By Choi Sung-jin
I can't drive. A rarity in Korea where one of the first things people ― men and women ― do upon graduating from high school is to get a license.
Being in the passenger's seat for so long, however, I can tell good drivers from bad. Excellent motorists know the exact coordinates of their destinations, seldom change driving lanes or directions abruptly and make co-riders feel safe and comfortable.
By that standard, President Moon Jae-in does not appear to be so good a driver. Right after his summit with U.S. President Donald Trump on June 30, Moon said Seoul would sit in the driver's seat in dealing with North Korea. The liberal president, who took office less than three months ago, said he would combine pressure and dialog and try to freeze the North's nuclear programs first before moving to denuclearize the Stalinist regime.
On Friday, Pyongyang launched a rocket capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, the second intercontinental ballistic missile it launched following the one the North's propagandists described as the "present to America on the Fourth of July."
As expected, it touched off criticisms and actions on both sides of the Pacific.
"Counter Kim Jong-un's midnight provocation with maximum pressure," said the editorial headline of a conservative newspaper here. "North Korea is no longer the dialog partner," wrote another. In a show of its military prowess, the U.S. flew two supersonic B-1 bombers, nicknamed the "swans of death," over the Korean Peninsula. Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, called for China to decide whether Beijing is finally willing to take a vital step. "The time for talk is over," she said.
All those could be entirely predictable, even comprehensible. Less understandable were Seoul's moves. After a National Security Council meeting early Saturday morning, the Moon administration decided to install the four remaining launchers for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense unit (THAAD), the U.S. anti-missile system.
Yes, President Moon said he would sternly cope with any further North Korean military provocations. But the hurried deployment of the U.S. missile shield has more than a few problems as an effective countermeasure against the North's continuously improving nuclear and delivering capabilities. Most of all, the decision came only a couple of days after the government suggested it would take another year or so to complete the battery's installation given the time needed for assessing its effects on the environment. Defense Minister Song Young-moo said Friday's missile launch was a "game changer," requiring different approaches.
The Moon administration needs to be a little more honest. Officials say they had known about the North's launch plan two days before, which makes their initial foot-dragging and sudden turnaround toward quick deployment all the more perplexing, however. More importantly, and fundamentally, those in the know admit THAAD is part of the U.S. missile defense system aimed at China under the pretext of North Korea's yet-to-be-completed ICBM. As most experts pointed out numerous times, if another all-out war breaks out on this peninsula, the Koreas can inflict irrecoverable damages on each other ― annihilate themselves ― with conventional weapons alone.
Politicians made mixed responses to President Moon's latest decision. Liberals called it an appropriate eye-for-an-eye step while conservatives pointed out the flip-flop reflected Moon's lack of principle, saying he shouldn't have wavered on North Korea policy from the start. I agree with the latter group ― for opposite reasons. If the president and his diplomacy-national security aides had thought Pyongyang would discontinue its nuclear and missile development for anything less than the full normalization of ties with the U.S. and Washington's lifting of economic sanctions, they are hopelessly naïve at best and shamefully irresponsible at worst. Pyongyang will demand the cessation of annual U.S.-Korea war games in return for just the temporary halting of its schedule.
It's a pity we can't find a single country deserving favorable comments when it comes to the North's nuclear crisis ― or Korea's division itself. The North's Kim Jong-un and his coterie are gambling with their country's fate while Japan is rearming itself under the excuse of Pyongyang's play with nuclear fire. China has stuck to the status quo as long as it can avoid the U.S. presence along the Sino-Korean border, while South Korea, particularly its conservative establishment, has been bent on maintaining their vested rights capitalizing on inter-Korean hostility and tension. The U.S. military-industrial complex may be the biggest beneficiary of the situations surrounding this divided peninsula for decades, though.
Currently, there is a flurry of solutions, or scenarios, to put an end to the decades-old North Korean nuclear crisis, ranging from hawkish ideas, such as a preemptive surgical attack and regime change, to a more dovish approach of recognizing the North's status as a nuclear power while stopping its further growth. Like it or not, all regional powers need to admit they made North Korea into what it is today. They also must acknowledge North Korea's desperation for survival ― and its cunning calculation on the improbability of another full-blown military conflict in this part of the world ― has combined with its adversaries' pursuit of selfish concerns to turn the table for Pyongyang's advantage, for now.
At least some things appear apparent. Further isolation and sanctions will not make North Korea give up its nuclear ambition but strengthen its determination. Seoul should never let the U.S. hawks have their way, especially under the current unprecedentedly bizarre administration in Washington, whose ability and intention to solve the crisis peacefully are in doubt. Nor should it watch and see the fate of 80 million Koreans decided by G2.
The only way to solve the crisis is to let the North return to the international community as its responsible member, through talks ― and incentives if needed. What President Moon should do is clear ― set his sights on denuclearizing North Korea by peaceful means through opening it up, not catering to conservatives' whims, here or abroad, even for short-term political purposes.
Hold tight to the handle bars, Mr. President.
