

Xenophobia and Civil Society: Durban's Structured Social Divisions

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ABSTRACT: Xenophobia in Durban was of a lower-intensity than SA's other two metropolises in the 2008-10 period, and yet was just as durable, with incidents continuing to reflect underlying social antagonism. The roots of the conflict are, we argue, to be found in material processes that are too rarely tackled in the public or policy spheres, and that have also been difficult for researchers and critical civil society forces to comprehend and counteract. These processes include a glutted labour market, housing shortages, township retail competition, highly-gendered cultural differences, and apparently intractable regional geopolitical tensions. These root-cause pressures continue – as will xenophobia – because short of a national political shift in power and interests, they are extremely difficult to resolve. As a result, civil society will continue bandaiding the problems when they surface as social crises, or be compelled to generate much more explicit politics of regional solidarity, including in Durban whose port and traditions of community politics already offer examples of the kinds of alliances required in future.

The May-June 2008 xenophobic violence - 62 people including 21 South Africans dead, 670 wounded, dozens of women raped, at least 100,000 people displaced, and property worth of millions of rand looted (Misago, Landau and Monson 2009, 7-12) – was followed by a period of latent hostility to immigrants, some of which manifested in attacks during 'service delivery protests' in small cities across the country, as well as an explicit January 2009 attack on a United Nations place of safety in Durban, and dozens more incidents (mostly in the Western Cape and Gauteng) immediately after the World Cup ended in July 2010.

In addressing xenophobia, two narratives have emerged. One approach is to *deny* xenophobia as a structural outcome of inequality and instead consider the billion people who engage in migratory labour in the world today as willing volunteers who enter labour markets with little impact upon local conditions. Hence, as United Nations Development Programme administrator Helen Clark (2009, v) puts it, '...fears about migrants taking the jobs or lowering the wages of local people, placing an unwelcome burden on local services, or costing the taxpayer money, are generally exaggerated.' The then president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, reacted to a report of xenophobic tendencies brought to his attention through the African Peer Review Mechanism - 'xenophobia against other Africans is currently on the rise and must be nipped in the bud' - in December 2007: 'He said the report's assessment that xenophobic tendencies prevailed was "simply not true"' (Sapa 2007). Similar to his stubbornness on HIV/AIDS, Zimbabwe and the impact of his government's neoliberal public policies, Mbeki repeated the denial in October 2010:

So I am saying that if there was xenophobia, I would expect it to be expressed against people who might stand out as being different from me and also, given our history, these are the people that oppressed us. But you don't have any evidence of racism among our people... But so long as the message to the rest of the continent that these attacks took place as a manifestation of xenophobia - that message came from us. It is us who said that. But why did we say it?... Let us get to the root causes (of) this thing and communicate it to the rest of the continent, which I am certain... would confirm the statement that our people are not in the grip of xenophobia (Ncana 2010).

Similarly, wrote African National Congress (ANC) spokesperson Jackson Mthembu as the World Cup wound down, 'The reported xenophobic attacks by South Africans on foreign nationals, particularly from the African continent, after the conclusion of the 2010 Fifa World Cup in South Africa, is baseless and without any rational' and ANC National Chairperson Baleka Mbete remarked, 'These reports are irrational have no basis whatsoever'. In Durban, police officers who arrested one author for distributing an anti-xenophobia leaflet before the World Cup's Ghana-Uruguay match – it was termed 'ambush marketing' – confirmed in a taped conversation that City Manager Mike Sutcliffe had explicitly ordered, 'No distribution of pamphlets, especially which mention xenophobia.' The reasoning, according to a police superintendent, was that 'You are reminding [people] of xenophobia. Even myself I had forgot about that thing, but now you write it down' (Bond 2010).

The second approach is to not deny but rather to *expect* structural roots of xenophobia to emerge under conditions of economic stress. As urban scholar David Harvey (1989, 13-14) put it, 'The response is for each and every stratum in society to use whatever powers of domination it can command (money, political influence, even violence) to try to seal itself off (or seal off others judged undesirable) in fragments of space within which processes of reproduction of social distinctions can be jealously protected.' If Harvey is correct as a general proposition, and if the South African economy has generated some of the world's most severe stresses since the end of formal racial apartheid in 1994, with a rising Gini coefficient and far higher unemployment (Bond 2005), what this means is that we require a *durable* epistemology to uncover both 'contingent' (momentary, conjunctural) and the 'necessary' (theoretically-derived) processes within South African political economy that help us understand xenophobia so as to transcend it.

These structural forces do not excuse or cancel agency. It is crucial to point out that xenophobic rhetoric and attacks are grounded in a politics that can be traced to leadership decisions (or vacuums) in both the apartheid and post-apartheid eras. After all, politicians have long attempted divide-and-rule rhetorical strategies, and in South Africa, the history of organised, top-down xenophobia includes the appeal of Prime Minister Jan Smuts to Parliament in the 1930s:

We will prevent aliens from entering this land in such quantities as would alter the texture of our civilization. We intend to determine ourselves, the composition of our people... South Africa runs the danger of being flooded by undesirable elements of all kinds... owing to the extent of the borders of our country, it is easy for aliens to enter from Angola, from Bechuana-land and from Southern Rhodesia or from Lourenco Marques... We know that there are a great number of aliens in this country who are not legally here (cited in Peberdy and Crush, 1998).

In the same spirit, the first post-apartheid Home Affairs Minister, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, made the following claim (without supporting documents) to the National Parliament in 1997:

With an illegal population estimated at between 2.5 million and 5 million, it is obvious that the socio-economic resources of the country, which are under severe strain as it is, are further being burdened by the presence of illegal aliens... [citizens should] aid the Department and the South African Police Services in the detection, prosecution and removal of illegal aliens from the country... the cooperation of the community is required in the proper execution of the Department's functions (cited in Crush, 2008, 17-18).

Migration researchers Jean Pierre Misago, Loren Landau and Tamlyn Monon (2009, 7-12) contend that violence against [black] immigrants to South Africa has been a permanent attribute cross the apartheid and post-apartheid divide, where otherness/outsiderness, stereotypes, and structural exclusion prevent immigrants from exercising 'political rights and rights to residence in the cities'. Durban geographer Brij Maharaj (2004, 2-3) argues that the 'historical influx of migrants to South Africa has created a high proportion of rightless non-citizens, despite their length of residence which sometimes spans generations'.

