report: "rapping against walls"

2011-05-14

[de]
in the west bank, dissident voices questioning the palestinian authority's increasingly authoritarian rule have become rare. but a young musician in ramallah refuses to hold his tongue. (...) [read more]

interview: "the neoliberal consensus in palestine"

2011-04-26

[it] [fr]
recently, palestinian economists raja khalidi and sobhi samour published a highly critical article on the palestinian authority's neoliberal policies and its statehood program. they claim that the palestinian authority is offering the palestinians living in the occupied west bank “a program predicated upon delivering growth and prosperity without any strategy for resistance or challenge to the parameters of occupation.” electronic intifada contributor and a-films activist ray smith interviewed raja khalidi. (...) [read more]

report: "nablus stands beautiful and unvisited"

2011-04-24

palestine experiences a boom in tourism, as herds of tourists storm the cities of jerusalem, jericho and bethlehem. meanwhile, the west bank city of nablus, rich in historic and religious sites, hardly attracts visitors. (...) [read more]

report: "palestinians find trade, not an economy"

2011-04-19

[es] [fr]
the palestinian authority is preparing to establish a state in near future. but the palestinian economy remains strongly tied to israel, and manufacturers are struggling to recover from the second intifada. (...) [read more]

report: "emergency aid: a means of coercion"

2011-03-02

[de]
a campaign launched in early february criticizes switzerland's emergency aid regime for rejected asylum-seekers as inhuman and violating the basic rights of those concerned. the constitutional right to assistance in emergency situations has become an instrument of migration policy. (...) [read more]

video: "deterred, but still around"

2011-01-30

[de] [it] [fr]
since january 2008, all rejected asylum-seekers in switzerland are only entitled to receive emergency aid ('nothilfe'). it is provided by the cantons in different ways. emergency aid however shouldn't be considered as an assistance, but as an instrument of a policy of deterrence within the framework of 'fighting migration'. the underlying idea is: the more the marginalisation and material deprivation of the illegalised people, the better chance they'll leave switzerland.
for different reasons however, many rejected asylum-seekers don't leave the country, but defy state control and go into hiding. others receive emergency aid and live on the fringe of society for years, while being systematically hassled and marginalized by the authorities. the emergency aid barely ensures the survival of the affected people. and most definitely it doesn't guarantee a dignified life.
with the help of three undocumented migrants, our 25-minute film documents what it concretely means to live under the emergency aid regime. the question why those people have come to switzerland is intentionally blanked out. in our opinion, the question isn't relevant, neither in general nor regarding the discussion of the emergency aid regime.

we thank solidarité sans frontières for supporting this film.

the short documentary can be downloaded here and watched here on youtube.

report: "Rapping Against Walls"

2011-05-14

[de]
In the West Bank, dissident voices questioning the Palestinian Authority's increasingly authoritarian rule have become rare. But a young musician in Ramallah refuses to hold his tongue.

Old houses are torn down in Ramallah by bulldozers to make way for fancy restaurants, shopping malls, office buildings and apartment blocks. The Palestinian Authority's headquarters are being rebuilt, too. The compound looks like a fortress. Nearby, the 28-level Palestine Trade Tower is nearing completion. Soon it will host luxury offices, a high-end hotel and a cinema.

Six or seven years ago, when most West Bank cities were still up in arms against Israeli occupation, Ramallah had already been pacified. Fancy cars and trendy boutiques conquered its downtown area. In one of the new restaurants sits a young Palestinian music composer going by the name 'Boikutt'.

"It's very confusing to live in Ramallah," says the 25-years old. "It's like a bubble." He feels that people are living in the illusion of being free, even though Ramallah is still an occupied town surrounded by checkpoints and the separation wall. "When you drive just 10 minutes in any direction you'll realise you're in a prison," Boikutt says.
The waitress has come over to ask for orders. In English. Boikutt answers in Arabic. However she, a Palestinian woman in her twenties, insists on speaking English. As she walks away, Boikutt meaningfully raises his eyebrows. "Ramallah has become very different and separated from other Palestinian cities." The restaurant next door doesn't even serve Arabic coffee any more.

Israeli tanks occupying the streets of Ramallah in 2002, threatening to shoot at anyone who'd walk in the street, pushed Boikutt to compose his first track called 'Under Curfew’. In 2003, Boikutt, his brother 'Aswatt' and 'Stormtrap' established the music collective 'Ramallah Underground'. The group's experimental approach resulted in a distinct musical outcome, combining trip-hop, hip-hop, downtempo and traditional Arabic music.

Most of their initial tracks dealt with life under Israeli occupation. As Israeli army presence inside Ramallah decreased, the Palestinian Authority (PA) emerged as a new target of their rhymes. In the artists' opinion, one oppressor had just replaced another: "They robbed us / Took away our land, our country / Defeated / Turning on us / They convinced us / Trained to defend Israel from us / We're being controlled / Soldiers everywhere / But tell me who is this all for?"

Boikutt says he has been being imprisoned twice: "There's the Israeli Apartheid wall, resulting in an open-air prison. And then there's the rule of the PA and its police forces that are placed at every corner of Ramallah. They're constantly controlling us, even though we're just roaming within our own prison."

While as in several Arab countries regimes were toppled by popular uprisings, the PA has so far successfully suffocated anything similar in the West Bank. The Authority's repression of dissident voices and political opponents has led to an atmosphere where "people know where the limits are," says Boikutt.

The so-called March 15 movement which pushed for ending the division between Hamas and Fatah indicated, though, that many young Palestinians are fed up with the ruling political class. "The PA has allowed the protests to happen as long as they were under control," Boikutt says. "That's the maximum to where you can go."

The young musician considers it a shame that most Palestinian artists are voicing criticism only very softly. In contrast, Ramallah Underground's rhymes are quite explicit: "Civil riots, because the cops are pissing me off / As if the Apartheid wall isn't enough / Now they put a virus into my country."

Boikutt is asking people to start some kind of a third Intifada. "Its goal would be to disrupt the colonial machine and all of its pieces." Indeed, many Palestinians consider the current security coordination between Israel, the U.S. and the PA a form of collaboration with the enemy. As cables published by WikiLeaks have shown, the PA has been eager to "keep the coordination out of the public eye." So far, the PA has succeeded in keeping the security situation calm, thereby protecting Israel's interests.

"Maybe the only way to actually reach the coloniser is to get rid of the one who's holding you back," Boikutt says. In the track 'Prison within a Prison', Stormtrap raps: "While leaders masturbate for one another / Settlements multiply, grow, and expand! / Want to solve the problem? / Dismantle our government! / Maybe then we can start something."
Ramallah Underground spread its work mostly through the Internet. "Considering the isolated geographical position of Ramallah, it's been very important," Boikutt says. Even though he raps in Arabic, reaching the domestic audience is difficult. Due to Israeli restrictions, staging a concert in nearby Jerusalem for example is impossible. "Performing in Europe is much easier," he points out.

In 2009, Ramallah Underground split up. Besides doing solo performances, Boikutt started a new project along with Basel Abbas and Ruanne Abou-Rahme, two installation-based artists working with sound and video. Their project is called 'Tashweesh', which means interference. The group's name is its programme.

Tashweesh focusses on live performances. Boikutt admits that performing in public spaces or streets is quite difficult. "Ramallah is being destroyed by urban development. Public spaces have become rare," he says. Performing in commercial places is unavoidable. Boikutt regrets that there, mostly members of the local elite attend, while by-passers or those who don't belong to the scene, don't.

One his greatest performances was when he performed in a parking lot and people spontaneously joined in, the rapper tells. "You know, they didn't come to be entertained, but because they were actually interested in what they were hearing."

Having his dissident voice being heard isn't easy nowadays. For many Palestinians, materialist desires have become more important than the political struggle for liberation. In one of his recent tracks, Boikutt raps: "Let them wait for foreign aid until they die / Drive around with their expensive cars / Inside the Apartheid wall, until they enter into mazes." The rhyme ends with the sound of a car crashing.

This report was written by Ray Smith and was published here by IPS Inter Press Service.

bericht: "Gegen Mauern rappen"

2011-05-14

[en]
In der West Bank gibt es nicht mehr viele Stimmen welche die zunehmend autoritäre Herrschaft der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde offen hinterfragen. Ein junger Musiker in Ramallah weigert sich aber standhaft, sein Maul zu halten.

In Ramallah reissen Bulldozer alte Häuser ab, um Raum zu schaffen für schicke Restaurants, Einkaufszentren, Bürokomplexe und Apartment-Blöcke. Der Sitz der Autonomiebehörde wird gerade renoviert – die Anlage gleicht einer Festung. In der Nähe ist der Bau des 28-stöckige Palestinian Trade Tower beinahe fertig gestellt. Luxusbüros, ein teures Hotel und ein Kino werden einst darin unterbracht.

Vor sechs oder sieben Jahren, als die meisten Städte im Westjordanland noch gegen die israelische Besatzung ankämpften, war Ramallah bereits befriedet. Schicke Autos und trendige Boutiquen eroberten das Stadtzentrum. In einem der neuen Restaurants sitzt ein junger palästinensischer Musiker, der unter dem Künstlernamen 'Boikutt' bekannt ist.

