

Order & Violence (Political Economy of Development)




Week 7: Armed interventions
Chris Blattman

Week 7 objectives

- There is a logic behind much violence
 - Civil wars as bargaining by other means, and mass atrocities as an attempt by the powerful to improve bargaining positions permanently
- We can understand interventions through their ability to facilitate bargaining, provide information, and develop self-enforcing commitments or external enforce commitments
 - Negotiation and mediation as facilitating elite bargains
 - The “corrupt” use of aid as an incentive for peace
 - Peacekeeping as information provision and external enforcement
 - Trusteeship as a temporary form of external enforcement
 - Sanctions or military intervention as a means to increase the costs of atrocities
- Interveners, however, tend to make some consistent mistakes
 - Underestimating the time that state and institutional development takes
 - Underestimating the power of elites and the difficulty of changing the balance
 - Misreading the situation and their own abilities to plan and implement change

I. A present day example: South Sudan

PRESIDENT TRUMP
JUST SAID SOMETHING
STUPID.



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AFRICA

Quandary in South Sudan: Should It Lose Its Hard-Won Independence?

By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN JAN. 23, 2017

NAIROBI, Kenya — Tens of thousands of civilians dead, countless children on the verge of starvation, millions of dollars stolen by officials, oil wells blown up, food aid hijacked and as many as 70 percent of women sheltering in camps raped — mostly by the nation’s soldiers and police officers.

Just a few years ago, South Sudan accomplished what seemed impossible: independence. Of all the quixotic rebel armies fighting for freedom in Africa, the South Sudanese actually won. Global powers, including the United States, rallied to their side, helping to create the world’s newest country in 2011, a supposed solution to decades of conflict and suffering.

Now, with millions of its people hungry or displaced by civil war, a radical question has emerged: Should South Sudan lose its independence?


Sudan: Conflict before Independence in 2011

- Colonial powers united an Arab-dominated north with a black and non-Muslim dominated South
- Southern armed groups fought for independence 1955-72 and 1983-2005
- Also motivated by oil rents, with 75% of reserves in the South
- Gained independence in 2011
- As a result of war and neglect, one of the least politically and economically developed countries on the planet
- Oil revenues 98% of budget





The current conflict in South Sudan


- Even before Independence, several ethnic groups and leaders competed for dominance in the South
- In 2013, this dissolved into a civil war
- Also widespread killing of civilians by ethnic militias
- About a quarter of the 12 million people have been displaced, and perhaps 300,000 killed
- A small peacekeeping mission has so far failed to stem the violence



Military situation in South Sudan as of 1 April 2016

 Under control of the Government of South Sudan

 Under control of the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition

 Under control of the Government of Sudan

The Opinion Pages | OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

Can the African Union Save South Sudan from Genocide?

By MAHMOOD MAMDANI JAN. 8, 2017

Assured unconditional international support, South Sudan's rulers acted with impunity. Uninterested in reform, this political class remains incapable of reform on its own. The simple fact is that the very political and institutional foundation for the existence of a state — as a political process that legitimates a sovereign power, and the creation of an administrative, technical and legal infrastructure as the means for exercising that power — has yet to be forged.

South Sudan is not a failed state but a failed transition. It needs a second transition, this time under an authority other than the United States, Britain and Norway, whose project has failed, or IGAD, whose members have conflicting interests in South Sudan.

In contrast...

“Why should an intervention in Darfur not turn out to be a trigger that escalates rather than reduces the level of violence as intervention in Iraq has done?”

—Mahmood Mamdani, London
Review of Books (2007)



These terrible events provoke some of the most difficult questions in the world, and answers are limited

There are logically consistent reasons to favor intervention in one place but not another (e.g. South Sudan vs. Darfur)


Ought neighbors, military allies, aid donors, and responsible governments respond to civil wars or atrocities?

This moral question is affected by a very practical questions:


- Do any strategies work, under what circumstances, and why?
 - Sanctions
 - Peacekeeping missions
 - Regime change
 - International trusteeship
 - Brokered deals
- What are the unintended consequences?