The combination of immigrant *rightlessness* and structural exclusion, amidst a perceived invasion of immigrants, resulted in organised social activism against individuals perceived as dangerous to the socio-cultural and moral fabric, and as threatening the economic opportunities of poor South Africans, within a system set up by wealthy South Africans to *superexploit* migrant labour from both South Africa and the wider region. Hence we require a framework to incorporate not only the flows of labour, the reproduction of labour in housing (especially during an unprecedented real estate bubble coinciding with a worsening housing shortage), the nature of extremely competitive retail trade in community reproduction, gender power delineations, and regional geopolitics, but also the consciousness that arises from these socio-economic relations, and the ways civil society organisations both contest the xenophobic reactions and in many cases fail to locate or address the root causes of xenophobia in structural oppressions.

Structural forces and the power of civil society

Xenophobia is a result of structural and human crises that have adversely affected low-income communities. If analysed properly, these should also provide clues for long-term, bottom-up antidotes. These crises are the result of interlocking, overlapping market and state failures, including:

- extremely high unemployment which exacerbates traditional and new migrancy patterns;
- a tight housing market with residential stratification, exacerbating service delivery problems (water/sanitation, electricity and other municipal services);
- extreme retail business competition;
- world-leading crime rates;
- Home Affairs Department corruption;
- patriarchal processes ¹ and cultural conflicts; and
- severe regional geopolitical stresses, particularly in relation to Zimbabwe and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa.

A variety of indicators suggest a mixed story with regard to socio-economic, political and environmental change, especially during the early 2000s when democracy and the 'developmental state' strategy were being consolidated. On the one hand, various indicators suggested sustained growth and political optimism lay ahead, as predictable macroeconomic policy and rising world commodity prices maintained confidence in post-liberation state management. An 'economic boom' was regularly proclaimed by observers such as the *Financial Times* (Russell, 2007a, 2007b; MacNamara, Russell and Wallis 2007), thanks to 'macroeconomic stability', GDP growth uninterrupted for more than a decade after 1998, and a substantial rise in exports.

Yet at the same time, South Africa began suffering not only economic problems (Bond 2005), but also a dramatic increase in social unrest - with many thousands of protests per annum (Nqakula 2007) - that presaged a deterioration of the integrity of several central liberal political

institutions. It was soon evident that 'service delivery protests' could as easily be directed against fellow community residents – especially if they hailed from outside South Africa – as against the genuine sources of their problems. Along with rising domestic violence and the AIDS pandemic, the xenophobia wave was perhaps the worst case of the tearing South African social fabric. But there were, in contrast, other more optimistic signs of social grievances channelled through policy advocacy, public conscientisation, international alliance-building and even the court system. These signs correspond to what Karl Polanyi (1956, 76) termed a 'double movement' in which, initially during the 19th century in Europe, 'the extension of the market organisation in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied by its restriction' as people defended their land, labour and other resources from excessive commodification. Certain areas were illustrative of great potential, such as the Treatment Action Campaign's 1998-2008 street pressure and legal strategy of acquiring anti-retroviral drugs for HIV+ people; and Soweto activists' protests which helped drive the controversial water privatiser Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux out of Johannesburg and whose Johannesburg High Court victory in April 2008 began undoing its commercialised water policies.

Whether campaign-oriented or simply momentarily explosive in character, civil society activism was by all accounts a contributing factor in the 2007-08 transfer of power within the ANC, from the man favoured by local and global corporations and the prosperous classes (Mbeki) to the candidate of trade unions, the youth, organised ANC women and the SA Communist Party (Jacob Zuma). This latter group represented a 'centre-left', comprising the Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu), SA Communist Party, SA National Civic Organisation, some churches and NGOs, ANC Youth League and ANC Women's League. South Africa's 'independent left', in contrast, is comprised of social and community movements, NGO critics, feminists, internationalists, environmentalists, some in the faith community, and others alienated by the 'neoliberal' (market-oriented) economic policies, cronyism, corruption and patriarchal nationalism that represent durable ideologies within the ruling party, including the Zuma camp. They are part of a 'social justice' tradition that arose across the world over the past decade and achieved prominence in contesting globalisation's adverse impacts.

This context of structural crises and the uneven development of civil society meant no rest before, during and after the xenophobic attacks of May-June 2008. The challenge for progressive organisations across South Africa at that moment was to adequately direct social unrest and grievances into effective avenues. The state's failure to assess the threat to immigrants has been the subject of extensive discussion, including ridicule at Mbeki's denialism as well as the hypothesis by then intelligence minister, Ronnie Kasrils, that a 'Third Force' comparable to early 1990s state divide-and-rule strategies was in play. There had been plenty of warning, such as multiple reports of especially Somali murders in Western and Eastern Cape townships, as well as police brutality and abuse at the Lindela repatriation centre outsourced by Home Affairs. More generally, a 'FutureFact' (*Mail&Guardian* 2008) survey asked South Africans if they agreed with this statement: 'Most of the problems in South Africa are caused by illegal immigrants or foreigners.' In 2006, '67% percent agreed, a substantial increase on a few years ago, when the figure was 47%. And it is reflected among all population sectors of the country. FutureFact also put this statement to respondents: 'Immigrants are a threat to jobs for South Africans and should not be allowed into South Africa' - with which 69% agreed.'

When the violence began in mid-May, the immediate reaction from the state, academics and NGOs was the call for more civic 'education', usually about human rights, the plight of refugees, or the role that neighbouring societies played in hosting South African exiles during apartheid. But beyond platitudes, civic education would not be sufficient to address genuine grievances. In a report that reflected latent policy xenophobia, the Human Sciences Research Council (2008) found that 'Settlements that have recently experienced the expression of

“xenophobic” violence have also been the site of violent and other forms of protest around other issues, most notably service delivery.¹²

Behind some of this tension is the recent expansion of the migrant labour system. In 1994, the choice was made *not* to rid South Africa’s economy of migrancy, which could have been accomplished by improving wages, maintaining much higher employment, turning single-sex migrant hostels into decent family homes, establishing a rural development programme that would lower migration pressure, and compelling the extension of formal employment benefits (health insurance, housing, pensions) to black workers and their families, as is the case with higher-income white workers. Today, hostels remain but with the doubling of the unemployment rate, the buildings are often full of unemployed men, and these were the source of many xenophobic attacks.

Moreover, even if South Africa’s racially-defined geographical areas known as bantustans – Zululand, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Transkei, Ciskei, QwaQwa, etc - have disappeared from apartheid-era Swiss-cheese maps, the economic logic of drawing inexpensive labour from distant sites is even more extreme, now that it no longer is stigmatised by apartheid connotations. Instead of hailing from KwaZulu or Venda or Bophuthatswana or Transkei, the most desperate migrant workers in SA’s major cities are from Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, countries partially deindustrialised by South African business expansion up-continent. In one frank admission of self-interest regarding these workers, First National Bank chief economist Cees Bruggemann told *Business Report*, ‘They keep the cost of labour down... Their income gets spent here because they do not send the money back to their countries’ (Comins 2008). If many immigrants don’t send back remittances (because their wages are low and the cost of living has soared), that in turn reminds us of how apartheid drew cheap labour from Bantustans: for many years women were coerced into supplying unpaid services - child-rearing, healthcare and eldercare for retirees - so as to reproduce fit male workers for the mines, factories and plantations.

