

**9 + 11**

**franck leibovici**

$$9 + 11$$

we have come together with a unity of purpose because our nation demands it

the nation was unprepared

and we took public testimony from 160 witnesses  
(19 days of hearings )

\_\_\_\_\_ more than 2.5 million pages of documents and  
more than 1200 individuals interviewed in ten countries

*collateral damage* is not in its lexicon

four planes

(core / récit I -

“WE HAVE SOME PLANES”

\_\_\_\_\_,  
dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern \_\_\_\_\_

they spoke for three minutes

boston : american 11 and united 175

according to the united ticket agent, they had trouble understanding the standard security questions

(seats 8d, 8g, and 10b, respectively)

(banihammad in 2a, shehri in 2b, shehhi in 6c, hamza al ghamdi in 9c, and ahmed al ghamdi in 9d)



he did so because one of the brothers did not have photo identification nor could he understand english, and because the agent found both of the passengers to be suspicious

at 7:50, majed moqed and khalid al mihdhar boarded the flight and were seated in 12a and 12b in coach

washington dulles : american 77

\_\_\_\_\_ the security checkpoint,  
owned by united airlines and operated under contract by  
argenbright security \_\_\_\_\_

jarrah \_\_\_ in seat 1b, closest to the cockpit; nami \_\_\_ in 3c,  
ghamdi in 3d, haznawi in 6b

newark : united 93

no physical, documentary, or analytical evidence provides a convincing explanation of why Atta and Omari drove to Portland, Maine, from Boston on the morning of September 10, only to return to Logan on flight 5930 on the morning of the day after.

the call was placed from a pay phone in terminal c (between the screening checkpoint and united 175's boarding gate).

the phone call between sweeney and woodward lasted about 12 minutes (8:32–8:44) and was not taped.

dialing \*349 on an airphone.

(flight crew on board ual aircraft could contact the united office in san francisco (samc) simply by )

aal transcript, telephone call from nydia gonzalez to craig marquis, sept. 11, 2001

aal transcript, telephone call from betty ong to nydia gonzalez, sept. 11, 2001

only the first four minutes of the phone call between ong and the reservations center (minter, sadler, and gonzalez) was recorded because of the time limit on the recently installed system.

nine passengers holding reservations for flight 175 did not show for the flight.

they were interviewed and cleared by the fbi.

woodward noted that the morning bank of flights had all departed boston and the gate area was quiet. he further realized that flight 12 had not even departed yet, so he and williams returned to the office to try to clarify the situation.

two seated in first class close to the cockpit door, the pilot hijacker seated close behind them, and at least one other hijacker seated close behind the pilot hijacker.

at or around this time, flight attendants kathryn laborie and alfred marchand would have begun cabin service in first class ;

amy king and robert fangman in business class ;

with michael tarrou, amy jarret, and alicia titus in economy class.

the initial service assignments for flight attendants on american 11 would have placed karen martin and bobbi arestegui in first class ; sara low and jean roger in business class ; dianne snyder in the midcabin galley; betty ong and amy sweeney in coach ; and karen nicosia in the aft galley. jeffrey collman would have been assigned to work in coach, but to assist in first class if needed.

" we are flying low. we are flying very, very low. we are flying way too low. "

american 11

captain john ogonowski and first officer thomas mcguinness piloted the boeing 767

it carried its full capacity of nine flight attendants. eighty-one passengers boarded the flight with them (including the five ones).

at 8:19, ong reported: "\_\_\_\_\_ at 8:26, ong reported that the plane was "flying erratically."

the plane took off at 7:59. just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26 000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29 000 feet.

one spoke very little english and one spoke excellent english

" something is wrong. we are in a rapid descent . . . we are all over the place."

sixteen seconds after that transmission, atc instructed the aircraft's pilots to climb to 35 000 feet.

seconds later she said, "oh my god we are way too low." the phone call ended.

they claimed they had a bomb

lewin had served four years as an officer in the israeli military.

began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter.

stabbing the two unarmed flight attendants who would have been preparing for cabin service.

wail al shehri and waleed al shehri < row 2 in first class >—

at 8:21, one of the american employees receiving ong's call in north carolina, nydia gonzalez, alerted the american airlines operations center in fort worth, texas, reaching craig marquis, the manager on duty

not realizing that another was sitting behind him, he may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of him.

betty ong contacted the american airlines southeastern reservations office in cary, north carolina, via an at&t airphone

they inadvertently broadcast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of the cabin public address channel

the emergency call lasted approximately 25 minutes

at 8:47, the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a minute

the call ended abruptly.

united 175

at 8:52, in easton, connecticut, lee hanson received a phone call from his son peter (united 175)

captain victor saracini and first officer michael horrocks ---> the boeing 767 ( seven flight attendants. fifty-six passengers)

“i think they’ve taken over the cockpit—an attendant has been stabbed— and someone else up front may have been killed. the plane is making strange moves. call united airlines—tell them it’s flight 175, boston to l. a.” (his son told him)

it’s getting bad, dad—a stewardess was stabbed—they seem to have knives and mace—they said they have a bomb—it’s getting very bad on the plane—passengers are throwing up and getting sick—the plane is making jerky movements—i don’t think the pilot is flying the plane—i think we are going down—i think they intend to go to chicago or someplace and fly into a building — don’t worry, dad— if it happens, it’ll be very fast—my god, my god

the flight attendants would have begun their cabin service

lee hanson then called the easton police department and relayed what he had heard

at 9:00, lee hanson received a second call from his son peter

8:59 flight 175 passenger brian david sweeney trying to call his wife julie he left a message on their home answering machine : the plane had been hijacked he then called his mother louise sweeney: the flight had been hijacked : the passengers were thinking about storming the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the hijackers

the hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46

at 8:58, the flight took a heading toward new york city

lee hanson had heard a woman scream just before it cut off

both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant)

at 9:00, american airlines executive vice president (gerard arpey) learned that communications had been lost with  
(american 77).

the solicitor general then informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes. (she did not display signs of panic and did not indicate any awareness of an impending crash)

captain charles f. burlingame and first officer david charlebois ---> a boeing 757 (4 flight attendants 58 passengers)

at that point, the second call was cut off

cabin service would have begun

at 9:34, ronald reagan washington national airport advised the secret service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the white house

two minutes later the transponder was turned off

neither of the firsthand accounts mentioned any stabbings or the threat or use of either a bomb or mace, though both witnesses began the flight in the first-class cabin

she asked her mother to alert american airlines.

he ordered all american airlines flights in the northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground

shortly after the first call, barbara olson reached her husband again. she reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, and she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do. ted olson asked for her location and she replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses. another passenger told her they were traveling *northeast*.

at some point between 9:16 and 9:26, barbara olson called her husband, ted olson, the solicitor general of the united states. solicitor general olson tried unsuccessfully to reach attorney general john ashcroft

at 9:12, renee may called her mother, nancy may, in las vegas.

she said her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them to the rear of the plane.

nancy may and her husband promptly did so

several passengers had terminated phone calls with loved ones in order to join the revolt. one of the callers ended her message as follows : “everyone’s running up to first class. i’ve got to go. bye.”

according to one call, they voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. they decided, and acted

when it left the ground at 8:42, the flight was running more than 25 minutes late

" hey get out of here—get out of here—get out of here "

(c1)

leading them to worry about a transcontinental flight—delta 1989—that in fact was not hijacked.

\_\_\_\_\_ were wearing red bandanas, and they forced the passengers to the back of the aircraft

at 10:00:08, " is that it? shall we finish it off? "  
" no. not yet. when they all come, we finish it off. "  
at 10:00:26, " in the cockpit. if we don’t, we’ll die!" sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled, “roll it!” at about 10:01:00, he said, “allah is the greatest! allah is the greatest! "  
" is that it ? *i mean*, shall we put it down? "  
" yes, put it in it, and pull it down.”  
at 10:02:23, " pull it down! pull it down!”

shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from gte airphones and cellular phones

u n i t e d 9 3

within two minutes, at 9:26, the pilot, jason dahl, responded with a note of puzzlement: “ed, confirm latest mssg plz—jason.” the hijackers attacked at 9:28.

it was the air carriers’ responsibility to notify their planes of security problems

five passengers holding reservations for flight 93 did not show for the flight. all five were interviewed and cleared by the fbi.

" ladies and gentlemen : here the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting.we have a bomb *on board*. so, sit "

the operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, mohamed al kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at florida’s orlando international airport in august.

captain jason dahl & first officer leroy homer, & five flight attendants. & thirty-seven passengers, including the hijackers (boarded the plane

she struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her

taxiing from the gate to the runway normally took about 15 minutes (bob varca-dipane interview)

on american 11, the transponder signal was turned off at 8:21 ; on united 175, the code was changed at 8:47 ; on american 77, the signal was turned off at 8:56 ; and on united 93, the signal was turned off at 9:41.

the faa knew or strongly suspected that flight 11 was a hijacking 11 minutes after it was taken over ; flight 175, 9 minutes after it was taken over.

united 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and awareness of that hijacking began to spread after 8:51. american 77 was hijacked between 8:51 and 8:54. there is no evidence to indicate that the faa recognized flight 77 as a hijacking until it crashed into the pentagon.

needs files are time-stamped as accurate to the naval observatory clock.

the four calls were at 9:15:34 for 1 minute, 42 seconds ; 9:20:15 for 4 minutes, 34 seconds ; 9:25:48 for 2 minutes, 34 seconds ; and 9:30:56 for 4 minutes, 20 seconds. fbi report, "american airlines airphone usage," sept. 20, 2001

times assigned to audio transmissions were derived by the commission from files provided by the faa and the northeast air defense sector (needs) based on audio time stamps contained within the files provided by the sender.

in 1993, a lufthansa aircraft was hijacked from its frankfurt to cairo route and diverted to jfk airport in new york. the event lasted for 11 hours and was resolved without incident.

in accordance with faa regulations, united 93's cockpit voice recorder recorded the last 31 minutes of sounds from the cockpit via microphones in the pilots' headsets, as well as in the overhead panel of the flight deck.

faa tapes are certified accurate to universal coordinated time by quality assurance specialists at faa air traffic facilities.

on september 6, 1970, members of the popular front for the liberation of palestine hijacked a pan american boeing 747, a twa boeing 707, and a swissair dc-8. on september 9, a british airliner was hijacked as well. an attempt to hijack an israeli airliner was thwarted. the pan american plane landed in cairo and was blown up after its passengers were released. the other three aircraft were flown to dawson field, near amman, jordan ; the passengers were held captive, and the planes were destroyed.

on fdr, see ntsb report, "specialist's factual report of investigation—digital flight data recorder" for united airlines flight 93, feb. 15, 2002 ; on cvr, see fbi report, "cvr from ua flight #93," dec. 4, 2003 ; faa report, "summary of air traffic hijack events: september 11, 2001," sept. 17, 2001; ntsb report, air traffic control recording—united airlines flight 93, dec. 21, 2001.







federal aviation administration

north american aerospace defense command

capps (computer assisted passenger prescreening system)

the security checkpoints were operated by globe security under a contract with american airlines.

“squawking” a transponder code of “7500” is the universal code for a hijack in progress  
  
the protocols for the faa to obtain military assistance from *norad* required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government.

all the hijacked aircraft were in norad’s northeast air defense sector (also known as *neads*), which is based in **rome, new york**

*norad* is a binational command established in 1958 between the united states and canada. its mission was, and is, to defend the airspace of north america and protect the continent (that mission does not distinguish between internal and external threats\_\_\_\_\_)

the four hijacked aircraft were monitored mainly by the centers in boston, new york, cleveland, and indianapolis

that morning *neads* could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters : otis air national guard base in **cape cod, massachusetts**, and langley air force base in **hampton, virginia**

each center thus had part of the knowledge

*neads* reported to the continental u.s. norad region (*conr*) headquarters, in **panama city, florida**, which in turn reported to norad headquarters, in **colorado springs, colorado**

many controllers work at the faa’s 22 air route traffic control centers. they are grouped under regional offices and coordinate closely with the national air traffic control system command center, located in herndon

the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the united states—and using them as guided missiles—was not *recognized* by norad

they turned off the transponders on three of the four hijacked aircraft

controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to faa headquarters in washington.

in sum, the protocols in place for the *faa* and *norad* to respond to a hijacking presumed that  
- the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear  
- there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate *faa* and *norad* chains of command  
- the hijacking would take the traditional form : that is, *it would not be* a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.

the faa was mandated by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation

faa headquarters is ultimately responsible for the management of the national airspace system. the operations center located at faa headquarters receives notifications of incidents, including accidents and hijackings

headquarters had a hijack coordinator, who was the director of the faa office of civil aviation security or his or her designate. if a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on *nmcc*

**the faa and norad**

the national command authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense)

the pentagon’s national military command center (*nmcc*) would then seek approval from the office of the secretary of defense to provide military assistance. if approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down norad’s chain of command

two categories: “event” and “threat” event conferences seek to gather information. if the situation escalates, a threat conference may be convened.

they agreed to “sterilize” the airspace along the flight’s westerly route so the safety of other planes would not be affected.

the vice chairman was on capitol hill when the pentagon was struck, and he saw smoke as his car made its way back to the building.

\_\_\_\_\_ states that at 9:28:17 “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin was heard over the *zob* [cleveland center] radio.”

\_\_\_\_\_ states that at 9:28:54 a “second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible screaming or a struggle and a statement, ‘get out of here, get out of here’ from an unknown origin was heard over the *zob* [cleveland center] radio.”

at 9:31:48, execjet 56 also called in, reporting that “we’re just answering your call. we did hear that, uh, yelling too.” the *faa* responded at 9:31:51, “okay, thanks. we’re just trying to figure out what’s going on.”

the seismic data on which they based this estimate are far too weak in signal-to-noise ratio and far too speculative in terms of signal source to be used as a means of contradicting the impact time established by the very accurate combination of *fd*, *cvr*, *atc*, radar, and impact site data sets.

these data sets constrain united 93’s impact time to within 1 second, are airplane- and crash-site specific, and are based on time codes automatically recorded in the *atc* audiotapes for the *faa* centers and correlated with each data set in a process internationally accepted within the aviation accident investigation community. furthermore, one of the study’s principal authors now concedes that “seismic data is not definitive for the impact of ua 93.” email from won-young kim to the commission, “re:ua flight 93,” july 7, 2004

*norad's* mission is set forth in a series of renewable agreements between the united states and canada.

the “primary missions” of norad were “aerospace warning” and “aerospace control” for north america.

aerospace warning was defined as “the monitoring of man-made objects in space and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against north america whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles.”

aerospace control was defined as “providing surveillance and control of the airspace of canada and the united states.”

norad was scheduled to conduct a military exercise, vigilant guardian, which postulated a bomber attack from the former soviet union.

according to general eberhart, “it took about 30 seconds” to make the adjustment to the real-world situation.

at 9:10:22, the otis fighters were told by boston center that the second tower had been struck.

for the authority to shoot down a commercial aircraft, granted to norad but not used against payne stewart’s plane in 1999 after the pilot and passengers lost consciousness, see richard myers interview (feb. 17, 2004).

at 9:12:54, the otis fighters told their boston center controller that they needed to establish a combat air patrol over new york, and they immediately headed for new york city.

