STATEMENT DRAWN UP BY LA AND CAMERON. CASKEY RETURNS FROM LEAVE ON 23 AUGUST AND WOULD LIKE TO MEET LA SOON AFTERWARDS IF THIS IDEA IS ACCEPTED

/ H.

PAGE THREE

STORMONT [E - SECTION REFERENCE] [E - CLASSIFICATION]

H. CASKEY MADE THE OBVIOUS POINT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE HONEST WITH DPP. IF HE KNOWS THE FULL STORY HE MIGHT AGREE TO OMIT ALL REFERENCES TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ON THE PUBLIC ENQUIRY IF THEY SEEMED IRRELEVANT, OR ARRANGE FOR THAT PART OF THE PUBLIC ENQUIRY TO BE 'IN CAMERA' OR ARRANGE FOR THE DOCUMENTS TO BE SEEN ONLY BY THE CHAIRMAN SEMI COLON

4. CASKEY WAS PLEASANT AND UNDERSTANDING THROUGHOUT, BUT HE DID MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD TO HAVE A STATEMENT FROM CAMERON TO COMPLETE HIS ENQUIRY. DCI AND I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE TO HIS PROPOSAL IN 3G ABOVE WHICH SEEMS A SENSIBLE COMPROMISE. DHSB ([E - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY] - EX CID AND A FRIEND OF CASKEY) WAS PARTICULARLY HELPFUL AND SENSIBLE. GRS 700

11

BT

[E - SECTION REFERENCE]

[E - ADMIN ANNOTATION]

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION

NOTE FOR FILE

E - FILE REFERENCE

*Copied to: J. D. ... Attorney
General's Chambers. 5.2.80*

At a meeting with the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland (at which Mr Steel, the Acting Legal Secretary, was also present), I referred to the police investigations into Kincorra House. I had previously informed the Attorney General of my intention to do so and had given him a brief description of developments.

2. I said that SIB (acting in conjunction or on behalf of the RUC) had taken a statement from a former Army intelligence officer to the effect that one of his agents reporting on a different subject (TARA) had reported on his behalf that McGRATH of Kincorra House was engaged in homosexual activities. He said that he had made a report about this to Ian Cameron, a member of the Security Service on secondment to HQNI, who had told him to take no further action. I said that the RUC had wished to interview Cameron who of course required authority to make any disclosures which might involve his work. We had seen Cameron who had confirmed that, although he no longer remembered the details, he had received such a report from the Army officer and would have told him that he should cease collecting information of this sort upon the ground that it was not his business. We had asked Cameron whether he had made any report to the RUC and he had said that he would not have done so as neither he nor the Army officer had any direct information on the subject and had no means of knowing whether it was true. I said that this had been reported to the RUC but we had been unwilling to allow Cameron to make a formal statement. He had no personal knowledge which was relevant to any alleged offence and it also appeared that the RUC thought that they were collecting evidence for an enquiry as well as investigating criminal offences. If there were other factors which had not been declared to us, we would of course reconsider the position and equally if there should be a public enquiry we would discuss the handling of any relevant information which we might have (and I thought we had none) with those responsible for setting it up. We were not, however, willing to create statements which did not appear to assist in the criminal investigation and which might touch upon the organisation of intelligence in Northern Ireland - particularly as we had no idea who would have access to the statements or whether their creation might not automatically lead to their disclosure in the event of an enquiry. I said that the Chief Constable had been informed of our position and that I wished the Attorney and the DPP to be aware of it also to facilitate discussions about the handling of any problems of which we were unaware. The Attorney General commented that any information which Cameron could give would appear to be "hearsay upon hearsay". The DPP, Barry Shaw, said that this problem had not been reported to him and he would ascertain the position.

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - ADMIN
ANNOTATION

E - CLASSIFICATION

- 2 -

3. After a meeting with the Attorney General on 24 September, Jim Nursaw and Henry Steel told me that Barry Shaw had raised the subject again with the Attorney in the interim and appeared to have obtained some sympathy for his attitude. Nursaw said that he had developed an argument that he needed to know whether Cameron had made a report to people in the Northern Ireland Office where there were some suspects. Their failure to take action in that event might be significant. Nursaw said he regarded this as very far fetched and had suggested that the police should set out a clear list of questions to which they wished to have answers. He thought that this advice would be followed. I said that we would consider any such request on its merits but the police would also have to come clean with us about their objectives. If there was a real as opposed to a fanciful problem we would certainly wish to find ways of helping.