And in turn, the need for civil society to think beyond the immediate grievances and find international solidaristic relationships – as did the SA Transport and Allied Workers Union when they refused the April 2008 offloading (from a Chinese ship) of three million bullets destined for Zimbabwe police and army guns – could not be greater. On 24 May, 2008 Johannesburg civil society mobilised several thousand people – local supporters and immigrants alike – to march through Hillbrow in solidarity with immigrants. Various other initiatives in townships across South Africa showed that communities could welcome immigrants back, and live in harmony. The provision of resources by churches, NGOs and concerned citizens was impressive, even while the state backtracked from responsibilities, and in some cases including Durban, actively oppressed fearful immigrants who remained homeless and unable to return to communities. Three case study sites in Durban – Chatsworth, Cato Manor and the central business district – provide evidence.

Chatsworth/ Bayview and Bottlebrush

It is estimated that about six million people live in shacks in South Africa; in Durban, there are an estimated 650 000 shack dwellers out of a total population of 3.5 million, about 20 percent (Brown 2009). Bottlebrush was one of the test cases in a project by the eThekweni municipality to address socio-environmental problems. It was found to have ‘severe pollution problems impacting on community health [and] low level or poor existing infrastructures and services’ (Brown 2009). During field visits, there was no sign of the benefits of this project, nor of an effective Ward Committee or ANC branch. As one community leader put it,

Bottlebrush is big but the problem is the leadership. The people there put their hopes on me because they are not good leaders. The committees have spent 15 years in power and even if it is time to vote then there are shenanigans with membership cards. It is people who are working for their pockets.³

In the same vein, another respondent argues,

No development. Nothing happens here. Even if there is a little development then they eat the money, there is corruption and then that development ends up getting nowhere. It is exactly the local leaders and committees, everything ends up with them. It is just them who get everything, they block things and we get nothing.⁴

Nevertheless there is a small cash flow within the settlement, to some extent based on immigrant worker wages. Almost all the African immigrants whom our researchers engaged confirmed that they are employed, especially the men. But they are mostly precariously employed. One respondent, for example, complained that he travelled to work about three times the previous week only to be told there was no job for the day. The employer insists that he reports for duty and only decides when he is there whether his services will be needed. There are many other stories of such ill-treatment with the most common one being that immigrants are, as a rule, paid much less than South Africans. On a research visit in July 2010 we learned of a nearby clothing factory that had recently replaced local workers earning R100/day with immigrants paid just R20/day (Zvavanhu 2010). Some South Africans resident in Bottlebrush recognize this injustice and blame the employers, while others blame the immigrants for accepting low wages. Why do immigrants accept low wages? Because they are desperate. Because they can save. Because when they get back home they can change the money into the local currency and make a fortune.

The Bottlebrush findings also indicate that immigrant workers are not only ill-treated by the employers but also by fellow workers. They work harder, longer and are given the most difficult tasks. In at least one case, the employer docks immigrant workers' pay at the behest of other (South African born) workers and such money is used to buy braaivleis. Immigrant workers appear to sometimes provide cheap labour to the South African economy and also serve as a kind of underclass labour force that is pushed around by both employer and fellow employee at the workplace. This is well recognized in Bottlebrush.

The same story can be found in the reproductive sphere, especially housing. The evidence from Bottlebrush suggests that as soon as the land invaders take over the land, build their shacks and manage to ward off attacks and attempts to remove them by the state, the tendency is to slide into individualized private ownership of the shacks and the land upon which they are erected. The attack on private property represented by the invasion and the raising of the principle of public collective ownership implied by the collective act of invading and defending against state attempts to dislodge the invaders soon gives way to the parcelling out of more or less privately owned pieces of land which, after sometimes, congeals into a 'lumpen' form of landlordism.

This is exactly what happened in Bottlebrush. Today, many 'houseowners' in this informal settlement are landlords and landladies who rent out shacks to other community members including immigrants from African countries. Homeownership, in short, invites a faction of the working class to wage its inevitable fight over the appropriation of value in capitalist society in a very different way. It frequently leads them to appropriate values at the expense of other factions of the working class. The ethic and practice of self-management and self-government which develops during the period of invasion and initial settlement, instead of being extended and developed into a struggle against capital, is turned into its opposite whereby the 'people's committees' which lead the community end up being arbiters and

managers of value extraction by landlords from tenants, many of whom, in Bottlebrush at least, are immigrants.

People born in South Africa are not immune from such exploitation. The invasion of land in Crossmore was effected by Bottlebrush tenants who 'got tired' of paying exorbitant rents in the settlement. The worst part, according to the leader of the Crossmore invaders, was that as tenants, they were not allowed any say in Bottlebrush community affairs. But when the invaders are left alone by the state after successfully taking over the land, their hope is to be given 'umxhaso' (Zulu for subsidy) housing and this is premised on the orderly existence of individual households or people who qualify. This further pushes the community towards acceptance of the private property principle in land and house ownership because it is a condition set by the state to get a house.

At the same time, African immigrants without documents are automatically excluded. And, in the case of Bottlebrush, tenants even if born in South Africa, are also excluded with only landlords or 'stand owners' ('omastende') qualifying to receive houses. Indeed this is exactly what is happening now in Bottlebrush with the government busy building RDP houses in the area. And, as happened with the Crossmore invaders, meetings are still being called by tenants in Bottlebrush who are planning another land invasion both to escape petit landlordism and to position themselves to get subsidized houses sometime in the future, something they are not going to get as long as they are tenants in someone's yard in Bottlebrush.

What is the relevance of all this to the xenophobic attacks? The most exploited tenants appear to be the immigrants. The disadvantage of being an immigrant is that you are condemned to the status of a permanent tenant as you are excluded from ever owning a house in South Africa especially if you don't have papers. Where rent for a typical two-room shack costs R200, there is not infrequently a sharing of five young male immigrants into the two rooms, with landlords charging R100 each, or R500 in total. Upward pressure on available rental residential space thus becomes another source of pressure.

Civil society is not a factor in Bottlebrush itself. The settlement is notorious for being a rough, crime-ridden place. This was brought somewhat under control when the community, led by the local ANC, organized a vigilante group, but other forms of civic organization were banished from the area, and the vigilantes reportedly ended up ill-treating people in the name of maintaining law and order. That left the ANC Branch Executive Committee, which does not operate well within Chatsworth's Ward 71, which incorporates Bottlebrush. In the 2006 municipal election, the Ward was won by the Minority Front with the ANC losing out because of the 'Indian vote'. The ANC allocated a proportional representative councillor to work in the area but respondents confirm that she is inactive in local affairs.