“\_\_\_\_\_ autoplay,” undated

because the otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to new york, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling.

american 11: we have some planes. just stay quiet, and you'll be okay. we are returning to the airport.

american 11: nobody move. everything will be okay. if you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. just stay quiet.

he did not hear the specific words "we have some planes".

the herndon command center immediately established a teleconference between boston, new york, and cleveland centers so that boston center could help the others understand what was happening.

american 11: nobody move. everything will be okay. if you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. just stay quiet. nobody move please. we are going back to the airport. don't try to make any stupid moves.

faa : hi. boston center tmu [traffic management unit], we have a problem here. we have a hijacked aircraft headed towards new york, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some f-16s or something up there, help us out.

neads : is this real-world or exercise?

faa: no, this is not an exercise, not a test.

(" i don't know where i'm scrambling these guys to. i need a direction, a destination. ")

neads received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it struck the north tower.

ual 175 : new york ual 175 heavy.

faa : ual 175 go ahead.

ual 175 : yeah. we figured we'd wait to go to your center. ah, we heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of boston, ah, with someone, ah, it sounded like someone keyed the mikes and said ah everyone ah stay in your seats.

faa : oh, okay. i'll pass that along over here.

"we may have a hijack"

he believed american 77 had experienced serious electrical or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone.

" looks like that aircraft crashed into the pentagon sir. "

neads : and he's heading into washington?

(faa : yes. this could be a third aircraft.)

there was confusion at that moment

an aircraft about which norad had heard nothing (united 93).

“somebody call cleveland?”

ziad jarrah : uh, this is the captain.  
would like you all to remain seated.  
there is a bomb *on board* and are  
going back to the airport, and to  
have our demands [unintelligible].  
please remain quiet.

faa headquarters : they're pulling jeff  
away to go talk about united 93.

command center : uh, do we want to  
think, uh, about scrambling aircraft ?

faa headquarters : oh, god, i don't  
know.

command center : uh, that's a decision  
somebody's gonna have to make prob-  
ably in the next ten minutes.

faa headquarters : uh, ya know every-  
body just left the room.

that's what they're speculating, that's  
speculation only.

that's the last report. they don't know  
exactly where

assurant la surveillance et la défense de l'espace aérien nord-ouest depuis 1996, le *norad* est enterré sous le mont cheyenne (colorado)

*north america aerospace defense command*, plus connu sous l'acronyme *norad*

le 1er septembre 1982, s'installe à son tour l'*air force space command*, puis l'*united states space command*, le 23 septembre 1985

en janvier 1956, le général earl e. partridge, commandant le *continental air defense command*, décidait que l'amérique devait absolument disposer d'un centre opérationnel souterrain pour remplacer celui d'ent air force base (colorado)

afin de servir de courroie de transmission directe avec la maison blanche

7 centres de commandements et de contrôle

- *air warning center* (centre d'alerte aérienne)
- *missile warning center* (centre d'alerte missile)
- *space controle center* (centre de surveillance spatiale)
- *combined intelligence watch center* (centre unifié de veille et du renseignement)
- *systems center* (centre de systèmes informatiques et de communication)
- *weather report unit* (unité d'assistance météo)
- *command center* (centre de commandement)

*national security agency, national reconnaissance office* et *central intelligence agency* sont les agences du renseignement

*nsa, nro* and *cia* are intelligence agencies

les 1ers coups de pioche sont donnés en juin 1961

trois mots-clés en guise de code de communication : *yes* (oui, l'amérique du nord subit une attaque), *no* (non, pas de menace ni d'attaque), *concern* (à surveiller : possibilité d'attaque, mais besoin de plus d'information)

5 équipes américano-canadiennes désignées "alpha", "bravo", "charlie", "delta", "echo" se relaient en permanence 24h / 24, 365 jours / an, de 6h30 du matin à 14h30, de 14h30 à 22h30, et de 22h30 à 6h30 avant de rester 3 jours en repos.



en 1955, un journal local de colorado springs (etats-unis) publia une annonce publicitaire pour le compte d'un grand magasin qui donnait un numéro de téléphone exclusif pour joindre le père noël.

\_\_\_\_\_ s'avéra être le numéro d'urgence du commandement de la défense aérienne continentale, le prédécesseur du *norad*.

surpris par le nombre d'appels d'enfants, l'officier de service leur expliqua qu'il aidait le père noël et qu'il pouvait suivre son trajet sur ses écrans radar.

ce programme a fait son apparition sur internet en 1997 et l'an dernier, durant la période de mise en service du site, en décembre et janvier, 712 millions de personnes l'ont consulté, selon le *norad*, qui précise que ce site est publié en français, italien, japonais, espagnol, portugais et anglais.

## clarifying the record

american airlines flight 11  
(aa 11)  
boston to los angeles  
7:59 takeoff  
8:14 last routine radio communication ; likely takeover  
8:19 flight attendant notifies aa of hijacking  
8:21 transponder is turned off  
8:23 aa attempts to contact the cockpit  
8:25 boston center aware of hijacking  
8:38 boston center notifies needs of hijacking  
8:46 needs scrambles otis fighter jets in search of aa 11  
8:46:40 aa 11 crashes into 1 wtc (north tower)  
8:53 otis fighter jets airborne  
9:16 aa headquarters aware that flight 11 has crashed into wtc  
9:21 boston center advises needs that aa 11 is airborne heading for washington  
9:24 needs scrambles langley fighter jets in search of aa 11

united airlines flight 175  
(ua 175)  
boston to los angeles  
8:14 takeoff  
8:42 last radio communication  
8:42-8:46 likely takeover  
8:47 transponder code changes  
8:52 flight attendant notifies ua of hijacking  
8:54 ua attempts to contact the cockpit  
8:55 new york center suspects hijacking  
9:03:11 flight 175 crashes into 2 wtc (south tower)  
9:15 new york center advises needs that ua 175 was the second aircraft crashed into wtc  
9:20 ua headquarters aware that flight 175 had crashed into wtc

american airlines flight 77  
(aa 77)  
washington, d.c., to los angeles  
8:20 takeoff  
8:51 last routine radio communication  
8:51-8:54 likely takeover  
8:54 flight 77 makes unauthorized turn to south  
8:56 transponder is turned off  
9:05 aa headquarters aware that flight 77 is hijacked  
9:25 herndon command center orders nationwide ground stop  
9:32 dulles tower observes radar of fast-moving aircraft (later identified as aa 77)  
9:34 faa advises needs that aa 77 is missing  
9:37:46 aa 77 crashes into the pentagon  
10:30 aa headquarters confirms flight 77 crash into pentagon

united airlines flight 93  
(ua 93)  
newark to san francisco  
8:42 takeoff  
9:24 flight 93 receives warning from ua about possible cockpit intrusion  
9:27 last routine radio communication  
9:28 likely takeover  
9:34 herndon command center advises faa headquarters that ua 93 is hijacked  
9:36 flight attendant notifies ua of hijacking ; ua attempts to contact the cockpit  
9:41 transponder is turned off  
9:57 passenger revolt begins  
10:03:11 flight 93 crashes in field in shanksville, pa  
10:07 cleveland center advises needs of ua 93 hijacking  
10:15 ua headquarters aware that flight 93 has crashed in pa ; washington center advises needs that flight 93 has crashed in pa

it had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching washington ( \_\_\_ the fighters were in the wrong place)

they had been responding to a report about an aircraft that did not exist.

tunnel of \_\_\_\_\_ *conflicting reports*

air force one departed at about 9:54 without any fixed destination. the objective was to get up in the air—as fast and as high as possible—and then decide where to go

the secret service logged mrs. cheney's arrival at the white house at 9:52, *and she joined her husband in the tunnel*

at the white house, the video teleconference was conducted from the situation room by richard clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism. logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the cia ; the fbi ; the departments of state, justice, and defense ; the faa ; and the white house shelter

the president said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been an *interceptor* pilot.

the faa and white house teleconferences

(9:36) agents propelled him out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker. the vice president entered the underground tunnel leading to the shelter at (9:37).

*norad* said it had **conflicting reports**

at about 9:20, security personnel at faa headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the defense department.

the president emphasized to us that he had authorized the shutdown of hijacked aircraft

he again asked for authorization to engage. the vice president again said yes

she joined her husband in the tunnel

on the morning of september 11, \_\_\_\_\_ was having breakfast at the pentagon with a group of members of congress. after the pentagon was struck, he went to the parking lot to assist with rescue efforts

the president's reaction was that the incident must have been caused by pilot error.

the vice president was wondering "how the hell could a plane hit the wtc", then he saw the second aircraft strike the south tower.

(...)

at the white house, vice president dick cheney had just sat down for a meeting when his assistant told him to turn on his television because a plane had struck the north tower of the world trade center.

in sarasota, florida, the presidential motorcade was arriving at the emma e. booker elementary school, where president bush was to read to a class and talk about education.

in the absence of information that the crash was anything other than an accident, the white house staff monitored the news as they went ahead with their regular schedules.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

there was “one phone call from the tunnel. and basically i called to let him know that we were a target (and) i strongly urged him not to return to washington right away, that he delay his return until we could find out what the hell was going on.”

[Redacted]

“(and when i got there), he was on the phone with the president (. . .) (but from that first place where i ran into him), i moved with him into what they call the peoc”

on the morning, general eberhart was in his office at headquarters — roughly 30 minutes away from cheyenne mountain, where the operations center is located.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

floor leadership : you need to read this. . . the region commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. copy that?  
controllers : copy that, sir.  
floor leadership : so if you're trying to divert somebody and he won't divert—

controllers : do [director of operations] is saying no.  
floor leadership : no ? it came over the chat... you got a conflict on that direction ?  
controllers : right now no, but —  
floor leadership : okay ? okay, you read that from the vice president, right ? vice president has cleared. vice president has cleared us to intercept traffic and shoot them down if they do not respond per [general arnold].

in interviews with us, *neads* personnel expressed considerable confusion over the nature and effect of the order.

**what if ?**

most notably in a declaration faxed early in 1998  
to an arabic-language newspaper in london



*u. b. l.*

(portrait)

" our fight against these governments is not separate from our fight against you. "

twenty-three when he arrived in afghanistan in 1980 was the seventeenth of 57 children of a saudi construction magnate six feet five and thin appeared to be ungainly but was in fact quite athletic skilled as a horseman runner climber and soccer player\_\_\_\_\_

had attended abdul aziz university in saudi arabia by some accounts, had been interested there in religious studies inspired by tape recordings of fiery sermons by abdullah azzam a palestinian and a disciple of qutb

the "golden chain" put together mainly by financiers in saudi arabia and the persian gulf states

they established what they called a *base* or *foundation* as a potential general headquarters for future jihad

creating a "bureau of services" (mektab al khidmat, or mak), which channeled recruits into afghanistan

he soon made clear his desire for unchallenged control and for preparing the mujahideen to fight anywhere in the world. azzam, by contrast, favored continuing to fight in afghanistan until it had a true islamist government. and, as a palestinian, he saw israel as the top priority for the next stage. whether the dispute was about power, personal differences, or strategy, it ended on november 24, 1989, when a remotely controlled car bomb killed azzam and both of his sons.

2.3 the rise (1988-1992)

## 2.1 A DECLARATION OF WAR

**moves to sudan**  
by the fall of 1989 by 1994, the saudi government would freeze his financial assets and revoke his citizenship. he no longer had a country he could call his own

in secret meetings with saudi officials, sudan offered to expel b. l. to saudi arabia and asked the saudis to pardon him

dozens of additional militants arrived on later flights

a need to cut off the “head of the snake.”

later set up an ngo in nairobi as a cover for operatives there.

in building this islamic army, the “islamic army shura”, \_\_\_ enlisted groups from saudi arabia, egypt, jordan, lebanon, iraq, oman, algeria, libya, tunisia, morocco, somalia, and eritrea

left sudan — significantly weakened, despite his ambitions and organizational skills. he returned to afghanistan.

over time, these schools produced large numbers of half-educated young men with no marketable skills but with deeply held islamic views

fulfilling his bargain with turabi, b. l. used his construction company to build a new highway from khartoum to port sudan on the red sea coast.

" if the instigation for jihad against the jews and the americans to liberate the holy places is considered a crime ", he said, " let history be a witness that i am a criminal "

also established cooperative but less formal relationships with other groups from these same countries ; from the african states of chad, mali, niger, nigeria, and uganda ; and from the southeast asian states of burma, thailand, malaysia, and indonesia. \_\_\_ maintained connections in the bosnian conflict as well. the groundwork for a true global network was laid.

also provided equipment and training assistance to the moro islamic liberation front in the philippines and also to a newly forming philippine group that called itself the abu sayyaf brigade, after one of the major afghan jihadist commanders. also helped jemaah islamiya (ji), a nascent organization headed by indonesian islamists with cells scattered across malaysia, singapore, indonesia, and the philippines. also aided a pakistani group engaged in insurrectionist attacks in kashmir. in mid-1991, also \_\_\_ dispatched a band of supporters to the northern afghanistan border to assist the tajikistan islamists in the ethnic conflicts that had been boiling there even before the central asian departments of the soviet union became independent states.

the taliban leader mullah omar promptly “invited” b. l. to move to kandahar, ostensibly in the interests of b. l.’s own security but more likely to situate him where he might be easier to control.

□

oss

cia

- some *covert action* -



(few operations or the history of the fbi)

the father of the oss was william j. "wild bill" donovan, a wall street lawyer.

the cia is a descendant of the office of strategic services (oss), which president roosevelt created early in world war ii after having first thought the fbi might take that role.

the national security act of 1947 created the position of director of central intelligence (dci).

he recruited into the oss others like himself—well traveled, well connected, well-to-do professional men and women.

(in addition) to those from the department of defense, other elements in the intelligence community include the national security parts of the (fbi) - the bureau of intelligence and research in the state department (birsd); the intelligence component of the treasury department (ictd) ; the energy department's office of intelligence and counterintelligence (edoic), the former of which, through leveraging the expertise of the national laboratory system, has special competence in nuclear weapons ; the office of intelligence of the coast guard (oicg); and, today, the directorate of intelligence analysis and infrastructure protection in the department of homeland security (diaipdh).

the hughes-ryan amendment requires that the president approve and report to congress any covert action

combined with fears of creating a u.s. gestapo,

(reagan)

though shultz elevated the status and visibility of counterterrorism coordination by appointing as coordinator first l. paul bremer and then robert oakley, both senior career ambassadors of high standing in the foreign service, the department continued to be dominated by regional bureaus for which terrorism was not a first-order concern.

until the 1960s, when the kennedy and johnson administrations turned instead to robert mcnamara's defense department, the state department retained primacy < as a mini-state department created to analyze foreign policy issues>. president richard nixon then : a powerful national security council staff, overseen by henry kissinger.

the department of defense is the behemoth among federal agencies.

the white house, members of congress, and the news media asked the pentagon whether the united states was prepared for similar action. the answer was no.