E - SIGNATURE

Bernard Shelton

LA
1 October 1982


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Telephone
BELFAST 650222



BROOKLYN
KNOCK ROAD
BELFAST
NORTHERN IRELAND BT9 6L1

11 October 1982



THE KINCORA ENQUIRY - IAN CAMERON, FORMER OFFICER IN THE SECURITY
SERVISE, NOW RETIRED

Further to your conversation last week with the Chief Constable about
this subject I forward herewith a report by the officer conducting the
police investigation into the Kincora Scanda, Superintendent George
Cassidy.

The questions are all relevant and clearly define the area of police
interest. It may be that if Mr Cameron answers certain questions in
a certain way further unscripted questions may have to be asked in
order to clarify some points so raised. I mention this lest there
would be any misunderstanding about unscripted questions being asked.

E - SIGNATURE

J A WHITESIDE
Assistant Chief Constable 'C'

J Bourn Esq
Northern Ireland Office
Stormont House
BELFAST
BT9 3ET

Reference _____

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH MR IAN CAMERON

Assistant Chief Constable 'C'

It is essential to the Kinross Enquiry that Mr Ian Cameron is interviewed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in relation to intelligence concerning Kinross Boys' Hostel allegedly passed to him by Military Intelligence Officers.

I hereby submit a list of questions to be put to Mr Cameron.

It will be necessary in the first instance to ask Mr Cameron to provide such personal details as full name, age, occupation, address or contact address.

Whilst it is intended to adhere to the list of questions now supplied answers to these questions may demand a follow-up question or questions:

- Mr
No
Mr
- Q1 What was your period of service in Northern Ireland? - giving dates
 - Q2 In what capacity were you employed?
 - Q3 Where were you employed?
 - Q4 What did your duties entail?
 - Q5 Do you accept that you were attached to HQMI at Lisburn?
 - Q6 In the course of your duties were you supplied with intelligence by Captain Brian S Gemmill who was the Officer Commanding 12) Intelligence Section 39 Infantry Brigade and later Staff Officer Grade III on the Brigade Headquarters Intelligence Staff?
 - Q7 Mr Gemmill has alleged that on a Saturday morning between December 1974 and December 1976 that he had a meeting with you in your office at BOMI when he passed on information he had obtained from a Mr Roy Garland?
 - Q8 Mr Gemmill has also alleged that at this meeting he passed on to you, intelligence provided by Garland which included information that a William McGrath who headed an organisation named TARA was a homosexual and was employed in a boys' home?

Reference: _____

- Q9 Mr Gemmell has told the police that you reacted very strongly when you were told of the homosexual involvement of various persons in TARA and that you directed him to terminate his enquiries concerning TARA?
- Q10 Mr Gemmell said that you later reversed this decision?
- Q11 Mr Gemmell has alleged that during the meeting that Saturday morning, he believed the conversation was either tape recorded or that your secretary, a female, was taking notes?
- Q12 If the meeting was tape recorded, is the recording available or can you indicate where it might be located?
- Q13 Can you identify the person Mr Gemmell described as a female secretary who took notes during this meeting?
- Q14 Where can this person be located?
- Q15 If notes were taken can you assist with the whereabouts of these notes?
- NB: If Mr Cameron should state that these notes or tape recording are not available having been destroyed or otherwise disposed of it will be necessary to pursue this aspect.
- Q16 Did Mr Gemmell identify to you the boys' home in which William McGrath was employed?
- Q17 Were there allegations that McGrath had committed any homosexual offences?
- Q18 To whom or to what Department did you pass the intelligence concerning homosexuality?
- Q19 If this information was passed to the Northern Ireland Office to your knowledge was such information mis-used by anyone in that Department? This question is being asked of you because allegations have been made by the media that British Civil Servants

employed in the Northern Ireland Office had been part of a homosexual prostitution ring involving boys in care at Kincora Boys' Hostel and other homes run by the Eastern Health and Social Services Board.