When in May 2008 xenophobia erupted in Chatsworth, foreign nationals from Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe living in the Bottlebrush and Unity Avenue informal settlements of Chatsworth were most severely affected. In these areas, anger and resentment brewed as locals collectively blamed foreigners for housing and job shortages. As the violence ensued, the government did not provide assistance and it was left to civil society to fill the void and respond to the crisis. Neighbourhood associations and religious groups from the area provided relief in the form of shelter, clothing and food, but due to limited resources and capacities assistance did not extend beyond the short term.

The response of civil society did not extend into the long term or address the root causes of xenophobia, but there is potential. Civil society groups in Chatsworth, such as the Bayview and Westcliff Flat Residents Associations have been organizing around issues of structural violences such as evictions and service delivery failures in the post-apartheid era. Civil society in Chatsworth, with its history of organization and mobilization around issues of housing and service delivery (Desai 2002), is in a position to coordinate with marginalized citizen in communities where xenophobia occurred to share experiences and lessons learned.

Before prevention measures were put into place however, xenophobic incidents began to be reported. Pockets of violence were recorded throughout the township, but two areas were particularly hard hit. The hardest hit was the informal settlement of Bottlebrush located in Unit 11. Also recording violence was the Unity Avenue settlement. In Bottlebrush informal settlement residents note that before the attacks began pamphlets were distributed throughout the community warning foreigners threatening imminent violence if they did not immediately vacate the premises. Many foreigners fled immediately, but there were attacks and several deaths inside the settlement. The flashpoint of violence descended into chaos and it is impossible to get clear numbers of the number of attacks and murders that ensued.

Victims fled to police stations such as the Bayview SAPS station and the Chatsworth SAPS station as well as to nearby Morton Community Hall. In addition, other victims fled to churches in central Durban, such as Emmanuel Cathedral, where intake of xenophobic victims from other areas of the city had already begun.

Some of the perpetrators were apprehended:

The man who beat me was arrested, he stayed 2 months in the police station after that he was released. He is around. I am scared of him because I don't know what he is thinking about me.⁵

Police came and said whoever beat makwerekwere must be arrested. Landladies were asked to identify those who beat up makwerekwere. Some did, some did not.⁶

The victims of xenophobia and those displaced by the violence were mostly foreign nationals from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. There were also a few victims from Tanzania. Mozambicans, Malawians, and Zimbabweans which represent the largest communities of foreign nationals in Bottlebrush and Unity Avenue. Nigerians have also business contacts and links in the township as do many Pakistani immigrants. While the Nigerians typically reside in central Durban, only coming to Chatsworth on business, the Pakistani immigrants hold residence in Chatsworth in owned houses throughout the area.

While some that were displaced from Chatsworth sought shelter outside of the township, at Emmanuel Cathedral in central Durban for example, this analysis focuses specifically on the response of those in Chatsworth to the violence within the township. In Chatsworth, many of those displaced from Bottlebrush sought shelter in the Moorton Community Hall just outside of the settlement. The victims were transported from there to the Chatsworth Police station. Those displaced from Unity Avenue sought immediate shelter in the Bayview Police station. Due to space constraints at Bayview Police station, these victims were also transported to the Chatsworth Police station. At the Chatsworth Police station, victims were corralled inside the gates and a tent was set up in the open air next to the holding cells. Eventually, due to overcrowding and lack of resources, some victims had to be housed elsewhere and the Westville Baptist Church in Westville took in the overflow.

Approximately thirty xenophobia victims from Bottlebrush and Unity Avenue spent six weeks at the Chatsworth Police station. Most were single males, but there were several families including women and children as well. The current investigation focuses on the assistance of these victims at the Chatsworth Police station. Coordination and assistance was handled by three main groups of actors: neighbourhood associations, religious organizations, and private philanthropists. Brandon Pillay of the Bayview Flat Residents Association and Orlean Naidoo of the Westcliff Flat Residents Association (neighbourhood organizations from Unit 2 and Unit 3, respectively) managed assistance from their groups. Isaa coordinated assistance from the local Muslim community and Swami Ramkripananda Saraswathi that of the Sarva Dharma Ashram. In addition, Professor Fatima Meer donated money to aid the relief effort.

Overall, however, the Bottlebrush case is one combining severely adverse structural forces, inadequate community leadership, inadequate civil society protection, and ongoing nationalist harassment of immigrants. A July 2010 visit (Zvavanhu 2010) resulted in yet more evidence of a working-class and poor community under severe stress, and willing to express that stress in highly xenophobic language.

Cato Manor and Cato Crest

Cato Manor (CM)/Cato Crest (CC) is a generally culturally diverse community, so relatively well-located that in the 1950-60s, its mainly African and Indian residents were subject to forced removals. Various efforts to resettle the land were made since the 1980s, and after 1994, many more people of various African cultural backgrounds – with a large Mozambican plurality - immigrated. Their education qualifications do not go beyond high school level. Most of them left their country for economic reasons. As one said,

When I left Malawi I knew that, with my business skills, I would do well in South Africa. And since I got here over ten years ago, I hardly worked for someone else. I have been doing my own small business, selling bags. I also sell frozen juices. South Africa offers better economic opportunities if you know what you are doing. I drive to different places to sell, where there is a market...⁷

For some, South Africa has been the most natural place to come to since their relatives, e.g. uncles, fathers or grandfathers, worked in South Africa, mainly in the mines. Many have lived in South Africa for over ten years, and possess work permits. ⁸ Many men came unmarried and some are living with, or are married to, South African women. Others prefer married women from their countries of origin.⁹ But housing and jobs represent a challenge. As a Mozambican informant put it,

We don't want to talk about our landlord. But, no I am not happy with this room. Look how small it is. Yesterday it was raining, and the roof was leaking, as you can see that spot on the floor. The room is not only small, but also dirty, look at the mud on the floor. I have a single bed here, nothing else. I keep my suitcase on my bed because there is no space for it in here. The room can accommodate only the bed. Look at the door, it's not even safe living here. But I pay R350 per month. But what can I do? The only good thing here is that, as you can see, we are all from Mozambique here, so we feel that sense of community ... Yes, but you see, I cannot live anywhere else, I don't want to leave my fellow country men here. It's safer. Besides, my salary is not so good. I get R50 a day. So I cannot afford a better place anywhere else. I have a family at home. I get R1200 per month. I take half of that home, and use the rest for rent and food here. ¹⁰

No matter how little they earn, immigrants tend not to complain about high housing rates, and for the most part they are reliable tenants. There are general perceptions that landlords and employers are lenient towards immigrants. However, as one of the informants said, this is not a genuine 'friendly relationship' between employers and the employees. Immigrants get paid less than the locals. And other tensions also emerge:

What actually stirred up trouble here was rape. You see here in Durbar, there is a place called KwaMadlokovu. An Indian woman was kidnapped from somewhere and raped by the Shangaans who were renting a house around there. This happened shortly before the attack. When attacks took place, people here were still very bitter about that, so they used

*that as an excuse to rob the foreigners. Even there, they did not attack them, they stole their belongings, that's all.*¹¹

Paradoxically, retail was not the major issue during attacks. The main reason is that, in Cato Crest, there is no room for business competition. Tuck shops and taverns or *shebeens* in such areas are run by South Africans. Except for street hawkers who sell fruits and vegetables, and small business men like 'Ham' who sell their goods at flea markets, most immigrants are workers, mostly in shops or in construction companies outside Cato Manor/Crest. Retail was therefore not the cause of tension, unlike other townships where East African and Pakistani shops were targets.