(entebbe)

among the uniformed military, the top official is the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who is supported by a joint staff divided into standard military staff compartments— j-2 (intelligence), j-3 (operations), and so on.

its men and women tended to judge one another by the quantity and quality of their publications (in this case, classified publications).

(cia)

the prolonged crisis of 1979–1981, when 53 americans were held hostage at the u.s. embassy in tehran, ended the state department leadership in counterterrorism. president carter's assertive national security advisor, zbigniew brzezinski, took charge,

apart from their own peers, they looked for approval and guidance to policymakers. during the 1990s and today, particular value is attached to having a contribution included in one of the classified daily "newspapers"— the senior executive intelligence brief—or, better still, selected for inclusion in the president's daily brief.

remembered as “desert one” this failure remained vivid for members of the armed forces.

(massacre of the marines by hezbollah)

by the end of president clinton’s first term, this official had become the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.



(somalia)

the world’s television screens showed images of an american corpse dragged through the streets by exultant somalis.

by the autumn of 1993, u.s. commanders concluded that the main source of trouble was a warlord, mohammed farrah aidid.

a few months later, as the b. l. unit was gearing up, jamal ahmed al fadl walked into a u.s. embassy in africa, established his bona fides as a former senior employee of b. l., and provided a major breakthrough of intelligence on the creation, character, direction, and intentions of a. q.

president clinton’s first national security advisor, anthony lake, had retained from the bush administration the staffer who dealt with crime, narcotics, and terrorism (a portfolio often known as “drugs and thugs”), the veteran civil servant richard clarke.

a doomsday cult, aum shinrikyo, had released sarin nerve gas in a subway, killing 12 and injuring thousands.

timothy mcveigh and terry nichols

in early 1998, the cabinet-level principals committee apparently gave the concept its blessing.

international terrorism intelligence cases were designated as 199 matters ; international terrorism criminal cases were designated as 265 matters. in 2003, these designations were eliminated; all international terrorism matters now receive the same designation, 315.

the fbi must not only continue to bring on board more linguists, it must also continue to take advantage of technology and best practices to prioritize its workflow, enhance its capabilities, and ensure compliance with its quality control program. fbi linguists interviews

“knives with blades under 4 inches, such as swiss army knives, scout knives, pocket utility knives, etc. may be allowed to enter the sterile area. however, some knives with blades under 4 inches could be considered by a reasonable person to be a ‘menacing knife’ and/or may be illegal under local law and should not be allowed to enter the sterile area.”

even as the fbi has increased its language services cadre, the demand for translation services has also greatly increased.

the fbi’s hiring process includes language testing, a personnel security interview, polygraph, and a full background investigation.

since september, the fbi has recruited and processed more than 30,000 translator applicants. this has resulted in the addition of nearly 700 new translators.

“text of world islamic front’s statement urging jihad against jews and crusaders,” al quds al arabi, feb. 23, 1998 (trans. foreign broadcast information service), which was published for a large arab world audience and signed by usama bin ladin, ayman al zawahiri (emir of the egyptian islamic jihad), abu yasir rifa’i ahmad taha (leader of the egyptian islamic group), mir hamzah (secretary of the jamiat ul ulema e pakistan), and fazlul rahman (head of the jihad movement in bangladesh).

“bin laden’s ‘letter to america,’” observer worldview, nov. 24, 2002 (trans., online at <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world-view/story/0,11581,845725,00.html>).

for a general history of the fbi, supporting the subsequent text, see athan g. theoharis, et al., *the fbi : a comprehensive reference guide* (onyx press, 1999) ; the fbi’s authorized history, fbi report, “history of the fbi” (online at [www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historymain.htm](http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historymain.htm)); the fbi’s history as told by the federation of american scientists, “history of the fbi,” updated june 18, 2003 (online at [www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/fbi\\_hist.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/fbi_hist.htm)).



as defined by statute, covert action “means an activity or activities of the united states government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the united states government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include — (1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence[.]” 50 u.s.c. § 413b(e). executive order 12333, titled “united states intelligence activities,” terms covert action “special activities,” defined as “activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the united states government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities[.]” e.o. 12333 § 3.4(h). pursuant to that order, the cia has primary responsibility for covert action ; another nonmilitary agency may conduct covert action only if the president determines that it “is more likely to achieve a particular objective.” *ibid.* § 1.8(e).

regarding the dissolution of the oss and creation of the cia, see michael warner, *central intelligence : origin and evolution* (center for the study of intelligence, 2001)



blue 1 (developping a capture plan)

one told his colleague in malaysia that “they” were in the “ninth month [of pregnancy].”

counterterrorist center officers briefed attorney general janet reno and fbi director louis freeh, telling them that the operation had about a 30 percent chance of success.

in preparation for briefing the senate select committee on intelligence on september 2, tenet was told that the intelligence community knew more about b. l.’s network “ than about any other top tier terrorist organization.”

(developping a capture plan)

\_\_\_\_\_ albanian authorities,

he said he was “greatly concerned.”

though “jeff ” also used the 30 percent success figure, he warned that someone would surely be killed in the operation. white’s impression from the new york briefing was that the chances of capturing b. l. alive were nil.

the initial strikes had been called *operation infinite reach*. the follow-on plans were given the code name *operation infinite resolve*.

an alleged bin ladin supporter in yemen late last month remarked to his mother that he planned to work in “commerce” from abroad and said his impending “marriage,” which would take place soon, would be a “surprise”. “commerce” and “marriage” often are codewords for terrorist attacks.

zinni was even less enthusiastic than cohen and shelton about follow-on cruise missile strikes. he knew that the tomahawks did not always hit their targets.

hit him tonight — we may not get another chance.”

“mike” is the chief of the b. l. unit

over time the procedures came to be referred to as “the wall.”

individual field offices made choices to serve local priorities, not national priorities.

when doris meissner became ins commissioner in 1993, she found an agency seriously hampered by outdated technology and insufficient human resources.

the next aviation security layer was passenger prescreening. the faa directed air carriers not to fly individuals known to pose a “direct” threat to civil aviation. the faa’s “no-fly” list contained the names of just 12 terrorist suspects (including mastermind khalid sheikh mohammed),

they assembled a “terrorist kit” that included bomb-making manuals, operations guidance, videotapes advocating terrorist action against the united states, and false identification documents.

going back again and again to reclaim his \$ 400 truck rental deposit

the national security agency (nsa), the defense department signals collection agency, ramped up its communications intercept network and searched its databases for clues

the faa’s 40-person intelligence unit

the percentage of americans declaring a “highly favorable” view of the fbi dropped from 84 percent to 37 percent. the fbi’s domestic intelligence division was dissolved.

a proposed system to track foreign student visa compliance and a program to establish a way of tracking travelers’ entry to and exit from the united states.

in 1999, his plan, called *maxcap 05*, set the goal of bringing the bureau to its “maximum feasible capacity” in counterterrorism by 2005.

fbi deputy director bryant reinforced the office’s caution by informing agents that too much information sharing could be a career stopper.

reportedly, the hijackers were instructed to use items that would be undetectable by airport checkpoints.

8 - the hamburg contingent

(portraits)

was born on september 1, 1968, in kafr el sheikh, egypt, to a middle-class family headed by his father, an attorney

was born on may 9, 1978, in ras al khaimah, the united arab emirates.

when asked why he was living so frugally, shehhi responded that he was living the way the prophet had lived.

after graduating from cairo university with a degree in architectural engineering in 1990, \_\_\_ worked as an urban planner in cairo for a couple of years.

as a student, shehhi was less than a success.

similarly, when someone asked why he and atta never laughed, shehhi retorted, “how can you laugh when people are dying in palestine ?”

in the fall of 1991, he asked a german family he had met in cairo to help him continue his education in germany. they suggested he come to hamburg and invited him to live with them there, at least initially.

the transfer to hamburg did not help shehhi’s academic progress ; he was directed by the scholarship program administrators at the emirati embassy to repeat his second semester starting in august 1998, but back in bonn.

born on may 11, 1975, in mazraa, lebanon, ziad jarrah came from an affluent family and attended private, christian schools.

5.3 the hamburg contingent

after completing a course in german, he traveled to germany for the first time in july 1992.

mohamed atta was born

far from displaying radical beliefs when he first moved to germany, he arrived with a reputation for knowing where to find the best discos and beaches in beirut, and in greifswald was known to enjoy student parties and drinking beer.

in school, atta came across as very intelligent and reasonably pleasant, with an excellent command of the german language.

ramzi binalshibh was born

\_\_\_\_\_ was born on may 1, 1972, in ghayl bawazir, yemen.

marwan al shehhi was born

in september 1997, jarrah abruptly switched his intended course of study from dentistry to aircraft engineering

although jarrah’s transformation generated numerous quarrels, their breakups invariably were followed by reconciliation.

continually had academic problems, failing tests and cutting classes ; he was expelled from one school in september 1998.

born on may, ziad jarrah

he read brochures in arabic about jihad, and professed a desire not to leave the world “in a natural way.”

the apartment assumed as a center for the group, as he would write on them the notation “dar el ansar,” or “house of the followers.”

educated in morocco, bahaji returned to germany to study electrical engineering at the technical university of hamburg-harburg.

zakariya essabar, a moroccan citizen, moved to germany in february 1997 and to hamburg in 1998, where he studied medical technology.

said bahaji, son of a moroccan immigrant, was the only german citizen in the group.

(forming a cell)

mounir el motassadeq, another moroccan, came to germany in 1993, moving to hamburg two years later to study electrical engineering at the technical university.

atta and binalshibh used bahaji’s computer for internet research, as evidenced by documents and diskettes seized by german authorities.

shortly before the attacks, he would travel to afghanistan to communicate the date for the attacks to the a. q. leadership.

a witness has recalled motassadeq saying that he would kill his entire family if his religious beliefs demanded it.

abd el ghani mzoudi, also a moroccan, arrived in germany in the summer of 1993, after completing university courses in physics and chemistry.

in april 1996, mzoudi and motassadeq witnessed the execution of atta’s will.



there was no one named umar al masri. the name, apparently, was simply a code ;

in march 2000, atta emailed 31 different u.s. flight schools

in 1999, atta, binalshibh, shehhi, and jarrah decided to fight in chechnya against the russians.

going to afghanistan

according to binalshibh, a chance meeting on a train in germany caused the group to travel to afghanistan instead.

an individual named khalid al masri approached binalshibh and shehhi (because they were arabs with beards, binalshibh thinks) and struck up a conversation about jihad in chechnya.

abu musab turned out to be mohamedou ould slahi, a significant a. q. operative who, even then, was well known to u.s. and german intelligence, though neither government apparently knew he was operating in germany in late 1999.

when they arrived, slahi explained that it was difficult to get to chechnya at that time because many travelers were being detained in georgia. he recommended they go to afghanistan instead, where they could train for jihad before traveling onward to chechnya.

they were to contact someone named umar al masri at the taliban office.

slahi instructed them to obtain pakistani visas and then return to him for further directions on how to reach afghanistan.

when they later called masri and expressed interest in going to chechnya, he told them to contact abu musab in duisburg, germany.

o n c e  
a g a i n ,  
the need  
for travel  
d o c u -  
m e n t s  
dictated a.  
q.'s plans.

according to nickels, who was distancing himself from the group by this time, “atta was just too strange.”

he also carried art supplies, which he hoped would explain the presence of a box cutter if anyone asked.

a videotape of bahaji’s october 9, 1999, wedding at the quds mosque, recovered by german authorities after the september 11 attacks, depicts binalshibh giving a speech denouncing jews as a problem for all muslims. on the videotape, binalshibh also reads a palestinian war poem, and shehhi and mzoudi sing a jihad song.

“we will do something bad again”

for ksm’s learning from the first world trade center bombing and his interest in a more novel form of attack, see intelligence report, interrogation of ksm, july 1, 2003. for ksm’s interest in aircraft as weapons and speculation about striking the world trade center and cia, see intelligence report, interrogation of ksm, feb. 19, 2004.

ksm says that he permitted the trainees to view hollywood films about hijackings only after he edited the films to cover the female characters.

for the use of game software and discussions of casing flights, see intelligence report, interrogation of khallad, nov. 6, 2003.

*a media committee*

b. I. urged them to look for a u.s. warship instead

fahd al quso was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment.

/

quso did not arrive at the apartment in time to film the attack.

quso apparently fell asleep and missed the attack.

for quso not filming the attack, see fbi report of investigation, interview of fahd mohammed ahmad al-quso, feb. 3, 2001, p. 8.

instructed the media committee, then headed by khalid sheikh mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the a. q. training camps and training methods ; it also highlighted muslim suffering in palestine, kashmir, indonesia, and chechnya.

in january 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank.



highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9/11 generally rest on reports of unusual pre-9/11 trading activity in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks. some unusual trading did in fact occur, but each such trade proved to have an innocuous explanation. for example, the volume of put options — investments that pay off only when a stock drops in price—surged in the parent companies of united airlines on september 6 and american airlines on september 10 — highly suspicious trading on its face. yet, further investigation has revealed that the trading had no connection with 9/11. a single u.s.-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al qaeda purchased 95 percent of the ual puts on september 6 as part of a trading strategy that also included buying 115 000 shares of american on september 10. similarly, much of the seemingly suspicious trading in american on september 10 was traced to a specific u.s.-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on sunday, september 9, which recommended these trades.

exhaustive investigations by the securities and exchange commission, fbi, and other agencies have uncovered no evidence that anyone with advance knowledge of the attacks profited through securities transactions.

reported to have been trained in passport alteration.

before that, a. q. spent funds as quickly as it received them.

*travel*

*general financing*

the plotters eventually spent somewhere between **\$ 400 000** and **\$ 500 000** to plan and conduct their attack.

zakat

a. q. required jihadists to turn in their passports before going to the front lines in afghanistan. if they were killed, their passports were recycled for use.

khalil deek had created an electronic version of a terrorist manual, *the encyclopedia of jihad*

with this document he was able to obtain a canadian passport under the name of benni antoine noris.

the chemicals were so caustic that the men kept their windows open, despite the freezing temperatures outside, and sucked on cough drops to soothe their irritated throats.

nine months later, his attorney notified the court that he could not locate his client.

the funding\_\_\_\_\_

“the time for training is over.”

learning, among other things, how to place cyanide near the air intake of a building to achieve maximum lethality at minimum personal risk.

one of the 16, raed hijazi, worked as a cabdriver in boston, and sent money back to his fellow plotters

they obtained a cd-rom of this *encyclopedia*

after a cursory examination of ressam’s car, the ins agents allowed ressam to board the ferry.

" mike was not diplomatic ", clarke reported to berger.

from threat to threat

“the season is coming, and bodies will pile up in sacks.”