Q20 There have been reports circulating amongst journalists that the following people who were civil servants attached to the Northern Ireland Office in mid seventies were believed to have been concerned in homosexual activity and that 3 of them were involved in homosexual offences against children:

Peter Bell
Brian Watkins
Leslie Iurie

and the late Peter England. To your knowledge could any of these persons have had access to any intelligence relating to Kincora or other boys' homes forwarded by you?

Q21 Do you know any of these persons?

Q22 Are you aware of any mis-use of any intelligence regarding homosexuality concerning boys in care in Northern Ireland?

Q23 Did you meet Mr Roy Garland?

Q24 Similar intelligence was provided by Major Halford Macleod an Intelligence Officer attached to 3 Infantry Brigade from October 1974 until July 1976 - did you receive any such intelligence from him?

Q25 If so what action did you take?

Q26 Did you receive any such intelligence from any other source and if so what action did you take?

Q27 Are you aware, either through your own office or through any other source, if such information was passed to the police?

Q28 Had you any contact with an Army Press Officer named John Colin Wallace who was employed at that time at Army HQ Lisburn in the Information Service?

Reference:

- Q29 In a document purported to have been written by Wallace and sent to the Press he alleges that he complained to 3 Senior Army Officers in 1974 that a cover up of the Kinora Vice Ring was preventing the killers of ten year old Brian McDermott from being apprehended. Wallace also alleged that he named 3 people thought to be linked with the vice ring who were suspected of the killing (Brian McDermott was murdered between 2 and 8 September 1973 at Belfast). Do you have any information about or knowledge of the above allegations?
- Q30 Do you have any knowledge or information in your possession that could assist the police in their investigations into what has been described as the Kinora Sex Scandal or the murder of Brian McDermott?



E - SIGNATURE

G CASKEY
D/SUPERINTENDENT
31 October 1982

E - CLASSIFICATION

NOTE FOR FILE

E - FILE REFERENCE

1. Having received a message from Ian Cameron that he was about to go abroad for three weeks and wanted to know whether there were any matters I wished to discuss with him, I spoke to him on Monday 1 November about the questions which the RUC wished to put to him **E-DOC REF**
2. Cameron had no comments on the first five questions apart from pointing out that his duties were covered by formal terms of reference and agreeing that they illustrated the difficulties which I had anticipated. He had the following comments on the remaining questions:-
 - Q6. He agreed that in the course of his duties he received intelligence from Gemmell.
 - Q7. He remembered that on some occasion Gemmell had passed him information, but his **OWN PROTECTION OF IDENTITY** recollection was that it came from **OWN PROTECTION OF IDENTITY**. He accepted that Gemmell was probably right.
 - Q8. He agreed that Gemmell had informed him of an allegation that McGrath was a homosexual but had no recollection of any reference to a boys' home and did not agree that McGrath headed TARA.
 - Q9. He agrees that he would have told Gemmell not to pursue the allegation of homosexuality. He was also clear that the Army should not handle investigations in this field which were designed to procure leads to Paisley.
 - Q10. He does not accept that he reversed his decision but is not sure what the police are getting at.
 - Q11. The conversation was not tape recorded and he has no recollection of a secretary being present.
 - Q12. Not applicable.
 - Q13. If a secretary was present it could have been any one of /number of girls - particularly if the meeting took place on a Saturday.

/ . . .

E - CLASSIFICATION

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- 2 -

- Q14. Not applicable.
- Q15. No. Unless there is something in the files.
- Q16. No recollection of any reference to a boys' home.
- Q17. No recollection of any details and believes that the allegation was merely that McGrath was a homosexual.
- Q18. Believes that this report will have only been seen by his staff, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
- Q19. Has no recollection of the information being passed to any Northern Ireland Office staff apart from those in [REDACTED] in HQNI.
- Q20. Does not know Bell, Imrie or Watkins. Has never heard of the first two but Watkins' name is vaguely familiar. He met Peter England on two or three occasions but does not believe that any of the four could have had access to information provided to him. It was not their business.
- Q21. See Q20.
- Q22. No.
- Q23. No.
- Q24. Remembers Macleod whom he describes as something of a cowboy who needed to be held back. Has no recollection of receiving any information of this sort from him.
- Q25. Not applicable.
- Q26. Only recollects receiving information from Gemmell.
- Q27. Does not believe that information was passed to the police.
- Q28. He had no contact with Wallace either socially or at work.
- Q29. Has no knowledge of anything of the sort.
- Q30. No.