Civil society in Cato Manor/Crest gave support to immigrants in May-June 2008, including churches, doctors, local committees, foreigners' associations and other interest groups. They provided food, shelter, clothes, transportation and prayers. Some employers used to come and pick up immigrant employees for work. Former *Umkhonto we Sizwe* soldiers also provided support.¹² There was a series of meetings between the police, local government structures, representatives of the immigrants and other interested parties. Cato Manor/Crest is an interesting site in part because xenophobia was a problem, but it did not degenerate into the violence witnessed elsewhere, in part because material conditions were sufficiently different to avoid sources of tension between immigrants and local residents.

Central Business District and Umbilo Road

Although better protected than in many outlying townships, the centres of South Africa's major cities witnessed intense incidents of xenophobia, and these continued in Durban in early 2009, when a mob led by a city councillor pushed a Zimbabwean and Tanzanian to their deaths, out of a sixth floor window at the Venture Africa building in Albert Park. Trouble began in May 2008 at a bar next to Dalton Hostel in Umbilo Road, followed by incidents in the Central Business District area stretching from Albert Park in the south to the Warwick Junction trading area to the northwest (there were no recorded incidents of violence we could determine further east to the Point and beachfront).

In Albert Park, the 2009 attacks were led by the Albert Park Community Policing Forum overseen by the 32 Ward Councillor, Vusi Khosa, who officially requested that the eThekweni Municipality remove all non-South Africans from the area because they allegedly increased the crime rate and overcrowded the flats. A month earlier, Jambo House in St. George's Street was the scene of several of police raids. And in the period August-November 2008, Congolese refugees in Albert Park tents represented, to City Manager Mike Sutcliffe, a 'problem' that had to be made to disappear: 'we also have to take care that we do not perpetuate the situation longer than necessary. A growing refugee problem is something we must try and avoid at all costs'.¹³

If on the one hand, refugee support has become technised and individualized, the recognition of refugees in the city on the other has resulted in excessive professionalisation. Amisi and Matate (2009) point out that in its early years the commemoration of World Refugee day in Durban was organised by the refugee community themselves. However for the 2008-10 World Refugee Days, the community was replaced in this work by service providers supported by the government, whose commemoration 'celebrated themselves'.

At the Warwick Junction, there was not a major confrontation between local and foreign traders in the area. Yet this area is one of the most difficult areas in the Durban informal economy for locals and immigrants alike, requiring unity when traders have faced regular attempts at and closure of the Early Morning Market by the Municipality. Police corruption and crime are also rife in the area. Warwick Junction presents challenges to the

traders and foreign traders in particular because of competition over trading space, willingness or refusal to pay rental from the eThekweni Municipality, trading in perceived stolen goods, and retail business competition. Once the threat of eviction wanes, other problems - lack of trust, suspicion, and xenophobic feelings - resurface.

Notably, however, barbers organised themselves and created the Siyagunda Association with 242 members. The majority of its members are so poor that they are struggling to pay membership fees. The organisation was created at a time when non-South Africans did not have any right to trade in the area and were threatened with removal. Siyagunda's leadership requested and finally gained trading permits from City officials, and pledged to investigate all cases of stolen goods inside and around the Warwick Junction regardless of the perpetrators. As Siyagunda's vice president confirms,

One or two members were involved indeed in some of these activities... We reported to the police the first two transactions of stolen mobile phones. The refugees who bought that two stolen mobile phones were arrested by the police. Unfortunately, the suspects were later released after they bribed the police. The message was, however, clear. Since then, these transactions stopped, at least officially and both customers and traders in the Pinetown Rank move peacefully...¹⁴

The Municipality then attempted to replace the Early Morning Market because a new shopping mall would allegedly 'reduce crime and regulate people's movements in the area. The Mall will be also part of Black Economic Empowerment'. Siyagunda was in opposition – and the mall was delayed on technical and legal grounds – but immigrants played a low-profile role.

Competition over space, retail prices, and customers creates potential for conflicts among non-South African traders and between the latter and local traders. According to a Congolese trader,

Ethiopians represent the first group of traders who kill our business. They sell goods to us in bulk and then they begin to sell per unit below the price that we bought the goods from them. As result, we do not sell. Remember that we do not work like Pick'n Pay, Cheecker, or SPAR which retail items for producers. When the products e.g. bread or apples expire, the producers are paid from the quantities sold. The rest is a loss to the producers not retailers. We buy once for all. If I do not sell, I lose... All traders are not happy with Ethiopians and Somali traders. I do not really know what will happen one day...

Somalis, the second group of traders, work like Ethiopians. They are also destroying other people market niches. Let me give an example. I sell on the streets. I use to my goods in bulk from a Somali shop owner at R45 per unit. I would like to sell it at R55 or R60. After buying at R45 per unit from a Somali trader, he/ she will resell the remaining goods at R30 per unit. Obviously, buyers will go to Somali and Ethiopians traders than buying from me. That is why traders in the formal and informal economy are not happy with the two nationalities...¹⁵

The two groups of traders are so powerful that they own several businesses around the market, and in streets other than West and Smith they own up to 60 % of businesses. South Africans have only 40 percent except big brands like Edgars, Woolworth, and others. The two nationalities are so powerful in this business that even Chinese are buying from them rather than importing all their goods from China....¹⁶

A South African trader and shop owner of Asian origin agrees with the previous trader from the Congo. He even goes far arguing that

This people they come here to do business without paying tax. They are not refugees or whatever name to give them. They are coming to make money that they do not spend here, they do not contribute to our economy, they came here to steal our monies... Now look here, I am not xenophobic... but what I want to say is that they destroy the businesses of people like you and me who belong to this country. This ANC government must do something with these people... My father fought for this country. He never went outside. So nobody will tell me these people come here because we went to their country... When I call the police, the police say these people got permits. Which permits?¹⁷