II. Some perspective on modern-day civil wars

Unfortunately conflicts like that in South Sudan have been enormously common since WWII



Civil wars have been especially common and long-lasting in post-colonial countries



Likewise, the decades after Independence in Latin America were followed by several decades of political instability, war between states, and war within them

TABLE 1
VIOLENCE INDICATORS FOR LATIN AMERICA, 1800–1879

Decade	Deaths from War and Civil Conflict	Total Population (000)	Deaths per 1,000
1800–1809	0		
1810–1819	474,360	14,820	32
1820–1829	307,439	16,822	18.3
1830–1839	8,565	19,047	0.4
1840–1849	147,680	21,566	6.8
1850–1859	220,688	24,492	9
1860–1869	357,141	27,869	12.8
1870–1879	18,500	31,303	0.6

How might we think of these conflicts through the lens of elite bargaining?

- Ex-colonies are largely limited access orders with elites who control the military, material and mobilizational power
- Newly independent elites will have to strike bargains to divide power and the rents in society
 - The rules and organizations developed will shape who holds power and controls rents now and also into the future
- These are high stakes bargains, and there is considerable uncertainty about different sides' power
- It is also difficult to credibly commit to bargains, or to construct the institutions—the systems of rules and organizations—that will enable credible commitments to be made

Any change in material, military, mobilizational power, or the rents available, threatens past bargains

e.g. Consider the following shocks in post-colonial Africa

- Abrupt departure of a colonial power
- Large spikes in commodity prices
- Economic crisis and the imposition of austerity and structural adjustment programs
- Discovery of natural resources such as oil
- Support for an opposition or insurgent group by a superpower
- Sudden end to regime support with the unexpected end of the Cold War
- War in a neighboring country

Bargaining can be especially difficult in highly centralized political systems

- Colonial systems, as well as post-Independence institutional choices, means that many countries are highly centralized Presidential systems
 - Commitment problems are especially difficult to solve
- The post-WWII international system gives groups strong incentives to try to capture the central state
 - Principles of territorial sovereignty and fixed borders
 - *“The three hundred years between 1648 and 1945 constituted an era of war between states; the last sixty years appear to be an age of war within states.”* —David Armitage, “Civil Wars” (2017)
- Thus, in weakly institutionalized systems, the Presidency is a high stakes prize to be captured

This is why Amos Sawyer advocated for multi-level governance in Liberia



Sawyer: Africa's state predation, personal rule, and conflict are rooted in its post-independence concentration of power

- Elections are not enough
- In fact all national-levels solutions are flawed
- Government must be accountable at multiple levels
 - Empower local government jurisdictions (elections, budgetary power)
 - Independent, task-specific bureaucracies crossing space
 - Regional security and economic apparatus
- Echoes elements of European and American constitutional principles
 - Checks and balances

III. Weighing interventions during & after civil war

Some foreign interventions we will consider

1. Incentives and opportunities for negotiated settlements
2. Peacekeeping missions
3. Trusteeships
4. (In the next two weeks)
Fostering state and democratic institutions after war



1. Providing incentives and opportunities for negotiated settlements

a) Mediation

- One of the most common features of post WWII war settlements
- Aim is to facilitate bargaining
- Does not promise rewards or threaten punishment
- Does not employ force to suppress or guarantee the settlement of a conflict

b) Rewarding peace

- Creating peace dividends
- Promoting rent sharing and bribery




(a) Mediators shape the information available and the bargaining environment to minimize breakdowns

- Structure how disputants interact in a bargaining situation
- Provide a procedural framework for discussions
- Ascertain facts
- Relay information to either side
- Facilitate communications
- Recommend concessions and propose possible settlements or compromises

So does mediation actually change anything?

Mediation more likely on summer vacations



- Mediated and non-mediated conflicts resolve at about the same rate
- But there is a selection problem? what if mediators tackle the easier or more difficult conflicts?
- Using summer months to instrument for mediation, Beber (2010) finds that the presence of a mediator raises the likelihood of a settlement

(b) The peril and promise of rewarding peace

- In bargaining, a bigger pie can have mixed effects
 - It can make enforcing peace agreements easier, since the costs of defecting are greater: it helps make bargains self-enforcing
 - But it can make the bargaining stage longer and more fraught, because the stakes are higher
- In theory, external enforcement and incentives could smooth bargaining and facilitate enforcement
 - Incentives to stay at the bargaining table
 - Cushy locations and expense accounts
 - Incentives not to defect from an agreement once made
 - Nobel peace prizes (fame and reputation)
 - External judicial processes
 - Post-conflict reconstruction aid, trade deals
 - Threat of sanctions

Recall Mukhopadhyay's take on Afghan warlords: A patrimonial limited access order as a self-enforcing alternative to conflict

“*The political center in Kabul was not (and has never been) a collection of formal, bureaucratic institutions working in concert to penetrate the unwieldy periphery of wayward warlords, defiant mullahs, and rebellious tribal chieftains.*


It was, instead, a political center operating largely in the neopatrimonial image, and, much like many of its predecessors, forging links to the countryside through partnerships with power holders who could sometimes expand the scope of the state by engaging it.