E - SIGNATURE

Bernard Sheldon

LA
3 November 1982**E - CLASSIFICATION**

E - CLASSIFICATION

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

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E - FILE REFERENCE

Ref:

3 November 1982

Jim Nursaw, the Legal Secretary to the Attorney General, spoke to Barry Shaw, the Northern Ireland DPP, last week about the questions which the RUC wished to put to Cameron. He told him that in his view these questions did not properly arise on any investigation. Shaw said he had no knowledge of them and made it plain that he was not behind them. He gave Nursaw to understand that he would not be concerned one way or another whether they were answered. Nursaw did not get an opportunity to speak to Philip Woodfield or Jack Hermon.

2. I have made it plain to Nursaw and to Barry Shaw and the Attorney General that our unwillingness to authorise Cameron to give a statement should not be taken as meaning that we have anything to hide in connexion with homosexual offences or that we wish to be obstructive. We believe that we have nothing to contribute to any criminal investigation and are unwilling to allow statements to be taken from Cameron which will disclose intelligence arrangements to those who have no need to know. We are conscious that once a statement has been taken we will have no control over who has access to it and that its very existence could cause problems if an enquiry is ordered. If an enquiry is ordered, we would of course be in touch with those responsible for arranging evidence for it (this would normally be the Treasury Solicitors) if it was thought that we had some contribution to make. Nursaw has suggested that it might be sensible to explain the position informally to the Chief Constable and to stress that we have no knowledge of criminal offences.

3. By chance Cameron phoned at the end of last week to enquire whether there were any questions I wanted to put to him before he went overseas for another [REDACTED] or so. I spoke to him yesterday and attach for your information his comments on and answers to the RUC questions. I have also sent this to [REDACTED] and have asked them to let me know who was aware of the Gemmell report so that we can assess the issues. In logic the RUC would wish to put similar questions

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

E - CLASSIFICATION

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Ref:

- 2 -

3 November 1982

to all those who were informed of these pieces of accurate gossip.

E - SIGNATURE

Bernard Sheldon

D - MI5 DIRECTOR

DCI

Copied to

D - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

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cc: -LA (file copy)

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- NOTE FOR

E - FILE REFERENCE

I spoke to Sir John Hermon, Chief Constable RUC, on 11 November about the RUC's efforts to obtain a statement from Ian Cameron on Kincora. Initially it was clear that Hermon thought that our objections were bureaucratic but his attitude altered when I deployed the arguments set out in LA's letter of 3 November to DCI and made the point that this line had been cleared with the Attorney General and his Legal Secretary. I also told him that the Attorney General had described the information available to Cameron as "hearsay upon hearsay" and I stressed the fact that it was in no way specific. Hermon then said that it now appeared that we were seriously concerned that the intelligence effort could be impaired if the RUC were to continue down this road. I confirmed this and invited Hermon's attention to the opening questions in the proposed RUC questionnaire and the difficulty Cameron would have dealing with these, now that he was retired, and given his obligations under the OSA.

2. Hermon then said that he was going to the USA on the following morning and would not be back in office until the first full week in December. He would then go into the whole matter again with a view to stopping these enquiries to Cameron. But he said that he did have difficulties. First his primary concern was to ensure that the RUC handled this enquiry in an entirely professional and competent way. The matter was politically controversial and he did not want there to be any apparent failing in the RUC's enquiries which could be used to support charges of a cover-up. In this connexion he said that he had not yet received the report of the Chief Constable of Sussex (George Terry) into the RUC's past enquiries. Secondly, although he anticipated no trouble with Whiteside or Caskie in discontinuing the Cameron sideline, there were other more junior detectives involved whose motives he suspected and who could possibly leak any apparent failure in this area to those with a malicious political axe to grind. It was left that Hermon now understood and sympathised with our position, that he would take the question up again on his return from the States and would almost certainly be in touch with me then.