Regarding the products and prices that immigrants offer, according to one local critic,

They sell cheap because they do not spend any money on electricity, shop, shop assistants... Nothing, nothing at all. They pretend to employ South Africans, how many locals do they employ and how much money do they pay them? This is not possible. We can not continue like this. Something must be done to stop this... and I hope it will be done soon...¹⁸

Durban civil society's response

A few Durban civil society organisations quickly emerged in June 2008 to address the crisis (Schwarer and Mwalasi 2008). There was a clear division between those civic groups providing material assistance to the displaced and those whose work was more 'behind the scenes' but nonetheless vital, as well as the organizations which took a solidaristic, more political/advocacy role. Most visible were the churches, of several denominations, which took in displaced people, housing and feeding them, sometimes for weeks at a time, with limited facilities and resources. The Red Cross took on the role of collecting, coordinating and delivering material aid in the form of food, clothing and basic hygiene supplies. They were supported largely by student volunteers and donations from the public, though they received financial support from the eThekweni Disaster Management fund. Several observers noted that Red Cross appeared under-resourced and unprepared for a crisis of this nature.

Most organisations at first acted in the belief that the City of Durban and/or the provincial government would soon step in to coordinate and lead efforts. This did not occur, and as a result, despite attempts from more experienced coordinators, efforts were haphazard, often overlapping and largely undocumented. As mentioned, the Red Cross was largely supported by donations from members of the public. In late May 2008, Durban Action Against Xenophobia (DAAX) led a 'trolley drive', placing trolleys at the entrances to supermarkets in major shopping centres all around Durban. Public response was exceptional, and volunteers had to be called upon to empty trolleys several times a day over the week that the drive was on. Several private citizens also took it upon themselves to collect food, clothing and blankets at their places of work and deliver them to the Red Cross, which was headquartered in a small room behind the Cato Manor Police Station. Additionally, parishioners of the many churches that hosted displaced people gave donations and spent time cooking for people. These included members of all communities around Durban, though there was a predominance of upper-middle class people involved, particularly at the volunteer level.

All the civil society organisations we spoke to in the course of this research emphasised the important role the public played in generously providing for the displaced. This response was, unfortunately, was short-lived. This may have been partially due to 'burnout' as the public felt they had 'contributed enough' by a certain point. There also seems to have been widespread belief in government announcements that the xenophobia was 'over' and that

there were no longer any displaced people (media coverage of local and national government announcements).

Three networks deserve mention. First, the Durban Refugee Service Providers Network (RSPN) worked on material relief alongside the main representatives of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees: Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) and the Mennonite Central Committee, later renamed Refugee Social Services (RSS). Other member organisations provided an important support network both for 'legal' refugees and for 'illegal migrants' during the crisis. The RSPN organised and hosted several workshops during the crisis period and provided a leadership and coordination role (to the best of its capacity). All member organisations have an ongoing commitment to education around xenophobia. It should be noted that member organisations are mandated to provide assistance to official refugees – that is, foreign nationals who have asylum seeker or refugee status in South Africa. There are a large number of Congolese and Rwandan nationals, as well as citizens of other African countries, living in the Durban area, and LHR and the RSS report that in general these groups are well integrated into local communities.

Second, Durban Action Against Xenophobia (DAAX) was originally a group of students and lecturers who rallied via a group created on Facebook, volunteering their time to stand with trolleys at local shopping centres or deliver goods to and from the Red Cross headquarters in Cato Manor. Later, many members of the public joined the group and at its height, in around mid-June 2008, the Facebook group had just under 1000 members, while the database listed around 150 active volunteers. Apart from donations, DAAX assisted in monitoring sites to track numbers of people and donations needed. They also played an active role during the confrontations at City Hall, with members of DAAX buttonholing City Manager Mike Sutcliffe in the car park to demand an explanation for the removal of people to Albert Park. DAAX representative Anthony Collins was particularly scathing about the City, which he felt had failed as leaders and had made a series of empty promises to assist.

Third, the Coalition Against Xenophobia, Racism, Ethnicism and Poverty (CAXREP) was a more politicized network that cut across the usual divisions between centre-left and left in SA politics. The most active organizations were the SA Communist Party, the SA National Civic Organisation, Student Socialist Movement, and several regional support bodies: the Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwean), the Siyagunda traders' association (mainly DRC) and the KZN Refugee Council. The politicisation was explicit in the coalition's July 2008 self-mandate, which included the desire to

Deepen public understanding of the situation in Zimbabwe... uniting in action against the common poverty shared by South Africans and African migrants based on the lack of access to good health care or other infrastructural and financial services or the 'Red Card'... Deepen public understanding of the root causes of xenophobia in South Africa based on globalization as imperialism...[and] Work for a humane immigration policy in South Africa (Caxrep 2008).

In spite of the persistence of these problems, the Caxrep effort was truncated by exhaustion, and some of the more committed immigrant members – especially Zimbabweans – turned their attention in 2010 to self-organisation as well as collaboration with the Centre for Civil Society in its anti-xenophobia campaigning during the World Cup.

Networks aside, there were several crucial civil society organizations worthy of a brief discussion. Sherylle Dass of Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) notes that the LHR became involved because they were called in by local police, together with Mennonite Centre Committee (subsequently renamed Refugee Social Services). The core mandate of the LHR is facilitate the local integration of refugees and the resettlement to the third country on individual' specific needs basis. They do not deal with mass resettlement. Local integration is

the official position of the South African regarding refugees and asylum seekers into communities, with the same access to services and rights as South African citizens. This is so because refugee camps do not represent a viable option in South Africa. As a result, their activities during the xenophobia crisis consisted of screening the Bottlebrush immigrants sheltering in Morton Community Hall with the aim of repatriating them to their countries of origin or to third countries including Canada.

The Diakonia Council of Churches does not deal with charity work, though individual church members do. Diakonia became involved in relief work with immigrants from the time, during the xenophobic violence, that a group invaded its premises and refused to leave without any durable solutions to problems of displacement, lack of food and other basic necessities. Diakonia then was forced to act at two levels. Firstly, it directly distributed food parcels and clothing to the victims of xenophobic violence. Secondly, Diakonia requested that member churches open their doors and provide assistance to the victims of xenophobic violence. Diakonia also tried to reduce xenophobic violence through public awareness before, during, and after the attacks. Diakonia was selected by the eThekweni Municipality as a coordinating civil society body to manage assistance to the victims of xenophobic violence. In 2010, Diakonia also hosted two meetings of a new informal network of concerned organisations, as it appeared xenophobia would again become a major problem after the World Cup ended.