*(requirements for a successful attack)*

nonstate actors and chemical and biological weapons

he was developing a plan to attack a ship near yemen. on january 3, an attempt was made to attack a u.s.warship in aden, the uss the sullivans. the attempt failed when the small boat, overloaded with explosives, sank.

searches in amman found the rented house and, among other things, 71 drums of acids, several forged saudi passports, detonators, and deek’s *encyclopedia*

president clinton was a voracious reader of intelligence.

the *encyclopedia* is a multivolume instruction manual containing lessons on weapons handling, tactics, covert operations, bomb making, and other topics.

the manual was originally created in the late 1980s by afghanistan-based extremists, who considered it essential for waging terrorist operations and guerrilla warfare in the jihad against the soviets.

for more on the origins of the *encyclopedia*, see intelligence report, interrogation of abu zubaydah, june 24, 2003.

“within this building, they were breathless”  
cia briefing materials, “ctc *powerpoint*,”  
apr. 3, 2000.

the cia’s ben bonk told us he could not guarantee from analysis of the video feed that the man in the white robe was in fact bin ladin, but he thinks bin ladin is the “highest probability person.” (bin ladin is unusually tall).

(bin ladin is unusually tall)



**10 -**

**3 portraits**

**game simulators**

a proposal for an operation that would involve training pilots who would crash planes into buildings in the united states.

ksm also presented \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ during the summer of 2001, ksm approached b. l. with the idea of recruiting a saudi arabian air force pilot to commandeer a saudi fighter jet and attack the israeli city of eilat. b. l. reportedly liked this proposal, but he instructed ksm to concentrate on the operation first.

ksm declined : he preferred to remain independent and retain the option of working with other mujahideen groups still operating in afghanistan.

ksm does not appear to have contributed any more substantially to this operation. (on november 3, 1992, ksm wired \$660 from qatar to the bank account of yousef's co-conspirator, mohammed salameh)

terrorist *entrepreneurs*

khalid sheikh mohammed (ksm), riduan isamuddin (better known as hambali), and abd al rahim al nashiri (three subordinate commanders)

at the meeting, b. l. listened to ksm's ideas without much comment, but did ask ksm formally to join a. q. and move his family to afghanistan.

during this same period, ksm and yousef also developed plans to assassinate president clinton during his november 1994 trip to manila, and to bomb u.s.-bound cargo carriers by smuggling jackets containing nitro-cellulose on board.

highly educated and equally comfortable in a government office or a terrorist safehouse, ksm applied his imagination, technical aptitude, and managerial skills to hatching and planning an extraordinary array of terrorist schemes. these ideas included conventional car bombing, political assassination, aircraft bombing, hijacking, reservoir poisoning, and, ultimately, the use of aircraft as missiles guided by suicide operatives.

born and educated in indonesia, hambali moved to malaysia in the early 1980s to find work.

hambali

in 2001, sufaat would spend several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for a. q. in a laboratory he helped set up near the kandahar airport.

a. q. began funding ji's increasingly ambitious terrorist plans, which atef and ksm sought to expand.

thus, like any powerful bureaucrat defending his domain, hambali objected when a. q. leadership tried to assign ji members to terrorist projects without notifying him.

in that relationship, hambali became the key coordinator.

they included tawfiq bin attash, also known as khallad, who later would help bomb the uss cole, and future hijackers nawaf al hazmi and khalid al mihdhar. ksm also presented \_\_\_\_\_

although bin ladin urged nashiri to continue plotting strikes against u.s. interests in the persian gulf, nashiri maintains that he actually delayed one of these projects because of security concerns.

nashiri's november 2002 capture in the united arab emirates finally ended his career as a terrorist.

on the other hand, abd al rahim al nashiri — the mastermind of the cole bombing and the eventual head of al qaeda operations in the arabian peninsula — appears to have originally been recruited to his career as a terrorist by b. l. himself.

abd al rahim al nashiri

during this period, nashiri also led a plot to smuggle four russian-made antitank missiles into saudi arabia from yemen in early 1998 and helped an embassy bombing operative obtain a yemeni passport.

when nashiri had difficulty finding u.s. naval vessels to attack along the western coast of yemen, b. l. reportedly instructed him to case the port of aden, on the southern coast, instead.

he needed to graduate to a more novel form of attack.

the plot was now referred to within a. q. as the “planes operation.”

a study reportedly conducted by atef, while he and b. l. were still in sudan, concluded that traditional terrorist hijacking operations did not fit the needs of al qaeda, because such hijackings were used to negotiate the release of prisoners rather than to inflict mass casualties.

to overcome this problem, ksm decided to split the planes operation into two components.

ksm himself was to land the tenth plane at a u.s. airport and, after killing all adult male passengers on board and alerting the media, deliver a speech excoriating u.s. support for israel, the philippines, and repressive governments in the arab world.

while khallad was waiting for the letter from the clinic confirming the appointment, however, he was arrested by yemeni authorities. the arrest resulted from mistaken identity : khallad was driving the car of another conspirator in the ship-bombing plot who was wanted by the yemeni authorities.

the *bojinka* concept

shoe bombs,

he presents himself as an entrepreneur seeking venture capital and people.

(indeed), ksm describes a grandiose original plan : a total of ten aircraft to be hijacked, nine of which would crash into targets on both coasts — they included those eventually hit on september 11 plus cia and fbi headquarters, nuclear power plants, and the tallest buildings in california and the state of washington.

ksm

he showed them how to read phone books, interpret airline timetables, use the internet, use code words in communications, make travel reservations, and rent an apartment.

they used the game software to increase their familiarity with aircraft models and functions, and to highlight gaps in cabin security.

the mes aynak training camp was located in an abandoned russian copper mine near kabul.

b. l. paid particular attention to the 1999 training session.

khallad adds that the training involved using flight simulator computer games, viewing movies that featured hijackings, and reading flight schedules to determine which flights would be in the air at the same time in different parts of the world.

for instance, he collected western aviation magazines ; telephone directories for american cities such as san diego and long beach, california ; brochures for schools ; and airline timetables,

khallad had originally scheduled his trip in order to receive a new prosthesis at a kuala lumpur clinic called endolite,

as for hazmi and mihdhar, they had left bangkok a few days before khallad and arrived in los angeles on january 15, 2000.

those detainees are khalid sheikh mohammed, abu zubaydah, riduan isamuddin (also known as hambali), abd al rahim al nashiri, tawfiq bin attash (also known as khallad), ramzi binalshibh, mohamed al kahtani, ahmad khalil ibrahim samir al ani, ali abd al rahman al faqasi al ghamdi (also known as abu bakr al azdi), and hassan ghul.

though ksm and bin ladin knew each other from the anti-soviet campaign of the 1980s, ksm apparently did not begin working with al qaeda until after the 1998 east africa embassy bombings.

(in which nashiri is described as widely known to be one of al qaeda's most committed terrorists and, according to one of his mujahideen colleagues, so extreme in his ferocity in waging jihad that he "would commit a terrorist act 'in mecca inside the ka'aba itself ' if he believed there was a need to do so").

a. q.'s standard security practice dictated that no senior member could manage terrorist activities in a location where another senior member was operating.

evidence gathered at the time of yousef 's february 1995 arrest included dolls wearing clothes containing nitrocellulose.

(in which ksm also says *bojinka* is not serbo-croatian for "big bang," as has been widely reported, but rather a nonsense word he adopted after hearing it on the front lines in afghanistan).

hambali also was one of the founders of konsojaya, a malaysian company run by a close associate of wali khan.

prompted criticism from bashir, the ji leader, who thought hambali should focus more directly on indonesia and malaysia instead of involving himself in al qaeda's broader terrorist program.

(in which ksm also says that as *head of the media committee*, he would take charge of producing the propaganda video al qaeda issued following the bombing of the uss cole).





“it was a fat pitch, a home run.”

it was called, simply, “the plan.

the cia had no confidence in the pakistani effort.

as 1999 came to a close, the cia had a new strategic plan in place for capturing bin ladin, but no option was rated as having more than a 15 percent chance of achieving that objective.

kandahar, may 1999

cia saw a 95 percent chance of special operations command forces capturing b. l. if deployed—but less than a 5 percent chance of such a deployment.

but it also knew that massoud would act against bin ladin only if his own interests and those of the united states intersected. by early december, the cia rated this possibility at less than 15 percent.

“unfortunately,” he wrote, “the light at the end of the tunnel is another tunnel.”

clarke recently recalled that an angry sheehan asked rhetorically of defense officials : “does a. q. have to attack the pentagon to get their attention ?”

within the first weeks after the attack, the yemenis found and arrested both badawi and quso, but did not let the fbi team participate in the interrogations.

tenet walked out of a meeting of the principals. “it has web feet, flies, and quacks.”

one option was to use a small, unmanned u.s. air force drone called the *predator*, which could survey the territory below and send back video footage.  
another option—eventually dismissed as impractical—was to place a powerful long-range telescope on a mountain within range of one of b. l.’s training camps.

the paper also expressed concern about the presence of a. q. operatives in the united states

berger did not recall seeing or being briefed on the *blue sky* memo

the paper was therefore informally referred to as the “blue sky” memo

no such ultimatum was issued

shelton tasked general tommy franks, the new commander of cent-com, to look again at the options.

- o creating an interagency center to target illegal entry and human traffickers
- o imposing tighter controls on student visas
- o activating a special court to enable the use of classified evidence in immigration-related national security cases and
- o both implementing new security measures for u.s. passports and working with the united nations and foreign governments to raise global security standards for travel documents.

a strategy called *maxcap 05* that had been unveiled in the summer of 2000.

bonk told bush that americans would die from terrorism during the next four years

in march 2001, the cia's *briefing slides* for rice were still *describing*

president bush told us he asked tenet whether the cia could kill b. l., and tenet replied that killing b. l. would have an effect but would not end the threat. president bush told us tenet said to him that the cia had all the authority it needed.

rice and others recalled the president saying, "i'm tired of swatting at flies."

white house officials had seen the *predator* video of the "man in white."

the president reportedly also said, "i'm tired of playing defense. i want to play offense. i want to take the fight to the terrorists."

" that future day could happen at any time. "

executive order 12333

one line in the *briefing slides* said that a. q. had sleeper cells in more than 40 countries, including the united states

the *slides* warned, "there will be more attacks."

he could not recall any specific guidance on the topic from the secretary. brian sheridan — the outgoing assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (solic), the key counterterrorism policy office in the pentagon — never briefed rumsfeld. he departed on january 20

he had not been replaced

he told us that he was frustrated with his role and with an administration that he considered not "serious about a. q."

invoking president bush's own language, clarke wrote, "you are left with a modest effort to swat flies,

III

15) core / récit 2

on the upper and lower boundaries of these deviations were transfer hallways contained within the stairwell proper.

both towers had 110 stories, were about 1 350 feet high, and were square ; each wall measured 208 feet in length.

each tower contained three central stairwells, which ran essentially from top to bottom, and 99 elevators.

stairwells a and c ran from the 110th floor to the raised mezzanine level of the lobby.

consisted of seven buildings, including one hotel, spread across 16 acres of land.the buildings were connected by an underground mall (the concourse).

on any given workday, up to 50 000 office workers occupied the towers, and 40 000 people passed through the complex.

generally, elevators originating in the lobby ran to “sky lobbies” on higher floors, where additional elevators carried passengers to the tops of the buildings.

time runs out  
/  
time ran out.

(1 wtc, or the north tower, and 2 wtc, or the south tower) were the signature structures, containing 10.4 million square feet of office space.

stairwell b ran from the 107th floor to level b6, six floors below ground, and was accessible from the west street lobby level, which was one floor below the mezzanine.

reentry from the stairwells was generally possible on at least every fourth floor. doors leading to the roof were locked.

all three stairwells ran essentially straight up and down, except for two deviations in stairwells a and c where the staircase jutted out toward the perimeter of the building.

each hallway contained smoke doors to prevent smoke from rising from lower to upper portions of the building ;

there was no rooftop evacuation plan. the roofs of both the north tower and the south tower were sloped and cluttered surfaces with radiation hazards, making them impractical for helicopter landings and as staging areas for civilians.

although the south tower roof had a helipad, it did not meet 1994 federal aviation administration guidelines.

they were kept closed but not locked. doors leading from tenant space into the stairwells were never kept locked ;

at 12:18 p.m. on february 26, 1993,

helicopter evacuations in fact were not incorporated into the wtc fire safety plan

a 1 500-pound bomb stashed in a rental van on a parking garage ramp beneath the twin towers

the port authority acknowledges that it had no protocol for rescuing people trapped above a fire in the towers.

the public-address system and emergency lighting systems failed. the unlit stairwells filled with smoke and were so dark as to be impassable.

overwhelmed was the 911 emergency call system.

the towers lost power and communications capability.

the general evacuation of the towers' occupants via the stairwells took more than four

generators had to be shut down to ensure safety, and elevators stopped.

rescue efforts by the fire department of new york (fdny) were hampered by the inability of its radios to function in buildings as large as the twin towers.

there was no backup site.

102 minutes

- the 17 minutes from the crash of the hijacked american airlines flight 11 into 1 world trade center (the north tower) at 8:46 until the south tower was hit
- the 56 minutes from the crash of the hijacked united airlines flight 175 into 2 world trade center (the south tower) at 9:03 until the collapse of the south tower
- the 29 minutes from the collapse of the south tower at 9:59 until the collapse of the north tower at 10:28

at 8:46:40, the hijacked american airlines flight 11 flew into the upper portion of the north tower, cutting through floors 93 to 99.

evidence suggests that all three of the building's stairwells became impassable from the 92nd floor up.



north tower

many of the injuries after the 1993 bombing occurred during the evacuation.

the roof of the south tower was also engulfed in smoke because of prevailing light winds from the northwest.

a large group was reported on the 92nd floor, technically below the impact but unable to descend.

a jet fuel fireball erupted upon impact and shot down at least one bank of elevators.

the burning jet fuel immediately created thick, black smoke that enveloped the upper floors and roof of the north tower.

civilians were also trapped in elevators.

civilians trapped on or above the 92nd floor gathered in large and small groups, primarily between the 103rd and 106th floors.

the fireball exploded onto numerous lower floors, including the 77th and 22nd ; the west street lobby level ; and the b4 level, four stories below ground.

despite these obstacles, the evacuation was relatively calm and orderly.