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NOTE FOR FILE

E - FILE REFERENCE

I called on Sir George TERRY the Chief Constable of Sussex at the County Police Headquarters at Lewes at 12.30 on Thursday 27 January. I had previously warned him that we were getting into difficulties with the RUC about their conduct of the KINGORA enquiries and would value his advice and if possible assistance in resolving these problems. The day after the arrangements had been made I was informed by DCI that WHITESIDE and Supt CASKEY of the RUC were aware of my visit and of its general purpose. They had apparently heard from TERRY's Staff Officer.

2. TERRY had his Staff Officer Det Chief Insp FLENLEY standing by but we agreed that in the first instance I should explain the problem to him so that he could decide whether FLENLEY should join us.

3. I opened the conversation by saying that I would give TERRY all the facts lying behind the difficulties which were known to me and would inform him of all the steps which we had taken in an attempt to resolve matters. I said that in doing so I was conscious that things might look different if seen through the eyes of WHITESIDE and CASKEY who were responsible for the investigations and that I would not attempt to influence TERRY's own view. I said I was also conscious that it would be important to him in the discharge of the functions which he had been given to avoid putting him into a position where his impartiality might be called in question. I then detailed what had happened and covered the following points:-

- a. the CASKEY interview with GEMMEL in July 1982,
- b. CASKEY's attempts to interview CAMERON and the reasons why we had been unwilling to authorise CAMERON to make a statement. I said that it was my understanding that the RUC had been informed that CAMERON agreed that he had received a report in general terms alleging that McGRATH was a homosexual, that he would have told GEMMEL that he should make no further enquiries in this field and that neither he nor anyone else in that part of the intelligence machine under our control had passed information to the police. CAMERON regarded the information as gossip and the

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ADDRESSEE ONLY **E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE**

30 March 1987

S R Dinwiddy Esq
Cabinet Office

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JAMES MILLER: 29 MARCH 1987

1. I understand that you spoke today to **D - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY** about the latest call we have received from James Miller. A summary of the call is as follows.

2. Miller telephoned **an official** on the morning of Sunday 29 March. During their short talk Miller expressed anger about the second Sunday Times article, of 29 March, which claimed that he had made further allegations during the previous week about events in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. Miller was anxious to make it clear that he had not spoken to Barrie Penrose again, and as a throw-away gesture, said that he might seek legal advice about mis-representation. He told **an official** that there had been further press enquiries from the Sunday Times during the past week, seeking details of his current whereabouts. **B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY**

B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

3. Miller confirmed that both he and McGrath knew each other, but from Miller's comments the acquaintance seems to have been nothing more than casual. Miller did however confirm that he had mentioned his acquaintanceship with McGrath to Penrose, whose second article Miller claims "was built on machinations" and scraps of detail he had not used in his original story.

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

5. We shall learn more about the link between Miller, McGrath, Wallace and the Kincora School when Miller is seen later this week by **two officials**

F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

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LOOSE MINUTE

cc: E - FILE REFERENCE

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Brian Smart GEMMELL @ GEMMEL
Born: 18.8.50

E - FILE REFERENCE

I agreed to summarise the information given to you on 29 June 1982 following HQNI/^{D - MIS OFFICER} telephone call to me while I was NDO on the evening of 28 June. (I had earlier passed a similar reply to HQNI,^{D - MIS OFFICER} at 0900 hours the same morning).

Background

2. According to HQNI^{E - MIS OFFICER} GEMMEL was shortly to be interviewed by an RUC Inspector in the course of their criminal enquiries into homosexual activities at the Kincora Boys Home, the subject of a recent Protestant scandal in the Northern Ireland newspapers. GEMMEL himself was not accused of any illegal activity, but a source he ran while in the Intelligence Corps in 1976 was alleged to be involved.

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

Biography

4. Examination of ^{E - FILE REFERENCE} shows the following:
1969-72 Student at Strathclyde University
studying Economics & Business Administration

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

Sept. 1972 Interviewed at his own request for possible recruitment to the Security Service by ^{E - SECTION REFERENCE}
^{D - MIS OFFICER} advised to get outside job experience and return in 5/6 years time if still interested.