The Refugee Social Services (RSS), formerly the Mennonite Central Committee, was actively involved in providing assistance to some refugees since before the outbreak of violence in mid-2008. RSS assists newly arrived refugees with accommodation, often providing financial assistance for months at a time while refugees seek work in South Africa. In May-June 2008, the RSS provided accommodation to some displaced. Yasmin Rajah of the RSS noted that during xenophobic violence in Durban, the majority of their clients were safe and did not report harassment or intimidation. Some displaced people came from the same buildings in which RSS have other clients who reported they had not been threatened. RSS was involved in donation collection and management. Rajah was impressed by the generosity of churches and other interested groups despite the fact that they were not prepared or did not budget for the xenophobic crisis. However, she deplores some civil society organisations' 'opportunistic behaviour', in which they allegedly distorted the facts, claiming that they were attacked so as to attract resources.

StreetNet put the word out to members of its street vendors' organisations that xenophobia was not to be tolerated. The organisation subsequently reported several cases where potential incidents had been 'nipped in the bud' through members preventing other members or non-affiliated vendors/ consumers from threatening or attacking foreign nationals. Pat Horn of Streetnet reports that the organisation includes members who are foreign nationals who have successfully organised vendors associations in their own areas, and these groups were particularly well placed to provide support and education.

Churches, mosques and temples around Durban offered temporary and longer-term shelters for hundreds of refugees during May and June 2008. Emmanuel Cathedral in the Warwick Triangle area housed the largest number of refugees, and was most able to provide care and resources due to its ongoing involvement in refugee service provision in the city. Other churches became involved when refugees began arriving at their premises requesting shelter. The churches were supported to a large degree by the Red Cross but also relied heavily on their parishes for donations and resources. Several did not have adequate facilities for cooking, so parishioners were called upon to prepare food at their homes and deliver it to the churches.

Some churches were reluctant to let it be known that they were sheltering displaced people. In most cases this was to ensure their safety, but there was some suggestion that churches felt they did not have the capacity to accept further displaced people and did not

want it known that they were sheltering people for fear others would follow. The Anglican Church in Durban was able to source funding to provide reintegration packages for all displaced people they were sheltering (at three church locations). In conversation with a member of DAAX, a church representative stressed that the Anglican Church would aim to provide ongoing pastoral care alongside the reintegration package. He also emphasised the importance of engaging community stakeholders in the reintegration process and noted that widespread poverty in South Africa is a serious barrier. These concerns were to be echoed by civil society organisations in our interviews.

Finally, the KwaZulu-Natal Refugee Council (KZNRC) is a voluntary, registered non-profit organisation which includes, works for and with 17 refugee communities from 17 refugee producing countries and several refugee non-profit organisations. The main objectives of the KZNRC consist of promoting the human rights of refugees through access to health care, education, employment, identification document and travel document, freedom of speech and movement; and raising awareness within the refugee community around the responsibility and obligations of refugees toward their host country. The secondary objectives of the KZNRC include facilitating self-integration into the South African community; promoting peaceful cohabitation and exchange between the entire refugee community and South Africans; and fighting all forms of discrimination and xenophobia.

Conclusions

It is apparent from our investigations that there are deep structural forces behind the xenophobia, and that Durban civil society was only partially successful in organising short-term crisis response to the violence of 2008, but did not offer or create any long-term solutions. Moreover, as for maintaining attention, civil society organisations were generally incapable of preparing for a new upsurge of xenophobic sentiments. Few were involved following the short term response in 2008; yet the analysis above suggests that there is a space for civil society cooperation around the structural factors and root causes of xenophobia.

For example, civil society in Chatsworth has a history of successful mobilization around issues such as housing and service delivery, but this did not directly benefit xenophobia hotspots such as Bottlebrush and Unity Avenue. As another example, the KwaZulu-Natal Refugee Council has barely begun the work of building political solidarity with the wide range of regional immigrants – especially from the Great Lakes region, Nigeria's Niger Delta, Zimbabwe and Swaziland – that might be feasible.

As for short-term problems within civil society, a lack of coordination and leadership were consistently cited as the greatest challenges in dealing with this crisis. Respondents suggested that organisations had been 'polarised', and mentioned 'antagonism' and 'finger pointing'. This suggests that, due to the lack of leadership, the situation deteriorated as the crisis wore on. Many organisations had expected local government to take a leadership role, and expressed their surprise and disappointment that this had not occurred. They eventually experienced a kind of donor fatigue.

All respondents seemed to view reintegration as the only realistic solution, but viewed management of the reintegration process as flawed. This was tied to the view that several respondents expressed that not enough had been done to engage both displaced people and community members in education, response and reintegration proposals. Reintegration cannot be successful without engagement with 'host' communities and well-facilitated dialogue between communities and refugees. In Durban, there was no coherent process to manage this communication, and this appears to have resulted in reintegration being successful in some cases but not others. We note a definite disjuncture between organizations

which dealt directly with communities within their member base, and other organisations who dealt specifically with displaced people and whose response was instinctively charitable rather than developmental.

Most importantly, the response of civil society did not address the root causes of xenophobia. Within a year, most of those repatriated returned to South Africa. Worldwide economic crisis, job losses, and rising prices made the situation even more precarious. The sentiments that bred the mid-2008 attacks are still present and although there has been no mass violence on the scale of that social catastrophe, the period immediately after the 2010 World Cup suggested the high potential for renewed disaster.

Many of the structural constraints are beyond local community capacity in any case because of the politics of scale. Changing regional geopolitical policies – such as South Africa's exploitation of Zimbabwe, the DRC and Swaziland – is a tall order, as is insulating South Africa from ongoing world economic volatility. Another example of a structural challenge well beyond civil society's control is the sensibility that foreign nationals receive SA citizenship fraudulently after bribing Department of Home Affairs officials. (Such fraudulently acquired citizenship resulted in foreign nationals getting access to child support grants, permits to work permanently in SA, access to free medical treatment in state hospitals and acquisition of free houses.) It is perceived that some foreigners go to the extent of bribing Home Affairs officials and Marriage officers that conduct illegal marriages with SA women without their consent so as to acquire citizenship. Another local cultural perception is that foreign men take wives and partners away from South African men, because they are willing to pay school fees for children that they are not even biological parents to. Hence some of the causes of xenophobic attacks mentioned to researchers include jealousy. Other structural, long-term problems noted by researchers include alleged crime and drug dealing.

In sum, we have identified a series of shortcomings associated with the partial responses to xenophobia by civil society organisations in Durban, and major long-term structural problems that local organisations are unable to address – and that we are only at the initial stage of identifying and documenting. These latter include unemployment, poverty, competition for few resources that the government is providing, poor services provided by the municipality to local people, preferential treatment of foreigners by employers who perceive them as a source of unorganized and cheap labour, and fraudulent marriages that assisted foreign nationals to get SA citizenship.