„Es ist ziemlich verwirrend, in Ramallah zu leben,“ sagt der 25-Jährige. „Es ist eine Art Blase.“ Er habe den Eindruck, dass die Menschen in der Illusion lebten frei zu sein, obwohl Ramallah nach wie vor eine besetzte und von zahlreichen Checkpoints und der Mauer umzingelte Stadt sei. „Fahr mal 10 Minuten in irgend eine Richtung und du wirst feststellen, dass du in einem Gefängnis lebst,“ sagt Boikutt.
Mittlerweile ist die Kellnerin gekommen und fragt nach den Bestellungen. Auf Englisch. Boikutt antwortet auf Arabisch. Sie hingegen, eine Palästinenserin in den Zwanzigern, hält unweigerlich am Englischen fest. Als sie weg läuft zieht Boikutt bedeutungsvoll seine Augenbrauen hoch. „Ramallah unterscheidet sich immer mehr von anderen palästinensischen Städten.“ Das Restaurant gegenüber bietet mittlerweile nicht einmal mehr arabischen Kaffee an.

Israelische Panzer, welche 2002 durch Ramallahs Strassen rollten und Ausgangssperren mit Waffengewalt durchsetzten bewegten Boikutt dazu, einen ersten Track namens 'Ausgangssperre' zu produzieren. 2003 gründete er zusammen mit seinem Bruder 'Aswatt' und dem befreundeten MC Stormtrap das Musikkollektiv 'Ramallah Underground'. Der experimentelle Ansatz der Gruppe resultierte in einzigartigem Sound, welcher Trip-Hop, Hip-Hop, Downtempo und traditionelle arabische Musik verband.

Die ersten Musikstücke setzten sich primär mit dem Leben unter israelischer Besatzung auseinander. Nachdem die israelische Armee sich aus Ramallah weitgehend zurückgezogen hatte, wurde die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde (PA) zur neuen Zielscheibe der jungen Musiker. In deren Meinung hatte nämlich bloss der eine Unterdrücker den anderen ersetzt: „Sie raubten uns aus / Nahmen unser Land weg / Wir waren geschlagen / Sie wendeten sich uns zu / Sie überredeten uns / Sie wurden trainiert um Israel vor uns zu verteidigen / Wir werden überwacht / Soldaten überall / Aber sag': Wem dient all dies?“

Boikutt fühlt sich doppelt eingesperrt: „Da ist einerseits die israelische Apartheid-Mauer, welche ein Freiluftgefängnis konstituiert. Und andererseits ist es die Herrschaft der PA und ihrer Polizeikräfte, welche an jeder Ecke von Ramallah stationiert sind. Sie kontrollieren uns ständig, obschon wir uns bloss innerhalb unseres Gefängnisses umher bewegen.

Während in mehreren arabischen Ländern autoritäre Regimes nach Volksaufständen stürzten, ist es der PA bislang gelungen, ähnliche Bestrebungen in der West Bank im Keim zu ersticken. Die Repression oppositioneller Stimmen hat zu einer Atmosphäre geführt, in der „die Menschen wissen, wo die Grenzen sind,“ sagt Boikutt.

Die sogenannte 'Bewegung vom 15. März', welche ein Ende der Spaltung zwischen Hamas und Fatah verlangte, zeigte deutlich, dass viele junge Palästinenser die Nase voll haben von der herrschenden politischen Elite. „Die PA hat die Proteste zugelassen, solange sie ihrer Kontrolle nicht entglitten,“ sagt Boikutt. „Das ist das Maximum. Weiter kann man nicht gehen.“

Der junge Musiker findet es schändlich, dass die meisten palästinensischen KünstlerInnen allfällige Kritik bloss in sanfte Worte fassen. Im Gegensatz dazu sind die Reime von Ramallah Underground äusserst explizit. „Strassenschlachten, weil die Polizei mich nervt / Als wäre die Apartheid-Mauer nicht genug / Nun haben sie auch noch diesen Virus in mein Land eingeschleust.“

Boikutt fordert die Menschen auf, eine Art dritte Intifada zu beginnen. „Ziel des Aufstands wäre es, die koloniale Maschine und all ihre Einzelteile zu sabotieren.“ In der Tat betrachten viele PalästinenserInnnen die gegenwärtige Koordination zwischen Israel, den USA und der PA in Sicherheitsbelangen als eine Art von Kollaboration mit dem Feind. Wie von WikiLeaks enthüllte Dokumente gezeigt haben, war die PA stets darauf erpicht, „die Koordination fern der Öffentlichkeit zu halten.“ Bislang ist es der PA gelungen, eine ruhige Sicherheitslage herzustellen und zu bewahren und dadurch die Interessen Israels zu schützen.

„Vielleicht der einzige Weg um an die Kolonialmacht zu gelangen, ist sich desjenigen zu erledigen, der einen davon abzuhalten versucht,“ sagt Boikutt. Im Track 'Gefängnis im Gefängnis' rappt Stormtrap: „Während sich die Führer gegenseitig masturbieren, wachsen die Siedlungen und breiten sich aus / Willst du das Problem lösen? / Demontiere unsere Regierung! / Dann können wir vielleicht etwas Neues beginnen.“
Ramallah Underground verbreitete seine Musik vor allem über das Internet. „Angesichts unserer geographisch isolierten Position in Ramallah war es enorm wichtig,“ betont Boikutt. Obwohl er auf Arabisch rappt, ist es nicht einfach, die einheimische Zuhörerschaft zu erreichen. Aufgrund der israelischen Restriktionen ist es unmöglich, etwa im nahen Jerusalem ein Konzert zu veranstalten. „In Europa aufzutreten ist viel einfacher,“ sagt Boikutt.

2009 löste sich Ramallah Underground auf. Neben Soloauftritten begann Boikutt mit Basel Abbas und Ruanne Abou-Rahme, zwei anderen KünstlerInnen, welche vor allem Sound- und Videoinstallationen machen, an einem neuen Projekt zu arbeiten. Dessen Name 'Tashweesh' bedeutet Einmischung. Der Name ist zugleich Programm des Kollektivs.

Tashweesh fokussiert auf Liveauftritte. Boikutt weist darauf hin, dass Performances auf öffentlichen Plätzen oder Strassen äusserst schwierig zu bewerkstelligen seien. „Ramallah wird durch Stadtentwicklung zerstört. Öffentlicher Raum ist zur Mangelware geworden,“ klagt er. Auftritte an kommerziellen Orten sind dadurch unvermeidbar. Boikutt bedauert, dass dort vor allem Publikum aus der lokalen Oberschicht kommt, während zufällige Passanten und Leute, die nicht zur Szene gehören, nicht auftauchen.

Einer seiner besten Auftritte sei gewesen, als er einst auf einem Parkplatz auftraten und Menschen spontan hinzu kamen, sagt der Rapper. „Weisst du, die kamen nicht um unterhalten zu werden, sondern weil das was sie hörten sie interessierte.“

Es ist alles andere als einfach für Boikutt, gehört zu werden. Für viele PalästinenserInnen sind materielle Bedürfnisse weit wichtiger geworden als der politische Befreiungskampf. In einem seiner letzten Tracks rappt Boikutt: „Lass sie auf Hilfe aus dem Ausland warten bis sie sterben / Lass sie mit ihren teuren Autos herum fahren / Innerhalb der Apartheid-Mauer, bis sie in Labyrinthe hinein fahren.“ Der Reim endet mit dem krachenden Ton eines Autounfalls.

Dieser Bericht wurde von Ray Smith verfasst. Die englische Originalversion des Beitrags wurde hier von IPS Inter Press Service veröffentlicht.

bericht: "gegen mauern rappen"

2011-05-14

[en]
in der west bank gibt es nicht mehr viele stimmen welche die zunehmend autoritäre herrschaft der palästinensischen autonomiebehörde offen hinterfragen. ein junger musiker in ramallah weigert sich aber standhaft, sein maul zu halten. (...) [weiterlesen]

interview: "The Neoliberal Consensus in Palestine"

2011-04-26

[it] [fr]
Earlier this month, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) each published reports backing the Palestinian Authority statehood program. They claim that from an institutional point of view, the PA is ready for the establishment of a state in the near future.

In August 2009, the PA published a strategy paper [PDF] called “Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State.” The Palestinian statehood program states that the establishment of a Palestinian state within two years “is not only possible, it is essential.” The PA stresses the building of “strong state institutions capable of providing for the needs of our citizens, despite the occupation.” As concerns the economic system, “Palestine shall be based on the principles of a free market economy,” the program states.
Recently, Palestinian economists Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour published a highly critical article on the PA’s neoliberal policies in the Journal of Palestine Studies entitled “Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement.” Khalidi and Samour argue that the statehood program “cannot succeed either as a midwife of independence or as a strategy for Palestinian economic development.” They claim that the PA is offering the Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank “a program predicated upon delivering growth and prosperity without any strategy for resistance or challenge to the parameters of occupation.”

The Electronic Intifada contributor Ray Smith interviewed Raja Khalidi, a senior economist with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), about the PA’s economic policies and its implications for statehood. The views expressed in this interview do not represent those of the UN secretariat.
Ray Smith: How do you feel about the unanimous praise from those leading international institutions?