F - INFORMATION CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT BY HIAI

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E - SIGNATURE
E - STAFF DESIGNATION

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DATED AND RECD 8/11/89

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F - RELEVANCE GROUNDS

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IN SNUFFBOX FOR
SUBJECT: WILLIAM MCGRATH

1. I CAN FIND NO EVIDENCE THAT [REDACTED] HAS EVER HELD A FILE ON MCGRATH [REDACTED]

2. THE SUBSTANCE OF REPORT [REDACTED] WAS CONTAINED IN TELEGRAM OF 13 FEBRUARY 1980. THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION WAS [REDACTED]

TELEGRAM WAS SENT BY [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] COPIED TO [REDACTED] AND SNUFFBOX.

3. [REDACTED] HOLDS AN INDEX CARD ON WILLIAM MCGRATH BORN 11.12.16 WHICH HAS THREE ENTRIES WHICH APPEAR TO BE RELEVANT.

A. 'MCGRATH IS A BOYS' HOSTEL WARDEN (AND APPARENTLY HOMOSEXUAL) AND RUNS TARA. NOT BELIEVED TO BE INVOLVED IN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AT THE MOMENT' [REDACTED] 10.9.73, [REDACTED] 12.9.73

B. 'SOCIAL WORKER, KINCORA HOSTELS, BELFAST' [REDACTED] 22.11.73, [REDACTED]

C. 'SUBJECT IS THE WARDEN OF KINCORA BOYS' HOSTEL, 18B UPPER NEWTONWARDS ROAD. INVOLVED WITH TARA AND THE REVEREND PAISLEY [REDACTED] 31.3.75 [REDACTED] THE FIRST ENTRY ON MCGRATH'S INDEX CARD [REDACTED]

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

PAGE TWO

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E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE

CARD IS DATED 13 APRIL 1973. E - FILE REFERENCE ON TARA WAS OPENED 1. 7.74.

4. SO FAR I HAVE TRACED THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IN RESPECT OF ONLY THE THIRD OF THESE INDEX CARD ENTRIES. THIS IS A LETTER FROM E - SECTION REFERENCE TO E - SECTION REFERENCE DATED 31 MARCH 1975 CONCERNING MEANS OF GATHERING INTELLIGENCE ON THE DUP. ATTACHED TO THIS LETTER IS ANOTHER LETTER FROM LINCO/CONCO EAST BELFAST DATED 22 MARCH 1975 TO CAPTAIN B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY HEADQUARTERS 39 INFANTRY BRIGADE. IT CONTAINS PERSONAL SKETCHES ON DUP FIGURES OBTAINED FROM CONSTABLE B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY RUC SPECIAL PATROL GROUP INTELLIGENCE. B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM MISS V SHAW, PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO PAISLEY, ON MCGRATH THE LETTER NOTES HIS ADDRESS AS BEING 188 UPPER NEWTOWNARDS ROAD AND THAT HE WAS THE WARDEN OF KINCORA BOYS' HOSTEL. THE LETTER GOES ON TO SAY THAT MCGRATH USED TO LIVE AT FINAGHY BEFORE THE SCANDAL BROKE AND IT MAKES CLEAR THAT MCGRATH WAS HAVING OR HAD HAD AN AFFAIR WITH ROY GARLAND. IT WAS ASSESSED THAT B - PROTECTION OF IDENTITY WOULD ASSIST WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE APPROACH TO SHAW PROVIDED THAT THE RUC WERE NOT INVOLVED. HOWEVER, E - SECTION REFERENCE THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT DCI WOULD APPROVE ANY SUCH APPROACH.

5. OTHER PAPERS ON E - FILE REFERENCE CONFIRM THAT HQNI WERE AWARE THAT MCGRATH WAS CONNECTED WITH TARA AND THAT HE WAS A HOMOSEXUAL. HOWEVER, I HAVE AS YET FOUND NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT THE RUC WERE AWARE OF EITHER OF THESE FACTS.

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