911 : many called 911

crashing through the 77th to 85th floors.

the wing of the plane had sliced through his office

then the second plane hit.

then the second plane hit.

south tower

consistent with protocol, at 8:49 the deputy fire safety director in the south tower told his counterpart in the north tower that he would wait to hear from “the boss from the fire department or somebody” before ordering an evacuation.

they did know that the explosion had been large enough to send down a fireball that blew out elevators and windows in the lobby and that conditions were so dire that some civilians on upper floors were jumping or falling from the building.

as they entered the lobby, they encountered badly burned civilians who had been caught in the path of the fireball.

the air traffic controllers had been unaware of the incident.

did not know what the impact floors were ; they did not know if any stairwells into the impact zone were clear ; and they did not know whether water for firefighting would be available on the upper floors.

the papd lacked written standard operating procedures for personnel responding from outside commands to the wtc during a major incident

at about this time, an announcement over the public-address system in the south tower stated that the incident had occurred in the other building and advised tenants, generally, that their building was safe and that they should remain on or return to their offices or floors.

they also did not know what the fire and impact zone looked like from the outside.

they also knew from building personnel that some civilians were trapped in elevators and on specific floors.

i told them, when they answered the phone, where i was, that i had passed somebody on the 44th floor, injured—they need to get a medic and a stretcher to this floor, and described the situation in brief, and the person then asked for my phone number, or something, and they said—they put me on hold.

i was on hold a second time, and needed to repeat the story for a third time.

and so i waited a considerable amount of time. somebody else came back on the phone, i repeated the story. and then it happened again.

the operators were not given any information about the inability to conduct rooftop rescues and therefore could not advise callers that they had essentially been ruled out.

but i told the third person that i am only telling you once. i am getting out of the building, here are the details, write it down, and do what you should do.

“you gotta talk to one of my supervisors”—and suddenly i was on hold.

one person was advised to remain on the 73rd floor despite the caller’s protests that oxygen was running out.

the callers were transferred back and forth several times and advised to stay put.

evidence suggests that these callers died.

“be careful, stay near the stairwells, and wait for the police to come up”

“absolutely” evacuate.

at approximately 9:30, a civilian landed on and killed a fireman near the intersection of west and liberty streets.

pancake collapse,

“mayday, mayday, mayday”

a ladder company found a working elevator to the 40th floor and from there proceeded to climb stairwell b.

evacuation orders did not follow the protocol for giving instructions when a building’s collapse may be imminent — a protocol that includes constantly repeating “mayday, mayday, mayday” — during the 29 minutes between the fall of the south tower and that of the north tower.

(indeed, radio communications indicated that in certain cases some firemen believed that the south tower was 1 wtc when in fact it was 2 wtc.)

the chief in the lobby there directed some units to proceed to what he thought was the south tower.

in fact, he pointed them to the north tower.

“we are not fucking coming out ”

— a protocol that includes constantly repeating “mayday, mayday, mayday” —

that second button was never activated

the activation of transmission on the master handset required, however, that a second button be pressed.

incredibly, twelve firefighters, one papd officer, and three civilians who were descending stairwell b of the north tower survived its collapse.

at 9:58:59, the south tower collapsed in ten seconds,

2 973

2 973

“ all fdny, get the fuck out ! ” - not certain what to do, as no chiefs were present

("i would love to be able to tell you who did it, who brought this proposal to me, but i don't know")

it also noted that more than 25 percent of the bulk dust samples collected before september 18 showed the presence of asbestos above the agency's 1 percent benchmark.

(whitman says there is no reason for concern given epa tests for asbestos).

the national institute of standards and technology has provided a preliminary estimation that between 16,400 and 18,800 civilians were in the wtc complex as of 8:46 a.m. at most 2,152 individuals died at the wtc complex who were not (1) fire or police first responders, (2) security or fire safety personnel of the wtc or individual companies, (3) volunteer civilians who ran to the wtc after the planes' impact to help others, or (4) on the two planes that crashed into the twin towers. out of this total number of fatalities, we can account for the workplace location of 2,052 individuals, or 95.35 percent. of this number, 1,942 or 94.64 percent either worked or were supposed to attend a meeting at or above the respective impact zones of the twin towers ; only 110, or 5.36 percent of those who died,worked below the impact zone.







qualid benomrane, an arabic-speaking taxicab driver, was arrested on immigration charges in early 2002.

when asked to look at a series of photographs that included the 19 hijackers involved in the attacks, benomrane responded ambiguously, seeming first to pick out the photographs of hazmi and mihdhar but then denying that he recognized them.

whereas hazmi managed to speak broken english, mihdhar did not even have this much command of the language, which he appeared uninterested in learning.

the west coast operatives' language limitation posed a problem, as ksm had to send emails in arabic using the english alphabet.

while in san diego, bayoumi was officially employed by ercan, a subsidiary of a contractor for the saudi civil aviation administration, although a fellow employee described bayoumi as a "ghost employee," noting that he was one of many saudis on the payroll who was not required to work.

in april 2000, bayoumi received a promotion and his status was also adjusted from "single" to "married" (despite the fact that he was already married). as a result, his salary was raised and his "other allowances" stipend increased significantly, from approximately \$465 to \$3,925 a month, remaining at that level until december 2000. in january 2001, the stipend was reduced to \$3,427. it stayed constant until august 2001, when bayoumi left the united states.

on february 15, 2000, when the landlord returned a page from bayoumi's cell phone, hazmi answered the phone.

his instructor described him as a terrible pilot.

atta bought a car.

the mosque administrator also suspected that mihdhar might have been an intelligence agent of the saudi government.

both ksm and khallad were aware of hazmi's interest in finding a bride, and ksm reportedly went so far as to promise hazmi a monthly stipend of \$700 in the event he succeeded in marrying.

even after the last application was rejected, binalshibh sought ways to get a visa, such as by marrying a u.s. citizen. he corresponded by email with a woman in california, but atta told him to discontinue this effort.

two weeks in los angeles

**thumbing through a san diego phone book acquired at a karachi flea market**

the fbi found a notebook (belonging to someone else) with references to planes falling from the sky, mass killing, and hijacking

after august 25, 2001, according to his friends, he started acting strangely

hazmi and mihdhar were ill-prepared for a mission in the united states

bayoumi and bin don have been interviewed many times about the february 1, 2000, lunch

their only qualifications for this plot their only qualifications for this plot were their devotion to u. b. l., their veteran service, and their ability to get valid u.s. visas. were their devotion to u. b. l, their veteran service, and their ability to get valid u.s. visas\_\_\_\_\_

by the end of may 2000, hazmi and mihdhar had given up on learning how to fly.

he worked for a few weeks at a gas station in la mesa.

mihdhar left the country the following day.

other instructors who worked with hazmi and mihdhar remember them as poor students who focused on learning to control the aircraft in flight but took no interest in takeoffs or landings.

according to the instructor at jones, the two were aggressive, rude, and sometimes even fought with him to take over the controls during their training flights.

they turned out to have no aptitude for english

marwan al shehhi came on may 29, arriving in newark on a flight from brussels. he went to new york city and waited there for mohamed atta to join him. on june 2, atta traveled to the czech republic by bus from germany and then flew from prague to newark the next day.

on one occasion, hazmi told a fellow employee that he was planning to find a better job, and let slip a prediction that he would become famous.

he borrowed his housemate's computer for internet access, following news coverage of fighting in chechnya and bosnia. with his housemate's help, hazmi also used the internet to search for a wife (after obtaining ksm's approval to marry). this search did not succeed.

in the fall of 2000, ksm had sent moussaoui to malaysia for flight training, but moussaoui did not find a school he liked.

in early october, they took the stage i exam for instruments rating at jones aviation and failed. very upset, they said they were in a hurry because jobs awaited them at home. atta and shehhi then returned to huffman.

he worked instead on other terrorist schemes, such as buying four tons of ammonium nitrate for bombs to be planted on cargo planes flying to the united states. when ksm found out, he recalled moussaoui back to pakistan and directed him to go to the united states for flight training.

a new recruit with just the right background conveniently presented himself in afghanistan

university of arizona in tucson

ksm then trained hanjour for a few days in the use of code words

the fourth pilot

(hani hanjour)

hanjour reportedly applied to the civil aviation school in jeddah after returning home, but was rejected.

at that point, they started driving east, anticipating the arrival of the “muscle hijackers”— the operatives who would storm the cockpits and control the passengers. by as early as april 4, hanjour and hazmi had arrived in falls church, virginia

by the end of 2000, less than six months after their arrival, the three pilots on the east coast were simulating flights on large jets

in early 2001, he started training on a boeing 737 simulator at pan am international flight academy in mesa. an instructor there found his work well below standard and discouraged him from continuing.

as the summer approached, the lead operatives were settled in florida and new jersey, waiting for the rest of their contingent to join them.

he says that they returned with him to fairfield that night, and that he never saw them again.



the motorcade consisted of a military police lead vehicle and a van;

originally titled "infinite justice," the operation's code word was changed — to avoid the sensibilities of muslims who associate the power of infinite justice with god alone — to the operational name still used for operations in afghanistan : "enduring freedom."

an air force officer, sometime around 10:20, identified barksdale air force base as an appropriate interim destination.

one of these alarms was of a reported threat against air force one itself, a threat eventually run down to a misunderstood communication in the hectic white house situation room that morning.

after the attacks had occurred, while crisis managers were still sorting out a number of unnerving false alarms, air force one flew to barksdale air force base in louisiana.

when air force one landed at barksdale at about 11:45, personnel from the local secret service office were still en route to the airfield.

secretary rumsfeld wondered aloud how much evidence the united states would need in order to deal with these countries, pointing out that major strikes could take up to 60 days to assemble.

the immediate objective was to find a safe location—not too far away—where the president could land and speak to the american people.

air force one arrived at offutt at 2:50 p.m. rice said president bush began the meeting with the words, - "we're at war".

as a former pilot, the president was struck by the apparent sophistication of the operation and some of the piloting, especially hanjour's high-speed dive into the pentagon.

offutt air force base in nebraska was chosen because of its elaborate command and control facilities, and because it could accommodate overnight lodging for 50 persons.

"every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make : either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists"

a group he would later call his "war council"

attorney general john ashcroft told us that he saw his job in directing this effort as "risk minimization," both to find out who had committed the attacks and to prevent a subsequent attack.

(centcom also began dusting off plans for a full invasion of iraq during this period, franks said.)

he quoted psalm 23— "though i walk through the valley of the shadow of death..."

the government's ability to collect intelligence inside the united states, and the sharing of such information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities, was not a priority before 9/11.

mohammed atef was killed by a u.s. air strike

they considered a paper that went beyond a. q. to propose the "elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life," an aim that would include pursuing other international terrorist organizations in the middle east.

"we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."

wolfowitz cited theories that ramzi yousef was an iraqi agent and iraq was behind the 1993 attack on the world trade center

"this is civilization's fight," he said. "we ask every nation to join us"

colin powell returned from peru after hearing of the attacks

his standing in pakistan was certain to suffer

no american, he said, "will ever forget this day."

wartime

all times are eastern daylight time.

sometime around 10:30, after the decision had already been made not to return to washington, a reported threat to “angel”—the code word for air force one—was widely disseminated in the presidential emergency operations center (peoc) and aboard air force one.

screening of this flight was directed by an fbi agent in the baltimore field office who was also a pilot.

one flight, the so-called b. l. flight, departed the united states on september 20 with 26 passengers, most of them relatives of usama bin ladin.

the fbi is alleged to have had no record of the flight and denied that it occurred, hence contributing to the story of a “phantom flight.”

the company’s owner and director of operations agreed, saying that “it was just a routine little trip for us”

the pilot said he followed standard procedures and filed his flight plan with the faa prior to the flight, adding, “i was never questioned about it.” christopher steele interview (june 14, 2004)

the three saudi nationals debarked from the plane and were met by local police.

their private security guards were paid, and the police then escorted the three saudi passengers to a hotel where they joined relatives already in lexington.





*the drumbeat begins* (- the phenix memo)

each *pdb* (president's daily brief) consists of a series of six to eight relatively short articles or briefs covering a broad array of topics

the senior executive intelligence brief (*seib*), distributed to a broader group of officials, has a similar format and generally covers the same subjects as the *pdb*. it usually contains less information so as to protect sources and methods.

8 "THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED"

SUMMER OF \_\_\_\_\_ THREAT

like their predecessors, the attorney general, the fbi director, and richard clarke, the national security council (nsc) counterterrorism coordinator, all received the *seib*, not the *pdb*.

clarke and his staff had extensive access to terrorism reporting, but they did not have access to internal, nondisseminated information at the national security agency (nsa), cia, or fbi.

the faa did present a cd-rom to air carriers and airport authorities describing the increased threat to civil aviation.

no indication of any further discussion

ashcroft told him that he did not want to hear about the threats anymore

the domestic agencies did not have a game plan.  
neither the nsc (including the csg) nor anyone else instructed them to create one.

it did not suggest that there was a domestic threat

(the drumbeat begins)

it asked the offices to task all resources, including human sources and electronic databases, for any information pertaining to "current operational activities relating to sunni extremism."

a high probability of near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks


on july 27, clarke informed rice and hadley that the spike in intelligence about a near-term a. q. attack had stopped.

postponed for a few months "but will still happen."

no one was looking for a foreign threat to domestic targets.  
no one gave them direction.

he told us the threat information was "nebulous."

the source did not recognize mihdhar. but he indicated he was 90 percent certain that the other individual was khallad.




in early january 2001, two photographs from the kuala lumpur meeting were shown to the source. one was a known photograph of mihdhar, the other a photograph of a then unknown subject.

the cia asked that a kuala lumpur surveillance photo of mihdhar be shown to the joint source who had identified khallad.

identification of khallad  
(january 2001:

in december 2000, on the basis of some links associated with khalid al mihdhar, the cia's b. l. unit speculated that khallad and khalid al mihdhar might be one and the same



this meant that khallad and mihdhar were two different people

the headquarters agent complained that minneapolis's fisa request was couched in a manner intended to get people "spun up." the supervisor replied that was precisely his intent. he said he was "trying to keep someone from taking a plane and crashing into the world trade center."

because the links between ksm and b. l. were not recognized at the time, responsibility for ksm remained in the small islamic extremist branch of the counterterrorist center, not in the b. l. unit.

ksm's nickname was mukhtar

only after would it be discovered that mukhtar / ksm had communicated with a phone that was used by binalshibh, and that binalshibh had used the same phone to communicate with moussaoui, as discussed in chapter 7.

zacarias moussaoui said he did not intend to become a commercial pilot but wanted the training as an "ego boosting thing."

the *phoenix* memo

he was focused on malaysia.

no one was looking for him

she appears to have misunderstood the complex rules that could apply to this situation

john" made no effort to determine whether any of these individuals was in the united states.

he did not raise that possibility with his fbi counterpart.

finally, on september 11, the agent sent a lead to los angeles, because mihdhar had initially arrived in los angeles in january 2000

when additional pieces of the puzzle arrived in the spring and summer of 2001, they were not put together.

(they did not yet realize this was an alias for tawfiq bin attash, a.k.a. khallad)

it is also notable that virtually all the information regarding possible domestic threats came from human sources.

the information on overseas threats came mainly from signals intelligence.

jane told investigators that she viewed this matter as just another lead and so assigned no particular urgency to the matter.

officials believed that signals intelligence was more reliable than human intelligence.

the analyst's email, however, reflects that she was confusing a broad array of caveats and legal barriers to information sharing and rules governing criminal agents' use of information gathered through intelligence channels.

beginning in december 1999, these briefings were conducted based on *slides* created by the cia's b. i. unit. see richard interview (dec. 11, 2003)

the 70 full-field investigations number was a generous calculation that included fund-raising investigations.

we were able to review the slides to identify the subjects of the respective briefings.

it also counted each individual connected to an investigation as a separate full-field investigation.

