15-1815

To Be Argued By: Eun Young Choi

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Docket No. 15-1815

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

—v.—

Appellee,

ROSS WILLIAM ULBRICHT,

also known as Dread Pirate Roberts, also known as Silk Road, also known as Sealed Defendant 1, also known as DPR,

Defendant-Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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United States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Docket No. 15-1815

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

—v.—

ROSS WILLIAM ULBRICHT, also known as Dread Pirate Roberts, also known as Silk Road, also known as Sealed Defendant 1, also known as DPR,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Preliminary Statement

Defendant Ross Ulbricht appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on June 1, 2015, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, following an eleven-day jury trial before the Honorable Katherine B. Forrest, United States District Judge.

Superseding Indictment S1 14 Cr. 68 (KBF) (the "Indictment") was filed on August 21, 2014, charging the defendant in seven counts. Count One charged Ulbricht with distributing and aiding and abetting

the distribution of narcotics, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A) and 2; Count Two charged him with doing so by means of the Internet, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(h) & 841(b)(1)(A); Count Three charged him with conspiring to distribute narcotics, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846; Count Four charged Ulbricht with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 848; Count Five charged him with conspiring to obtain unauthorized access to a computer, for purposes of commercial advantage and private financial gain and in furtherance of other criminal and tortious acts, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030(a)(2) & 1030(b); Count Six charged him with conspiring to traffic in fraudulent identification documents, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028(f); and Count Seven charged him with conspiring to launder money, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h).

Trial commenced on January 13, 2015 and ended on February 4, 2015, when the jury found Ulbricht guilty on all counts. On May 29, 2015, the District Court sentenced the defendant to a term of life imprisonment, ordered forfeiture in the amount of \$183,961,921, and imposed a \$500 special assessment.

Ulbricht is currently serving his sentence.

Statement of Facts

From early 2011 through October 1, 2013, Ross Ulbricht owned and operated a vast online black market, known as "Silk Road," through which thousands of vendors sold approximately \$183 million dollars of illegal drugs, as well as a variety of other goods and services. The defendant designed and created Silk Road to facilitate illegal transactions anonymously and beyond the reach of law enforcement, including by hosting the site on the Onion Router (or "Tor") network, which hides the identities of its users and their IP addresses, and by requiring vendors and customers to do business in Bitcoin, a virtual currency designed to be as anonymous as cash. During its operation, Ulbricht oversaw and managed all aspects of Silk Road, including maintaining the computer infrastructure, determining vendor and customer policies, deciding what could be sold on the site, managing a staff of online administrators and computer programmers, and controlling the profits, from which he personally earned millions of dollars.

The evidence at trial consisted of testimony by law enforcement agents who spent years investigating the operation of Silk Road through undercover purchases and online communications with the man who administered it using the alias "Dread Pirate Roberts" (or "DPR"). Despite "DPR"'s efforts to mask the location of Silk Road through Tor, law enforcement agents ultimately identified the servers hosting Silk Road (and seized the trove of data they contained, documenting thousands of transactions and communications through the site and its associated forums). Ulbricht

was initially identified as "DPR" through connections between his personal email account and online posts about Silk Road. After identifying him, agents were able to catch Ulbricht red-handed, arresting him in a public library while he was logged into Silk Road from his laptop as "DPR," administering the site and talking online as "DPR" with an undercover agent. That laptop, in turn, contained journals describing how Ulbricht created and operated the site (corroborated by testimony from one of Ulbricht's college friends), records related to Silk Road's operation, and Bitcoin "wallets" containing millions of dollars' worth of Bitcoins.

A. The Government's Case at Trial

1. Overview of the Silk Road Website

Silk Road was an extensive and sophisticated online criminal marketplace that sought to make conducting illegal transactions on the Internet as easy and frictionless as shopping online at main-stream e-commerce websites. (Tr. 87-88).¹ The web-

¹ "PSR" and "Presentence Report" refer to the Presentence Investigation Report prepared by the United States Probation Office (the "Probation Office") in connection with Ulbricht's sentencing; "Br." refers to the defendant's brief on appeal; "A." refers to the appendix filed with that brief; "S." refers to the sealed appendix filed with that brief; "SA" refers to the Government's supplemental appendix, filed with this brief; "NACDL Br." refers to the *Amicus Curiae*

site offered a sales platform that allowed users to conduct transactions online, and the basic user interface resembled those of well-known online market-places. (Tr. 87-88).

a. The Tor Network

Unlike mainstream commerce websites, however, Silk Road was accessible only through the Tor network. (Tr. 99). The Tor network is a special network of computers on the Internet, distributed around the world, that is designed to conceal the true Internet Protocol (or "IP addresses")² of the computers on the network, and, thereby, the identities of the network's users. (Tr. 98-110, 135). Every communication sent through Tor is bounced through relays within the network, and wrapped in layers of encryption, such that it is practically impossible to trace the communi-

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of Ulbricht's appeal; "DPA Br." refers to the *Amici Curiae* Brief of the Drug Policy Alliance, Law Enforcement Against Prohibition, JustLeadershipUSA, and Nancy Gertner in support of Ulbricht's appeal; "Docket Entry" refers to an entry on the District Court's docket for this case; and "Tr." refers to the corrected and final trial transcript. With respect to the last item, the Government notes that the Appendix contains portions of the transcript that were later corrected.

² See infra n.26.

cation back to its true, originating IP address. (Tr. 136-38).

Tor also allows websites that operate on the network, referred to as "hidden services," to conceal the true IP addresses of the computer servers that host them. (Tr. 137-38). Hidden services like Silk Road have complex web addresses ending in ".onion," which can only be accessed using specialized Tor web browser software (which is freely available on the Internet). (Tr. 98-99).

b. The Silk Road User Interface

Upon arriving at the Silk Road website, users could create a new account and access the site simply by creating a unique username and password. (Tr. 140-41).

The website's homepage contained its logo, "Silk Road anonymous market," and listed various categories of illegal items for sale on the site, including, most prominently, "Drugs." (Tr. 141-46; SA 1, 9, 70). The homepage also included links permitting users to access: (1) a private message system, which allowed users to send messages to each other through the website, similar to emails (Tr. 192); (2) online forums, where users could post messages to "discussion threads" concerning various topics related to the website (Tr. 196-200); (3) a "wiki" that contained a collection of frequently asked questions, and other

³ Silk Road's address was silkroadvb5piz3r.onion. (Tr. 98).

forms of guidance for users (Tr. 211-13; SA 4); and (4) a "support" section, where users could get assistance from the Silk Road administrative staff. (Tr. 236).

When a user clicked on any of the links to items for sale, the website would bring up a page containing the details of the listing, including a description of the item, its price and product reviews, and the username of the vendor selling it. (Tr. 148-51; SA 3). To purchase an item, the user would simply click on a link to add the item to an electronic "shopping cart." (Tr. 164-65). The user would later be prompted to supply a shipping address and to confirm the placement of the order. (Tr. 165). Once the order was placed, it would be processed through Silk Road's Bitcoin-based payment system.⁴ (Tr. 150-51, 165-67).

Bitcoins are an anonymous, decentralized form of electronic currency, existing entirely on the Internet and without any physical form. (Tr. 151, 159-60). The currency is not issued by any government, bank, or company, but rather is generated and controlled automatically through computer software operating on a decentralized network of computers (the "Bitcoin network"). (Tr. 159-60). Although there exists a public record of Bitcoin transactions (known as the "Blockchain"), which prevents individuals from spending the same Bitcoin twice. Bitcoins are exchanged by sending them from one anonymous Bitcoin address (analogous to a bank account number) to another, and without independent information tying an individual to their address, so the transactions are effectively untraceable. (Tr. 159-64). Bitcoin

Silk Road would collect a commission on each sale. (Tr. 170-72).

c. "Dread Pirate Roberts" Controlled Silk Road

In or about June 2011, a Silk Road user emerged on the Silk Road forum who held himself out as the lead administrator and person in charge of Silk Road, who posted information about rules and policies of the site, and signed messages as "Silk Road staff." (Tr. 242-45). On January 31, 2012, the administrator announced that he was adopting the name "Dread Pirate Roberts" (or "DPR") but continued to operate as the lead administrator of both the Silk Road marketplace and the Silk Road forums. (Tr. 243, 245-46). "Dread Pirate Roberts" used a particular electronic signature-known as a "PGP" signature, short for "Pretty Good Privacy"—to encrypt and digitally sign his communications to allow users to authenticate that messages from "DPR" had in fact been sent by "DPR," and "DPR" alone.⁵ (Tr. 246-49). "Dread Pirate

holders can convert that currency into a national currency (like dollars) through various exchange services. (Tr. 152-53, 170-71).

⁵ PGP software creates a unique "public key," which can be shared by the message sender with others. (Tr. 247). When the message sender uses a "private key" to digitally sign messages, the recipients of the message can use the PGP program to validate that the message sent was from a particular sender and had not been altered. (Tr. 247-49, 370-83). Dur-

Roberts" would post various messages to the Silk Road community, including rules and regulations regarding the marketplace, commissions that would be charged, issues related to site maintenance, and the "State of the Road" address, outlining his plans for Silk Road. (Tr. 250-64).

"Dread Pirate Roberts" ran the site with the aid of support staff. (Tr. 264). In furtherance of the Government's investigation, in July 2013, one undercover agent lawfully assumed control of the accounts of "cirrus," a support staff member, on both the Silk Road forums and the marketplace. (Tr. 264-65). As "cirrus," the agent served as a moderator for the Silk Road forums, which allowed him to access certain features of Silk Road that general users could not, such as search capabilities and the ability to edit, delete, and move threads and posts on the forum. (Tr. 268-70, 273). While using the "cirrus" accounts, the agent frequently communicated with "DPR," as well as other staff support administrators, through Silk Road's built-in messaging systems on both the Silk Road marketplace and forum, as well as through a Silk Road "staff chat," a private messaging platform that "DPR" had set up (separate from the Silk Road website) which "DPR" used to communicate with his

ing the operation of Silk Road, "Dread Pirate Robert"s public PGP key—which validated messages sent from "DPR"—did not change, and thus "DPR"s private key had not changed during that time. (Tr. 368-84).

employees in real time. (Tr. 272-77, 290-310).⁶ Those communications confirmed that "Dread Pirate Roberts" served as the ultimate decision maker for the staff, paid the staff members a salary, and had the capacity to grant new administrative powers to "cirrus" and other staff members. (Tr. 272-74, 290).

2. Illegal Goods and Services Sold on the Silk Road Website

The illegal nature of the items sold on Silk Road was readily apparent to any user browsing through its offerings, and included the following.

a. Illegal Narcotics

The vast majority of the goods for sale were illegal drugs of nearly every variety, which were openly advertised on the site as such. (Tr. 88, 142-43). As of the takedown of the Silk Road website on October 2, 2013, there were nearly 13,802 listings for controlled substances on the website, listed under the categories "Cannabis," "Dissociatives," "Ecstasy," "Intoxicants," "Opioids," "Precursors," "Prescription," "Psychedelics," and "Stimulants," among others. (Tr. 1756-57;

The instructions that were provided by "Dread Pirate Roberts" to "cirrus" on July 20, 2013 on how to log onto Silk Road staff chat and communicate with him (as well as other Silk Road staff), including "DPR"'s dread@pi5mmj2ronhutyxv.onion address, were found in a text file on Ulbricht's computer. (Tr. 991-94).

SA 70). As of the same date, among other illegal narcotics, there were at least 643 different listings for cocaine products, which included listings for cocaine base (commonly known as "crack" cocaine), 205 different listings for heroin products, at least 305 different listings for LSD products, and 261 different listings for methamphetamine products. (Tr. 1759-63; SA 71-82).

During the course of the investigation, law enforcement seized a wide variety of controlled substances obtained through undercover purchases made on the Silk Road website, including cocaine, crack, heroin, MDMA (commonly known as "ecstasy"), LSD, and oxycodone. (Tr. 88-96, 98, 149-52, 154-68, 176-83, 1388-90; SA 68-69).

b. Fraudulent Identification Documents

Silk Road also offered for sale counterfeit and fraudulent identity documents, which included, among other things, counterfeit United States and foreign passports and driver's licenses and social security cards. (Tr. 1764-68; SA 83-99). As of October 2, 2013, there were approximately 156 different listings for forged identity documents in the "Forgeries" section of the Silk Road website. (SA 83).

During the course of the investigation, law enforcement seized counterfeit identity documents that had been ordered through the Silk Road website, which included nine counterfeit U.S. and foreign driver's licenses that had been ordered by the defendant. (Tr. 1467-76; SA 64).

c. Computer Hacking Tools and Services

Silk Road offered a wide variety of computer hacking tools as well as the services of computer hackers. (Tr. 1768-71). As of the takedown of the Silk Road website on October 2, 2013, the following computer hacking goods and services were available on the site, among others:

- Account password hacking tools and services, which included tools for compromising the usernames and passwords of online accounts, including email accounts, Facebook accounts, and other social media accounts. (Tr. 1769-70; SA 102-07).
- Remote Access Tools, commonly known as "RATs," which allow users to obtain unauthorized remote access to a compromised computer. (Tr. 1769-70, SA 100-01). Once a RAT is installed, a hacker can use such a tool to view the user's activity, view the user's webcam activity, and execute programs remotely, among other things. (Tr. 1769-70; SA 101).
- Keyloggers, which allow a user to monitor keystrokes inputted by a victim into his or her computer and are used to steal confidential

- information, including usernames, passwords, and account information. (SA 108-09).
- Distributed Denial of Service ("DDoS") services, which involve disabling websites or other publicly available services on the Internet by using large networks of compromised computers to flood victim systems with malicious Internet traffic. (SA 110-11).

During the course of the investigation, law enforcement purchased a computer hacking pack from a Silk Road vendor that contained a variety of 50 different computer hacking tools, including RATs, keyloggers, and other computer viruses. (Tr. 1390-95). The FBI tested a selection of the tools that were purchased from the computer hacking pack, and verified that they operated as advertised to compromise victim computer systems. (Tr. 1613-33).

d. Money Laundering Services

Silk Road offered a variety of money laundering services to its users, many of which were directly marketed to vendors who sold illegal goods and services on the website as a means to convert proceeds of illegal transactions (obtained in Bitcoins, the required means of payment on the Silk Road website) into other forms of currency. (Tr. 1771-74; SA 112-14). Vendors in this category offered, among other things, the sale of United States currency, anonymous debit cards preloaded with currency, and other

prepaid payment systems, including Moneypak cards. (Tr. 1771-74; SA 115-26).

3. Ross Ulbricht's Creation and Operation of the Silk Road Website

Ulbricht conceived of Silk Road during 2009 and 2010, worked to launch it in early 2011, and oversaw every aspect of its operation from then until his arrest on October 1, 2013.

a. Ulbricht Creates and Launches Silk Road

Ulbricht conceived of Silk Road in late 2009 as an "online storefront that couldn't be traced back to me." (Tr. 989-91). As described in a personal journal entry, he wanted "to create a website where people could buy anything anonymously, with no trail whatsoever that could lead back to them." (Tr. 898-900; SA 27). Ulbricht researched the technologies, including Tor and digital currencies, to promote anonymity for himself and users of the site. (Tr. 898-900, 989-91; SA 27). By mid-2010, he was growing illegal, hallucinogenic mushrooms "so that [he] could list them on the site for cheap to get people interested." (Tr. 898-900; SA 27). During the same time period, in late 2010, "[o]n the website side, [Ulbricht] was struggling to figure out on [his] own how to set it up." (SA 27).

Ulbricht solicited computer programming help from a college friend, Richard Bates, as he built the site. (Tr. 1114-16, 1120-24). Bates testified that, for a number of months initially, when he would ask Ulbricht what type of site he was working on, Ulbricht

would reply only that it was "top secret." (Tr. 1123-24). However, after Bates refused to provide further programming help unless Ulbricht disclosed the nature of his project, Ulbricht confided that he was running an online marketplace for illegal drugs, which he showed to Bates—the Silk Road website. (Tr. 1124-38).⁷

In early 2011, Ulbricht launched an early version of the website (Tr. 900-04; SA 30). Ulbricht attempted to attract users to Silk Road by marketing it on various online forums, including forums frequented by

On November 11, 2011, Ulbricht told Bates that he had "sold" Silk Road to someone else. (Tr. 1157-59). But chats dated December 9, 2011 between Ulbricht and a co-conspirator named "Variety Jones," or "vj," recovered from Ulbricht's laptop, made clear that this was a lie Ulbricht had told to Bates and his ex-girlfriend, both of whom he feared knew too much about his involvement in Silk Road. (Tr. 1211). And about a month thereafter, on January 15, 2012, the same co-conspirator, "vi," suggested to Ulbricht that he change his name from "Admin" to "Dread Pirate Roberts" on Silk Road, to "[c]lear your trail." (Tr. 1211-12). The name—an allusion to the protagonist of the cult classic film "The Princess Bride"—was deliberately adopted by Ulbricht so as to falsely suggest that multiple people ran Silk Road, when in fact Ulbricht alone controlled it from inception to end. (Tr. 367-68; 1211-12).

Bitcoin users. (Tr. 900-04, 1252-68; SA 30).8 Those efforts were successful enough to enable Ulbricht to

⁸ Law enforcement was able to trace those online forum posts to an email address, rossulbricht@gmail.com, controlled by Ulbricht. (Tr. 1266-67). A review of the contents of that email account confirmed his connection to "altoid," the name used to publicize Silk Road on online forums. (Tr. 1271-75).

The contents of Ulbricht's email account and his related Facebook account also included various additional pieces of information that confirmed Ulbricht's identity as "Dread Pirate Roberts" and his involvement as chief administrator of the Silk Road website. For example, Ulbricht's personal email account contained discussions of a rental property in Bastrop, Texas, and receipts for various lab-related materials from 2010, which matched a journal entry from Ulbricht's laptop that referred to setting up a "lab in a cabin out near Bastrop [Texas] off the grid" to grow hallucinogenic mushrooms, and a Silk Road expense spreadsheet listing the materials purchased for the lab. (Tr. 1275-81). Emails containing airline reservations for both international and domestic trips in Ulbricht's account, as well as Facebook messages from Ulbricht's account noting travel during the same time, matched Silk Road staff chats from Ulbricht's computer, discussing "DPR"s travel plans at the same time. (Tr. 1291-1301, 1366-74). These include, for example, chats from "DPR" about a trip from Australia to Thailand at the end of January 2012 and messages and pictures on Ulbricht's Facebook page of sell approximately 10 pounds of his hallucinogenic mushrooms through the website. (Tr. 900-01; SA 30).

According to Ulbricht's journal, user traffic to the website increased dramatically following an article posted on the Gawker website in June 2011, which described Silk Road. (Tr. 436, 900-04; SA 30). Sales spiked (with Ulbricht recording monthly revenues of approximately \$20,000 to \$25,000 in United States currency), and based on the growth, Ulbricht decided to hire staff to help with the site. (Tr. 902-04; SA 31-32).

The defendant oversaw every aspect of the operation of the Silk Road website until his arrest in October 2013. Among other things, Ulbricht was responsible for setting the commission rate for transactions

the defendant in Thailand during January and February of 2012. (Tr. 1296-1301). Documents from Ulbricht's laptop, including a chat from March 2012 in which "DPR" and a co-conspirator discussed getting foreign passports (such as from the Caribbean nation of Dominica), as well as application materials for citizenship in Dominica, containing the defendant's identifying information, were complemented by emails from Ulbricht's email account dated May 2012, discussing the defendant's application for citizenship to Dominica. (Tr. 997-1003, 1357-63). And finally, Ulbricht's email account contained emails in which others referred to him as "Frosty," the name of both Ulbricht's laptop computer, and the sole username for that computer. (Tr. 864-65, 1309, 1752-54).

that occurred over Silk Road. (Tr. 256-61). He was responsible for determining what goods were allowed to be sold on Silk Road. (Tr. 254-55). He enforced the rules of the site, including the ban against offline sales directly between vendors and customers, designed to avoid Silk Road commissions. (Tr. 220-21, 229-30, 261-63, 939-47, 1609-11, 1789-91). Ulbricht maintained and managed the computer servers and code used to operate and run Silk Road. (Tr. 250-54, 900-04, 960-67, 974-87, 1378, 1637-48). And he managed the day-to-day operations of the site, with the help of his staff of employees whom he hired, supervised, and paid. (Tr. 266-68, 270-74, 904-05, 924-25, 935-37, 939-43, 947-48, 953-56).

Ulbricht's Willingness to Use Violence to Protect His Interests in Silk Road

Communications seized from the Silk Road server also revealed that Ulbricht was willing to use violence to protect his interests in Silk Road, paying a total of approximately \$650,000 in United States currency to solicit the murders-for-hire of five people.

Beginning in or about March 13, 2013, a vendor by the name "FriendlyChemist" threatened to release the identities of other vendors and customers, unless Ulbricht paid him approximately \$500,000 in United States currency. (Tr. 1802-24, 1876-79). "Friendly-Chemist" predicted that the release of the information would expose those individuals to law enforcement and threaten the future of Silk Road:

what do u . . . think will happen if thousands of usernames, ordr amounts, addresses get leaked? all those people will leave sr and be scared to use it again. those vendors will all be busted and all there customers will be exposed too and never go back to sr

(Tr. 1806-07). He also provided a sample of the user information that he claimed to have stolen. (Tr. 1807-08).

In response, on March 27, 2013, Ulbricht contacted the man he understood to be a supplier for "FriendlyChemist" (who went by the moniker "redandwhite") and indicated that he wished to have "FriendlyChemist" executed. (Tr. 1819-22). Ulbricht provided identifying information for "Friendly-Chemist" and negotiated to pay "redandwhite" approximately 1,670 Bitcoins (roughly \$150,000 in United States currency at the time). (Tr. 1822, 1883-85). "Redandwhite" later confirmed that he received the payment and, about a day later, told the defendant that the murder had been carried out. (Tr. 1886-87). At Ulbricht's request, "redandwhite" sent a photograph purporting to be of the victim, with a code chosen by the defendant visible in the picture. (Tr. 1891-92). On April 5, 2014, the defendant replied. "I've received the picture and deleted it. Thank you again for your swift action." (Tr. 1892).

Ulbricht remained concerned that associates of "FriendlyChemist" were involved with the extortion attempt and might still pose a threat, however. (Tr. 1887-1896, 1905-08). After negotiating with

"redandwhite," Ulbricht sent another \$500,000 to assassinate those four associates, with the understanding that if "redandwhite" recovered any drugs or money from the scene of the crime, they would split it equally. (Tr. 1896-99).9

c. Ulbricht Orders Fraudulent Identification Documents from Silk Road

Communications seized from the Silk Road server and a controlled delivery revealed that Ulbricht used the Silk Road account "shefoundme" to order nine fraudulent identity documents from Silk Road.

In June 2013, "shefoundme" made arrangements to purchase the documents from a vendor on the Silk Road website for approximately \$1,650 in United States currency. (Tr. 1794-1802). "Shefoundme" asked if the documentation would be good enough to "pass airport security for a domestic flight" or to "get through being pulled over by a cop," and the vendor confirmed that the identity documents were shipped in early July 2013. (Tr. 1794-95, 1800).

⁹ Blockchain records confirm that the payments for the five attempted murders for hire were made from Bitcoin addresses associated with Bitcoin wallet files (defined below, *see infra* n.11), found on Ulbricht's laptop computer (Tr. 1729-32, 1884-86, 1899-1900; SA. 66-67). The murders-for-hire do not appear to have been carried out, however, as the Government stipulated at trial. (Tr. 1908-09).

On July 10, 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection intercepted a package inbound from Canada, containing nine counterfeit driver's licenses from six different U.S. states and three countries (matching the list of jurisdictions requested in the order made by "shefoundme"), each of which bore Ulbricht's photograph and date of birth, but different names. (Tr. 1467-71; SA 64). On July 26, 2013, Homeland Security agents performed a controlled delivery of those documents to Ulbricht in San Francisco, California. (Tr. 1471-72). During the encounter, when asked about the source of the fraudulent identification documents, Ulbricht said, "[H]ypothetically an individual could purchase anything they wanted—fake IDs, drugs, or generally anything illegal on the Tor browser, using the Tor browser to access the Silk Road website." (Tr. 1475).

d. Ulbricht's Arrest and His Electronic Media

On October 1, 2013, Ulbricht was arrested while he was logged into Silk Road and acting as "Dread Pirate Roberts." As law enforcement agents surveilled him, Ulbricht began using his computer at a public library in San Francisco, California. (Tr. 323-27, 847-54). Moments after Ulbricht entered the library, an undercover agent who had been masquerading as "cirrus," a trusted member of "Dread Pirate Robert"s Silk Road's customer support staff, began chatting with "Dread Pirate Roberts" and asked him to check a specific message on the Silk Road web site. (Tr. 327-35, 384-86). After the undercover agent confirmed that "Dread Pirate Roberts" was online and

using his account, other agents arrested Ulbricht and seized his laptop computer. (Tr. 333-35, 386-88, 854-56). At the time of the defendant's arrest, he was logged into the Silk Road website under the username "Dread Pirate Roberts," and he was logged into an online chat client, engaged in the conversation with the undercover agent. (Tr. 388-94, 859-71; SA 11-24).¹⁰

Subsequent examination of the defendant's computer revealed voluminous evidence tying the defendant to the creation, ownership, and operation of Silk Road for the length of its existence. This included, among other things:

• Thousands of pages of chat logs with his employees (Tr. 890-97, 904-09, 911-12, 918-22, 924-27, 935-49, 960-67, 980-87, 1062, 1152-54, 1211-12, 1296-98, 1301-05, 1357-61, 1366-67, 1369-73, 1459-66, 1609-11, 1905-08, 1917-21, 2000-01);

¹⁰ At the time he was arrested, Ulbricht was accessing the Silk Road "Mastermind" webpage, the top-level administrative page for Silk Road that, forensic analysis of the Silk Road server showed, could only be accessed using "Dread Pirate Roberts"'s account on the server, and could not be accessed by any of the other Silk Road staff employees. (Tr. 399-400, 1775-76).

- Journal entries describing his ownership and operation of the Silk Road website (Tr. 897-904, 909-11, 922-24, 1050-52; SA 26-43);
- A weekly "to do" list regarding Silk Road-related tasks (Tr. 947-48; SA 57-58);
- A copy of the Silk Road website (Tr. 1006-11; SA 62-63);
- A copy of the Silk Road website's database (which included information about Silk Road's users and their transactions) (Tr. 1053-55);
- A spreadsheet listing information regarding the servers used to operate Silk Road (Tr. 975-79, 1637-49);
- The private PGP encryption key "Dread Pirate Roberts" used to authenticate and encrypt his messages (Tr. 1010-15);
- An expense report spreadsheet, listing expenses and profits related to Silk Road (Tr. 950-52; SA 44-51);
- A spreadsheet listing Ulbricht's assets, which included a reference to Silk Road being an asset valued

at approximately \$104 million as of June 2012 (Tr. 957-60; SA 53); and

• Scanned copies of identification documents belonging to Silk Road staff members (Tr. 932-34; SA 60).

From a Bitcoin wallet file recovered from the defendant's computer, FBI agents seized approximately 144,341 Bitcoins, then worth approximately \$18 million. (Tr. 1052-53, 1673-78). A review of Blockchain records regarding Bitcoin addresses associated with the Silk Road servers and Ulbricht's laptop computer demonstrated a huge flow of Bitcoins from the Silk Road servers to the files maintained on the defendant's computer. (Tr. 1682-99, 1723-27). Nearly 90 percent of all the Bitcoins ever transferred into the wallets on Ulbricht's laptop came directly from the wallets found on Silk Road, and those transfers were made over many months. (Tr. 1695-99; SA 65). 12

¹¹ Bitcoin wallets are electronic files which contain Bitcoin addresses and the private keys required to control the funds associated with the Bitcoin addresses within the file. (Tr. 1668-70).

¹² These transfers were consistent with Ulbricht using his laptop as a "cold storage" location for Silk Road proceeds—*i.e.*, a storage location that was not vulnerable to hacks or crashes that might affect the Silk Road servers. (Tr. 1677-78, 1737-39). Indeed, a "log" file found on Ulbricht's computer contained an entry dated April 7, 2013, which said, "moved storage

On the day of Ulbricht's arrest, law enforcement agents also executed a search warrant on Ulbricht's residence. During that search, they recovered, among other things, a thumb drive containing versions of Silk Road-related documents recovered from Ulbricht's computer. (Tr. 1038-52, 1111-13). In addition, agents seized handwritten notes from Ulbricht's trash bin which contained details about the revamped Silk Road vendor rating system that "Dread Pirate Roberts" had recently announced on the Silk Road forums. (Tr. 406-08, 414-18).

4. The Volume of Illegal Transactions on Silk Road

In the course of its investigation, the FBI seized computer servers located in Iceland and the United States that were used to operate and back up the Silk Road marketplace. (Tr. 1637-59). Those servers included records of transactions occurring on Silk Road throughout its operation. (Tr. 1739-52, 1783-84, 1909-12, 1921-26). The records included detailed information about each transaction, including but not limited to the category of product that was sold, the purchase price (in Bitcoins and U.S. dollars), and the commission taken by the website. (Tr. 1909-12, 1921-26). According to that data, between February 2, 2011

wallet to local machine," and metadata associated with the primary wallet file on the laptop indicated that the file had been moved to the laptop on the same date, April 7, 2013. (Tr. 1052-53, 1673, 2155; SA. 25, 39).

and October 2, 2013, approximately 1.5 million transactions occurred over Silk Road, with a total value of approximately \$213.9 million in United States currency, which generated a total of approximately \$13.2 million in commissions for Silk Road, based on Bitcoin exchange rates at the time that the transactions occurred. (Tr. 1942-44; SA 130).

The vast majority of sales, approximately \$183 million dollars' worth, were for illegal narcotics (Tr. 1929-32; SA 127), including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and LSD:

Drug	Total No. of Sales	Total Sales Revenue
	of Sales	
Heroin	53,649	\$8,930,657
Cocaine	82,582	\$17,386,917
Methamphetamine	34,689	\$8,110,453
LSD	54,567	\$7,073,838

(Tr. 1935-37; SA 131).

Thousands of fraudulent identification documents were sold through the site:

Type	Total No. of Sales	Total Sales Revenue
Fake IDs	3,642	\$699,053
Forgeries	3,487	\$197,291
Passports	103	\$105,292

(Tr. 1933-34; SA 128).

And millions of dollars' worth of currency and valuable metals were laundered using services available through the site:

Type	Total No. of Sales	Total Sales Revenue
Money	14,345	\$2,846,025
Digital Currencies	18,134	\$177,167
Gold	81	\$159,944
Bullion	122	\$80,952
Silver	138	\$9,746

(Tr. 1934-35; SA 129).

The database also included information regarding the number of vendors and users on the Silk Road website. Between approximately January 2011 and October 2013, there were approximately 3,748 different registered vendor accounts and approximately 115,391 registered buyer accounts that had engaged in at least one transaction on the website (Tr. 1942-44; SA 130), for users who were located around the world (Tr. 1939-42; SA 132-33).

B. The Defense Case

In its opening statement, the defense admitted that Ulbricht conceived of and "created" Silk Road, but "after a few months," he "handed it off to others," because running the site had become "too stressful for him and [had] got[ten] out of hand." (Tr. 60-61).

The defense argued that ultimately, it was the unidentified buyers of the site who, after believing they were under investigation, lured Ulbricht back to Silk Road, some two-and-a-half years later, so that Ul-

bricht could "take the fall" for them. (Tr. 61). In support of this theory, defense counsel argued that no one as technically-sophisticated and security-conscious as "Dread Pirate Roberts" would have made the mistakes of, for example, leaving notes about Silk Road in his waste basket at home, or using his laptop and file sharing programs on a public Wi-Fi network. (Tr. 62-63). As for the evidence on Ulbricht's laptop, the defense's theory was that the real "DPR" had planted it, so "when the FBI arrived," the day of his arrest, Ulbricht "would be left holding the bag." (Tr. 65).

The defense pursued this theory through its crossexamination of the Government's witnesses, particularly Special Agent Jared Der-Yeghiayan, who had investigated other individuals before another agent brought his attention to Ulbricht in September 2013. (Tr. 489-509, 527-30, 651-55, 659-79). One of those individuals was Mark Karpeles, who owned the company that hosted a website on the open Internet ("silkroadmarket.org") that provided information on how to access the real Silk Road through Tor. (Tr. 528-29, 660-61). Evidence later recovered from Ulbricht's laptop revealed that Ulbricht was the customer who leased the space on Karpeles's server, however. (Tr. 809-11; 1003-06). The other individual was Anand Athavale, who posted on a libertarian website ("mises.org") that "Dread Pirate Roberts" referred to in his online profile. (Tr. 813-14). Agent Der-Yeghiayan noted similarities between the language "DPR" used on the Silk Road forums and postings on mises.org by Athavale. (Tr. 813-19).

The defense also called three character witnesses and authenticated a document obtained from Ulbricht's laptop that contained a task list. (Tr. 2001-22, 2098-112). As described in more detail below, see infra Point III.A, the defense proffered testimony by two witnesses as experts, but upon the Government's motion, the Court precluded testimony from both witnesses because the defense did not provide timely or sufficient notice of their testimony. (A. 362-79).

C. The Verdict and Sentencing

After closing arguments, the jury returned with a verdict after three-and-a-half hours of deliberation. Ulbricht was found guilty on all counts. (Tr. 2334-38).

At the beginning of the sentencing hearing on May 29, 2015, Judge Forrest vacated Ulbricht's convictions on Counts One and Three of the Indictment, finding that they were lesser included offenses, and therefore duplicative, of other counts of conviction, pursuant to *United States* v. *Rutledge*, 517 U.S. 292 (1996). (A. 1459-62).

As described in more detail below, see infra Point VII.A, Judge Forrest sentenced Ulbricht principally to life imprisonment, ordered forfeiture in the amount of \$183,961,921, and imposed a \$500 special assessment. (A. 1539-41).

ARGUMENT

POINT I

There Was No Discovery Violation

Confronted with overwhelming proof (the sufficiency of which he does not challenge on appeal), Ulbricht claims that his rights were violated, because he was not given unfettered access to the Government's criminal investigation of two law enforcement agents for behaving corruptly in connection with their roles in a parallel investigation of Silk Road, and because he was precluded from introducing evidence of that investigation at trial. (Br. 20-62). But nowhere, either below or here, has Ulbricht explained, other than in the most conclusory way, how the corruption of two agents—who neither testified at his trial nor generated the evidence against him tended to disprove that he was running Silk Road from his laptop. As the District Court found in vetting this challenge both before and after trial, neither Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), nor any recognized principle of criminal discovery justified the relief Ulbricht sought or a basis to overturn his conviction.

A. Relevant Facts

1. The Maryland Investigation of Silk Road

In 2013, the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland ("Baltimore USAO") indicted Ulbricht for conspiring to distribute narcotics, witness tampering, and murder for hire, see United States v. Ross William Ulbricht, No. CCB-13-0222 (D. Md.), as a result of an undercover investigation led by a group of federal agents based in Baltimore (the "Baltimore Task Force"), including then-Special Agent Carl Force of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). (A. 649).

The Baltimore undercover investigation stemmed from the arrest of one Silk Road employee, Curtis Green, a/k/a "Flush," on narcotics charges in early 2013. (A. 664). Green guickly cooperated and provided Force with access to his "Flush" account on Silk Road, to use for undercover purposes. (A. 664). Force also used Green to communicate with "DPR" during this period. (A. 664). About a week later, another Silk Road employee (named "Inigo") advised "DPR" that approximately \$350,000 worth of Bitcoins had been stolen from Silk Road user accounts, possibly by the user named "Flush," and that he had locked "Flush" out of his account. (A. 665). "DPR" then reached out to "nob"—an undercover account that then-Agent Force had been using to communicate with "DPR," posing as a large-scale drug dealer—and paid him \$80,000 to torture and murder Green. (A. 652, 664).¹³

¹³ Although the Government indicated during pretrial proceedings that it would seek to admit Ulbricht's communications concerning this murder for hire (A. 664), at trial, the Government did not seek to admit any aspect of either this attempted murder or Ulbricht's communications about it, including with Force.

The Government (meaning, this Office) produced these facts to Ulbricht in the ordinary course of discovery, through Force's investigative reports and documents (including chat conversations between Ulbricht and "nob") recovered from Ulbricht's computer. (A. 664-65).

2. The Government's Pretrial Disclosure of the Investigation of Carl Force

On November 21, 2014 (two months before trial), the Government sought leave from the District Court to disclose to the defense that a grand jury in San Francisco was investigating Force for selling information about the Silk Road investigation to Ulbricht and for stealing proceeds from Silk Road website users. (A. 649-54).

As the Government explained, the San Francisco U.S. Attorney's Office (the "San Francisco USAO") began investigating Force after learning that he exchanged hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of Bitcoins into dollars over some period of time, which he transferred to his personal accounts; and that during that time (as described above) Ulbricht had learned that "Flush" had stolen approximately \$350,000 worth of Bitcoins from Silk Road users. (A. 650). This Office assisted that investigation by sharing evidence it had collected in the course of its own investigation (like copies of digital media), and communications recovered from that media suggested that Force might have used other Silk Road accounts (besides his authorized undercover account, "nob") to offer (and potentially sell) information about the DEA's investigation of "Dread Pirate Roberts." (A. 650-51).

Because the foregoing matters related to a non-public, ongoing grand jury proceeding, the Government moved the District Court under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(E) for leave to disclose the foregoing facts to Ulbricht's defense counsel, subject to a protective order, so that the defense would have the opportunity to challenge the Government's conclusion that the information in question was neither exculpatory nor otherwise discoverable. (A. 653-54).

In response, Ulbricht moved *in limine* to unseal the Government's November 21, 2014 disclosure letter and to admit the facts described therein at trial, citing *Brady* v. *Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83. (Docket Entry 227-1, at 15-20). The District Court granted the Government's requested protective order, scheduled a conference, and asked the Government to respond in writing to certain follow-up questions (largely related to the need for ongoing secrecy), which it did. (A. 656-60).

In a sealed pretrial conference held on December 15, 2014, the District Court indicated that it had also received an *ex parte* submission from the defense and, perhaps based thereon, explored whether the investigation of Force was exculpatory insofar as it raised the possibility that Force had the opportunity to fabricate evidence against Ulbricht through his access to the "Flush" account on Silk Road. (A. 225-26, 228-31, 240-41; *see also* Docket Entries 281, 283). As the Government explained then and in a subsequent written submission, Force's access to "Flush"s account cre-

dentials would have given him a limited amount of administrator access (such as the power to reset user passwords, which, conceivably, could have enabled him to make unauthorized withdrawals), but it was not the kind of core, root-level access that "DPR" had, nor did it include access to Ulbricht's laptop or to chat facilities outside the Silk Road website. (A. 228-31, 240-41, 242-43, 256, 663, 666-67). Nevertheless, the Government agreed that the defense was free to investigate Force or to otherwise explore the theory that evidence against Ulbricht had been manufactured, short of revealing to anyone that Force was the subject of a grand jury investigation. (A. 249-50).

The defense then sought to unseal the information contained in the Government's letter and requested extensive discovery into the ongoing Force investigation, including, but not limited to, "any and all" records of Force's bank accounts, other assets, phone records, email messages and chat communications, tax records, and the fruits of any legal process or computer forensic examination. (A. 669-72). After consulting with the San Francisco USAO, the Government urged the District Court not to approve subpoenas with respect to the defense discovery requests, but it affirmed its obligation to provide any exculpatory material stemming from the Force investigation, to the extent it learned of it. (Docket Entry 227-1, at 67-72).

3. The District Court Denies Ulbricht's Motion

The District Court denied Ulbricht's motion to unseal information about the Force investigation and for discovery by written decision issued December 22, 2014. (A. 673-700). In light of the presumption of secrecy attaching to matters occurring before a grand jury, and the Government's specific representations that public disclosure of the Force grand jury investigation could have adverse consequences, the District Court rejected the defense's motion to unseal, finding that the defense "has failed to make a showing of 'particularized need' sufficient to overcome the presumption of secrecy." (A. 696). In so doing, the District Court found that the information in the Government's disclosure was, if anything, "inculpatory" (A. 690 n.13 (emphasis original)), and that, while there was "persuasive evidence that no ... fabrication" of evidence occurred (A. 691), the defense was free to pursue that theory through technical examination of the Silk Road evidence produced in discovery (A. 694). The Government's commitment to produce any such information, pursuant to its Brady obligations, should it come to light, combined with the fact that it would not use any evidence obtained from the Baltimore USAO's investigation (such as any communication between Ulbricht and Force), "mitigate[d] the (virtually non-existent) risk of 'possible injustice' from maintaining" the disclosure under seal. (A. 694).

Consistent with these conclusions, the District Court also denied the defendant's requests for additional discovery, noting that (1) the defendant had failed to "meet the threshold of materiality" required to compel disclosure under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) (A. 696); (2) the scope of the discovery demands constituted an "unreasonable or oppressive" "fishing expedition" disallowed by Rule 17 (A. 699); and (3) the defendant had failed to "articulate[] a coherent or particular reason why" either the fact of the Force investigation, Force's leaking of information regarding the Silk Road investigation, or Force's conversion and/or theft of bitcoins, would either "counter the government's case" or "bolster the defense." (A. 697). It also noted that the Government's continuing Brady obligation to produce any exculpatory material discovered through the Force investigation was not, itself, an affirmative vehicle for the defense to compel discovery. (A. 699).

On December 30, 2014, Ulbricht requested a third adjournment of trial "until the government completes its grand jury investigation" of former Agent Force, again citing the possibility that the investigation might yield exculpatory evidence. (A. 701-03). ¹⁴ The Government opposed (A. 704-06), and the next day, the District Court denied the request for the adjournment, citing its prior ruling (A. 706; Tr. 118-19).

¹⁴ Although trial was initially scheduled for November 3, 2014, on applications by Ulbricht, the Court adjourned the trial to November 10, 2014 and then to January 5, 2015. (A. 877; Docket Entries 58, 78, 90).

4. The Defense's Attempts to Introduce Evidence Relating to the Force Investigation During Trial

During trial, Ulbricht attempted to introduce evidence that was tangentially related to the investigation of Force. (Tr. 594-614, 1440-42, 2084-97).

More specifically, Ulbricht sought to introduce chat messages sent to "DPR" by a Silk Road user named "DeathFromAbove," in which "DeathFromAbove" intimated that he knew "DPR"'s true identity was that of an individual named Anand Athavale, and he threatened to leak this name to law enforcement unless "DPR" paid him \$250,000. (Tr. 594-614, 1440-42; A. 712). The Government opposed admitting those messages, on the ground that they constituted hearsay statements, which the defense sought to introduce in support of an alternative perpetrator theory. (A. 707-18).

As it turned out, Force controlled the "Death-FromAbove" account, and was using it to extort money from "DPR," based on information he learned from his access to the reports of Agent Der-Yeghiayan (who, as described above, had initially suspected that Athavale was "DPR," based on some common patterns in their writing, see supra page 28). (Tr. 1440; A. 710-11). In any event, "DPR" responded to "Death-FromAbove" by telling him to "[s]top messaging me and go find something else to do," and he wrote in a "log" file that "DeathFromAbove"s threats to expose him were "bogus." (A. 708-10).

The District Court ultimately precluded the messages, finding that they were hearsay that the defense was improperly seeking to introduce for their truth, and that they were more prejudicial than probative, since they were not substantial evidence of an "alternative perpetrator." (Tr. 1872-73).

Ulbricht Moves for a New Trial While the San Francisco USAO Charges Carl Force and Shaun Bridges

On March 6, 2015, Ulbricht filed post-trial motions, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, in which, among other things, he argued that the Government violated its disclosure obligations under *Brady* because (1) Force "himself was obligated to disclose any misconduct he committed during the course of or related to his investigation of the Silk Road website," and Force's "knowledge in that regard is imputed to the prosecution as a whole"; and (2) the Government's February 1, 2015 letter regarding Force's control of "DeathFromAbove" (A. 707-10) constituted additional exculpatory material that the Government had failed to disclose in a timely manner. (A. 719-21; Docket Entry 224, at 10 n.2).¹⁵

¹⁵ Ulbricht also contended that the timing and manner in which Agent Der-Yeghiayan's 3500 material was produced (to the extent it reflected his initial theories of who might have been responsible for Silk Road) and the Government's changes to its trial exhibits amounted to a *Brady* violation. (Docket Entry 224, at 10-15).

On March 30, 2015 (after the defendant had filed his Rule 33 motion, but before the Government filed its opposition), the San Francisco USAO unsealed a criminal complaint charging both Carl Force and Shaun Bridges, a former United States Secret Service Special Agent who had previously served with Force on the Baltimore Task Force. (SA 134-228 (the "Force Complaint"); Docket Entry 226). The Force Complaint alleged theft of government property, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 641; wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343; money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h); and criminal conflict of interest, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 208. (SA 134, 140-41).

As related to the Silk Road investigation, the Force Complaint alleged that (i) Force converted the Bitcoins that Ulbricht had sent to "nob" (Force's official undercover identity) to his own personal use; and (ii) Force used other unauthorized online personas to extort Ulbricht by seeking money in exchange for information related to the investigation of Silk Road. (SA 145-60). It further alleged that (iii) Bridges used the Baltimore Task Force's access to their informant Curtis Green's "Flush" account (as well as another account under Bridge's control) to steal approximately \$350,000 dollars' worth of Bitcoins from the Silk Road marketplace. ¹⁶ (SA 175-80 & n.26).

¹⁶ On or about July 1, 2015, Force pled guilty to an information charging him with money laundering,

In response, Ulbricht argued that the Force Complaint undermined the Government's justification for keeping the investigation secret, and that he was entitled to materials related to the Force investigation, based on certain revelations in the Force Complaint. (Docket Entry 232).

The Government opposed Ulbricht's motion, because "Force played no role in the investigation of Silk Road conducted by this Office; he was never contemplated as a witness at trial; and none of the trial evidence otherwise came from the USAO-Baltimore

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A) and (B) (Count One); obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (Count Two); and extortion under color of official right, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count Three). (*United States* v. *Force*, No. 15 Cr. 319, Docket Entries 38, 47 (N.D. Cal.) (hereinafter "Force" Docket Entries). On or about October 19, 2015, Force was sentenced principally to 78 months' imprisonment. (Force Docket Entries 81, 88).

On or about August 31, 2015, Bridges pled guilty to an information charging him with money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count One); and obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (Count Two) (Force Docket Entries 36, 65). On or about December 7, 2015, Bridges was sentenced principally to 71 months' imprisonment. (Force Docket Entries 97, 100). The San Francisco USAO continues to investigate Bridges. (See Force Docket Entry 116, at 3).

investigation in which he was involved," and because the USAO-San Francisco investigation never yielded any information that was exculpatory as to Ulbricht, "not before trial, not during trial, and not since." (Docket Entry 230, at 22, 25).

On April 27, 2015, the District Court denied the defendant's motion in its entirety. (A. 876-900). The District Court set forth the evidence at trial, calling it "overwhelming" and "unrebutted," and noted that Ulbricht's motion "does not address how any additional evidence, investigation, or time would have raised even a remote (let alone reasonable) probability that the outcome of the trial would be any different." (A. 878-79; see also A. 893).

With respect to the investigation of Force and Bridges, the District Court found that it "remains unclear (as it always was) as to how any information relating to that investigation is material or exculpatory vis-à-vis Ulbricht." (A. 892). Even after assuming, for the sake of argument, what the defense *might* have argued the omitted information *could* have revealed, the District Court rejected those possible defense theories as having "no basis in the record," and amounting to "no more than speculation and premised on erroneous assumptions as to the scope of discovery obligations and the meaning of exculpatory evidence." (A. 892). Finally, the District Court rejected Ulbricht's assertion that he was prevented from "exploring potentially exculpatory avenues," because although the Government "had an obligation to turn over favorable material evidence to prevent injustice; it had no obligation to keep Ulbricht continually apprised of developments in a separate investigation." (A. 893-94).

B. Applicable Law

1. The Government's Discovery Obligations

a. Rule 16

The Government's discovery obligations in criminal cases begin with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E), which provides, in pertinent part, that the Government must disclose to the defense documents and objects that are "within the government's possession, custody, or control" if they are "material to preparing the defense" or will be used by the Government in its case-in-chief at trial. Evidence is material to the defense "if it could be used to counter the government's case or to bolster a defense," but "information not meeting either of those criteria is not to be deemed material within the meaning of" Rule 16. *United States* v. *Stevens*, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Rule's predecessor, Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C)).

"Materiality means more than that the evidence in question bears some abstract logical relationship to the issues in the case. There must be some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed evidence would have enabled the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor." *United States* v. *Maniktala*, 934 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).

b. The Jencks Act

The Jencks Act provides that "[a]fter a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement... of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b).

The purpose of the statute is not to serve as a general vehicle for discovery, but rather to provide the defense with prior statements of Government witnesses for purposes of impeachment. See United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 76 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that the Jencks Act "does not normally mandate disclosure of statements made by a person who does not testify").

c. Brady v. Maryland

The Government has an obligation under the Due Process Clause to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory and impeaching evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). To warrant a new trial based on a violation of this obligation, "a defendant must show that: (1) the Government, either willfully or inadvertently, suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the failure to disclose this evidence resulted in prejudice." United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, it is not enough to show that the Government failed to turn over any favorable evidence. A Brady or Giglio violation will result in a new trial only "if the

undisclosed information is 'material,' within the exacting standard of materiality established by the governing case law." *United States* v. *Spinelli*, 551 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2008); accord United States v. Rivas, 377 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 2000).

Where a new trial is sought based on a proffered Brady violation, the Supreme Court has said that the "touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a different result," that is, whether "the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (suppressed evidence is "material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different"); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) ("[T]here is never a real 'Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict."); United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1209 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[U]ndisclosed evidence will be deemed material only if it 'could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 435)). "While the trial judge's factual conclusions as to the effect of nondisclosure are ordinarily entitled to great weight, this Court conducts its own independent examination of the record in determining whether the suppressed evidence is material." *United States* v. *Sessa*, 711 F.3d 316, 321 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, "evidence is not considered to have been suppressed within the meaning of the Brady doctrine if the defendant or his attorney either knew, or should have known, of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of that evidence." United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 225 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). There can be no "suppression" for *Brady* purposes when the defense actually possessed the information in time for effective use at trial or to otherwise investigate the information, even if the evidence was produced after trial had begun. See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144 ("[A]s long as a defendant possesses Brady evidence in time for its effective use, the government has not deprived the defendant of due process of law simply because it did not produce the evidence sooner.").

2. Rule 17(c)

Rule 17(c) grants to criminal defendants and the Government the right to subpoena documents and objects to be introduced as evidence at trial, and further states that a court "may direct the witness to produce the designated items in court before trial or before they are to be offered in evidence." Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) (emphasis added). However, the rule "was not intended to provide a means of discovery for criminal cases." *United States* v. *Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 698 (1974). Although Rule 17(c) may be used to pro-

cure "evidentiary" materials in anticipation of trial, pretrial subpoenas "merely [constituting] a fishing expedition to see what may turn up" are not authorized by Rule 17(c) and should be quashed. *Bowman Dairy Co.* v. *United States*, 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951). "It was not intended by Rule 16 to give a limited right of discovery, and then by Rule 17 to give a right of discovery in the broadest terms." *Id.* at 220. Accordingly, a pretrial Rule 17(c) subpoena should not issue unless it meets three criteria: "(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity." *United States* v. *Nixon*, 418 U.S. at 700.

3. Standards of Review

Where a defendant's *Brady* claim is raised in a motion for a new trial, the denial of that claim is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion, *United States* v. *Douglas*, 525 F.3d 225, 245 (2d Cir. 2008); *United States* v. *Gil*, 297 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2002), like motions for a new trial, generally, *United States* v. *Rigas*, 583 F.3d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 2009); *United States* v. *Owen*, 500 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2007).