Jamaluddin Badar, Nuristan governor (prosecuted)
Lutfullah Mashal, Langham governor (journalist & poet)
Gul Agha Sherzai, Nangarhar governor (famous Mujahideen commander)

Another example comes from the former Soviet Republics

“*The central mechanism of civil war settlement is bribery.*”



Unlike African and Latin American decolonization, Soviet decolonization resulted in somewhat fewer wars, and generally much shorter wars



Negotiated settlements as deals among elites and warlords (i.e. limited access orders)

- Some of the post-Soviet circumstances may have helped them solve the information asymmetries and commitment problems
 - A history of relatively strong states
 - The threat of international intervention by Russian forces, or clandestine Russian deal-making
- Driscoll argues that the post-Soviet governments skilfully built a coalition of violence elites by buying just enough off
 - The state was too weak to disarm all of its opponents
 - Certain warlords were provided with offers to keep their private armies to secure their holdings, giving them the credible threat of voice (a coup) or exit (a return to violence or predation)
 - Warlords were also given spoils, such as ministry appointments and large offshore bank accounts
 - Some of the aid that (indirectly) funded regime came from the West

What drives the stability of such patrimonial elite deals?

Self-enforcing examples


- Will be more likely in environments with fewer shocks to power distribution
- Helpful to have institutions for power sharing that are flexible to changes in de facto power
 - As opposed to winner-take-all personalized Presidential systems
- Competing groups are allowed to maintain their economic or military power
- These enable elites to more credibly split rents

Externally enforced examples


- Third party polices agreement
- Or enforcement in the shadow of enforcement (i.e. credible threat of policing)
- Uses sanctions or their threat
- Can offer access to privileges, potentially through aid dollars or resource rents
- Or offer international recognition and esteem

2. Peacekeeping missions

- Two kinds of missions
 - With consent of fighting parties (Chapter VI)
 - Without consent (Chapter VII)
- Lightest missions are tasked with monitoring cease-fires, troop withdrawals, or other conditions outlined in a ceasefire agreement
- Over time missions have become:
 - More aggressive (without consent)
 - Wider in scope, going beyond observation and enforcement to include electoral supervision, police and security forces reform, institution building, economic development, and more
- Most missions came after the Cold War
- Vast majority of these have been stationed in Africa



Fortna: Peacekeeping associated with a lower risk of renewed warfare



But does peacekeeping cause peace?

Could be a selection problem

- What if the UN Security Council picks the “easy” cases?
- Then peacekeeping would correlate with peace by construction
- To test: collect data on conditions likely to influence peacekeeping

BUT, probably not the case

- Historical ties and economic interests are not associated with peacekeeping support
- In fact, peacekeepers seem to go to the tougher cases
 - Especially where belligerents can't agree on a solution
- Hence (if anything) Fortna understates the impact of peacekeeping

Peacekeeping as rationalist warfare in reverse

Create commitment

- Enforce commitments to peace
 - Military deterrence and threat of force
- Provide direct incentives for peace
 - Condition aid on good behavior
 - Provide a ‘peace dividend’
- The core idea is to provide temporary external enforcement of commitments until self-enforcing commitments can be reached

Reduce info asymmetries

- Reduce uncertainty and mutual fear
 - Monitoring, reporting, and communication
- Prevent and control accidents
 - Deter rogue groups and ‘spoilers’
 - Provide law and order

Some experiences from Liberia: Peacekeepers responding to riots



Peacekeepers and pacifying occupied rubber plantations



Why doesn't peacekeeping seem to be enough in South Sudan?

- Peacekeeping can fail to keep the peace for many reasons
 - E.g. At least one side continues to see strategic advantage in fighting
- One limitation of the S Sudanese mission is relatively low levels of force size, especially given the size of the territory

Table 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations in Five African Failed States

Country	Highest Number of Peacekeepers	Date	Peacekeepers per 100,000 Persons	Peacekeepers per 100 Square Kilometers
Burundi	7,145	May 2004	112	28
Democratic Republic of Congo	19,566	January 2006	33	1
Ivory Coast	9,098	June 2004	53	3
Liberia	17,700	January 2006	508	18
Sierra Leone	18,339	March 2001	304	25
South Sudan	15,777	Since July 2011	126	2.5

3. Trusteeships



UN Mission in Liberia, 2008

What is a trusteeship?