"jane" did not seek oipr's permission to share this information at the meeting.

many of these investigations should not have been included, such as the one that related to a dead person, four that concerned people who had been in long-term custody, and eight that had been closed well before august 6, 2001.

no one who was at the meeting suggested that option, however.

"jane" also apparently did not realize that one of the agents in attendance was a designated intelligence agent, so she could have shared all of the information with that agent regardless of the caveats.

for people not thinking a second plane would hit, see, e.g., panynj interview 7 (june 2, 2004).

hazmi and mihdhar used their true names to obtain california driver's licenses and open new jersey bank accounts.

hazmi also had a car registered and had been listed in the san diego telephone book.

she said the answer she received to both questions was no.

[www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/fdny/media/tribute/tribute.html](http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/fdny/media/tribute/tribute.html)  
[www.panynj.gov/abouttheportauthority/portauthoritypolice/inmemoriam/](http://www.panynj.gov/abouttheportauthority/portauthoritypolice/inmemoriam/)  
[www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/memorial\\_01.html](http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/memorial_01.html)

an fbi *bolo* (*be on the lookout*) combined with a media campaign.

40

184

2,749





this weakly policed area is sometimes called "the wild frontier."

recruitment and selection

assembling the teams

despite the phrase widely used to describe them, the so-called muscle hijackers were not at all physically imposing; most were between 5' 5" and 5' 7" in height.

salem's family recalled him as a quarrelsome teenager.

although ahmed al ghamdi, hamza al ghamdi and saeed al ghamdi attended prayer services regularly and omari often served as an imam at his mosque in saudi arabia, suqami and salem al hazmi appeared unconcerned with religion and, contrary to islamic law, were known to drink alcohol.

all were between 20 and 28 years old ; most were unemployed with no more than a high school education and were unmarried.

several family members remembered that their relatives had expressed a desire to participate in jihad, particularly in chechnya.

ksm states that several of the muscle hijackers faced problems traveling to chechnya and so went to afghanistan, where they were drawn into a. q.

the majority of these saudi recruits began to break with their families in late 1999 and early 2000.

a number of saudi mujahideen who tried to go to chechnya in 1999 to fight the russians were stopped at the turkish-georgian border. upon arriving in turkey, they received phone calls at guesthouses in places such as istanbul and ankara, informing them that the route to chechnya via georgia had been closed. these saudis then decided to travel to afghanistan, where they could train and wait to make another attempt to enter chechnya during the summer of 2000. while training at a. q. camps, a dozen of them heard b. l.'s speeches, volunteered to become suicide operatives, and eventually were selected as muscle hijackers for the planes operation. khallad says he met a number of them at the kandahar airport, where they were helping to provide extra security.

what brought you to afghanistan ? how did you travel here ? how did you hear about us ? what attracted you to the cause ? what is your educational background ? where have you worked before ?

(whether they were prepared to serve as suicide operatives) ; those who answered in the affirmative were interviewed by senior a. q. lieutenant muhammad atef.

ksm claims that the most important quality for any al qaeda operative was willingness to martyr himself.

(upon arriving in afghanistan, a recruit would fill out an application with standard questions, such as,)

ksm claims that the most important quality for any al qaeda operative was willingness to martyr himself.

after the selection and oath-swearing, the operative would be sent to ksm for training and the filming of a martyrdom video, a function ksm supervised as *head of a. q.'s media committee*.

they were subjected to artificial stresses to measure their psychological fitness and commitment to jihad.

the second most important criterion was demonstrable patience, khallad says, because the planning for such attacks could take years.

in addition to the operatives who eventually participated in the attacks as muscle hijackers, b. l. apparently selected at least nine other saudis who, for various reasons, did not end up taking part in the operation : mohamed mani ahmad al kahtani, khalid saeed ahmad al zahrani, ali abd al rahman al faqasi al ghamdi, saeed al baluchi, qutaybah al najdi, zuhair al thubaiti, saeed abduallah saeed al ghamdi, saud al rashid, and mushabib al hamlan.

a tenth individual, a tunisian with canadian citizenship named abderraouf jdey, may have been a candidate to participate in 9/11, or he may have been a candidate for a later attack. these candidate hijackers either backed out, had trouble obtaining needed travel documents, or were removed from the operation by the a. q. leadership.

khallad believes ksm wanted between four and six operatives per plane. ksm states that al qaeda had originally planned to use 25 or 26 hijackers but ended up with only the 19.

he also trained them in bodybuilding and provided them with a few basic english words and phrases.

according to ksm, abu turab even had the trainees butcher a sheep and a camel with a knife to prepare to use knives during the hijackings

according to ksm, the muscle did not learn the full details before reaching the united states.

he also taught them about everyday aspects of life in the west, such as purchasing clothes and ordering food.

the last muscle hijacker to arrive was khalid al mihdhar.

the muscle hijackers began arriving in the united states in late april 2001, in orlando or miami, florida ; washington, d.c. ; or new york. they traveled in pairs on tourist visas.

he had abandoned hazmi in san diego in june 2000 and returned to his family in yemen. mihdhar reportedly stayed in yemen for about a month before khallad persuaded him to return to afghanistan. mihdhar complained about life in the united states.

suqami was the only hijacker not to obtain a u.s. identification document.

muhammad mani ahmad al kahtani <currently in custody> is the last known saudi muscle candidate to be sent to the united states, in early august 2001, to round out the number of hijackers. was refused entry.

khalid saeed ahmad al zahrani traveled to afghanistan illegally after being prohibited by saudi authorities from leaving saudi arabia. after being assigned to a mission in the u.s., he secretly reentered the kingdom but failed in an attempt to have his name removed from the list of prohibited travelers so that he could obtain a u.s. visa.

ali abd al rahman al faqasi al ghamdi (aka abu bakr al azdi) reportedly was to have been part of the planes operation but was held in reserve by bin ladin for a later, even larger operation. like other muscle hijackers, he reportedly set out for chechnya but diverted to afghanistan.

saeed al baluchi and qutaybah al najdi. both were sent to saudi arabia via bahrain, where najdi was stopped and briefly questioned by airport security officials. both were so frightened by the experience that they withdrew from the operation. ksm urged baluchi to obtain a u.s. visa, but baluchi refused, fearing that he might be watchlisted at the u.s. embassy.

zuhair al thubaiti has reportedly admitted membership in al qaeda, stating “proudly” that he was among a select number of operatives who had the personal endorsement of bin ladin. he was not ultimately selected for the attacks because the a. q. leadership considered him too high-strung and lacking the necessary temperament.

saeed abdullah saeed (“jihad”) al ghamdi. he arranged to travel to afghanistan in march 2000, swore allegiance to bin ladin (agreeing to serve as a suicide operative), and was sent to saudi arabia by ksm with hijacker ahmad al haznawi to obtain a u.s. visa, but his visa application was denied because he appeared to be intending to immigrate.

a videotape of jdey’s martyrdom statement was found in the rubble of atef’s house near kabul following a november 2001 airstrike, together with a martyrdom video of binalshibh.

shehri and another individual (presumably suqami) settled in hollywood, florida, moving into a motel on april 30.

he stayed at a hotel in lake buena vista with an unidentified male through july 12.

in december 1999, while still in high school in saudi arabia, hamlan became involved with a group that gathered periodically to watch jihad propaganda tapes, and was encouraged by a mentor named bandar marui to pursue jihad, especially as practiced in the bosnia-herzegovina and russian-afghan wars and a book titled *gladiator of pas-*

describing saud al rashid as headstrong and immature, ksm says he disappeared after being sent to saudi arabia for a u.s. visa, either because he had second thoughts or because his family interceded and confiscated his passport. passport photos of rashid and three 9/11 hijackers — nawaf al hazmi, mihdhar, and omari — were found together during a may 2002 raid in karachi.

sent to saudi arabia to acquire a u.s. visa, mushabib al hamlan and his travel companion, hijacker ahmed al nami, both applied for and received visas on october 28, 2000. hamlan never returned to afghanistan, probably dropping out either because he changed his mind or because his family intervened.

ksm says jdey was slated for a “second wave” of attacks but had dropped out by the summer of 2001 while in canada.

ksm also taught the muscle hijackers english and provided lessons about airplanes.

ksm told them to meet with atef before returning to saudi arabia, where they should contact hijacker future hijacker waleed al shehri for additional documentation.

abderraouf jdey, a.k.a. faruq al tunisi. a canadian passport holder, he may have trained in afghanistan with khalid al mihdhar and nawaf al hazmi and received instruction from ksm with atta and binalshibh.

mihdhar gave his intended address as the marriott hotel, new york city, but instead spent one night at another new york hotel.

his conduct, however, raised the suspicions of his flight instructor

noting his concern and the potential for delay, ksm at one point instructed binalshibh to send “the skirts” to “sally”—a coded instruction to binalshibh to send funds to zacarias mouss-

a. q. members received advice and training from hezbollah

before binalshibh left spain, he gave atta eight necklaces and eight bracelets that atta had asked him to buy when he was recently in bangkok, believing that if the hijackers were clean shaven and well dressed, others would think them wealthy saudis and give them less notice.

atta replied that he could not yet provide a date because he was too busy organizing the arriving hijackers and still needed to coordinate the timing of the flights so that the crashes would occur simultaneously.

on august 16, once the instructor reported his suspicion to the authorities, moussaoui was arrested by the ins on immigration charges

if atta could not strike the wtc, he planned to crash his aircraft directly into the streets of new york.

atta did not believe they would need any other weapons

according to binalshibh, had b. l. and ksm learned that moussaoui had been detained, they might have canceled the operation

they discussed targets in coded language, pretending to be students discussing various fields of study : “architecture” referred to the world trade center, “arts” the pentagon, “law” the capitol, and “politics” the white house.

through august, the hijackers kept busy with their gym training and the pilots took frequent practice flights on small rented aircraft

all 19 tickets were booked and purchased between august 25 and september 5

b. l. pressed particularly strongly for the latter date in two letters stressing the need to attack early.

according to binalshibh, atta used a riddle to convey the date in code—a message of two branches, a slash, and a lollipop

although atta had forbidden the hijackers to contact their families, he apparently placed one last call to his own father on september 9. jarrah alone appears to have left a written farewell — a sentimental letter to aysel senguen.

now 19 men waited in *nondescript* hotel rooms to board four flights the next morning.

during the summer of 2001, b. l. was reputed to have remarked, “i will make it happen even if i do it by myself.”

they stayed in a motel during the first week in september and spent time working out at a gym.

one witness quotes salmi as commenting after the attacks, “i knew they were going to do something, that is why i got married.”

ksm claims b. l. told him it would be enough for the hijackers simply to down planes rather than crash them into specific targets. ksm says he resisted the pressure.

from the taliban’s perspective, an attack against the united states might be counterproductive

awadallah said “it is finally going to happen” as the others celebrated by giving each other high fives.

mullah omar is reported to have opposed this course of action for ideological reasons. he is said to have preferred for a. q. to attack jews, not necessarily the united states.

b. l. also reportedly thought an attack against the united states would benefit *the foundation* by attracting more suicide operatives, eliciting greater donations, and increasing the number of sympathizers willing to provide logistical assistance.

ksm claims to have assigned the pentagon specifically to hanjour, the operation's most experienced pilot.

in tehran, arrangements were made for them to fly to qatar.

according to binalshibh, he took each of the muscle hijackers shopping for clothes and set them up with email accounts during their time in karachi.

from qatar they traveled onward to the uae and then to mecca.

nami called ksm, who told them to return to afghanistan the next day.

during the trip, ghalyoun videotaped a number of u.s. landmarks, including the world trade center.

hamlan returned to college and resumed living with his parents, who confiscated his passport.

in jeddah, they briefly shared an apartment with shehri, who provided them with directions to the consulate and showed them how to fill out the visa application.

ksm also says that he and atef were so concerned about this lack of discretion that they urged bin ladin not to make any additional remarks about the plot.

the conversation was brief and, according to senguen, not unusual.

told by his brother that their mother had fallen ill, hamlan decided not to return to afghanistan even after nami reminded him of his allegiance to bin ladin and commitment to complete the suicide mission.

in the early morning hours of september 11, jarrah made one final call to senguen from his hotel.

thereafter, hamlan received a visit at the college from a former associate at al faruq camp, khalid al zahrani, who asked why he had not returned to afghanistan. zahrani admitted having been sent by ksm to convince hamlan to return to afghanistan. hamlan never did.



making atm withdrawals, eating pizza, and shopping at a convenience store.

(the two spent their last night pursuing ordinary activities :





WHAT TO DO ? A GLOBAL STRATEGY

what to do—how to do it

agencies need to be able to measure success.  
standards for performance \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ (they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.)

an attack is probably coming ; it may be terrible.

afghanistan seemed very far away.  
to members of a. q., america seemed  
very close. in a sense, they were  
more globalized than we were.

foresight / hindsight

institutionalizing imagination : the  
case of aircraft as weapons

imagination is not a gift usual-  
ly associated with bureaucracies.  
it is therefore crucial to find a way  
of routinizing, even bureaucratiz-  
ing, the exercise of imagination.

he dismissed the idea that he had been wandering around the situation room alone, saying, "i don't do that."

he said that he did not think that any president would roam around looking for something to do.

clarke said he had found the president's tone "very intimidating", president bush doubted that anyone would have found his manner intimidating.

the original "infinite justice" name was a continuation of a series of names begun in august 1998 with operation infinite reach, the air strikes against b. l's facilities in afghanistan and sudan after the embassy bombings.

the series also included operation infinite resolve, a variety of proposed follow-on strikes on a. q. targets in afghanistan.

since u.s. attacks were expected in afghanistan, an american attack in south america or southeast asia might be a surprise to the terrorists.

(nearly two-thirds of the known leaders of the *foundation* had been killed or captured).

also, in february 1974, a man named samuel byck attempted to commandeer a plane at baltimore washington international airport with the intention of forcing the pilots to fly into washington and crash into the white house to kill the president.

the man was shot by police and then killed himself on the aircraft while it was still on the ground at the airport.

opening the islamic conference of muslim leaders from around the world on october 16, 2003, then malaysian prime minister mahathir mohamad said :

“but today the jews rule the world by proxy. they get others to fight and die for them.”

the current lack of a single convention for transliterating arabic names enabled the 19 hijackers to vary the spelling of their names to defeat name-based watchlist systems and confuse any potential efforts to locate them.

the introduction of biometric identifiers will help

the gradual introduction of biometric identifiers will help

the icao should discuss the adoption of a standard requiring a digital code for all names that need to be translated into the roman alphabet, ensuring one common spelling for all countries.