Raja Khalidi: Such reports don’t make me especially happy, and I do have concerns about their veracity. There’s a big contrast between those statements and the political reality on the ground and there are several problems with these assessments. They claim that the PA is now above the “threshold” for establishing a functioning state, that it has met these institutions’ various criteria for statehood eligibility. There’s a general problem in this sort of generic template approach to evaluating complex governance issues, wherever they might be. In the Palestinian case the real problem is that such criteria and arbitrary thresholds are irrelevant to the reality and to the big elephant in the room of Palestinian governance, namely the Israeli occupation.
So today, what actually matters is: what happens in September when all that changes, when at best the formal diplomatic status becomes the “State of Palestine”? What’s going to make this virtual state turn into a real state? Nobody seems to be addressing that. All the talk is about polishing this virtual state, reforming and fixing it, adding services here, privatizing there, saving money here and cutting budgets there. It’s like the manner in which donors and international institutions approach the performance of a normal middle-income country. The PA seems to assume that by the will of the people, the citizens who proved themselves being capable of respecting traffic signals, paying electricity bills and not carrying guns in public, statehood will “impose itself.” Somehow statehood “just arrives” in September because technically everything is ready.

RS: According to recent reports, Palestine seems to be doing quite well in economic terms. Is it?

RK: Well, we’re certainly witnessing an “economic bubble.” We saw this before in the 1980s and the 1990s, but the bubbles eventually burst or were crushed by Israeli tanks. Economic growth of 9 percent in 2010 was largely fueled by donors, aid and private investment recovery in the West Bank, as well as the booming illicit tunnel economy in Gaza. It’s no secret that “growth” is mainly taking place in Areas A and B, and not in Area C, the south of the West Bank and the Jordan valley, while Gaza and Jerusalem anyway are effectively excluded from the growth map. So it’s about half of the Palestinian people under occupation who are actually enjoying the economic recovery. [Editorial note: Under the Oslo accords, the occupied West Bank is split into three zones: Areas A, B and C. The PA has security control over Area A, and shares control with Israel over B. Area C, which accounts for 60 percent of the West Bank, is under Israeli control.]
The focus on reaching the threshold for statehood wasn’t a total waste of time. It certainly helped to organize, if nothing else, the image of a functioning state. All at the risk though that the PA will satisfy itself with the image of a functioning state and “citizens” will acquiesce in what appears a normal life. Welcome to Palestinian “economic peace!” Palestinians basically have to settle for that and dress it up as much as possible for an indefinite future without any scope for real economic policy-making that goes beyond service delivery and helps to create the conditions for ending occupation, rather than for coexisting with it. So, as a development economist, I’m instinctively wary of bubbles such as this, especially taking into account the specific historic trends and structural changes that preclude such growth from being developmental.

RS: Do you have any other concerns?

RK: Yes indeed, my second point is: There’s an assumption that things are so much better institutionally than they were in 2000 or 2005. Had these institutions been in place back then, what would have prevented the state from being functional? If you recall Oslo, the state was supposed to be established by the end of the 1990s. Five years were considered to be enough. It was assumed that whatever was in place could be turned into a state in one way or the other. Of course, today public finance transparency is improved, but ultimately the control of finance is still in the hands of one person, as it was under the supposedly corrupt [late Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman] Yasser Arafat. The main public institutions certainly function. They provide their services. But they were doing that before, too! It’s not as if they weren’t delivering services ten or five years ago or that what was preventing the state from being established was such a weakness.
According to the whole institutional reform scorecard that the PA and the donors are keeping, by such criteria, it’s only now that the Palestinian right of national self-determination may be addressed, since the Palestinians have now shown that they can govern themselves. So, does mean that the reason they haven’t been able to do so ever since 1988, when they first declared their independent state in accordance with UN resolutions, was because of their own institutional failings, which took the past twenty years to address? This is an unhelpful diversion from the real focus that is required for effective state-building and managing economic development of a war-torn economy.
My third concern is about the sort of economy that’s being established. Let’s assume that by September there’s a Palestinian state running and Israel withdraws. What sort of economy are they thinking about? They’re talking about a very open trade system, perpetuation of the Paris Protocol framework and so-called “customs union,” compliance with World Trade Organization standards, no autonomous monetary or macroeconomic policy, fiscal responsibility, etc. But you don’t need an UNCTAD economist to tell you that this is the wrong approach for such a situation.

RS: According to the latest figures, manufacturing output has declined. What are the implications of this trend for the future of the Palestinian economy?

RK: We at UNCTAD have estimated that about one third of the productive capacity that existed prior to the second intifada was lost. Certainly industry has to be invested in as part of strengthening the components of domestic demand. I don’t see any of that happening in Palestine, except anecdotally in certain niche sectors. Why not? How do you come out of a conflict with a war-torn economy wanting your state to stand on its own feet, if it has not domestic industrial productive capacity? All these reports show that there’s hardly been any change in the high unemployment and poverty rates. So, propagating export-led growth and development is simply wrong. It has not worked in the Palestinian context and it only worked for others in very different stages of development. It may come later, but definitely not now. Also, if in September we’re going to have something like a Palestinian state, its access to markets will totally remain in the hands of Israel. So, what sort of export-led growth are we talking about? All the recent experiences of neoliberal market fundamentalism around the world and many experiences of export-led growth strategies in similarly weak economies in Africa, not to mention North Africa, have evidently failed, and in the latter they’ve done so spectacularly! Yet, the PA is making plans for such an economy. There’s a saying that fits the case perfectly: “They are going to the Hajj when all the pilgrims are coming back.”

RS: What are the key pillars of the PA’s neoliberal agenda?

RK: In the West Bank at least, neoliberalism has permeated pretty much every area of economic policy and social life. Of all the options available in its fiscal, trade, monetary, labor, industrial or foreign investment attraction policy, the PA chose the neoliberal path, for example pursuing full integration with the Israeli economy or liberalizing our trade regime to the maximum. Export-led development, as I’ve mentioned before, is said to be the only optimal policy for developing countries and integration with the more advanced Israeli economy the best option. There’s an assumption that such a development strategy will allow integration with the long-term trend of the Israeli economy whereby the statistics brutally show that income divergence is the only sure trend in Palestinian-Israeli economic relations for forty years.
Indeed, if we look at the Arab economy in Israel since 1948, basically the relation of Palestinian economic resources to Israeli capital and development prerequisites is the same. Furthermore there is this all pervasive discourse about the need for the Palestinian state to enable “private sector led growth.” This is a bit of a canard since the Palestinian public sector is non-existent as an economic agent and nowadays, there’s hardly anything left to privatize. Yet ordinary people suffer from privatization.
Let’s take electricity distribution as an example. Go to the Jordan Valley or to the south of the West Bank at night and you’ll see hillsides of villages using candle light. Prepaid electricity meters were forcibly introduced as part of the PA budget pruning exercises in line with Washington consensus provisions, but of course many poor people can’t pay and the usual “social safety nets” are simply neglected.
In my opinion the blind adoption of such a policy agenda is one of the PA’s most grievous mistakes; indeed, it is inimical to development and liberation, the two things the Palestinian people need above all. What does the Palestinian economy need? It needs to be rebuilt. The productive capacity needs to be reconstituted deliberately and investment accordingly directed. Sustainable revival can’t simply be market-led. Decisions have to be made: What sort of industry do we want? What sort of agriculture? What about food security? What about natural resources: the natural gas fields, the Dead Sea resources, water? Where is the policy and what are the institutions of the sovereign independent Palestinian state to deal with these strategic aspects of national economic security?

RS: When did the neoliberal turn begun?

RK: It’s going back to the 1990s, to the Madrid Peace Conference, the Oslo peace process, globalization and the incremental involvement of the international financial institutions in Palestine. Particularly the World Bank and increasingly the IMF have left their traces in the policy-making elites’ way of thinking. And of course Prime Minister [Salam] Fayyad’s own background matters: he comes from the IMF, while the CEO of the Palestinian Investment Fund, Muhamad Mustafa, was bred in the World Bank next door. I don’t blame them since they really can only think of these issues in that same frame of reference. But it’s surprising however that there’s so little alternative economic thinking coming out of Palestine. On everything else, in terms of activism, human rights, civil society engagement, etc., there’s intellectual thinking and Palestine remains a vibrant avant garde. So why is it that only a few people question the PA’s neoliberal approach? That’s why Sobhi Samour and I wrote that article in the Journal of Palestine Studies. Things are so obvious, but nobody says anything about it and we felt that it needed to be said, in this case by two Palestinian economists.

RS: How do force, consent and persuasion work in the Palestinian context?

RK: The emphasis on the Palestinian reform, institutional building, development expenditures and showcasing has provided the security component, especially the successful partnering with US military trainers and the Israeli army in securing a “calm” in the West Bank since 2007, presumably bringing down the military burden and cost of occupation in the process. Also, after all these years of unsuccessful struggle, modernization, transition to some kind of normalcy, peace and normal life is very appealing and persuasive, while PA jobs sustain a hard core of at least a third of the employed — that’s quite a constituency for persuasion!
Consent goes further than that in the sense that there are elites who were waiting for this kind of situation. In the West Bank there are plenty of building contractors, luxury service providers, property developers and speculators who are currently making good money, while in Gaza a new elite of several hundred entrepreneurs and rent seekers has arisen through the illicit tunnel economy. I think all of these are important supporters of the current “consensus.”

