TO GET TO SECUREDROP AND BEGIN USING IT TO CONTACT WRITERS AND EDITORS AT THE NEW YORKER, FOLLOW THE THREE STEPS BELOW.
- Download and install software to access the Tor network: https://www.torproject.org. This should only take a few minutes.
- Once you load the Tor browser, copy and paste the URL http://strngbxhwyuu37a3.onion into the Tor address bar. When the page loads, you will find further instructions on how to submit files and messages to The New Yorker.
- You will be assigned a randomly generated and unique code name. If a writer or editor at The New Yorker wants to contact you about the information you have submitted, he or she will leave a message for you in SecureDrop. These messages are the only way we will be able to reach you, and can only be accessed using your code name.
For security reasons, we advise you, especially if you are uploading documents, not to use your home or work network, and instead to use a public Wi-Fi network in an area where your screen is not visible to security cameras. Alternately, you can boot your computer from a USB key loaded with the Tails secure operating system, which is available at https://tails.boum.org and includes the Tor Web browser.
Please note: general fiction, poetry, art, and PR submissions sent via SecureDrop will not be assessed. To contact The New Yorker for general inquiries, please read our Contact Us page. Please do not include links to Google Documents or Dropbox files—files should be submitted through SecureDrop directly.
For more about The New Yorker’s SecureDrop project, watch this video, and read the introductory posts written by Amy Davidson, Kevin Poulsen, and Joshua Rothman.
Our privacy statement
The New Yorker's SecureDrop is designed to let you communicate with our writers and editors with greater anonymity and security than is afforded by conventional e-mail.
When you visit or use our public SecureDrop server at http://strngbxhwyuu37a3.onion, The New Yorker and our parent company, Condé Nast, will not record your I.P. address or information about your browser, computer, or operating system, nor will we embed third-party content or deliver cookies to your browser.
The The New Yorker'sSecureDrop servers are under the physical control of The New Yorker and Condé Nast.
SecureDrop is designed to be accessed only through a “hidden service” on the Tor anonymity network, which is set up to conceal both your online and physical location from us and to offer full end-to-end encryption for your communications with us. This provides a higher level of security and anonymity in your communication with us than afforded by standard e-mail or unencrypted Web forms. SecureDrop does not provide perfect security. Among other risks, if you share your unique code name, or if your computer is compromised, any activities, including communications through SecureDrop, should be considered compromised as well. The system is provided on an “as is” basis, with no warranties or representations, and any use of it is at the user's own risk.