*WOULD*

(*may* \_\_\_\_\_ + *should* \_\_\_\_\_)

*a firm tripod of policies to*

- attack terrorists and their organizations ;
- prevent the continued growth of islamist terrorism ;
- protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

*a complex international terrorist operation appears to require*

- time, space, and ability to perform competent planning and staff work ;
- a command structure able to make necessary decisions and possessing the authority and contacts to assemble needed people, money, and materials ;
- opportunity and space to recruit, train, and select operatives with the needed skills and dedication, providing the time and structure required to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge their trustworthiness, and hone their skills ;
- a logistics network able to securely manage the travel of operatives, move money, and transport resources (like explosives) where they need to go ;
- access, in the case of certain weapons, to the special materials needed for a nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological attack ;
- reliable communications between coordinators and operatives ;
- opportunity to test the workability of the plan.

*if you were a terrorist leader today, where would you locate your base ?*

- western pakistan and the pakistan-afghanistan border region
- southern or western afghanistan
- the arabian peninsula, especially saudi arabia and yemen, and the nearby horn of africa, including somalia and extending southwest into kenya
- southeast asia, from thailand to the southern philippines to indonesia
- west africa, including nigeria and mali
- european cities with expatriate muslim communities, especially cities in central and eastern europe where security forces and border controls are less effective

“changing the engine while flying”

a useful analogy

the defense intelligence agency and the service production agencies are the institutional memory and reference source for enemy order of battle, enemy organization, and enemy equipment.

the joint staff and all the theater commands still have their own j-2s.

the dci's counterterrorist center would become a cia unit, to handle the direction and execution of tasks assigned to

the ctc would rely on the restructured cia (discussed in section 13.2) to organize, train, and equip its personnel.

the fbi's counterterrorism division would remain, as now, the operational arm of the bureau to combat terrorism.

the counterterrorism division would rely on the fbi's office of intelligence to train and equip its personnel, helping to process and report the information gathered in the field.

the defense department's unified commands—socom, northcom, and centcom—would be the joint operational centers taking on dod tasks.

smaller and more efficient.  
it should be an authoritative reference base on the transnational terrorist organizations

the department of homeland security's directorate for information analysis and infrastructure protection should retain its core duties, but the nctc should have the ultimate responsibility for producing net assessments that utilize homeland security's analysis of domestic vulnerabilities and integrate all-source analysis of foreign intelligence about the terrorist enemy.

how to do it ? a different way of *organizing*

this center would offer an integrated depiction of groups like al qaeda or hezbollah worldwide, overseas, and in the united states.

their people, goals, strategies, capabilities, networks of contacts and support, the context in which they operate, and their characteristic habits across the life cycle of operations—recruitment, reconnaissance, target selection, logistics, and travel.

the proposed national counterterrorism center should offer one-stop shopping to agencies with counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities.

**a biometric screening system**  
they may seek to acquire a passport  
they may apply for a visa  
they may transit to another gate to get on an airplane  
they stop at ticket counters, gates, and exit controls at airports and seaports. upon arrival, they pass through inspection points  
once inside the country, they may seek another form of identification and try to enter a government or private facility  
they may seek to change immigration status in order to remain  
each of these checkpoints or portals is a screening—a chance to establish that people are who they say they are and are seeking access for their stated purpose, to intercept identifiable suspects, and to take effective action

**what information is an individual required to present and in what form?**  
a lack of standardized information in “feeder” documents used in identifying individuals.  
biometric identifiers that measure unique physical characteristics, such as facial features, fingerprints, or iris scans, and reduce them to digitized, numerical statements called algorithms, are just beginning to be used.  
travel history, however, is still recorded in passports with entry-exit stamps called cachets.

**how will the individual and the information be checked ?**

**who will screen individuals, and what will they be trained to do ?**

**what are the consequences of finding a suspicious indicator, and who will take action ?**

**how much money should be set aside for criteria not directly related to risk ?**

**can useful criteria to measure risk and vulnerability be developed that assess all the many variables ?**

on tuesday morning, the 19 hijackers were screened by a computer-assisted screening system called *capps*

a biometric screening program, called us *visit* (the united states visitor and immigrant status indicator technology program).

more than half were identified for further inspection, which applied only to their checked luggage

good people who have worked in such jobs for a long time understand this phenomenon well

competing risks include "false positives"

two reforms are needed soon : (1) screening people for explosives, not just their carry-on bags, and (2) improving screener performance

preparedness should include  
(1) a plan for evacuation,  
(2) adequate communications capabilities, and  
(3) a plan for continuity of operations

hard choices must be made

at several points in our inquiry, we asked -“who is responsible for defending us at home?”

private-sector preparedness is a cost of doing business in the post-9/11 world

to win the cold war

“watchlisting”, “information sharing”, “connecting the dots”

we regularly asked witnesses : **who is the quarterback?**

the national reconnaissance office was formed to organize the work of the cia and several defense agencies in space

(comparing enemy capabilities and intentions against u.s. defenses and countermeasures)

track implementation

**members of the u.s. intelligence community**

office of the director of central intelligence, which includes the office of the deputy director of central intelligence for community management, the community management staff, the terrorism threat integration center, the national intelligence council, and other community offices

the central intelligence agency (cia), which performs human source collection, all-source analysis, and advanced science and technology national intelligence agencies:

- national security agency (nsa), which performs signals collection and analysis
- national geospatial-intelligence agency (nga), which performs imagery collection and analysis
- national reconnaissance office (nro), which develops, acquires, and launches space systems for intelligence collection
- other national reconnaissance programs
- departmental intelligence agencies :
  - defense intelligence agency (dia) of the department of defense
  - intelligence entities of the army, navy, air force, and marines
  - bureau of intelligence and research (inr) of the department of state
  - office of terrorism and finance intelligence of the department of treasury
  - office of intelligence and the counterterrorism and counterintelligence divisions of the federal bureau of investigation of the department of justice
  - office of intelligence of the department of energy
  - directorate of information analysis and infrastructure protection (iaip) and directorate of coast guard intelligence of the department of homeland security

***counterproliferation, crime and narcotics, and china***

**six problems that have become apparent before and after :**

- structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work
- lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide
- divided management of national intelligence capabilities
- weak capacity to set priorities and move resources
- too many jobs
- too complex and secret

acquiring the systems, training the people, executing the operations

developing a stronger language program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives

a decentralized network model

unglamorous “back office”

ensuring a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection at the operational level

the intelligence community currently makes information shareable by creating “tearline” reports, with the nonshareable information at the top and then, below the “tearline,” the portion that recipients are told they can share. this proposal reverses that concept. all reports are created as tearline data, with the shareable information at the top and with added details accessible on a system that requires permissions or authentication.



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" ô peuple américain, je m'adresse à toi afin de te parler du meilleur moyen d'éviter un nouveau manhattan, de la guerre, de ses causes et de ses conséquences.

all the operations should be carried out within 20 minutes

all of a sudden he was affected by these monarchies

je suis surpris par toi.

aussi te raconterai-je l'histoire derrière ces événements et te raconterai-je toute la vérité sur ces moments durant lesquels la décision fut prise pour que tu puisse te demander

mener les opérations dans un délai de 20 minutes

(transcription française du discours d'ousama bin ladin tirée d'une cassette vidéo diffusée par aljazeera le vendredi 29 octobre.)

dieu nous est témoin que l'idée d'attaquer les tours ne nous avait pas traversé l'esprit

ils ont appelé cela le " patriot act "

alors que je regardais les tours détruites au liban, je me suis dit qu'il fallait punir l'injuste de la même façon et détruire les tours en Amérique

une détermination forte à punir l'injuste

j'y ai pensé

il pensait qu'écouter un enfant parler de sa chèvre (...) était plus important que les avions

les événements qui m'ont affecté directement sont ceux de 1982

so i shall talk to you about the story behind those events and i shall tell you truthfully about the moments in which the decision was taken for you to consider

comment explique-t-il que nous n'ayons pas attaqué la suède, par exemple.

mais tout à coup, il a été touché par ces monarchies

but i am amazed at you

people of united states, this talk of mine is for you and concerns the ideal way to prevent another manhattan and deals with the war and its causes and results.

i say to you allah knows that it had never occurred to us to strike towers

it seemed to him that occupying himself by talking to the little girl about the goat and its butting was more important than occupying himself with the planes

the events that affected my soul in a difficult way started in 1982

if so, then let him explain why did not strike - for example - sweden

(english transcript of usama bin ladin's speech in a videotape aired by aljazeera on friday 29 october)

it came to my mind

and as i looked at those demolished towers in lebanon it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressors in kind and that we destroy towers in america

a strong resolve to punish the oppressors

they named it the patriot act

toute la nuit ravagé la tour windsor à madrid

les parois de verre avaient la particularité de changer de couleur selon l'éclairage du jour.

les parois de verre se sont effondrées dans les rues voisines.

"j'étais couché quand mon amie a vu les images à la télévision, nous nous sommes habillés et sommes allés voir", a confié l'un d'entre eux aux journalistes.

jugeant la situation "à hauts risques".

"ça m'a immédiatement fait penser aux attaques contre les twin towers de new york en septembre 2001".

le chef du gouvernement espagnol, josé luis rodriguez zapatero, s'est rendu dimanche après-midi sur les lieux du sinistre et a rendu hommage à "tous ceux qui se sont consacrés corps et âme à combattre cette catastrophe".

après 17 heures d'incendie, il ne restait plus de ce gratte-ciel d'une trentaine d'étages, haut de 106 mètres, du quartier financier et d'affaires du nord de la capitale, qu'un squelette calciné et fumant, présentant des poutres d'acier tordues par la chaleur.

"nous avons connu l'incendie le plus important de l'histoire de madrid, mais pas le pire, car heureusement nous n'avons à déplorer aucun mort et aucun blessé grave", a commenté le maire de madrid, roberto ruiz gallardon sur place.

il tue tout le monde sans excep-  
tion

(je connais ses habitudes)

je savais qu'il \_\_\_\_\_

je ne veux pas parler du portrait  
de wilson sur l'autre page car le  
photographe était anglais

j'aime aider. c'est pourquoi j'irai  
chez clémenceau et je lui dirai que  
je n'ai pas de révolver.

je veux décrire une autre  
promenade

je veux que les hommes compren-  
nent que la mort du corps n'est pas  
une chose affreuse, c'est pourquoi  
je vais raconter ma promenade.

les lloyd-georgiens veulent avoir  
en france un homme qui a fait de  
la prison.

je sais que je gagnerai car je suis  
avec dieu

le docteur frantel te (me) ressent

je ne comprenais pas la distance.

je sais que l'impression abîme les yeux, c'est pourquoi je veux qu'on photographie mes écrits. la photographie abîme un seul oeil, mais l'impression en abîme plusieurs.

je veux qu'on photographie mon manuscrit, seulement j'ai peur d'abîmer la photographie.

dieghilev a deux fausses dents devant.

les surveillants ne peuvent pas faire l'éducation des enfants car ils ne sont pas mariés.

j'aimais les voitures car je pouvais tirer sur les passants.

j'ai jeté l'alliance encore une fois car j'ai senti qu'elle avait envie de viande.

je ne comprenais pas cet évangile car il était en polonais et en latin.

j'ai peu vécu. je n'ai vécu que six mois.

je sais que les enfants qui mangent de la viande se masturbent.

je me masturberai et je ferai du spiritisme.

j'ai compris que si les gens continuent à vivre ainsi, (ils seront sans orteils)

je sais ce que c'est qu'un soldat. j'ai vu beaucoup d'images, et en plus, j'ai une forte imagination.

je comprends le sens du charbon.

je travaillais sur un système de notation car je n'avais rien à faire.

je voudrais raconter une autre promenade.



je me masturberai et je ferai du spiritisme.

je comprends le sens du charbon.

je lui dirai que je n'ai pas de  
révolver.

je ne comprenais pas la distance.


j'ai peu vécu. je n'ai vécu que six  
mois.

(ils seront sans orteils)


je sais ce que c'est qu'un soldat.

je voudrais raconter une autre promenade

*index & cartes*



The World Trade Center Radio Repeater System  
 Rendering by Marco Crupi



The World Trade Center North Tower Stairwell with Deviation  
 Rendering by Marco Crupi

APPENDIX B

TABLE OF NAMES

U.S. OFFICIALS

Madeleine Albright  
Charles Allen  
Richard Armitage  
Larry Arnold  
John Ashcroft  
Monte Belger  
Samuel “Sandy” Berger  
J. Cofer Black  
Joshua Bolten  
Robert “Bear” Bryant  
George H.W. Bush  
George W. Bush  
Andrew Card, Jr.  
Richard B. Cheney  
Richard Clarke  
William J. Clinton  
William Cohen  
Caysan Bin Don  
Zakariya Essabar  
Jamal Ahmed Mohamed al Fadl  
Ahmed al Ghamdi  
Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi  
Hamza al Ghamdi  
Saeed al Ghamdi  
Saeed (“Jihad”) al Ghamdi  
Hassan Ghul  
Abu Hafis al Masri  
Abu Hafis al Mauritanian  
Wadi al Hage  
Mushabib al Hamlan  
Hani Hanjour  
Mustafa al Hawsawi  
Nawaf al Hazmi  
Salem al Hazmi  
Ahmad al Hazzawi  
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar  
Saddam Hussein  
Zein al Abideen  
Mohamed Hussein  
Abu Hajer al Iraqi  
Riduwan Isamuiddin  
Ziad Jarrah  
Abderraouf Jdey

Secretary of State, 1997–2001  
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, 1998–  
Deputy Secretary of State, 2001–  
Commander, First Air Force and Commander of the Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Region, 1997–2002  
Attorney General, 2001–  
Acting Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration 1997–2002  
National Security Advisor, 1997–2001; Deputy National Security Advisor 1993–1997  
Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, 1999–2002  
White House Deputy Chief of Staff, 2001–2003  
Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997–1999  
41st President of the United States, 1989–1993; Vice President, 1981–1989  
43rd President of the United States, 2001–  
White House Chief of Staff, 2001–  
Vice President of the United States, 2001–  
National Counterterrorism Coordinator, NSC, 1997–2001  
42nd President of the United States, 1993–2001  
Secretary of Defense, 1997–2001  
num plot to destroy tourist landmarks in Jordan (a.k.a. Isamu Dyson, a.k.a. Clayton Morgan) U.S. citizen; met two 9/11 hijackers in Los Angeles and San Diego, CA  
Moroccan; Hamburg cell associate  
Sudanese; al Qaeda member who defected to the United States in 1996  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (UA 175) (deceased)  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (AA 77) (deceased)  
Saudi; candidate 9/11 hijacker; currently in U.S. custody  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (UA 175) (deceased)  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (UA 93) (deceased)  
Saudi; candidate 9/11 hijacker  
Pakistani; al Qaeda facilitator; currently in U.S. custody  
see Mohammed Atef  
Mauritanian; senior al Qaeda theologian  
U.S. citizen; al Qaeda operative; Bin Ladin’s personal assistant; convicted in embassy bombings trial  
Saudi; candidate 9/11 hijacker  
Saudi; 9/11 pilot/hijacker (AA 77) (deceased)  
Saudi; al Qaeda media committee member; financial and travel facilitator for 9/11 plot  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (AA 77) (deceased)  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (AA 77) (deceased)  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (UA 93) (deceased)  
Afghani; founder and leader of the Hizb-e-Islami, a Taliban opposition group; Prime Minister of Afghanistan, 1993–1994; 1996  
President of Iraq, 1979–2003  
(a.k.a. Abu Zubaydah) Palestinian; al Qaeda associate; currently in U.S. custody  
see Mamdouh Mahmud Salim  
(a.k.a. Hambali) Indonesian; operational leader of Jemaah Islamiya; currently in U.S. custody  
Lebanese; 9/11 pilot/hijacker (UA 93) (deceased)  
(a.k.a. Faruq al Tunisi) Tunisian/Canadian; candidate 9/11 hijacker