Similarly, review of a district court's discovery rulings, including rulings on motions to compel or to issue pretrial subpoenas, are also reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 702; United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 142 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d at 125. Abuse of discretion occurs if a district court "based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the

range of permissible decisions." Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Finally, "the decision whether to grant a continuance is a matter traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge." *United States* v. *O'Connor*, 650 F.3d 839, 854 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court "review[s] an order denying a continuance for abuse of discretion, and . . . will find no such abuse unless the denial was an arbitrary action that substantially impaired the defense." *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Discussion

Ulbricht's appeal based on the corruption of two Baltimore agents fails for the simple reason that, even now, Ulbricht has not explained how the information he sought to compel or admit was exculpatory. As the District Court remarked, "[e]ither the defense assumes the answer is so obvious that it need not explain, or its omission is purposeful." (A. 892). Because Ulbricht has not identified any suppressed, exculpatory information, much less demonstrated that it could have impacted the verdict, his Brady claim should be rejected. That being the case, Ulbricht's collateral claims, concerning his statutory discovery demands, limitations on his examination, and his request for an adjournment, should likewise be rejected.

1. There Was No Brady Violation

As the District Court held, and the Government acknowledged, the prosecution team was under a continuing obligation to turn exculpatory information over to the defense, including any information that tended to show that evidence on either Ulbricht's laptop or the Silk Road servers was fabricated or compromised. (A. 694, 699; Docket Entry 227-1, at 70). Were there any evidence that Force, Bridges, or anyone else had planted or altered evidence, or that the Government's exhibits were otherwise unreliable, the Government would have been obligated to produce that information to the defense.

But the fact that two agents sold information to Ulbricht, attempted to extort him, and stole money from his customers' accounts through the Silk Road website, itself did nothing to undermine the reliability of the evidence found outside that website that demonstrated that Ulbricht was "Dread Pirate Roberts," including:

• A wide variety of documentary evidence on his laptop, created over many years, ranging from chat logs and journal entries; to Silk Road financial and employee records, a to-do list, and the very PGP key that "DPR" used to authenticate his messages; and \$18 million dollars' worth of Bitcoins, most of which were previously stored on the Silk Road servers (supra pages 22-25);

- The overlap between Ulbricht's personal email and Facebook accounts and chat logs recovered from his laptop (*supra* note 8); and
- The fact that Ulbricht was acting as *the* Silk Road administrator "Dread Pirate Roberts" at the moment he was arrested (*supra* pages 21-22).

Neither has Ulbricht explained how Force or Bridges, even with unauthorized Silk Road user accounts and the limited ability to reset other users' passwords (using the "Flush" account), could have manipulated the data that was admitted from the Silk Road servers (principally records establishing the type and volume of transactions conducted through the Silk Road website and private messages with and posts from "DPR" that demonstrated how that individual, whoever he was, ran Silk Road (Tr. 192-203, 207-64, 1783-1803)). Indeed, the Government offered the District Court "persuasive evidence that no such fabrication occurred." (A. 240-41, 691 (citing A. 666-67); cf. Tr. 273-74 (Agent Der-Yeghiayan's administrator account had limited privileges)).

Nowhere does Ulbricht explain how Force's and Bridge's crimes impeach the Government's "overwhelming" proof. (A. 878). If anything, Force's attempts to sell information to "DPR" or otherwise extort him were "inculpatory as [they] suggest[ed] that Ulbricht, as 'DPR,' was seeking to pay law enforce-

ment for inside information to protect his illegal enterprise." (A. 893). And to the extent Ulbricht assumes that he should have been permitted to inform the jury that some of the agents who targeted him were corrupt, even though they neither testified nor developed the evidence against him, he is mistaken. Such a line of argument, without even the slightest nexus to the proof at trial, would have been far more prejudicial than probative and properly excluded on that basis. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; United States v. Millan-Colon, 836 F. Supp. 1007, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[A]s the Government indicates that it will not offer evidence seized by any officer implicated in the corruption investigation and that those officers will not be in the chain of custody, any testimony regarding their misdeeds would be substantially more prejudicial than probative."); cf. United States v. Warme, 572 F.2d 57, 62 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978) (deferring to district court's decision not to order prosecution to turn over 3500 material concerning the investigation of defendant's associates, which "was not relevant to any issue at trial"); United States v. Lopez, 577 F.3d 1053, 1057-58, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (undisclosed assessment that testifying informant was not reliable was not material under *Brady*, in part because his testimony "did not directly inculpate" defendant).¹⁷

¹⁷ Ulbricht asserts throughout his brief that he was precluded from admitting evidence of Force's and Bridge's misconduct (Br. 37), but in fact, the District Court indicated that it would, "over the course of the trial, entertain specific requests to use information

Ulbricht's appeal rests on the unspoken assumption that, once the Government identified a pocket of corruption in sweeping law enforcement investigations of him, he was entitled to conduct his own independent inquiry, to ensure no exculpatory material existed anywhere in the federal government's holdings. But that is not the law. "There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); see also United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 414 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Brady did not create a criminal right analogous to discovery in a civil case."); United States v. Evanchik, 413 F.2d 950, 953 (2d Cir. 1969) ("Neither [Brady] nor any other case requires the government to afford a criminal defendant a general right of discovery."). Nor does the defense have a "constitutional right to conduct his own search of the [Government's] files to argue relevance." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987). "Unlike Rule 16 and the Jencks Act . . . Brady is not a discovery rule, but a rule of fairness and min-

from [the Government's disclosures] on cross-examination," and if the Government "open[ed] the door to specific information or facts develop which render particularized disclosure of facts or documents relevant, the Court will entertain a renewed application at that time" (A. 700). Ulbricht never sought to question any witnesses about the agents' corruption or to proffer such evidence at trial, however, aside from the statements by "DeathFromAbove," discussed below, *infra* Point I.C.5.

imum prosecutorial obligation" United States v. Maniktala, 934 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d 434, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) "Brady is not a rule of discovery—it is a remedial rule." (citing Coppa, 267 F.3d at 140)). It was the prosecution team's duty to evaluate whether exculpatory information existed within its holdings. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976) ("If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice. . . . [T]he Constitution surely does not demand that much."). Having concluded that it did not, however, the Government was entitled to protect the ongoing investigation of Force and Bridges from exposure, and to try Ulbricht with independently derived evidence.18

¹⁸ Ulbricht challenges the independence of this Office's investigation from the investigations in Baltimore and San Francisco. (Br. 40-46). As previously discussed, the investigations were independent, as the agents involved in the Baltimore investigation played no role in the New York investigation, and none of the trial evidence came from the Baltimore investigation (*supra* page 40). In any event, whether those different prosecutors were part of the same prosecution team might bear on this Office's duty to search for exculpatory material, *see United States* v. *Zagari*, 111 F.3d 307, 320 n.13 (2d Cir.1997); *United*

The fact that the Government disclosed the ongoing investigation "in an abundance of caution" (A. 649) was neither remarkable nor a concession that the existence of the Force investigation was actually exculpatory. (Contra Br. 38-39). The Government's decision to go beyond what it perceived its Brady obligations to be, so that the defense would have the opportunity to litigate the question, was simply prudent practice, common in this District. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 ("The prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."); A. 225 (Government's practice of disclosing "in an abundance of caution" occurs "with relative frequency"). As the Government intended, the District Court encouraged the defense to alert the prosecutors to its theories, to help the Government ensure that it was complying with Brady in its continuing reviews (although the defense declined the offer). (A. 700).

Moreover, Ulbricht knew that \$350,000 had been stolen, apparently by a Silk Road employee, and potentially by "Flush," a user whose account Force, Bridges, and the Baltimore Task Force controlled.

States v. Chalmers, 410 F. Supp. 2d 278, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), but, as the District Court found, "whether the investigations proceeded separately or intersected has no bearing on whether any undisclosed materials relating to the Rogue Agents are exculpatory as to Ulbricht." (A. 892 n.6).

(A. 664-65, 690-91). To the extent Ulbricht suspected that Force (or anyone else) had planted evidence on his laptop or elsewhere, the defense was free to examine those media forensically for signs of tampering. In other words, regardless of whether a law enforcement agent was responsible, knowledge that someone exploited a Silk Road administrator's credentials to steal money was enough information to lead the defense to investigate the authenticity of the Government's exhibits (assuming, of course, there was any connection between the two, which the Government disclaims). "Evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew, or should have known, of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 918 (2d Cir. 1993). This is because "[t]he rationale underlying *Brady* is not to supply a defendant with all the evidence in the Government's possession which might conceivably assist in the preparation of the defense, but to assure that the defendant will not be denied access to exculpatory evidence only known to the Government." United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d at 918 (same). Since the defense was in the same position as the Government (insofar as the Government was unaware of any evidence tending to impeach the authenticity of its poof, but the defense was able to explore that possibility through forensic analysis), nothing was "suppressed" from the defense.

In seeking a new trial based on the suppression of exculpatory material, Ulbricht's burden is to point out information that calls into question the verdict against him. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 140. Since the fact of a collateral corruption investigation alone was inadmissible, and because "there is no basis . . . to believe that any undisclosed materials" relating to that investigation "would have been remotely useful, let alone exculpatory, vis-à-vis Ulbricht" (A. 892), he has failed to carry that burden.

2. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Ulbricht's Discovery Requests

The District Court also properly denied Ulbricht's sweeping demand for discovery with respect to the Force investigation. (A. 669-72).

As the District Court found, the 28 requests for "any and all" information related to the investigation amounted to a "speculative fishing expedition" wellbeyond Rule 16's limitation to items "material to preparing the defense." (A. 680 & n.9, 696-97). Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 16(a)(1)(E). For the same reasons that information about Force's corruption was not itself exculpatory, "[d]efendant has not articulated a coherent and particular reason why the fact of SA Force's investigation, or that fruits of that investigation, could themselves counter the government's case or bolster a defense." (A. 697 (internal quotation marks omitted)). "Such broad and speculative requests are inappropriate under Rule 16." (A. 697). Since Ulbricht did not demonstrate how fulfilling his blunderbuss requests for information about Force "would have enabled [him] significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor," *Maniktala*, 934 F.2d at 28 (emphasis added), it was no abuse of discretion for the District Court to deny them under Rule 16. And for the same reason, it would have been inappropriate to approve pretrial subpoenas under Rule 17. *See Bowman Dairy Co.* v. *United States*, 341 U.S. at 221.

3. There Was No Abuse of Discretion in Denying an Adjournment

Based on the District Court's denial of his discovery motion and the subsequent charges against Force and Bridges, Ulbricht argues he was entitled to an adjournment of trial until after the corruption investigation was complete. (Br. 37). But the defense's adjournment request was based on a desire to wait until the "full nature of [Force's] alleged misconduct is known, and available to [the] defense." (A. 701). And as the District Court found, Ulbricht never "made a showing that either the fact of the Force Investigation or the information learned during that investigation is 'needed to avoid a possible injustice.'" (A. 690).

In light of the defendant's continued inability to posit how any information from that investigation would tend to exculpate Ulbricht, even now that Force and Bridges have been charged (and in light of the defendant's two prior requests for adjournments (A. 877; Docket Entries 58, 78, 90)), it cannot be said that the denial was either "arbitrary" or that it "substantially impaired the defense," so as to amount to an abuse of discretion. *United States* v. *O'Connor*, 650 F.3d at 854 (internal quotation marks omitted).

4. The Government Produced Jencks Act Material in a Timely Fashion

Ulbricht also argues that the manner in which the Government produced Agent Der-Yeghiayan's prior statements pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, violated *Brady*, because he lacked a sufficient opportunity to use the material to support his "alternative perpetrator" theory. (Br. 61-63).

Although Ulbricht asserts that 70 documents in the 3500 material "contained exculpatory material and information that was not provided to the defense at a time in which it could be used effectively at trial," the only defense they are proffered to support was the "alternative perpetrator" theory. (Br. 61 (citing A. 643-48)). But the materials in question were produced to Ulbricht on December 31, 2014, 13 days before trial (A. 889-90), and Ulbricht's counsel requested no adjournment at that time on that ground (A. 890). See Douglas, 525 F.3d at 245-46 (disclosure of 290 pages one day before trial does not constitute suppression); see also United States v. Menghi, 641 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1981) (no *Brady* violation where, inter alia, defense counsel made no motion for a continuance to allow for further investigation); *United* States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 290 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[T]he five day interval provided an adequate period within which to digest the substance of the materials and prepare for cross-examination."). Instead, as the District Court noted, counsel "displayed great familiarity with the Karpeles/Athavale Materials and used them repeatedly during cross examination." (A. 890). See United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 473 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding no Brady violation where "nothing within the . . . files was necessary to develop [the] theory" that defendant successfully explored through cross-examination and argued to the jury). Here, as below, "Ulbricht does not offer any explanation as to why there is a chance that he would not have been convicted had the defense been given more time to review the Karpeles/Athavale Materials." (A. 890). "A defendant who claims that his hand was prematurely forced by delayed disclosure cannot rely on wholly conclusory assertions but must bear the burden of producing, at the very least, a prima facie showing of a plausible strategic option which the delay foreclosed." United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d at 290. Here, there is "no reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense" earlier, "the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Nicolapolous, 30 F.3d 381, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing materiality in the 3500 context).

Moreover, the fact that Agent Der-Yeghiayan pursued multiple leads in the course of his investigation, but rejected them conclusively, is not exculpatory. There is "no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case," including an "early lead the police abandoned." See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972); see also United States v. Sessa, 711 F.3d 316, 322 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[T]he fact that the authorities diligently pursued other leads but found no evidence implicating any other person [does not] tend to exculpate [the defendant]."); United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 145

(2d Cir. 1996) ("The government has no Brady obligation to communicate preliminary, challenged, or speculative information." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Canales v. Stephens, 765 F.3d 551, 576 (5th Cir. 2014) ("[T]here is not a Brady violation every time the government does not disclose an alternative suspect, especially when the other suspect was not a particularly plausible one."); Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2009) (ruling that non-disclosed "evidence casting suspicion on" another murder suspect was not Brady material because it "d[id] not amount to much," whereas "[o]verwhelming evidence" connected defendant to the crime). As described above, see supra page 28, Agent Der-Yeghiayan suspected Karpeles because he owned the servers that hosted a website related to Silk Road, and he suspected Athavale for even less reason (namely, some linguistic similarities between his writing and "DPR"s). In the face of the overwhelming evidence establishing that Ulbricht was "DPR," and the lack of evidence that either Karpeles or Athavale were, even if (counterfactually) the Government had not disclosed those leads, they would not have qualified as material Brady information in the context of this case.

5. The District Court Properly Precluded Cross-Examination Using Force's Hearsay Statements

Finally, Ulbricht challenges the District Court's decision to preclude his cross-examination using statements by a Silk Road user, "DeathFromAbove,"

who threatened to expose "Dread Pirate Roberts" as Anand Athavale. (Br. 27-29, 37).

Although Ulbricht includes this issue in the section of his brief devoted to Brady, the prosecutors did not learn that "DeathFromAbove" was controlled by Force until after the defense proffered the relevant exhibit (A. 707, 710-11), and at trial, Ulbricht appeared to be offering the chat messages from "Death-FromAbove" in order to shore up his theory that "Dread Pirate Roberts" was Athavale (not Ulbricht), and not to delve into the Force investigation. (Tr. 672-79, 682, 813-19, 840; A. 712). The District Court correctly concluded that "DeathFromAbove"'s statements were hearsay that the defense was improperly seeking to introduce for the truth, and that in any event, the messages were more prejudicial than probative, since they were not substantial evidence of an "alternative perpetrator." (Tr. 1871-73). See Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d 51, 61-62 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Although . . . a defendant has a right to attempt to establish his innocence by showing that someone else did the crime, a defendant still must show that his proffered evidence on the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime charged and the asserted 'alternative perpetrator."). This would be so, regardless of who "DeathFromAbove" was, but the fact that it was Force (whose "knowledge" can be traced to Der-Yeghiayan's initial investigation Athavale) reduces the marginal probative value of this chat conversation to zero, because it merely recycles the basis for Agent Der-Yeghiayan's crossexamination through the misleading impression that a second source believed that Athavale was "DPR." Because no defendant has "an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent . . . or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence," *Taylor* v. *Illinois*, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988), the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's effort to introduce this chat conversation.

To the extent that Ulbricht sought to use this exhibit to reveal that a law enforcement agent (namely Force) was attempting to extort Ulbricht, that would have introduced the very same prejudicial, and irrelevant, argument that the District Court had denied Ulbricht discovery to develop. As described above, the fact that Force behaved corruptly in attempting to extort Ulbricht has no bearing on the independent evidence admitted against Ulbricht.

POINT II

The District Court's Limitations on Cross-Examination Were Proper

A. Relevant Facts

Agent Der-Yeghiayan's Testimony About Mark Karpeles

During cross-examination of Agent Der-Yeghiayan, defense counsel sought to advance its theory that the owner and operator of Silk Road was actually Mark Karpeles (who owned a Bitcoin exchange known as "Mt. Gox"), based on Agent Der-Yeghiayan's earlier investigation of him. (Tr. 490-91,

494-96, 502-03; see also Tr. 541-47). For example, the defense elicited Agent Der-Yeghiayan's statements, in an application for a warrant to search Karpeles's email account, that there was probable cause to believe that Karpeles engaged in narcotics trafficking and money laundering and controlled the open Internet site, "silkroadmarket.org." (Tr. 527-30). When counsel sought to elicit what an informant had told Agent Der-Yeghiayan about Karpeles, however, the Government objected on hearsay grounds. (Tr. 530, 537). The Government also objected more generally to eliciting Agent Der-Yeghiayan's beliefs, rather than merely the facts he learned from investigating Karpeles (which might themselves be admissible). (Tr. 548-51). Judge Forrest indicated her tentative view that the defense was entitled to elicit that Agent Der-Yeghiayan investigated Karpeles, and how he did so, but she also invited briefing on the issue over the weekend and made clear that she had yet to reach a conclusion. (Tr. 537-38, 541, 552-57).

The defense also sought to elicit that Agent Der-Yeghiayan learned from federal prosecutors in Baltimore that Karpeles's attorney had told one of them that his client was willing to "tell the government who was behind Silk Road if he would not be prosecuted," which, he contended, demonstrated that Karpeles was trying to "set up Mr. Ulbricht." (Tr. 506-08, 512; see also A. 310-11). The Government objected, both on hearsay grounds and for lack of notice. (Tr. 514). Judge Forrest indicated that she was inclined to admit the fact that Karpeles's attorney made a proffer, but not for its truth (i.e., that Karpeles actually knew anything about who was running

Silk Road), and she offered counsel the opportunity to brief that issue as well. (Tr. 522-23).

Over the weekend, the Government moved to strike testimony elicited from Agent Der-Yeghiayan concerning his initial beliefs about Karpeles's involvement, because a law enforcement officer's opinion about guilt is not probative, admissible evidence. (A. 312-15, 319). The Government also sought to preclude testimony concerning the hearsay statements of Karpeles's lawyer to Baltimore prosecutors, because those statements did not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 807. (A. 315-17). Finally, the Government urged the District Court to reject evidence of an "alternative perpetrator" unless the defense established, through competent evidence, a "substantial" nexus between that perpetrator and the crime, as case law requires. (A. 317-18). In response, the defense argued Agent Der-Yeghiayan himself had established the requisite nexus between Karpeles and the crimes charged; that Karpeles's attorney's statements were not themselves hearsay (and that the repetition of those statements to Agent Der-Yeghiayan satisfied Rule 807); and that any objection was untimely. (A. 326-33).

In ruling, the District Court acknowledged the defense's right to pursue an "alternative perpetrator" theory and admit "competent . . . evidence" in favor of it, but that would not include the "thoughts and beliefs" of Agent Der-Yeghiayan, which, it ruled, were "irrelevant." (Tr. 575, 577). In providing examples of proper questions, the District Court made clear that Agent Der-Yeghiayan's firsthand knowledge of facts,

based on his investigation of Karpeles, could be admitted, but his suspicions or instincts could not be. (Tr. 579-80). As to Karpeles's attorney's proffer, the District Court found that the offer to provide information was not, itself, probative of any disputed issue of fact, and to the extent it invited the jury to speculate (contrary to fact) that Karpeles had inside knowledge about who was responsible for Silk Road (which, as it turns out, he did not), his lawyer's proffer was more prejudicial than probative. (Tr. 580-81).

The District Court invited the Government to propose specific portions of the testimony that should be struck, based on its ruling (Tr. 583-84, 589), which the Government did (A. 334-41), and which the District Court adopted (Tr. 646, 647). To avoid drawing extra attention to that testimony, the District Court did not point out to the jury the particular questions and answers that were struck and instead instructed it generally to disregard any testimony from Agent Der-Yeghiayan concerning his "personal beliefs or suspicions he may have had about particular individuals at various points during his investigation." (Tr. 646-47, 974). The jury did not request Agent Der-Yeghiayan's testimony during its deliberations and never saw it redacted. (Tr. 2329-38).

The defense then continued its cross-examination of Agent Der-Yeghiayan, which included many questions about Karpeles, most of which were proper. (Tr. 651-54, 659-72, 681-82). Over the course of cross-examination, defense counsel established that (1) Karpeles owned Mt. Gox, a large Bitcoin exchange (Tr. 490, 494); (2) Karpeles is a computer developer

systems administrator and a self-proclaimed hacker (Tr. 495); (3) Agent Der-Yeghiayan investigated Karpeles (Tr. 491-92, 672); (4) as did the Department of Homeland Security, which seized several million dollars from a Karpeles company in May 2013 (Tr. 497-98); (5) the website "silkroadmarket.org"—the website on the regular Internet that provided instructions on how to access Silk Road on Tor—was registered to Karpeles's company (Tr. 500-01); and (6) websites run by Karpeles had software features in common with Silk Road (Tr. 659-61, 663).

On redirect, the Government elicited testimony from Agent Der-Yeghiayan to clarify that the software used by Karpeles's websites and Silk Road was freely available and widely used (Tr. 742-45), that the silkroadmarket.org website was merely one of many websites hosted by a company that Karpeles controlled (Tr. 751-53), and that it was registered using an alias found on Ulbricht's laptop (Tr. 809-11).

2. Thomas Kiernan's Testimony About Ulbricht's Computer

During his direct examination, FBI Computer Scientist Thomas Kiernan testified as a percipient lay witness to the seizure and review of Ulbricht's laptop. (Tr. 852-71). His testimony was limited to (1) what he saw on Ulbricht's laptop on the day of the arrest (e.g., Tr. 859-71); (2) what he later found when reviewing a copy of Ulbricht's laptop's hard drive (e.g., 872, 880-81, 886-87); and (3) what certain documents from Ulbricht's laptop said (e.g., Tr. 898-904, 921-22).

On cross-examination, the District Court precluded, as beyond the scope of direct examination, three lines of questioning concerning: (1) whether the FBI permitted Kiernan to run BitTorrent (a file sharing software that Ulbricht was using at the time of his arrest) on his work computer, in light of the security hazards it presented (Tr. 1072-74); (2) whether Kiernan could interpret certain computer code (obtained from Ulbricht's laptop), to determine whether someone who logged onto the Silk Road website using "DPR"s username and password would automatically be directed to the "Mastermind" page, from which "DPR" administered Silk Road (Tr. 1081, 1084-88); and (3) and the Linux "kernel," including whether Kiernan's version of TorChat (one of the programs "DPR" used to communicate with Silk Road staff) ran on the same version of Linux that Ulbricht had installed on his computer (Tr. 1089-94).

B. Applicable Law

1. The Confrontation Clause

While the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses and present a defense, the scope and extent of cross-examination are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See United States v. Figueroa, 548 F.3d 222, 227 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 734 (2d Cir. 2004). District courts are responsible for supervising the "mode . . . of examining witnesses" so as to make the presentation effective for "determining the truth" and to "avoid wasting time." Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).

In carrying out this responsibility, the district judge has "wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Evid. 403. Additionally, "[c]ross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness's credibility." Fed. R. Evid. 611(b). Only upon showing that the district court abused its "broad discretion" to "restrict cross-examination" is a defendant entitled to relief on appeal. United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d at 417. "To find such an abuse, [this Court] must be persuaded that the trial judge ruled in an arbitrary and irrational fashion." United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1996).

An error in limiting cross-examination should be disregarded if the error is harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). "The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. The principal factors to be considered in assessing the effect of the confrontation error are (1) the importance of the witness's testimony, (2) whether that testimony was cumulative, (3) the presence of contradictory evidence on material points, (4) the extent of cross-examination otherwise permit-

ted, and (5) the strength of the evidence against the defendant. *Id.*; accord Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 254 (2d Cir. 2003).

2. Alternative Perpetrator Evidence

Although "a defendant has a right to attempt to establish his innocence by showing that someone else did the crime," he "must show that his proffered evidence on the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime charged and the asserted 'alternative perpetrator." Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d at 61-62 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[U]nsupported speculation that another person may have done the crime" will not suffice, because "[s]uch speculative blaming intensifies the grave risk of jury confusion, and it invites the jury to render its findings based on emotion or prejudice." Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Evidence that tends to prove a person other than the defendant committed a crime is relevant, but there must be evidence that there is a connection between the other perpetrators and the crime, not mere speculation on the part of the defendant."); People of Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring "substantial evidence tending to directly connect that person with the actual commission of the offense" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In light of this principle, courts have excluded such evidence where, for example, there was evidence that a third-party had the motive to murder a victim but not the opportunity, see Wade, 333 F.3d at 60, and where an undercover informant had information about other extremists in the area who shared the defendant's political views, but no evidence tied them to the crime at issue, *United States* v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1188-92 (10th Cir. 1998), and where the only concretely identified third parties "could not possibly have been" responsible for the crime, DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d at 9.

3. Opinions of Law Enforcement Agents

Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant when "it has any tendency to make a fact [of consequence] more or less probable." Fed. R. Evid. 401. But as this Court has made clear, "[t]he agent's state of mind as the investigation progressed is ordinarily of little or no relevance to the question of the defendant's guilt." *United States* v. *Johnson*, 529 F.3d 493, 501 (2d Cir. 2008); accord United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Fed. R. Evid. 701 (limiting lay opinion to that which is "rationally based on the witness's perception").

Nor is such testimony made relevant if the agent attempts to explain the basis for his belief by summarizing, even at a general level, what led him to his conclusion. It only makes matters worse for an agent to give, for example, the "imprecise assurance that his belief is based on information from other people, actual physical evidence, and verification through interviewing the people who are involved." *United*

States v. Johnson, 529 F.3d at 499 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding it was "error to allow law enforcement witnesses to express opinions as to the defendant's culpability based on the totality of information gathered in the course of their investigations"); United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750-51 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting opinion testimony from law enforcement agent who had listened to the contents of a wiretap). This is because, when an agent evaluates an individual's guilt based on the "entirety' or 'totality' of information gathered in an investigation," "he is not presenting the jury with the unique insights of an eyewitness's personal perceptions," as Rule 701 requires. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211.

C. Discussion

1. Agent Der-Yeghiayan's Testimony Was Properly Limited to Facts

The District Court properly instructed the jury not to consider Agent Der-Yeghiayan's "personal beliefs or suspicions he may have had about particular individuals at various points during his investigation." (Tr. 974). Ulbricht does not dispute that instruction was accurate, nor does he identify relevant, admissible evidence that was excluded under this rule or otherwise demonstrate, specifically, how it prejudiced him. Contrary to the suggestion of his brief on appeal, Ulbricht was free to pursue his alternative perpetrator theory (contra Br. 63-71), and the District Court's

rulings limiting him to competent evidence were no abuse of discretion.

Ulbricht does not really dispute that a law enforcement agent's opinion about the guilt of an individual is inadmissible, because it is irrelevant, see Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211, other than to imply without support that the rule simply does not apply when it is the defendant who seeks to admit the agent's opinion, as opposed to the Government. (Br. 66 (distinguishing cases based on whether they "protect[]" the defendant's rights)). But the Rules of Evidence do not distinguish between inculpatory and exculpatory evidence: "Relevant evidence is admissible.... Irrelevant evidence is not admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 402. And Agent Der-Yeghiayan's belief, early in the investigation, that Karpeles and one of his employees might be responsible for Silk Road, was clearly irrelevant to Ulbricht's guilt. (A. 336-37). The District Court's decision to strike those portions of testimony that elicited Agent Der-Yeghiayan's "beliefs," "theories," and "conclusions" was clearly correct. (A. 336-41 (highlighting stricken testimony)).¹⁹

¹⁹ Although Ulbricht contends otherwise, the Government's objections were timely. (*Contra Br.* 70-71). Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a "timely" objection or motion to strike, but it does not define timeliness. Although an objection should generally be interposed "after the question has been asked but before an answer has been given, this rule is not inflexible." *Hutchinson v. Groskin*, 927

F.2d 722, 725 (2d Cir. 1991). Courts do "not necessarily find an objection affirmatively waived because it might have been interposed a few questions earlier in the midst of a hotly-contested trial, particularly where the grounds for the objection are not immediately apparent." United States v. Pujana-Mena, 949 F.2d 24, 33 (2d Cir. 1991). And where, as here, "it became increasingly apparent exactly what the [defense] was attempting to accomplish through" its cross-examination, courts have allowed greater flexibility and have not insisted upon immediate, fully fleshed out objections. United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 676 (2d Cir. 1978). Here, the Government repeatedly objected after the purpose and extent of defense counsel's questioning became more clear. (E.g., Tr. 509, 530).

And even if the Government's objection was untimely, the District Court, which could have stricken the testimony sua sponte, see United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 1985), had the discretion to grant the Government's request for relief, see United States v. Achiekwelu, 112 F.3d 747, 754 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that Rule 103 "provide[s] that a party must object timely in order to preserve the issue for appellate review" and "do[es] not address the power of a district court to exclude evidence in the first instance after a late objection" (emphasis added)); 21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Fed. Prac. & Pro. § 5037.1 (2d ed. 2005) ("[T]he trial judge has discretion to sustain an objection even though it was untimely.").

Moreover, nothing in that ruling precluded Ulbricht from pursuing his alternative perpetrator theory, based on the evidence that Agent Der-Yeghiayan gathered (and which he was competent to sponsor), for example, that Karpeles was a self-described hacker who ran a major Bitcoin exchange, who was targeted by law enforcement, and had connections (albeit superficial ones) to Silk Road. *See supra* pages 64-65. Indeed, Ulbricht argued that very theory to the jury in summation. (Tr. 2205, 2007-09).²⁰

Even if the District Court erred in striking any of Agent Der-Yeghiayan's responses, there was no prejudice to Ulbricht, because he failed entirely to demonstrate a sufficient "nexus between the crime charged and the asserted 'alternative perpetrator" to justify admitting any of the evidence against Karpeles. Wade, 333 F.3d at 61-62. The only objective link between Karpeles and Silk Road was the fact that Karpeles ran a webhosting company that hosted, among other websites, one that provided directions

²⁰ Nor was Ulbricht prejudiced by the District Court's rejection of his request for an adjournment to digest its ruling. (Br. 64). As the District Court noted, once the Government raised the issue, defense counsel had a long weekend to prepare to properly elicit any facts that had been admitted based on improper questioning (Tr. 648-49), and the stricken testimony was hardly so voluminous as to preclude such preparation by one of the defendant's three trial lawyers, even on the morning of the ruling (A. 334-341).

on how to reach Silk Road through Tor (Tr. 379), which, by itself, provided no basis for a rational jury to conclude that Karpeles was "Dread Pirate Roberts" (especially given the evidence that it was Ulbricht who registered that website (Tr. 809-11)). The facts that Karpeles owned a Bitcoin exchange and that websites associated with him used publicly available software also used by the Silk Road website (Tr. 502-03, 742-45), are no more probative than the fact that extremists in Oklahoma besides Timothy McVeigh considered attacking the Murrah Federal Building (a fact that was excluded from McVeigh's trial). See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1188-92. Ulbricht's only response is that Agent Der-Yeghiayan "provided the requisite nexus between the alternate perpetrator and specific offenses here" (Br. 69), by which he must mean that Agent Der-Yeghiayan's decision to investigate Karpeles was itself sufficient. Not so: Agent Der-Yeghiayan's hunch, instinct, opinion, or the like was not competent to satisfy Wade. Accordingly, the District Court would have been justified in excluding more than it did.

This case is easily distinguished from those relied upon by the defense (Br. 69-70), where an alternate suspect had been identified, who lived near the crime, whose first name, physical characteristics, and automobile's color and appearance "were consistent with the descriptions given to the police by eyewitnesses to the shooting," but whom the NYPD never pursued, *Alvarez* v. *Ercole*, 763 F.3d 223, 230-32 (2d Cir. 2014); where the defense was entirely precluded from cross-examining a witness, the "only living person" to identify the defendant as a shooter, on his hearsay identi-

fication, *Cotto* v. *Herbert*, 331 F.3d at 223-24, 249; or where the crux of the error was a failure to disclose *Brady* material to the defense, *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 432-41, 453.

Finally, even if the District Court erred (and it did not), any error was harmless, in light of "the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted," *Cotto*, 331 F.3d at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted), the fact that the jury never asked to read Agent Der-Yeghiayan's testimony during deliberations, and "the overall strength of the prosecution's case," *id.* (internal quotation marks omitted), which was overwhelming.

2. The District Court Properly Excluded the Fourth-Hand Hearsay of Karpeles

It was also entirely proper to strike (and preclude) testimony that Agent Der-Yeghiayan had heard from one federal prosecutor, who heard from another federal prosecutor, who heard from Karpeles's lawyer, that Karpeles was willing to share who he thought was running Silk Road in exchange for immunity. (Tr. 580-81; A. 340-41).

Each of those nested statements was itself hear-say, offered for the purpose of showing that each declarant in the chain had been told "the truth of the matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2). Although Ulbricht maintained that he was not offering Karpeles's statement for its truth (Tr. 584-85), Karpeles's offer was irrelevant *unless* one believed that he actually had information to give. Indeed, Ulbricht's counsel sought to admit Karpeles's offer so as to imply

that Karpeles was a Silk Road insider (to support counsel's stated theory that Karpeles was actually responsible for Silk Road). (Tr. 586).

There was no basis to admit this compound hearsay. Although the so-called "residual exception" permits admission of hearsay not specifically covered by an exception, the statement must have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," be "evidence of a material fact," and be more probative than any other evidence the proponent can obtain through "reasonable efforts." Fed. R. Evid. 807. As this Court has repeatedly noted, the residual hearsay exception is meant to "be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances." *Parsons* v. *Honeywell, Inc.*, 929 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); *see also United States* v. *DeVillio*, 983 F.2d 1185, 1190 (2d Cir. 1993) (residual hearsay exception is "applied in the rarest of cases").

Even assuming "exceptional circumstances" justified application of the exception in the "interests of justice," Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(4), and that it would have been unreasonable to expect Ulbricht to seek testimony directly from Karpeles's lawyer (it was not), Ulbricht has not satisfied the other requirements of the rule. First and foremost, the record reveals that Karpeles's information concerned a suspicious account at Mt. Gox that, he believed, was associated with Silk Road. (A.310-12). Eliciting *only* the offer to provide information, but not his basis of belief, would have falsely (and unfairly) implied that Karpeles was himself criminally responsible for Silk Road (which, of course, was the defense's goal). The

statement was not, therefore, "evidence of a material fact," or at least, not the fact that the defense sought to prove. Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(2).

Second, Karpeles's statement lacked "circumstantial guarantees of truthfulness" that are "equivalent" to existing hearsay exceptions. Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(1). Knowing that he was the target of a criminal investigation (Tr. 507-08), Karpeles had the incentive to exaggerate his knowledge in order to appear valuable enough to law enforcement to obtain a meeting with them. Indeed, conditioning his offer on immunity, and conveying it through counsel, distinguishes his statement from one that might have been admitted, under different circumstances, as an admission against penal interest. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A). That Karpeles's statement lacks "equivalent" guarantees of trustworthiness counseled against admitting it. Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(1).

Finally, although the District Court struck this testimony as a formal matter (A. 340-41), since the jury heard it, and nothing about the District Court's curative instruction addressed it (Tr. 974), Ulbricht probably received an unjustified benefit from this testimony, notwithstanding the fact the District Court granted the Government's motion. He certainly was not unfairly prejudiced.

3. The District Court Reasonably Limited Cross-Examination of Kiernan to the Scope of His Direct Testimony

Finally, as to Kiernan, Ulbricht argues that the District Judge abused her discretion by excluding a

few questions as irrelevant or beyond the scope of the Government's direct examination. (Br. 75-76). To the contrary, the District Court's limitations were sensible ones, in light of the scope of Kiernan's direct testimony, and in any event, the defense made the points it sought to before the jury.

First, the defense sought to establish that the software program BitTorrent, which Ulbricht was running at the moment he was arrested, was not secure. (Br. 76). It did so by asking Kiernan a slew of questions about the security of BitTorrent (Tr. 1068-72, 1108-09), establishing, among other things, that seven other computers were connected to Ulbricht's computer at the time he was arrested (Tr. 1069-70), that running BitTorrent required an open port to the Internet on Ulbricht's laptop, exposing him to hackers (Tr. 1070-72), and that file sharing of that type could have exposed Ulbricht's laptop to malware (Tr. 1071). The only question the District Court sua sponte precluded was whether the FBI permitted Kiernan to run BitTorrent at work (Tr. 1072), because it was "irrelevant" and "beyond the scope" of Kiernan's testimony on direct examination (Tr. 1073-74). This ruling was proper, because the FBI's network security practices were "far afield" from any issues in the case and would be based on a variety of factors beyond the scope of this case. (Tr. 1073).

Second, although Kiernan remembered that Ulbricht had been logged into the "Mastermind" page of the Silk Road website (Tr. 864-70), he could not tell, from reviewing the purported code for that webpage, whether a user who logged into Silk Road using

"DPR"s username and password would automatically be directed to that page (Tr. 1081). During the break at that point in the testimony, the District Court admonished the defense to remain within the scope of direct examination, which was "quite narrow," and not attempt to turn Kiernan into a "generalized computer expert." (Tr. 1084-88). Defense counsel protested that Kiernan could be questioned with respect to any aspect of the laptop he sponsored, but the District Court disagreed. (Tr. 1085). This was a reasonable limitation, see Fed. R. Evid. 611(b), and in any event, the defense has not identified what testimony was excluded that Kiernan was competent to provide.

Finally, the District Court precluded the defense from asking Kiernan a few questions about the Linux "kernel," including whether, when Kiernan tested TorChat, he was running it on the same version of Linux (or "kernel") that Ulbricht had installed on his laptop. (Br. 76). Even if that particular question were within the scope of Kiernan's direct (and it was not, since Kiernan offered only high-level descriptions of how his copy of TorChat worked (Tr. 887-90)), any error was harmless, because defense counsel elicited the limits of Kiernan's knowledge about the operation

The "kernel" refers to the core of an operating system, like Linux. See Network Prot. Scis., LLC v. Fortinet, Inc., No. C 12-01106 WHA, 2013 WL 146033, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013); VMWare, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., No. C 02-3705 CW, 2005 WL 6220090, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2005).

of TorChat on *Ulbricht's* computer, such as whether the chats stored on Ulbricht's computer could have been altered (Tr. 1075-76, 1097), or whether they were necessarily created on Ulbricht's laptop at all (Tr. 1077). Defense counsel also elicited possible differences in the operation of TorChat on Kiernan's computer and on Ulbricht's laptop, as Kiernan did not know what version of TorChat Ulbricht used, whether Kiernan had used the same version, and whether Kiernan had installed TorChat in the same way Ulbricht had, nor did Kiernan test TorChat on Ulbricht's laptop (Tr. 1092-95). Having made the basic point, the District Court had the discretion to limit defense counsel's cross-examination to "avoid wasting time," Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).

In all respects, then, the District Court reasonably limited defense counsel's cross-examination to matters within the scope of Kiernan's direct examination, and the defense has not shown that it was prejudiced by those limits.

POINT III

The District Court Properly Precluded Expert Testimony that Was Proffered Without Adequate Disclosure

A. Relevant Facts

1. Pretrial Proceedings

The Indictment in this case charged Ulbricht with designing, owning, and operating an online market-place that used "a Bitcoin-based payment system" to facilitate illegal commerce, including by concealing the identities and locations of its users. (A. 150-51, 161). The criminal complaint on which Ulbricht was arrested (the "Complaint") explained in more detail how Ulbricht used that payment system to construct "the most sophisticated and extensive criminal marketplace" then on the Internet. (A. 53, 59-61). It also summarized data extracted from the Silk Road servers, including the value of Bitcoin transactions conducted through the site. (A. 61-62).

In March 2014, 10 months before trial, the Government produced in discovery copies of the Silk Road servers (including evidence of Bitcoin transactions), a copy of Ulbricht's laptop (including the Bitcoin wallets thereon), and evidence of what Ulbricht was doing on his laptop at the time of his arrest. (Docket Entry 70-1; A. 363).

Five weeks before trial, on December 3, 2014, the Government produced most of its proposed trial ex-

hibits, including those derived from the Silk Road servers and Ulbricht's laptop. (Docket Entry 96).

On December 29, 2014, the Government "reiterate[d] its requests for reciprocal discovery from the defense," including, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(1)(B), the "disclosure of any results or reports of any scientific text or experiment that the defense intends to use . . . or that relates to the testimony of any witness that the defense intends to call who prepared any such report," and, pursuant to Rule 16(b)(1)(C), the "disclosure of a written summary of any expert testimony the defendant intends to use at trial." (A. 397).

As of the start of trial, on January 13, 2015, the defense had not provided any expert disclosure.

2. The Trial Begins

In its opening statement, the Government summarized the evidence it intended to introduce, including the fact that Ulbricht's laptop "contained the defendant's enormous profits" from running Silk Road, in the form of "[B]itcoins worth approximately \$18 million at the time of his arrest." (Tr. 55).

During its opening, the defense countered with its theory that, although the defendant had created Silk Road, the "real DPR" had framed Ulbricht by planting files on his computer, and that because Ulbricht was the originator of the site and a Bitcoin investor, he was the perfect "fall guy" when law enforcement closed in on Silk Road. (Tr. 61-65).

On the second day of trial, January 14, 2015, the District Court asked defense counsel to estimate the length of any defense case, including "whether or not [he] had a computer expert in [his] pocket who [he] w[as] thinking of having on the stand for a week." (Tr. 124-25). The Government noted that it had received no expert notice and would object to an untimely notice. (Tr. 125). The District Court said it had assumed that "all the required notices" were being given, and the defense responded that "as soon as [it had] a firm intention to call a witness, [it would] provide it," "at the earliest possible rather than the latest." (Tr. 125).

As discussed above, see supra page 66, during cross-examination of Kiernan, the District Court sustained various objections that the defense's questions were outside the scope of direct, but it reminded the defense that, if it "complied with the appropriate disclosure requirements," it could call its own witnesses, including an expert. (Tr. 1084; see also Tr. 670-71 (sustaining objection on basis that SA Der-Yeghiayan is "not an expert witness to talk about the evidence of hacking"), 1073-74 (sustaining objection on basis that defense was "trying to make [Kiernan] into a general expert on BitTorrent" which was "far afield" of his testimony), 1084-88 (limiting scope of Kiernan cross to scope of direct).

In addition, in response to the defense's opening statement, the Government called a former FBI Special Agent, Ilhwan Yum, to preempt the claim that the defendant had earned the approximately \$18 million worth of Bitcoins recovered from his laptop

through innocent investing and trading. (See Tr. 1637-58, 1661-67, 1673-75, 1683-97).

3. The Defense's Expert Notice

On January 26, 2015, the defense notified the Government that it intended to call Andreas M. Antonopolous as an expert witness on Bitcoin. (A. 349-50). The notice listed eight "subjects" of "expert opinion testimony," such as "the origins of Bitcoin" and their "purposes and uses," the "value of Bitcoin over time," and the "ability to tie Bitcoins from Silk Road to Mr. Ulbricht," although it did not describe the substance of the testimony or any opinions it would include. (A. 349-50). The Government moved to preclude Antonopolous's testimony, arguing that the anticipated topics of his testimony, to the extent the Government discerned them, were either not relevant to the case or not the proper basis for expert testimony. (A. 342-48).

On January 30, 2015, the defense notified the Government that it intended to call another witness, Steven M. Bellovin, to provide expert testimony on six subjects, including "[g]eneral principles" of "intenet security," "public-key cryptography," and other technical matters, and to explain certain computer code produced in discovery. (A. 360). The Government likewise moved to preclude his testimony, on the ground that the notice was insufficient. (A. 354-59).

The defense opposed the Government's motions on January 31 and February 1, 2015. (A. 380-84; 385-89).

4. The District Court's Preclusion Order

On February 1, 2015, the District Court issued an opinion granting the Government's motions to preclude both expert witnesses. (A. 362-79). After reciting the relevant procedural history of the case, illustrating the length of time during which defense counsel had the opportunity to develop its defense (A. 362-66), the District Court first observed that the disclosure letters for both experts were lacking (1) "any expected opinions," (2) "the bases for such opinions," (3) "any description of analysis or methodology," and, (4) in the case of Antonopoulos, "any indication that [he] has any expertise in the areas in which he seeks to testify." (A. 366).

The District Court found that this "tactical choice" not to comply with Rule 16 (A. 367), which the defense failed to cure in its response to the Government's motions to preclude (A. 373), left it "unable to determine what Antonopoulos'[s] and Bellovin's opinions are," whether their views are relevant, whether their methods are reliable, and whether they are even qualified. (A. 376). Nor could the District Court weigh the probative value of their testimony against its potential for prejudice, as required by Rule 403. (A. 378).

Finally, the District Court evaluated remedies short of preclusion. Finding that the Government would be "at a plain and unfair disadvantage in countering such testimony" (A. 378), given that it was resting the next day, and the witnesses were "on deck" (A. 369), the District Court declined to continue the trial, because doing so could lead to the potential

dismissal of one or two jurors who had "timing issues" (A. 369). Accordingly, the District Court declined to order a continuance and granted the Government's motions to preclude. (A. 369).

B. Applicable Law

In light of district courts' established "gatekeeping" role with regard to expert testimony based on scientific, technical, or "other specialized" knowledge, see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993), the admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the broad discretion of the trial court, see Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974); Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d Cir. 1993). Accordingly, this Court reviews a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 at 158, and "a decision to exclude expert testimony ... shall be sustained unless manifestly erroneous," United States v. Lumkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); *United* States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2004).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(1)(C) provides, in relevant part:

The defendant must, at the government's request, give to the government a written summary of any testimony that a defendant intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence as evidence at trial This summary must describe the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications.

Fed R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that Rule 16 "requires" a defendant to provide such material at the Government's request) (citing Rule 16(b)(1)(C)).

The purpose of this rule is to "minimize surprise that often results from unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert's testimony through focused cross-examination." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, advisory committee's note (1993). A party who fails to comply with its discovery obligations may be precluded from introducing evidence not disclosed. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2).

Compliance with Rule 16 is necessary to enable a district court to make several determinations required by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 provides that, where "specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact," a witness who is "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" may testify if: "[1] the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; [2] the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and [3] the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." Fed. R. Evid. 702. District courts are responsible for ensuring that expert testi-

mony "rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand," Amorgianos v. Romano Enters., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and would assist the jury by "shed[ding] light on activities not within the common knowledge of the average juror," see United States v. Wexler, 522 F.3d 194, 204 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1216-17 (1992) ("[W]hether the witness's opinion will be 'helpful'... [is] a legal matter that must be determined by the court before it may allow the opinion to be heard by the jury."). Thus, compliance with Rule 16 facilitates the district court's assessment of whether expertise is helpful, whether the expert is qualified, and whether his testimony is relevant and reliable.

Even if expert testimony would otherwise be admissible, it may be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403; *Daubert* v. *Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.*, 509 U.S. at 595. As the Supreme Court noted in *Daubert*, "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it." 509 U.S. at 595 (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also United States* v. *Young*, 745 F.2d 733, 766 (2d Cir. 1984) (danger of confusion stems from the "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness surrounding expert testimony" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Finally, as the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he principle that undergirds the defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence is also the source of essential limitations on the right," Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. at 410, and therefore it "may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process," Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). Thus, a defendant's failure to follow "established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence," Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 302, may prompt the court to correspondingly curtail the defendant's right to present evidence. See, e.g., Taylor, 484 U.S. at 412 ("The court's preclusion sanction was an entirely proper method of assuring compliance with its order." (citation omitted)).

C. Discussion

The defendant's expert notice left the District Court unable to perform the "gatekeeping" function assigned to it, *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 597, and reflected a tactical choice of "trial by ambush" (A. 368). Accordingly, it was neither an abuse of discretion to preclude the defense's proffered witnesses, nor even now has the defense shown that exclusion was prejudicial.

The defense's initial disclosures were clearly inadequate. Listing the "subjects" of testimony, as the defense did (A. 349-50, 360), is not the same as providing "a written summary of" that testimony, including any "opinions" and the "bases and reasons for" those

opinions, as Rule 16(b)(1)(C) requires. See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1993) ("[T]he requesting party is entitled to a summary of the expected testimony.... For example, this should inform the requesting party whether the expert will be providing only background information on a particular issue or whether the witness will actually offer an opinion."). Because the defense did not describe what the witnesses would actually say, by reference to the evidence in the case and the defense's theories, there was no way for the District Court to assess whether the testimony would "help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," whether the witness was qualified to offer such testimony, or whether the testimony was based on sufficient information and otherwise reliable. Fed. R. Evid. 702.

For example, presumably Antonopoulos was being called to rebut Yum's testimony, tracing the Bitcoins on Ulbricht's laptop to the Silk Road servers (A. 350), but other than referring generally to "the ability to tie Bitcoins from Silk Road to Mr. Ulbricht" (A. 350) the defense did not give the witness's opinion on the matter (if he had one), much less the "bases and reasons" for it, Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(C). In responding to the Government's objection, the defense explained in more detail why Antonopoulos's testimony concerning Bitcoin might have been relevant, as a topical matter, but it still did not explain how Antonopoulos would have countered the evidence connecting Ulbricht's Bitcoins to Silk Road. (A. 380-84). The closest he came was a proffer that, based on "market forces," it would have been difficult for Ulbricht to sell large amounts of Bitcoins that were transferred to his laptop but not recovered there (A. 381), but that is too vague to satisfy Rule 16, and still lacks the "bases" for Antonopoulos's conclusions about those "market forces" (much less his qualifications to opine about them) (A. 373).

Similarly, with respect to the other witness, Bellovin, the defense sought "an opportunity . . . to provide further specifics as [to] the opinions Dr. Bellovin plans to offer and the bases for those opinions," but then failed to offer them. (A. 385). For example, Bellovin would testify to "the security implications" of using file sharing software, BitTorrent, but not what those "implications" were (or the bases for Bellovin's conclusions). (A. 386). Even when given the opportunity to cure, defense counsel proffered the topics of testimony, not a "summary" of it, much less the "bases and reasons" for any opinions. (A. 387 (defense will elicit testimony "with respect to" the creation time for certain files; or "whether an individual [using "DPR"'s account] would automatically be directed to the Mastermind page"), 388 (the "varying methods of software installation" and how it can "change the way a computer program operates").

"The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of showing that its proffered expert's testimony is admissible." *United States* v. *Banks*, 761 F.3d 1163, 1200 (10th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014) (affirming preclusion). Ulbricht's "generalized explanations do not provide us with any real information about what these experts would have said at trial," making it im-

possible for the District Court (much less this Court) to assess admissibility. United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 187 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming preclusion because defense notice "did not include the experts' opinions and the bases and reasons for those opinions"); see also United States v. Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1371-72 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming preclusion where a doctor listed the tests he had performed but "failed to state what [he] had concluded"); United States v. Concessi, 38 F. App'x 866, 868 (4th Cir. 2002) (expert designations properly excluded where they "included only the general topics concerning which each proposed expert would testify" but "failed to describe the witnesses opinions or provide the bases and reasons for the witnesses' opinions"). To be sure, the general topic areas of testimony overlapped with the subject matter of the case, but "undoubted relevance does not trump the need to provide opinions and, particularly here, analytical or methodological bases." (A. 378). The District Court's conclusion that the defense's notice was entirely "[l]acking" was entirely correct. (A. 366).