Choi Sung-jin is a contributing op-ed columnist for The Korea Times. Contact him at choisj1955@naver.com.
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Being in the passenger's seat for so long, however, I can tell good drivers from bad. Excellent motorists know the exact coordinates of their destinations, seldom change driving lanes or directions abruptly and make co-riders feel safe and comfortable.
By that standard, President Moon Jae-in does not appear to be so good a driver. Right after his summit with U.S. President Donald Trump on June 30, Moon said Seoul would sit in the driver's seat in dealing with North Korea. The liberal president, who took office less than three months ago, said he would combine pressure and dialog and try to freeze the North's nuclear programs first before moving to denuclearize the Stalinist regime.
On Friday, Pyongyang launched a rocket capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, the second intercontinental ballistic missile it launched following the one the North's propagandists described as the "present to America on the Fourth of July."
As expected, it touched off criticisms and actions on both sides of the Pacific.
"Counter Kim Jong-un's midnight provocation with maximum pressure," said the editorial headline of a conservative newspaper here. "North Korea is no longer the dialog partner," wrote another. In a show of its military prowess, the U.S. flew two supersonic B-1 bombers, nicknamed the "swans of death," over the Korean Peninsula. Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, called for China to decide whether Beijing is finally willing to take a vital step. "The time for talk is over," she said.
All those could be entirely predictable, even comprehensible. Less understandable were Seoul's moves. After a National Security Council meeting early Saturday morning, the Moon administration decided to install the four remaining launchers for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense unit (THAAD), the U.S. anti-missile system.
Yes, President Moon said he would sternly cope with any further North Korean military provocations. But the hurried deployment of the U.S. missile shield has more than a few problems as an effective countermeasure against the North's continuously improving nuclear and delivering capabilities. Most of all, the decision came only a couple of days after the government suggested it would take another year or so to complete the battery's installation given the time needed for assessing its effects on the environment. Defense Minister Song Young-moo said Friday's missile launch was a "game changer," requiring different approaches.
The Moon administration needs to be a little more honest. Officials say they had known about the North's launch plan two days before, which makes their initial foot-dragging and sudden turnaround toward quick deployment all the more perplexing, however. More importantly, and fundamentally, those in the know admit THAAD is part of the U.S. missile defense system aimed at China under the pretext of North Korea's yet-to-be-completed ICBM. As most experts pointed out numerous times, if another all-out war breaks out on this peninsula, the Koreas can inflict irrecoverable damages on each other ― annihilate themselves ― with conventional weapons alone.
Politicians made mixed responses to President Moon's latest decision. Liberals called it an appropriate eye-for-an-eye step while conservatives pointed out the flip-flop reflected Moon's lack of principle, saying he shouldn't have wavered on North Korea policy from the start. I agree with the latter group ― for opposite reasons. If the president and his diplomacy-national security aides had thought Pyongyang would discontinue its nuclear and missile development for anything less than the full normalization of ties with the U.S. and Washington's lifting of economic sanctions, they are hopelessly naïve at best and shamefully irresponsible at worst. Pyongyang will demand the cessation of annual U.S.-Korea war games in return for just the temporary halting of its schedule.
It's a pity we can't find a single country deserving favorable comments when it comes to the North's nuclear crisis ― or Korea's division itself. The North's Kim Jong-un and his coterie are gambling with their country's fate while Japan is rearming itself under the excuse of Pyongyang's play with nuclear fire. China has stuck to the status quo as long as it can avoid the U.S. presence along the Sino-Korean border, while South Korea, particularly its conservative establishment, has been bent on maintaining their vested rights capitalizing on inter-Korean hostility and tension. The U.S. military-industrial complex may be the biggest beneficiary of the situations surrounding this divided peninsula for decades, though.
Currently, there is a flurry of solutions, or scenarios, to put an end to the decades-old North Korean nuclear crisis, ranging from hawkish ideas, such as a preemptive surgical attack and regime change, to a more dovish approach of recognizing the North's status as a nuclear power while stopping its further growth. Like it or not, all regional powers need to admit they made North Korea into what it is today. They also must acknowledge North Korea's desperation for survival ― and its cunning calculation on the improbability of another full-blown military conflict in this part of the world ― has combined with its adversaries' pursuit of selfish concerns to turn the table for Pyongyang's advantage, for now.
At least some things appear apparent. Further isolation and sanctions will not make North Korea give up its nuclear ambition but strengthen its determination. Seoul should never let the U.S. hawks have their way, especially under the current unprecedentedly bizarre administration in Washington, whose ability and intention to solve the crisis peacefully are in doubt. Nor should it watch and see the fate of 80 million Koreans decided by G2.
The only way to solve the crisis is to let the North return to the international community as its responsible member, through talks ― and incentives if needed. What President Moon should do is clear ― set his sights on denuclearizing North Korea by peaceful means through opening it up, not catering to conservatives' whims, here or abroad, even for short-term political purposes.
Hold tight to the handle bars, Mr. President.
Choi Sung-jin is a contributing op-ed columnist for The Korea Times. Contact him at choisj1955@naver.com.
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