RS: Does the division between Fatah and Hamas contribute to this?

RK: With regard to the West Bank, the division certainly has been a facilitating factor. With Hamas involved in policy-making, this agenda would have faced a lot more resistance, as the resulting poverty and unemployment would have caused unrest and political pressure among Hamas’ constituency. However, there’s currently a lot going on in the region, as people reject authoritarian rule. As much as these revolutions were political, they’ve been socioeconomic ones, too. This wave will hit Palestine in one way or the other regardless of the dilemma of what to do with the occupation.

RS: What about the Palestinian 15 March movement that seeks to end the division?

RK: The younger generation doesn’t trust anybody, I think. The 15 March movement, even though it’s quite small, indicates that many youth have lost respect for Hamas, Fatah or the PA under Fayyad. It’s a generational issue, too. Among the middle class, there’s of course some dependency. Also, there’s a very powerful entrepreneurial capitalist class. It’s the people involved in these big development projects like the industrial estates, model cities and gated communities or gas projects. This class has certainly flourished under this PA, but even before they’ve done quite well. These people have a big stake in keeping the whole thing working. I haven’t seen much of major long-term investment projects though. Basically it’s residential construction. The level of construction and its share in the gross domestic product has traditionally been high in Palestine, even in the 1980s. But it just takes one Israeli tank in Ramallah to bring all these billboards, glass fronts and traffic signs down. Just one tank and it’s finished. Let’s hope that it doesn’t end like that.

This interview was done by Ray Smith and was published here by Electronic Intifada.

intervista: "Il consenso neoliberale in Palestina"

2011-04-26

[en] [fr]
La Banca Mondiale, il FMI e il Coordinatore Speciale ONU per il processo di pace in Medio Oriente (UNSCO) hanno pubblicato propri comunicati in appoggio al programma statuale dell’Autorità Palestinese. Affermano che da un punto di vista istituzionale l’ANP è pronta per l’istituzione di uno stato nel prossimo futuro.

Nell’Agosto 2009, l’ANP pubblicò un documento strategico [PDF] intitolato “Porre fine all’occupazione, istituire lo Stato”. Tale programma asseriva che l’istituzione di uno stato Palestinese nei due anni successivi “non solo è possibile, ma è essenziale”. L’ANP sottolinea la costruzione di un “forti istituzioni statuali che possano provvedere alle necessità dei cittadini, nonostante l’occupazione”. Riguardo al sistema economico “la Palestina sarà basata sui principi di una economia di libero mercato”, sostiene il programma.

Di recente, gli economisti palestinesi Raja Khalidi e Sobhi Samour hanno pubblicato un articolo fortemente critico sulle politiche neoliberali dell’ANP sul Journal of Palesatine Studies, intitolato “ Il neoliberalismo come liberazione: il programma statuale e il rimodellamento del movimento nazionale palestinese”.

Khalidi e Samour affermano che il programma statuale “non può avere successo né come levatrice dell’indipendenza né come strategia per lo sviluppo economico palestinese”. Questo perché l’ANP offre ai palestinesi della West Bank occupata “ un programma concepito sulla crescita e la prosperità senza alcuna strategia di resistenza o sfida ai parametri dell’occupazione”.

Ray Smith, collaboratore di Electronic Intifada , ha intervistato Raja Khalidi, economista  all’UNCTAD, a proposito delle politiche economiche dell’ANP e delle loro implicazioni per lo stato. Le opinioni di questa intervista non rispecchiano quelle del segretariato ONU.
Ray Smith: Cosa pensi dell’apprezzamento unanime di queste istituzioni internazionali?

Raja Khalidi: Mi piacciono poco, e dubito che siano vere. C’è un abisso tra queste dichiarazioni e la realtà politica in campo, e anche le dichiarazioni pongono molti problemi. Affermano che l’ANP è oggi oltre la “soglia” necessaria a uno stato funzionante, e che ha soddisfatto i loro diversi criteri per una entità statuale. Questo approccio generico alla valutazione di questioni di governo complesse, dovunque collocate, pone un problema generale. Nel caso palestinese, il vero problema è che tali criteri e soglie arbitrarie sono ininfluenti sulla realtà , e sull’elefante nella cristalleria del governo palestinese, l’occupazione israeliana.
Quindi oggi, ciò che conta davvero è: che succederà a Settembre, quando tutto cambierà, quando ben che vada lo status diplomatico formale diverrà lo “Stato di Palestina”? In che modo questo stato virtuale diverrà reale? Nessuno sembra pensarci. Si parla solo di lucidare questo stato virtuale, riformandolo e aggiustandolo, qui aggiungendo un servizio, lì privatizzando, risparmiando qui e tagliando bilanci là. Somiglia al modo col quale donatori e istituzioni internazionali affrontano la performance di un normale paese a reddito medio. L’ANP sembra dare per scontato che per volontà del popolo, dei cittadini che si sono dimostrati capaci di rispettare la segnaletica stradale, pagare le bollette della luce, e non portare armi in pubblico, l’entità statale si “imporrà”. In Settembre in qualche modo lo Stato “arriva” perché tecnicamente tutto è pronto.

RS: Secondo recenti rapporti, la Palestina se la cava piuttosto bene n economia. E’ così?

RK: Vediamo una “bolla” economica. Ne abbiamo già viste negli anni’80 e ’90, ma sono scoppiate, o sono finite sotto i tanks di Israele. Il 9% di crescita del 2010 è stato in gran parte alimentato da donatori, aiuti e investimenti privati nella West Bank, e il boom del contrabbando dai tunnel di Gaza. E’ evidente che la “crescita” avviene nelle zone A e B, e non nella C, il sud della West Bank e la valle del Giordano, mentre Gaza e Gerusalemme sono comunque escluse da essa. Quindi solo circa la metà della popolazione palestinese sotto occupazione gode della crescita.
L’attenzione al raggiungimento della soglia non è stata del tutto una perdita di tempo. Almeno si è creata l’immagine di uno stato funzionante. Si rischia però che l’ANP sia soddisfatta dall’immagine e che i “cittadini”si adagino in una vita apparentemente normale. Benvenuti nella “pace economica” palestinese! Che si accontentino di questo, e si preparino meglio possibile ad un futuro indefinito senza ambizioni di una vera politica economica che vada oltre l’erogazione di servizi, e aiuti a creare le condizioni per porre fine all’occupazione, piuttosto che coesistere con essa. Per questo, da economista dello sviluppo, diffido istintivamente di queste bolle, tenendo conto delle specifiche tendenze storiche, e dei cambiamenti strutturali che impediscono a questa crescita di divenire motore di sviluppo.

RS: Altri problemi?

RK: Senz’altro: si dà per scontato che istituzionalmente le cose vadano assai meglio che nel 2000 o nel 2005. Se queste istituzioni ci fossero state all’epoca, perché lo stato non avrebbe dovuto funzionare? Se ricordate Oslo, lo stato avrebbe dovuto essere istituito alla fine degli anni ’90. Si pensava che bastassero cinque anni. Si assumeva che qualunque cosa ci fosse, potesse essere in un modo o nell’altro trasformata in stato. Ovviamente, la trasparenza della finanza pubblica oggi è migliorata, ma in ultima analisi il controllo della finanza è ancora nelle mani di una persona, come era sotto l’ex Presidente dell’OLP, Yasser Arafat, che dicevano corrotto. Le principali istituzioni certamente funzionano, erogando servizi, ma lo facevano anche prima! Non è questo che ha impedito cinque o dieci anni fa l’istituzione di uno stato.
Secondo il programma dell’ANP e dei donatori, solo ora il diritto dei palestinesi alla autodeterminazione nazionale può essere considerato, perché ora i palestinesi hanno dimostrato di potersi governare da soli. Quanto a dire che il motivo per cui non hanno potuto farlo dal 1988, quando dichiararono il loro stato indipendente secondo la risoluzione dell’ONU era la loro inadeguatezza istituzionale, e ci sono voluti venti anni per rimediare? E’ una bugia dannosa, che trascura il vero punto di una effettiva costruzione statuale e gestione di uno sviluppo economico in una economia devastata dalla guerra.
Un altro problema è il tipo di economia che si vuole stabilire. Supponiamo cha a Settembre Israele si ritiri e vi sia un vero stato palestinese. Che tipo di economia hanno in mente? Parlano di un sistema commerciale apertissimo, in ossequio al Protocollo di Parigi, una cosiddetta “unione doganale”, adeguamento agli standards del WTO, nessuna politica monetaria, macroeconomica o fiscale autonoma, etc. Non c’è bisogno di un economista dell’UNCTAD per vedere un approccio sbagliato alla situazione.

RS: Secondo le ultime cifre, il prodotto manifatturiero è diminuito. Che significa questo per il futuro dell’economia palestinese?