Moreover, the untimely nature of the defense's notices, coming, as they did, after the 7th and 10th days of trial, and between one and three days before the Government rested, respectively, would itself justify exclusion. Case law is legion that untimely disclosure justifies preclusion, especially where, as here, the defense knew of the subject matter of expert testimony much earlier. See United States v. Lundy, 676 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Holmes, 670 F.3d 586, 597-99 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 184-87; United States v. Day, 524

F.3d at 1371-72; United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992). As the District Court noted, the electronic evidence on which the Government's case was based had been disclosed to the defense "long" before trial. (A. 363). And although Ulbricht contends that he was only responding to Yum's testimony tying Ulbricht's Bitcoins to the Silk Road servers, which he could not have anticipated (Br. 81-83), it was, in fact, the defense that opened on the theory that the Bitcoins on Ulbricht's laptop resulted from innocent trades, and which necessitated the Government's 11th hour scramble for Yum's testimony (A. 373-74).²²

²² Likewise, this Court should reject the defense's complaint that it required experts only because it was not permitted to cross-examine the Government's witnesses beyond the scope of their direct testimony. (Br. 80-81). That argument "defies credulity" and is "without a scintilla of merit." (A. 374). In fact, defense counsel was able to question Government fact witnesses about many of the topics listed in the defective notice as to Bellovin. See, e.g., Tr. 628 (PGP encryption); 1070-72 (potential computer vulnerabilities); 1095 (operation of time stamps in UNIX-based operating systems); 1243-50 (forensic memory analysis and potential computer vulnerabilities). And in any event, the District Court's decision to enforce the Rules of Evidence, see Fed. R. Evid. 611(b), does not excuse the defense from complying with its discovery obligations.

This Court should credit the District Court's finding that the defense's "substantially inadequate notices" reflected a "tactical choice" (A. 367; see also A. 373-74) and the kind of "sharp practice" and "ambush" that "might well violate due process," United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 476 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2007), for which preclusion is an appropriate sanction. In Chin, a one-day continuance was sufficient to avoid reversal, in part because that was all defense counsel requested. Id. Here, however, allowing the proffered testimony would have been all the more unfair, given that it appeared to go to the heart of the Government case (A. 378), the Government could not reasonably be expected to respond immediately (A. 369), and any continuance to address the unfairness could impact the jurors to the point of causing a mistrial (A. 369).

Finally, even now, Ulbricht has "failed to establish prejudice" from excluding the witnesses, *United* States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 148 (2d Cir. 2003), by explaining "why their testimony would have altered the outcome of the trial," Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Onumonu, 967 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he district court's erroneous exclusion of testimony is subjected to harmless-error analysis."). Ulbricht merely repeats the topics of testimony, not how, specifically, that testimony would have "countered" the Government's case. (Br. 78-79, 85). Unlike cases cited by the defense (Br. 86-89), where the relevance of the expert's testimony to disputed issues of fact was clear, see United States v. Diallo, 40 F.3d 32, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1994); *United States* v. *Onumonu*, 967 F.2d at 784; United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1986); *United States* v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 927 (2d Cir. 1976), it is impossible to know what either defense witness would have said, with any degree of specificity, much less how it would have impacted the jury.²³ In the face of the overwhelming proof against Ulbricht, see supra pages 14-25, any error in excluding general, educational testimony about technical matters (which is all the defense has proffered) was harmless. See generally United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2014) (listing factors this Court considers in evaluating whether improper exclusion of evidence amounts to reversible error, including "the overall strength of the prosecution's case"), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1841 (2015); Howard v. Walker, 406 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2005) (considering "strength of the prosecution's case as a whole").

Having chosen "trial by ambush" (A. 368, 363), Ulbricht's challenge to the preclusion of his proffered experts should be rejected.

²³ These cases are also distinguishable for the additional reason that those district courts, unlike Judge Forrest, provided either improper justifications or no justification at all for excluding the experts. See, e.g., Onumonu, 967 F.2d at 788; United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d at 927; United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d at 50-51.

POINT IV

The District Court Properly Excluded a Co-Conspirator's Hearsay Statement

A. Relevant Facts

About two weeks before trial, on December 29, 2014, the Government disclosed to the defense the substance of certain statements by a cooperating witness, Andrew Michael Jones, a/k/a "Inigo," who had been an administrator on Silk Road and who plead guilty to various offenses pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the Government. (A. 398).

According to Jones, in or about October 2012, Jones and "Dread Pirate Roberts" agreed upon a verbal "handshake" to verify each other's identity during online chat conversations, in which Jones would mention a certain prompt and "Dread Pirate Roberts" would provide an agreed-upon response. (A. 398). In or about August or September 2013, Jones tried to confirm that he was speaking with the same individual and "provided what he believed to be the designated prompt," but "Dread Pirate Roberts' was unable to provide the response Jones thought they had agreed on." (A. 398). However, later in the conversation, Jones asked "Dread Pirate Roberts" to demonstrate his identity by specifying the first job that "Dread Pirate Roberts" had ever assigned to him (running the "DPR Book Club"), which "Dread Pirate Roberts" was able to do. (A. 398).

The Government further disclosed that an October 2012 chat between Ulbricht and Jones (previously

produced in discovery) discussed a "handshake," but the Government had not located any record of the 2013 conversation. (A. 398).

About two weeks later, the Government advised the defense that it would not be calling Jones as a witness as planned, during its case in chief. (A. 563, 584-85). When Ulbricht's counsel then explored the possibility of calling Jones to the stand, Jones's defense counsel advised that Jones would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. (A. 564, 585).

Although the Government was amenable to stipulating to the sum and substance of the disclosure, the defense would not agree to stipulate that, when Jones used a second prompt, he believed he was successful in validating "Dread Pirate Roberts"s identity. (A. 395-96, 399-400, 563-64, 566, 568). In the defense's view, doing so would "compromise Mr. Ulbricht's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights" and give the Government a benefit it should only obtain by calling Jones to the stand. (A. 396; see also A. 587 ("They could have called the witness if they wanted balance.")).

When the parties could not agree (A. 579-81), the defense moved the District Court to admit the Government's disclosure as if it were Jones's own statement, as a statement against interest, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), or under the "residual" exception, pursuant to Rule 807. (A. 395-96). In the alternative, Ulbricht argued that he had a Due Process right under the Fifth Amendment to admit the statement, and he urged the District Court to grant Jones immunity so that he could testify.

(A. 395). Ulbricht also sought a missing witness instruction from the District Court. (Tr. 1863).

The District Court denied the defense's application, concluding that the statements were not made against penal interest, because they were made while Jones was cooperating with the Government, they were not sufficiently corroborated, and they did not possess sufficient indicia of trustworthiness. (A. 583-84, 589-90). The District Court also denied the defense's request for a missing witness charge, because the record did not support the inference that Jones's testimony would have been unfavorable to the Government, so as to justify the instruction, given that "Dread Pirate Roberts" was able to identify himself in response to the second prompt. (A. 590-92).

B. Applicable Law

The "Against Interest" Exception

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide an exception to the hearsay rule for statements by an unavailable declarant that were "against interest." Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). "To satisfy [this] exception the proponent must show (1) that the declarant is unavailable as a witness, (2) that the statement is sufficiently reliable to warrant an inference that a reasonable man in [the declarant's] position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true, and (3) that corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." *United States* v. *Wexler*, 522 F.3d 194, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

At bottom, a statement qualifies as such only if "a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes would perceive the statement as detrimental to his or her own penal interest." United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 2004). "[N]on-self-inculpatory statements . . . made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory" are not admissible as statements against penal interest, Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994), and neither are proffer statements of non-testifying witnesses, which are made under the condition they cannot be used against the declarant if he tells the truth, *United* States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 543 n.16 (2d Cir. 1997). "Whether a challenged statement is sufficiently selfinculpatory can only be answered by viewing it in context," United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that hearsay is more reliable under Rule 804(b)(3) where the declarant "was not attempting to minimize his own culpability, shift blame onto [the defendant], or curry favor with the authorities").

With regard to the requisite corroboration to establish trustworthiness, such corroboration is "not an insignificant hurdle," *DeVillio*, 983 F.2d at 1190, and "must be strong, not merely allowable," *United States* v. *Salvador*, 820 F.2d 558, 561 (2d Cir. 1987) (requirement "demonstrates the obvious suspicion with which the drafters of the Rule regarded a statement exposing the declarant to criminal liability but exculpating the accused" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2. The Residual Exception and Nested Hearsay

Meanwhile, the residual hearsay exception of Rule 807 allows a statement not covered by another exception to the hearsay rule to be admitted only if: "(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice." As this Court has noted, the residual hearsay exception is meant to "be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances." Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d at 907 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., DeVillio, 983 F.2d at 1190 (residual hearsay exception is "applied in the rarest of cases").

Additionally, "[h]earsay within hearsay" may be admitted only if "each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule." Fed. R. Evid. 805.

3. Standard of Review

The District Court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d at 544 (Rule 804(b)(3)). To find an abuse of discretion, this Court "must conclude that the trial judge's evidentiary rulings were arbitrary and irrational." United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Sept. 28, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Discussion

On appeal, Ulbricht challenges only the District Court's decision not to admit Jones's statement under an exception to the hearsay rule. (Br. 90-96). But Jones's statement to the Government while he was cooperating, and after he had pled guilty to essentially the same offenses Ulbricht was charged with, was not the kind that could have exposed him to additional criminal liability at that point, and, therefore, it failed to satisfy Rule 804(b)(3).

When a declarant is in a cooperative posture with the Government, his statements may not tend to expose him to "more serious charges or more severe punishment," *United States* v. *Marquez*, 462 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1972), and, as a result, are not against his penal interest. For this reason, this Court has approved the exclusion of statements made pursuant to the protections of a proffer agreement, *Doyle*, 130 F.3d at 543 n.16, or while the declarant was actively cooperating with the Government and wearing a wire, *DeVillio*, 983 F.2d at 1190.

By December 2013, when Jones made the statements in question, he had pled guilty to a four-count information charging him with essentially the same criminal activity that Ulbricht was on trial for, including narcotics trafficking, computer hacking, identification fraud, and money laundering through the Silk Road website from October 2012 to October 2013. (SA 229-30). In exchange for his guilty plea and his commitment to provide truthful information (SA 230), the Government agreed that Jones "will not be further prosecuted criminally by this Office for any

crimes . . . related to" that activity (SA 231).²⁴ As a result, Jones's statements that he attempted to authenticate "Dread Pirate Roberts"s identity with a handshake in 2013, and succeed on the second attempt, were not the kind that "a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes would perceive. . . as detrimental to his or her own penal interest." *United States* v. *Saget*, 377 F.3d at 231. He had "already accepted responsibility" for his crimes, and those statements "did not add much additional weight to his confession." *Doyle*, 130 F.3d at 543 n.16.²⁵ Accord-

²⁴ The Government also agreed not to prosecute Jones for his personal involvement in selling narcotics, on and off Silk Road, and his work as a Silk Road forum moderator after October 2013. (SA. 231).

The record does not reveal why defense counsel for Jones advised that his client would have invoked his Fifth Amendment right, but, on this record, Ulbricht must assume that he would have done so legitimately, as only the proper invocation of that privilege would have rendered Jones "unavailable," as required by the rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1); United States v. Rodriguez, 706 F.2d 31, 40 (2d Cir. 1983). And because "[t]he 'against penal interest' requirement of Rule 804(b)(3) is more narrow than the Fifth Amendment's declaration that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," proper invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination does not necessarily mean that the statement fell within the exception to the

ingly, admission under Rule 804(b)(3) would have been improper.

Rule 807, which applies in only the "rarest of cases," DeVillio, 983 F.2d at 1190, was also not satisfied, for a number of reasons. Even assuming the statement had "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" "equivalent" to those of the hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 or 804, because Jones was obligated to tell the truth by the terms of his cooperation agreement, Ulbricht's counsel did not demonstrate "reasonable efforts" to ensure Jones's was available at trial, see Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(3), by, for example, giving the Government sufficient notice, prior to the eve of the defense case, that Jones's testimony was crucial enough to ensure his availability (including immunization, if required). (A. 584 (Government counsel: "He's under our control and we would not have resisted allowing him to testify.")). See also Fed. R. Evid. 807(b).

But most significantly, the defense sought to distort the record by admitting *only* that portion of Jones's statement that he deemed helpful, which would not "serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice." Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(4). (A. 400 (defense counsel's redline to proposed stipulation, depriving Government of a fair reading of Jones's statements)). As the District Court found, "the only reasonable inference to be drawn" from the fact that

hearsay rule. *United States* v. *Thomas*, 62 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1995).

"Dread Pirate Roberts" answered a second question correctly was that "the DPR identification was completed," and as a result, Jones's statements, when taken in their entirety, lacked the exculpatory flavor counsel sought to wring from them. (A. 592).

There was no abuse of discretion in the District Court's decision to exclude the nested hearsay statements of the defendant's co-conspirator, and no injustice in that ruling, where the defense refused a "balance[d]" stipulation that would have admitted the facts he sought. (A. 587).

POINT V

The Cumulative Error Doctrine Does Not Warrant Reversal

Ulbricht is correct that a series of errors that are harmless individually might, when aggregated, yield a "cumulative unfairness" that deprives a defendant of a fair trial. See United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 178 (2d Cir. 2008). However, "a cumulative-error analysis aggregates only actual errors to determine their cumulative effect." United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990). Ulbricht cannot establish cumulative error by stitching together a series of correct, but adverse, rulings by the District Court. See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1995).

Whether it was the decision not to identify how alleged corruption might have affected the integrity of the physical evidence against him, *supra* Point I, or not to investigate alternate perpetrators, *supra* Point

II, or provide timely and complete expert notice, supra Points II & III, or ensure that a purportedly key witness was available at trial, supra Point IV, the thread running through the errors urged on appeal was the defense's tactical decision to share as little information as possible with the Government and the Court, thereby flouting the "established rules of procedure and evidence [that are] designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. That tactical choice, while perhaps a reasonable defense strategy, does not, in hindsight, transform the proper exercise of discretion by the District Court into reversible error when it fails. There was no error in the District Court's rulings, much less cumulative error sufficient to overwhelm the evidence that Ulbricht was "Dread Pirate Roberts."

POINT VI

The District Court Properly Denied Ulbricht's Suppression Motions

A. Relevant Facts

1. The Pen Register and Trap-and-Trace Orders

By September 2013, Ulbricht was the FBI's leading suspect in the investigation of "Dread Pirate Roberts." (Docket Entry 57, Decl. of Christopher Tarbell ¶ 19 ("Tarbell Decl.")). To further the investigation, the Government obtained five pen register and trapand-trace orders (the "pen/trap orders"), pursuant to

18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-26 (the "Pen/Trap Act"), authorizing the FBI to collect routing data about the Internet traffic to and from the IP address²⁶ assigned to Ulbricht's residence by his Internet service provider ("ISP"), the wireless router at that residence, and certain devices that were determined to be regularly connecting to that router. (Tarbell Decl. ¶ 19; S. 67-78, 80-91, 93-99, 125-32, 134-41).

The pen/trap orders authorized the Government to receive the source and destination IP addresses for all Internet traffic to and from, respectively, each of the foregoing facilities, along with the dates, times, durations, and other routing information associated with those connections. (See S. 69, 80, 93, 125, 134; see also Tarbell ¶ 19). In each application, the Government expressly noted that it was "not requesting, and d[id] not seek to obtain, the contents of any communications," and that the information sought did not "encompass the 'contents' of a communication" nor "information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." (S. 75,

²⁶ Every device on the Internet is identified by a unique number called an Internet Protocol ("IP") address. This number is used to route information between devices, for example, between two computers. To send information from one computer to another over the Internet, the data is split into discrete "packets," each of which carries the IP addresses of the device that sent it and of the of the device to which it is destined. (S. 73-74).

88, 98, 130, 139 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8)). None of the applications requested, nor did the orders authorize, collection of location data regarding any of the devices in question. (Tarbell Decl. ¶ 21).

2. The Warrant for Ulbricht's Laptop

On the morning of October 1, 2013, hours before arresting Ulbricht, the Government applied for a warrant to search a silver Samsung laptop with a certain unique identifier (known as a "MAC address"), believed to be his personal laptop. (S. 202-03 (the "Laptop Warrant")).

In its application, the Government alleged probable cause to believe that Ulbricht was committing enumerated federal crimes, namely, narcotics trafficking, computer hacking, money laundering, and murder-for-hire, in violation of, 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 1956 & 1958, respectively, which it defined as the "Subject Offenses." (S. 207). After describing the design and operation of the Silk Road website (S. 209-21) and "Dread Pirate Roberts" s role as owner and operator (S. 221-31), the affidavit identified the bases for believing Ulbricht was "DPR," including common attributes between Ulbricht's public statements on social networking sites and statements by "DPR" (S. 231-32, 234-35), Internet posts related to Silk Road made under pseudonyms linked to Ulbricht (S. 232-34, 239-41), administrator-level security measures on the Silk Road website that used Ulbricht's pseudonym (S. 241-42), IP logs and other information suggesting that "DPR" accessed the Silk Road website from a cafe near Ulbricht's home (S.

235-37), and that "DPR" was seeking to purchase fraudulent identification at or about the same time that Ulbricht ordered and received some through Silk Road (S. 237-39). There was also evidence that "DPR" and Ulbricht were using the same type of computer, and logged on and off the same websites at or about the same times. (S. 242-46).

The application went on to explain the evidence agents expected to find on the laptop, including, as pertains to this appeal, "evidence relevant to corroborating the identification of Ulbricht as the Silk Road user 'Dread Pirate Roberts," including, but not limited to, "writings by Ulbricht, which may reflect linguistic patterns or idiosyncracies associated with 'Dread Pirate Roberts,' or political/economic views associated with him"; evidence of Ulbricht's travel or patterns of movement, "to allow comparison with patterns of online activity of 'Dread Pirate Roberts' and any information known about his location at particular times"; and "other evidence implicating Ulbricht in the Subject Offenses." (S. 248-49).

A federal magistrate judge in the Northern District of California issued the Laptop Warrant, authorizing the FBI to seize Ulbricht's laptop and to search the laptop for "evidence, contraband, fruits or instrumentalities" of the Subject Offenses that fit two categories. (S. 206, 252-53). The first, not challenged on appeal, was "[a]ny evidence relating in any way to the Silk Road website, including but not limited to" six types of data related to Silk Road or Tor. (S. 252).

Second, the Laptop Warrant authorized the seizure of "[a]ny evidence concerning Ross William Ul-

bricht relevant to the investigation of the Subject Ofincluding but limited fenses. not (a) "any communications or writings by Ulbricht"; and "any evidence concerning" (b) "any computer equipment, software, or usernames used by Ulbricht"; (c) "Ulbricht's travel or patterns of movement"; (d) "Ulbricht's technical expertise concerning Tor, Bitcoins, computer programming, website administration, encryption, or any other area of [relevant] technical expertise . . . "; (e) "any efforts by Ulbricht to obtain fake identification documents"; (f) "any aliases used by Ulbricht"; and (g) "any effort to evade law enforcement." (S. 252-53 (capitalization standardized)).

Finally, the Laptop Warrant specified the procedure agents should employ in executing the warrant, including seizing it, making a forensic copy, and reviewing the computer off-site. (S. 253-55).

3. The Warrants for Ulbricht's Facebook and Google Accounts

On October 8, 2013, the Government sought two warrants authorizing the FBI to obtain the contents of Ulbricht's Facebook and Google accounts (the "Facebook Warrant" and the "Google Warrant," respectively), pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703. (S. 312-18, 376-82). Just as with the Laptop Warrant, the applications for these warrants set forth probable cause to search those accounts for evidence, fruits or instrumentalities of specific offenses, namely, conspiracy to commit narcotics trafficking, computer hacking, and money laundering, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846,

and Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030 and 1956. (S. 320-21, 384-85). Each warrant incorporated the Complaint by reference, which, like the Laptop Warrant, described the Silk Road website, "Dread Pirate Robert"s role in operating it, and the evidence that Ulbricht was "DPR." (S. 336-74, 395-443). The Facebook and Google Warrant applications alleged that, "Given the parallels that law enforcement has been able to draw between Ulbricht and 'DPR' based on Ulbricht's public online footprint, . . . examination of Ulbricht's communications contained in [those accounts] will reveal additional parallels between Ulbricht and 'DPR' that will further corroborate the identification of Ulbricht as 'DPR," such as "linguistic patterns or idiosyncracies" and "travel or patterns of movement." (S. 328-29, 386-87).

After reviewing both applications, Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein issued both warrants, which ordered Facebook and Google to produce copies of Ulbricht's Facebook and Google accounts to the Government (S. 312, 333-34, 376, 392-393), and authorized the Government to search their contents for "evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities" of the specified offenses, including:

- 1. Any evidence concerning Ross William Ulbricht relevant to the investigation of the Subject Offenses, including but not limited to:
 - a. any communications or writings by Ulbricht;

- b. any evidence concerning any computer equipment, software, or usernames used by Ulbricht;
- c. any evidence concerning Ulbricht's travel or patterns of movement;
- d. any evidence concerning Ulbricht's technical expertise concerning Tor, Bitcoins, computer programming, website administration, encryption, or any other area of technical expertise relevant to administering the Silk Road website;
- e. any evidence concerning any efforts by Ulbricht to obtain fake identification documents; and
- f. any evidence concerning any aliases used by Ulbricht or other means of evading law enforcement.
- 2. Any communications with coconspirators, aiders, abettors, or anyone else involved in any way with the Subject Offenses, including but not limited to any communications seeking to recruit such individuals.
- 3. Any evidence concerning Bitcoin exchangers or bank accounts used by Ulbricht, or any other evidence relevant to

locating the proceeds of the Subject Offenses.

- 4. Any evidence concerning the Silk Road website or otherwise concerning narcotics trafficking.
- 5. Any evidence concerning the use of Bitcoins to move criminal proceeds or otherwise concerning money laundering.
- 6. Any other evidence of the Subject Offenses.

(S. 334-35, 393-94 (capitalization standardized)).

4. Ulbricht's Suppression Motions

On August 1, 2014, Ulbricht moved to suppress the majority of electronic evidence in the investigation, including, as pertains to this appeal, evidence obtained pursuant to the Laptop, Facebook, and Google Warrants, on the grounds that they lacked the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment, and were unlawful fruits of the pen/trap orders. (Docket Entries 46-48). The Government opposed Ulbricht's motions. (Docket Entries 56-57).

On October 10, 2014, the District Court denied Ulbricht's suppression motions. (A. 176-213). First, the District Court suggested that Ulbricht had not adequately established his personal expectation of privacy in any of the searched materials, because he did not submit a sworn statement establishing as

much. (A. 198-203).²⁷ Moving to the merits, the District Court disagreed that these were "general warrants," because they were "specific" both "as to the items to be seized" and "as to what type of evidence should be searched for." (A. 204). The District Court specifically noted that, in a case where "the use of idiosyncratic linguistic patterns" was a "key issue[]" relevant to attribution, it was appropriate for the Government to review "any [of the] communications or writings" in the subject email account. (A. 207 n.12). The District Court further concluded that even if the warrants were overbroad, the exclusionary rule should not apply, because the agents were entitled to rely in good faith upon the warrants, as the applications therefor were neither so lacking in probable cause nor so facially deficient as to render that reliance unreasonable. (A. 207 n.12). Finally, the District Court rejected Ulbricht's argument that the pen/trap orders violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that "[t]he law is clear—and there is truly no room for debate—that the type of information sought in [the pen/trap orders was entirely appropriate for that type of order." (See A. 208-09 (citing Smith v. Mary-

²⁷ As to the searches challenged on appeal, however, the Government indicated that it was willing to stipulate to his standing, because his privacy interest in at least the laptop and Google and Facebook accounts "seems clear" (A. 175), and the District Court considered challenges to those searches on the merits (A. 183).

land, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Rizzo, 491 F.2d 215, 216 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974)).

B. Applicable Law

1. The Fourth Amendment and Particularity

The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants "particularly describ[e] . . . the person or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The particularity requirement "makes general searches . . . impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another," *Marron* v. *United States*, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), by foreclosing a "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings," *Coolidge* v. *New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). To satisfy the particularity requirement, warrants must specify (1) the offenses for which probable cause has been established; (2) the place to be searched; and (3) the items to be seized relating to the specified offenses. *United States* v. *Galpin*, 720 F.3d 436, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2013).

Although "nothing [should be] left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant," *Marron* v. *United States*, 275 U.S. at 196, "[c]ourts tend to tolerate a greater degree of ambiguity where law enforcement agents have done the best that could reasonably be expected under the circumstances, have acquired all the descriptive facts which a reasonable investigation could be expected to cover, and have insured that all those facts were included in the warrant." *United States* v. *Young*, 745 F.2d 733, 759 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding warrant that concluded a list of specific items

to be seized with "other evidence of a conspiracy" to distribute narcotics).

Accordingly, "broadly worded categories of items available for seizure" do not necessarily render a warrant deficient: "Once a category of seizable papers has been adequately described, with the description delineated in part by an illustrative list of seizable items, the Fourth Amendment is not violated because the officers executing the warrant must exercise some minimal judgment as to whether a particular document falls within the described category." United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 843-45 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding warrant that authorized a search for "records and other items that constitute evidence of the offenses of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and distribution of the same"). "It is true that a warrant authorizing seizure of records of criminal activity permits officers to examine many papers in a suspect's possession to determine if they are within the described category. But allowing some latitude in this regard simply recognizes the reality that few people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked 'drug records.'" Id. at 845; see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480-82 & n.10 (1976) (upholding warrant that authorized the seizure of "other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown," when limited to a real estate fraud relating to a particular parcel of land); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d at 759-60 ("[U]se of the term 'other evidence' following the term 'money' was sufficient to permit the agents to seize such manifestations of wealth as furs, jewelry, and expensive automobiles."); United States v. George,

975 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1992) (collecting similar cases).

And "where a particularly complex scheme is alleged to exist, it may be appropriate to use more generic terms to describe what is to be seized." *United States* v. *Gotti*, 42 F. Supp. 2d 252, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Parker, J.) (citing *United States* v. *Regan*, 706 F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The degree to which a warrant must state its terms with particularity varies inversely with the complexity of the criminal activity investigated.")). For example, where there is probable cause to believe that a business is "permeated with fraud," "the agents could properly seize all of the business records." *Nat'l City Trading Corp.* v. *United States*, 635 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1980); *accord United States Postal Ser*v. v. *CEC Servs.*, 869 F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1989).

2. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

Although the exclusionary rule "requir[es] the exclusion of evidence [w]hen the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights," *United States* v. *Stokes*, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original), the rule "is not an individual right and applies only where it result[s] in appreciable deterrence," *Herring* v. *United States*, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration original). Accordingly, in *United States* v. *Leon*, the Supreme Court held that evidence should not be suppressed where the authorities act in

"objective good faith" and "reasonable reliance" on a warrant, even if the warrant is later found to be invalid. 468 U.S. 897, 920, 922 (1984); see United States v. Ganias, — F.3d —, No. 12-240-cr, 2016 WL 3031285, at *17 (2d Cir. May 27, 2016) (en banc). "[M]ost searches conducted pursuant to a warrant would likely fall within [Leon's] protection," United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2011), because a law enforcement agent is not "required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested," *United States* v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding good faith reliance on warrant that was predicated unwittingly on a constitutional violation).

The Supreme Court later extended that principle to include actions taken by an officer "acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute," unless the statute was "clearly unconstitutional" at the time the officer obtained the evidence, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987);seeUnited StatesMcCullough, 523 F. App'x 82, 83 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying principle in the context of cellphone location records obtained under Section 2703), as well as to "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent," Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231 (2011).

3. Severance

Finally, even where a warrant is facially invalid, suppression can be narrowly tailored to remedy only the constitutionally infirm portion of a search warrant. In *United States* v. *George*, this Court adopted the doctrine of severance, i.e., the separation of any constitutionally infirm portion of a warrant from the rest of the warrant, thereby permitting the admission of evidence pursuant to the valid portion of the warrant. 975 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Fourth Amendment guarantees are adequately protected by suppressing only those items whose seizure is justified solely on the basis of the constitutionally infirm portion of the warrant, which no reasonably well-trained officer could presume to be valid." (citing United States v. Riggs, 690 F.2d 298, 300 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 754 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1981)).

For this remedy to apply, "the court must be able to excise from the warrant those clauses that fail the particularity or probable cause requirements in a manner that leaves behind a coherent, constitutionally compliant redacted warrant." *United States* v. *Galpin*, 720 F.3d at 448-49. Severance "is not available where no part of the warrant is sufficiently particularized, where no portion of the warrant may be meaningfully severed, or where the sufficiently particularized portions make up only an insignificant or tangential part of the warrant." *United States* v. *George*, 975 F.2d at 79-80 (citations omitted).

4. The Pen/Trap Act

The Pen/Trap Act authorizes installation of a "pen register" to record or capture, prospectively, "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information" that is "transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted," and a "trap and trace" device to "identify the originating number or . . . source of a wire or electronic communication," 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) & (4). To install either device, the Government must certify that the information likely to be collected is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation, but it is not required to establish probable cause or obtain a warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 3122.

The Supreme Court has held, in the context of telephones, that the use of a pen register does not constitute a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, for which a warrant is ordinarily required, because "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties," such as the dialing instructions he conveys to telephone companies when he makes a call. *Smith*, 442 U.S. at 743-44.

This same principle behind the "third party doctrine" applies when a pen register is used to collect the data, like IP addresses, used to route electronic communications over the Internet, which is "constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that the Court approved in *Smith*." *United States* v. *Forrester*, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008); accord *United States* v. *Graham*, — F.3d. —, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 WL 3068018, at *7-8 (4th Cir. May 31,

2016); United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010). Just like telephone users, Internet users "rely on third-party equipment in order to engage in communication" and "have no expectation of privacy in . . . the IP addresses of the websites they visit, because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information." United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510; accord Graham, 2016 WL 3068018, at *7. Accordingly, IP addresses and similar Internet routing information are not protected by the Fourth Amendment and can be collected without a warrant under the Pen/Trap Act. Id.

5. Standard of Review

"The factual findings on which the district court's suppression ruling was based are reviewed for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government; the legal conclusions on which this ruling was based are reviewed de novo." United States v. Lewis, 386 F.3d 475, 480 (2d Cir. 2004); see also United States v. George, 975 F.2d at 75, 77 (whether search warrant is sufficiently particular, or good faith exception applies, are questions of law reviewed de novo). Additionally, this Court "may uphold the validity of a judgment on any ground that finds support in the record." United States v. Ganias, 2016 WL 3031285, at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Discussion

1. The Warrants Were Particular

Ulbricht's argument that the Laptop, Facebook, and Google Warrants "lacked any particularity," and thus violated the Fourth Amendment (Br. 98), is unavailing, because the applications recited sufficient probable cause to justify the scope of the Warrants, which themselves listed particular items and offenses that, in turn, limited other general language therein.

To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant must specify: (1) the offenses for which probable cause has been established; (2) the place to be searched; and (3) the items to be seized relating to the specified offenses. Galpin, 720 F.3d at 445-46. Ulbricht contends that "the terms of the warrants imposed no limitation at all on the parameters of the searches" that law enforcement were authorized to undertake (Br. 104), but in fact, the Warrants enumerated categories of communications and other information that were relevant to establishing Ulbricht's identity as "DPR," through parallels in their language and behavior. (S. 252-53, 334-35, 393-94). The Warrants and their applications explicitly "link[ed] the items to be searched and seized to the suspected criminal activity." United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2010). For example, even the clauses that authorized the seizure of "any communications or writings by Ulbricht" and "any evidence concerning Ulbricht's travel or patterns of movement" (highlighted by Ulbricht and amicus curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (Br. 99; NACDL Br. 10-11)), were phrased to "identify with reasonable certainty those items that the magistrate has authorized [the agents] to seize." *George*, 975 F.2d at 75.

Moreover, those categories of evidence, while broad, were explicitly justified by the Warrant applications, which described "the items to be seized with as much particularity as the circumstances reasonably allow[ed]." George, 975 F.2d at 76. Ulbricht's communications and travels were highly relevant to the goal of the Government's investigation at this stage: "corroborating the identification of Ulbricht as the Silk Road user 'Dread Pirate Roberts.'" (S. 248; see also S. 328, 387). It was the parallels between the online persona "DPR" and Ulbricht's attributable statements and conduct—his online habits, where he lived and traveled, and even his tone, spelling, syntax, and viewpoints—that led the Government to develop probable cause to believe Ulbricht was "DPR." (S. 231-35, 248, 327-29, 359-68, 386-88, 418-27). All "communications" and "travel" records are broad categories, but, like business records of an enterprise "permeated with fraud," Nat'l City Trading Corp. v. *United States*, 635 F.2d at 1026, they were justifiably seized, because even innocent communications or travel records might contain details overlapping with "DPR"s (innocent) statements, shoring up the proof against Ulbricht. See also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. at 481 n.10 (acknowledging that to uncover a complex scheme, a warrant may seek a broader range of evidence). And, as the application foreshadowed, the warrant yielded additional evidence of this type establishing Ulbricht's identity beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. (See, e.g., Tr. 1298-1301, 2143 (statements made by "DPR" coupled with pictures and posts from Facebook and information about Ulbricht's whereabouts gleaned from Google used to establish identity, including that both "DPR" and Ulbricht were likely in Thailand at same time)).²⁸

Amicus NACDL also challenges references to "any other evidence" implicating Ulbricht in the subject crimes (NACDL Br. 11 (referring to S. 248-49, 252-53)). But while a warrant that authorizes the seizure of "any other evidence relating to the commission of a crime," George, 975 F.2d at 75 (emphasis added), or "violations of . . . federal statutes" generally, Galpin, 720 F.3d at 447, is invalid, a warrant that lists specific offenses, and specific items that may be seized as evidence (or fruits or instrumentalities) of those offenses, will not be invalidated by reference to "other evidence" of those identified offenses, because the specific terms are naturally read to limit the general ones. See Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480-82 & n.10; Young, 745 F.2d at 759-60.

Ulbricht and NADCL's principal contention sounds less in the doctrine of particularity than it faults the Warrants for permitting the Government to

²⁸ For this reason, *amicus* NACDL's suggestion (NACDL Br. 24-26) that this Court limit warrants by the information the Government already has at that stage of the investigation is misguided, because it would defeat the point of an investigative technique designed to gather *new* information.

search the data it obtained to find the identified categories of information, i.e., that the Warrants allowed "a detailed review of every piece of digital information," instead of prescribing search protocols. (Br. 102; NACDL Br. 12-23). But as this Court recently acknowledged en banc, comprehensive review of digital media is often necessary, because although "to a user a hard drive may seem like a file cabinet, a digital forensic expert reasonably perceives the hard drive simply as a coherent physical storage medium for digital data—data which is interspersed throughout the medium, which itself must be maintained and accessed with care, lest this data be altered or destroyed." Ganias, 2016 WL 3031285, at *10 (emphasis original); see also id. (noting files "are not as discrete as they may appear to a user," and "[t]heir interspersion through a digital storage medium . . . may affect the degree to which it is feasible . . . to fully extract and segregate responsive data from non-responsive data"). Although a warrant that authorizes the search of electronic devices without specifying what data thereon may be seized will be invalid, see United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d at 58-59, 62, this Court has recognized that "the size or other outwardly visible characteristics of a file may disclose nothing about its contents," which is why, "by necessity, government efforts to locate particular files will require examining a great many other files to exclude the possibility that the sought-after data are concealed there," Galpin, 720 F.3d at 447 (internal quotation marks omitted). This practical reality of digital media "demands a heightened sensitivity to the particularity requirement in the context of digital searches," id., but it does not impeach the *procedure* used here to execute the warrants. *Cf. Andresen*, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11 ("[I]t is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.").²⁹

The NACDL urges this Court to reject the search procedures laid out on the warrants (S. 253-55, 331-32, 390-91) and to adopt the procedures set forth by Judge Kozinski in his concurrence in *United* States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) ("CDT III"). (NACDL Br. 13-19). But the Second Circuit has expressly declined to adopt Judge Kozinski's suggested protocols as required under the Fourth Amendment. See Galpin, 720 F.3d at 451 (citing CDT III and noting "[u]nlike the Ninth Circuit, we have not required specific search protocols or minimization undertakings as basic predicates for upholding digital search warrants, and we do not impose any rigid requirements in that regard at this juncture"). Even the Ninth Circuit has noted the limited precedential value of CDT III. See United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing search procedures in CDT as "no longer binding circuit precedent" and emphasizing no "clear-cut rule" because, "[u]ltimately, the proper balance between the government's interest in law enforcement and the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of electronic data must be determined on a case-by-case basis"). To date, no other federal Court

2. Suppression Would Not Be an Appropriate Remedy

Even if some portions of the Warrants were overbroad, suppression would have been inappropriate, for two reasons.

First, as the District Court found, "the law enforcement agents who executed the searches and seizures at issue were entitled to rely in good faith upon the magistrates judges'" decision to issue the Warrants. (A. 207 n.12). That reliance was "objectively reasonable," United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921-22 (1984); see also United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1992), and neither Ulbricht nor amicus contends otherwise. There is no evidence investigators "sought evidence beyond the scope of the [crimes] that [were] particularized in the warrant application[s] and for which the application[s] supplied probable cause," Galpin, 720 F.3d at 453, nor do the Warrants contain "only a catch-all description of the property to be seized," so as to render them "facially invalid" and incapable of supporting good faith reliance, George, 975 F.2d at 77-78 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put simply, "[t]here is nothing more the officer could have or should have done under these circumstances to be sure his search would be legal." United States v. Ganias, 2016 WL 3031285, at *18 (internal quotation marks omitted): see also United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d at 105 ("[W]here the need

of Appeals has required *CDT III*'s procedures in every case involving a search of electronic evidence.

for specificity in a warrant or warrant affidavit on a particular point was not yet settled or was otherwise ambiguous, we have declined to find a well-trained officer could not reasonably rely on a warrant issued in the absence of such specificity.").

Second, even if the magistrate judges erred in approving the Warrants, and the agents were deemed to have acted unreasonably in relying on them, wholesale suppression of their fruits would be inappropriate. "[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant held unconstitutional in part does not invalidate the entire search." George, 975 F.2d at 79. Rather, the exclusionary rule requires "suppressing only those items whose seizure is justified solely on the basis of the constitutionally infirm portion of the warrant." Id. As long as the warrant's "valid parts are distinguishable from the nonvalid parts," and the valid parts do not "make up 'only an insignificant or tangential part of the warrant," severance is appropriate. Galpin, 720 F.3d at 448-49 (quoting George, 975 F.2d at 80). Accordingly, because the evidence admitted at trial fell into specific categories of the Warrant, nothing would have been suppressed, even if the Warrant's more general provisions (referring to "other evidence") were struck.

3. The Pen/Trap Orders Were Valid

Ulbricht's challenge to the pen/trap orders has no support in either statutory or case law and should be rejected.

The Government may obtain dialing information prospectively and without a warrant, because there is

no reasonable expectation of privacy in non-content information used to route communications, *Smith*, 442 U.S. at 743-44, and the use of a pen register to collect basic Internet routing data is "constitutionally indistinguishable" from the use of a pen register to collect dialing instructions, *Forrester*, 512 F.3d at 510; *see also Graham*, — F.3d. —, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 WL 3068018, at *7-8; *United States* v. *Christie*, 624 F.3d at 574. The data collected by the Government here (namely, source and destination IP addresses, and associated dates and times of communication) are analogous to the dialed numbers in *Smith* and plainly covered by the Pen/Trap Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) & (4).³⁰

Ulbricht argues that the pen/trap orders were invalid, because they monitored Internet traffic in and out of his home, thus revealing activity in a special locus of constitutional privacy protection. (Br. 118-

³⁰ Congress amended the Pen/Trap Act in 2001 to explicitly include non-content addressing information for Internet communications, in addition to telephone toll records. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3); see also 147 Cong. Rec. S11,006-07 (Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (describing amendment as a way to "ensure[] that the pen register and trap and trace provisions apply to facilities other than telephone lines (e.g., the Internet)"); 147 Cong. Rec. H7,197 (Oct. 23, 2001) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (same).

20).³¹ But that argument proves too much, as today's telephone pen registers likewise reveal when someone is home, when they answer the phone or place a call. *See Smith*, 442 U.S. at 743 ("The fact that [petitioner] dialed the number on his home phone rather than on some other phone could make no conceivable difference, nor could any subscriber rationally think that it would."); *see also United States* v. *Todisco*, 667

³¹ Ulbricht also mischaracterizes the pen/trap orders as "hybrids," procured through both 18 U.S.C. § 3127 and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), and akin to cell-site location orders (Br. 122), but in fact, the pen/trap orders were sought and issued only pursuant to the Pen/Trap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27. (See, e.g., S. 67-78). Accordingly, the authorities addressing location data under the Stored Communications Act are irrelevant. (Contra Br. 122-24).

Nor did the pen/trap orders authorize the collection of content. (Tarbell Decl. ¶ 19). The Government did not collect the URLs for websites Ulbricht viewed or the searches he typed into Google. (Contra Br. 113-14). Nor did it collect geolocation data. (Tarbell Decl. ¶ 21). Rather, the Government sought and obtained only routing information that revealed when someone using the specified facilities connected to the Internet and the IP addresses of the computers he was communicating with, just as a pen register on a home phone would reveal when an occupant was using the phone and what numbers he dialed.

F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1981) (installing a pen register on a home telephone is not a Fourth Amendment search, even if it is installed by police without the assistance of a telephone company).

Even if this Court were to be the first to conclude that use of the Pen/Trap Act to collect Internet routing information violates the Fourth Amendment, contrary to the "strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress," *United States* v. *Watson*, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted), agents were entitled to rely in good faith on orders issued under the Pen/Trap Act, and suppression of their fruits would be unjustified, *see Illinois* v. *Krull*, 480 U.S. at 349.

Accordingly, the District Court properly denied Ulbricht's motions to suppress.

POINT VII

Ulbricht's Sentence Was Reasonable

A. Relevant Facts

1. The Presentence Report

In advance of the defendant's sentencing, the Probation Office prepared a Presentence Report, which calculated that the Total Offense Level was 43, that the defendant's Criminal History Category was I, and that the recommended sentence under the Guidelines was life imprisonment. (PSR at 36).

Section 2D1.1 drove the Guidelines calculation. Based on a "conservative" estimate of drug weight, derived from the Silk Road website's transactions database, Ulbricht was accountable for more than 82 kilograms of cocaine, more than 26 kilograms of heroin, and more than 8 kilograms of methamphetamine (PSR ¶¶ 60, 94), for a base offense level of 36 (PSR ¶ 94 & n.2), which was increased by 4 levels, for operating a continuing criminal enterprise (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.5; PSR ¶ 94). The Probation Office increased that offense level of 40 by three enhancements of two levels each, for directing the use of violence (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)), distributing a controlled substance through mass-marketing by means of an interactive computer service (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(7)), and maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12)). (PSR ¶ 94). 32 The Probation Office increased that offense level by two levels for money laundering, pursuant to Section 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) (PSR ¶ 95), and arrived at a total offense level of 50. (PSR ¶ 99). After conducting a grouping analysis that did not impact that offense level (PSR ¶¶ 100-20), the Probation Office reduced the offense level to the maximum under the Guidelines, 43, pursuant to Section 5A, comment. (n.2).

³² Accordingly, the base offense level should have been 46, not 48, as the Probation Office calculated, although as described below, the mistake was not material, because the maximum offense level under the Guidelines is 43.

The Probation Office recommended that Ulbricht be sentenced to life imprisonment. (PSR at 36). Such a sentence was warranted in part because Silk Road was "unprecedented" in its ability to entice people who would not otherwise have engaged in "traditional drug deals." (PSR at 38). In light of Silk Road imitators that were quick to populate the dark web after Ulbricht's arrest, "a severe sentence is needed to provide general deterrence." (PSR at 38).

2. The Overdose Deaths

Although it did not impact the Guidelines calculation, the Government urged the District Court to consider the overdose deaths of six individuals that were linked to drugs purchased from Silk Road. Those deaths were relevant, the Government argued, because they "illustrate the obvious: that drugs can cause serious harm, including death, particularly when distributed in the massive quantities they were here." (A. 902). The individuals who died were:

Jordan M.: On August 29, 2013, first responders found Jordan M. unconscious, slumped in a chair next to his laptop computer in his bedroom, in Bellevue, Washington. (PSR ¶ 62). A black belt with a looped end was lying near his feet, and a hypodermic needle, a bag containing 1.7 grams of powdered heroin, and a torn open express mail package were strewn around the room. (PSR ¶ 63). Jordan's computer was open to his private message inbox on Silk Road, which included messages from a Silk Road vendor about a package of heroin and Xanax due to arrive that morning, with a tracking number that matched

the package in his room; another browser window showed tracking information for the package from the Postal Service. (PSR ¶ 64). Jordan M. was transferred to a hospital where he died two days later. (PSR ¶ 62). An autopsy determined the cause of death to be acute intoxication from heroin, Xanax, and valium, all drugs he had ordered on Silk Road. (PSR ¶¶ 62, 65, 68).

Preston B.: On February 15, 2013, during a post-prom party at a hotel, Preston B., a 16-year old boy from Perth, Australia, took two doses of 25i-NBOMe (known as "N-bomb"), a powerful synthetic drug designed to mimic LSD, which one of Preston's friends purchased from Silk Road. (PSR ¶¶ 77-78). Preston began acting erratically, muttering incoherently with aggressive outbursts and random, destructive behavior, seemingly "at war with himself." (PSR ¶ 79). When Preston's friends went to get help, Preston screamed loudly, then jumped off the room's balcony to the pool deck below. (PSR ¶ 80). He died two days later. (PSR ¶ 77).

Bryan B.: On October 7, 2013, Boston police found Bryan B., age 25, dead in his apartment, with a belt in his left hand and a small plastic bag of brown heroin and a syringe next to him. (PSR ¶ 69). Opiates were found in his system and were listed as the cause of death on his death certificate. (PSR ¶ 69). Only days before law enforcement shuttered Silk Road, Bryan used the website to purchase a pack of syringes and one gram of heroin (approximately 5 to 10 doses' worth), which arrived on October 1. (PSR ¶¶ 70-72).

Alejandro N.: On September 10, 2012, Alejandro N., age 16, took four doses of N-bomb that had been purchased from a dealer on Silk Road. (PSR ¶¶ 73-76). Alejandro acted "goofy" at first, then became increasingly incoherent and aggressive before he fell on his face, had a seizure, and died on the floor of a friend's garage in California. (PSR ¶ 74).

Scott W.: On May 19, 2013, Scott W., a 36-year old man from Australia, was found dead at his home, hunched over his desk, with his sleeve rolled up and a used syringe and a plastic bag of cream-colored powder nearby. (PSR ¶ 85). An autopsy found toxic levels of morphine in Scott's system that were "almost certainly derived from heroin," as well as depressants with the potential to increase the drug's harmful effects. (PSR ¶ 85). The cause of death was determined to be "multiple drug toxicity." (A. 926, 1322). Scott had used Silk Road to place nearly 70 orders between January and May 2013, including 9 orders for heroin and 19 orders for depressants, all of which were shipped to him at the address where he was found dead. (PSR ¶ 86).

Jacob L.: On February 14, 2013, the mother of 22-year-old Jacob L. found him dead at their home in Australia. (PSR ¶ 81). Jacob was recently treated for bronchitis, and the autopsy listed the cause of death as pneumonia, although heroin, cocaine, and other drugs were found in his system, which "may have blunted the deceased's perception of the severity of his illness." (PSR ¶¶ 82-83). A Silk Road account named "Needheroin" was used to place more than 30 orders for various drugs between early 2012 and ear-

ly 2013, including heroin, "speed," "meth," and "crack," which were shipped to Jacob under his true name at the address where he was found dead. (PSR ¶ 84).

These were, the Government argued, "specific examples of the harm caused by drug trafficking in the context of this case," which resulted from risks that were "plainly foreseeable" to the defendant. (A. 902).

3. The Parties' Sentencing Submissions

Through its first of several submissions, on May 15, 2015, the defense made two principal arguments to mitigate offense conduct. First, the defense contended that Silk Road made drug dealing and using safer, through a variety of measures like "access to physician counseling," "quality control," and vendor "ratings." (A. 904-05). It invoked academic studies of Silk Road that found that anonymity allowed members to "converse freely about their drug use," "minimized drug-related stigma by reinforcing a[] sense of community," and, in some cases, made it easier to get information about how to quit using. (A. 905-06 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Second, relying on review of the relevant records by a forensic pathologist, Dr. Mark Taff (S. 437-47), the defense argued that the evidence was "utterly insufficient to attribute any of the deaths to drugs purchased from vendors on the Silk Road site," and that they should not be included in the Presentence Report. (A. 904, 1047-48). According to the defense, deficiencies in the death investigations would prevent any medical examiner from opining "to a reasonable"

degree of medical certainty as to the cause, manner, and time of death," in a manner that would qualify for statutory, criminal liability. (A. 911, 913-14). For example, Jordan M.'s death might have been caused by hemorrhaging in his brain after he took the heroin and other drugs that were in his system. (A. 923-24). Dr. Taff also pointed to gaps in the paperwork associated with various cases. (*E.g.*, A. 927).

The defense specifically disclaimed the need for a hearing to settle any factual disputes, however, encouraging the District Court to rely on the papers. (A. 903-04).³³

In a second submission, on May 22, 2015, the defense sought a sentence "substantially below the applicable advisory" Guidelines sentence, based on the defendant's history and characteristics and other factors. (A. 973-75). After a lengthy recitation of Ulbricht's personal history, Ulbricht argued that he created Silk Road because he was a "young idealist" who wanted people to have "the freedom to make their own choices, to pursue their own happiness," and that he "never sought to create a site that would provide an avenue for people to feed their addictions" or because he was interested in "financial gain." (A. 1003 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The defense also urged the District Court to disregard the attempted murder-for-hire allegations, and objected

³³ The District Court ordered the defense to respond to several questions in response to its initial filing (A. 971-72), and it did so (A. 1386-1413).

to an enhancement based on that conduct, because the plots were "fictitious" and "limited to cyberspace." (A. 1007, 1047-48). The defense argued that Ulbricht's conduct was more analogous to running a so-called crack house, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 856, than being a member of a drug distribution conspiracy. (A. 1014). As such, it would be unfair to sentence him as if he were one of "the most dangerous offenders" (A. 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted)), and it would not be justified by concerns about deterrence. (A. 1021-46).³⁴

For its part, the Government sought "a lengthy sentence, one substantially above the mandatory minimum" of 20 years' imprisonment. (A. 1315). In the Government's view, Ulbricht was the kingpin of a global drug-trafficking enterprise who was responsible for all of the foreseeable consequences of his actions, including the multiple deaths tied to drug sales on Silk Road. (A. 1316-24). Ulbricht knew, and sometimes mocked the fact, that his customers were often addicts struggling to quit, and he took their money, all the same. (A. 1327). The proliferation of "dark markets" in the wake of Silk Road's founding underscored the need for general deterrence. (A. 1327-28).

³⁴ The defense made three additional submissions regarding the profits, safety, transactions, and customers of Silk Road; attaching additional letters in support of Ulbricht; and including a final report from Dr. Taff regarding the six overdose deaths. (A. 1386-1413, 1414-34, 1435-46).

And notwithstanding positive aspects of Ulbricht's personal history, he "consciously chose to operate a criminal enterprise for several years, motivated in substantial part by greed and vanity." (A. 1328). The Government also submitted five victim impact statements from relatives of the individuals whose drugrelated deaths were described above. (A. 1362-85).

4. Ulbricht's Sentencing

Judge Forrest sentenced Ulbricht on May 29, 2015. (A. 1447-1544). After noting that she had read "the entirety of every piece of paper submitted to [her] in this proceeding" (A. 1451), the District Court turned to the Guidelines calculation and the Presentence Report. (A. 1458). In a decision not challenged on appeal, the District Court found "ample and unambiguous evidence that Ulbricht commissioned five murders as part of his efforts to protect his criminal enterprise and that he paid for these murders." (A. 1464-66). Consistent with the Probation Office, the District Court found that the defendant's offense level was 43 and that his Criminal History Category was I. (A. 1470).

The District Court also denied Ulbricht's request to strike references in the Presentence Report to the six overdose deaths tied to drugs purchased from Silk Road. (A. 1471-72). The District Court acknowledged Dr. Taff's report, but found that the standard he applied (whether he could "render opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to the cause" of death) was inapplicable here, because the District Court was not attempting to determine whether the

drugs purchased on Silk Road were a "but-for" cause of death. (A. 1476). Instead, the relevant question was whether "there is a connection between" those drugs and death, that is, "whether the drugs . . . purchased on Silk Road were ingested and whether the ingestion of those drugs may be reasonably associated with those deaths." (A. 1476). The District Court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, a "direct tie" between Silk Road and "each of the decedents and to the purchase of the drugs in proximate—very proximate relation to their death." (A. 1473-74). That evidence was "strong and even more than sufficient circumstantial evidence," which the District Court recounted in part. (A. 1476-80). The District Court then adopted the PSR's factual findings. (A. 1481).