Roger Cressey  
Ralph Eberhart  
Tommy Franks  
Louis Freeh  
Scott Fry  
Jane Garvey  
Newt Gingrich  
Rudolph Giuliani  
John Gordon  
Al Gore, Jr.  
Scott Gratton  
Stephen Hadley  
Dennis Hastert  
Karl Inderfurth  
Donald Kerrick  
Zalmay Khalilzad  
Anthony Lake  
Trent Lott  
Mary McCarthy  
John McLaughlin  
William Milam  
Norman Mineta  
Robert Mueller  
Richard Myers  
John O’Neill  
Paul O’Neill  
James Pavitt  
Thomas Pickard  
Mohamed al Kahtani  
Mir Amal Kansil  
Hamid Karzai  
Younis Khalis  
Khallad  
Wali Khan Amin Shah  
Ibn al Khattab  
L’Houssaine Kherchtou  
Usama Bin Ladin  
Ibn al Shaykh al Libi  
Ahmed al Nami  
Sheikh Saeed al Masri  
Ahmed Shah Massoud  
Khalid al Mihdhar  
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed  
Majed Moqed  
Moumir el Motassadeq  
Zacarias Moussaoui  
Hosni Mubarak  
Pervez Musharraf  
Abdelghani Mzoudi  
Qutaybah al Najdi  
Abd al Rahim al Nashiri  
Mullah Mohammed Omar  
AbdulAziz al Omari  
Muammar Qadhafi

NSC counterterrorism official, 1999–2001  
Commander in Chief, NORAD and U.S. Space Command, 2000–  
Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 2001–2003  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1993–2001  
Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998–2000  
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, 1997–2002  
Speaker of the House, 1995–1999  
Mayor, City of New York, 1994–2001  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1997–2000  
Vice President of the United States, 1993–2001  
Fry’s Chief Information Operations Officer, 2000–2001  
Deputy National Security Advisor, 2001–  
Speaker of the House, 1999–  
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, 1997–2001  
Deputy National Security Advisor, 2000–2001  
NSC Senior Director for Near East and South Asia and Special Envoy to Afghanistan, 2001–2003  
National Security Advisor, 1993–1997  
Senate Majority Leader, 1996–2001  
NSC senior director for intelligence, 1998–2001  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 2000–2004  
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, 1998–2001  
Secretary of Transportation, 2001–  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001–  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, September 2001–; Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman, 2000–2001  
FBI Special Agent in Charge for National Security, New York Field Office, 1997–2001; Chief of Security of the World Trade Center, killed on 9/11  
Secretary of the Treasury, 2001–2002  
Deputy Director of Operations, CIA, 1999–2004  
Acting Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, June 25, 2001–September 4, 2001  
Saudi; candidate 9/11 hijacker; currently in U.S. custody  
Pakistani; extremist who killed two CIA employees at CIA headquarters in Virginia in 1993 (executed)  
Interim Leader and later President of Afghanistan, Dec. 2001–  
Afghani; leader of Hizb-e-Islami; hosted UBL upon his return to Afghanistan in 1996  
see Tawfiq bin Attash  
(a.k.a. Osama Asmurai) Turkmen; early associate of Usama Bin Ladin; convicted in Manila air (Bojinka) plot  
Saudi; mujahid leader in Chechnya  
(a.k.a. Joe the Moroccan, Abu Talal) Moroccan; former al Qaeda member who broke with Bin Ladin and became a U.S. government informant  
Saudi; head of al Qaeda  
Libyan; head of jihadist training camp in Afghanistan  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (UA 93) (deceased)  
Egyptian; head of al Qaeda finance committee  
Leader of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, a Taliban opposition group (assassinated Sept. 9, 2001)  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (AA 77) (deceased)  
(RSM) (a.k.a. Mukhtar) Pakistani; mastermind of 9/11 attacks; currently in U.S. custody  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (AA 77) (deceased)  
Moroccan; Hamburg cell associate  
French; arrested in the U.S. in connection with the 9/11 attacks  
President of Egypt, 1981–  
Leader of Pakistan, 1999–  
Moroccan; Hamburg cell associate  
Saudi; candidate 9/11 hijacker  
(a.k.a. Mullah Bilal) Saudi; mastermind of USS Cole attack; currently in U.S. custody  
Leader of Afghanistan’s Taliban, which ruled most of the country from 1996 to 2001  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (AA 11) (deceased)  
Leader of Libya, 1970–

Thomas Pickering  
Colin Powell  
Ronald Reagan  
Janet Reno  
Condoleezza Rice  
Bill Richardson  
Thomas Ridge  
Bruce Riedel  
Christina Rocca  
Michael Rolince  
Donald Rumsfeld  
Peter Schoomaker  
Gary Schroen  
Michael Sheehan  
Hugh Shelton  
Walter Slocombe  
James Steinberg  
Strobe Talbott  
George Tenet  
Larry Thompson  
Dale Watson  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Anthony Zinni  
Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz  
Mohdar Abdullah  
Sayf al Adl  
Mahmud Ahmed  
Mohammed Farrah Aidid  
Fahd al Quso  
Sayyid Qutb  
Eyad al Rababah  
Abd al Rahim Ghululum Rabbani  
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman  
Saud al Rashid  
Ahmed Ressam  
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim  
Yazeed al Salmi  
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf  
Aysel Senguen  
Nawaz Sharif  
Marwan al Shehhi  
Mohand al Shehri  
Wail al Shehri  
Waleed al Shehri  
Mohamedou Ould Slahi  
Yazid Sufaat  
Satam al Suqami  
Madani al Tayyib  
Zuhair al Thubaiti  
Fahad al Thumairy  
Hassan al Turabi


Under Secretary of State, 1997–2000  
Secretary of State, 2001–  
40th President of the United States, 1981–1989  
Attorney General, 1993–2001  
National Security Advisor, 2001–  
Ambassador to the United Nations, 1997–1998  
First Secretary of Homeland Security, 2003–; Homeland Security Advisor, 2001–2003  
Senior Director for Near East and South Asia, NSC, 1997–2001  
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, 2001–  
FBI Section Chief, International Terrorism Operations Section, 1998–2002  
Secretary of Defense, 2001–  
Commander, Special Operations Command, 1997–2000  
CIA Station Chief, Islamabad, 1996–1999  
Counterterrorism Coordinator, U.S. Department of State, 1998–2000  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997–2001  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1994–2001  
Deputy National Security Advisor, 1996–2000  
Deputy Secretary of State, 1994–2001  
Director of Central Intelligence, 1997–2004  
Deputy Attorney General, 2001–2003  
Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, FBI, 2001–2002  
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2001–  
Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 1997–2000  
OTHERS  
Crown Prince and de facto regent of Saudi Arabia, 1995–  
Yemeni; student in San Diego who assisted two 9/11 hijackers  
Egyptian; high-ranking member of al Qaeda military committee  
Director General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, 1999–2001  
Somali warlord who challenged U.S. presence in Somalia in the early 1990s (deceased)  
Yemeni; al Qaeda co-conspirator arrested in Yemen for the USS Cole attack  
Egyptian writer; member of Muslim Brotherhood (deceased)  
Jordanian; Virginia resident who helped Hazmi and Hanjour  
(a.k.a. Abu Rahmah) Saudi; al Qaeda member who worked closely with KSM in Karachi and assisted many of the 9/11 hijackers  
(a.k.a. the Blind Sheikh) Egyptian cleric; convicted for crimes related to 1993 World Trade Center bombing and 1995 plots against other NY landmarks  
Saudi; candidate 9/11 hijacker  
(a.k.a. Benni Antoine Noris) Algerian; convicted in millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport  
(a.k.a. Abu Hajer al Iraqi) Iraqi; chief procurement officer for al Qaeda in Sudan; arrested in connection with 1998 embassy bombings  
Saudi; briefly a housemate of a 9/11 hijacker in San Diego  
Afghani; head of the Hizbul-Ttihad El-Islami, and KSM’s mentor  
German; fiancée of 9/11 hijacker Jarrah  
Pakistani Prime Minister, 1990–1993, 1997–1999  
Emirati; 9/11 pilot/hijacker (UA 175) (deceased)  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (UA 175) (deceased)  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (AA 11) (deceased)  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (AA 11) (deceased)  
(a.k.a. Abu Musab) Mauritanian; recruited 9/11 hijackers in Germany  
Malaysian; member of Jemaah Islamiya  
Saudi; 9/11 hijacker (AA 11) (deceased)  
Saudi; former head of al Qaeda finance committee  
Saudi; candidate 9/11 hijacker  
Saudi; Imam of King Fahd mosque in Los Angeles; accredited diplomat at Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles  
Sudan’s longtime hard-line ideological leader and Speaker of the country’s National Assembly

Ali Abdul Aziz Ali  
Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani  
Mohamed Atta  
Mohammed Atef  
Tawfiq bin Attash  
Anwar Aulaqi  
Abdullah Azzam  
Jamal al Badawi  
Said Bahaji  
Saeed al Baluchi  
Fayez Banihammad  
Abu Ubaidah al Bانشiri  
Abu Bara al Yemeni  
Ramzi Binalshibh  
Omar Hassan Ahmed al Bashir  
Abu Bakar Bashir  
Omar al Bayoumi  
Khalil Deek  
Prince Turki bin Faisal  
Ramzi Yousef  
Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani  
Mohammed Haydar Zammar  
Ayman al Zawahiri  
Hamdan Bin Zayid  
Abu Zubaydah

(a.k.a. Ammar al Baluchi) Pakistani; KSM’s nephew; financial and travel facilitator for 9/11 plot  
Iraqi intelligence officer who allegedly met with Atta in Prague, Czech Republic; currently in U.S. custody  
Egyptian; tactical leader of 9/11 plot; pilot/hijacker (AA 11) (deceased)  
(a.k.a. Abu Hafis al Masri) Egyptian; al Qaeda military commander (deceased)  
(a.k.a. Khallad, Waleed bin Attash) Yemeni; senior al Qaeda operative connected to the U.S. embassy bombings, the USS Cole attack, and the 9/11 attacks; currently in U.S. custody  
U.S. citizen; Imam at Rabat mosque (San Diego, CA) and later at Dar al Hijra mosque (Falls Church, VA), who associated with two 9/11 hijackers  
Palestinian; founder of the Maktab al Khidmat, which provided logistical support to mujahideen in Afghanistan (deceased)  
Yemeni; co-conspirator arrested in Yemen for the USS Cole attack  
German son of Moroccan immigrant; Hamburg cell associate  
Saudi; candidate 9/11 hijacker  
Emirati; 9/11 hijacker (UA 175) (deceased)  
Egyptian; al Qaeda military commander until 1996 (deceased)  
(a.k.a. Abu al Bara al Ta’izi, Suhail Shurabi, and Barakat) Yemeni; potential suicide bomber in original 9/11 plot  
Yemeni; Hamburg cell member; coordinator for 9/11 plot; currently in U.S. custody  
Indonesian; spiritual leader and founder of Jemaah Islamiya, al Qaeda–affiliated terrorist group in Southeast Asia  
Saudi; assisted two 9/11 hijackers in San Diego, CA  
U.S. citizen; created electronic version of *Encyclopedia of Jihad*; believed to be involved in millennium during the 1990s  
Saudi intelligence chief prior to 9/11  
(a.k.a. Abdul Basit) Pakistani; convicted mastermind of and co-conspirator in 1993 WTC bombing and Manila air (Bojinka) plots  
Saudi; candidate 9/11 hijacker


COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

- CAP combat air patrol
- CAPPS Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
- CENTCOM Central Command
- CIA Central Intelligence Agency
- CONR Continental U.S. NORAD Region
- CSG Counterterrorism Security Group
- CTC Counterterrorist Center
- DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
- DCI Director of Central Intelligence
- ESU Emergency Service Unit (NYPD)
- FAA Federal Aviation Administration
- FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
- FDNY Fire Department of New York
- FFTC Florida Flight Training Center
- FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
- FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
- INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
- ISID Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan)
- JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JI Jemaah Islamiyah
- JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
- KSM Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
- Legat legal attaché
- MAK Maktab al Khidmat
- MON memorandum of notification
- NEADS Northeast Air Defense Sector
- NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
- NGO nongovernmental organization
- NMCC National Military Command Center



**American Airlines Flight 77 (AA 77)**  
Washington, D.C., to Los Angeles

**United Airlines Flight 93 (UA 93)**  
Newark to San Francisco




**American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11)**  
Boston to Los Angeles


**United Airlines Flight 175 (UA 175)**  
Boston to Los Angeles




FAA Air Traffic Control Centers



Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector  
Graphics courtesy of ESRI




Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the 9/11 plot, at the time of his capture in 2003



Unity of Effort in Managing Intelligence

- NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
- NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
- NSA National Security Agency
- NSC National Security Council
- NSPD national security policy directive
- NYPD New York Police Department
- OEM Office of Emergency Management (New York City)
- OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control
- OIPR Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
- OMB Office of Management and Budget
- PAPD Port Authority Police Department
- PDD presidential decision directive
- SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
- TSA Transportation Security Administration
- TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center
- UBL Usama Bin Ladin
- WMD weapons of mass destruction
- WTC World Trade Center
- WTO World Trade Organization



**American Airlines Flight 11**  
Left to right, *Mohamed Atta*, pilot; *Waleed al Shehri*, *Wail al Shehri*, *Satam al Suqami*, *Abdulaziz al Omari*, hijackers

**American Airlines Flight 77**  
Left to right, *Hani Hanjour*, pilot; *Nawaf al Hazmi*, *Khalid al Mihdhar*, *Majed Moqed*, *Salim al Hazmi*, hijackers

**United Airlines Flight 93**  
Left to right, *Ziad Jarrah*, pilot; *Saeed al Ghandi*, *Ahmad al Haznawi*, *Ahmed al Nami*, hijackers

**United Airlines Flight 175**  
Left to right, *Masean al Shehhi*, pilot; *Fayez Banihamad*, *Ahmed al Ghandi*, *Hamza al Shehri*, hijackers

**franck leibovici**  
*9+11*  
**paris**  
**october 2005**