RK: Noi dell’UNCTAD abbiamo stimato che un terzo della capacità produttiva di prima della seconda intifada sia stato perso. Occorrono investimenti nell’industria per rafforzare la domanda interna, ma nulla del genere accade in Palestina, salvo marginalmente in settori di nicchia. Perché? Come si fa ad uscire da un conflitto che sconvolge l’economia, con uno stato che sta in piedi da solo, se non ha una capacità produttiva industriale interna? Tutti gli studi evidenziano che i livelli di povertà e disoccupazione non sono cambiati. Quindi è semplicemente sbagliato promuovere una crescita e uno sviluppo basati sulle esportazioni. Non ha mai funzionato nel contesto palestinese, e poco in altri in fasi di sviluppo molto diverse. Potrà accadere dopo, certamente non ora. Peraltro, se a Settembre dovessimo avere qualcosa di simile ad uno stato palestinese, il suo accesso ai mercati resterebbe totalmente in meno israeliana. Quindi, di che esportazione parliamo? Tutte le recenti esperienze di fondamentalismo di mercato neoliberale nel mondo, e molte esperienze di crescita basata sulle esportazioni in economie deboli in Africa sono fallite, per non parlare del Nord Africa dove sono fallite in modo spettacolare! Comunque, l’ANP pianifica ciò. Un proverbio lo sintetizza:”vanno alla Mecca quando i pellegrini ritornano”.

RS: Quali sono le basi dell’agenda neoliberale dell’ANP?

RK: Almeno nella West Bank, il neoliberalismo ha permeato tutti gli spazi della politica economica e della vita sociale. Di tutte le scelte possibili nelle politiche fiscali, commerciali, monetarie, industriali, di mercato del lavoro o di attrazione di investimenti stranieri, l’ANP ha sempre scelto quelle neoliberali, ad esempio la completa integrazione con l’economia israeliana, o il massimo di liberalizzazione commerciale. Dicono che lo sviluppo basato sull’esportazione sia la sola politica ottimale per paesi in via di sviluppo, e l’integrazione con la più avanzata economia israeliana la scelta migliore. Si dà per scontato che una tale strategia di sviluppo consentirà l’integrazione con la tendenza a lungo termine dell’economia israeliana, mentre le statistiche mostrano brutalmente che l’unico trend sicuro nei rapporti economici tra Palestina e Israele è la divergenza delle entrate, da 40 anni a questa parte. Infatti, se consideriamo l’economia araba in Israele dal 1948, il rapporto tra capitale israeliano e risorse economiche palestinesi è lo stesso. Oltre a ciò c’è un continuo riferimento alla necessità che lo stato palestinese promuova la crescita “guidata dal settore privato”. E’ un po’ una battuta, visto che il settore pubblico palestinese è inesistente come soggetto economico, e oggi c’è poco da privatizzare. Nondimeno, le privatizzazioni colpiscono la gente.
Prendiamo ad esempio la distribuzione di energia elettrica. Se andate al sud della West Bank, o nella valle del Giordano di notte, vedrete interi villaggi a lume di candela. Là sono stati introdotti per forza contatori prepagati, in nome dei tagli di bilancio dell’ANP ispirati da Washington, e naturalmente molta gente povera può pagare.
Penso che l’adozione cieca di simili politiche sia uno degli errori più gravi dell’ANP; è il contrario dello sviluppo e della liberazione, che sono le due cose più necessarie ai palestinesi. Cosa serve all’economia palestinese? Una ricostruzione. La capacità produttiva va ricostituita con appositi investimenti. Non si può lasciare tutto al mercato, occorre prendere decisioni: che tipo di industria vogliamo? Quale agricoltura? Quali approvvigionamenti di cibo? E le risorse naturali, gas naturale, le risorse del Mar Morto, l’acqua? Quali sono le politiche, e quali le istituzioni del sovrano e indipendente stato palestinese che si occupano di questi aspetti strategici della sicurezza economica nazionale?

RS: Quando è iniziata la svolta neoliberale?

RK: Negli anni ’90, con la conferenza di pace di Madrid, e il processo di pace di Oslo, la globalizzazione e il sempre crescente coinvolgimento delle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali in Palestina. La Banca Mondiale, e in particolare il FMI hanno condizionato il modo di pensare delle elites politiche. Importante anche la formazione del Primo Ministro Fayyad, che viene dal FMI, mentre il capo del Fondo di Investimento Palestinese, Muhamad Mustafa, viene dalla porta accanto, la banca Mondiale. Non li biasimo, non possono che pensarla così, in quel quadro. Ma sorprende cha dalla Palestina venga così  poco pensiero economico alternativo. Su tutto il resto, attivismo, diritti umani, impegno civile, etc., c’è un pensiero intellettuale e la Palestina rimane una valida avanguardia. Ma perché così pochi contestano l’approccio neoliberale dell’ANP? Per questo Sobhi Samour ed io abbiamo scritto quell’articolo sul Journal of Palestine Studies. Le cose sono assai ovvie, ma nessuno ne parla, e pensiamo che invece andasse detto, e da economisti palestinesi.

RS: Qual è il ruolo della forza, del consenso e della persuasione nel contesto palestinese?

RK: Si enfatizza la riforma palestinese, la costruzione istituzionale, le spese per lo sviluppo e la sicurezza, specialmente la collaborazione con gli istruttori militari USA e l’esercito israeliano nell’assicurare una “calma” nella West Bank dal 2007, probabilmente diminuendo il peso militare e i costi dell’occupazione. Inoltre, dopo tutti questi anni di lotta senza successo, la modernizzazione, la transizione ad una qualche normalità, la pace ed una vita normale hanno un grande potere di persuasione, e l’ANP comunque assicura circa un terzo dell’impiego – ce ne è abbastanza per convincere!
Il consenso va anche più in là, nel senso che vi sono elites che attendevano questo tipo di situazione. Nella West Bank vi sono molti costruttori, fornitori di servizi di lusso, speculatori che ora fanno parecchi soldi, mentre a Gaza vi è una nuova elite di centinaia di imprenditori e redditieri nati con il contrabbando dei tunnel. Tutti costoro sostengono l’attuale consenso.

RS: La divisione tra Fatah e Hamas contribuisce a ciò?

RK: Nella West Bank, la divisione è stata un fattore facilitante. Se Hamas avesse partecipato alle decisioni politiche, il documento avrebbe incontrato resistenze assai maggiori, perché la povertà e la disoccupazione avrebbero causato scontento e pressione politica nel suo elettorato. Peraltro, attualmente molte cose accadono nella regione, perché la gente respinge i governi autoritari; quste rivoluzioni sono socioeconomiche, oltre che politiche. L’ondata arriverà in Palestina in ogni modo, a prescindere dalla occupazione.

RS: Che pensa del Movimento del 15 Marzo che cerca di comporre la divisione?

RK: Le giovani generazioni non hanno fiducia in nessuno. Il Movimento del 15 Marzo, per quanto piccolo, indica che molti giovani hanno perso fiducia in Hamas, Fatah, o nell’ANP di Fayyad. E’ anche un fatto generazionale. Per il ceto medio, c’è una certa dipendenza, e c’è anche una forte classe imprenditoriale capitalista. Sono quelli implicati nei grandi progetti  come le installazioni industriali, le città modello o le comunità chiuse. Prosperano con l’ANP, ma guadagnavano bene anche prima, e hanno molto in gioco ora. Solo che pochi sono i grandi progetti di investimento a lungo termine. Sostanzialmente, si tratta di edilizia residenziale. Questo era un settore che copriva una buona parte del PIL da sempre in Palestina, perfino negli anni ’80. Ma basta un tank israeliano per sfasciare insegne, vetrate e cartelli. Basta un carro armato, ed è finita. Speriamo non vada così.

Questa intervista e’ stata pubblicata qui da Electronic Intifada.

intervista: "il consenso neoliberale in palestina"

2011-04-26

[en] [fr]
si rischia che i 'cittadini' dell'ANP si adagino in una vita apparentemente normale. che si accontentino di un futuro indefinito senza una vera politica economica che vada oltre l’erogazione di servizi ed aiuti e che crei le condizioni per la fine dell’occupazione. (...) [leggi tutto]

interview: "Le consensus néolibéral en Palestine"

2011-04-26

[en] [it]
Plus tôt ce mois-ci, la Banque Mondiale, le Fond Monétaire International et le Coordinateur Spécial des Nations Unies pour le Processus de Paix au Moyen Orient (UNSCO) ont publié chacun des rapports qui soutiennent le programme de l’Autorité palestinienne de mise en place d’un état. Ils prétendent que, du point de vue des institutions, l’AP est prête à établir un état dans un avenir proche.

En août 2009, l’AP a publié un document de stratégie [PDF], intitulé « Fin de l’Occupation, Construction de l’État. » Le Programme de mise en place d’un état indique que l’instauration d’un état palestinien d’ici deux ans « est non seulement possible, mais aussi essentiel. » L’AP insiste sur la construction de « solides institutions d’état susceptibles de pourvoir aux besoins de nos citoyens, malgré l’occupation. » En ce qui concerne le système économique, le programme indique que « la Palestine se fondera sur les principes d’une économie de marché. »

Récemment, les économistes palestiniens Raja Khalidi et Sobhi Samour ont publié un article très critique à l’égard de la politique néolibérale de l’AP, dans le Journal of Palestine Studies, intitulé « Le Néolibéralisme en tant que Libération : Le Programme de mise en place de l’État et la Réfection du Mouvement National Palestinien. »

Khalidi et Samour soutiennent que le programme de mise en place d’un état « ne peut réussir ni en tant qu’accoucheur d’indépendance, ni en tant que stratégie pour le développement économique de la Palestine. » Ils déclarent que l’AP offre aux Palestiniens qui vivent en Cisjordanie occupée « un programme basé sur le fait de produire croissance et prospérité sans aucune stratégie de résistance ou de défi aux mesures d’occupation. »

Le collaborateur de l’Intifada Électronique Ray Smith a interviewé Raja Khalidi, économiste supérieur à la Conférence de l’ONU sur le Commerce et le Développement (CNUCED /UNCTAD), au sujet de la politique économique de l’AP et de ses implications pour l’instauration d’un état. Les opinions exprimées dans cette interview ne représentent pas celles du secrétariat de l’ONU.
Ray Smith: Que pensez-vous de l’éloge unanime de la part de ceux qui dirigent les institutions internationales ?