After hearing from the parents of two of those decedents, Bryan B. and Preston B. (A. 1482-96), the Government, and the defense (A. 1496-1508), the District Court pronounced sentence. Judge Forrest said she "spent well over 100 hours on this sentence contemplating it, walking and being silent and thinking about it, and running over and over and over it in my mind from every angle I could think of." (A. 1509). The District Court emphasized that the "biggest part of the sentencing" is "thinking about each and every fact and consideration and provision of law that [it is] required to look at." (A. 1510). The District Court noted that while the Guidelines recommended a life sentence, she arrived at her sentence only after independently considering the factors set forth in Section 3553(a). (A. 1510). Citing extensively to the record, the District Court analyzed those factors while rejecting a number of Ulbricht's arguments, including that (1) Silk Road was started by a naïve and impulsive young man; (2) Silk Road was merely an economic experiment; (3) Silk Road did not expand the market for drugs; (4) the sale of drugs imposes no costs on society; (4) Ulbricht's murder-for-hire schemes should be ignored; (5) the negative effects of Silk Road were mitigated by its "harm reduction" features; (6) general deterrence, through sentencing, is illusory; (7) personal deterrence is unnecessary in this case; and (8) the recent sentencing of a Silk Road moderator to time-served provided a meaningful benchmark. (A. 1514-36).

After reiterating that it had "examined each potential year of incarceration carefully," the District Court sentenced Ulbricht to life imprisonment on both Counts Two and Four and to 5, 15, and 20 years' imprisonment on Counts Five, Six, and Seven, respectively, to be served concurrently. (A. 1539-40).³⁵ The District Court also ordered Ulbricht to forfeit \$183,961,921 (A. 1536) and imposed a \$500 special assessment (A. 1541).

The District Court found, "after deep contemplation and much searching . . . that this sentence and no other is sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the factors under 3553(a)." (A. 1541).

³⁵ At the beginning of sentencing, the District Court vacated the convictions on Counts One and Three, as lesser included offenses of Counts Two and Four, respectively (and therefore duplicative). (A. 1459-61; Docket Entries 258, 259).

B. Applicable Law

Appellate review of a district court's sentence "encompasses two components: procedural review and substantive review." United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). An appellate court "must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In that regard, a district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 281 (2d Cir. 2012), and application of the Guidelines based on those factual findings is reviewed de novo, United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 222 (2d Cir. 2013). Procedural error also occurs if the sentencing judge fails to provide an adequate explanation for the sentence imposed, which requires showing that "it has 'considered the parties' arguments' and that it has a 'reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority." United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 193 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).

If the Court determines that there was no procedural error, it "should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." *Gall* v. *United States*,

552 U.S. at 51. Defendants challenging the substantive reasonableness of their sentences bear a "heavy burden[,] because [this Court's] review of a sentence for substantive reasonableness is particularly deferential." United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289. In conducting such review, this Court must "take into account the totality of the circumstances, giving due deference to the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the institutional advantages of district courts." Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190. This Court cannot "substitute [its] own judgment for the district court's on the question of what is sufficient to meet the § 3553(a) considerations in any particular case," and should "set aside a district court's substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court's decision 'cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions." Id. at 189 (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 26-27 (2d Cir. 2006).

When applying the applicable, deferential standard of review, this Court will also bear in mind that a sentencing judge may take into consideration his or her "own sense of what is a fair and just sentence under all of the circumstances." *United States* v. *Jones*, 460 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2006). "That is the historic role of sentencing judges, and it may continue to be exercised, subject to the reviewing court's ultimate authority to reject any sentence that exceeds the bounds of reasonableness." *Id.* "The particular weight to be afforded aggravating and mitigating factors is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge," *Broxmeyer*, 699 F.3d at 289 (internal

quotation marks omitted), and it need not be the weight that this Court would give each factor, so long as "the factor, as explained by the district court, can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case." Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191; accord United States v. Pope, 554 F.3d 240, 246-47 (2d Cir. 2009).

Review for substantive reasonableness is comparable to considering whether a jury's verdict constitutes "manifest injustice" or whether state actors have engaged in conduct that "shocks the conscience." *United States* v. *Rigas*, 583 F.3d at 122-23. At bottom, the substantive reasonableness standard "provide[s] a backstop for those few cases that, although procedurally correct, would nonetheless damage the administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law." *Id.* at 123.

C. Discussion

The District Court Did Not Make a Procedural Error

Ulbricht argues that the District Court committed procedural error by considering the six overdose deaths in imposing sentence, because its factual finding that those deaths related to Silk Road was "clearly erroneous" and relied on the wrong legal standard. (Br. 125). To the contrary, the District Court was entitled to consider deaths linked to Silk Road in sentencing Ulbricht, and its factual finding that those six overdoses qualified was not clearly erroneous.

In fashioning a sentence, the District Court was obligated to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense" and "the seriousness of the offense." 18 U.S.C. $\S 3553(a)(1) \& (a)(2)(A)$. For these purposes, the term "offense" is broad and includes more than merely the conduct that justifies specific enhancements under the Guidelines. See United States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 174 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[C]onduct that is in some way 'related' to the offense conduct need not be technically covered by the definition of relevant conduct in order to be considered in a § 3553(a) analysis." (internal quotation marks omitted)). This provision contains no causation requirement itself, and encompasses harm to victims broadly, even indirect victims who lack the "nexus or proximity to the offense" required by the Guidelines. *United States* v. *Singer*, — F.3d —, No. 15-2169, 2016 WL 3244869, at *7 (10th Cir. June 13, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (requiring presentence reports to contain "information that assesses any financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on any victim" (emphasis added)).³⁶ Ulbricht faults the District Court for

³⁶ Even under the Guidelines, which look to the "harm that resulted from" jointly undertaken criminal activity, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(3), this Court has taken an expansive view of consequences relevant to sentencing. What matters, under that provision, is whether the defendant "knowingly risked" the lives of others by "put[ting] into motion a chain of events that contained an inevitable tragic result." *United States*

v. *Molina*, 106 F.3d 1118, 1124 (2d Cir. 1997) (wounding of a bystander by a security guard "resulted from" the defendants' robbery attempt) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even where a defendant's conduct merely "contributed to the danger" directly caused by others, he is properly punished for it. *United States* v. *Moskowitz*, 888 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 1989). The focus on the defendant's conduct and state of mind, and the reasonable foreseeability of consequences flowing therefrom (*i.e.*, proximate cause), as opposed to but for causation, is appropriate at sentencing.

This Court has recognized, in the context of common law torts, that, although it can be difficult to determine whether one among several factors "caused" injury, "if (a) a negligent act was deemed wrongful because that act increased the chances that a particular type of accident would occur, and (b) a mishap of that very sort did happen, this was enough to support a finding by the trier of fact that the negligent behavior caused the harm." Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 390 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 98 (1st Cir. 2012) ("When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and application of the butfor rule to each of them individually would absolve all of them, the conduct of each is a cause in fact of the event." (quoting Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 41 at 268 (5th ed. 1984))); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 27, cmt. n.g (2010) ("[S]ome or all of the person's exposures [to a toxic evaluating whether the deaths were "related to Silk Road" (Br. 128), but that was the right standard for

agent] may not have been but-for causes of the disease. Nevertheless, each of the exposures prior to the person's contracting the disease . . . is a factual cause of the person's disease Whether there are some exposures that are sufficiently de minimis that the actor should not be held liable is a matter not of factual causation, but rather of policy "). While that rule may not suffice to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, "given the need for clarity and certainty in the criminal law," Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 890-92 (2014), it is appropriate in the context of sentencing, where "less demanding causal standards are necessary ... to vindicate the law's purposes," Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2014) (applying principles of "aggregate causation" to determine fair restitution to a victim of child pornography, where many offenders besides the defendant viewed images of the victim).

Not even the defense's expert suggested that the decedents would have died *without* ingesting the drugs obtained from Silk Road. (*E.g.*, S. 445 ("Based on my review of [Alejandro A.'s] records, it is my opinion . . . that [his] cause of death was due to multiple drug (25I-NBOMe, marijuana and Prozac) intoxication.")). Accordingly, the District Court's conclusion that the drugs from Silk Road "caused" harm to the decedents was justified, even if they were not a "but for" cause. (A. 1473).

the District Court to use in evaluating the scope of "the offense." Whether "ingestion of those drugs [purchased on Silk Road] may be reasonably associated with those deaths" (A. 1476) was an entirely reasonable basis for measuring the consequences of Ulbricht's actions under Section 3553(a).

Moreover, the District Court's factual findings that those deaths were "connect[ed]" to Silk Road were amply supported by the record, and certainly not clearly erroneous. (A. 1476-77). In making its findings, the District Court was free to consider information from any source without "limitation," 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see United States v. Gomez, 580 F.3d 94, 105 (2d Cir. 2009) (sentencing court may consider, for example, "evidence of uncharged crimes, dropped counts of an indictment and criminal activity resulting in acquittal in determining sentence" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Any circumstance that aids the sentencing court in deriving a more complete and true picture regarding the convicted person's ... behavior is properly considered."). That information must, of course, be "reliable and accurate," as opposed to "'untrue'" or "'misinformation," but a district court's factual findings may be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, not just evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d at 1055, 1057 (quoting Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948)).

The evidence recounted above (and in more detail in paragraphs 62-86 of the Presentence Report) amply supported the District Court's finding that there was "more than sufficient circumstantial evidence to show the connection" between Silk Road and those deaths. (A. 1476-77). The defense did not dispute the evidence proffered by the Government that each victim purchased illegal drugs (of the type that caused his death) either directly from Silk Road or from others who did, nor did the defense dispute that consuming those drugs contributed in some way to their death. Those facts were a sufficient basis for the District Court to consider those deaths in fashioning a sentence under Section 3553(a). See United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (affirming district court's conclusion that defendant's drugs caused victim's death where, among other things, the record contained no evidence that victim had other sources for narcotics); United States v. Howard, 454 F.3d 700, 702-03 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court's conclusion that defendant was "responsible for" an overdose victim's death, and took that fact into account under Section 3553(a), where the weight of evidence suggested decedent had bought the heroin in question from defendant).

Ulbricht's principal argument, below and on appeal, is that gaps in the documentation relating to the overdose deaths, as well as evidence that some of the victims suffered from other health issues (or used other drugs), precluded the District Court from drawing any conclusions about the legal cause of their death. (Br. 130-33). But Dr. Taff, whose opinion Ulbricht relied on, addressed an irrelevant standard when he concluded that he could not draw conclusions about the causes of death "to a reasonable degree of forensic medical certainty." (S. 445). Whether

some of the victims might have deliberately overdosed or suffered from other health problems, or whether their deaths were the result of a combination of drugs, which were the questions he focused on (S. 438-39, 445-46), were all beside the point, for these purposes. A drug dealer takes his customers as he finds them. See United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.3d at 48 n.5 ("[W]hile [defendant] could not have anticipated the exact sequence of events that unfolded here, he could (and should) have foreseen the possibility of the kind of serious harm that in fact occurred."). And although Dr. Taff may not have rendered an opinion on the causes of death in most cases, he did not dispute that illegal drugs played a role in each death. (E.g., S. 440 (Jordan M.: "Autopsy report correctly attributed death to multiple/combined drug intoxication.")).37

³⁷ Amici argue that the association between the six overdose deaths and Silk Road is "specious," because the causes of overdose are "incredibly complex," and typically the "result of societal failings rather than the drug use alone." (DPA Br. 9). Regardless of whether more could be done as a matter of social policy to prevent those deaths, drugs themselves still "cause" them, in any meaningful legal, moral, and scientific sense of that word; they are also likely to do so, and those who sell them are properly held accountable for the "necessary or natural consequence[s]" of their actions. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648 (1946); see also United States v. Faulkner, 636 F.3d 1009, 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) ("While [the defendant] may not have played a direct role in

The District Court found there was "no factual doubt that[,] based on the evidence before the Court, the sale of the drugs through Silk Road caused harm to the decedents" (A. 1473), and that it would have been "pure speculation" to believe that any decedent would have died absent the drugs he obtained from Silk Road. (A. 1477-80). Those findings, which were not clearly erroneous, were relevant to Ulbricht's sentence and properly considered by the District Court under Section 3553(a).

2. A Life Sentence Was Justified

In challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, Ulbricht implies that a life sentence is per se unreasonable (Br. 134), accuses the District Court of "ignor[ing]" his arguments (Br. 135), and contends that, because prison does not deter criminals, deterrence should not have factored into his sentence (Br. 138-39). To the contrary, the record reveals that Judge Forrest carefully weighed Ulbricht's arguments, but found them wanting in light of his conduct, and she imposed a sentence within the rea-

manufacturing or distributing the heroin that caused [the victim's] death, he was part of the conspiracy that distributed the heroin."); *United States* v. *Westry*, 524 F.3d 1198, 1219 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Where a conspirator is involved in distributing drugs to addicts, . . . it is a reasonably foreseeable consequence that one or more of those addicts may overdose and die.").

sonable exercise of her broad discretion and with due regard for Section 3553(a)'s parsimony clause.

"Silk Road was a worldwide criminal drug enterprise with a massive geographic scope," which, the District Court found, "posed serious danger to public health and to our communities." (A. 1512). Approximately 1.5 million transactions, having a value of nearly \$214 million, were conducted over Silk Road, the vast majority of which involved illegal drugs. (PSR ¶ 59). Silk Road became what it was, not because Ulbricht was "an impulsive or naïve young man," but because he viewed himself as "above the law," and consequently set out to "run[] a multimillion dollar criminal enterprise." (A. 1513-15). Ulbricht's own words, such as when he joked about a heroin addict who relapsed, or allowed cyanide to be sold on the site, were "the words of a man who knows precisely what he is doing and . . . who is callous as to the consequences or the harm and suffering that it may cause others." (A. 1521).

The District Court rejected the defense's arguments that Silk Road mitigated the harm of drug dealing by providing a safer forum to obtain narcotics. (A. 904-10). By making illegal drugs of every variety available over the Internet, the site "[brought] drugs to communities that previously may have had no access to such drugs or in such quantities." (A. 1522; see also A. 1487, 1492 (statements from deceased victims' relatives)). It greatly eased access to drugs for "first-time users or those trying different drugs for the first time." (A. 1522). As a result, the District Court found, there was "no doubt" that Silk

Road was "market expanding" and left "a tr[ai]l of drug users and drug dealers in its wake." (A. 1521-22). After summarizing the social costs of narcotics distribution and use, the District Court called the defense's harm reduction arguments "fantasy." (A. 1529).³⁸

The District Court also cited the defendant's efforts to murder "five people to protect [his] drug enterprise." (A. 1528). While recognizing that there was no evidence the murders were actually carried out, the District Court found "no doubt" that the defendant intended to solicit them. (A. 1528-29).³⁹ As it noted, the defendant commissioned the murders, and paid for them—using \$650,000 in Bitcoins—after receiving photographs purporting to be of the dead bodies, sent to him as confirmation that they were carried out. (A. 1471, 1529; PSR ¶¶ 49, 60).

Finally, the District Court emphasized the need for deterrence—both general and specific. As to general deterrence, the District Court found that what the defendant did "was unprecedented" in terms of the vast online criminal enterprise he created, and

³⁸ The District Court called a physician who advised Silk Road users on their drug use, sight-unseen, "particularly despicable" and "breathtakingly irresponsible." (A. 1529-30).

³⁹ *Amici* are mistaken to suggest such conduct needed to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt to be considered at sentencing. (DPA Br. 15). *See United States* v. *Gomez*, 580 F.3d at 105.

that the outcome of the case was being closely followed by the public. (A. 1533). Under the circumstances, the District Court found general deterrence interests to be particularly salient, commenting to the defendant: "For those considering stepping into your shoes, carrying some flag, some misguided flag, or doing something similar, they need to understand very clearly and without equivocation that if you break the law this way there will be very, very severe consequences." (A. 1533).

As to specific deterrence, the District Court found that the defendant could not be trusted to live a lawabiding life upon release from prison—despite his assurances to the court to that effect. It noted that the defendant had lived a double life for several years and had made substantial plans to flee and obtain citizenship in a Caribbean country. (A. 1533-34). The District Court also expressed doubt that the defendant had abandoned the beliefs that led him to start Silk Road in the first place. (A. 1534).

Based on the foregoing, meticulous response to the defense's arguments and dispassionate review of the evidence, the District Court's decision to impose a Guidelines sentence of life imprisonment was entirely reasonable. To be clear, the District Court noted that it arrived at its sentence independent of the Guidelines, but the fact that the Guidelines called for a life sentence (as did the Probation Office in its recommendation) further underscored that the sentence appropriately reflected the relevant Section 3553(a) factors and was not substantively unreasonable. *Rita* v. *United States*, 551 U.S. at 355 ("[W]here [the sen-

tencing] judge and [the Sentencing] Commission both determine that the Guidelines sentence is an appropriate sentence for the case at hand, that sentence likely reflects the § 3553(a) factors."); *United States* v. *Eberhard*, 525 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[I]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.").

None of Ulbricht's arguments on appeal provide a basis to disturb the District Court's sentence. Ulbricht argues that life sentences are "extremely rare in the federal system." (Br. 134). But life sentences are hardly unprecedented for defendants who held leadership roles in large-scale drug conspiracies, especially when they used the threat of violence to maintain their organization. See United States v. Ortiz, 394 F. App'x 722, 726 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d 1, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Cortez-Diaz, 565 F. App'x 741, 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2014); *United States* v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 908-09 (7th Cir. 2010). Far from establishing that Ulbricht's sentence was an outlier, a study by the United States Sentencing Commission (cited by the defense and amici) demonstrates that Ulbricht's sentence is comparable to others who were similarly situated. (Br. 134, DPA Br. 5 & n.10-12) (citing Glenn R. Schmitt & Hyun J. Konfrst, Life Sentences in the Federal System, United States Sentencing Commission (February 2015), available at http://go.usa.gov/chzRj) ("USSC Study"). Drug trafficking was the most common basis for a life sentence in 2013, and the median drug quantities in those cases were dwarfed by the quantities Ulbricht facilitated through Silk Road. See USSC Study, at 4, 7 (38.8kg for powder cocaine, 1 kg for heroin, and 4.8kg for methamphetamine convictions).

Nor did the District Court "ignore[]" Ulbricht's arguments. (Br. 135). Judge Forrest discussed each one, concluding, for example, that the letters submitted on Ulbricht's behalf did not outweigh the defendant's conduct (A. 1535), that the defense's "harm reduction" arguments were "misguided in many respects" (A. 1523), that "'highly publicized'" punishments, in a closely watched case like this one, may deter in ways other sentences do not (A. 1532 (quoting a study relied upon by the defense)),40 and (as

⁴⁰ Amici argue that general deterrence theory does not provide a basis for imposing sentence in drug cases, "because there is no evidence that long sentences have a general deterrent effect," or more of one than shorter sentences do. (DPA Br. 15-21). They ignore, however, the statutory mandate that courts "shall consider" the "need for the sentence . . . to afford adequate deterrence." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); see also United States v. Williams, 441 F. App'x 52, 56 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting contention that district court was obligated to cite "social science studies or other empirical evidence to show that [defendant's] sentence would have a deterrent effect in the community"); United States v. Swackhammer, 400 F. App'x 615, 616 (2d Cir. 2010) ("To reverse simply because the District Court did not conduct an empirical anal-

discussed above), why Dr. Taff's affidavit was offpoint (A. 1476). The District Court was not required even to address each of these arguments in the first place, much less accept them. See United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 30 (district court is not required to "expressly parse or address every argument relating to [sentencing] factors that the defendant advanced").

Although Ulbricht likens himself to the "landlord" who lets his tenants sell drugs (Br. 138), in fact he was a kingpin, the "captain of th[e] ship," (Tr. 258), in his words, who was "lead[ing] an international narcotics organization" from "[b]ehind [his] wall of anonymity," (Tr. 264, 283). The drug dealers who sold through Silk Road were his "business partners" (Tr. 1793), not mere tenants, and unlike a landlord, Ulbricht received a commission on each and every sale that Silk Road facilitated. Ulbricht generally did not sell drugs himself, 41 because he did not have to; like any other kingpin, he had an entire network of individuals operating under his umbrella who did the work for him, including individuals he paid to kill others (Tr. 272-77, 290-310, 1802-24, 1876-79, 1883-87, 1891-92).

ysis of the statistical support underlying the Sentencing Guidelines would reach far beyond the scope of our substantive reasonableness review.").

⁴¹ Ulbricht did sell several kilograms of hallucinogenic mushrooms through Silk Road, when he first launched the site, to attract traffic. (PSR ¶¶ 45-46).

Nor was Ulbricht comparable to Peter Nash, a Silk Road staff member who worked for him as a forum "moderator." (A. 1535). As the District Court remarked, Nash "was a very, very different person" from Ulbricht, who was "way up on top of the hierarchy," while Nash was "way down." (A. 1535-36). And in any event, while a district court is permitted to consider disparities between co-defendants (or co-conspirators), it is not required to do so. *See United States* v. *Ghailani*, 733 F.3d 29, 55 (2d Cir. 2009).

At bottom, the District Court rejected Ulbricht argument that Silk Road was different from any other multi-million dollar narcotics enterprise, because it sold drugs online as a form of morally ambiguous protest against authority: "No drug dealer from the Bronx selling meth or heroin or crack has ever made these kinds of arguments to the Court. It is a privileged argument, it is an argument from one of privilege." (A. 1523).

The District Court had broad discretion to weigh the applicable factors under Section 3553(a), and this Court has declined to "substitute [its] own judgment for the district court's on the question of what is sufficient to meet the § 3553(a) considerations in any particular case." *Cavera*, 550 F.3d at 189. Judge Forrest was not obligated, as Ulbricht suggests, to justify "each potential increment of time" in prison (although she did consider it (A. 1539)). "Selection of an appropriate amount of punishment inevitably involves some degree of subjectivity that often cannot be precisely explained." *United States* v. *Jones*, 460 F.3d at 195. In light of the vast scope of the defendant's crim-

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inal enterprise, its deadly social impact, the precedent he set for other criminals, and his willingness to kill, the District Court's sentence was clearly the product of a "reasoned exercise of discretion" that should be affirmed. *Cavera*, 550 F.3d at 193.⁴²

⁴² Even if this Court finds that the District Court erred in sentencing Ulbricht, it should not assign the matter to a different judge on remand, as Ulbricht requests. (Br. 139). "Remanding a case to a different judge is a serious request rarely made and rarely granted." United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2006). It is appropriate "only in the rare instance in which the judge's fairness or the appearance of the judge's fairness is seriously in doubt." United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782 n.9 (2d Cir. 1987). Ulbricht asserts that resentencing before a different judge is required "to avoid the irremediable taint from the improper factors the [District] Court considered" (Br. 139), but even Ulbricht's brief alleges only that Judge Forrest gave too much weight to some factors and too little weight to others, and he does not contend that she was biased or otherwise unfair. (Br. 133-39). Accordingly, reassignment would not be appropriate, particularly in light of the District Court's familiarity with an extensive trial record.

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CONCLUSION

The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

Dated: New York, New York June 17, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

PREET BHARARA, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Attorney for the United States of America.

EUN YOUNG CHOI,
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Of Counsel.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Rule 32(a)(7)(C) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this brief complies with the Court's June 7, 2016 order permitting the Government leave to file an oversized brief of up to 40,000 words. As measured by the word processing system used to prepare this brief, there are 37,016 words in this brief.

PREET BHARARA, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York

By: ADAM S. HICKEY,
Assistant United States Attorney

15-1815

Hnited States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Docket No. 15-1815

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

—v.—

Appellee,

ROSS WILLIAM ULBRICHT, also known as Dread Pirate Roberts, also known as Silk Road,

also known as Sealed Defendant 1, also known as DPR,

 $Defendant ext{-}Appellant.$

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

PREET BHARARA, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Attorney for the United States of America.

One St. Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007 (212) 637-2200

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
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
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
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
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If you are reading this now, you have at least figured out how to access a tor hidden service, good job:) You have either installed tor and configured your browser to use it, or you are using a proxy such as tor2web. We strongly encourage you to connect to the hidden service directly rather than going through a proxy as it is much more secure and anonymous. The Tor Browser Bundle is available for all major platforms.

Getting bitcoins

Bitcoin main article

Click here for a list of reputable exchangers that will take many different forms of payment for Bitcoins. When they ask for your receiving address, give them the address on your account page that looks something like this:

1E8sKdGWSy9ysm5ndCbBfdySzRhiPwmYDr

Your deposit will appear in your account once the Bitcoin network confirms your transfer. This can take up to an hour or more. If for some reason your transfer doesn't come through, just let us know and be sure to include the address you sent the coins to.

Your account has a built-in eWallet for Bitcoins, so you can buy and sell here without ever having to worry about third-party services at all. When you sell something, your account is credited, and when you buy something, it is debited.

Shopping Cart

Shopping Cart main article

The first step to placing an order is selecting the items you want to purchase by adding them to your shopping cart. From the cart, you may increase the quantity of your purchase, and select the appropriate postage option. See your vendor's page or the item description for postage instructions. When you've chosen your postage and quantity, click "update cart" to confirm the changes. Once your cart is ready, you must enter the address you would like your items sent to. This is the one point in the process where some kind of personal information is revealed. We take this very seriously and have taken every precaution to protect it.

Receiving address

From the moment you submit your order, to the moment it is displayed to your vendor, the information is fully encrypted and totally unreadable. Then, as soon as your vendor marks your package with the address and confirms shipment, the address is deleted forever and is not retrievable. For the extra cautious, you can encrypt your information yourself with your vendor's public key so that even we at Silk Road would be unable to view it, even if we wanted to. See below for more ways to be safe.

Payment

If you have enough funds in your account to cover your purchase, then your order will be validated instantly and sent on to your vendor. If not, then you must deposit enough Bitcoins into your account to cover your total.

When your order ships, its status will change from "processing" to "in transit." Now just kick back and wait for it to arrive. Once it does, don't forget to click "finalize" next to your order and leave feedback:)

Tumbler

Just when you thought Silk Road couldn't be more secure, we went one step further. The tumbler sends all payments through a complex, semi-random series of dummy transactions, each with a new, one-use receiving address, making it nearly impossible to link your payment with any coins leaving the site. The quantity, frequency, and number of transactions are all varied chaotically in a way that mimics the transactions of the bitcoin economy as a whole.

Escrow

Escrow main article

Our commitment is to total satisfaction for each and every purchase you make here. If your package never arrives or is not in the condition you expected, you may have a chance at a full or partial refund of the purchase price. Just click "resolve" next to your order. Our resolution center gives you total flexibility in working out a mutually agreeable outcome with your vendor, whether you want to request a full or partial refund, release payment to your vendor, or extend the time you want for arrival. In the rare event that an agreement can't be made, a Silk Road admin will be right there to mediate and investigate if necessary. The vast majority of orders are filled exactly as expected, but to avoid even the rare hang up, we strongly encourage you to read your vendor's feedback and ask questions of them ahead of time.

NEVER go around the escrow and pay a vendor directly. We will be totally unable to protect you in this event and the vendor will have much less motivation to serve you well. People HAVE been scammed this way. If a seller requests that you pay them directly, please let us know so we can address the situation.

Escrow hedge

Unfortunately, the Bitcoin exchange rate isn't as stable as we would all like it to be, and can fluctuate wildly in a matter of hours, let alone the days or weeks it takes for a package to arrive. Because of this, there is a real danger that the Bitcoins being held in your escrow account will lose value by the time your vendor gets paid or you are refunded. So, we've given the option to vendors to hedge the future payments they are expecting from escrow such that the dollar value of the payment doesn't change as the Bitcoin exchange rate changes.

For example, a vendor is hedging the escrow for a 10 btc order you place with them, and the dollar value of your order when you purchase it is \$100. Now, let's say your order never arrives and your vendor agrees to a full refund, but those 10 btc are no longer worth \$100, they're worth \$50! Because your vendor hedged the escrow, you won't get a refund of 10 btc, you'll get 20 btc equaling the original value of \$100. Of course, the opposite is also true. If Bitcoins appreciate in value while your order is in escrow, your refund will be fewer Bitcoins, but still equaling the original dollar value.

When checking out, you will see which orders will be hedged and which won't. After the order is placed, your escrow balance will reflect the dollar value of your hedged orders and the Bitcoin value of your unhedged orders. All hedged orders are hedged as soon as the order is placed. So when getting a refund for hedged items, don't be surprised if the number of Bitcoins you get back is not the same as the amount you paid.

Receiving packages

Use a different, unrelated address than the one where your item will be kept such as a friends house or P.O. box. Once the item arrives, transport it discretely to its final destination. Avoid abandoned buildings or any place where it would be suspicious to have mail delivered.

Do not sign for your package. If you are expecting a package from us, do not answer the door for the postman, let him leave it there and then transport it as described above. Do not use your real name. This tactic doesn't work in some places because deliveries won't be made to names not registered with the address. If you think this is a problem, send your self a test letter with the fake name and see if it arrives.

If you follow these guidelines, your chances of being detected are minimal. In the event that you are detected, deny requesting the package. Anyone can send anyone else anything in the mail.

Purchasing statistics

Because you are totally anonymous on Silk Road, the vendors here have no way of knowing if they can trust you at first. To help them judge whether they want to do business with you or not, some statistics are kept about your past purchases. When you purchase an item, before the order is accepted, your vendor can see how long you have been a member on the site, how many orders have been shipped out to you, and what percentage of the payments you made for those purchases were ultimately refunded to you. They can also see how many orders you ignored and allowed to "auto-finalize." So, the best way to keep a good reputation and eventually be accepted by all of the vendors here is to finalize your orders as soon as they arrive and you confirm they are good, and to only request a refund when you deserve it. The statistics are weighted toward the present, so you must keep up your good behavior, but if you have a bad streak, you can recover by doing well going forward. You can view your own stats at any time by clicking the link on your account page.

Final note

We do everything we can to protect your anonymity and ensure that your visits here bring you great satisfaction. However, you should understand the risks of possessing and using any of the items you purchase here. Research these matters before jumping in and be responsible for your actions. Learn how Tor and Bitcoin work so you can understand how to use them and where their limitations are. If you have any questions or concerns, we are here to support you.


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This page has been accessed 14,996 times.

Privacy policy About Silk Road wiki Disclaimers



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
GOVERNMENT 14 Cr. 68 (KBF) **EXHIBIT** 125 J Silk Road discussion / Re: State of the Road Address « on: January 10, 2012, 02:17 am » 658

Thank you everyone for your comments and suggestions. One suggestion I especially like is the one about commission being affected by trade volume. To those of you that are either supportive of the change, or have faith in what I am doing regardless of whether you see the point or not, thank you for your support! I have done everything I can to earn that trust and I cherish it.

When have I cheated or stolen from anyone here? When have I treated anyone unfairly? When have I lead you astray? Why do you turn To those of you chalking my actions up to pure greed and ignoring the context for the changes, I say shame on you. When have I lied? on me now when I have poured my heart and soul into this community and project?

operating this site are taking? Do you have any clue what we've been through to get here today? Do you have any clue what it's going to think it runs itself? Do you have any clue what goes on behind the scenes to keep this going? Do you have any idea the risk the people 10% on \$50 orders? We are talking about an extra \$1.88! A \$10 order? An extra 38 cents! Do you think this site built itself? Do you take to get through the next year? Whether you like it or not, I am the captain of this ship. You are here voluntarily and if you don't like the rules of the game, or you don't trust your captain, you can get off the boat. For those that stay, we at Silk Road will continue to do everything in our power to keep this market running smoothly and safely, and thank you again for your support!





Dread Pirate Roberts 5.0

Favorite vendors

Libertas 1.0 remove

remove

inigo 0.0 remove

New display currencies

Winning the war on

and health

Try Tails for a more

secure OS



messages 0 orders 0 account \$0.0000 \$0.00

Silk Road

Search

anonymous market

Boldabol 200 (B. Dragon), 10ml, 200mg.ml \$66.11

Psychedelics 1,754

Stimulants 1,634

Tobacco 219

Apparel 767

Prescription 4,659

Precursors 62



Dissociatives 199

Intoxicants 75

Opioids 367

Other 82

Ecstasy 1,274

Cannabis 2,934

Drugs 13,810

Shop by Category

Buyer ratings discussion

From the forum

Feedback system

changes

HOW TO: Run your own

relay and help the Tor

network!

Ask a drug expert physician about drugs

PIRACETAM tbl. \$92.64



25X LSD BLOTTER

\$421.19







grams of PURE MDMA

Computer equipment 101

Collectibles 27

Books 1,322

Custom Orders 86

Digital goods 886

Moonrocks. \$378.58

Drug paraphernalia 512

Electronics 234

2mg Xanax Bars from

Wallgreens \$5.42



HYDRO BUDS 2G

10.0g MDA - Reagent

\$550.00

Lotteries & games 165

Lab Supplies 29

Jewelry 104

Home & Garden 27

Forgeries 152

Hardware 35

Fireworks 35

Food 10

Erotica 584

Musical instruments 6

Money 258 Medical 60

Packaging 95

Services 168

Sporting goods 4

Writing 8 Tickets 4

rested

Pop ...





10g Amnesia Haze



4 Orange sunshine 300ug



1/4 Bubba Kush

\$90.20

\$90.49


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
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
community forums | wiki | support





















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



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






SA-21











2010

I started the year in the middle of my stint with Good Wagon Books. Donny and I had worked on it the last quarter of 2009 and were trying to ramp up by hiring people to go door-to-door. It was a real struggle and by the end of our trial partnership, it was clear that we hadn't grown the business to the point that it made sense for me to stay on. I also had an offer for a job from Peter and David that sounded great and I was ready to move on and work for them on their private equity venture. Unfortunately, they were all smoke and mirrors and after several weeks of them not returning my calls, I realized there was not an opportunity for me there. This was extremely discouraging. There I was, with nothing. My investment company came to nothing, my game company came to nothing, Good Wagon came to nothing, and then this.

I had to find a job quickly, so I turned to Craig's List and found American Journal Experts. For the next six months, I edited scientific papers written by foreigners. It sucked. The hours were flexible, but it drained me. I hated working for someone else and trading my time for money with no investment in myself.

Up to this point, I had been working on selling my rental house in Pennsylvania. It had helped me stay afloat with around \$600/mo in cashflow, but finally the sale came to a close. I made about \$30k off the whole thing, and could finally start trading again. I had been practice trading for a while and saw an opportunity to take my \$30k and make it as a day trader. \$30k isn't alot to start with, and I didn't get off to a very good start with my trading.

Around that time, another opportunity came into my life. Donny had gotten a job offer from his brother in Dallas to be the VP of sales at their milling company. He didn't know what to do about Good Wagon, which he had grown somewhat to the point that he was making around \$6k per month in sales. He made me an offer. 50% of the company and a \$3k per month salary to take over and run the business going forward. I took the deal and we went to work on it. By the end of the

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 240 A 14 Cr. 68 (KBF)

year, we had our best month on record with around \$10k in sales in December.


While all of this was happening, I began working on a project that had been in my mind for over a year. I was calling it Underground Brokers, but eventually settled on Silk Road. The idea was to create a website where people could buy anything anonymously, with no trail whatsoever that could lead back to them. I had been studying the technology for a while, but needed a business model and strategy. I finally decided that I would produce mushrooms so that I could list them on the site for cheap to get people interested. I worked my ass off setting up a lab in a cabin out near Bastrop off the grid. In hindsight, this was a terrible idea and I would never repeat it, but I did it and produced several kilos of high quality shrooms. On the website side, I was struggling to figure out on my own how to set it up. Driving out to Bastrop, working on Good Wagon, and trying to keep up my relationship with Julia was taking all of my time. By the end of the year, I still didn't have a site up, let alone a server.

I went through a lot over the year in my personal relationships as well. I had mostly shut myself off from people because I felt ashamed of where my life was. I had left my promising career as a scientist to be an investment adviser and entrepreneur and came up empty handed. More and more my emotions and thoughts were ruling my life and my word was losing power. At some point I finally broke down and realized my love for people again, and started reaching out. Throughout the year I slowly re-cultivated my relationship with my word and started honoring it again.

My relationship with Julia was pretty rocky throughout the year. We even broke up for about a month and half toward the end. I

couldn't even tell you now why it was a struggle, or why we broke up. On my side, I wasn't communicating well at all. I would let little things build up until I got mad. We eventually got back together and even moved in together, and it has been amazingly good since.

In 2011, I am creating a year of prosperity and power beyond what I have ever experienced before. Silk Road is going to become a phenomenon and at least one person will tell me about it, unknowing that I was its creator. Good Wagon Books will find its place and get to the point that it basically runs itself. Julia and I will be happy and living together. I have many friends I can count on who are powerful and connected.



2011

still working on good wagon books and Silk Road at the same time. Programming now. Patchwork php mysql. Don't know how to host my own site. Didn't know how to run bitcoind. Got the basics of my site written. Launched it on freedomhosting. Announced it on the bitcointalk forums. Only a few days after launch, I got my first signups, and then my first message. I was so excited I didn't know what to do with myself. Little by little, people signed up, and vendors signed up, and then it happened. My first order. I'll never forget it. The next couple of months, I sold about 10 lbs of shrooms through my site. Some orders were as small as a gram, and others were in the gp range. Before long, I completely sold out. Looking back on it, I maybe should have raised my prices more and stretched it out, but at least now I was all digital, no physical risk anymore. Before long, traffic started to build. People were taking notice, smart, interested people. Hackers. For the first several months, I handled all of the transactions by hand. When they came into my local bitcoin client, I matched them up with the amount and time of the purchase and did all of the necessary account adjustments. Between answering messages, processing transactions, and updating the codebase to fix the constant security holes, I had very little time left in the day, and I had a girlfriend at this time! At some point, a hacker found some major flaws in my code. I sent it to him for review and he came back with basically "this is amateur shit". I knew it too. I tried to work with him but I think he lost interest and since I wasn't charging commission, I only had my shroom money to pay him with. Thankfully that guadrupled from bitcoin increasing in price, little did I know I could've cashed out at 8x higher for a total of 32x! That would have gotten me off to a hell of a start. As it was, I cashed out all the way up and all the way down. I called the peak, my timing was just off. In any case, I decided to rewrite the site in an myc framework as suggested by my benevolent hacker adviser. So, while still manually processing transactions and responding to a bigger and bigger message load, I learned to use codeigniter and began rewriting the site. At some point around this time, I also learned how to host my own site and was on my own servers. I think I made this plunge because I wasn't sure how much traffic freedomhost could handle, and I wanted control of my .onion domain. So, when I switched I posted a redirect from the old .onion to the new, ianxz6zefk72ulzz.onion. And yea, that was yet another learning curve, configuring and running a LAMP server, oh joy! But I was loving it. My ideas were actually working. Sure it was a little crude, but it worked! Rewriting the site was the most stressful couple of months I've ever experienced. I worked all day everyday, still processing transactions by hand, dealing with scammers, answering messages, meeting new strange people through my site and getting to know them. When I finally got the site ready, there were several new features including a tumbler and automated payment processing. The weekend of the switch was the peak of stress for me. Updating a live site to a whole new version is no easy task. You don't realize how many little pieces lay on top of one another so it works just right (at least when you code poorly like my amateur ass was doing). So for about 48 hours it was stop and start on the switch, but I finally got there and it was working. It looked like I didn't have to process the transactions manually anymore, but then the rot started. Some where, the site accounting wasn't balancing, and I was losing hundreds of dollars every few hours. I started to panic. I tried everything I could think of, but couldn't stop the bleeding. It was getting to be thousands of dollars and I was losing sleep and getting slow. I didn't give up though. I rewrote the entire transaction processor from scratch and some how it worked. To this day I don't know what the problem was. AND in addition to these stressors, Silk Road got its first press, the infamous Gawker article. When you look at the historical #s, you can see right when it happened. A huge spike in signups, and the beginning of an upward trend in commerce that would continue until the time of this writing, and hopefully for much longer. There was really a smattering of press at this time


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including the local news in FL! Most interestingly, two US senators came out against the site and against bitcoin. They made a big deal out of it and called for a shutdown of the site. I started to get into a bad state of mind. I was mentally taxed, and now I felt extremely vulnerable and scared. The US govt, my main enemy was aware of me and some of it's members were calling for my destruction. This is the biggest force wielding organization on the planet. Eventually we got through it though and entered a more calm and harmonious phase, there were still the hackers and scammers, and occasional fuck ups by me when trying to add a feature of what not, but in general, working within the CI framework and getting a feel for linux allowed me to take it a little easier and get into a normal work rhythm. Some major advances were price pegging, vendor ranking, a more sophisticated feedback system, buyer stats, transaction logging, and building up the admin toolset. Most importantly, the market began it's path to maturity. Vendors and buyers forged great relationships, more vendors came in to fill holes in the market, others competed and variety, customer service. and professionalism emerged. After making about \$100k and up to a good \$20-25k monthly, I decided it was time to bring in some hired guns to help me take the site to the next level. This would prove to be the biggest challenge I had ever faced. I actually got to see a fairly wide range of employee types. SYG, the schmoozer who winds up being a waste, DA, the model employee. Super enthusiastic, hard working, and trainable. Then there is utah, professional who does it for the money. Get's the job done, but his heart isn't always in it. First I put up an ad for a system administrator. I needed someone to help me take the back end to the next level in security. I had many candidates duke it out in the forum on many topics from os to isolation to software to security. In the end, I made what I thought was a wise decision. Looking back, I picked the most vocal one who also was on board ideologically. At first he was very good, giving me lots of advise and helping me upgrade the server's security. We spent many hours on torchat configuring the server. We ran it on FreeBSD for the first time and it actually ran pretty well. Getting it set up was a total disaster, though. My host had suddenly stopped paying his upstream provider and dropped it on me that in a few days they would shut off the server. Luckily I had a backup and a spare server ready to go, so we decided to setup freebsd and run it. It was a trial by fire, but we eventually passed. The site was down for almost a week. You can see it die on the historical charts. For the next 3 months, SYG had my full attention. I was basically at his mercy because he knew FreeBSD and I didn't. We kept trying to implement different solutions, but he just kept dragging on and on. He was trying to get his bitcoin exchange thing going through the site at the same time and he just wasn't giving the site everything he had. In the end, he milked me for the last few weeks and eventually I had to let him go. It was a really painful lesson, but one I hopefully won't need to learn again. I eventually moved the site back to ubuntu where I am comfortable. At around the time SYG was falling out of favor, I started looking for someone new and utah was there. I gave him more and more responsibility and he gave me good time estimates and followed through on them. I was still working with SYG, so utah was set to work on rewriting the site. Around this time, Variety Jones showed up. This was the biggest and strongest willed character I had met through the site thus far. He quickly proved to me that he had value by pointing out a major security hole in the site I was unaware of. It was an attack on bitcoind. We quickly began discussing every aspect of the site as well as future ideas. He convinced me of a server configuration paradigm that gave me the confidence to be the sole server administrator and not work with someone else at all. He has advised me on many technical aspect of what we are doing, helped me speed up the site and squeeze more out of my current servers. He also has helped me better interact with the community around Silk Road, delivering proclamations, handling troublesome characters, running a sale, changing my name, devising rules, and on and on. He also helped me get my

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head straight regarding legal protection, cover stories, devising a will, finding a successor, and so on. He's been a real mentor. Shortly after I met VJ, I started looking for a right hand man, an administrative assistant of sorts. Someone to answer messages, manage the forum and wiki, and eventually even dispute resolution. I found that man in Digital Alchemy, who was one of the original members of the site, and had been modding the forums for pretty much the whole time. There were lots of applicants, but for some reason DA stuck out as promising, and he has turned out to be invaluable. He quickly learned how to respond to messages and keep things running smoothly. Before long he was managing the forums, the wiki, the messages, the resolution center, scam prevention, and odd jobs for me like miniresearch projects and tedious tasks. He works his ass off and will eventually get burnt out, so I need to find him some help at some point.




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12/29/2011

chatted with VJ again today. Him coming onto the scene has re inspired me and given me direction on the SR project. He has helped me see a larger vision. A brand that people can come to trust and rally behind. Silk Road chat, Silk Road exchange, Silk Road credit union, Silk Road market, Silk Road everything! And it's been amazing just talking to a guy who is so intelligent and in the same boat as me, to a certain degree at least. So, today we talked mostly about the exchange, what to charge, boundary conditions, etc. Then I went for a surf with Billy Becket. Caught a couple of good waves, chatted with him took some wipe outs, and went in. Soon after, I ran around the city with Ashely and Kelly. We drank some beer, walked around the city and botanical gardens. I then went out with Jessica. Our conversation was somewhat deep. I felt compelled to reveal myself to her. It was terrible. I told her I have secrets. She already knows I work with bitcoin wich is also terrible. I'm so stupid. Everyone knows I am working on a bitcoin exchange. I always thought honesty was the best policy, and now I don't know what to do. I should've just told everyone I am a freelance programmer or something, but I had to tell half truthes. It felt wrong to lie completely so I tried to tell the truth without revealing the bad part, but now I am in a jam. Everyone knows too much. Dammit.






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January 1st 2012

Well, I'm choosing to write a journal for 2012. I imagine that some day I may have a story written about my life, and it would be good to have a detailed account of it. I did some work in the morning, can't remember now exactly what it was, but it wasn't long before I was responding to text messages and making plans to hang out on the beach. It was a holiday for everyone, so the beach was as packed as I've ever seen it. A teeming mass of humanity, helicopters flying overhead, waves crashing, a real spectacle. I was offered a ticket to a warehouse party by Nicole, but just couldn't bring myself to accept. I just was not in the partying mood. George also invited me to join him camping for 2-3 nights. I wanted to go, but the swell is low and it's just too much time away from Silk Road, and there is so much to do before the rents get here, and before I leave for Thailand. I need to get DigitalAlch set up handling the resolutions, and it just seems like Variety Jones gives my broad sweeping tasks on a daily basis. Emma, Jessica, Cally, Kim, Tim and a couple others, Mike, were all on the beach with me. Playing paddle ball and soaking up the sun. I've been thinking a bunch about what is next for me. I like my little life here in Bondi, but what if I love Thailand, or want to go on even further? I don't want to go backwards, and while I could see a lot more in Australia. I'm not even taking the opportunities that are coming up as it is. I need to find a place I can work from. Cheap and off the beaten path.

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03/20/2013

someone posing as me managed to con 38 vendors out of 2 btc each with a fake message about a new silk road posted about cartel formation and not mitigating vendor roundtable leaks. worked on database error handling in CI

03/21/2013

main server was ddosed and taken offline by host met with person in tor irc who gave me info on having custom hs guards buying up servers to turn into hidden service guards

03/22/2013

deployed 2 guards on forum adjusted check_deposit cron to look further back to catch txns that died with an error

03/23/2013

bought a couple of more servers from new hosts organized local files stripped out srsec db naming functions introduced at least two bugs doing this

03/24/2013

been slowly raising the cost of hedging orgainzed local files and notes

03/25/2013

server was ddosed, meaning someone knew the real IP. I assumed they obtained it by becoming a guard node. So, I migrated to a new server and set up private guard nodes. There was significant downtime and someone has mentioned that they discovered the IP via a leak from lighttpd.

03/26/2013

private guard nodes are working ok. still buying more servers so I can set up a more modular and redundant server cluster. redid login page.

03/27/2013

set up servers

03/28/2013

being blackmailed with user info. talking with large distributor (hell's angels).

03/29/2013

commissioned hit on blackmailer with angels

04/01/2013

got word that blackmailer was excuted created file upload script started to fix problem with bond refunds over 3 months old

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04/02/2013

got death threat from someone (DeathFromAbove)

. messaged googleyed about it. goog says he doesn't know. user is prolly friend of who

who he confided his

plan to.

applied fix to bond refund problem

stopped rounding account balance display

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04/03/2013

spam scams have been gaining tracktion. limited namespace and locked current accounts.

lots of delayed withdrawals. transactions taking a long time to be accepted into blockchain. Wallet was funded with single large transaction, so each subsequent transaction is requiring change to be verified. lesson: wallets must be funded in small chunks.

got pidgin chat working with inigo and mg

04/04/2013

withdrawals all caught up

made a sign error when fixing the bond refund bug, so several vendors had very negative accounts.

switched to direct connect for bitcoin instead of over ssh portforward

received visual confirmation of blackmailers execution

04/05/2013

a distributor of googleyed is publishing buyer info mapped out the ordering process on the wiki. gave angels access to chat server

04/06/2013

made sure backup crons are working gave angels go ahead to find tony76 cleaned up unused libraries on server added to forbidden username list to cover I <-> 1 scam

04/07/2013

moved storage wallet to local machine refactored mm page

04/08/2013

sent payment to angels for hit on tony76 and his 3 associates

began setting up hecho as standby

very high load (300/16), took site offline and refactored main and category pages to be more efficient

04/09/2013

problem with load was that APC was set to only cache up to 32M of data. Changed to 5G and load is down to around 5/16.

ssbd considering joining my staff

transferring standby data to hecho standby server

04/10/2013

some vendors using the hedge in a falling market to profit off of me by buying from themselves. turned of access log pruning so I can investigate later. market crashed today.

being blackmailed again. someone says they have my ID, but hasn't proven it.

04/11/2013

set up tor relays

asked scout to go through all images on site looking for quickbuy scam remnants cimon told me of a possible ddos attack through tor and how to mitigate against it.

guy blackmailing saying he has my id is bogus

04/12/2013

removed last remnance of quickbuy scam implemented new error controller

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SA-40

rewrote userpage

04/13/2013

inigo is in the hospital, so I covered his shift today. Zeroed everything and made changes to the site in about 5 hours

04/14/2013

did support. inigo returned.

started rewritting orders->buyer_cancel, been getting error reports about it.

04/15/2013

day off

04/16/2013

rewrote buyer_cancel

04/17/2013

rewrote settings view

04/18/2013

modified PIN reset system

04/19/2013

added blockchain.info as xrate source and modified update_xrate to use both and check for discrepancies and log. modified PIN reset system

04/20/2013

migrated to different host because current host would not connect to guards. Bandwidth limited and site very slow after migration.

04/21 - 04/30/2013

market and forums under sever DoS attack. Gave 10k btc ransom but attack continued. Gave smed server access. Switched to nginx on web/db server, added nginx reverse proxy running tor hs. reconfiged everything and eventually was able to absorb attack.

05/01/2013

Symm starts working support today. Scout takes over forum support.

05/02/2013

Attack continues. No word from attacker. Site is open, but occasionally tor crashes and has to be restarted.

05/03/2013

helping smed fight off attacker. site is mostly down. I'm sick. Leaked IP of webserver to public and had to redeploy/shred promoted gramgreen to mod, now named libertas

05/04/2013

attacker agreed to stop if I give him the first \$100k of revenue and \$50k per week thereafter. He stopped, but there appears to be another DoS attack still persisting.

05/05/2013

Attack is fully stopped. regrouping and prioritizing next actions.

05/06/2013

working with smed to put up more defenses against attack

05/07/2013

paid \$100k to attacker

05/08/2013

reconfigured nginx to not time out. almost all errors have disappeared.

05/10/2013

started buying servers for intro/guard nodes

05/11/2012

still buying servers

05/13/2013

helping catch up support

smed demo'ed multi address scheme for the forum

05/15/2013

more servers

05/22/2013

paid the attacker \$50k

05/26/2013

tried moving forum to multi .onion config, but leaked ip twice. Had to change servers, forum was down for a couple of days.

05/28/2013

finished rewritting silkroad.php controller

05/29/2013

rewrote orders page

paid attacker \$50k weekly ransom \$2M was stolen from my mtgox account by DEA added smed to payroll rewrote cart page

05/30/2013

05/31/2013

\$50k xferred to cimon

06/01/2013

someone claiming to be LE trying to infiltrate forum mods

06/02/2013

loaning \$500k to r&w to start vending on SR.