- Broader, deeper, and longer-lasting types of state reconstruction efforts
 - Conceived of as an international presence over periods of several years up to several decades
 - Includes the creation of international civilian administrations
- e.g. Liberia 2003-08
 - UN oversaw a 2-year period of transitional rule, a 2005 election, and a 2-3 year transition to self-government
 - Set up parallel international-run bureaucracies for each government bureaucracy, needing approval from both for major decisions and spending, gradually handing off control
 - In late stages subsidized salaries of many government bureaucrats in order to help attract talent
 - At the same time UN peacekeepers substituted for a national police and military as both were reconstructed

We can consider the U.S. role in Afghanistan a form of trusteeship



What is the problem for which trusteeships are the solution?


- If elites or society agree to a new set of post-war organizations institutions, in theory they could benefit from protection and encouragement in their infancy, e.g.
 - Independent and task-specific bureaucracies
 - Professionalized military and police force
 - Peaceful elections
 - Actively competing political parties
 - Decentralization of taxation and spending decisions to regions or towns
 - New constitutional divisions of power
 - Free media

Different models

- Full state trusteeship (Fearon & Laitin)
 - Call for the recruitment of “lead states” with significant national security or economic interests in a collapsed state to run interventions
 - an exit strategy that focuses squarely on developing local ownership for missions through the establishment of taxation capacity.
- More specific “shared sovereignty” contracts (Krasner)
 - Create joint authority structures in specific issue areas, such as natural resource management (e.g. oil)
 - Combining international actors with domestic institutions
 - Create commitment
- Idea is to externally enforce a bargain temporarily
 - To get through a period when defection is less costly
 - To allow formal and informal rules to solidify

Questionable whether international actors have the capacity and will to maintain the commitment to remain more than 3-5 years

Figure 1. Reconstruction Aid Pledges in Four African Countries (\$ millions)



And worth asking: What separates trusteeship from imperialism or colonialism?


- They likely require a consensus between local and international actors to succeed
 - Something that does not appear to exist in South Sudan at present, but did exist in Liberia
- This narrows the number of cases where a trusteeship can be successful
- The US Afghan mission illustrates one of the perils of a trusteeship without the consent of all actors
 - Reduced legitimacy
 - Potential to become a target

Sustained interventions also carry their own risks

“ *All interventions are intrinsically unpredictable, chaotic, and uncertain and will rapidly confound well laid plans and careful predictions*

...sustained intervention, therefore, often prevents local leaders from taking responsibility; it does not put pressure on politicians to settle with their enemies, or broaden the kinds of deals they could offer.

Instead, it sometimes strengthens the legitimacy and popularity of insurgents.




What is the end goal?

One view is the complete transformation of society: Nation-building

“*The more sweeping a [nation-building] mission’s objectives, the more resistance it is likely to inspire.*

Resistance can be overcome, but only through a well-considered application of personnel and money over extended periods of time.

—RAND Corporation



On balance, there is a reasonable argument for limited trusteeships, at least when most parties are supportive

- e.g. In intervening in Bosnia, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff explained to Congress: “IFOR [the international Implementation Force] will not be responsible for the conduct of humanitarian operations. It will not be a police force. It will not conduct nation-building.”
- In 1996 the National Security Adviser explained: “It is a dangerous hubris to believe we can build other nations. But where our own interests are engaged we can help nations build themselves—and give them time to make a start at it.”


IV. Understanding mass atrocities and their prevention

Mass killings versus civil wars

- Almost all mass killings in history were perpetrated by government or militarily powerful rebel groups killing large numbers of an identifiable group in their country
- Since World War II some 50 episodes of mass killings have led to between 12 and 25 million civilian casualties and by 2008 have induced the displacement of 42 million people
- Most mass killing events have taken place towards the end or after wars, especially civil wars
 - Between 1960 and 2000 roughly a third of all civil wars (50 out of 152) featured mass killings, while in none of the interstate wars (23) were there mass killings


Number of mass killing perpetrators, by region

One-sided Actors by Region, 1989-2015




Number of fatalities, excluding Rwanda

Fatalities by type of violence(excluding Rwanda 1994), 1989-2015




The Rwandan genocide stands out



Genocide versus mass killings

- This is largely a question of scale and intent. Genocide is an attempt to destroy an entire people—usually an ethnic, national, or religious group