Raja Khalidi: De tels rapports ne me rendent pas particulièrement heureux, et je m’inquiète de leur véracité. Il existe un grand contraste entre ces déclarations et la réalité politique sur le terrain et il y a plusieurs problèmes au sujet de ces opinions. Ils prétendent que l’AP est maintenant au-dessus du « seuil » pour l’instauration d’un état viable, qu’elle a répondu aux divers critères requis par ces institutions pour avoir droit à devenir un état. Ce genre de modèle générique utilisé pour évaluer des questions complexes où qu’elles soient, concernant le gouvernement, présente un problème général. Dans le cas de la Palestine, le vrai problème est que de tels critères et des seuils arbitraires n’ont rien à voir avec la réalité, ni avec le gros éléphant dans la pièce de la gouvernance palestinienne, à savoir l’occupation israélienne.

Donc aujourd’hui, voilà ce qui importe vraiment : Que se passera-t-il en septembre, quand tout cela changera, quand, au mieux, la position diplomatique officielle deviendra « l’État palestinien » ? Qu’est-ce qui fera changer cet état virtuel en un vrai état ? Personne ne semble aborder ce problème. On ne parle que de peaufiner cet état virtuel, le réformer et le réparer, ajouter des services par ci, privatiser par là, économiser par ci et réduire le budget par là. C’est comme la façon dont les donateurs et les institutions internationales abordent la performance d’un pays normal à revenu moyen. L’AP semble présumer que, par la volonté du peuple, ces citoyens qui se montrent capables de respecter les feux de signalisation, de payer leurs factures d’électricité et de ne pas porter de fusils en public, le statut d’état « s’imposera. » D’une manière ou d’une autre, le statut d’état « arrivera tout simplement » en septembre, parce que techniquement, tout est prêt.

RS: Selon des rapports récents, la Palestine semble bien réussir au point de vue économique. Vraiment ?

RK: Eh bien, nous constatons certainement une « bulle économique ». On a vu ça avant dans les années 80 et 90, mais les bulles ont éclaté à la fin ou ont été écrasées par les chars israéliens. La croissance économique de 9% en 2010 a été alimentée principalement par des donateurs, l’aide et une reprise des investissements privés en Cisjordanie, et aussi par l’économie des tunnels florissante dans la bande de Gaza. Ce n’est un secret pour personne que La « croissance » a lieu principalement dans les zones A et B, non dans la zone C, le sud de la Cisjordanie, ni la vallée du Jourdain, tandis que, de toute façon, Gaza et Jérusalem, sont en réalité exclues de la carte de la croissance. Donc c’est à peu près la moitié de la population palestinienne sous occupation, qui jouit de la reprise économique. [Note de la rédaction : Selon les Accords d’Oslo, la Cisjordanie occupée est divisée en trois secteurs : Zones A, B et C. L’AP détient le contrôle de la sécurité dans la zone A et partage le contrôle avec Israël dans la B. La zone C qui représente 60% de la Cisjordanie, est sous contrôle israélien].

La priorité accordée à l’accès au seuil de l’indépendance, n’était pas une complète perte de temps. Elle a certainement aidé à composer au moins l’image d’un état qui fonctionne. Tout ceci cependant, au risque de voir l’AP se satisfaire de l’image d’un état qui fonctionne et les « citoyens » accepter ce qui leur semble une vie normale. Bienvenue à la « paix économique » de la Palestine ! En fait, les Palestiniens doivent s’en contenter et la déguiser autant que possible pour un avenir indéterminé, sans latitude pour prendre de vraies décisions économiques qui ne s’arrêtent pas à l’organisation de services et qui aident à créer les conditions pour mettre fin à l’occupation plutôt que coexister avec celle-ci.

Donc, en tant qu’économiste du développement, je me méfie instinctivement des bulles comme celle-ci, spécialement si on tient compte du cours spécifique de l’histoire et des changements structurels qui empêchent cette croissance de progresser.

RS: Avez-vous d’autres préoccupations ?

RK: Mais oui, voilà mon deuxième point : On prétend que la situation est bien meilleure au niveau des institutions qu’elle ne l’était en 2000 ou 2005. Si celles-ci avaient été en place en ce moment-là, qu’est-ce qui aurait empêché l’état de fonctionner ? Si on se souvient d’Oslo, l’état était censé être établi d’ici la fin des années 90. On pensait que cinq ans devaient suffire. Ce qui était là, on le supposait, pouvait être transformé en un état d’une façon ou d’une autre. Évidemment, aujourd’hui la transparence dans la finance publique s’est améliorée, mais en fin de compte, le contrôle des finances est toujours entre les mains d’une personne, comme c’était au temps du soi-disant corrompu Yasser Arafat [feu Président de l’Organisation de Libération de la Palestine]. Il est certain que les principales institutions publiques fonctionnent. Elles fournissent leurs services. Mais elles faisaient ça avant aussi ! Ce n’est pas comme si elles ne fournissaient pas des services il y a dix ou cinq ans, ou ce qui empêchait l’état d’être établi était ce défaut.

Selon la fiche de score de toute la réforme institutionnelle, que tiennent l’AP et les donateurs, par ces critères, c’est seulement maintenant que le droit des Palestiniens à l’autodétermination peut se discuter, puisque les Palestiniens se sont montré capables de se gouverner eux-mêmes. Alors, ça veut dire que la raison pour laquelle ils ne pouvaient pas le faire depuis 1988, moment où ils avaient déclaré leur indépendance pour la première fois, en accord avec les résolutions de l’ONU, c’était à cause de leurs propres défaillances institutionnelles qu’on a mis vingt ans à discuter ? Sans apporter quoi que soit d’utile, on s’éloigne du point de mire qui est nécessaire pour bien bâtir un état et diriger le développement économique d’une économie déchirée par la guerre.

Ma troisième préoccupation concerne le type d’économie qui est en train de s’établir. Supposons que d’ici septembre, un état palestinien soit en place et qu’Israël se retire. Quel genre d’économie envisage-t-on ? On parle d’un système commercial très ouvert, de la perpétuation de la structure du Protocole de Paris et de la soi-disant « union douanière », de la conformité avec les normes de l’Organisation du Commerce Mondial, sans politique monétaire ou macroéconomique autonome ni responsabilité fiscale etc. Mais tout économiste de l’UNCTAD vous dira que ce n’est pas la bonne façon d’aborder une telle situation.

RS: Selon les tout derniers chiffres, la production industrielle a baissé. Quelles sont les conséquences possibles de cette tendance pour l’avenir de l’économie de la Palestine ?

RK: À l’UNCTAD, nous estimons qu’un tiers environ de la capacité de production existant avant la deuxième intifada, a été perdu. Il est certain qu’il faut investir dans l’économie pour renforcer en partie les éléments nécessaires aux besoins domestiques. À mon avis, rien de ça ne se passe en Palestine, sauf quelquefois dans certains secteurs spécialisés. Et pourquoi pas ? Comment pouvez-vous sortir d’un conflit avec une économie déchirée par la guerre, si vous voulez que votre état tienne debout, sans capacité intérieure de production industrielle ? Tous ces rapports montrent qu’il n’y a eu presque aucun changement dans les taux élevés de chômage et de pauvreté.

Par conséquent, on a tout simplement tort d’encourager la croissance et le développement en vue de l’exportation. Cela n’a pas marché dans le contexte palestinien et cela n’a marché pour les autres qu’à des stades très différents de développement. Cela pourrait arriver plus tard, mais certainement pas maintenant. Qui plus est, si, en septembre nous allons avoir une sorte d’état palestinien, son accès aux marchés restera fermement entre les mains d’Israël. Alors, de quelle sorte de croissance à vocation exportatrice parlons-nous ? Toutes les expériences récentes de fondamentalisme de marché néolibéral partout dans le monde et beaucoup d’expériences de stratégies de croissance tournées vers l’exportation dans des économies tout aussi faibles en Afrique, sans parler de l’Afrique du Nord : toutes ont manifestement échoué, et dans cette dernière, c’est spectaculaire ! Pourtant, l’AP fait des projets pour ce genre d’économie. Voilà un dicton qui convient parfaitement : « Ils vont au hadj quand les pèlerins en reviennent. »

RS: Quels sont les piliers-clés du programme néolibéral de l’AP ?