06/03/2013

put cimon in charge of LE counter intel

06/04/2013

rewrote reso center

06/05/2013 - 09/11/2013

Haven't been logging.

did an interview with andy greenberg from forbes where i said i wasn't the original DPR, went over well with community.

r&w flaked out and disappeared

with my 1/2 mil. smed has been working hard to develop a monitoring system for the SR infrastructure, but hasn't produced much in actual results. similarly cimon has been working on the mining and gambling projects, but no results forthcoming. created Anonymous Bitcoin Exchange (ABE) and have been trying to recruit tellers. the vendor "gold" is my best lead at the moment. nod is an H dealer on SR who says he has world class it skills and I am giving him a chance to show his stuff with ABE. did a "ratings and review" overhaul. It hasn't gone over too well with the community, but I am still working on it with them and I think it will get there eventually. tor has been clogged up by a botnet causing accessibility issues.

09/12/2013

Got a tip from oldamsterdam that supertrips has been busted.

09/13/2013

09/11 - 09/18/2013

could not confirm ST bust.

Got covered in poison oak trying to get a piece of trash out of a tree in a park nearby and have been moping. went on a first date with amelia from okc.

09/19/2013


red pinged me and asked for meeting tomorrow.

09/19 - 09/25/2013

red got in a jam and needed \$500k to get out. ultimately he convinced me to give it to him, but I got his ID first and had cimon send harry, his new soldier of fortune, to vancouver to get \$800k in cash to cover it. red has been mainly out of communication, but i haven't lost hope. Atlantis shut down. I was messaged by one of their team who said they shut down because of an FBI doc leaked to them detailing vulnerabilities in Tor.

09/30/2013

spoke with inigo for a while about the book club and swapping roles with libertas. Had revelation about the need to eat well, get good sleep, and meditate so I can stay positive and productive.



07/17/2010 07/18/2010		total expenses \$0	revenue	total_revenue \$0	total \$0	notes start	
		4 0		ΨΨ	Ŷ	Otal t	
07/18/2010						lab clothes, carry over from	
07/10/2010	\$25	\$25		\$0	-\$25	fall 2009	
	ΨΖΟ	Ψ20		φο	Ψ20	petri dishes, carry over	
07/18/2010	\$31	\$56		\$0	-\$56	from fall 2009	
07/10/2010	ψΟΊ	ψΟΟ		ΨΟ	-ψ00	hepa filter, carry over from	
07/20/2010	\$89	\$145		\$0	-\$145	fall 2009	
01/20/2010	φυσ	ψ143		φυ	-\$143	agar, carry over from fall	
07/21/2010	\$6	\$150		\$0	-\$150		
01/21/2010	φυ	φ130		φυ	-\$130	malt extract, carry over	
07/22/2010	C 4	Φ4 <i>E</i> 4		Φ0	¢1E1		
07/22/2010	\$4	\$154		\$0		from fall 2009	
07/23/2010	\$6	\$160		\$0	-\$160		
07/26/2010	\$5	\$165		\$0		digital timer	
07/26/2010	\$6	\$171		\$0	-\$171		
07/26/2010	\$150	\$321		\$0		Kelly deposit	
07/26/2010	\$80	\$401		\$0		pressure cooker	
07/27/2010	\$20	\$421		\$0		cleaning supplies, misc	
07/27/2010	\$6	\$427		\$0	-\$427		
07/27/2010	\$452	\$879		\$0	-\$879		
07/29/2010	\$37	\$916		\$0	-\$916		
07/30/2010	\$6	\$922		\$0	-\$922		
07/31/2010	\$6	\$928		\$0	-\$928		
07/31/2010	\$46	\$974		\$0		jars, deadbolt, propane	
08/01/2010	\$33	\$1,007		\$0		caulk, foil, strainers, tape	
08/01/2010	\$6	\$1,013		\$0	-\$1,013		
08/01/2010	\$2,000	\$3,013		\$0		payroll, me	
08/01/2010	\$65	\$3,078		\$0	-\$3,078	window ac	
08/02/2010	\$6	\$3,084		\$0	-\$3,084	gas	
08/02/2010	\$10	\$3,094		\$0	-\$3,094	thermometers	
08/06/2010	\$6	\$3,100		\$0	-\$3,100	gas	
08/11/2010	\$6	\$3,106		\$0	-\$3,106	gas	
						containers, jars, hose,	
						gluegun, plastic sheet,	
08/13/2010	\$112	\$3,218		\$0	-\$3,218	tape, trays, bleach, fan	
08/13/2010	\$6	\$3,224		\$0	-\$3,224		
08/15/2010	\$33	\$3,258		\$0		humidifier	
08/16/2010	\$6	\$3,264		\$0	-\$3,264		
08/16/2010	\$7	\$3,271		\$0		gloves, thermometer	
08/16/2010	**	\$3,271	\$22	\$22	-\$3,249	returns	
08/20/2010	\$52	\$3,323	<u> </u>	\$22		peat, verm, lime, gypsum	
08/20/2010	\$27	\$3,350		\$22	-\$3,328		
08/21/2010	\$6	\$3,356		\$22	-\$3,334		
08/25/2010	\$6	\$3,362		\$22	-\$3,340		
08/26/2010	\$6	\$3,368		\$22	-\$3,346	nas	
08/27/2010	\$6	\$3,374		\$22	-\$3,352		
08/28/2010	\$120	\$3,494		\$22	-\$3,472		
08/29/2010	\$6	\$3,494		\$22	-\$3,472		
08/29/2010	\$190	\$3,690		\$22		humidifier	
08/30/2010	\$6			\$22	-\$3,674		
09/01/2010	\$6	\$3,702		\$22	-\$3,680		
09/01/2010	\$2,000	\$5,702		\$22		payroll, me	
09/01/2010	\$410	\$6,112		\$22	-\$6,090		
09/04/2010	\$6	\$6,118		\$22	-\$6,096	Ü	
09/07/2010	\$6	\$6,124		\$22	-\$6,102		
		± -				acetone, gtape, measure	
09/12/2010	\$22	\$6,146		\$22		tape, rubberbands	
	\$6	\$6,152		\$22	-\$6,130	gas	
09/12/2010							
09/12/2010 09/14/2010 09/14/2010	\$7 \$6	\$6,159 \$6,165		\$22 \$22	-\$6,137 -\$6,143	denatured alcohol	



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date	expense	total expenses	revenue	total_revenue	total	notes	
09/15/2010		\$6,171		\$22	-\$6,149		
09/17/2010		\$6,177		\$22	-\$6,155	ŭ	
09/18/2010		\$6,183		\$22	-\$6,161		
09/19/2010		\$6,189		\$22	-\$6,167		
09/20/2010		\$6,195		\$22	-\$6,173		
09/22/2010	\$6	\$6,201		\$22	-\$6,179	gas	
09/22/2010		\$6,268		\$22		petri dishes, wash bottles	
09/23/2010		\$6,274		\$22	-\$6,252	0	
09/24/2010		\$6,280		\$22	-\$6,258		
09/25/2010		\$6,325		\$22	-\$6,303		
09/27/2010		\$6,331		\$22	-\$6,309		
09/30/2010	\$6	\$6,337		\$22	-\$6,315		
10/01/2010	\$2,000	\$8,337		\$22	-\$8,315	payroll, me	
10/04/2010	\$6	\$8,343		\$22	-\$8,321	gas	
10/04/2010	\$420	\$8,763		\$22	-\$8,741	rent	
10/09/2010	\$70	\$8,833		\$22	-\$8,811	cooler, funnels, trays, mixer	
10/09/2010		\$8,839		\$22	-\$8,817		
10/10/2010	\$6	\$8,845		\$22	-\$8,823	gas	
10/12/2010	\$6	\$8,851		\$22	-\$8,829	gas	
10/12/2010	\$12	\$8,863		\$22	-\$8,841	sheet, tote	
10/14/2010	\$6	\$8,869		\$22	-\$8,847	gas	
10/14/2010	\$12	\$8,881		\$22	-\$8,859	seed, corn	
10/14/2010	\$3	\$8,884		\$22	-\$8,862	trays	
10/15/2010	\$6	\$8,890		\$22	-\$8,868	gas	
10/15/2010		\$8,912		\$22	-\$8,890		
10/17/2010		\$8,918		\$22	-\$8,896		
10/18/2010	\$6	\$8,924		\$22	-\$8,902	gas	
10/20/2010		\$8,930		\$22	-\$8,908		
10/20/2010		\$8,953		\$22		propane	
10/21/2010		\$8,959		\$22	-\$8,937		
	,	, ,					
10/22/2010	\$19	\$8,978		\$22	-\$8.956	container, stepstool, pitcher	
10/22/2010		\$8,984		\$22	-\$8,962		
10/23/2010		\$8,990		\$22	-\$8,968		
10/25/2010		\$8,996		\$22	-\$8,974		
10/26/2010		\$9,002		\$22	-\$8,980		
10/27/2010		\$9,008		\$22	-\$8,986		
10/27/2010		\$9,049		\$22		peat, lime, ph	
10/27/2010		\$9,179		\$22		usonic humidifier	
10/28/2010		\$9,185		\$22	-\$9,163		
10/28/2010				\$22		return humidifier	
10/29/2010		\$9,386		\$22	-\$9,364		
10/30/2010		\$9,392		\$22	-\$9,370		
10/30/2010		\$9,442		\$22		heater, box	
10/30/2010		\$9,445		\$22	-\$9,423	not	
10/31/2010	_	\$9,472		\$22	-\$9,425		
10/31/2010		\$9,478		\$22			
11/01/2010				\$22		payroll, me	
11/01/2010		\$11,484		\$22	-\$11,450		
11/02/2010		\$11,464		\$22	-\$11,462		
11/03/2010		\$11,925		\$22	-\$11,903		
11/03/2010		\$11,931		\$22	-\$11,903		
11/04/2010		\$11,957		\$22		bucket, dessicant	
11/05/2010		\$11,957		\$22	-\$11,935	Ducket, uessiedlit	
11/06/2010				\$22	-\$11,941		
		\$11,969 \$11,075					
11/08/2010				\$22			
11/09/2010	\$6	\$11,981		\$22	-\$11,959		

dete		4-4-1		(-(-l	1-1-1		
	expense	total expenses	revenue		total	notes	
11/10/2010		\$12,001		\$22		board and misc	
11/10/2010		\$12,007		\$22	-\$11,985		
11/11/2010		\$12,013		\$22	-\$11,991		
11/12/2010		\$12,098		\$22		silver app fee	
11/12/2010		\$12,104		\$22	-\$12,082		
11/13/2010		\$12,110		\$22	-\$12,088		
11/14/2010		\$12,116		\$22	-\$12,094		
11/15/2010		\$12,122		\$22	-\$12,100		
11/17/2010		\$12,128		\$22	-\$12,106		
11/26/2010		\$12,290		\$22	-\$12,268	humidifier	
12/01/2010	\$2,000	\$14,290		\$22	-\$14,268	payroll, me	
12/03/2010		\$14,290	\$260	\$282	-\$14,008	humidifiers return	
12/03/2010	\$195	\$14,485		\$282	-\$14,203	rent	
12/04/2010	\$30	\$14,515		\$282	-\$14,233	scale	
12/06/2010	\$13	\$14,528		\$282	-\$14,246	shelves	
12/07/2010		\$14,562		\$282		container and trays	
01/01/2011	\$2,000	\$16,562		\$282	-\$16,280	payroll, me	
01/02/2011	\$750	\$17,312		\$282		payroll, da	
01/03/2011	\$469	\$17,781		\$282	-\$17,499		
01/08/2011	Ţ.30	\$17,781	\$110			ian and joseph	
01/08/2011	\$750	\$18,531	4 111	\$392		payroll, da	
02/01/2011	\$2,000	\$20,531		\$392		payroll, me	
03/01/2011	\$2,000	\$22,531		\$392		payroll, me	
04/01/2011	\$2,000	\$24,531		\$392		payroll, me	
04/15/2011	\$500	\$25,031		\$392		server rent	+
05/01/2011	\$2,000	\$27,031		\$392		payroll, me	
05/05/2011	Ψ2,000	\$27,031	\$17,569	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	-\$9,070		
05/05/2011	\$500	\$27,531	Ψ17,509	\$17,961		server rent	
05/31/2011	ψ500	\$27,531	\$13,843			commissions	
06/01/2011	\$2,000	\$29,531	ψ13,043	\$31,804		payroll, me	
06/15/2011	\$500	\$30,031		\$31,804		server rent	
07/01/2011	\$2,000	\$30,031		\$31,804		payroll, me	
07/01/2011	\$500	\$32,531		\$31,804		server rent	
	\$300		¢44 400		_		
07/25/2011	£4.000	\$32,531	\$11,488			commissions	
08/01/2011	\$4,000	\$36,531	¢47.476	\$43,292		payroll, me	
08/06/2011	Ф ГОО	\$36,531	\$17,176			commissions	-
08/15/2011	\$500	\$37,031	#00.040	\$60,468		server rent	
08/28/2011	# 4.000	\$37,031	\$29,642			commissions	
09/01/2011	\$4,000	\$41,031		\$90,110		payroll, me	
09/15/2011	\$500	\$41,531		\$90,110		server rent	
09/21/2011	\$2,000	\$43,531	0 0.400	\$90,110		payroll, utah	<u> </u>
09/30/2011	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	\$43,531	\$3,180		+ -,	commissions	<u> </u>
09/30/2011				\$93,290		payroll, utah	<u> </u>
10/01/2011	\$4,000	\$48,531	A	\$93,290		payroll, me	
10/05/2011		\$48,531	\$3,815			commissions	
10/06/2011		\$48,531	\$6,412			commissions	
10/07/2011	\$1,000	\$49,531		\$103,517	. ,	payroll, utah	
10/12/2011		\$49,531	\$10,390			commissions	
10/12/2011		\$49,531	\$3,461			commissions	
10/14/2011	\$1,000	\$50,531		\$117,368		payroll, utah	
10/15/2011	\$4,000	\$54,531		\$117,368		payroll, syg	
10/15/2011	\$1,000			\$117,368		server rent	
10/17/2011		\$55,531	\$1,532	\$118,900	\$63,369	commissions	
10/19/2011		\$55,531	\$37,750	\$156,650		commissions	
10/23/2011	\$500	\$56,031		\$156,650	\$100,619	payroll, utah	
10/25/2011		\$56,031	\$3,216	\$159,866	\$103,835	commissions	
11/01/2011	\$4,000	\$60,031		\$159,866	\$99,835	payroll, me	
11/04/2011	\$1,000	\$61,031		\$159,866		payroll, utah	
11/08/2011		\$61,031	\$46,735	\$206,601	\$145,570	commissions	
		_					


11/10/2011 \$1,500 \$62,531 \$2,706 \$209,307 \$148,276 commissions 11/11/2011 \$1,500 \$67,531 \$209,307 \$141,776 parroll, tath 11/15/2011 \$1,000 \$68,531 \$209,307 \$141,776 parroll, tath 11/15/2011 \$1,000 \$68,531 \$209,307 \$141,776 parroll, tath 11/15/2011 \$1,000 \$68,531 \$249,341 \$180,810 commissions 11/17/2011 \$1,000 \$69,531 \$249,341 \$180,810 commissions 11/17/2011 \$1,000 \$69,531 \$249,341 \$178,310 payroll, utah 11/28/2011 \$1,500 \$71,031 \$249,341 \$178,310 payroll, utah 11/28/2011 \$130 \$71,211 \$249,341 \$178,310 payroll, bounties 11/28/2011 \$330 \$71,541 \$249,341 \$178,310 payroll, bounties 12/01/2011 \$4,000 \$75,541 \$21,634 \$249,341 \$178,800 payroll, me 12/02/2011 \$500 \$77,541 \$21,634 \$270,975 \$199,434 payroll, utah 12/05/2011 \$500 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$199,434 payroll, dath 12/05/2011 \$500 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$199,434 payroll, dath 12/05/2011 \$500 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$199,434 payroll, dath 12/15/2011 \$500 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$79,621 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$79,621 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$105 \$79,621 \$248,544 \$205,333 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$203,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$203,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$205,333 payroll, bounties 12/16/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$36,621 \$284,854 \$209,233 payroll, bounties 12/16/2011 \$300 \$39,621 \$36,621 \$36,621 \$36,621 \$36,621 \$36,621 \$36	date	expense	total expenses	revenue	total_revenue	total	notes
11/11/2011 \$5,000 \$67,531 \$209,307 \$146,776 payroll, utah 11/15/2011 \$5,000 \$67,531 \$209,307 \$140,776 server rent 11/15/2011 \$1,000 \$68,531 \$209,307 \$140,776 server rent 11/19/2011 \$1,000 \$68,531 \$40,034 \$249,341 \$190,810 commissions 11/19/2011 \$1,000 \$69,531 \$249,341 \$190,810 commissions 11/12/2011 \$1,000 \$71,031 \$249,341 \$179,810 payroli, utah 11/22/2011 \$1,500 \$71,031 \$249,341 \$177,800 payroli, bounties 11/22/2011 \$330 \$71,541 \$249,341 \$177,800 payroli, bounties 12/20/2011 \$330 \$71,541 \$249,341 \$173,800 payroli, bounties 12/20/2011 \$3,000 \$75,541 \$21,634 \$270,975 \$195,434 commissions 12/20/2011 \$2,000 \$77,541 \$21,634 \$270,975 \$195,434 commissions 12/20/2011 \$570,541 \$270,975 \$195,434 commissions 12/20/2011 \$570 \$78,041 \$270,975 \$192,934 payroli, total 12/20/2011 \$970 \$78,041 \$270,975 \$192,934 payroli, total 12/20/2011 \$970 \$78,041 \$270,975 \$191,939 payroli, bounties 12/12/2011 \$975 \$79,016 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroli, bounties 12/12/2011 \$975 \$79,016 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroli, bounties 12/15/2011 \$970 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroli, bounties 12/15/2011 \$300 \$78,562 \$284,554 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$81,621 \$284,554 \$205,338 payroli, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$81,621 \$284,554 \$205,338 payroli, bounties 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,554 \$203,233 payroli, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,554 \$200,233 payroli, utah 12/15/2011 \$0,000 \$87,721 \$317,583 \$229,962 commissions 12/15/2011 \$0,000 \$87,721 \$317,583 \$229,962 commissions 12/15/2011 \$0,000 \$87,721 \$34,900 \$37,581 \$37,783 \$229,000 commissions 12/15/2011 \$0,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$250,522 payroli, dual 12/15/2011 \$0,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$250,622 payroli, dual 12/25/2011 \$2,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$2		•					commissions
11/15/2011 \$1,000 \$68,531 \$209,307 \$141,775 [payroll, syg 11/15/2011 \$1,000 \$68,531 \$40,034 \$249,341 \$180,810 commissions 11/16/2011 \$1,000 \$88,531 \$40,034 \$249,341 \$179,810 payroll, utah 11/25/2011 \$1,500 \$71,031 \$249,341 \$179,810 payroll, butah 11/25/2011 \$1,500 \$71,031 \$249,341 \$179,810 payroll, butah 11/25/2011 \$130 \$71,211 \$249,341 \$178,810 payroll, bounties 11/26/2011 \$130 \$71,541 \$249,341 \$178,810 payroll, bounties 12/01/2011 \$4,000 \$75,541 \$249,341 \$173,800 payroll, me 12/02/2011 \$575,541 \$21,634 \$270,975 \$195,434 payroll, utah 12/06/2011 \$500 \$77,541 \$270,976 \$199,434 payroll, utah 12/06/2011 \$500 \$77,541 \$270,976 \$199,434 payroll, utah 12/06/2011 \$500 \$77,541 \$270,976 \$199,434 payroll, dah 12/16/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,459 payroll, dah 12/16/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,459 payroll, dah 12/16/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$13,879 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/16/2011 \$105 \$79,621 \$249,854 \$206,338 commissions 12/16/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$203,333 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,888 \$250,622 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$600 \$88,421 \$317,888 \$250,622 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$600 \$88,421 \$317,883 \$259,622 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$600 \$89,421 \$317,883 \$259,622 payroll, bounties 12/26/2011 \$600 \$89,421 \$34,900 \$34,563		\$1,500		, ,			
11/16/2011 \$1,000 \$68,531 \$209,307 \$140,776 server rent							
11/19/2011 \$1,000 \$69,531 \$249,341 \$179,810 payroll, utah 11/28/2011 \$1,500 \$71,031 \$249,341 \$178,310 payroll, bounties 11/28/2011 \$3300 \$71,541 \$249,341 \$178,310 payroll, bounties 11/29/2011 \$3,300 \$75,541 \$249,341 \$178,130 payroll, bounties 12/04/2011 \$4,000 \$75,541 \$249,341 \$173,800 payroll, bounties 12/04/2011 \$2,000 \$75,541 \$21,634 \$270,975 \$195,434 commissions 12/04/2011 \$2,000 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$193,434 payroll, data 12/05/2011 \$5,000 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$193,434 payroll, data 12/05/2011 \$5,000 \$78,041 \$270,975 \$191,934 payroll, data 12/12/2011 \$975 \$79,916 \$270,975 \$191,934 payroll, data 12/12/2011 \$975 \$79,916 \$270,975 \$191,459 payroll, data 12/15/2011 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,459 payroll, data 12/15/2011 \$79,516 \$224,854 \$205,233 payroll, sygglore, sygglo		\$1,000					
11/19/2011 \$1,000 \$69,531 \$249,341 \$179,810 payroll, utah 11/28/2011 \$1,500 \$71,031 \$249,341 \$178,310 payroll, bounties 11/28/2011 \$3300 \$71,541 \$249,341 \$178,310 payroll, bounties 11/29/2011 \$3,300 \$75,541 \$249,341 \$178,130 payroll, bounties 12/04/2011 \$4,000 \$75,541 \$249,341 \$173,800 payroll, bounties 12/04/2011 \$2,000 \$75,541 \$21,634 \$270,975 \$195,434 commissions 12/04/2011 \$2,000 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$193,434 payroll, data 12/05/2011 \$5,000 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$193,434 payroll, data 12/05/2011 \$5,000 \$78,041 \$270,975 \$191,934 payroll, data 12/12/2011 \$975 \$79,916 \$270,975 \$191,934 payroll, data 12/12/2011 \$975 \$79,916 \$270,975 \$191,459 payroll, data 12/15/2011 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,459 payroll, data 12/15/2011 \$79,516 \$224,854 \$205,233 payroll, sygglore, sygglo	11/19/2011		\$68,531	\$40,034	\$249,341	\$180,810	commissions
11/28/2011 \$1.600 \$71.031 \$249.341 \$178.310 payroll, tutah 11/28/2011 \$180 \$71.211 \$249.341 \$178.310 payroll, bounties 11/29/2011 \$330 \$71.541 \$249.341 \$177.800 payroll, bounties 12/01/2011 \$4.000 \$75.541 \$249.341 \$177.800 payroll, bounties 12/01/2011 \$4.000 \$75.541 \$249.341 \$177.800 payroll, bounties 12/04/2011 \$5.000 \$77.541 \$270.975 \$199.349 payroll, dan 12/04/2011 \$2.000 \$77.541 \$270.975 \$199.349 payroll, dan 12/05/2011 \$500 \$78.041 \$270.975 \$199.349 payroll, dan 12/12/2011 \$500 \$78.041 \$270.975 \$191.959 payroll, dan 12/12/2011 \$575 \$79.016 \$270.975 \$191.959 payroll, dan 12/12/2011 \$500 \$79.516 \$270.975 \$191.959 payroll, dan 12/15/2011 \$500 \$79.516 \$270.975 \$191.459 payroll, dan 12/15/2011 \$79.516 \$13.879 \$2248.454 \$203.233 payroll, syg 12/15/2011 \$105 \$79.621 \$284.854 \$203.233 payroll, syg 12/15/2011 \$1.000 \$81.621 \$284.854 \$203.233 payroll, syg 12/15/2011 \$1.000 \$85.621 \$284.854 \$203.233 payroll, syg 12/15/2011 \$1.000 \$86.621 \$284.854 \$203.233 payroll, syg 12/15/2011 \$1.000 \$86.621 \$284.854 \$292.239 payroll, syg 12/16/2011 \$1.000 \$86.621 \$284.854 \$199.239 payroll, syn 12/18/2011 \$800 \$87.621 \$337.583 \$230.962 payroll, dan 12/18/2011 \$800 \$87.621 \$317.883 \$229.062 payroll, dan 12/28/2011 \$800 \$87.621 \$317.883 \$229.962 payroll, dan 12/28/2011 \$800 \$87.621 \$317.883 \$229.962 payroll, dan 12/28/2011 \$800 \$88.421 \$317.883 \$229.962 payroll, dan 12/28/2011 \$800 \$80.421 \$337.833 \$39.982 payroll, dan 12/28/2011 \$800 \$80.421 \$337.833 \$339.982 payroll, dan 12/28/2011 \$800 \$80.821 \$80.823 \$80.8		\$1,000					
11/28/2011 \$180 \$71,211 \$249,341 \$178,130 payroll, bounties 12/01/2011 \$4,000 \$75,541 \$249,341 \$177,800 payroll, bounties 12/02/2011 \$4,000 \$75,541 \$21,634 \$270,975 \$193,434 payroll, tutah 12/02/2011 \$2,000 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$193,434 payroll, tutah 12/05/2011 \$500 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$193,434 payroll, tutah 12/05/2011 \$500 \$78,041 \$270,975 \$191,934 payroll, tah 12/05/2011 \$975 \$79,016 \$270,975 \$191,939 payroll, bounties 12/12/2011 \$975 \$79,016 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroll, bounties 12/12/2011 \$975 \$79,016 \$270,975 \$191,459 payroll, da 12/15/2011 \$79,516 \$13,879 \$284,884 \$205,233 payroll, da 12/15/2011 \$105 \$79,621 \$284,884 \$205,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$100 \$88,621 \$284,884 \$205,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$88,621 \$284,884 \$205,333 payroll, tutah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$88,621 \$284,884 \$199,233 payroll, tutah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$88,621 \$284,884 \$199,233 payroll, tutah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$88,621 \$284,884 \$199,233 payroll, tutah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$88,621 \$324,884 \$198,233 payroll, tutah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$88,621 \$324,884 \$198,233 payroll, tutah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$88,621 \$324,884 \$198,233 payroll, tutah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$88,621 \$324,894 \$198,233 payroll, tutah 12/15/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,62 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,62 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$500 \$89,021 \$347,583 \$229,62 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$500 \$89,021 \$347,583 \$227,62 payroll, da 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,89 \$357,473 \$265,929 payroll, da 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,89 \$357,473 \$265,929 payroll, da 12/25/2011 \$600 \$90,921 \$34,89 \$357,473 \$266,952 payroll, da 12/21/2011 \$600 \$30,561 \$357,473 \$266,952 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$600 \$310,9							payroll, utah
11/29/2011 \$3.30 \$71,541 \$249,341 \$177,800 payroll, bounies 12/02/2011 \$4,000 \$75,541 \$21,634 \$270,975 \$195,434 commissions 12/04/2011 \$2,000 \$77,541 \$21,634 \$270,975 \$195,434 payroll, utah 12/05/2011 \$500 \$78,041 \$270,975 \$199,349 payroll, utah 12/12/2011 \$550 \$79,016 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroll, bounties 12/12/2011 \$550 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$13,879 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$105 \$79,516 \$13,879 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$105 \$79,621 \$284,854 \$205,338 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$81,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/18/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/18/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,563 \$229,62 payroll, da 12/18/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,563 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,563 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,563 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,563 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,563 \$229,962 payroll, utah 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$265,529 payroll, utah 12/25/2011 \$90,021 \$30,00 \$32,561 \$357,473 \$265,529 payroll, utah 12/25/2011 \$600 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$265,529 payroll, utah 12/25/2011 \$600 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$256,529 payroll, utah 12/31/2011 \$2,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$256,529 payroll, utah 12/31/2011 \$4,000 \$90,561 \$357,473 \$256,529 payroll, utah 13/25							
1201/2011		\$330	\$71,541				
1204/2011 \$2,000 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$193,434 payroll, tda 12/12/2011 \$500 \$78,041 \$270,975 \$192,934 payroll, da 12/12/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroll, bounties 12/12/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$13,879 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$105 \$79,621 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$2,000 \$81,621 \$284,854 \$205,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$33,729 \$317,583 \$230,462 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,121 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$2,000 \$98,421 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,533 \$322,162 payroll, bounties 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$267,052 commissions 12/26/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$2,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$266,952 payroll, da 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, tah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$109,248 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, tah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$109,2	12/01/2011	\$4,000	\$75,541		\$249,341		
1204/2011 \$2,000 \$77,541 \$270,975 \$193,434 payroll, tda 12/12/2011 \$500 \$78,041 \$270,975 \$192,934 payroll, da 12/12/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,959 payroll, bounties 12/12/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$13,879 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$105 \$79,621 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$2,000 \$81,621 \$284,854 \$205,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$33,729 \$317,583 \$230,462 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,121 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$2,000 \$98,421 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,533 \$322,162 payroll, bounties 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$267,052 commissions 12/26/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$2,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$266,952 payroll, da 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, tah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$109,248 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, tah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$109,2	12/02/2011		\$75,541	\$21,634	\$270,975	\$195,434	commissions
12/12/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,459 payroll, da 12/12/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$13,879 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$105 \$79,516 \$13,879 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$2,000 \$81,621 \$284,854 \$205,333 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$202,333 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$202,333 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/19/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$32,729 \$317,533 \$230,962 commissions 12/19/2011 \$500 \$87,121 \$317,538 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,538 \$323,0462 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,538 \$322,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,538 \$229,962 payroll, bounties 12/26/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$367,473 \$267,052 commissions 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$367,473 \$267,052 commissions 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$367,473 \$267,052 commissions 12/26/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$367,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$2,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$2,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$259,812 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$259,628 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$259,628 payroll, utah 10/10/2012	12/04/2011	\$2,000	\$77,541				payroll, utah
12/12/2011 \$500 \$79,516 \$270,975 \$191,459 payroll, da 12/15/2011 \$105 \$79,621 \$284,854 \$205,233 payroll, bounties \$12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$81,621 \$284,854 \$205,233 payroll, bounties \$12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$205,233 payroll, ush \$12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$205,233 payroll, ush \$12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah \$12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah \$12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah \$12/18/2011 \$800 \$87,121 \$317,583 \$230,962 payroll, da \$12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$230,962 payroll, da \$12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da \$12/24/2011 \$500 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,162 payroll, da \$12/24/2011 \$500 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,162 payroll, utah \$12/25/2011 \$500 \$89,421 \$317,583 \$229,162 payroll, utah \$12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,283 \$22,3162 commissions \$12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$30,000 \$322,283 \$223,162 commissions \$12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$267,052 commissions \$12/26/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da \$12/31/2011 \$4000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$265,912 payroll, bounties \$12/31/2011 \$4000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties \$10/107/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties \$10/108/2012 \$4000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties \$10/108/2012 \$4000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties \$10/108/2012 \$4000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$258,912 donate to torservers \$10/107/2012 \$4000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$258,912 donate to torservers \$10/108/2012 \$4000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties \$10/108/2012 \$4000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties \$10/108/2012 \$4000 \$109,248 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll \$1000 \$109,248 \$357,473 \$256,912 payrol	12/05/2011	\$500	\$78,041		\$270,975	\$192,934	payroll, da
12/15/2011 \$105 \$79,516 \$13,879 \$284,854 \$205,338 commissions 12/15/2011 \$2,000 \$81,621 \$284,854 \$203,233 payroll, bounties 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, syg 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$500 \$87,121 \$317,583 \$230,962 commissions 12/19/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,162 payroll, bounties 12/24/2011 \$2,000 \$90,421 \$317,583 \$227,162 payroll, tah 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$387,733 \$267,052 commissions 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$266,562 payroll, da 12/26/2011 \$90,921 \$345,891 \$357,473 \$266,562 payroll, da 12/26/2011 \$90,921 \$357,473 \$266,562 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$40,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$265,912 payroll, bounties 12/31/2011 \$40,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$265,912 payroll, tah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, tah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, tah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$98,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, tah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, tah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll, tounties 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll \$1,166 \$108,001 \$357,473 \$256,282 payroll \$1,166 \$108,001 \$357,473 \$249,225 server	12/12/2011	\$975	\$79,016		\$270,975	\$191,959	payroll, bounties
12/15/2011 \$1.05 \$79.621 \$284.854 \$205.233 payroll, bounties	12/12/2011	\$500			\$270,975	\$191,459	payroll, da
12/15/2011 \$2,000 \$81,621 \$284,854 \$203,233 payroll, syg 12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$84,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$198,233 server rent 12/18/2011 \$86,621 \$32,729 \$317,583 \$230,962 commissions 12/19/2011 \$500 \$87,121 \$317,583 \$230,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,662 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,662 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,662 payroll, bounties 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,7162 payroll, utah 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,583 \$227,162 payroll, utah 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,583 \$227,162 payroll, da 12/26/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/26/2011 \$640 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$640 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$268,912 payroll, tutah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, tutah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$10,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, tutah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,328 payroll, bounties 10/14/2012 \$750 \$106,845 \$357,473 \$256,328 payroll, bounties 10/14/2012 \$750 \$106,845 \$357,473 \$256,378 bounties 10/14/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,378 bounties 10/14/2012 \$1,000 \$109,248 \$357,473 \$256,378 bounties 10/14/2012 \$1,000 \$109,248 \$357,473 \$249,625 payroll \$101/22/2012 \$1,000 \$109,48 \$357,473 \$249,625 payroll \$101/22/2012 \$1,000 \$110,48 \$357,473 \$249,625 payroll \$101/22/2012 \$1,000 \$110,48 \$357,473 \$249,	12/15/2011		\$79,516	\$13,879	\$284,854	\$205,338	commissions
12/15/2011 \$3,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$200,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$32,729 \$317,583 \$230,962 commissions 12/19/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$230,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, bounties 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, bounties 12/26/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$90,421 \$317,583 \$229,162 payroll, bounties 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,583 \$232,162 payroll, utah 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/26/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$640 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, bounties 12/31/2011 \$4,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$265,912 payroll, bounties 12/31/2011 \$4,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$265,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$98,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$2,000 \$30,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$98,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$98,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$30,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties 10/10/2012 \$1,500 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,282 payroll, bounties 10/10/2012 \$1,500 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,282 payroll, bounties 10/14/2012 \$3,750 \$106,845 \$357,473 \$255,912 payroll, bounties 10/14/2012 \$3,750 \$106,845 \$357,473 \$259,525 payroll \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$249,225 server rent 10/19/2012 \$1,000 \$109,248 \$357,473 \$249,225 server re	12/15/2011	\$105	\$79,621		\$284,854	\$205,233	payroll, bounties
12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$85,621 \$284,854 \$199,233 payroll, utah 12/15/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$284,854 \$198,233 payroll, utah 12/16/2011 \$66,621 \$32,729 \$317,583 \$230,462 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,121 \$317,583 \$230,462 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, bounties 12/24/2011 \$2,000 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$317,633 \$227,162 payroll, bounties 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,583 \$223,162 commissions 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$266,552 commissions 12/26/2011 \$500 \$99,921 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$640 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, bounties 12/31/2011 \$640 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$269,572 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$98,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$98,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$100,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties 10/10/2012 \$150 \$100,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 pay	12/15/2011	\$2,000	\$81,621		\$284,854	\$203,233	payroll, syg
12/16/2011 \$1,000 \$86,621 \$224,854 \$198,233 server rent 12/18/2011 \$500 \$87,121 \$317,583 \$230,962 commissions 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$230,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,162 payroll, bounties 12/24/2011 \$2,000 \$90,421 \$317,583 \$222,162 payroll, utah 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,583 \$227,162 payroll, utah 12/26/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,583 \$223,162 commissions 12/26/2011 \$500 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$266,502 payroll, da 12/26/2011 \$500 \$90,921 \$357,473 \$266,502 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$640 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$266,592 payroll, bounties 12/31/2011 \$640 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$265,912 payroll, bounties 12/31/2011 \$640 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$265,912 payroll, utah 01/01/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$258,912 payroll, utah 01/01/2012 \$4,000 \$97,561 \$357,473 \$258,912 donate to torservers 01/07/2012 \$1,000 \$98,561 \$357,473 \$258,912 donate to torservers 01/07/2012 \$1,000 \$100,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties 01/08/2012 \$630 \$101,191 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties 01/08/2012 \$154 \$101,345 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, bounties 01/14/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll, bounties 01/14/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,28 payroll bounties 01/14/2012 \$1,166 \$108,011 \$357,473 \$225,028 payroll bounties 01/14/2012 \$1,000 \$109,248 \$357,473 \$249,25 donate to torservers 01/12/2012 \$1,000 \$110,48 \$357,473 \$249,25 server rent 01/22/2012 \$1,000 \$110,48 \$357,473 \$249,25 server rent 01/22/2012 \$5,000 \$116,948 \$357,473 \$249,25 server rent 01/31/2012 \$700 \$116,948 \$357,473 \$249,25 server rent 01/31/2012 \$5,000 \$136,948 \$357,473 \$249,25 server rent 01/31/20	12/15/2011	\$3,000	\$84,621		\$284,854	\$200,233	payroll, utah
12/18/2011 \$500 \$87,121 \$317,583 \$230,962 commissions 12/19/2011 \$500 \$87,121 \$317,583 \$230,462 payroll, da 12/23/2011 \$500 \$87,621 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, da 12/24/2011 \$800 \$88,421 \$317,583 \$229,962 payroll, bounties 12/24/2011 \$2,000 \$90,421 \$317,583 \$227,162 payroll, bounties 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$5,000 \$322,583 \$232,162 commissions 12/25/2011 \$90,421 \$34,890 \$357,473 \$267,052 commissions 12/26/2011 \$500 \$90,921 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$540 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$266,552 payroll, da 12/31/2011 \$640 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$263,912 payroll, utah 10/10/12012 \$4,000 \$93,561 \$357,473 \$263,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$98,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$98,561 \$357,473 \$259,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$91,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$100,561 \$357,473 \$256,912 payroll, utah 10/10/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll, bounties 10/11/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll, bounties 10/11/2012 \$3,750 \$106,845 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll, bounties 10/11/2012 \$3,750 \$106,845 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll, bounties 10/11/2012 \$3,750 \$106,845 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll bounties 10/11/2012 \$3,750 \$106,845 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll bounties 10/12/2012 \$1,000 \$103,095 \$357,473 \$256,128 payroll bounties 10/12/2012 \$1,000 \$109,248 \$357,473 \$249,225 server rent 10/12/2012 \$500 \$109,748 \$357,473 \$249,225 server rent 10/12/2012 \$5,000 \$116,948 \$357,473 \$249,225 server rent 10/13/2012 \$750 \$116,948 \$357,473 \$249,225 server rent 10/13/2012 \$750 \$116,948 \$357,473 \$249,225 server rent 10/20/2012 \$1,00	12/15/2011	\$1,000	\$85,621		\$284,854		
12/19/2011	12/15/2011	\$1,000	\$86,621		\$284,854	\$198,233	server rent
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12/24/2011			\$87,621		\$317,583		
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02/04/2012 \$160 \$140,858 \$357,473 \$216,615 server rent 02/05/2012 \$800 \$141,658 \$357,473 \$215,815 bounties 02/11/2012 \$1,000 \$142,658 \$357,473 \$214,815 donate to torservers	-					. ,	l l
02/05/2012 \$800 \$141,658 \$357,473 \$215,815 bounties 02/11/2012 \$1,000 \$142,658 \$357,473 \$214,815 donate to torservers							
02/11/2012 \$1,000 \$142,658 \$357,473 \$214,815 donate to torservers	-						
	02/11/2012	\$2,750	\$145,408		\$357,473		
02/12/2012 \$250 \$145,658 \$357,473 \$211,815 bounties							
02/16/2012 \$2,394 \$148,052 \$357,473 \$209,421 server rent	-						
02/17/2012 \$450 \$148,502 \$357,473 \$208,971 payroll							
02/18/2012 \$1,000 \$149,502 \$357,473 \$207,971 bounties			\$149,502		\$357,473	\$207,971	bounties

date	expense	total expenses	revenue	total_revenue	total	notes
02/18/2012	\$1,000	\$150,502	TOTOTIAG	\$357,473		donate to torservers
02/19/2012	\$2,900	\$153,402		\$357,473		
02/21/2012	\$132	\$153,534		\$357,473	+ - ,-	server rent
03/02/2012	7.0=	\$153,534	\$65,933	\$423,406		commissions
03/02/2012	\$2,800	\$156,334	, ,	\$423,406		payroll, me
03/03/2012	\$1,000	\$157,334		\$423,406		donate to torservers
03/03/2012	\$3,200	\$160,534		\$423,406	\$262,872	payroll
03/03/2012	\$15,000	\$175,534		\$423,406	\$247,872	payroll (sr2.0)
03/10/2012	\$1,000	\$176,534		\$423,406	\$246,872	donate to torservers
03/10/2012	\$3,200	\$179,734		\$423,406	\$243,672	payroll
03/12/2012	\$200	\$179,934		\$423,406		
03/17/2012	\$200	\$180,134		\$423,406		
03/17/2012	\$1,000	\$181,134		\$423,406		donate to torservers
03/17/2012	\$3,200	\$184,334		\$423,406		
03/23/2012	\$1,400	\$185,734		\$423,406		server rent
03/25/2012	\$3,200	\$188,934		\$423,406		
03/29/2012	\$772	\$189,706		\$423,406		server rent
04/07/2012	\$1,000	\$190,706		\$423,406		donate to torservers
04/07/2012	\$4,000	\$194,706 \$404,706		\$423,406		
04/11/2012	¢40.000	\$194,706 \$206,706		\$510,778		commissions
04/11/2012	\$12,000	\$206,706		\$510,778		payroll, me
04/11/2012 04/13/2012	\$37,000 \$38,000	\$243,706 \$281,706		\$510,778 \$510,778		payroll (sr2.0)
04/13/2012	\$36,000	\$281,706				commissions
04/14/2012	\$1,000	\$282,706	\$43,000	\$553,778 \$553,778		donate to torservers
04/14/2012	\$4,000	\$286,706		\$553,778 \$553,778		
04/14/2012	\$300	\$287,006		\$553,778 \$553,778		
04/21/2012	\$1,000	\$288,006		\$553,778		donate to torservers
04/21/2012	\$4,000	\$292,006		\$553,778		
04/22/2012	ψ.,σσσ	\$292,006	\$8,000	\$561,778		commissions
04/23/2012	\$12,000	\$304,006	4 0,000	\$561,778		420 grand prize
04/23/2012	\$800	\$304,806		\$561,778		420 grand prize
04/23/2012	\$32,000	\$336,806		\$561,778		420 prizes
04/25/2012	\$4,000	\$340,806		\$561,778	\$220,972	payroll (forum)
04/25/2012	\$37,000	\$377,806		\$561,778		payroll (sr2.0)
04/28/2012	\$1,100	\$378,906		\$561,778	\$182,872	bounties
04/28/2012		\$378,906	\$90,900	\$652,678	\$273,772	commissions
04/28/2012	\$1,150	\$380,056		\$652,678	\$272,622	laptop
04/28/2012	\$4,000	\$384,056		\$652,678		
04/28/2012	\$350	\$384,406		\$652,678		payroll, me
05/06/2012	\$1,000	\$385,406		\$652,678		donate to torservers
05/06/2012	\$4,000	\$389,406		\$652,678		
05/08/2012	\$20,090	\$409,496				payroll (sr2.0)
05/11/2012	\$4,000	\$413,496				420 grand prize
05/11/2012	\$2,000	\$415,496 \$410,406				donate to torservers
05/11/2012	\$4,000	\$419,496 \$410,406			\$233,182	
05/18/2012	¢4 E00	\$419,496 \$430,006				commissions
05/18/2012	\$1,500	\$420,996 \$430,006		\$794,768 \$700,768		donate to torservers
05/18/2012 05/18/2012	\$100,000	\$420,996 \$520,996	\$5,000	\$799,768 \$799,768		
05/18/2012	\$100,000	\$520,996 \$524,996		\$799,768 \$799,768		
05/16/2012	φ4,000	\$524,996 \$524,996				
05/20/2012		\$524,996				
05/25/2012	\$1,000	\$525,996		\$901,768		donate to torservers
05/25/2012	\$4,000	\$529,996		\$901,768		
06/01/2012	ψ 1,000	\$529,996				commissions
06/01/2012	\$1,000	\$530,996		\$911,768		donate to torservers
06/01/2012	\$4,000	\$534,996			\$376,772	
06/02/2012	\$40,000	\$574,996		\$911,768		payroll (sr2.0)
30/02/2012	ψ-70,000	Ψ57 7,390		ψυ11,700	ψυσυ,112	payron (012.0)

date	expense	total expenses	revenue	total_revenue	total	notes	
06/03/2012		\$574,996	\$26,000	\$937,768	\$362,772	invest	
06/05/2012	\$3,000	\$577,996				cp poker promo	
06/05/2012	\$3,338	\$581,334				server rent	
06/05/2012	\$150	\$581,484		\$937,768		server rent	
06/05/2012	\$150	\$581,634		\$937,768		smsdragon	
06/08/2012	*	\$581,634	\$54,238			commissions	
06/08/2012	\$2,000	\$583,634	+	\$992,006		donate to torservers	
06/08/2012	\$5,600	\$589,234			\$402,772		
06/12/2012	\$600	\$589,834			\$402,172		
06/16/2012	\$2,000	\$591,834				donate to torservers	
06/16/2012	\$4,000	\$595,834			\$396,172		
06/16/2012	\$18,000	\$613,834				payroll (forum)	
06/16/2012	\$20,000	\$633,834				payroll (mail)	
06/16/2012	\$20,000	\$653,834				payroll (sr2.0)	
06/16/2012	\$1,800	\$655,634				server rent	
06/17/2012	ψ1,000	\$655,634	\$66,400			commissions	
06/17/2012		\$655,634	\$64,000	\$1,122,406			
06/17/2012	\$160	\$655,794	ψυ,υυυ	\$1,122,406			\vdash
06/17/2012	ψ100	\$655,794 \$655,794	\$33,713			commissions	+
06/19/2012		\$655,794	\$21,125	\$1,177,244		commissions	+
06/19/2012	\$3,228	\$659,022	ΨΖ1,123	\$1,177,244		server rent	
06/20/2012	ψ5,220	\$659,022	\$11,960	\$1,189,204		commissions	
06/22/2012	\$2,000	\$661,022	\$11,900	\$1,189,204		donate to torservers	
06/22/2012	\$4,000	\$665,022		\$1,189,204			1
06/30/2012	\$775	\$665,797		\$1,189,204			1
07/06/2012	\$115	\$665,797	\$13,543	\$1,202,747		commissions	-
07/06/2012	\$1,000		\$13,543	\$1,202,747			-
	. ,	\$666,797 \$670,707		\$1,202,747		donate to torservers	
07/06/2012	\$4,000	\$670,797		. , ,	\$531,950		-
07/06/2012	\$1,768	\$672,565		\$1,202,747		server rent	-
07/14/2012	\$2,000	\$674,565		\$1,202,747		donate to torservers	-
07/14/2012	\$8,000	\$682,565		\$1,202,747	\$520,182		-
07/19/2012	\$14,305	\$696,870	\$32,005	\$1,202,747		payroll, me	-
07/20/2012	\$2,701 \$1,000	\$699,571	\$32,005	\$1,234,752		commissions	-
07/20/2012		\$700,571		\$1,234,752		donate to torservers	
07/20/2012	\$4,000	\$704,571 \$707,074		\$1,234,752			-
07/20/2012	\$2,700	\$707,271		\$1,234,752		server rent	-
07/27/2012	\$1,000	\$708,271		\$1,234,752		donate to torservers	
07/27/2012	\$4,000	\$712,271		\$1,234,752			
08/03/2012	\$1,000	\$713,271		\$1,234,752		donate to torservers	
08/03/2012	\$4,000	\$717,271		\$1,234,752			
08/03/2012	\$474	\$717,745		\$1,234,752		server rent	\vdash
08/11/2012	\$1,000	\$718,745		\$1,234,752		donate to torservers	\vdash
08/11/2012	\$4,000	\$722,745		\$1,234,752		i	\vdash
08/18/2012						donate to torservers	\vdash
08/18/2012	\$4,000	' '	Фоо о т :	\$1,234,752			\vdash
08/24/2012	M40.00	\$727,745	\$28,974			commissions	<u> </u>
08/24/2012						donate to torservers	<u> </u>
08/24/2012				\$1,263,726			<u> </u>
08/24/2012				\$1,263,726		payroll, me	<u> </u>
08/24/2012	\$500			\$1,263,726		server rent	
08/29/2012				\$1,263,726			<u> </u>
08/29/2012				\$1,263,726		payroll (forum)	<u> </u>
08/29/2012				\$1,263,726		payroll (forum) advance	
08/29/2012	\$25,000					payroll (smed)	
08/29/2012	\$30,000					payroll (sr2.0, exchange)	
08/29/2012				\$1,263,726			<u> </u>
08/29/2012				\$1,263,726			
08/31/2012	\$2,000					donate to torservers	
08/31/2012	\$4,000	\$881,245		\$1,263,726	\$382,481	payroll	

date	expense	total expenses	revenue	total_revenue	total	notes	
09/06/2012			Tevenue	\$1,263,726		donate to torservers	
09/06/2012	. ,			\$1,263,726			
09/14/2012	+ ,			\$1,263,726			
09/14/2012		\$891,620				payroll, bounties	
09/21/2012		\$892,620				donate to torservers	
09/21/2012	\$2,000	\$894,620		\$1,263,726			
09/28/2012	. ,	\$894,620				commissions	
09/28/2012		\$895,620	Ψ102, 470	\$1,416,201		donate to torservers	
09/28/2012	\$2,100	\$897,720		\$1,416,201			
10/05/2012		\$898,720				donate to torservers	
10/05/2012	\$2,100	\$900,820		\$1,416,201			
10/12/2012	\$1,000	\$901,820				donate to torservers	
10/12/2012		\$906,220		\$1,416,201			
10/12/2012	\$8,000	\$914,220		\$1,416,201		payroll, me	
10/26/2012	\$500	\$914,720		\$1,416,201		donate to btccharts	
10/26/2012		\$918,720		\$1,416,201			
10/26/2012	\$1,000	\$919,720		\$1,416,201		donate to torservers	
11/03/2012	\$4,400	\$924,120		\$1,416,201			
11/03/2012		\$925,120		\$1,416,201		donate to torservers	
11/16/2012		\$927,520		\$1,416,201			
11/16/2012	\$2,000	\$929,520		\$1,416,201		donate to torservers	
11/10/2012	Ψ2,000	ψ020,020		ψ1, +10,201	ψ-100,001	cimon debacle.	
11/16/2012	\$93,150	\$1,022,670		\$1 416 201	\$393 531	development	
11/17/2012		\$1,022,670		\$1,544,251		commissions	
11/18/2012		. , ,	Ψ120,000			pay off hacker	
11/23/2012				\$1,544,251			
11/23/2012		. , ,		\$1,544,251		donate to torservers	
11/30/2012		\$1,053,270		\$1,544,251			
11/30/2012	\$1,000			\$1,544,251		donate to torservers	
11/30/2012				\$1,544,251		server rent	
11/30/2012				\$1,544,251		server rent	
12/07/2012				\$1,544,251			
12/07/2012		\$1,059,670		\$1,544,251		donate to torservers	
12/07/2012	\$1,030	\$1,060,700		\$1,544,251		server rent	
12/14/2012	\$1,900	\$1,062,600		\$1,544,251			
12/14/2012		\$1,063,600		\$1,544,251		donate to torservers	
12/14/2012		\$1,063,600	\$40,930	\$1,585,181		commissions	
12/15/12	25000		¥ 10,000	\$1,585,181		pay off hacker	
12/20/2012		\$1,090,500		\$1,585,181			
12/24/2012	\$1,000	\$1,091,500		\$1,585,181		donate to torservers	
12/24/2012	\$3,159	\$1,094,659		\$1,585,181			
12/27/2012		\$1,096,659		\$1,585,181			
12/27/2012						donate to torservers	
01/03/2013	. ,			\$1,585,181			
01/04/2013				\$1,585,181		payroll, me	
01/07/2013		\$1,100,996		\$1,585,181		server rent	
01/10/2013		\$1,103,196		\$1,585,181			
01/10/2013				\$1,585,181		donate to torservers	
01/14/2013				\$1,585,181		server rent	
01/17/2013				\$1,585,181		server rent	
	, , ,	. , ,,,,,,,,		. ,			
01/18/2013	\$60,000	\$1,171,866		\$1,585,181	\$413,315	payroll smed and dev team	
01/24/2013				\$1,585,181			10k btc
		. , ,		. ,,	,		


date	expense	total expenses	revenue	total revenue	total	notes
01/24/2013				\$1,585,181		
01/24/2013	. ,					donate to torservers
01/24/2013		\$1,335,843		\$1,585,181		
01/31/2013	\$2,400			\$1,585,181		
01/31/2013	\$1,000	\$1,339,243		\$1,585,181		donate to torservers
02/05/2013	\$480	\$1,339,723		\$1,585,181		server rent
02/07/2013	\$1,200	\$1,340,923		\$1,585,181		
02/07/2013	\$948	\$1,341,871		\$1,585,181	\$243,310	server rent
02/07/2013	\$1,000	\$1,342,871		\$1,585,181	\$242,310	donate to torservers
02/10/2013	\$474	\$1,343,345		\$1,585,181	\$241,836	server rent
02/14/2012	\$1,200	\$1,344,545		\$1,585,181	\$240,636	payroll
02/21/2013	\$1,800	\$1,346,345		\$1,585,181	\$238,836	payroll
02/21/2013	\$162,000	\$1,508,345		\$1,585,181	\$76,836	op greenville
02/21/2013		\$1,508,345	\$444,745	\$2,029,926	\$521,581	commissions
02/28/2013		\$1,510,545		\$2,029,926	\$519,381	payroll
03/01/2013	\$537	\$1,511,082		\$2,029,926	\$518,844	server rent
03/01/2013	\$2,742	\$1,513,824		\$2,029,926	\$516,102	server rent
03/07/2013	\$2,200	\$1,516,024		\$2,029,926	\$513,902	payroll
03/13/2013	\$2,733					server rent
03/21/2013	\$2,500					payroll
03/26/2013	\$5,000					server rent
04/04/2013						payroll
04/11/2013						payroll
04/12/2013	\$15,000					payroll, me
04/19/2013	\$2,500					payroll
04/26/2013	\$2,500					payroll
05/03/2013						payroll
05/07/2013						to cimon for fpga
05/08/2013						pay off hacker
05/08/2013						payroll
05/11/2013	+					server rent
	\$2,000,000					theft from mtgox
06/02/2013	\$500,000					loan to r&w
06/05/2013						pay off hacker
06/12/13						pay off hacker
06/19/2013						pay off hacker
06/26/2013	\$50,000					pay off hacker
07/03/2013	\$50,000					pay off hacker
07/03/2013	\$57,000					to cimon



GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 251 14 Cr. 68 (KBF)


7	5																																000
) 																																0
Debt	inventory itsaa	2200	amex																														To+01
value	1400		20	20	ь С	nnel																											0000
ets	lisaa	2000	paypal	cash	000	westpac																		outstanding checks (-)									F
value	10400000				C	800			4150	00809	3000	64000																					000
Hard assets	er inc	2 = 5			COL	samsung 7002		bitcoins:	Mtgox – sh	instawallet	Sr	hot storage										accounts	receivable:										H
Notes	started at DSII	just before buying	house		start as CEO of	2939 Good Wagon		29948 launch sr				close GWB		hire syg and h7				fire syg		68647 bitcoin theft													
Net	WOLLIN R21	70	13809.78 house	33349.82	00100	29539	28/53	29948	52652	63780	69787	77131	87492	100992	105989	198031	214866	238645 fire syg	272360		179573	T	384050	14238400	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(
Net	71	,	13059.78	7418.59	0000	4,1999						90029						238245	272060	68397	179323		383800	3000									
Total			0	167157.8			61.001					9530						552	6	0	0		n	0									
Hard	750		750	193089	0076	3600	14425	14375	14125	14125	14125	15125	15125	15125	15125	13300	300	300	300	250	250	L	750	3000 14235400									
	dssets 71		13059.78	7418.59	07070	30003	24347	24821	48343	59283	65361	71536	81969	95469	100368	190236	214566	238897	272069	68397	179323		383800										
Date	90	20-851	May-07	May-09	2	Jan-11	Feb-11	Apr-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Aug-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	7	Apr-12	Jun-12									


NetWorthCalculator.ods



NetWorthCalculator.ods

NetWorthCalculator.ods






```
pay employees
    inigo - $1500
    libertas - $1500
    batman73 - $1000 // ssbd
     cirrus - $1000
     smedley - $2500
     spock8642 - $500 // drx
     albertpacino - $500 // pacino
check emails
    safe-mail.net
         dianewallace - bora
         donaldboone - loup
         nnsWp4tsgjrdhG3L, jKsbyiWqsAS6Gxo6 - maiden
    fastmail
         salesdept@ftml.net, sdept66 - btc
    mail.com
         jordanlind@linuxmail.org, RPGLdgjjveBtHpEN - lam
check server expirations
     add 1 month if within 1 month
update and test servers
    bora
    loup
    btc
    lam
check for CI update (currently 2.1.4)
    http://ellislab.com/codeigniter
    /var/www/market/system/core/Input.php
                       $this->ip_address = '127.0.0.1';
         + Line 313
         + Line 358 $this->ip_address = '127.0.0.1';
         + Line 359 //
         + Line 361 $this->ip_address = '127.0.0.1';
check for smf update (currently 2.0.5)
    http://download.simplemachines.org/
post on forum
post on twitter
review personal organization
    clear collection
    review projects
    review someday
    review references
    review "to read"
pay off bugger
     17LqFWnkP48nkgBsxt6fAtX1GJXBBTeRxc
     $55k
```





write weekly summary


MEMORIZE


memorize backup login
memorize cimon email and dprid password
memorize inigo handshake
read any good books lately?
anything by rothbard
how much were you fined for posession
\$200














MONTHLY TRANSACTION SUMMARY

ICELAND "BTC" SERVER/PHILADELPHIA "BACKUP" SERVER TO ULBRICHT LAPTOP WALLETS


MONTH	TRANSACTIONS	BTC RECEIVED	USD EQUIVALENT*
Sep-12	596	300,482	\$3,695,190.46
Oct-12	279	146,839	\$1,877,974.64
Nov-12	6	42,264	\$514,382.79
Dec-12	1	5,275	\$66,880.98
Jan-13	14	87,000	\$1,529,030.00
Feb-13	24	72,000	\$1,530,750.00
Mar-13	2	7,134	\$467,440.84
Apr-13	1	3,900	\$526,500.00
Jul-13	2,834	27,000	\$2,219,594.95
Aug-13	3	8,362	\$931,807.95

Grand Total 3,760 700,254 \$13,359,552.62





SA-67



Case 15-1815, Document 121-1, 06/17/2016, 1796763, Page75 of 121

SA-68

	Seizure Number	Purchase Date	Vendor	Date Analyzed	Net Weight (g)	Drug Detected
1	20123901-00022501	1/8/2012	JUERGEN2001	2/15/2012	0.98	MDMA
2	20123901-10252601	1/8/2012	CHEMICAL BROTHERS	2/17/2012	1	MDMA
3	20123901-00022401	1/8/2012	JUERGEN2001	3/1/2012	0.85	Amphetamine
4	20123901-10261601	1/8/2012	AMSTERDAMGOODS	2/15/2012	1	MDMA
5	20123901-00023701	1/8/2012	SESAMPINO	2/15/2012	0.97	MDMA
6	20123901-00025901	1/8/2012	MDMATE	2/15/2012	1	MDMA
7	20123901-00025601	1/8/2012	NAMASTE	2/16/2012	0.31	MDMA
8	20123901-00024401	1/8/2012	STREET PHARMACY	2/21/2012	2.6	MDMA
9	20123901-00023701	1/8/2012	SESAMPINO	2/28/2012	1.1	Cocaine Hydrochloride
10	20123901-00023301	1/8/2012	MROUID	3/1/2012	11.1	Meth Hydrochloride
11	20123901-10263901	1/8/2012	SUNSHINE	3/6/2012	0.1	2C-B
12	20123901-00023801	1/8/2012	PEACE AND LOVE	3/6/2012	0.13	Oxycodone
13	20123901-00026501	1/8/2012	WALTER	3/6/2012	0.19	DMT
14	20123901-00024501	1/8/2012	HASHUK	3/13/2012	1	Marijuana
15	20123901-00023401	1/8/2012	ALTEREGO	3/16/2012	19.2	Morphine, Codine, Thebaine
16	20123901-00023501	1/8/2012	CRIPLED CRANIUM	3/16/2012	0.011	LSD
17	20123901-00025801	1/8/2012	YESHUA	3/21/2012	1.2	Bufotenine
18	20123901-10390601	3/1/2012	DUTCHAANBOD	4/10/2012	0.61	Cocaine Hydrochloride
19	20123901-00037201	3/1/2012	IVORY	5/4/2012	0.24	2C-B/MDMA
20	20123901-10390801	3/1/2012	NORIEGA	5/7/2012	0.49	Heroin Hydrochloride
21	20123901-10390701	3/1/2012	MADE IN HOLLAND	5/11/2012	0.35	MDMA
22	20123901-10390901	3/1/2012	DRJOHNHALPERN	5/11/2012	0.27	MDMA
23	20123901-00037601	3/1/2012	SKYY	5/14/2012	1.3	MDMA/MDDMA
24	20123901-00037901	3/1/2012	DOPEYDWARF	5/14/2012	0.24	MDMA
25	20123901-00038001	3/1/2012	DAGOBERT	5/14/2012	0.28	MDMA
26	20123901-00038101	3/1/2012	MITANOX	5/14/2012	1	MDMA
27	20123901-00039301	3/1/2012	BLAATZOR	5/4/2012	0.93	Amphetamine
28	20123901-00039401	3/1/2012	MISTERSAFE	5/14/2012	1.7	MDMA
29	20123901-00042101	3/1/2012	MRNICE1	5/14/2012	0.1	Heroin
30	20123901-00042201	3/1/2012	GOOGLEYED	6/1/2012	16	(No Controlled Substance)
31	20123901-00055901	5/18/2012	KITTYCAT	7/24/2012	0.34	MDMA
32	20123901-00056101	5/29/2012	DUTCHQUALITYBEANS	7/24/2012	2	MDMA
33	20123901-00056201	5/18/2012	MAGICALBONNY	7/24/2012	0.63	MDMA
34	20123901-00056401	5/18/2012	CLOUDSURFER	7/24/2012	1	MDMA
35	20123901-00056501	5/18/2012	SCHIZOFREEN	7/25/2012	0.3	MDMA
36	20123901-00056501	5/18/2012	SCHIZOFREEN	7/25/2012	0.93	MDMA
37	20123901-00056301	5/18/2012	AMSTERDOPE	8/22/2012	0.97	Amphetamine
38	20123901-00062001	5/18/2012	ABZU	7/25/2012	1	MDMA
39	2013390100044601	3/6/2013	BEST DUTCH DRUGS	4/26/2013	1.1	MDMA
40	2013390100044701	3/6/2013	EMONKEY	4/26/2013	1.2	MDMA
41	2013390100045401	3/6/2013	CHEMICALSISTERS	4/26/2013	0.47	MDMA
42	2013390100045101	3/6/2013	UGLYDOLL	5/17/2013	0.21	Heroin/MDMA
43	2013390100044201	3/6/2013	HAPPYTIMEZZ	5/23/2013	0.44	Cocaine Base
44	2013390100044201	3/6/2013	CHARLIEANDMOLLIE	5/23/2013	0.49	Cocaine Hydrochloride
45	2013390100044501	3/6/2013	ABZU	7/18/2013	1	Amphetamine
46	2013390100045201	3/7/2013	THE DUTCH GUY	7/18/2013	0.089	DMT
47	2013390100043201	3/6/2013	FREDTHEBAKER	8/1/2013	0.014	LSD
48	2013390100044301	3/6/2013	AAKOVEN	8/1/2013	0.032	LSD
49	2013390100043301	3/6/2013	NEVITA	7/31/2013	1	25i-NBOMe
50	2013390100048201	3/6/2013	MERCURY 31	4/26/2013	2.1	MDMA
51	2013390100049301	3/6/2013	DUTCHFLOWERS	4/29/2013	1.3	MDMA
52	2013390100043401	4/11/2013	AMSTERDOPE	8/1/2013	0.1	5-MeO-DMT
2-	_515556166661461	1./ 1.2/ 2010	P	0, 1, 2010	10.2	5C5 51411

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 801 14 Cr. 68 (KBF)

802 14 Cr. 68 (KBF)

Undercover Purchases from Silk Road Made by DEA New York Field Office

Purchase Date	Vendor	Drug Ordered	Delivery Date	Lab Test Date	Net Weight (g)	Drug Detected
9/22/2011	ITALIANPILOT	heroin	10/4/2011	10/11/2011	0.21 g	heroin
1/3/2012	PAPERCHASING	heroin	1/12/2012	1/19/2012	0.39 g	heroin
2/10/2012	PHARMVILLE	oxycodone	2/15/2012	5/10/2012	5.7 g	oxycodone
3/6/2012	PHARMVILLE	oxycodone	3/11/2012	6/21/2012	26.3 g	oxycodone
3/6/2012	PHARMERJOHN	heroin	3/9/2012	6/21/2012	2.9 g	heroin
5/4/2012	HYPERCITY	amphetamine	5/11/2012	8/31/2012	0.46 g	amphetamine
5/31/2012	KALONJI	crack cocaine (cocaine base)	6/8/2012	12/3/2012	5.3 g	cocaine base
6/18/2012	VICODIN	oxycodone	6/28/2012	1/24/2013	0.54 g	oxycodone
8/16/2012	VICODIN	oxycodone	8/21/2012	3/11/2013	2.7 g	oxycodone
9/14/2012	MOXYCOTTON	oxycodone	9/26/2012	4/4/2013	2.3 g	oxycodone
9/14/2012	DEADHEAD777	heroin	9/26/2012	3/29/2013	0.52 g	heroin
10/19/2012	MOXYCOTTON	oxycodone	10/25/2012	4/10/2013	2.3 g	oxycodone
5/14/2013	NOD	cocaine	5/21/2013	8/29/2013	7.0 g	cocaine



the Dread Pirate Roberts

messages 0 orders 0 account \$0.0000

Silk Road anonymous market

Search

3

16

HI, FBINY



Dissociatives 203

Ecstasy 1,304 Intoxicants 71

Opioids 365

Other 82

Cannabis 2,906

Drugs 13,802

Shop by Category

White DMT crystals 200 mg

B0.2424

Psychedelics 1,746

Stimulants 1,644

Tobacco 218

Apparel 753

Prescription 4,650

Precursors 62

B0.2243







Drug paraphernalia 496

Electronics 239

Computer equipment 100

Collectibles 26

Books 1,322

Art 14

Custom Orders 87

Digital goods 892





Lotteries & games 169

Lab Supplies 30

Jewelry 104

Home & Garden 28

Forgeries 156

Food 13

Fireworks 34

Erotica 584

Hardware 35

Musical instruments 7

Money 269

Medical 56

Packaging 91

Services 171



Sporting goods 3

Writing 7

1 gr of AFGHAN OPIUM, Limited Stock



HOW TO: Run your own

Feedback system

'A TUITA

changes

relay and help the Tor

network!

French Seller Pure HC Flake

Cocaine 0.5 Gr (500mg)

15/0", 2013

Ask a drug expert physician about drugs

Winning the war on

and health

DPR's Book Club: Cast

your vote!

From the forum

Methylmethcathinone 99.8% 1G Mephedrone 4-MMC, 4-



framadol generic 100mg 100 ₿0.4585 count

Anavar 100 tabs @ 20mg

\$0.9830



DEEMS BEENS

 Modafinil 200mg 100 pills
 Tracking + Free ship • BO.7121

₿0.5346



3.5g DMT - Majestic and High quality! \$4.7925




MDMA Lowest Price Grams

₿0.4182




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
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Electronics 200 Erotica 584 Fireworks 34 Food 13 Forgeries 156 Hardware 35 Home & Garden 28 Jewelry 104 Lab Supplies 30 Lotteries & games 169 Medical 56 Money 269 Musical instruments 7 Packaging 91 Services 171 Sporting goods 3 Tickets 4 Writing 7



	seller: lexq 0.0 ships from: Canada	4 3 2 1	BO.9017 add to cart
CHENZ	3.5g of Cocaine **FAST SHIPPING** seller: nationchemz 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2	\$1.4188 add to cart
no image	7g of Amazing uncut Fishscale Cola seller: JustSmuggledN 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$4.4803 add to cart
Shine69 01/07/2013	3.5 GRAMS OF GOOD QUALITY COCAINE CHEAPEST IN UK! seller: shine69 0.0 ships from: United Kingdom	5 4 3 2 1	\$2.2169 add to cart
DISPATER	COCAINE 3.5G seller: dispater 0.0 ships from: United Kingdom	5 4 3 2 1	\$2.5533 add to cart
BIG SALE	10G Pure Cocaine Cristal !!!!!! seller: c63amg 0.0 ships from: Netherlands	5 4 3 2 1	\$6.1074 add to cart
HINE69	3.5 GRAMS ULTRA PURE COCAINE- LAB TESTED 90%+ seller; shine69 0.0 ships from: United Kingdom	5 4 3 2 1	\$3.8710 add to cart
Barland	1 gram ***HIGH GRADE PREMIUM QUALITY COCAINE*** seller: BestPricePills 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$1.1452 add to cart
	1Gr High Quality Cocaine from UK delivery 2 days seller: FPUK 0.0 ships from: United Kingdom	5 4 3 2 1	\$1.1719 add to cart
	3.5 grams High quality cocaine seller: Lloydsbrothers 0.0 ships from: United Kingdom	5 4 3 2 1	\$4.0125 add to cart
3 > Last >			




Diesel	Gram of Heroin	5	
Thurapy	seller: DieselTherapy 0.0	3 2	₿0.5228
	ships from: United States of America	1	add to cart
事をなった	Heroin China White 1/2 Gram	5 4	
	seller: supremesmoke 0.0	3 2	B1.2261
	ships from: United States of America	1	add to cart
	Blue Diamond Heroin 1 Gram	5 4	
no image	seller: DieselTherapy 0.0 ships from: United States of America	3 2 1	#0.8588 add to cart
	snips from, office states of Affenda	1	add to sair.
	1/2 GR- # 4 AFGHAN HEROIN - US XPRESS	5 4	
	seller: subsrgood 0.0 ships from: United States of America	3 2 1	BO.9708 add to cart
	T		
	HEROIN 1G	5 4	A Company
no image	seller: dispater 0.0 ships from: United Kingdom	3 2 1	BO.7999 add to cart
no image	East Coast Style Heroin Stamps x 50 Bags (1 Brick) seller: deezletime 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$2.5888 add to cart
MMY BOYLE	my mid wised batch LUCU CUALITY barein mag	5	
	my mid priced batch. HIGH QUALITY heroin no3. 0.5g	4 3	₿0.7147
多	seller: jimmy boyle 0.0 ships from: United Kingdom	2 1	add to cart
	1 gram of #4 SE Asian White Rock Heroin	5 4	
	seller: OZconnection 0.0 ships from: Australia	3 2 1	\$2.5888 add to cart
417	Uncut Raw brown Heroin #4 1 Gram WARNING	5 4	
MARIA	UNCUT RAW	3 2	\$1.9505
	seller: FreeWay 0.0 ships from: United States of America	1	add to cart
	1g #3 Afghan Brown Heroin, FAST shipping	5 4	
		3 2	B0.6315
	seller: JunkieXXL 0.0 ships from: Germany	1	add to cart
	seller: JunkieXXL 0.0 ships from: Germany	1	add to cart
		5 4	add to cart


	1g #3 Afghan Brown Heroin, FAST shipping seller: JunkieXXL 0.0 ships from: Germany	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.6315 add to cart
no image	Blue Diamond Stamp Bags seller: DieselTherapy 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.0897 add to cart
BIG SALE	5G Afghan Heroin (Light Brown Powder #3) Strong!!! seller: c63amg 0.0 ships from: Netherlands	1 5 4 3 2 1	\$3.5775 add to cart
no image	1 gram afghan h #4 seller: Tomorrowman 0.0 ships from: Canada	5 4 3 2 1	\$1.7098 add to cart
A SAL	NYC HEROIN STAMPS seller: deluxedelivery 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.1651 add to cart
Purcst"	Pure, Uncut Black Tar Heroin (BTH) 1 Gram seller: purest 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$1.4281 add to cart
BIG SALE	0.5G Afghan Heroin (Light Brown Powder #3) Strong! seller: c63amg 0.0 ships from: Netherlands	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.4937 add to cart
Purcat"	1/2 Gram Pure, Uncut Black Tar Heroin seller: purest 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.7796 add to cart
Dirsel Threapy	Heroin Stamp Bags seller: DieselTherapy 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.0598 add to cart

\$1 = \$1.0000

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
Services 171 Sporting goods 3 Tickets 4 Writing 7





	100v.I CD blotter WeW	5	
9	100x LSD blotter WoW	4 3	
1 comme	seller: OrderOfThePhoenix 0.0	2	\$4.6670
150	ships from: United States of America	1	add to cart
	50x LSD blotter WoW 100ug	5 4	
Total mark	seller: OrderOfThePhoenix 0.0	3 2	B 2.4642
	ships from: United States of America	1	add to cart
Management of the	10 x DUTCH Premium LSD - Clean 8 REAL - Lab	5 4	
Edini - Complete	test	3	B0.5705
BEETE BEETE	seller: HollandOnline 0.0	2	add to cart
	ships from: Netherlands		
W 18:	LSD - RED MICRODOTS - 120/125UG x10 DOTS	5 4	
and answer.	seller: jerseycow 0.0	3 2	B0.7612
ALL THE	ships from: Ireland	1	add to cart
	4 Potent LSD blotters	5 4	
	seller: Clearance 0.0	3 2	B0.4281
	ships from: United States of America	1	add to cart
	25x LSD blotter WoW 100ug	5 4	
		3	B1.4935
	seller: OrderOfThePhoenix 0.0 ships from: United States of America	2	add to cart
A MARIANTANA	50 x 150ug LSD Blotters - PURE, CLEAN and	5 4	
	POTENT	3	B3.8450
	seller: Peaceful 0.0	2	add to cart
	ships from: Australia		
	3 blotters *Dalai Lama LAB TESTED @ 210ug*	5	
		4 3	₿0.3337
	3 blotters *Dalai Lama LAB TESTED @ 210ug* seller: FartBomber 0.0 ships from: Netherlands	4	B 0.3337 add to cart


\$1 = \$1.0000


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












What is the best way to send the ID form + pic?

Fill out your ID form, provide an Anonfiles picture link and send it in an PGP encrypted message at checkout. If you don't know how to encrypt yet use privnote.com to upload the ID form along with the Anonfiles picture link.

Anonfiles URL: anonfiles.com Privnote URL: privnote.com

For those who want to start PGP encrypting, download the program GPG4USB, its the easiest encryption tool to use

GPG4USB URL: http://gpg4usb.cpunk.de/ *Include shipping details at checkout*

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (MingW32)

--- END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK---

mQGiBFBinv4RBACiMKVLxmpgiuaH9ZRLonOn2V+1MVGNJkqqpK77XH+bGGSiYvzi l3fasWYeF6m1g97vafpB9Q/H+d75RfXBMsN+g0i29jQR4/iXw/ZwzUitG+rAercL LH/YfUDP2AePya+2KtKSFUJrSuHagh0wj8V/ri52P149UtAi8Q/qArWtiwCg51vM qWjLEWJSAWQkr0ZYvZGcZXUD/0HkRTxy5pU7HFgK0kBMqdOJ5XSXLlBk8TyQBlea dJY07ti15zXuYmhxAUkxKdzzVvXSgJKBD0mNPGpTHJgUesvmEMKhTZrmebCuMql/ hv2HF596Uv/u8qQlfyfBXeb0LQ3rfLvBV+zLBgR62LOXVXIL+bkBw2h3QiHFOsly FphHA/9f7RKERPSaWLHK6g30a2zsPbdf5yFSuC5JIqvGj0Iqtci7ap4XjSDV6zth n4znm1x+Peo66VtBC2pq1o/zf6PF/QEEAuY8lUbGGTinOqXWxgv4FffUJkVqO7Gd iLmRapWs8WW7x1IKIhLPflUPf9ABRD1B/peEYlpat9TattdgH7QIS2luZ09mQ2x1 YnMgPGtpbmdvZmNsdWJzOHRvcm1haWwub3JnPohiBBMRAgAiBOJOYp7+AhsiBgsJ CAcDAgYVCAIJCgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRCqda8F7pGKlk1RAKCOkSNTqAhorXHu okIPvq9l/rns1gCbBJqNdORqpk6auf7BIFh3LGgBPsK5Ag0EUGKe/hAIAK/0e1il GfK7QJ3tfSRv8AHGIFhuKeO7kPuilzSTPf97C34Zgy0o2vUQ1HtkrTgNsSAW5OJ+ ou+gdDOCU5VDf4WWNVagnRe7SLfa8yzNvPih5SjTlxNLEAHgD18UllwVAnPmRFBP X+FJZSza9xYhCUdYwNgpz7VAoPazCRPAVKqurLzvTtk5nhCx2XzDxngplOuCoHGF W9Ki6KaE8SzXwOH2GmbLqAREEHWJqWuMU8Z4Py8kYiTi6yQXilxF7+lj5njkR1Vv QLmSdRMKUYY+qPUbQlfpWqQZJnQezP4Fq04h8Bi/hjytvEntTOMgot9pmQ16fxP9 G8HtP4oOElCr4GMAAwYH/31mfy/wSD9BXoc0gOgTap7Q5wbid69KfMM1eDmGStAs cf1U37WdfUqA+hNo+LQMpUonz//dJMRsTyq5df116Dh39W32Y4o0P9MD50WQrWSc wl2XLsjPpIQSnLvVaEdFU0I4uTfYgwLwjIMzonmWnZdNW2iOBm9I0RSei+y6ao8I f2Vmg7Q6u+x+waBumPvmPgEIyksqv3whzPGMLA85DWTnFVJS9mH0d2WQQWvPrzKr ZVKfLfL3aikVheCR32LpfUZlFOdNDZg+3HrQc7l1L6G5pUGwCM7SFovER6yMawgB MVP6w2vSHXke2AJCYnvh1JeO+HxnVR4ATM2Cs9qLYGOISQQYEQIACQUCUGKe/glb DAAKCRCqda8F7pGKlviCAKCBJCKAR/F2D76uD/8qxr5S1Dby9wCfWJGJyQrw9J9S ELuFH6y5RtX4+TU= =t1H/

Reviews:

ort by: freshness	go ③		
on ay. Treatment	(3-)		
irepdaronx	review for: New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable) qty; 1 price: B1+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 1+ \$1+ 1+	Very honest seller. As straight up as you can get in an industry where I have only encountered the opposite! Would recommend!! 5/5		
alias hidden	review for: New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable)	1y 5m old	5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Awesome as always :)		
alias hidden	review for. New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable)	1y 6m old	1 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Terrible quality, looks 0 fake, got denied twice, doesn't even scan. Made me FE now I can't get my money back, don't even think about buying from this guy.		
alias hidden	review for. New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable)	1y 6m old	2 of 5
stats: (hidden)	I gave him over 2 weeks in advanced notice and told him I did not want it unless it was here in time. Claims to have sent out the package on friday although the tracking states that the post office did not receive it until the following Tuesday. I am very upset I worked not recommend. The only reason why he gets a 2 is because he did send it.	with this vendo	r, 1 do
alias hidden	review for: New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable)	1y 6m old	3 of 5
stats: (hidden)	took forever but refunded so its all good		
alias hidden	review for. New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable)	1y 6m old	4 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Quality not quite the same as original, but the vendor made me a deal on another product.		
alias hidden	review for: New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable)	1y 7m old	5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	great communication, cant wait!		
alias hidden	review for: New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable)	1y 7m old	5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Great response times and photo! Guy is legit, don't waste your time with anyone else.		
alias hidden	review for. New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable)	1y 7m old	5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Looks amazing. Great communication and service. Will be back! 5/5		
	review for, New York Driver's License (Hologram + Scannable)	1y 7m old	5 of 5
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Pennsylvania Drivers License (Holograms+Scannable)

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DEINER'S LICENSE

Item info:

add to cart bookmark discuss 1 report





GOVERNMENT

Description

ID Form:

(Whatever info you provide below will be the same info that goes on the card, please double check to make sure there are no mistakes)

Date of Birth (MM/DD/YY):

Height:

Weight:

Hair Color:

Eye Color:

issue Date: (if you don't provide an issue date i'll make one up for you)

Address: (If you don't provide an address ill make one up for you)

Take 1 photo taken with a digital camera against a wall, from the shoulders up. (The better the pic the better the ID, you can also get passport photos done and scan them, up to you)

-If you want your own signature, draw your signature on paper, take a pic and attach it. (If you don't send a signature or if the signature you sent isn't **Try to avoid having shadows in the pictures, if there is a shadow I will do my best to edit accordingly**

usable i'll make one up for you.)

What is the best way to send the ID form + pic?

out your ID form, provide an Anorfiles picture link and send it in an PGP encrypted message at checkout. If you don't know how to encrypt yet use privnote.com to upload the ID form along with the Anonfiles picture link.

Anonfiles URL: anonfiles.com Privnote URL: privnote.com For those who want to start PGP encrypting, download the program GPG4USB, its the easiest encryption tool to use

GPG4USB URL http://gpg4usb.cpunk.de/ *Include shipping details at checkout*

----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK---Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (MingW32)

MVP6w2vSHXke2AJCYnvh1JeO+HxnVR4ATM2Cs9qLYGOISQQYEQIACQUCUGKe/glb f2Vmg7Q6u+x+waBumPvmPgEIyksqv3whzPGMLA85DWTnFVJS9mH0d2WQQWvPrzKr YnMqPGtpbmdvZmNsdWJzOHRvcm1haWwub3JnPohiBBMRAqAiB QJQYp7+AhsiBqsJ CAcDAgYVCAIJCgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRCqda8F7pGKIKIRAKCOkSNTqAhorXHu qwjLEWJSAWQkroZYvZGcZXUD/0HkRTxy5pU7HFgK0kBMqdOJ5XSXLIBk8TyOBlea mQGiBFBinv4RBACiMKVLxmpgiuaH9ZRLonOn2V+1MVGNJkqqpK77XH+bGGSiWzi G8HtP4oOElCr4GMAAwYH/31mfy/wSD9BXoc0gOgTap7Q5wbid69KfMM1eDmGStAs d1U37WdfUqA+hNo+LQMpUonZ//dJMRsTyq5df116Dh39W32Y4o0P9MD50WQrWSc ou+gdDOCU5VDf4WWNVagnRe7SLfa8yzNvPih5SjTIxNLEAHgD18UllwVAnPmRFBP ZVKfLfL3aikVheCR32LpfUZIFOdNDZg+3HrQc7l1L6G5pUGwCM7SFovER6yMawgB DAAKCRCqda8F7pGKlviCAKCBJCKAR/F2D76uD/8qxr5S1Dby9wCfWJGJyQrw9J9S dJY07ti15zXuYmhxAUkxKdzzVvXSgJKBD0mNPGpTHJgUesvmEMKhTZrmebCuMql/ X+F.JZSza9xYhCUdYwNgpz7VAoPazCRPAVKqurLzvTtk5nhCx2XzDxngplOuCoHGF W9Ki6KaE8SzXwOH2GmbLqAREEHWJqWuMU8Z4Py8kYiTi6yQXilxF7+ij5njkR1Vv QLmSdRMKUYY +qPUbQifpWqQZJnQezP4Fq04h8Bi/hjytvEntTOMgot9pmQ16fxP9 GfK7QJ3tfSRv8AHGIFhuKeO7kPuilzSTPf97C34Zgy0o2vUQ1HtkrTqNsSAW5OJ+ w/2XLsjPpIQSnLvVaEdFU0I4uTfYgwLwjIMzonmWnZdNW2iQBm9IQRSei+y6ap8I n4znm1x+Peo66VtBC2pq1o/zf6PF/QEEAuY8IUbGGTinOqXWxgv4FffUJkVqO7Gd LH/YfUDP2AePya+2KtKSFUJrSuHaghowj8V/ri52P149UtAi8Q/qArWtiwCg51vM nv2HF596Uv/u8qQlfyfBXeb0LQ3rfLvBV+zLBgR62LOXVXIL+bkBw2h3QiHFOsly iLmRapWs8WW7x11KihLPflUPf9ABRD1B/peEY/pat9TattdgH7QIS2luZ09mQ2x1 FphHA/9f7RKERPSaWLHK6g30a2zsPbdf5yFSuC5JlqvGj0lqtci7ap4XjSDV6zth 3fasWYeF6m1g97vafpB9Q/H+d75RfXBMsN+g0i29jQR4fiXw/ZwzUitG+rAercL okiPvq9l/rns1gCbBJqNdORqpk6auf7BiFh3LGqBPsK5Aq0EUGKe/hAIAK/0e1ji ELLIFH6y5RtX4+TU=

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Reviews:



Description

Price Includes Free Regular Shipping Worldwide

ID FORM:

(Whatever info you provide below will be the same info that goes on the card, please double check to make sure there are no mistakes)

Name:

Date of Birth (MM/DD/YY);

Height: Weight: Hair Color: Eye Color:

Issue Date: (If you don't provide an issue date i'll make one up for you)

Address: (If you don't provide an address ill make one up for you)

-Attach 1 photo taken with a digital camera, against a white wall, from the shoulders up

-If you want your own signature, draw the sig in black ink on white paper, take a closeup pic of the sig with a digital camera. If you don't send a sig, i'll make one up for you.

Please only send high quality pictures

Fill out your ID form, provide an Anonfiles picture link and send it in an PGP encrypted message at checkout. If you don't know how to encrypt yet use privnote com to upload the ID form along with the Anonfiles picture link.

What is the best way to send the ID form + pic?

Anonfiles URL: anonfiles.com Privnote URL: privnote.com For those who want to start PGP encrypting, download the program GPG4USB, its the easiest encryption tool to use

GPG4USB URL: http://gpg4usb.cpunk.de/ *Include shipping details at checkout* **Please provide your ID form before or during checkout, this avoids possible late/cancelled orders (it's difficult to keep track of orders on my end when the D form hasn't been sent by the buyer), also remember to include your shipping details at checkout**

----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (MingW32)

MVP6w2vSHXke2AJCYnvh1JeO+HxnVR4ATM2Cs9qLYGOISQQYEQIACQUCUGKe/glb ZVmg7Q6u+x+waBumPvmPgElyksqv3whzPGMLA85DWTnFVJS9mH0dZWQQWvPrzKr YnMgPGtpbmdvZmNsdWJzQHRvcm1haWwub3JnPohiBBMRAgAiBQJQYp7+AhsjBgsJ CAcDAgYVCAIJCgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRCqda8F7pGKIKIRAKCOkSNTqAhorXHu qWj.LEWJSAWQkr0ZWZGcZXUD/0HkRTxy5pU7HFgK0kBMqdOJ5XSXLIBk8TyQBlea mQGiBFBinv4RBACiMKVLxmpgiuaH9ZRLonOn2V+1MVGNJkqqpK77XH+bGGSiWzi G8HtP4oOElCr4GMAAwYH/31mfy/wSD9BXoo0gOgTap7Q5wbid69KfMM1eDmGStAs ou+gdDOCU5VDf4WWNVagnRe7SLfa8yzNvPih5SjTtxNLEAHgD18UllwVAnPmRFBP df1U37WdfUqA+hNo+LQMpUonz//dJMRsTyq5df116Dh39W32Y4o0P9MD50WQrWSc DAAKCRCqda8F7pGKlviCAKCBJCKAR/F2D76uD/8qxr5S1Dby9wCfWJGJyQrw9J9S dJY07ti15zXuYmhxAUkxKdzzVvXSqJKBD0mNPGpTHJqUesvmEMKhTZrmebCuMql/ ZVKftft.3aikVheCR32LpfUZIFOdNDZg+3HrQc711L6G5pUGwCM7SFovER6yMawgB X+F.JZSza9xYhCUdYwNgpz7VAoPazCRPAVKqurLzvTtk5nhCx2XzDxngplOuCoHGF M9Ki6KaE8SzXwOH2GmbLqAREEHWJqWuMU8Z4Py8KYITI6yQXilxF7+Ij5njkR1Vv QLmSdRMKUYY +qPUbQlfpWqQZJnQezP4Fq04h8Bi/hjytvEntTOMgat9pmQ16fxP9 GfK7QJ3tfSRv8AHGIFhuKeO7kPuilzSTPf97C34Zgy0o2vUQ1HtkrTqNsSAW5OJ+ n4znmlx+Peo66VtBC2pg1o/zf6PF/OEEAuY8IUbGGTinOgXWxqv4FffUJkVqO7Gd wl2XLsjPpIQSnLvVaEdFU0I4uTfYgwLwjiMzonmWnZdNW2iOBm9I0RSei+y6ao8I LH/YfUDP2AePya+2KtKSFUJrSuHaqh0wi8V/ri52P149UtAi8Q/qArWtiwCq51vM n/2HF596Uv/u8qQlfyfBXeb0LQ3rfLyBV+zLBgR62LOXVXIL+bkBw2h3QiHFOSIy LmRapWs8WW7x1IKIhLPflUPf9ABRD1B/peEVlpat9TattdgH7QlS2luZ09mQ2x1 FphHA/9f7RKERPSaWLHK6g30a2zsPbdf5yFSuC5JlqvGj0lqtci7ap4XjSDV6zth 3fasWYeF6m1g97vafpB9Q/H+d75RfXBMsN+g0i29jQR4fiXw/ZwzUitG+rAercL okiPvq9i/rns1gCbBJqNdORqpk6auf7BiFh3LGgBPsK5Ag0EUGKe/hAIAK/0e1ii ELUFH6y5RtX4+TU=

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alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for. Tennessee Driver's License (Holograms + Scannable) Great ID and fast	1y 5m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Tennessee Driver's License (Holograms + Scannable) Leave feedback here	1y 6m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Tennessee Driver's License (Holograms + Scannable) Finalized early but was sent picture of final product. Looks like great work in the picture. So far so good	1y 8m old 5 of 5
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sort by: freshness

Reviews:

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community forums wiki support







New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans)

B1.4935

add to cart | bookmark | discuss 1 | report

seller	KingOfClubs 0.0
ships from	undeclared
ships to	Worldwide
category	Fake IDs

postage options.

Regular (\$0.0000)

Description

Do you need a Medicare Card as well?

Driver's Licence & Health Card Combo: http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/16ee29bc70

Price Includes Free Regular Shipping Worldwide

ID FORM:

(Whatever info you provide below will be the same info that goes on the card, please double check to make sure there are no mistakes)

Class: Full (Yellow Top) or Provisional (Red Top)

Name

Date of Birth (MM/DD/YY):

Address: (If you don't provide an address ill make one up for you)

-Attach 1 photo taken with a digital camera, against a white wall, from the shoulders up

-If you want your own signature, draw the sig in black ink on white paper, take a closeup pic of the sig with a digital camera. If you don't send a sig, i'll make one up for you.

Please only send high quality pictures

What is the best way to send the ID form + pic?

Fill out your ID form, provide an Anonfiles picture link and send it in an PGP encrypted message at checkout. If you don't know how to encrypt yet use privnote.com to upload the ID form along with the Anonfiles picture link.

Anonfiles URL: anonfiles.com Privnote URL: privnote.com

For those who want to start PGP encrypting, download the program GPG4USB, its the easiest encryption tool to use

GPG4USB URL: http://gpg4usb.cpunk.de/ *Include shipping details at checkout* GOVERNMENT
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
Please provide your ID form before or during checkout, this avoids possible late/cancelled orders (it's difficult to keep track of orders on my end when the ID form hasn't been sent by the buyer), also remember to include your shipping details at checkout

Public Key:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (MingW32)

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Reviews:



ausdream420	review for. New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans) qty: 1 price: B1+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors	FE, Will update when product arrives.		
1+ \$10+ 1+	Looks very nice in the preview, vendor very helpful. Will be getting more once this one tested.		
	5/5		
Ozdeliver	review for: New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans) qty: 1 price: B1+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 10+ \$10+ 10+	2weeks to get to aus ID looks good hopefully it works well thanks mate		
Aussiebonghead90	review for. New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans) qty: 1 price: B1+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 10+ \$10+ 10+	It has been 25 days and still hasn't arrived to Aus, am trying to sort out a fair resolution will update with results		
dosandroz	review for: New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans) qty. 1 price: B1+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors	Speedy Work, superior product		
1+ \$1+ 1+			
zidn99	review for: New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans) qty: 1 price: #1+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 10+ #100+ 10+	excellent service!! trusted recommended vendor!! A++ service		
Butters1	review for. New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans) qty: 1 price: B1+	1y 4m old	unrated
orders spent vendors 1+ \$1+ 1+	FE early great communication. nice person. hopefully it arrives.		
Assymetry	review for: New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans) qty: 1 price: B1+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 10+ \$100+ 10+	Slight mishap but KingOfClubs was quick to respond and sort the situation out. Very communicative. Second order I've had with them/him/her.		
	ID's are pretty well made and IMO would pass for most necessary things. Stopping short may scrutinize them heavily under policy (maybe high end stores, banks, birth deaths an Post Offices and the like they have all worked flawlessly.		
TheDarkKnight123	review for: New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans) qty: 1 price: 81+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 1+ #1+ 1+	This vendor is great, would definitely recommend for speedy processing. Haven't yet received item but I have enough faith from my last transaction		
alias hidden	review for: New South Wales Driving License (Holograms+Scans)	1y 4m old	5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Satisfied with product, delivery was longer than expected, but communication from vendor was reassuring.		
123 > Last >			

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Description

This is a listing for a forged social security card. The card will look just like it looks in the picture (it is supposed to be offset as the real ones are printed that way). It will be printed on thick tag board cards and will be two sided. These are about just as good as the real ones as they have passed inside a bank before to open an account. These can even be used as one of the two forms of ID needed to open a PO box, so this and one other fake ID and you have a PO box under a fake name if you pay cash or use a prepaid card if card is required. The card will have whatever name and number you ask me to put on it. It will come unsigned and you will have to sign the signature on the card itself in ink as required for it to be valid. These are great if you just need to temporarily replace your card quicker than the formal process or need to assume another number or identity. This order will come with 4 identical cards in case you loose one, it gets something spilled on it or has wear and tear. This may also be used as secondary back up ID. If you match it to a fake ID and your fake is ever called into question presenting a backup matching ID will always clear any doubt. In addition if you assume another identity and all you have in your wallet is a fake ID and some cash it looks a little empty and suspicious, having more forms of ID and more cards to fill it up makes it look real, so buying this and more of my forged items will build a solid cover identity. Below is the order form.

Info Needed to Make Card:

- 1. Name (first, middle, last)
- 2. Number (000-00-0000)

*Please ensure to provide the name to be put on the card in all uppercase.

After you create the above order form make sure you paste it into the address/memo section in the shopping cart at check out, do not message it to me as then a copy is left in your sent box and my inbox needing to be deleted. Make sure before you place the order you save a copy of the order form and all info in case tor cuts out or SR does otherwise you will have to redo the whole thing, then after the order is placed delete and destroy the saved backup copy.

This item will be shipped between two strips of cardboard to armor it from mistreatment from mail carriers and to ensure it is not bent or damaged. I will also put it inside a plastic bag if you request me to before I put it in the envelope in case you live in an area where your package or mail is left in a moist environment such as it is snow season and it will be left on your doorstep, so just as if that is needed as this is a paper item. It will be in a discreet envelope and will be sealed in a way that is tamper evident, meaning if opened it cannot be resealed the same way and will show. The small envelope will be shipped with a tracking number without a signature so this way tabs can be kept on it without you giving out a signature or having to be home. It should fit in nearly every mail box or slot but still could be left on door steps. After you finalize the order I destroy the files using the Gutmann method of file destruction and shred the postal receipt in a paper shredder to keep this private, I suggest you do the same to any messages and destroy the envelope it came in by a paper shredder or burning it,

I can also do a cheaper version of the card where it is just a print out of the card on a sheet of paper designed to look like a xerox scan of the card in case all you need it for is to show to an employer or school as proof you have one and not bring in the actual card you can order just a scan from me at a much cheaper price and have the scan mailed to you or have a pdf emailed to you encrypted. Here is the link to the digital version:

\$\phi\$ Forged Social Security Card - Digital Copy \$\phi\$

http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/c2510150e7

Some users in the Silk Road marketplace have passed over this item or voiced concern regarding the appearance of the card. These users have asked why the card looks different from the Social Security card that they have that is their legit one. This is because this forged copy I am offering is not the current generation but the generation prior. The card was changed to a new generation after 9-11 when security measures were increased. The new cards have color change ink of the letters "USA" at the bottom center in the same kind of color change ink that is on U.S. currency down in the bottom right corner. In addition the background seal is different on the new copies. Both this forged generation and the new generations are valid. This is because Social Security cards are issued at birth or upon gaining citizenship and are good for the rest of your life, they do not expire. So if you are born before September 11, 2001 using my forged earlier generation is more credible than if you have a generation of Social Security card that was created well after you were born as it would be a dead giveaway. This way there are less anti counterfeiting measures on the card for someone to test and it will match you age / appearance. This card has received all 5/5 reviews and has passed every time so you are in good hands, use with

Please keep in mind that despite the illicit black market nature of Silk Road that this marketplace does have a strict set of rules that all buyers and sellers are held to. One of those rules is that selling real identities or identity info is strictly banned. I simply make the forged Social Security cards with information provided by the customer. I do not sell real Social Security numbers, I do not have real Social Security numbers on hand and I will not refer you to anyone who does. Please do not message me and ask for any of that information or offer to sell any of that to me. I will simply delete your message. If say a buyer purchases this item and provides a real name and number then the order will get processed. I do not verify if the information is real or not so that is allowed on Silk Road, just I cant sell any real info.

+++++++++++

→ Get Express Processing →

++++++++++++

If you need this item quickly I now offer a way to get express processing. If you order the express processing listing in conjunction with this listing, then instead of your order being processed after the other orders placed ahead of you; your order will be processed before any other order and shipped before any other order. This way you do not have to frantically message me asking for a speedy process and offering to pay extra, you can simply save time and just order the express processing. Please keep in mind that express processing does not after the postage / delivery method option. Express processing will only get yours processed and shipped first, you will still need to select the proper postage option you want, so if you need it via EMS then select EMS when ordering, then order the express processing on top of that, this way digital orders do not pay for postage they will not use and buyers who only want priority or first class with their express processing can do so. Express Processing Link: http://silkroadyb5pic3r.onion/silkroad/ifem/50c685cd7e

Message me with any questions you may have. Below is my PGP key:

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 915 G 14 Cr. 68 (KBF)

----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----Version; BCPG C# v1.6.1.0

mI0EUKoJSgEEAIITaD7qkByVwJosnHa/X5GFPM/3KvME2vSDtEBRGD9wkaMLjSU5
n9jN+evRjYkV1pqkQmdiu/U2C8Vf3e29fkFMm3bAZwE8QyLCgc4nptbjJEXMHy0p
PyOOTXV25bNn47feLorxU7Y2lxAVBxvmV8wn+ROTC5XOCQXRAbD9Pl8hABEBAAGO
GG5fbbW%ZwNsaW5IZEB0b331YWlsLm9yZ4icBBABAgAG6QJQqglkAAoJECYPcbgx
NFJIBLwD/0CS/2ockY0LZZ980W0d9XOznqA6Zbdhr0qm2e/wlXEIrHDmsYSYp+TE
P4ngBCwG1K7Mxpesz8IDzqhlcnvfowXh0gGMMM1q2rKv907SxekiOvWtPNvWpx
jttf2J36NjrocPkT21r4NylkK0/Z6H7FlkuihzZdHrZdyinS/ILR

=dqgO ----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----

Below are some of my most popular items:

- ⊕ Forged Rite Aid Prescription Rx Labels ⊕
 http://silkroad/vb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/36a29435a8

- ♠ Forged Binghamton University Student ID ♠
 http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/68e8ca3e17
- ♠ Forged Hawaii Drivers License Digital Copy ♠ http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/1bc67dddaf
- ♠ Forged Florida Drivers License Digital Copy ♠
 http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/6697040cb4
- ☆ Forged Auto Insurance Card Allstate ☆
 http://silkroad/b5piz3r.onion/index.php/silkroad/item/1abf67932f
- ⊕Forged Proof of Auto Insurance Card State Farm⊕
 http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/index.php/silkroad/item/6e697780de

- ☆ Forged Service Dog ID / Fake Guide Dog ID Card ☆
 http://silkroad/stem/ffe011cc42
- ⊕ Forged American Red Cross Cards All Classes! ⊕
 http://silkroad/vb5piz3r.onion/index.php/silkroad/item/cfa5bbedb5
- ♠ 50 Opium Poppy Seeds (Papaver Somniferum)
 ♠ http://silkroad/vb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/08281d97eb
- ф 100 Opium Poppy Seeds (Papaver Somniferum)
 ф
 http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/index.php/silkroad/item/23d2460b8e
- ± 1000 Opium Poppy Seeds (Papaver Somniferum) ± http://silkroad/b5piz3r.onion/index.php/silkroad/item/dda19aa671
- ☆ Forged Prescription Rx Labels Customized! ☆
 http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/1ee45cc6d1
- ⊕ Adobe Photoshop CS5 ⊕
 http://silkroad/b5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/be21463e1d

 ⊕ Adobe Dreamweaver CS5 ⊕
- http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/f26bf2e692

- \oplus MDMA Synthesis Instructions eBook \oplus http://silkroad/b5piz3r.onion/index.php/silkroad/item/198434ed95

Metta Tags: cannabis, oxycontin, bicoins, BTC, MDMA, speed, spores, heroin, methamphetamine, cash, vicodin, oxycodone, morphine, weed, marijuanna, ebook, methadone, NMDA, PCP, GHB, viagra, levitra, cialis, Vardenafil, Sildenafil, Seroquel, Quetiapine, norco, lortab, watson, 10mg, 5mg, 40mg, xanax, 5mg, 1mg, 2mg, alprazolam, benzos, benzodiazepines, klonopin, valium, diazepam, pill cutter, apple bags, drug baggies, ziplock, red dice, Pseudoephedrine, merchandise, silk road, adobe, illustrator, photoshop, acrobat, pro, dreamweaver, CS3, CS4, CS5, CS6, CS7, MS57, depakote, Wellbutrin, Bupopion, Divalproex Sodium, fireworks, qvar, Beclomethasone Dipropionate, thailand, redbull, original, synthesis, flexeril, cyclobenzaprine, epipen, shot, Adrenaline, Epinephrine, leaf, yellow bus, neon, orange, stash can, free, organic, chemistry, ID, service dog, guide, badge, fake, drivers license, passport, social security, hacking, internet, cyber, American Red Cross, CPR, First Aid, AED, auto, insurrance, digital copy, florida, hawaii, binghamton university, new york, student, staff, geico, postal, smuggling, tax, taxes, money, laundering, alibi, doctors note, receipt, credit, card, WalMart, CVS, CostCo, Rite Aid, QFC, safeway, AAA, triple A, roadside assistence, coupon, discount, w-2, tax, taxes, employment, paystub, express


sort by: freshness	90 ③		
msnastytime69	review for: Forged Social Security Card qty: 1 price: 80+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors	thanks.:)		
10+ B1+ 10+			
MaBell	review for: Φ Forged Social Security Card Φ qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors	Absolutely amazing. I made a mistake and the vendor worked with me and even provided an extra card.		
1+ 81+ 1+	This is my new go to guy for ID forgeries		
MyAliasName	review for: ### Forged Social Security Card ### qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 10+ \$10+ 10+	I am impressed! I just did a side by side check with the real deal version of this era cardand it is a very nice product! The only problem you could possibly have if ever using this card in person, it that it simply looks brand new for a card that has not been issued for several years now. But most are using it for scans, etcso no problems there.		
	BONUS: The vendor is kind enough include several copies with your order (Props To This Vendor). It is very helpful that se included, bc I can try different aging methods on one or two of the cards to try and make it look a bit older and beat uplike issued in this era.		
	Will definitely do business with again!		
Christian Slater	review for: Φ Forged Social Security Card Φ qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 10+ \$100+ 10+	These will pass with no problems. Thank you.		
jamesh4nd	review for: & Forged Social Security Card & qty: 1 price: 80+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors	Came packaged like a pro! Look pretty good as well! Thanks ND!		
1+ 80+ 1+			
happynolucky	review for:	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 1+ B1+ 1+	Very quick shipping, and the cards look great! Thanks a ton!		
yankees25	review for: © Forged Social Security Card © qty: 1 price: 80+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors	++++++AAAAAA++++++++ Vendor. Great fakes, super turnaround time and exras, if you pay the express amt.		
10+ \$100+ 10+	Perfect to back up my fake license.		
swishaman	review for: ♠ Forged Social Security Card ♠ qty: 1 price: \$0+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 1+ #1+ 1+	Super Fast Super Stealth shipping. SS card is damn near the real thing. I cant tell not a single difference from the original. Seller is highly recommended and will be my go to go for any of his forgeries. If you go anywhere but him first you are try losing out. Did I mention he was also kind enough to give me four for the price of one. On top of that the item was half off. Y better more legit seller then this one. Thanks again	'ou will not find	a
dannyvermin	review for: № Forged Social Security Card № qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 4m old	4 of 5
orders spent vendors 1+ #0+ 1+	Excellent product, looks totally real. Seller was very responsive.		
KushDragon420	review for: ♥ Forged Social Security Card ♥ qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 4m old	2 of 5
orders spent vendors	Shipping is quick, contact is straight to business. But the quality is not at all what I was expecting.		