By all accounts, there is severe competition for jobs, houses and social grants reported by some participants. Others disputed any form of competition as foreign nationals do work which South African nationals are refusing to do, such as operating as car guards and running cheap salon businesses in the streets. These are opportunities that foreign nationals created and local people are still reluctant to explore. Foreign nationals are willing to settle for lower-paying jobs whereas SA nationals demand a living wage when they choose jobs, a factor associated with the low cost of reproduction of labour power in the sites from which they came. In such settings, the traditional practice of superexploitation of women – who raise workers when they are young, who look after sick workers and who look after workers when they retire, thereby allowing employers to hire these workers more cheaply than those with local families, school fees, health insurance premiums, pensions, etc – is also a critical factor.

There are at least eight concrete conclusions. First, civil society's response to xenophobic violence did not go beyond relief which consists of providing food, temporary accommodation, lobbying and advocacy. It did not address South Africa's extremely high unemployment, tight housing market with residential stratification, extreme retail business competition, world-leading crime rates, Home Affairs Department corruption, patriarchy and cultural conflicts, and severe regional geopolitical stresses. It is therefore possible to witness the repeat of a large scale xenophobic violence in the future.

Second, the xenophobic violence is rooted in interlocking, overlapping, market and state failure beyond the ability of civil society organisations which are equipped for limited local advocacy, service delivery, and sometimes local solidarity. Third, the xenophobic violence was associated with denialism of structural inequality and of capitalist urbanisation's social-segregating orientation.

Fourth, reintegration of non-South Africans in the affected areas was spontaneous without the contribution of the United Nations and national/provincial/municipal government. Fifth, reintegration was also tolerated where non-South Africans rent accommodation (at high prices) from South Africans in sites like Cato Manor and Cato Crest, Chatsworth and Bottlebrush.

Sixth, civil society solidarity with immigrants did occur and shows that South African and non-South African communities can live in harmony – if there is a conducive environment in which people's concerns can be freely expressed. Seventh, immigrants have been always welcomed for their cheap labour in mining, factories, and plantations. Yet, both pre and post-1994 South African governments were reluctant to provide non-South Africans a genuine set of rights for living in hostile cities.

Eighth, the local KwaZulu Bantustan and same-sex hostels long served as Durban's 'reserve' for local cheap labour, and have since been replaced by regional labour supplies (especially Zimbabwe), overcrowded townships and shack settlements, and poorly maintained inner-city areas such as Albert Park and Point Road. These much broader spaces are now breeding grounds for socio-economic discontent, socio-cultural frustrations, persistent anti-foreigner rhetoric, and xenophobic violence.

Considering the underlying and immediate causes of the crisis, civil society organisations' short-term responses to the crisis were only partial. It is to the long-term problems of a durable, structural nature that our recommendations can be best addressed. Without a long-term solution, the lack of coordination and leadership exhibited in Durban civil society will continue. Hence we recommend:

- A unifying local/ national/regional approach to rising (and durably high) unemployment, based upon a 'right to work' and sufficient public work resources, directed to projects needed by poor people and the communities;
- A dramatic shift of state investment resources into housing/services, for both capital/infrastructure and ongoing operating/maintenance subsidies;
- A rising level of disposable income for low-income people – e.g. through a Basic Income Grant - to accommodate the intensified desperation in the informal sector;
- A commitment to dramatic increases in publicly-subsidised employment and to channelling investment resources into low-income areas, so as to mitigate the economic desperation that so often generates crime;
- Changes to SA state regulations that liberalise border restrictions (e.g. the Zimbabwean temporary work visa), and a very strong stance against such corruption, plus a dramatic increase in staff to accommodate the Department's rising clientele base;
- A much greater SA state commitment to fighting patriarchy and to the promotion of cultural diversity and the 'melting pot' of regional citizenries within SA;
- A shift of SA foreign policy – driven by regional solidaristic initiatives in civil society - away from strategies associated with subimperial ruling-class nurturing for

geopolitical purposes (e.g. Zimbabwe, Swaziland and the DRC) and with minerals extraction, which together exacerbate political-economic and geopolitical tensions in Southern and Central Africa.

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Notes

1. We recognise, especially, the need for further research regarding the material basis for intimate relationships between working-class men and women. On the ideological front, there is no doubt - given evidence from the Durban interviews - that patriarchal attitudes abound among both immigrant and South African born men. Women are assumed to 'naturally' do the unpaid domestic labour in working class male-headed households, in which men consider women as an asset or even private property. There is also the view that men must attract or pursue women and that the wealthier a man is, the better his chances of 'catching' women and keeping them. The corollary to this is that if a man does not have enough money, women will find him less attractive. In a nutshell, men are assumed to be in competition for women and their material possessions largely determine who comes out the winner. It is this potent mix of structure and ideology in a context of an unequal and highly competitive society that fuels the perceptions that lead to the 'masculine entitlements' and violent competition between men fighting over women that characterise xenophobic attacks. To this some gender activists add the role of the conservative ideology of 'familism' that can turn men into monsters in a context of the disempowerment many of them experience due to poverty, unemployment and a failure to see any way out of their sorry economic condition. The family remains the poor man's last resort: it will give him power and authority when no one else will.
2. The HSRC's (2008) recommendations – amongst which that RDP houses not be allowed to be occupied (even for rent or after sale) by immigrants and its call for retention of skilled migrants but extreme measures against unskilled workers - are unconstitutional and counterproductive.
3. Interview with Felakhe Mhlongo, ex-Bottlebrush resident, leader of Ekupholeni shack settlement, near Bottlebrush.
4. Interview with youth, MaSithole's first daughter, Bottlebrush resident.
5. Interview with Aguillo, immigrant from Mozambique, Bottlebrush resident.
6. Interview with MaSithole's 1st daughter, Bottlebrush resident.
7. Interview with 'Ham', originally from Malawi, Dunbar, Cato Manor, September 2009.
8. Some of them worked without work permits. Most of these got their permits after the May 2008 attacks in South Africa.
9. One of the informants felt that South African women are too consciously aware of their political power and empowerment, which presents a challenge to his cultural expectations of male dominance in the relationship. He also stated that South African women are financially greedy.
10. Interview with 'William' and 'Avel', Dunbar, Cato Manor, September 2009.
11. Interview with Ms HL, Cato Manor, November 2009.
12. It is claimed that the reason attacks did not take place in Chesterville, another township in Durban, was because of the strong presence of the *Umkhonto weSizwe* veterans there. It's possible that they might have provided support, but this has not been confirmed by other interviews.
13. <http://www.durban.gov.za/durban/government/media/cmn/cmnitem.2008-07-25.8057331980/view>, Accessed 27 June 2009
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*
17. Interview with South African and shop owner, 11/09/2009, Queen Street
18. *Ibid.*