RK: Au moins en Cisjordanie, le néolibéralisme est omniprésent dans tous les secteurs de la politique économique et de la vie sociale. Parmi les options disponibles, en considérant d’attirer des investissements dans les domaines fiscaux, commerciaux, monétaires, industriels ou étrangers, l’AP a choisi la voie néolibérale, par exemple la poursuite de l’intégration complète dans l’économie israélienne ou la libéralisation maximale du régime commercial. Le développement tourné vers l’exportation, comme je l’ai déjà dit, est censé être la seule politique optimale pour les pays en voie de développement, et l’intégration dans une économie israélienne supérieure la meilleure option. On s’imagine qu’une telle stratégie de développement permettra l’intégration avec la tendance de longue durée de l’économie israélienne dont les statistiques montrent de façon brutale que l’écart salarial est la vraie tendance dans les relations économiques palestino-israéliennes depuis quarante ans.

En effet, si nous considérons l’économie arabe en Israël depuis 1948, au fond, le rapport des ressources économiques palestiniennes avec le capital israélien et les conditions préalables au développement, est le même. De plus, on dit partout que l’état palestinien doit permettre « la croissance stimulée par le privé ». Ça a plutôt l’air d’un bobard, le secteur public palestinien n’existant pas en tant qu’agent économique, et aujourd’hui, il n’y a presque plus rien à privatiser. Cependant, le commun des mortels souffre de la privatisation.

Prenons l’exemple de la distribution d’électricité. Allez dans la vallée du Jourdain ou dans le sud de la Cisjordanie la nuit et vous verrez, sur les flancs des coteaux, des villages éclairés à la bougie. On a introduit de force des compteurs électriques prépayés, pour contribuer à l’exercice de réduction du budget de l’AP, selon les dispositions de l’accord collectif de Washington, mais évidemment beaucoup de pauvres ne peuvent pas payer et on délaisse tout simplement les « filets de sécurité sociale » habituels.

À mon avis, adopter aveuglément un tel programme politique est une des plus graves erreurs de l’AP ; assurément, c’est défavorable au développement et à la libération, deux choses dont les Palestiniens ont le plus besoin. De quoi l’économie palestinienne a-t-elle besoin ? Elle a besoin de se reconstruire. La capacité de production doit être reconstituée systématiquement et l’investissement affecté en conséquence. Une reprise viable ne peut pas simplement dépendre du marché. Il faut prendre des décisions : Quelle sorte d’industrie voulons-nous ? Quelle sorte d’agriculture ? Et la sécurité alimentaire ? Et les ressources naturelles : les champs de gaz naturel, les ressources de la Mer Morte, l’eau ? Où est le programme politique et quelles sont les institutions de l’état indépendant et souverain palestinien permettant d’aborder ces aspects stratégiques de sécurité économique intérieure ?

RS: Quand le tournant néolibéral a-t-il commencé ?

RK: Cela remonte aux années 90, à la Conférence de Paix de Madrid, au processus de paix d’Oslo, à la mondialisation et au rôle progressif des institutions financières internationales en Palestine. En particulier, la Banque Mondiale et de plus en plus le FMI ont laissé leur empreinte dans la façon de penser des élites qui décident. Et naturellement, la propre expérience du Premier Ministre [Salam] Fayyad est importante : Il vient du FMI, tandis que le DG du Fond d’Investissement Palestinien, Muhamad Mustafa, a été élevé à la Banque Mondiale voisine. Je ne le leur reproche pas, du fait qu’ils ne peuvent vraiment réfléchir à ces questions que dans le même système de référence. Mais il est étonnant qu’il y ait si peu de pensée économique différente issue de la Palestine.

Pour le reste, sur le plan de l’activisme, des droits de l’homme, de l’engagement dans la société civile etc., il existe une pensée intellectuelle et la Palestine reste une avant-garde pleine de vitalité. Alors, pourquoi se fait-il que seulement quelques-uns mettent en doute la démarche néolibérale de l’AP ? Voilà pourquoi Sobhi Samour et moi, nous avons écrit cet article dans le Journal of Palestine Studies. Les choses sont si évidentes, malgré tout personne n’en dit rien et nous avons pensé que cela devait être dit, à cette occasion par deux économistes palestiniens.

RS: Quel est le succès de la force, du consentement et de la persuasion dans le contexte palestinien ?

RK: L’accent sur la réforme palestinienne, l’instauration d’institutions, les dépenses sur le développement et l’opération de prestige, a fourni l’élément de sécurité, spécialement l’association fructueuse avec les instructeurs militaires américains et l’armée israélienne, qui assure une « période de calme » en Cisjordanie depuis 2007, réduisant en même temps, il semble, le poids des dépenses militaires et le coût de l’occupation. De plus, après toutes ces années de lutte sans issue, la modernisation, la transition vers une sorte de normalité, la paix et la vie normale, c’est attirant et convaincant, tandis que les emplois fournis par l’AP maintiennent un groupe qui représente un tiers des salariés – ça compte beaucoup pour persuader !

L’assentiment va encore plus loin, je veux dire qu’il y avait des élites qui attendaient ce genre de situation. En Cisjordanie, il y a de nombreux entrepreneurs, des prestataires de services de luxe, des promoteurs et des spéculateurs immobiliers qui gagnent bien leur vie actuellement, tandis que, dans la bande de Gaza, une nouvelle élite de plusieurs centaines de chefs d’entreprises et de profiteurs est apparue grâce à l’économie illégale des tunnels. À mon avis, tous ces personnages sont très influents dans le « consensus » actuel.

RS: Est-ce que la division entre le Fatah et le Hamas contribue à tout ceci ?

RK: En ce qui concerne la Cisjordanie, la division a certainement facilité la situation. Si Hamas avait participé aux prises de décisions, ce programme aurait rencontré beaucoup plus de résistance, du fait que la pauvreté et le chômage qui en auraient résulté, auraient provoqué des troubles et de la tension politique dans les rangs du Hamas. Cependant, à l’heure actuelle, il se passe beaucoup de choses dans la région, étant donné que le peuple rejette l’autoritarisme. Autant que politiques, ces révolutions étaient aussi socioéconomiques. Cette vague va frapper la Palestine d’une façon ou d’une autre, quel que soit le dilemme sur ce qu’il faut faire de l’occupation.

RS: Et le mouvement palestinien du 15 mars qui cherche à mettre fin à la division ?

RK: À mon avis, la nouvelle génération n’a confiance en personne. Le mouvement du 15 mars, bien qu’il soit assez faible, montre que beaucoup de jeunes n’ont plus de respect pour le Hamas, le Fatah ou l’AP sous Fayyad. C’est aussi une question de génération. Dans la bourgeoisie, on dépend évidemment un peu de ces derniers. Il y a également une classe capitaliste entreprenante, qui est très puissante. Ce sont ceux qui se lancent dans ces grands projets de développement tels que les zones industrielles, les villes modèles et les ghettos dorés ou les projets gaziers. Cette classe a manifestement prospéré sous cette AP, mais elle réussissait bien, même avant. Ces gens sont très intéressés matériellement au maintien du statu quo. Pourtant, je n’ai pas vraiment vu de projets d’investissements à long terme. En fait, c’est de la construction résidentielle. Le niveau de construction et sa part dans le produit intérieur brut est traditionnellement élevé en Palestine ; il l’était, même dans les années 80. Mais il suffit d’un char israélien à Ramallah pour abattre tous ces panneaux d’affichage, façades en verre et poteaux indicateurs. Un seul char et c’est fini. Espérons que ça ne finira pas de cette façon.

Ce reportage était écrit par Ray Smith. La version original Anglaise a été publié ici par Electronic Intifada.

interview: "le consensus néolibéral en palestine"

2011-04-26

[en] [it]
la palestine n’accèdera ni au développement, ni à l’indépendance par le biais des réformes économiques néolibérales, actuellement préconisées et mises en place par l’autorité palestinienne, soutiennent les économistes palestiniens raja khalidi et sobhi samour. le collaborateur de electronic intifada ray smith a interviewé raja khalidi. (...) [lire]

report: "Nablus Stands Beautiful and Unvisited"

2011-04-24

Palestine experiences a boom in tourism, as herds of tourists storm the cities of Jerusalem, Jericho and Bethlehem. Meanwhile, the West Bank city of Nablus, rich in historic and religious sites, hardly attracts visitors.

"It's an ancient city with a magnificent old town. It's home to Jacob's Well, the Samaritans and Sabastiya." Salem Hantoli, manager of Nablus' al-Yasmeen hotel, praises the various tourist attractions of Nablus, a city with 126,000 inhabitants in the northern West Bank. Al-Yasmeen, the second largest of Nablus' four hotels, has 45 beds and 16 employees.

"Before the second Intifada, our city used to be a major destination for religious tourism," recalls Abdelafo S. Aker, public relations officer at Nablus' municipality, adding that after the uprising, the siege and the closures, tourists have become rare in Nablus.
In 2009 only 7,170 hotel guests were counted in the whole Nablus governorate as compared to 451,840 in the West Bank as a whole, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). For 2010, figures aren't available yet.

Hotel manager Hantoli says that in 2008 things started to improve. "The year 2009 was even better, and 2010 was a boom." Al-Yasmeen's occupancy rates and revenue have reached new heights.

The hotel's improving performance has to be considered in the light of the extreme slump during the Intifada, however. "For at least five years, our occupancy rate was no more than 10 to 15 percent," the hotel manager remembers. Even now, 80 percent of his guests belong to the alternative tourism sector, visitors with political interests. "Lately, but very slowly, we start to have people coming only for tourism."