Reviews:











AviadOooo orders spent vendors 1+ #0+ 1+	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts gtyr. 1 price: #0+ really one of the best sellers i came across at SR.	1y 3m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts Great deal! Seller is really supportive.	1y 4m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts Fast and Good seller	1y 4m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts as always great seller	1y 4m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts Leave feedback here	1y 4m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts Looks good will update once I play with it	1y 5m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts Leave feedback here	1y 5m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts not bad.	1y 5m old 3 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts fast handeling!	1y 5m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: Hack Facebook Twitter and YouTube Accounts thanks	1y 5m old 5 of 5
123> Last>		



Reviews:





Case 15-1815, Document 121-1, 06/17/2016, 1796763, Page114 of 121

		123 > Last >
Iy 5m old 5 of 5.	review for, Email Cracking Tool Item came, works as expected.	alias hidden stats: (hidden)
1y 5m old 5 of 5	review for Email Cracking Tool Seems to be working, thank you.	alias hidden stats: (hidden)
1y 5m old 5 of 5	review for: Email Cracking Tool Leave feedback here	alias hidden stats: (hidden)
1y 5m old 5 of 5	review for Email Cracking Tool superb as always!!	alias hidden stats: (hidden)
1y 5m old 5 of 5	review for: Email Cracking Tool 5/5 vendor helped me with some questions	alias hidden stats: (hidden)
1y 5m old 5 of 5	review for: Email Cracking Tool Leave feedback here	alias hidden stats: (hidden)
1y 5m old 5 of 5.	review for. Email Cracking Tool awesome!	alias hidden stats: (hidden)
1y 4m old 5 of 5	review for Email Cracking Tool FE, was messaged almost instantly. (;	alias hidden stats: (hidden)



stats: (hidden)	Fast and very helpful, definitely treats his customers with great care	לו אווי מוח היו לד
alias hidden	Jeview for: Kevloader	z jo z. blo má vt
stats: (hidden)	thanks received . will try	r T
alias hidden	review for. Keylogger	1y 6m old 5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Leave feedback here	
alias hidden	review for: Keylogger	1y 6m old 5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	quick and easy peasy	
alias hidden	review for: Keylogger	1y 6m old 5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	dumbass confusing on my part, either way this guy is the man helpful and legit. 5/5.	, Ž
alias hidden	review for. Keylogger	1y 6m old 5 of 5
stats: (hidden)		
alias hidden	review for Keylogger	1y 6m old 5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Fast and smooth transaction!	
alias hidden	review for: Keylogger	1y 7m old 5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Perfect!	
alias hidden	review for: Keylogger	1y 7m old 5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Just what I needed! THANKS!	
123>		

This listing is for the consultation only. After we agree on a price, I will set up a custom listing and when I'm finished, you will leave feedback here.


Pricing will range anywhere from \$5 to \$200 an hour, depending on the type of connection and if it's protected by CloudFlare, etc.

If you have any questions, feel free to send me a message.

011 ob

sort by: freshness

Reviews:



GOVERNMENT 14 Cr. 68 (KBF) EXHIBIT 916 U


community forums wiki support

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B3.8764 add to cart bookmark discuss 0 report Description Distributed Denial Of Service on 1 IP for 48h F.E. REQUIRED - if the host don't go down. 100% REFOUND or feedback me as a scrammer. http://sikroad/bbiz/st.onion/sikroad/item/ae95aa85aa <- Denial Of Service for 96 h Other Customer reviews: Fraing review freshness 5 of 5 FE 2 months 5 of 5 FE 2 months 5 of 5 FE on request 3 months 1 mitp://sikroad/bbiz/st.onion/sikroad/item/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: Fraing review freshness 5 of 5 Le Donaths 5 of 5 Le Donaths 5 of 5 FE on request 3 months 1 mitp://sikroad/bbiz/st.onion/sikroad/item/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: Fraing review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDoS - USE this guy, Absolutely fucking brilliant server by: freshness	95	Hi, FBINY Ogout
#3.8764 add to cart bookmark discuss 0 report Description Distribulted Denial Of Service on 1 IP for 48h F.E. REQUIRED - if the host don't go down 100% REFOUND or feedback me as a scrammer. http://sikroad/b5piz3r.onion/sikroad/item/ae95aa85aa <- Denial Of Service for 96 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Ee on request 3 months http://sikroad/b5piz3r.onion/sikroad/item/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Le on request 3 months http://sikroad/item/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant ser- Reviews: sort by: freshness	48h	
#83.8764 add to cart bookmark discuss o report Description Distributed Denial Of Service on 1 IP for 48h F.E. REQUIRED - if the host don't go down 100% REFOUND or feedback me as a scrammer. http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onior/silkroad/frem/ae95aa85aa <- Denial Of Service for 96 h Other Customer reviews: frating review freshness 5 of 5 FE 2 months 5 of 5 FE on request 3 months. Intrp://silkroadvb5piz3r.onior/silkroad/frem/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy, Absolutely fucking brilliant ser sort by: freshness Sort by: freshness	Item info:	
Description Distributed Denial Of Service on 1 IP for 48h F.E. REQUIRED - if the host don't go down 100% REFOUND or feedback me as a scrammer. http://silkroad/b5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/ae95aa85aa <- Denial Of Service for 96 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 F.E. a months 5 of 5 F.E. a months 5 of 5 F.E. on request 3 months http://silkroad/b5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant ser Sof 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant ser Sor by: freshness	seller	
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Description Distributed Denial Of Service on 1 IP for 48h F.E. REQUIRED - if the host don't go down. 100% REFOUND or feedback me as a scrammer. http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/æ65aa85aa <- Denial Of Service for 96 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 FE on request 3 months http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant ser sort by: freshness	category	ory Services
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Description Distribuited Denial Of Service on 1 IP for 48h E.E. REQUIRED - if the host don't go down. 100% REFOUND or feedback me as a scrammer. http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/ae95aa85aa <- Denial Of Service for 96 h Other Customer review freshness 5 of 5 FE on request 3 months http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant ser sort by: Freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant ser sort by: Freshness		
Distribuited Denial Of Service on 1 IP for 48h F.E. REQUIRED - if the host don't go down 100% REFOUND or feedback me as a scrammer. http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/ae95aa85aa <- Denial Of Service for 96 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 FE on request 3 months http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant serviews: Sof 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant serviews: Sof 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant serviews:		
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http://silkroad/b5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/ae95aa85aa <- Denial Of Service for 96 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 FE 2 months 5 of 5 FE on request 3 months http://silkroad/b5piz3r.onion/silkroad/item/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant ser	as a scrammer.	
rating review freshness 5 of 5 FE 2 months 5 of 5 FE on request 3 months http://silkroadvibspiz3r.onion/silkroad/litem/c6ba1005c4 <- Denial Of Service for 48 h Other Customer reviews: rating review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy, Absolutely fucking brilliant ser Sort by: freshness 5 of 5 Updating 5 of 5 Updating 5 of 5 Updating 6 of 5 U	96 h	
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rating review freshness 5 of 5 Updating feedback. If you ever need a dDOS - USE this guy. Absolutely fucking brilliant ser Reviews: sort by. Freshness	18 h	
Reviews:	cking brilliant service. Cant thank you enough. 3 mon	ths
ob		
90		GOVERNMENT
		EXHIBIT
		910 V 14 Cr. 68 (KBF)



	ANONYMOUS VISA ATM DEBIT CARD EUR/USD/GBP	5 4 3 2	\$ 0.1380
VISA	seller: lamapoorboytoo 0.0 ships from: Poland	1	add to cart
YEw- 1)))	Australian Bank account 4.4k a day withdraw limit.	5 4 3	B19.4570
THE SAUD OTTES SHEET	seller: tucksh0p o.o ships from: Australia	2	add to cart
TRYPHOS	\$100 Green Dot Moneypak	5 4 3	4
FF 9559	seller: freemoney 0.0 ships from: United States of America	2	BO.9098 add to cart
1 £ 3 6 6 7 6 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6	ATM Cash Machine Hack	5 4 3	p 0 6000
	seller: UK Stealth 0.0 ships from: United States of America	2	BO.6000 add to cart
DITCOIN F	BTC loaded on Anonymous Inter, Checking/ATM Cards	5 4 3	#0.0001
ATM	seller: PureO 0.0 ships from: undeclared	2	BO.9981 add to cart
and a second	\$1000 cash (10 x \$100s) Express shipping available	5 4 3	* 0 5000
Total State of the	seller: MagicBeats 0.0 ships from: United States of America	2	88.5890 add to cart
Money Pak	\$100 Increment Vanilla Visa Pre-Paid or Moneypaks	5 4 3	4.4.4.4
Oncypes Onc	seller: catfish916 0.0 ships from: United States of America	2	BO.8692 add to cart
	ANONYMOUS VISA/MASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	5 4 3	8 0.2863
DINESANGASH	seller: DrugsAndCash 0.0 ships from: Germany	2	add to cart
	Anonymous EUR Visa debit card w IBAN 4 ATM cashout	5 4 3	B0.4166
VISA	seller: starlight 0.0 ships from: Netherlands	2 1	add to cart
	Sell your Moneypak for quick BTC here	5 4 3	40.0000
	seller: freemoney 0.0	2	BO.2063

Visa	casnout seller: starlight 0.0 ships from: Netherlands	2	BO.4166 add to cart
no imáge	Sell your Moneypak for quick BTC here seller: freemoney 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.2063 add to cart
£57.2011	VERIFIED BITSTAMP ACCOUNT IBAN AND VISA ATTACHED seller: fake 0.0 ships from: undeclared	5 4 3 2 1	\$1.4860 add to cart
CASHOUT	BTC Cashout 2 private Anon Bank Acct w ATMBankcard seller: PureO 0.0 ships from: undeclared	5 4 3 2 1	\$8.1675 add to cart
no image	1 Troy Ounce Gold Coin S. African Kruggerand seller: gold 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$12.1140 add to cart
ayPal	Make STEALTH PAYPAL and withdraw 100% anonymous \$ seller: NoQuarter 0.0 ships from: undeclared	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.0826 add to cart
BITCOIN ATM	BTC to Cashout 10% deposit seller: PureO 0.0 ships from: undeclared	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.1007 add to cart
ilk Road ser: gold	1/10 Troy Ounce Gold Coin American Eagle Bullion seller: gold 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$1.3555 add to cart
1 2 5 9	ATM Cash Machine Hack ++CHEAPEST on SR++ seller: mesa235z 0.0 ships from: United States of America	5 4 3 2 1	\$0.4853 add to cart
TES A	PATRIOT ACT PROOF MONEY LAUNDERING PROCEDURE!!!	5 4 3 2	\$0.2886 add to cart

15-1815

Hnited States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Docket No. 15-1815

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

—v.—

ROSS WILLIAM ULBRICHT, also known as Dread Pirate Roberts, also known as Silk Road,

also known as Sealed Defendant 1, also known as DPR,


 $Defendant ext{-}Appellant.$

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Attorney for the United States of America.

One St. Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007 (212) 637-2200



GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 917 A 14 Cr. 68 (K8F) community forums wiki support

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Description

Hello my good friends!

this is a listing for anyone to cash in their coins for moneypaks, REloadits, Vanilla Reloads, and netspends.

This means you give us your coins and we give you one of these packs.

We have changed the fee from 5% to 3% because of how many orders we're getting from customers trying to cash their packs in for coins.

Our fees are low because it's more of a service for the community. We know how difficult it can be for some people to get coins or packs (not to mentioned we've been scammed out of cashing in our coins by other vendors and thought it was complete bullshit and wanted to give the community some honesty and loyalty)

The rates are the same all the way up no matter what. 3%

500\$ pack costs 515\$ coins 100\$ pack costs 103\$ in coins. you get the picture.

Please place the order and let us know know in the description what type of pack you would like and how much in \$ worth you would like.

We are fair and understanding.

Please be ready to load the packs on to whatever card you're using within hours because we have customers on the other side waiting for their coins and they won't get them until you've loaded them.

thank you all very much!

Reviews:

go go review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+	1y 3m old	
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+	1v 3m old	
	Ly Oill Old	5 01 5
Awesome, Can't beat 3%! Thanks AR		
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
I needed a cash-out fast and out of several vendors, AlwaysReliable7 was the one who responded in minutes. It was literally less than 20 minutes between first and final contact. Thank you Mr. Reliable!		
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty; 1 price: 80+	1y 3m old	unrated
I've been a vendor on SR for 10 months and a customer much longer. There is no exeception to the fact that it is hard to maintain a high rating w/so many discerning requests from sometime difficult to handle people.		
		toI
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
Perfect yet again Please consider these nice folks for your cash out needs and with just a 3% fee you cant find a better deal! Beautiful!		
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
Just like his name says. Extremely fast for a small transaction as well.		
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
Perfect again Go nowhere else folks these guys are FAST!		
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty; 1 price: 80+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
Just perfect! Very fast and really nice folks wouldn't go anywhere else for my MP or Reloadit needsThanks guys!		
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
These guys were just GREAT! They helped me in a matter of seconds after my questions and order. I will be using these very nice people again as soon as I can! Thanks again AlwaysReliable7!		
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
quick bitcoins! Great deal trusted seller! Got bitcoins for my moneypak fast!		
review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: #0+	1y 4m old	5 of 5
AlwaysReliable was was very friendly, even in the face of delays caused myself. Excellent customer service, and he responds very quickly when online. I look forward to future business.		
	I needed a cash-out fast and out of several vendors, AlwaysReliable? was the one who responded in minutes. It was literally less than 20 minutes between first and final contact. Thank you Mr. Reliable! **review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+ I've been a vendor on SR for 10 months and a customer much longer. There is no exception to the fact that it is hard to maintain a high rating w/so many discerning requests from sometime difficult to handle people. However, I think this vendor has the recipeGREAT COMMUNICATION, EXCELLENT C SERVICE and PROMPT DELIVERY. There is no one else on SR that I would trust my BTC suggest you make the same declaration. **review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+ Perfect yet again Please consider these nice folks for your cash out needs and with just a 3% fee you cant find a better dealt Beautiful! **review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+ Just like his name says. Extremely fast for a small transaction as well. **review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+ Perfect again Go nowhere else folks these guys are FAST! **review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+ Just perfect) Very fast and really nice folks wouldn't go anywhere else for my MP or Reloadit needsThanks guys! **review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+ These guys were just GREAT! They helped me in a matter of seconds after my questions and order. I will be using these very nice people again as soon as I can! Thanks again AlwaysReliable?! **review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+ quick bitcoins! Great deal trusted seller! Got bitcoins for my moneypak fast! **review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) qty: 1 price: 80+ quick bitcoins! Great deal trusted seller! Got bitcoins for my moneypak fast!	I needed a cash-out fast and out of several vendors, AlwaysReliable7 was the one who responded in minutes. It was literally less than 20 minutes between first and final contact. Thank you Mr. Reliable! I review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) gty: 1 price: 80+ 1y 3m old I ve been a vendor on SR for 10 months and a customer much longer. There is no exeception to the fact that it is hard to maintain a high rating w/so many discerning requests from sometime difficult to handle people. However, I think this vendor has the recipeGREAT COMMUNICATION, EXCELLENT CUSTOMER SERVICE and PROMPT DELIVERY. There is no one else on SR that I would trust my BTC transactions suggest you make the same declaration. I review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) gty: 1 price: 80+ 1y 3m old Perfect yet again Please consider these nice folks for your cash out needs and with just a 3% fee you cant find a better deall Beautiful! I review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) gty: 1 price: 80+ 1y 3m old Just like his name says. Extremely fast for a small transaction as well. I review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) gty: 1 price: 80+ 1y 3m old Perfect again Go nowhere else folks these guys are FAST! I review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) gty: 1 price: 80+ 1y 4m old Just perfect Very fast and really nice folks wouldn't go anywhere else for my MP or Reloadit needs Thanks guys! I review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) gty: 1 price: 80+ 1y 4m old These guys were just GREAT! They helped me in a matter of seconds after my questions and order. I will be using these very nice people again as soon as I can! Thanks again AlwaysReliable?! I review for: VENDORS CASH IN UR COINS 4 Packs (3% fee) gty: 1 price: 80+ 1y 4m old quick bitcoins! Great deal trusted seller! Got bitcoins for my moneypak fast!



Description

Get your own anonymous reloadable ATM physical plastic VISA debit card, with sealed PIN code, shipped by me from EU, bank will never know your

Available in USD, EUR and PLN currency, please tell us what you need, if you never ask for a specific currency we will send random.

USD and EUR currency cards have no chip, PLN cards have the chip.

There is no name attached to the account and are fully anonymous!

I ship the card to you, the bank will never know your name and address, 100% safe.

You can attach the card to bitstamp, net and reload it anonymously with bitcoin, transfer take 1 day

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 91.7 C 14 Cr. 68 (K8F)

Fees: Hrst load fee: 1.00 EUR (free anytime after) Loading by IBAN transfer: FREE! Checking balance: FREE every 24 hours! Online Purchase: FREE every 24 hours! Online Purchase: REE every 24 hours! Currency Conversion: 2.8% ATM Withdrawal: 2.5 EUR / 3 USD / 2 GBP Monthly Fee: 0.25 EUR Monthly Fee: 0.25 EUR Maximum Balance: 2500 EUR / 3500 USD / 2100 GBP Daily withdrawal Limit: 150 EUR / 3500 USD / 130 GBP Daily withdrawal Limit: 150 EUR / 200 USD / 130 GBP Bank: bre bank SWIFT (BIC code): BREXPLPWMBK SWIFT (BIC code): BREXPLPWBK SWIFT (BIC code): BREXPLP
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evie	ort by:
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hotrocks12 orders spent vendors 1+ \$1+ 1+	review for ANONYMOUS VISA ATM CARD EUR USD PLN + Bank ACC qfy: 1 price: \$0+ 1y 3m old 5 of 5 FE- will update on arrival	t price: \$0+	1y 3m old 5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: ANONYMOUS VISA ATM CARD EUR USD PLN + Bank ACC arrived		1y 4m old 5 of 5

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ANONYMOUS VISA/MASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY

Item info:



DrugsAndCash 0.0	Germany	Worldwide	Money	ostage options.
seller	ships from	ships to	category	postage options.

GOVERNMENT 14 Cr. 68 (KBF) EXHIBIT 917 D

.....WHY TO CHOOSE ME?

Anonymous Debit Master Card/Visa Electron

Description

Only my cards work all around the world even in Canada. I can guarantee you, if it won't work I will refund you. If you buy from me you will get information how to exchange bitcoins with this card within 3 hours I.3 HOURS AND MONEY FROM BITCOINS IS ON YOUR CARD!

For small additional fee I will help you with doing paypal/ebay scam and frauds with this card, will provide you ID of money mule so you will be able to create identity, my cards has got access to online terminal so you can verify your paypal account with it.

How does it work?

- it's normal debit card but hasn't got your personal information, it's totally anonymous. It's connected with IBAN bank account number so you can transfer money on this card.

Is it really safe and anonymous?

- Yes, only you can be wack party of this mechanism if you for example break law send money on card and try to buy on petrol station and camera record your face. In other ways it's totally anonymous, but remember to hide your face.

UPDATE! Frequently Asked Questions by customers!

 Can I make a paypal on this card? Yes, you can purchase products in internet and card will verify your paypal. Buy VPN to this card and get anonymous paypal account. 	its issually a passes commerce 2 and half or 2 and 7 months. Not long period but you can exchange and withdraw a lot of hitcoms. You can use it for long	 - What is expiration date? - it's usually 2 years, sometimes 2 and half or 2 and 7 months. Not long period but you can exchange and withdraw a lot of bitcoins. You can use it for long time and have fun because no one see that you use it. Enjoy! 	ADVANTAGES: - you can withdraw money from all ATM around the world anonymously - card is available in 3 currencies: USD, GBP, EUR - you can transfer black money on this card and noone will spy it - you can withdraw money from bitcoins anonymously - you can withdraw money from bitcoins anonymously - wery low fees only 2.5 EUR when you withdraw money from ATM	- checking balance and list of transactions by text message	DISADVANTAGES: - you can withdraw only 120 EUR a day - your account balance cannot be higher than 1000 EUR - your account balance cannot be higher than 1000 EUR - you have year limit 2500 EUR balance so if you have big money, you have to order few cards	I give you discounts for bulk ammounts of cards.	Feel free to ask me any questions !	Finalized Early and other info::::::	In order details please choose card currency you preffer from USD, GBP, EUR, PLN and notice if you want additional option 1. work in Canada 2. for paypal/ebay and other scam because we have special prepared cards for scam and special different cards for Canada buyers
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Reviews:

sort by: Freshness go

TEVIEW FOR ANONYMOUS VISA/MASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	qty 1 price: BO+	never ordering nere again! item never arrived! if u send me the Item I would give u a better review!!
mdmAmin89	orders sperit vendors	1+ 80+ 1+

1y 3m old 1 of 5

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SA-122

odfilled	review for ANONYMOUS VISAMASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	1y 3m old	5 01 5
orders spent vendors 10+ \$10+ 10+	qty: 1 price: #0+ Received downloaded promptly within a couple of hours of placing the order. Guide is clear and information looks good. Will try out some of the methods. Thanks		
Alias89	5	1y 4m old 2 of 5	2 of 5
orders spent vendors 10+ #10+ 10+	qty: 1 price: #0+ Product never received. Poor communication from seller, SR finally resolved		
automenu	review for ANONYMOUS VISA/MASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	1y 4m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 1+ \$0+ 1+	qty; 1 price: 80+ got it. Thanks		
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: ANONYMOUS VISA/MASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	1y 4m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
alias hidden	TEVIEW FOR ANONYMOUS VISA/MASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	1y 4m old 1 of 5	1 of 5
stats: (hidden)	SELECTIVE SCAMMER!!! Provided no tracking number and ignored communication!		
alias hidden	TEVIEW FOT: ANONYMOUS VISAMASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	1y 4m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	super fast		
alias hidden	review for: ANONYMOUS VISAMASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	1y 4m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Everything arrived perfect. Thanks!		
alias hidden	review for: ANONYMOUS VISAMASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	1y 4m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Took some time to get it to scandinavia, but all as promised1 (Y)		
alias hidden	review for: ANONYMOUS VISA/MASTER CARD BTC WASH WITHDRAW MONEY	1y 4m old	5 of 5
stats: (hidden)	Arrived in good time, thanks:)		

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I need up to 24 hrs to buy these at the store, then I'll just PM you the card code and you can load it onto paypal, credit cards, online bank, or whatever as if you had bought it yourself.

Optimal: Contact me on TorChat to receive your code: km6zzhrcgncpq7i2

Multiples will be combined into 1 unless you specify otherwise.

The Green Dot website might give you a free debit card to load the moneypak onto, just ask them.

Also available as CASH IN MAIL (if you have good buyer stats), or other gift cards (ReLoadit, etc.).

Reviews:

sort by: freshness

go

Case 15-1815, Document 121-2, 06/17/2016, 1796763, Page11 of 120

SA-124

Magnoleah	review for: \$100 Green Dot Moneypak qty: 1 price: 80+	1y 3m old	5 of 5
orders spent vendors 10+ B1+ 10+	Very fast. Honest. great communication. Excellent service- highly recommend		
bobjenkins orders spent vendors 10+ \$1+ 1+	review for \$100 Green Dot Moneypak qty: 1 price: #0+ A+	1y 4m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	neview for: \$100 Green Dot Moneypak Smooth as silk.	1y 4m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for \$100 Green Dot Moneypak Quick, easy transaction! Will use again.	1y 4m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for \$100 Green Dot Moneypak Perfect	1y 5m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for \$100 Green Dot Moneypak. The one guy as a Vendor I trust with my funds. If your cashing out and moneypak is how you do it this guys the way to go.	1y 6m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for: \$100 Green Dot Moneypak Leave feedback here	1y 6m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for \$100 Green Dot Moneypak Fast and reliable as always!!!!!	1y 6m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
alias hidden stats: (hidden)	review for, \$100 Green Dot Moneypak smooth easy and quick	1y 6m old 5 of 5	5 of 5
103>			

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[BTC] Bitcion Laundry (Highly Anonymous, Impossibl

sh4d3r1950 0.0 undeclared Norldwide Money ships from Item info: category ships to seller

add to cart bookmark discuss a report

B1.3057

GOVERNMENT Download Link on PM EXHIBIT 917 F postage options:

14 Cr. 68 (KBF)

Description

Ever worried & paranoid about your unaccounted dirty money to be painful for you at some point?

then right now you are in the right listing, buy this listing & PM me...
I will provide you fresh, washed, clean bitcoins in your BTC wallet in just 24 hours, making it completely anonymous and never be able to trace by using my own methods of mixing algorithm.

[b]1) What is this?[/b]

[I]The bitcoin network might be anonymous in terms of single-handedly revealing your ip address, but the transaction history is recorded in the block chain and is publically available, which makes your anonymity very vulnerable, officials could easily track your money around the network [/i]

[b]2) Ok, I know that already, explain me more.[/b]

[]Knowing your transaction history, connecting your bitcoin addresses to real you is possible, because you will at some point need to exchange your bitcoins to or from a fiat currency using a bank account number, a credit card, LR account or similar service which is much less anonymous than the bitcoin network.[/i]

address/addresses for receiving clean money. With in 24 hours of time you will have clean, washed, fresh Bitcoins on your new wallet, and you are safe service, which, if properly done by you can eliminate any chance of finding your payments and making it impossible to prove any connection between a I am providing a solution for this, using my service you mix up your bitcoins on my own mixing algorithm and get paid back to other addresses from my [I] You place this listing as order, I will provide you a Wallet address to deposit bitcoins, I will also ask you to place your fresh & new bitcoin deposit and a withdraw inside my service and my system.[/i] [b]3) Hmmm, now what you do for that?[/b][i] [b]4) How your service works ?[/b]

[b]Cost:[/b] This Listing price + 5% of the amount.

officials will never know the in & out trace of my system. So clean exit. and anonymous, now nobody can trace real you by using transactions.

[b] Anonymous Type:[/b] Highly Anonymous and Impossible to trace the real you by using the BTCs.

[b] Time Limit.[/b] within 24 to 30 hours of passing me the amount to my provided wallet, you will have clean, washed, fresh money in your new address/addresses

[b]Minimum BTC Limit for mixing:[/b] 1 BTC

[b] Proof of Anonymity:[/b] You can check the publicly available blockchains regarding your deposit address, but [u]! BET [/u]you will never find a trace of exit address/addresses by tracking deposit address. So your profit of complete stealth, anonymous, & safe

Your money is safe. I guarantee and confirm about your anonymity. I will not take more than 5%. My system is Legit Legit Legit Legit. PM me in case you need amount figure calculations after mixing BTC or for more into if you have questions/doubts.


Reviews:

sort by: freshness

90

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Sales of Fake IDs, Forgeries & Passports

	Total Number of Sales	Total Sales Revenue
Fake IDs	3,642	\$ 699,053
Forgeries	3,487	\$ 197,291
Passports	103	\$ 105,292
TOTAL	7,232	\$ 1,001,636

Sales in Money-Related Categories

Money 14,345 Digital Currencies 18,134 Gold 81 Bullion 122	4,345 \$ 2,846,025 8,134 \$ 177,167
	81 \$ 159,944
	122 \$ 80,952
Silver 138	138 \$ 9,746
TOTAL 32,820	\$ 3,273,833





Silk Road Transactions January 2011- October 2013

Total Number of Transactions	1,530,252
Total Buyer Accounts	115,391
Total Seller Accounts	3,748
Total Sales Revenue (Bitcoins)	₿ 9,912,070
USD Equivalent	\$ 213,888,103
Total Commissions (Bitcoins)	₿ 642,455
USD Equivalent	\$ 13,174,896


GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 940 E 14 Cr. 68 (KBF)

Total Silk Road Sales of Selected Drugs

	Total Number of Sales	Total Sales Revenue
Heroin	53,649	\$ 8,930,657
Cocaine	82,582	\$ 17,386,917
Methamphetamine	34,689	\$ 8,110,453
LSD	54,567	\$ 7,073,838








GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 940G 14 Cr. 68 (KBF)

AO 91 (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Co	omplaint					FD	
	UNITED	STATES D	ISTRICT (COURT	FIL	ED	
	CIVILLE	for the		0001(1		5 2015	
Northern Northern Northern V. CARL MARK FORCE IV, et al		Northern District o	District of California)) Case No.)		RICHARD W. WIEKING CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COUR NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFO		
Dej	fendant(s)				λ		
	CI	RIMINAL CO	OMPLAINT		41	EJ	
I, the complaina	nt in this case, state t	that the following	is true to the bes	st of my kn	owledge and belief		
On or about the date(s)	of2012 thro	ough 2013	in the county	of	San Francisco	in the	
Northern Distri	ict of Californ	nia , the de	fendant(s) viola	ated:			
Code Section			Offense D	escription			
18 U.S.C. Section 641 18 U.S.C. Section 1343 18 U.S.C. Section 1956(18 U.S.C. Section 208	(h) Wire	oft of Government F Fraud ney Laundering offict of Interest	Property				
This criminal co	omplaint is based on t	these facts:					
See Affidavit of Special	Agent Tigran Gamba	aryan (attached)	dia	Parch	da		
		Approved as to for	a Ahr	Mor	40		
		rippiored as is is	AUSA Kathr	yn Haun			
♂ Continued on	n the attached sheet.						
				Compl	ainant's signature		
			S/A Tigrar		an, IRS-Criminal In	vestigations	
					ed name and title		
Sworn to before me and	signed in my present	ice.	3				
			1/1	nn			
Date: 03/25/201	15			111			
	2020		///		lge's signature	404	
City and state:	San Francisco	o, CA	Hon. Ma	ria-Elena J	ames, U.S. Magist	rate Judge	



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I. INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND

The following affidavit is made in support of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant for Carl Mark FORCE IV ("FORCE") for violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 1343 (Wire Fraud); 18 U.S.C. Section 641 (Theft of Government Property); 18 U.S.C. Section 1956 (Money Laundering); and 18 U.S.C. Section 208 (Conflict of Interest) and also in support of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant for Shaun W. BRIDGES ("BRIDGES") for violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 1343 (Wire Fraud) and 18 U.S.C. Section 1956 (Money Laundering).

I am a Special Agent with the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in the Northern District of California and have been since 2011. I am currently the group's Cyber Crimes Unit Liaison. Prior to that, my background was as an auditor for California's Franchise Tax Board where I investigated abusive tax shelters. My training and experience includes, but is not limited to, investigations involving money laundering, white collar fraud, public corruption, organized crime, and violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and tax code. I have developed a specialty in cyber and digital currency crimes.

I am involved in an investigation into members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force to include former Drug Enforcement Administration Agent Carl Mark FORCE IV (FORCE) and former Secret Service Agent Shaun BRIDGES (BRIDGES). This is a bicoastal investigation that is based in San Francisco, being handled by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California and the Public Integrity Section in Washington D.C.

In this investigation, I am joined by several co-case agents, to include Special Agents and a Staff Operations Specialist from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) San Francisco Division's Public Corruption Squad, which investigates abuse of public office in violation of criminal law to include fraud, bribery, extortion, conflicts of interest, and embezzlement. I am also joined in this investigation by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) and the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG), both of which investigate and prosecute fraud and abuse by federal officials.

The facts in this affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and experience, and information obtained from other agents and witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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there is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint and warrants and does not set forth all of my knowledge about this matter.

II. SUMMARY

The government had multiple investigations into the Silk Road marketplace, an underground black market that allowed vendors and buyers to conduct illegal transactions over the internet. One of these investigations was conducted in the Southern District of New York, and the other was conducted out of Baltimore in the District of Maryland. Both FORCE and BRIDGES were assigned to the Baltimore investigation and not the New York investigation. The two investigations were conducted independently of each other.

Throughout 2012 and 2013, both FORCE and BRIDGES had significant responsibilities related to Baltimore's investigation. In this capacity, FORCE was the lead undercover agent in communication with DPR, the owner, administrator and operator of the Silk Road website. BRIDGES was the computer forensics expert on the Baltimore investigation. In their capacity as members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, both FORCE and BRIDGES had significant exposure to and developed expertise in the digital currency known as Bitcoin.

As will be described further herein, FORCE and BRIDGES abused their positions as federal agents and engaged in a scheme to defraud a variety of third-parties, the public, and the government, all for their own financial enrichment. With respect to former Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent FORCE, the investigation has revealed among other things that:

- a. FORCE created certain fictitious personas -- that were not officially sanctioned -- to communicate with DPR, the target of FORCE's investigation. Using one of these personas, FORCE sought to extort DPR by seeking monetary payment, offering in exchange not to provide the government with certain information if DPR paid \$250,000;
- b. FORCE acted outside the scope of his official role on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force and created a fictitious persona named "French Maid." Operating as "French

¹ Until October 1, 2013, DPR was known to FORCE and the rest of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force only by his online moniker "Dread Pirate Roberts" or "DPR." Ulbricht was known on the Silk Road site by the moniker "Dread Pirate Roberts" (DPR) and is referred to hereafter interchangeably as "DPR" and "Ulbricht."

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Maid," FORCE fraudulently represented to DPR certain information concerning "French Maid's" true identity and offered to sell DPR information about the government's investigation into Silk Road in exchange for approximately \$100,000 worth of bitcoin, which DPR paid and FORCE deposited into his own personal accounts;

- c. FORCE stole and converted to his own personal use a sizeable amount of bitcoins that DPR sent to FORCE in FORCE's official undercover capacity and rather than turning those bitcoin over to the government, FORCE deposited them into his own personal accounts;
- d. FORCE engaged in a series of complex transactions between various Bitcoin accounts (known as Bitcoin addresses), his personal digital currency accounts, and his personal bank accounts, including a \$235,000 wire to an overseas account in Panama, all in an effort to launder and conceal the true source of the ill-gotten proceeds;
- e. FORCE used his official position as a DEA agent to illegally run criminal history checks on individuals for the benefit of a third-party digital currency exchange company, CoinMKT, in which FORCE had personally invested approximately \$110,000 worth of bitcoin;
- f. FORCE functioned as the de facto Chief Compliance Officer for CoinMKT all the while employed as a DEA agent, even allowing himself to be featured in CoinMKT's "pitch decks" to venture capital investors and allowing himself to be listed as CoinMKT's antimoney laundering and/or compliance officer in order to benefit CoinMKT (a company in which FORCE had invested);
- g. FORCE improperly directed CoinMKT to freeze one of its individual customer's accounts containing a large amount of digital currency, worth approximately \$297,000, even though he lacked a sufficient legal basis on which to do so, and FORCE then illegally seized those funds and transferred them into his own personal account; and
- h. FORCE used his supervisor's signature stamp, without authorization, on an official U.S. Department of Justice subpoena and sent the subpoena to a payments company, Venmo, directing the company to unfreeze his own personal account, which had been previously

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frozen due to certain suspicious activity. FORCE then sought to conceal evidence of his improper use of an official subpoena by directing the company not to contact the DEA and attempting to destroy copies of the subpoena. When the company did not comply, FORCE asked another agent on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, an IRS agent, to collaborate with him on seizing that company's bank accounts.

With respect to former U.S. Secret Service (USSS) Special Agent BRIDGES, the investigation has revealed among other things that:

- a. In late January 2013, members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, to include BRIDGES and FORCE, gained access to a Silk Road website administrator account as a result of the arrest of a former Silk Road employee. On January 25, 2013, the Silk Road website suffered a sizeable theft of bitcoins, bitcoins which were moved into Mt. Gox, a digital currency exchange based in Japan;
- b. On February 12, 2013, BRIDGES formed and registered a personal limited liability company called "Quantum International Investments, LLC," (Quantum), and on February 22, 2013, BRIDGES opened an account at Fidelity Investments (Fidelity) in the name of Quantum;
- c. According to records obtained from Fidelity, BRIDGES funded his Quantum Fidelity account exclusively with wire deposits from Mt. Gox in Japan. Specifically, between March 6, 2013 through May 7, 2013, BRIDGES' Quantum Fidelity account in the United States received nine wire transfers from Mt. Gox totaling approximately \$820,000;
- d. Despite having personally benefitted in the amount of \$820,000 from a Mt. Gox account and receiving a large wire on May 7, 2013 from Mt. Gox, just two days later on May 9, 2013, BRIDGES served as the affiant on a multi-million dollar seizure warrant for Mt. Gox and its owner's bank accounts; and
- e. Upon learning of the government's criminal investigation into the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force based in the Northern District of California, and following an interview by the FBI as part of the criminal investigation, BRIDGES transferred over \$250,000 out of

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his Quantum Fidelity account via wire transfers into another bank account held by himself and a third-party.

Because this affidavit is for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause for the crimes proposed to be charged at the present time, it does not include certain additional facts known to me and the government's investigation continues.

III. RELEVANT STATUTES

Based on my training and experience and the facts as set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE has committed violations of law to include Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (Wire Fraud), Title 18, United States Code, Section 641 (Theft of Government Property), Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 208 (Conflict of Interest). There is also probable cause to believe that BRIDGES has committed violations of law to include Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (Wire Fraud) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering).

Title 18 U.S.C. § 641 prohibits embezzling, stealing, or converting any property belonging to the United States worth more than \$1,000. The essential elements of this offense are: (1) the defendant knowingly embezzled, stole, or converted to the defendant's use or the use of another the money or property of value with the intention of depriving the owner of the use or benefit of the money or property; (2) the money or property belonged to the United States; and (3) the value of the money or property was more than \$1,000. See Ninth Circuit Instruction 8.39.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1343 prohibits wire fraud. The essential elements of this offense are: (1) the defendant knowingly participated in, devised or intended to devise a scheme or plan to defraud, or a scheme or plan for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises; (2) the statements made or facts omitted as part of the scheme were material, that is they had a natural tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing, a person to part with money or property; (3) the defendant acted with the intent to defraud, that is, the intent to deceive or cheat; and (4) the defendant used, or caused to be used, a wire communication to carry out or attempt to carry out an essential part of the scheme. See Ninth Circuit Instruction 8.124.

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Title 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) prohibits the laundering of proceeds from "specified unlawful activity" (SUA). The essential elements are: (1) the defendant conducted or intended to conduct a financial transaction involving property that represented the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; (2) the defendant knew that the property represented the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; (3) the defendant knew the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity; and (4) the defendant did something that was a substantial step toward committing the crime. See Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 8.147. The money laundering statute specifically identifies both § 1343 wire fraud and § 641 theft of government property as "specified unlawful activity."

Title 18 U.S.C. § 208 prohibits federal employees from taking certain acts affecting a personal financial interest. Although there is no Ninth Circuit model instruction for this statute, caselaw establishes that the essential elements are: (1) the defendant was an officer or employee of the Executive Branch of the United States; (2) the defendant participated personally and substantially as a government employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, rendering of advice, investigation or otherwise in a matter; and (3) the defendant knew that he had a financial interest in the particular matter in which he was participating.

IV. BACKGROUND

FORCE was employed as a DEA Special Agent for approximately 15 years. He began his career with the DEA in September 1999 and served in Denver, Puerto Rico, and Baltimore. FORCE resigned on May 4, 2014, shortly after law enforcement began the current investigation.

FORCE received approximately \$150,000 in annual salary from the DEA. Based on my investigation, during the relevant timeframe of 2012 into 2014, his wife was a homemaker and the household had no significant outside income.

FORCE used one of his personal bank accounts to receive several large international and domestic wire and Automated Clearing House (ACH) transfers throughout the latter half of 2013 and first half of 2014. I have reviewed FORCE's bank records, and two personal checking accounts in FORCE's name reveal incoming deposits totaling at least approximately \$757,000 for the roughly year

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long period beginning April 2013 through May 2014.² This does not include amounts deposited from May 2014 onward. I have also learned through my investigation that during this timeframe FORCE paid off his mortgage, a government thrift savings plan loan, and wrote several very large checks for tens of thousands of dollars. In 2014, FORCE made investments in real properties, in businesses, and wired hundreds of thousands of dollars into an overseas account.

From 2013 through the present, FORCE has held numerous accounts in his own name and with his own personal identifiers³ at a variety of digital currency exchanges around the world, including in the Northern District of California. Moreover, in April 2014, FORCE established a company called Engedi, LLC. According to documents filed with the Maryland Secretary of State, Engedi, LLC's purpose is to speculate and invest in Bitcoin.

Like FORCE, BRIDGES was a member of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. Until his abrupt resignation on March 18, 2015, after learning he was a subject of this investigation, BRIDGES was employed as a U.S. Secret Service (USSS) Special Agent for approximately six years. He began his career with USSS in October 2009 and served in its Baltimore Field Office. After the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force ended, BRIDGES remained part of the USSS Electronic Crimes Task Force in Maryland. In this role, he served as the affiant on numerous seizure warrants.

On January 25, 2013, the Silk Road website suffered a sizeable theft of Bitcoin, a theft with which BRIDGES was associated. For reasons discussed below, I believe the proceeds of this theft were transferred to the Mt. Gox exchange in Japan. On February 12, 2013, not long after the Silk Road thefts occurred, BRIDGES formed a company called Quantum International Investments, LLC (Quantum). On February 22, 2013, BRIDGES established a personal investment account at Fidelity Investments (Fidelity) in the name of Quantum.

BRIDGES used that Fidelity account to receive several large international wire transfers from Japan, specifically from Mt. Gox, throughout the March through May 2013 timeframe. There were nine

Approximately \$330,000 was deposited in 2013 and approximately \$427,000 was deposited in 2014. This does not include the deposits made after this period that are discussed further below.

³ These personal accounts use FORCE's home address, and link to his personal bank and email account information.

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wire transfers from Mt. Gox to BRIDGES' Quantum Fidelity account, and each was just under \$100,000. This account was funded exclusively with deposits from Mt. Gox.

Just two days after receiving his last Mt. Gox wire on May 7, 2013, BRIDGES served in his official capacity as the affiant on a May 9, 2013 seizure warrant where he seized over \$2.1 million from Mt. Gox, under the theory Mt. Gox was operating in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1960, which prohibits the operation of an unregistered money service business.

After learning of this investigation into the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force and after being interviewed by federal law enforcement in the summer of 2014, BRIDGES transferred via two separate interstate wires over \$250,000 from his Quantum Fidelity account into an account at another bank that was held in his own name and in the name of a third-party (with whom BRIDGES has a personal relationship).

V. BITCOIN BACKGROUND

Bitcoin⁴ is a form of decentralized, convertible virtual currency that exists through the use of an online, decentralized ledger system. While Bitcoin mainly exists as an internet-based form of currency, it is possible to "print out" the necessary information and exchange Bitcoin via physical medium. The currency is not issued by any government, bank, or company, but rather is generated and controlled through computer software operating via a decentralized network. To acquire bitcoins, a typical user will purchase them from a Bitcoin seller or "exchanger." It is also possible to "mine" bitcoin by verifying other users' transactions. Bitcoin is just one form of digital currency, and there are a significant number of other varieties of digital currency.

Bitcoin exchangers typically accept payments of fiat currency (currency which derives its value from government regulation or law), or other convertible virtual currencies in order to obtain bitcoins. When a user wishes to purchase bitcoins from an exchanger, the user will typically send payment in the form of fiat or other convertible virtual currency to an exchanger, usually via wire or ACH, for the corresponding number of bitcoins based on a fluctuating exchange rate. The exchanger, often for a

⁴ Since Bitcoin is both a currency and a protocol, capitalization differs. Accepted practice is to use "Bitcoin" (singular with an upper case letter B) to label the protocol, software, and community, and "bitcoin" or "bitcoins" (with a lower case b) to label units of the currency and that practice is adopted

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commission, will then typically attempt to broker the purchase with another user of the exchange that is trying to sell bitcoins, or, in some instances, will act as the seller itself. If the exchanger can place a buyer with a seller, then the transaction can be completed.

When a user acquires bitcoins, they are sent to the user's Bitcoin address. This is somewhat analogous to a bank account number, which is comprised of a case-sensitive string of letters and numbers amounting to a total of 26 to 35 characters. The user can then conduct transactions with other Bitcoin users, by transferring bitcoins to their Bitcoin addresses, via the internet.

Little to no personally identifiable information about the payer or payee is transmitted in a Bitcoin transaction. Bitcoin transactions occur using a public key and a private key. A public key is used to receive bitcoins and a private key is used to allow withdrawals from a Bitcoin address. Only the Bitcoin address of the receiving party and the sender's private key are needed to complete the transaction, which by themselves rarely reflect any identifying information.

All Bitcoin transactions are recorded on what is known as the block chain. This is essentially a distributed public ledger that keeps track of all Bitcoin transactions, incoming and outgoing, and updates approximately six times per hour. The block chain records every Bitcoin address that has ever received a bitcoin and maintains records of every transaction and all the known balances for each Bitcoin address.

Digital currencies, including Bitcoin, have many known legitimate uses. However, much like cash, bitcoins can be used to facilitate illicit transactions and to launder criminal proceeds, given the ease with which they can be used to move money anonymously. As is demonstrated herein, however, in some circumstances bitcoin payments may be traced to accounts at traditional financial institutions using the block chain.

VI. SILK ROAD BACKGROUND

The Silk Road website was established in early 2011 and operated until on or about October 2, 2013, when it was seized by law enforcement. The illegal nature of the commerce hosted on Silk Road was readily apparent to anyone visiting the site. The vast majority of the goods for sale consisted of illegal drugs of nearly every variety, openly advertised on the site as such and prominently visible on the home page. The only form of payment accepted on Silk Road was Bitcoin.

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Silk Road was only accessible through the TOR network, a special network on the internet designed to conceal the true IP addresses of the computers on the network, and, thereby, the identities of the network's users. TOR stands for "The Onion Router."

Every Silk Road user had at least one Bitcoin address associated with the user's Silk Road account, where deposits to the account could be sent. To make purchases on the site, the user first had to obtain Bitcoin (for example, from an exchanger) and have them sent to the bitcoin deposit address associated with the user's Silk Road account. After thus funding the account, the user could make purchases from Silk Road vendors.

A federal grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New York indicted Ross William Ulbricht, also known as "DPR," as being the creator of Silk Road and engaging in a drug conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 846, among other charges. The matter proceeded to a multi-week trial in January 2015 before U.S. District Judge Katherine B. Forrest. Evidence at that trial, and other evidence of which I am aware, establishes that from late 2012 through his arrest on October 1, 2013, Ulbricht (DPR) was residing in and ran the Silk Road from San Francisco. On or about February 4, 2015, a federal jury sitting in the Southern District of New York convicted Ulbricht of all counts with which he was charged. Sentencing is set for May 15, 2015. ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH PROVIDED TO COURT IN SEPARATE UNDER SEAL FILING IS REDACTED HERE.

Aside from the New York case, on October 1, 2013, the District of Maryland charged Ulbricht with murder-for-hire and related drug-conspiracy charges.⁵ It is the District of Maryland's investigation and case in which FORCE and BRIDGES were involved.

VII. FORCE PROBABLE CAUSE

FORCE's Official Undercover Role On Baltimore's Silk Road Task Force

As described above, FORCE, BRIDGES, and other law enforcement agents from the Department of Homeland Security, Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, 6 worked on a

⁵ The District of Maryland had previously charged "John Doe a/k/a Dread Pirate Roberts" with these charges on or about May 1, 2013, at which time the District of Maryland was unsure of the true identity of DPR. The District of Maryland subsequently charged <u>Ulbricht</u> with these offenses after an IRS Special Agent on the Southern District of New York's investigation identified DPR as Ulbricht.

⁶ The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF) was part of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force early on, but their involvement did not last long.
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task force out of Baltimore dedicated to identifying and apprehending DPR, later determined to be Ross Ulbricht.

As part of his official role in the Baltimore Silk Road investigation, FORCE communicated with DPR using an undercover identity, hereafter referred to as "Nob." Nob (FORCE) and DPR communicated throughout 2012 and 2013 using a variety of methods of communication, including on a private messaging system on the Silk Road website and on chat programs that operated over the TOR network. Their communications reveal that DPR believed Nob to be a drug smuggler operating in the United States with connections to criminal organizations throughout the world. In reality, of course, Nob was FORCE, an undercover DEA agent. Many but not all of their communications were encrypted, as discussed further below.

Some portion of the communications between DPR and Nob (FORCE) are memorialized in FORCE's official case file, preserved in what are known as DEA 6s, which are official reports of the DEA's investigation. Some of the communications are also preserved on FORCE's official computers. However, not all of the communications between DPR and Nob (FORCE) were memorialized.

At the time of Ulbricht's arrest, law enforcement seized a laptop computer from Ulbricht's person. This computer has been forensically analyzed. It, too, contained evidence of communications between DPR and Nob (FORCE). It also contained certain communications between DPR and FORCE that FORCE did not memorialize in his official reports or as part of his official case file.

Ulbricht's computer also contained a handful of files that appear to be Ulbricht's notes to himself. One such file is named "LE counterintel" which your affiant believes stands for "Law Enforcement Counterintelligence" and contains information that DPR was receiving from purported "inside" law enforcement sources. I have reviewed these files and believe that they contain information that came from a person or persons inside law enforcement, in part because of their substance and in part because of their use of certain terminology and acronyms that are not widely known by the public.

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Prior to his arrest, DPR was known to have been hiding his true identity and location from law enforcement, so information concerning the government's investigation was material and valuable to him.

I have reviewed many of the communications between DPR and Nob (FORCE) that are available. At some point, Nob (FORCE) and DPR began encrypting certain of these communications using what is known as PGP encryption. PGP stands for "pretty good privacy" and is an encryption algorithm that allows its users to send encrypted conversations through messaging or chat services. Much like the way bitcoins are controlled, PGP too uses a system of public keys and private keys. With PGP, a public key is used to encrypt a message for a specific user to read, and a private key is used by the recipient to decrypt the message. In addition to needing a private key to decrypt a message, a user must also possess a unique password that was established at the time of creation to decrypt or sign a message.

A review of FORCE's official case file does not contain any of the private PGP keys or passwords needed to decrypt FORCE's encrypted communications with DPR. Nor did FORCE provide these private PGP keys to the prosecutor on the Baltimore case or to those in his chain-of-command. Instead, FORCE appears to have been the only individual to have possessed the private PGP keys and passwords needed to unlock his communication with DPR. This is notable, because as a law enforcement agent, I know that one of the chief concerns in working an investigation and building evidence is the ability to obtain decipherable, admissible evidence for use in later proceedings.

Despite his involvement in the Baltimore Silk Road investigation, and knowledge that other law enforcement would be unable to read encrypted communications without the private PGP keys, FORCE, acting as Nob, specifically instructed DPR to use PGP to encrypt messages relating to the investigation. While this request may have enhanced Nob's (FORCE's) credibility to DPR as a "criminal," thereby furthering his cover, it would have made it difficult for FORCE to document the communications, communications that would be of use to law enforcement making a case against DPR at a later date. Even if encrypting messages to DPR would make Nob more credible, the communications should have been documented, in deciphered form, and memorialized in the case file.