The logic of mass killings and genocide

- Mass killings are usually an attempt to reduce the size of opponent groups, either directly or by causing refugee outflows and displacement
- Killing large numbers of a group is one way to avoid having to bargain with them in future
 - Reduces the rents you have to share with them
 - Though it can reduce productive output that depends on labor
- This is likely one reason mass killings are more likely in natural resource dependent countries
- Mass killings are also significantly more likely after recent democratization and in small, ethnically polarized countries

Rwanda, April-July 1994: An attempt to permanently change the balance of power in the country

- In 1990, a minority Tutsi rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), begin a civil war
- In 1993, international pressure leads to a ceasefire and beginnings of a power sharing agreement
- Hutu President dies in a plane accident
- The next day the Hutu elite initiate a highly planned mass killing of Tutsis
- Roughly 70% (800,000) of minority Tutsis were killed by majority Hutus
- A small Chapter VI UN peacekeeping mission is ordered not to interfere
- Ended when RPF took the capital



The failure to intervene in Rwanda and a mass killing in Bosnia (Srebrenica) helped to build a global political constituency to intervene in mass killings

President Bill Clinton referred to the failure of the U.S. to intervene in the genocide as one of his main foreign policy failings:

“I don't think we could have ended the violence, but I think we could have cut it down. And I regret it.”



The following decade sees a number of fairly successful humanitarian interventions to end long running conflicts


- Bosnia
 - The 1995 Srebrenica massacre of 8000 Bosniak civilians is followed by a military intervention that brought to an end three years of war
- Kosovo
 - From March to June 1999, NATO bombed Yugoslavia to compel it to withdraw its forces from the breakaway territory of Kosovo, after which Yugoslavia agrees to withdraw troops and allow a foreign military in
- Sierra Leone
 - In May 2000 a small British force bolster a UN peacekeeping force and the Sierra Leonean Army against rebels, helping lead to a ceasefire
- Liberia
 - A union of West African states and a credible threat of US military intervention helps to persuade rebel groups to a ceasefire and President Charles Taylor to enter exile in Nigeria

It is partly these successes, and the haunting failures of Rwanda and Srebrenica, that lead to strong “liberal interventionist” support for the Iraq War and the toppling of a dangerous dictator, Saddam Hussein



Of course we know how that turns out, with severe consequences for the reputation of humanitarian intervention

Documented civilian deaths from violence
by day, via iraqibodycount.org



Still, there remains a constituency for stopping mass killing

R2P: Responsibility to protect

- A commitment endorsed by all UN member states in 2005
- Recognizes that there are limits to sovereign noninterference
- A framework for employing measures that already exist to prevent atrocities
 - Mediation, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers, etc
- Authority to employ force rests solely with UN Security Council
- In contrast to “humanitarian intervention”: the use of force without Security Council authorization



The case for intervening against mass atrocities

- Third-party intervention to stop atrocities are designed to make it more costly and less effective for states to commit atrocities
- The credible threat of an intervention should mean that states are more reluctant to commit atrocities
- The audience for these interventions is not just the present killers but all future potential ones
- Most discussion focuses on how to make the threats more credible
- The number and length of civil wars and mass atrocities have declined over the past 20 years, as the norm supporting intervention has taken hold

Caution: The moral hazard problem in mass atrocities

- The prospect of intervention could encourage weak groups to rebel, and even to provoke state atrocities in order to trigger international intervention
- Perversely, this could actually increase the probability of war and atrocities
- Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leaders openly acknowledged that they would lose without intervention but hoped to provoke Serbian atrocities in order to draw in the international community.
- In theory, this should not outweigh the reduction in killings from intervention



Partial success stories: Kenya 2007/08



Cote d'Ivoire 2011



Libya 2011




Of course there are cases that could never be authorized by UNSC, such as Syria



V. The case for incrementalism in intervention

Balancing the evidence and the moral imperative

“We are comfortable with Bill Clinton’s motto from 1995: We cannot stop all war for all time but we can stop some wars. We cannot save all women and all children but we can save many of them. We can’t do everything but we must do what we can.”



How have you defined the problem and the objective?