A contributing factor has been the easing of entry restrictions to Nablus since 2009. The city has been under strict closure for seven years and the Israeli army often denied foreigners passage through the checkpoints surrounding the city. "The slight increase in tourism is largely domestic though, it's visitors from the West Bank and Israel," says municipality officer Aker. In terms of international tourism, no big shift could be noticed.

Aker points at Israeli measures as the main obstacle to attracting more international tourists. "When at Ben Gurion Airport you tell them you're planning to visit Nablus, they'll recommend you not going there because the city 'isn't safe’. And surely they'll make it harder for you to actually enter Israel," says Aker.
During the Intifada, Nablus and its three refugee camps were strongholds of armed resistance to Israeli occupation. Clashes, massive Israeli army raids, targeted killings and long curfews were part of everyday life. Israeli propaganda further contributed to the city's image as a chaotic and dangerous place.

In Nablus, efforts are under way to change the city's bad reputation. In 2007, the Palestinian Authority (PA) began to deploy police forces. Armed resistance has vanished and Israeli raids have become less frequent. They usually take place after midnight and are coordinated with the PA. Nablus representative Aker says that the much improved law enforcement has led to stability. "There's no reason any more not to visit Nablus," he concludes.

Yet local hotels are facing another problem. While in all other parts of Palestine, hotel guests stay for an average of two nights, in the northern West Bank they do so for less than 1.5 nights. Tour operators usually bring visitors only at daytime, while they spend their nights in Israeli hotels. Hantoli says that it's also the operators’ responsibility to better link Palestinian sites. "Unfortunately, most of them still solely focus on Jerusalem, Jericho and Bethlehem," he regrets.

Nablus lacks a competitive tourist infrastructure. "You can't just jump to tourism," PR officer Aker says. "We lack hotels, restaurants and experienced staff," he tells. Attracting investment, however, depends on stability. Even though things have calmed down, military raids could still occur and at any point, closure may be imposed and access to Nablus be interrupted. The Israeli army remains a factor of uncertainty.
Huge potential is seen in the reconstruction and renovation of Nablus' historic old town, likely the city's main attraction. During the April 2002 'Battle of Nablus' and several other big Israeli army invasions, the old town has suffered heavy damage. Several mosques, churches and traditional olive oil soap factories such as the Kanaan and the Nabulsi factory were totally destroyed, while other sites such as the Ottoman-area Turkish bathhouse 'Hammam as-Shifa' and the massive Abdelhadi Palace were severely damaged.

"By developing and renovating the old town, there'd be even more reason for tourists to actually spend more than just a few hours in the city," explains Salem Hantoli at al-Yasmeen Hotel. The municipality along with Palestinian and international partners is working on restoring some sites and alleys in the old town. Renovation work is noticeable, but remains quite scattered.

"Our financial resources are very limited in comparison to the needs on the ground," says the municipality's representative Abdelafo S. Aker. The immense destruction of private property left hundreds of the old town's 20,000 residents homeless. Sheltering and assisting them became a priority, while the protection of cultural heritage had to wait. "Also, infrastructure projects such as water, sewage or electricity have been our immediate priorities," explains Aker.
In the heart of the old town, Nasir Arafat directs a non-governmental organisation called 'Civil Society of Nablus Governorate'. "We used to pay the rent of people whose houses were destroyed or uninhabitable," says Arafat. Nowadays, the organisation is busy assisting people in renovating and rebuilding their private homes under the aspect of humanitarian aid.

During the interview residents pop in, listing up their needs and asking for money. "We're not fast enough, because we're lacking money," Arafat regrets. "Still more than 200 houses are in need of reconstruction."

Not far from Arafat's office lies the huge Tuqan palace. During the 18th century, the Tuqan clan nearly controlled all of Nablus and its hinterland. The palace is mostly neglected and its back garden now looks like a jungle. Obviously, restoration efforts would have to be a massive undertaking.

Members of the Tuqan family say it's beyond their financial scope. As time passed, the clan's wealth trickled down through several generations and dispersed. Goats are now grazing where once Nablus' powerful elite ruled.

This report was written by Ray Smith and was published here by IPS Inter Press Service.

report: "Palestinians Find Trade, Not an Economy"

2011-04-19

[es] [fr]
The Palestinian Authority is preparing to establish a state in near future. But the Palestinian economy remains strongly tied to Israel, and manufacturers are struggling to recover from the second Intifada.

Recent reports by the U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Process (UNSCO) and the World Bank acknowledge the Palestinian Authority's progress in institution building and in improving governmental functions, denoting it as well positioned for the establishment of a state.

According to the World Bank, economic growth in the West Bank reached about 7.6 percent of the GDP in 2010. These figures require careful interpretation, though. The World Bank stresses that growth is "primarily donor-driven" and "reflects recovery from the very low base reached during the second Intifada."

Growth isn't sustainable either and "remains hampered by Israeli restrictions," the report says. Not all sectors of the Palestinian economy are growing. While construction is booming, manufacturing output fell by nearly 6 percent, remaining more than 10 percent below the 1999 level, the World Bank points out.
In the city of Nablus, nestled between Mount Ebal and Mount Gerizim in the northern West Bank, the main streets, torn up by Israeli bulldozers and tanks nearly a decade ago, are packed with cars. Traffic lights have replaced the rule of chaos. Al-Mujamma, a massive ten-storey complex overlooks Nablus's ancient old city. It hosts a shopping mall, a cinema, various companies and an underground taxi station.

On Saturdays, scores of Palestinian Israelis flock into the vibrant markets. Basel H. Kanaan, chairman of Nablus's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, is pleased but warns: "It's not like before the Intifada." In the old city's Khan al-Tujjar, where centuries ago expensive clothes brought from Damascus and Cairo were sold, merchants nowadays underbid each other with low-quality products made in China.

"The Chinese goods destroy our businesses," says Kanaan. He explains that local producers can hardly compete with the Chinese. According to the Palestinian historian Beshara Doumani, Nablus has long been Palestine's most important centre for weaving and dying of textiles. Its garment manufacturers used to produce inexpensive clothes for the mass market of peasants and lower urban classes.

Today, the Palestinian garments and textiles industry is estimated to employ about 65,000 workers, contributing about 15 percent of the manufacturing output. Nablus has the highest concentration of the textile businesses. The large majority have less than 10 employees.
In the old city's Aqaba neighbourhood, Moaz Hlihil employs 15 workers. His enterprise, located in an old stone house with an arched ceiling, is packed with cloth, yarn and wooden boxes, with portraits of Yasser Arafat on the wall.

"We work with Israel," Hlihil says. "Our opportunities are very limited, we're under siege. Israel is the only market we have." Most Palestinian manufacturers are subcontractors to Israeli companies who outsource the labour-intensive stages of production because of the low wages in the West Bank.

Garment manufacturing consists of several steps. Following the design, cloth is cut and sewed. The garments then are washed, ironed, packed and distributed. Palestinian subcontractors are usually delivered the cut cloth. Finally, the packed garment is re-exported to Israel and sold in the local market or exported under Israeli tags.

Hlihil's business is among the few that do the design and cutting themselves. "The work remains the same, it's routine," Hlihil says. During the Intifada, he kept producing, despite the harsh conditions. "Our situation was bad, doesn't get better and remains bad."

Hlihil's employees earn up to 20 dollars per day. The Israelis pay by piece. "It's simple," says Hlihil: "If we work, we earn." Sometimes there's no work at all and his employees have to find another way to bridge the income gap. Hlihil admits that planning is difficult, as work is on-demand.
According to the World Bank, unemployment in the West Bank has decreased to 16.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2010. However, this number doesn't tell the whole story, because labour force participation rates are low and underemployment is high. Mohammad al-Aghbar, one of Hlihil's employees, finds it difficult to support his family if his income is unstable. "Before the Intifada," he says, "we used to have work every day. Also, our income was better, because our expenses were lower."

At Nablus's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, chairman Kanaan says he's happy about the re- establishment of connections between Israeli businesses and Palestinian manufacturers. He doesn't regard the subcontracting in the textile production as problematic. "They get us money and our guys have work," he says with a smile.

Putting on a more serious look, Kanaan says: "Here in Nablus, we have trade, but not an economy!" He explains that because many factories were destroyed during the Intifada, local manufacturing struggles. "No value is produced here, there's only trade. But trade is only to move money from one pocket to the next."
In Nablus's manufacturing sector, only the furniture business has witnessed improvement, Kanaan points out. In Zawata, a village adjacent to Nablus, Amer Nayef Qatalony confirms says "the year 2010 was excellent, the best year since a long time." Qatalony is manager of the al-Khulood Furniture Factory.

In 2002, when the Israeli army assaulted Nablus constantly, put the city under curfew for almost 200 days and imposed complete closure, the company escaped to ar-Ram near Jerusalem. In 2006, it relocated to Nablus. "Since then, our situation has been improving slowly, but steadily," Qatalony says.

Qatalony says Chinese competition is pushing prices down and endangering local producers. He's sure though that many people know that furniture produced locally is superior. "Fortunately, many customers don't only look at the price."

Thanks to increasing sales, the company today employs about 90 people as compared to 30 before the uprising. "Our customers used to come from Israel and from all over the West Bank," he remembers. Now they're slowly coming back.

This report was written by Ray Smith and was published here by IPS Inter Press Service.