Incremental

- Time limited
- Aiming to foster bargains that stop hostilities between groups
- Raise the costs for a ruling group to commit atrocities

Ambitious

- Deposing elites coalition in power
- Nation building
- Pursuit of democracy
- Ending corruption

Some regimes will be easier to influence than others

Low capacity

- Centralized power structure controlled by narrow elite
- Popular organization and support base limited
- Limited resources or resources that are easily shut off (e.g. capture the refinery, end diamond trade, cut off remittances, etc.)

High capacity


- diffuse power structure with a broad-based elite coalition
- Large, centrally controlled conventional and internal security forces embedded in bureaucratic institutions.
- Access to finance that is hard to cut off (e.g. from a strong external backer)
- Widespread social organization

This is a problematic way of looking at the world

“ *The more sweeping a [nation-building] mission’s objectives, the more resistance it is likely to inspire.*

Resistance can be overcome, but only through a well-considered application of personnel and money over extended periods of time.

—RAND Corporation




International community is not always aware of its own weaknesses

- “International policy-makers always have a muddled and half-understood picture of the country before intervention, perhaps an equally muddled and half-understood picture of their own society in the West, and some generally doubtful guesses about how to get from one to the other”
- International community is much weaker than they imagine
 - Have unparalleled resources and education and drive and resourcefulness
 - Isolated from local society and ignorant of context
 - Prey to misleading abstract theories
 - Lack legitimacy and local support
 - Underestimate and misunderstand local leaders, and misunderstand abilities to compromise

Knaus calls “principled incrementalism” and Stewart, “passionate moderation.”


“The best way of minimizing the danger of any intervention is to proceed carefully, to invest heavily in finding out about the specific context, particularly after the intervention, and to define concrete and not abstract goals.

Power and authority must be given to local leadership through elections as soon as possible. Only local leaders have the necessary ingredient of knowing the situation well, over many years and in all kinds of conditions; only they can get around the dangers that cannot be avoided, and skillfully respond to them.”



“ *Perpetual peace... is no empty idea but a task that, gradually solved, comes steadily closer to its goal.*

—Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” in *Practical Philosophy*



VI. War and political development

“ While there is little reason to believe that war would have exactly the same domestic effects in Africa today as it did in Europe several centuries ago, it is important to ask if developing countries can accomplish in times of peace what war enabled European countries to do.

I conclude that they probably cannot because fundamental changes in economic structures and societal beliefs are difficult, if not impossible, to bring about when countries are not being disrupted or under severe external threat .

—Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa”

Based on Herbst, Weinstein, Tilly: Should the rest of the world step back and allow the disintegration of African states?

“at some point, the reality of disintegrating dysfunctional African states stands in such contrast to the legal fiction of sovereign states that experimentation with regard to new states is in order.”

- Jeff Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, p.266





Figure 5.7. Mali and D.R.O.C. Compared


Recall the classic answer from Charles Tilly:
“Wars made states and states made war”



War is a selective survival mechanism (Tilly 1985, 1990)

- Technology growth → War increasingly capital intensive and expensive
- States need large, effective bureaucracies to:
 - Administer ever more complex and expensive wars
 - Organize recruitment (including conscription)
 - Raise taxes
- In the absence of strong state capacity there is a propensity to collapse or be conquered
- States that could not wage modern warfare were simply weeded out

Weinstein as the modern Tilly?
Uganda as an example of “autonomous recovery”




1962-86



1986-20??

Conditions underlying “Autonomous recovery”

Tilly-esque account of incidental institutions



So do only war and decisive victory make
the state?

or

Are there alternative, more peaceful
paths to strong and democratic states?

Bates, Coatsworth & Williamson: There are costs to the warlike path

- What did war and autocracy do in 19th century Latin America?
 - Lost out on global trade and industrialization boom
 - Aggressive antitrade and antimarket policies
 - War occupied most of government spending and bankrupted many nations
 - Sacrificed economic growth
- Not to mention the human cost

Are there other ways to solve commitment problems and information asymmetries

For example...

- Negotiated distribution of rents
- Institution building & democracy promotion
- Peacekeeping
- Trusteeship

Maybe the “technology” of state-building has advanced?

- Diffusion of governance “technologies”
 - Parliamentary systems
 - Constitutional democracies
 - Civil society organization
 - Democracy promotion
- Diffusion of norms
 - Respect for human rights
 - Press and civil society freedoms
 - Internationally monitored elections
- Training
 - Militaries
 - Parliaments
- Access to finance
 - World bank credit for long term investments
- International sanctions and pressure