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I have conferred with other law enforcement agents who conduct online undercover operations and believe the failure to preserve the private PGP keys while simultaneously directing a target to use PGP to encrypt messages makes little sense in the context of a law enforcement investigation, particularly taking into account that this task force involved multiple law enforcement officers, all of whom might require access to the evidence FORCE gathered in his dealings with DPR: In the event FORCE were to lose the PGP private keys, or that something were to happen to FORCE, any evidence contained in the encrypted PGP format would effectively be lost and unusable without the private key. FORCE's apparent failure to document the private PGP keys for his communications with DPR anywhere in his case file, or to provide them to others at the DEA or to the prosecutor, leads me to believe he did not want anyone other than himself (FORCE) to be able to decrypt certain of those communications, and that, as a result, he sought deliberately to undermine the integrity of the ongoing Baltimore Silk Road Task Force investigation.

Although in the beginning of his time communicating with DPR, FORCE (as Nob) occasionally provided certain decrypted communications to others on the Task Force, including the prosecutor with whom he was working, FORCE did not provide all communications in decrypted form. This was despite the fact that the prosecutor with whom FORCE was working repeatedly emphasized the need for FORCE to provide all encrypted communications. In fact, toward the end of the timeframe in which Nob (FORCE) was in relatively heavy communication with DPR, FORCE increasingly was not providing the decrypted versions of their communication.

FORCE's Theft of 525 Bitcoins Coming from Ulbricht, a/k/a "DPR"

In his communications with DPR, Nob (FORCE) created the fiction that Nob had sensitive information that he would provide to DPR, often in exchange for payment, including law enforcement sensitive information.

One of the cover stories that Nob (FORCE) created with DPR was that Nob had access to a corrupt government employee, fictionally named "Kevin." Ironically, "Kevin" was supposed to be a corrupt Department of Justice case agent on the government's Silk Road investigation and simultaneously on Nob's payroll, who would feed Nob information about law enforcement's

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investigation into the Silk Road. FORCE memorialized this cover story concerning "Kevin" in a DEA 6 dated August 1, 2013 (the "August DEA 6").

DPR subsequently paid Nob (FORCE) in bitcoins on at least two occasions. One payment was in June 2013 for 400 bitcoins⁷ for fraudulent identification documents that Nob was supposed to provide to DPR. A second payment was in August 2013 for 525 bitcoins for "Kevin's" inside law enforcement information. At the time of the payments, 400 bitcoins would have been worth approximately \$40,000 and 525 bitcoins would have been worth approximately \$50,000.8 Both the June 400 bitcoin payment and the August 525 bitcoin payment became official government property once DPR made the payments: they were received as part of FORCE's official undercover role from the target of a federal investigation and therefore became undercover proceeds.

As is described further below, rather than properly documenting these payments, and safeguarding them in a government account, FORCE took custody of the payments and deposited the bulk of the 400 bitcoin payment and all of the 525 bitcoin payment into his own personal account. Records received from a digital currency exchange, CampBX, reveal that FORCE maintained a personal account there that was linked directly to two additional personal accounts belonging to FORCE: (1) FORCE's account at another digital currency exchange, Bitstamp, and (2) FORCE's account at a payments processing account, Dwolla, neither of which were government or official accounts.

In the August DEA 6, FORCE memorialized the fact that he, acting as Nob, sent a PGPencrypted communication to DPR. According to the August DEA 6, Nob (FORCE) "advised DPR that

⁷ The 400 bitcoin payment was actually an 800 bitcoin payment but Nob (FORCE) refunded DPR 400 bitcoins because the deal for the fraudulent identification documents allegedly fell through.

These are very conservative estimates and the actual loss amount is likely greater than these amounts: FORCE himself valued the 400 bitcoin payment as being equal to \$76,800 on October 22, 2013, and not \$40,000 as described here. The reason for the difference concerns the fluctuating value of bitcoin during this timeframe. The value of bitcoin at the time of the June 2013 payment was approximately \$100 per bitcoin, yielding the \$40,000 approximation provided here. However, the value at the time of FORCE's own valuation of the 400 bitcoin payment in October 2013 was approximately \$192 per bitcoin. It should also be noted that during the time that FORCE was liquidating bitcoins through his own personal accounts, the value of bitcoin fluctuated dramatically ranging from less than \$300 per bitcoin to over \$1100 per bitcoin.

⁹ FORCE maintained a separate account at Dwolla in the name of his official undercover identity. In contrast, FORCE's personal account at Dwolla was in his own name and established using his own personal identifiers such as Social Security number, home address, personal email and date of birth.

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'Kevin' wanted a 'donation' of bitcoins from DPR, the inference being that the information on the Silk Road investigation is valuable." The August DEA 6 further specifies that "Special Agent FORCE provided a Bitcoin wallet address" for DPR to deposit the Bitcoin payment for "Kevin's" information. However, FORCE made an "Agent's Note" at the bottom of the August DEA 6 explicitly stating that DPR never made the payment, writing "AGENT'S NOTE: DPR made no such payment." (emphasis added).

The August DEA 6 is also notable for what information it does not contain. It does not include the actual Bitcoin public address that Nob (FORCE) provided to DPR to receive payment for "Kevin's" information. Including this information would have allowed other law enforcement agents to trace any payment if made. Nor does the August DEA 6 list or document the PGP encryption password that would be subsequently needed to decipher the encrypted communication between DPR and Nob (FORCE) concerning "Kevin's" information or the information surrounding the payment for that information.

However, certain communications between Nob (FORCE) and DPR were maintained on the server that hosted the Silk Road website, which the FBI imaged as part of the Southern District of New York investigation. I have obtained and reviewed a copy of that server and it contains the communications between Nob (FORCE) and DPR, including certain communications that FORCE does not appear to have memorialized in the official case file. The server contains a chain of messages between DPR and Nob (FORCE) from July 31, 2013 through August 4, 2013. With the exception of one message DPR authored, the messages in the chain are completely encrypted.

That sole unencrypted message in this chain is from DPR to Nob (FORCE). It is dated August 4, 2013, and concerns a payment DPR made for "Kevin's" information. Specifically, DPR wrote: "I could not decrypt your second message, got an error. I could decrypt the first, and have sent the 525 btc as requested. Please keep me posted and you have my word that no one else knows anything about this. I'm sorry I didn't know how much to send before. I was afraid of offending if I sent too little and looking foolish if I sent too much. I hope I didn't make things too difficult for you." (emphasis added).

Within approximately two hours of DPR sending the message described above, Nob (FORCE)

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responded to DPR with an encrypted message but containing the unencrypted subject line, "use PGP!" As noted, PGP stands for "Pretty Good Privacy," an encryption mechanism. In other words, FORCE was directing DPR to encrypt his messages. Following the message containing the unencrypted subject line were a series of additional back and forth encrypted PGP messages between Nob (FORCE) and DPR.

I know from other law enforcement agents who conduct undercover operations on TOR and black market sites that there is little reason to direct a target who is using clear communication to instead use encrypted communication, and no reason to fail to document a decryption mechanism in the case file or share it with other agents, management, or the prosecutor.

Again, FORCE did not memorialize the PGP private encryption key that could be used to decipher the July 31-August 4, 2013, encrypted communication chain between himself and DPR anywhere in his case file or provide it to anyone else at the DEA or to the prosecutor with whom he was working. Furthermore, the last mention of DPR's payment for "Kevin's" information in FORCE's official DEA case file is the August DEA 6, in which FORCE specifically stated that no payment was ever received. Nor are there any subsequent DEA 6s correcting or amending this. In fact, a review of FORCE's official case file reveals that FORCE never documented having received a 525 Bitcoin payment from DPR, as DPR's August 4, 2013, communication to Nob (FORCE) states had occurred.

I believe that FORCE, acting as Nob, instructed DPR to use PGP encryption in part to conceal the fact that DPR actually had made a 525 bitcoin payment to Nob (FORCE) that FORCE was not detailing in his official law enforcement reports. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in the August DEA 6 FORCE took care to explicitly note the fact in the "AGENT'S NOTE: DPR made no such payment," and there is no subsequent DEA 6 in which FORCE states that DPR did transmit a 525 bitcoin payment. It is further bolstered by the fact that FORCE does not appear to have memorialized the PGP encryption keys for his communications with DPR anywhere in the official case file. Finally, when DPR mentioned the 525 bitcoin payment in the August 4 communication, the first response FORCE acting as Nob gave was "use PGP!"

Notably, by late July 2013, the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force had been made aware that the FBI was seeking to obtain an image of the Silk Road server, and therefore FORCE may have had reason AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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to fear that any communications between himself and DPR would be accessible to the FBI in the event the FBI was successful in imaging the server.

Records obtained from FORCE's personal digital currency account at a digital currency exchange company, CampBX, reveal that on September 27, 2013, FORCE deposited the precise amount of 525 bitcoins into his own personal account at CampBX. 10

I have performed an analysis of the block chain as it concerns the 525 bitcoin deposit to FORCE's personal CampBX account. The analysis reveals that the 525 bitcoins FORCE received into his own personal CampBX account was directly linked, through a series of transactions, to the 525 bitcoin payment that DPR made on August 4, 2013, i.e. the same day DPR communicated to Nob (FORCE) that he had "sent the 525 BTC as requested."

Records from the Silk Road servers establish that this 525 bitcoin payment originated from DPR's Silk Road account on August 4, 2013. Specifically, the 525 bitcoin payment was split into four smaller payments and made in the following manner:

- a. On August 4, 2013 at 22:05 UTC a payment of 203 bitcoins
- b. On August 4, 2013 at 22:05 UTC a payment of 134 bitcoins
- c. On August 4, 2013 at 22:05 UTC a payment of 61 bitcoins
- d. On August 4, 2013 at 22:01 UTC a payment of 127 bitcoins

The 525 bitcoin payment went from four addresses and ultimately landed in a single passthrough account on September 1, 2013. The 525 bitcoin remained in the pass-through account from September 1, 2013 until September 27, 2013, when they were transferred into FORCE's personal account at CampBX. These transactions are depicted on "Trace of 525 Bitcoin Payment," attached as Exhibit B.

Notably, FORCE treated DPR's June 400 bitcoin payment differently from the way he treated the August 525 bitcoin payment. To be sure, FORCE wrongfully deposited substantial portions of both

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¹⁰ The September 27, 2013 date has significance because email records I have reviewed indicate that, at the latest on September 27, 2013, FORCE learned that DPR was about to be apprehended as part of the separate New York investigation into the Silk Road. In response to learning this information, FORCE wrote to the prosecutor with whom he was working inquiring as to the true name and identifying information of DPR. To my knowledge, FORCE was not provided with that information on September 27, 2013 in response to his inquiry.

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payments into his own personal account at CampBX, and later transferred them to another of his personal accounts at Bitstamp, another digital currency exchange where FORCE maintained a personal account. However, FORCE memorialized the 400 bitcoin payment in a DEA 6 (albeit many months after the June 400 bitcoin payment was made) and in January 2014 attempted to put together a seizure warrant for that 400 bitcoin payment. He did not do any of this for the 525 bitcoin payment.

And as part of the process of putting together a seizure warrant for the 400 bitcoin payment, the federal prosecutor with whom FORCE was working emailed FORCE on January 16, 2014, and asked him a series of questions, including where the 400 bitcoins physically were. FORCE replied in an email later that day that the 400 bitcoins were "at the DEA." Based on my review of records and an analysis of the block chain, this was not true. And, with respect to the 525 bitcoins, FORCE never made any attempt to memorialize the payment or to prepare a seizure warrant. The federal prosecutor with whom FORCE was working was unaware of any 525 bitcoin payment ever having been made, as were FORCE's superiors at the DEA.

As part of this investigation, a federal search warrant was issued to search various personal email facilities belonging to FORCE. One such email account contained what appears to be a note to himself saved in a drafts folder. This note references two transfers of bitcoin payments from DPR, one made in "June/July 2013 for the fraudulent UK identification" and one made on August 4, 2013, the same date that DPR transferred 525 bitcoins to Nob (FORCE). See Exhibit C attached ("Draft Note"). In other words, FORCE's own saved email note indicates there was a payment from DPR on August 4, 2013." The note also appears to attempt to justify FORCE's conduct, noting that the government actually made money during the time FORCE retained the payments (presumably given the fluctuating value of Bitcoin).

At the time of the 525 bitcoin payment and during the time of the communications between Nob (FORCE) and DPR, I have confirmed via internet service provider records and a variety of other means that DPR (Ross Ulbricht) was physically located in San Francisco, in the Northern District of California.

For reasons that are currently unknown to me, FORCE characterized the August 4, 2013 payment as being for 200 bitcoins. However, as demonstrated above, the August 4, 2013 payment was for 525 bitcoins.

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Based on the fact that DPR paid 525 bitcoins to Nob (FORCE) in FORCE's official government capacity as an undercover agent on Baltimore's Silk Road case, and based on the fact that the 525 bitcoins ultimately ended up in FORCE's personal account with CampBX, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE embezzled, converted, or stole government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 641. Given that these bitcoins went through several different accounts, often for short periods of time, as depicted in Exhibit B, and sat idle in a pass-through account from September 1, 2013 through September 27, 2013, before making their way to FORCE's personal account with CampBX on September 27, 2013, there is also probable cause to believe that FORCE was attempting to conceal the source of the true source of the proceeds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956.

FORCE's Fraud as "French Maid"

The only officially-sanctioned undercover identity for FORCE to communicate with DPR was as Nob. Nob was the persona that was discussed in FORCE's official reports. "Nob" was also the persona of which others in FORCE's chain-of-command and the federal prosecutor on the Baltimore Silk Road case were aware.

When DPR was arrested in San Francisco, he was caught literally in the act of running the Silk Road on a laptop computer. The FBI seized and forensically examined that laptop and its contents were part of the government's proof at trial against Ulbricht. As discussed above, Ulbricht's laptop contained a text document entitled "LE counterintel," a record of sorts that he maintained about information he was receiving from apparent law enforcement "insiders" purporting to have knowledge about the government's investigation into the Silk Road. The file appears to contain cut and pasted sections of what the insiders were relaying to him through online chats or private messages.

One such insider used the moniker "French Maid." Notes in a file from Ulbricht's computer indicate that he paid "French Maid" approximately \$100,000 worth of bitcoin in exchange for a name that he was told Mark Karpeles had provided to law enforcement. Mark Karpeles was at the time the CEO of the now-defunct Mt. Gox digital currency exchange. The Baltimore Silk Road Task Force was attempting to arrange an interview of Karpeles during the July to August 2013 timeframe, in order to obtain any information Karpeles might have had concerning the operator of Silk Road.

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Specifically, in a text document recovered from Ulbricht's computer titled "log," there is an entry dated September 13, 2013, in which Ulbricht wrote: "French Maid claims that mark karpeles has given my name to DHLS [sic]. I offered him \$100K for the name." Days later, ¹² Ulbricht wrote "I paid French Maid \$100K for the name given to DHLS by karpeles." Our investigation has revealed that there is probable cause to believe that FORCE was "French Maid," a source that Ulbricht paid for inside information.

I have reviewed private messages between "French Maid" (FORCE) and DPR obtained from the Silk Road server imaged by the FBI. The messages span from August 26, 2013 through September 14, 2013. The bulk of the messages are encrypted with PGP keys, but some early messages are not encrypted. In the first message in this thread, dated August 26, 2013, "French Maid" wrote to DPR: "I have received important information that you need to know asap. Please provide me with your public key for PGP. Carl." (Emphasis added).

Just four hours later, "French Maid" sent a follow-up message to DPR with the subject line
"Whoops!" and a message stating "I am sorry about that. My name is <u>Carla Sophia</u> and I have many boyfriends and girlfriends on the market place. DPR will want to hear what I have to say;) xoxoxo."

(Emphasis added).

What follow are a series of back and forth encrypted messages between DPR and "French Maid." Of particular note, there are several encrypted messages between DPR and "French Maid" on September 13, 2013, with "French Maid" including the subject line "Hope you like." It is unclear whether "French Maid" ever provided DPR with any name. In the "log" file recovered from Ulbricht's computer, after the entry stating that he had "paid French maid \$100k for the name given to DHLS by karpeles," there is an entry stating: "He hasn't replied for 4 days." There is no further entry in the "log" file regarding "French Maid."

The fact that the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force was attempting to arrange an interview with Karpeles was not widely known in law enforcement circles. In other words, "French Maid" could not have been just anyone out of the universe of law enforcement. It had to have been someone who knew

¹² The entry gives only the date range of "September 11-September 18" and does not provide an exact date.

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about Baltimore's attempt to arrange an interview with Karpeles. Based on emails I have reviewed, FORCE was one of a small group of individuals that knew of those discussions.

Additional pieces of circumstantial evidence prove that FORCE is "French Maid." Both "French Maid" and FORCE (operating as "Nob") used the exact same brand of PGP software, a free brand called GnuPG. There are different brands of PGP software so it is noteworthy that both FORCE (operating as "Nob") and "French Maid" used the same brand. Not only did FORCE and "French Maid" both use the same brand of PGP software, they also both used the same outdated version of that software, 1.4.12. Version 1.4.12 was released on January 2012, and was replaced with a new version by December 2012, and was one of several versions of GnuPG software. As such, both "French Maid" and FORCE (as Nob) were using a specific, older version of the GnuPG software, and neither of them replaced it with the other (free) versions of GnuPG that came out thereafter.

I know based on conversations with another federal agent who is involved in undercover investigations that among TOR users and consumers of PGP software, v1.4.12 version was somewhat outdated by late August 2013 when "French Maid" appeared in communication with DPR for the first time. This is not akin, for example, to two people using the same model of mobile phone but both having software that is out of date. Rather, the outdated version that both "French Maid" and FORCE (as Nob) used is more of a "signature" given the greater number of versions available.

There are also additional similarities between FORCE's (Nob's) and "French Maid's" PGP patterns. Both "Nob" and "French Maid" left certain default settings on their PGP software. For one thing, both "French Maid" and FORCE (Nob) left a "tag" that appeared on every message authored from their PGP key revealing the brand and version of PGP software they were using. This is akin to, for example, leaving the phrase "sent from my iPhone" on the bottom of one's emails but with greater detail: it would be akin to leaving a phrase like "sent from my iPhone 6 IOS 8.0.1." Leaving this "tag" on typically reveals that one is dealing with a fairly inexperienced user of PGP, because someone that regularly uses PGP to communicate would normally have changed their settings to omit this tag. After

¹³ My understanding is that that the interview with Karpeles never materialized.

¹⁴ FORCE's investigation into Silk Road began in approximately February 2012 and he began using PGP as "Nob" sometime by approximately April 2012.
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all, the entire point behind PGP software is anonymity, so if a user leaves the brand, version, bit, and release date of software on a message this is revealing something about the sender and undermines the goal of remaining 100% anonymous. One of the first things many PGP forums or regular users of PGP software instruct is that a user disable this feature. Moreover, PGP offers choices of 1024, 2048, 3072 or 4096 bit encryption keys, with the higher keys giving greater protection. Many of the regular PGP users that were active on the Silk Road chose the 4096 bit keys because of the additional protection the larger key provided. Here both FORCE (as Nob) and "French Maid" used the 2048 bit default encryption key.

In addition to the PGP similarities, additional evidence that FORCE is "French Maid" is that the 770 bitcoin payment DPR made to "French Maid," worth approximately \$98,000 at the time, ended up in FORCE's own personal digital currency account at CampBX. Specifically, Silk Road server data reveals that DPR made a payment on September 15, 2013, for 770 bitcoins. As noted, this is the same time frame when Ulbricht wrote in his journal that he had "paid French Maid \$100K for the name that [K]arpeles provided to DHLS."

An analysis of the block chain reveals that the 770 bitcoin payment was broken up into four separate bitcoin addresses and funneled through a series of pass-through accounts in September 2013. Between September 23, 2013 and September 29, 2013, those four addresses all came together to deposit 770 bitcoins in FORCE's personal account at CampBX. For a detailed analysis of these complex transactions, see attached Exhibit E ("Trace and Analysis of DPR September 2013 Payment to French Maid"). Records obtained from CampBX demonstrate that this was an account held in FORCE's personal capacity.

Moreover, throughout November 2013, a substantial portion (at least 600 bitcoins) of the bitcoins in FORCE's CampBX account moved to FORCE's personal account at Bitstamp, a global digital currency exchange. Again here, records obtained from Bitstamp demonstrate that FORCE used his personal identifiers, home address, date of birth, personal bank account, and personal email address in connection with his Bitstamp account. As is discussed further below, FORCE subsequently liquidated hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of bitcoin from this Bitstamp account by having the proceeds wired into his personal checking account.

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From having reviewed the entries from the "log" file on Ulbricht's computer and the unencrypted portion of the "French Maid" and DPR messages, I believe that FORCE's statement to DPR that he was "Carla Sophia," a user on the "market place" with "many girlfriends and boyfriends," and FORCE's omission of his true identity, was a material misrepresentation. I believe this information influenced or was capable of influencing DPR whether to part with property, in this case 770 bitcoins, had DPR known that he was not communicating with a female named "Carla Sophia" but instead a male named Carl FORCE who was in fact a federal agent.

When DPR made the 770 bitcoin payment and when the communications between "French Maid" (FORCE) and DPR occurred, I have confirmed via internet service provider records and a variety of other means that DPR (Ulbricht) was physically located in San Francisco, in the Northern District of California. Based on the fact FORCE fraudulently told DPR via the use of interstate wires that he was "Carla Sophia," and that this fact was material, and given that on that basis DPR paid 770 bitcoins to "French Maid" for information, and that FORCE's personal accounts received 770 bitcoins from DPR during the same September 2013 timeframe, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE committed wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1343. Given that, for example 194 bitcoins of this 770 payment went through several different accounts, as depicted in Exhibit E, from September 15, 2013 through September 22, 2013, before making its way to FORCE's personal account with CampBX on September 23, 2013, there is also probable cause to believe that FORCE was attempting to conceal the true source of the proceeds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956.

FORCE's Extortion of DPR As "Death From Above"

From reviewing one of FORCE's official reports dated November 12, 2012, I know that around that time FORCE obtained information from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) about an individual then being considered as a possible suspect for DPR. The individual was named "AA." [actual name omitted here for confidentiality.] Due to its law-enforcement sensitive nature, FORCE was not permitted to share this information with individuals outside the government.

On or about April 1, 2013, FORCE created a fictitious persona on the Silk Road website named "Death from Above." FORCE, using the "Death from Above," moniker, solicited a \$250,000 payment from DPR and provided DPR the AA name and personal identifying details. Specifically, on April 1, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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2013, "Death from Above" wrote DPR a message on the Silk Road server stating, "I know that you had something to do with [C.G.'s] disappearance and death. Just wanted to let you know that I'm coming for you. Tuque. You are a dead man. Don't think you can elude me. De Oppresso Liber."

On April 6, 2013, DPR replied: "I don't know who you are or what your problem is but let me tell you one thing: I've been busting my ass every god damn day for over two years to make this place what it is. I keep my head down, I don't get involved with the drama . . . somehow psychotic people still turn up at my doorstep . . . I've been hacked, I've had threats made against the site and now, thanks to you, I've had threats made against my life. I know I am doing a good thing running this site. Your threats and all of the other psychos aren't going to deter me . . . stop messaging me and go find something else to do."

Later that day "Death From Above" (FORCE) replied to DPR, this time dropping a reference to AA's name, stating "It's not that easy [AA]. I'm legit. Green Beret. Friend of [C.G.]. I have access to TS/SCI files that FBI, DEA, AFP, SOCA would kill for. In fact, that is what I do . . . kill. The only thing that I do . . . Don't worry DoD has no interest in you and your little website. North Korea and Iran are a lot more important. In fact, as far as the Army and Navy are concerned you are a nobody. Petty drug dealer. But, [C.G.] was somebody. So tell me where he is and we will be done with this."

On April 10, 2013, "Death from Above" (FORCE) wrote to DPR again, this time giving DPR details concerning AA including full name, date of birth, citizenship, address, and other personal identifying details. DPR stated, "Is that enough to get your attention? After watching you, there is no way you could have killed [C.G.]. But I think you had something to do with it. So, \$250,000 in U.S. cash/bank transfer and I won't give your identity to law enforcement. Consider it punitive damages. Death From Above."

This payment appears to have never materialized, apparently because DPR did not believe "Death From Above's" information: in April 2013 Ulbricht wrote in the "log" file found on his laptop

¹⁵ The entire series of messages that "Death From Above" sent to DPR is not included here for brevity. The reference to C.G. [N.B. actual name omitted here for confidentiality] was a reference to an employee of DPR whom DPR had sought to have murdered in January 2013, as explained further below. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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that he was "being blackmailed again. Someone says they have my ID, but hasn't proven it." Then, on April 11, 2013, Ulbricht wrote "guy blackmailing me who says he has my ID is bogus."

There appears to be no mention of "Death From Above" anywhere in FORCE's official DEA 6 reports. However, FORCE's case file contains several DVDs of video taken with FORCE's official DEA laptop with a screen-recording program that shows certain communications with DPR. At some point in that several hours' worth of video footage there is a clip of a message being typed on the Silk Road using the "Death From Above" account. A screenshot from that video is attached as Exhibit A. Therefore, I believe FORCE was "Death From Above." Death From Above was not known to FORCE's superiors at the DEA, or the prosecutor assigned to the investigation, and FORCE was not authorized to disclose information concerning persons under investigation to anyone outside the investigative team, including, of course, disclosing information to the target himself as part of an unsanctioned extortion effort.

FORCE's acting as "Death From Above" demonstrates that FORCE had a history of: (1) creating fictitious personas that he did not memorialize in his official reports or apprise his superiors at the DEA or the prosecutor of; (2) soliciting payments from DPR; and (3) providing law-enforcement sensitive information to outside individuals when the disclosure of such information was not authorized and not memorialized in any official report.

FORCE's Conflict of Interest with CoinMKT

CoinMKT is a California-based digital currency exchange company that supports trading between Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. I have reviewed a number of emails between FORCE and CoinMKT personnel, including its CEO and Co-Founder. These communications demonstrate that FORCE had a two-fold relationship with CoinMKT: he was both a major investor as well as its de facto compliance officer – all while he was employed as a full-time DEA agent who was investigating digital currency users and providers.

According to the emails, in November 2013 FORCE invested approximately \$110,000 worth of bitcoin in CoinMKT in two installments. First, on or about November 8, 2013, FORCE invested approximately \$10,000 worth of bitcoin in CoinMKT. Second, on or about November 25, 2013, FORCE invested approximately \$100,000 more worth of bitcoin in CoinMKT. According to CoinMKT, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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the amount of FORCE's investment made him one of the top four investors in its first seed round of fundraising.

In addition to his investor status, FORCE was engaged in negotiations with CoinMKT to become its Chief Compliance Officer. Early on in their communications, CoinMKT's CEO flagged the possibility of a conflict with FORCE simultaneously being a DEA agent and serving as CoinMKT's compliance officer, noting in a November 1, 2013 email, "Just FYI if there's a work conflict – I'm not interested in doing anything illegal, so if we have to wait until you're not officially an employee [with DEA] or whatever, then let me know, you're the best judge of that...."

On November 16, 2013, CoinMKT's CEO wrote to FORCE asking a few questions. For example:

CoinMKT: Where would you work? Would you retain your old job?

FORCE: I would work here in Baltimore. I'm not sure how much longer I will be staying here at DEA.

CoinMKT: What connections can you bring to the table to help us with compliance?

FORCE: I have numerous contacts with IRS-Criminal Investigations, and my Intel Analyst (among others have direct access to FinCEN [Financial Crimes Enforcement Network]) . . . plus I can run queries in criminal databases [database name omitted] for suspect members of CoinMKT.

I know from my training and experience as a law enforcement officer that running checks in government databases such as the one FORCE referred to by name in the email above is strictly forbidden if not for an official law enforcement purpose. In fact, misuse of a government database may violate federal law and expose the offender to potential criminal liability. Nor does it appear that FORCE was speaking in the future tense about what he could do for CoinMKT down the road in the event he left the DEA and had full-time employment with CoinMKT, because his offer to run checks in criminal databases such as the one he mentioned by name would have been contingent upon his remaining an agent in order to have access to such databases.

Moreover, FORCE explicitly indicated that he would remain at DEA and simultaneously perform compliance work for CoinMKT. In a November 23, 2013, email FORCE stated "you know for right now, I think it would be better if you just pay me in stock options. I will stay on with DEA until AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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[CoinMKT] hits it 'big time' I have a lot of down time at DEA so I am confident that I can handle all that needs to be done regarding Legal and Compliance on a daily basis."

CoinMKT has advised that it needed a bank account in order to be successful in the digital currency field. On November 25, 2013, CoinMKT's CEO wrote to FORCE stating that a primary antimoney laundering (AML) contact was needed and asking if CoinMKT could list FORCE as its AML point of contact. Subsequently, on January 13, 2014, CoinMKT advised FORCE it was listing FORCE as its Compliance Officer for purposes of contact with a bank. FORCE responded the next day, "All right...let's hope this goes." Again, this was while FORCE was still employed as a DEA agent.

During the latter part of 2013, FORCE and CoinMKT continued to discuss FORCE's role as a Compliance Officer. By January 2014, email correspondence indicates that CoinMKT thought of and included FORCE as part of its core team, including him on internal emails. For example, in a January 20, 2014, email CoinMKT's CEO sent to about 11 employees describing each employee's job description, FORCE was listed as the third person after the two founders as "compliance extraordinaire." Although CoinMKT authored this email, other communications demonstrate that FORCE thought of himself as one of the CoinMKT team and encouraged CoinMKT to use his status, his name, bio, and photo in their company materials. For example, on February 19, 2014, FORCE provided CoinMKT a headshot and bio to include in pitch decks for investors. And on January 25, 2014, FORCE wrote inquiring if CoinMKT was registered with appropriate authorities and offering guidance about money transmission laws. In his email inquiry, FORCE used phrasing that suggested he was part of the company: "this will keep <u>us</u> from having the Feds seize any monies from us under 18 U.S.C. Section 1960 eventually when <u>we</u> hit the big time, <u>we</u> are going to have to get a license from each state that we have customers in..." (emphasis added).

CoinMKT has provided numerous emails between CoinMKT and FORCE's personal email account. A search warrant was also obtained and served on Microsoft (which hosts Outlook email) for FORCE's personal emails. Some of the emails between FORCE and CoinMKT were included in the Microsoft production. However, several other of the emails that CoinMKT provided were not included

¹⁶ CoinMKT has confirmed that they used FORCE's bio and profile, and solicited venture fundraising in the San Francisco Bay Area, within the Northern District of California.
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in the production that Microsoft made, including many of the emails excerpted above. The FBI has conferred with Microsoft about this issue, and was advised that all emails from FORCE's personal email were provided and that any emails that were missing likely meant that the user had deleted those emails. In other words, it appears to me that FORCE may have selectively deleted certain inculpatory emails between himself and CoinMKT.

FORCE's Unlawful Seizure of R.P.'s Funds

R.P. was a California resident who held an account at CoinMKT during at least 2013 and 2014.
R.P. maintained cash in his account with CoinMKT as well as various brands of digital currency to include bitcoin, litecoin, feathercoin, and worldcoin.

On February 5, 2014, CoinMKT emailed FORCE regarding what it initially believed to be suspicious activity by R.P, noting that R.P. had withdrawn "\$10,000 three times instead of once for \$30,000." CoinMKT sought direction from FORCE on how to proceed, noting R.P. had approximately 128 bitcoin (approximately \$109,000 at the time) in his account with CoinMKT.

On February 8, 2014, FORCE emailed CoinMKT directing them to suspend R.P.'s account and to "tell [R.P.] that the federal government is investigating him for federal violations of 18 USC 1956 (money laundering) and 18 USC 1960 (unlicensed money transmitter) and 31 USC 5324 (structuring).....I will seize the 128 btc federally and do all the paperwork...."

On or about February 7, 2014, FORCE instructed a DEA intelligence analyst to run a criminal history check on R.P., noting that the purpose was to uncover illegal activity on R.P. According to a subsequent report FORCE authored, the only information found on R.P. was that he had previously withdrawn \$17,000, had a felony conviction for vandalism, and was a self-employed actor. Nonetheless, on February 8, 2014, at FORCE's direction, CoinMKT froze R.P.'s account.

On February 10, 2014, FORCE, now using his official DOJ account instead of the personal email account he had historically used to communicate with CoinMKT, served an administrative subpoena on CoinMKT requesting that they provide all information regarding R.P. FORCE also sent the subpoena to CoinMKT by facsimile later that day. CoinMKT's facsimile services are hosted by "Hello Fax," a company based in San Francisco within the Northern District of California.

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On February 11, 2014, CoinMKT's CEO emailed FORCE to relay that "some feedback from other users . . . may throw off our thesis about this user's [R.P.'s] activity. Let's talk when you can, I'm glad I caught this." CoinMKT's CEO has explained that he learned that a glitch in CoinMKT's system was not permitting users to withdraw more than \$10,000 worth of currency at a time, thereby diminishing the earlier suspicion that R.P. was structuring transactions or doing anything criminal. FORCE replied to this email, inquiring whether CoinMKT had frozen R.P.'s account and seeking information concerning R.P.'s digital currency balances, noting that R.P. may have a mental condition.

On March 1, 2014, R.P. wrote to CoinMKT advising that he had not been able to log in to his account. CoinMKT replied to R.P. that his account had been "suspended due to suspicious activity. Under government subpoena, we have been instructed to forward your communication to authorities. We have cc'd Mr. Carl FORCE who will be your point of contact, please send further communication to him to resolve this issue."

A Report of Investigation FORCE authored states that on February 26, 2014 and March 6, 2014, FORCE attempted to contact R.P. stating "I have attempted to contact you numerous times via telephone and emails, yet have received no response. I am trying to ascertain if your suspicious financial transactions at CoinMKT have a legitimate explanation. The facts show that you are structuring deposits and withdrawals. In addition, virtual currencies have been linked to illicit activities such as illegal narcotics transactions, money laundering, child pornography, etc. As such, I am starting the legal process to seize your Real Money Balances at CoinMKT. A negative response to this email will be evidence that you are abandoning your assets at CoinMKT."

Over the coming weeks, FORCE directed CoinMKT to seize R.P.'s account. CoinMKT has expressed it was hesitant to do so, but did not want to draw the ire of federal law enforcement, especially given that the digital currency field was already subject to fairly intense law enforcement scrutiny. CoinMKT also felt it prudent to defer to the direction of a federal law enforcement agent, and trusted that if FORCE was telling CoinMKT that R.P. was using their company as a platform for illegal activities, it was not in a position to second guess that conclusion. Nonetheless, CoinMKT requested something in writing from FORCE before seizing R.P.'s account.

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During this March 2014 timeframe, R.P.'s account with CoinMKT contained two forms of currency. First, it contained approximately \$37,000 in cash. Second, it contained approximately \$297,000 in four forms of different digital currencies (bitcoin, litecoin, feathercoin, and worldcoin).

FORCE instructed CoinMKT to seize R.P.'s balances. CoinMKT effectuated this seizure by creating an entirely new account with the name "R_seized."

On March 12, 2014, CoinMKT emailed FORCE, carbon copying others at the DEA, stating that it had created the "R_seized" account, providing the login and password information and asking FORCE to "please advise when you would like us to move the funds" from the R.P. account into the R_seized account. Later that same day FORCE replied to CoinMKT, including none of the other recipients on the original message in his reply, "Transfer them now please."

On March 23, 2014, using his official DEA email account with no one carbon copied, FORCE emailed CoinMKT noting that "we checked the balances this morning [in the R_seized account] and the coins are still not there. Is everything okay?" CoinMKT replied later that same day that they had experienced some logistical issues in effectuating the transfer of digital currency from R.P.'s account to the R_seized account.

On March 26, 2014, CoinMKT emailed FORCE stating "the [R.P.] funds should be in your account. We made the move 2 days ago but please confirm on your end that you have received them." FORCE replied, from his official DEA email account with no one carbon copied, "Yes they are in DEA's account now. Thank you very much!" I have confirmed that no such digital currency funds were received in any official DEA account, but instead went into FORCE's own personal account with Bitstamp, as described further below.

On April 3, 2014, FORCE emailed CoinMKT from his official DEA account, this time carbon copying three other DEA employees including his supervisor, directing CoinMKT to "please convert the \$37,051.08 that has been seized from R.P. into a certified check and forward it to DEA ... please make the certified check payable to the U.S. Marshals Service." CoinMKT did so and sent the government a certified check for \$37,051.08, representing that portion of R.P.'s account that had been in cash.

In a Report of Investigation dated March 11, 2014, FORCE wrote that "on March 13, 2014, DEA seized the following: 179.7977 bitcoin; 3,417.565 Litecoin; 366,511.2876 feathercoin; and AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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621,439,7182 worldcoin from [R.P.] for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act statutes, more specifically structuring financial transactions and money laundering. [R.P.] was exploiting CoinMKT to launder his illicit proceeds." FORCE did not attempt to translate these various digital currency balances to any approximate dollar values as he had done in other instances. In a Report of Investigation dated April 3, 2014, FORCE made reference to the earlier March 11 Report of Investigation and noted that "on April 4, 2014, DEA seized \$37,206.30 from [R.P]... FORCE directed CoinMKT to forward a certified check for \$37,206.30 to the U.S. Marshal's Service."

A Standard Seizure Form (SSF) is a government form that is typically completed by the DEA when funds are seized. FORCE prepared two SSFs relative to R.P.: (1) an SSF dated April 3, 2014, for the approximately \$37,000 in cash that was seized from R.P.'s account; and (2) an SSF dated March 12, 2014, for the approximately \$297,000 worth of digital currency that was seized from R.P.'s account. However, FORCE instructed the DEA Asset Forfeiture Specialist not to input the digital currency SSF into the government's computer tracking system for seized funds, the Consolidated Asset Tracking System (CATS), but rather to "hold" it for "a few months" or until further notice. The DEA Asset Forfeiture Specialist made a handwritten note on the digital currency SSF noting that FORCE had expressly directed it not be input at that time. FORCE included a copy of the SSF relating to the cash in the official case file of the Silk Road investigation." However, he did not include a copy of the SSF relating to the digital currency in that same case file.

It appears that FORCE "papered up" the seizure of the digital currency portion of R.P.'s account in such a way that he may have thought he would be covered in the event anyone ever asked any questions about it being documented, but at the same time in a way that made it appear as if the approximately \$37,000 in cash was the sum total of all that was seized from R.P. Telling in this regard is that (1) when FORCE emailed from his official DEA account about the approximately \$37,000 in cash he carbon copied numerous individuals; the same was not true when he emailed about the approximately \$297,000 worth of digital currency; (2) FORCE's co-case agent has advised that she was

¹⁷ My investigation confirmed with FORCE's then-supervisor that the R.P. "case" had no known connection to the Silk Road.

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of the belief that only approximately \$37,000 total was seized from R.P.'s account, and was unaware of the remaining approximately \$297,000 in digital currency that had been seized from R.P.'s account; (3) FORCE completed SSFs for both the cash and digital currency seizures but did not include the SSF for the digital currency in the case file; and (4) FORCE directed that the digital currency SSF be held.

In sum, I believe the way in which FORCE documented the R.P. seizure was FORCE's attempt to give himself plausible deniability by memorializing the digital currency seizure in both a Report of Investigation and SSF, albeit in a fashion that did not draw attention to the fact that it was worth approximately \$297,000. The documentation is particularly oblique for someone unfamiliar with digital currency, as many in FORCE's chain of command were.

The approximately \$297,000 worth of digital currency funds¹⁸ from R.P.'s CoinMKT account did not make it to any official DEA or government account. Instead, that amount ultimately went into FORCE's personal Bitstamp account and was subsequently liquidated into U.S. dollars into FORCE's personal checking account. Specifically, on April 14, 2014, the funds moved from the R_Seized account that CoinMKT had set up into a pass-through account. Then, on April 16, 2014, those funds moved from the pass-through account to FORCE's personal Bitstamp account. In late April 2014, FORCE made a withdrawal request of approximately \$201,000 from his Bitstamp account to his personal checking account. I have also confirmed with DEA that no case was ever opened against R.P. I am aware of no legal basis on which FORCE seized R.P.'s balances.

Within days of the seizure of the approximately \$297,000 in digital currency funds from R.P., FORCE launched his own personal limited liability company dedicated to the investment in and speculation of digital currency, Engedi, LLC.

FORCE's Use of Official Subpoena for His Own Financial Gain

Venmo is a payments platform company that enables person-to-person and merchant payment transactions using an application on mobile phones or other internet connected devices. Venmo is a subsidiary of PayPal, based in San Jose, California, and as discussed, relevant personnel from Venmo's compliance division are based in San Francisco, California, both within the Northern District of

¹⁸ The precise deposit amount was 222.9989 bitcoins. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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California. On or about February 12, 2012, FORCE opened a Venmo account with the user name "cforce." That same day, a user by the name of "R.R." also opened a Venmo account.

Also on or about February 12, 2014, "R.R." initiated a payment to FORCE using Venmo's platform. The note on the transaction to FORCE stated: "Reversing payment #7163719 for \$2500.00 from user [R.R.] to user better bitcoin." Venmo's fraud controls identified high risk payment activity and blocked both FORCE's and R.R.'s accounts.

On February 13, 2014, FORCE contacted Venmo by email from one of his personal email addresses to request, among other things, that his account with Venmo be unlocked so he could withdraw \$2,500. FORCE informed Venmo that R.R. was the target of a federal undercover investigation for which FORCE was the assigned case agent and the payment was for an undercover Bitcoin transaction. FORCE attached a copy of his badge and credentials in this email, and also mentioned in a post-script that he was interested in partnering with Venmo for employment opportunities.

On or about February 17, 2014, with his account at Venmo still blocked, FORCE served an administrative subpoena on Venmo from his official DOJ email account, Carl.M.Force@usdoj.gov, with a carbon copy to one of his personal email addresses. In this email, FORCE stated: "Please comply to the attached subpoena! If you should have any questions, please call me at 443.324.[XXXX]." The attached subpoena commanded the production of documents related to R.R. and directing Venmo's administrator to "lift the 'freeze' on the account of Carl Force, effective immediately." The subpoena itself contained a specific case matter number and grand jury number. FORCE sent this subpoena to Venmo's law enforcement contact within its compliance division, who was based in San Francisco, within the Northern District of California.

Given Venmo's belief that FORCE's request to unfreeze a personal account was not a proper use of an official government administrative subpoena, and given FORCE's repeated contact with Venmo from his personal email address, Venmo did not lift the freeze on FORCE's account and instead notified FORCE's superiors in the DEA. On February 24, 2014, FORCE emailed Venmo's compliance team in San Francisco and instructed them to disregard the subpoena.

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On March 4, 2014, FORCE asked one of his co-case agents on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force to run a query in a law enforcement database for Venmo, stating that he wanted to collaborate "on a suspicious money remitter, Venmo, Inc. Venmo has since registered with FinCEN, but I want to know if they have state money license remitting licenses in California and New York. Can you check? If not, I want to seize their bank accounts (need to identify them) á la BRIDGES and [M.M.'s] seizure warrants for Mt. Gox." In other words, FORCE appears to have been targeting Venmo for seizure after the company rebuffed his attempts to use a subpoena for his own personal matter.

On March 13, 2014, FORCE again used his personal email account to email Venmo's support division. In that email, FORCE advised Venmo that if they refused to unfreeze his account, he would retain an attorney and file a civil lawsuit. In another email FORCE sent to Venmo later that same day, FORCE explained the funds in his Venmo account were personal and stolen by R.R., and "As such, this \$2,500 has nothing to do with DEA, it was my personal assets that were stolen by [R.R.]." On March 14, 2014, FORCE, again using his personal email address, directed Venmo not to contact the DEA again.

The administrative subpoena addressed to Venmo contains DEA Special Agent A.P.'s signature stamp on the signature line. A.P. was FORCE's acting supervisor during the relevant timeframe of the subpoena. A.P. stated he did not review or sign the subpoena and believes that FORCE, without A.P.'s knowledge, used A.P.'s signature stamp to execute the subpoena.

Following FORCE's submission of his letter of resignation on May 4, 2014, described above, another DEA employee witnessed FORCE taking boxes into a room where documents are taken to be permanently burned or destroyed. The contents of FORCE's burn boxes have since been seized and analyzed. Among other documents, these burn boxes contained copies of the administrative subpoena to Venmo. However, FORCE's superior reported that there are no copies of this subpoena in the Baltimore Silk Road case file.

Based on the foregoing, FORCE issued and used an official government subpoena for his own personal financial gain and transmitted it to a third party. By doing so, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE committed a violation of the conflict of interest statute, in violation 18 U.S.C. Section 208. I also believe FORCE was trying to cover up evidence of his use of the subpoena by AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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placing the copies in his burn box instead of the official case file. Furthermore, I believe that by directing Venmo to ignore the subpoena and not to contact the DEA, FORCE was attempting to obstruct justice by concealing his wrongful use of an official government subpoena for a personal matter.

Additional Evidence Concerning Bitstamp

Bitstamp is a global digital currency exchange headquartered in Europe with a limited U.S. presence in San Francisco, within the Northern District of California. On October 12, 2013, FORCE attempted to create an account with Bitstamp using identification documents in the name of his DEA-issued undercover identity. Bitstamp's verification process rejected these documents as not genuine.

FORCE thereafter provided Bitstamp with his own personal identification documents and his true and correct name, and Bitstamp created an account in FORCE's name. FORCE's Bitstamp account is associated with a single bank account and with two email personal addresses. One of the personal email addresses contains the moniker "fiat broker," which refers to someone who trades in currency. The account is associated with FORCE's personal checking account at M&T Bank.

On approximately November 9, 2013, FORCE made his first withdrawal request from Bitstamp for approximately \$34,000 worth of bitcoins.¹⁹ I have reviewed FORCE's personal bank records and see an incoming international wire transfer to FORCE's bank account in the amount of approximately \$34,000 on November 13, 2013. Thereafter, FORCE made a second withdrawal request of Bitstamp for approximately \$96,000 worth of bitcoins. This withdrawal request triggered Bitstamp to conduct a Know Your Customer (KYC) check, also referred to as enhanced due diligence, on approximately November 20, 2013. This check essentially involved Bitstamp asking for more information from FORCE.

Throughout the latter part of November 2013, FORCE had a series of back and forth exchanges with Bitstamp using his personal email account. FORCE responded to Bitstamp's know-your-customer queries stating, among other things, the following: "I am a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration . . . and learned about Bitcoin through my investigation of SILK ROAD. I have attached a copy of my resume and a scanned copy of my badge and credentials."

¹⁹ All of these amounts represented in dollars from Bitstamp were in bitcoin based on their value at the time of the transfers.

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It appears that FORCE's account with Bitstamp remained active after these initial know-yourcustomer checks, as his personal M&T bank records reveal two incoming deposits from his account with Bitstamp in January 2014 for approximately \$57,000 and \$50,000.

On April 18, 2014, FORCE requested a withdrawal from his account with Bitstamp of approximately \$80,000 to be deposited into his M&T bank account. Bitstamp flagged this request and conducted additional know-your-customer checks. Bitstamp's review showed that FORCE's account had been accessed using TOR. Given this, Bitstamp blocked FORCE's account.²⁰

To unblock his account, FORCE made the following statements via an online support ticket with Bitstamp:

I am a U.S. Department of Justice – Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Special Agent who worked the original SILK ROAD website and corresponding investigation. I learned about Bitcoin through my investigation of DREAD PIRATE ROBERTS and SILK ROAD. I am attaching a scanned copy of my DEA credentials and badge to verify my status as Law Enforcement.

Again I obtained my bitcoin from investing a couple thousand dollars in the virtual currency in the beginning of 2012 when they were selling at \$4 a coin from exchanges such as GetBitcoin LLC (small "mom and pop" exchanges). Also, I have increased my holding of bitcoin through trading, the buying and selling, of the cryptocurrency.

I trade in Bitcoin. As such, I am constantly buying, shorting, selling, transferring, purchasing other assets such as real estate through RealtyShares and gold through goldsilverbitcoin.

I plan to continue to utilize Bitstamp to purchase and sell Bitcoin at a profit.

On April 24, 2014, as part of Bitstamp's fraud and theft prevention procedures, Bitstamp inquired why FORCE accessed his account through TOR and FORCE responded via the support ticket:

²⁰ Within a day after Bitstamp froze FORCE's account on April 18, 2014, FORCE sent an e-mail on April 19, 2014 to another DEA Special Agent whose primary responsibility was to account for undercover funds DEA had expended. FORCE's e-mail indicated that the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force had hundreds of bitcoin that they want to put into "service" and requested the creation of a DEA account with an exchange to liquidate bitcoin into U.S. dollars. That Special Agent advises that FORCE's April 19 e-mail was unusual because it was sent on a Saturday evening and there was a significant delay in time from when FORCE had acquired the bitcoin to when he sent the e-mail. I believe, based on my investigation, that the timing of FORCE's April 19 email was not coincidental given that Bitstamp had frozen his account earlier that day and he may have suspected that law enforcement had discovered that the bitcoins in his personal account were not his property. By sending such an e-mail, FORCE would be able to later maintain that he had tried to return the bitcoin to the government.

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"I utilize TOR for privacy. Don't particularly want NSA looking over my shoulder:)" The following day, a member of Bitstamp's management learned of FORCE's comments and thought it was strange that a government official would make such a statement. FORCE's account was blocked again.

On April 28, 2014, FORCE made another withdrawal request from his account at Bitstamp of approximately \$201,000 worth of bitcoin to his personal bank account. It is clear that FORCE's account with Bitstamp was frozen and unfrozen numerous times during the April timeframe after FORCE verified his identity. After speaking with another then-member of federal law enforcement, BRIDGES, Bitstamp subsequently processed the withdrawal request, and FORCE's bank records reveal that he received approximately \$201,000 to his M&T bank account on May 6, 2014.

Based on my investigation described above, I believe that some if not all of the bitcoins that went into FORCE's account with Bitstamp was property that belonged to the government and/or third parties and that FORCE had come into possession of in his capacity as a DEA Special Agent, and not his own personally-acquired bitcoins, as he told Bitstamp.

On or about May 2, 2014, FORCE emailed Bitstamp to request that they delete all transaction history associated with his account. I believe, based on my investigation and the timing of FORCE's request, that this was an attempt by FORCE to conceal his activity.

Evidence of FORCE's Improved Financial Picture

I have reviewed many but not all of FORCE's bank records from 2009 to present. I have also reviewed a financial analysis the FBI prepared of FORCE's financial history. Based on these sources, FORCE's financial situation and spending increased dramatically during 2013 and 2014, i.e., the timeframe of the wrongdoing described herein.

In summary, for the nearly two year period before FORCE worked the Silk Road case, FORCE deposited a total of approximately \$250,000 into his bank accounts, an amount consistent with his federal salary. In contrast to that, the bank records show that in the just over two-year timeframe from FORCE's joining the Silk Road case to his May 2014 resignation, FORCE deposited approximately \$776,000 into his bank accounts, an amount that represented solely his liquidation of bitcoins.

On or about February 17, 2012, FORCE began working on the Silk Road investigation. Thereafter, his financial situation improved markedly. In 2013 and 2014, FORCE had total deposits that AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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I have traced as bitcoin liquidation proceeds worth over approximately \$776,000. This includes, for example, six sizeable deposits into FORCE's checking accounts from his Bitstamp account totaling approximately \$518,000. There were also approximately \$118,000 worth of deposits from Coinbase, another San Francisco-based digital currency exchange company where FORCE had a personal account.

FORCE's spending also increased after his involvement on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. Aside from his approximately \$110,000 bitcoin investment into CoinMKT, FORCE paid off a \$22,000 government loan on November 19, 2013. On December 2, 2013, he paid off his mortgage in full, which was approximately \$130,000 outstanding. On February 18, 2014, FORCE signed a "Purchaser Agreement" with RealtyShares, Inc., listing his net worth in excess of \$1 million, and providing a \$15,000 investment in three real properties.

On or about May 8, 2014, presumably after learning of the government's investigation and after he had resigned, FORCE wired \$235,000 to an offshore account in Panama. Records that I have recovered reveal that this wire was ultimately destined for BTC-e, a digital currency exchange outside the U.S. and that is not registered with the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"). Based on evidence discussed further below, I believe that the vast majority – if not all – of this wire represented proceeds of illegal activities.

Other ways that FORCE appears to have spent some of the proceeds of his ultra vires activities include payments in the tens of thousands of dollars for the following:

- A June 2014 payment for the purchase of a company franchise;
- An August 2014 payment to a "Scottrade" account;
- A September 2014 transfer to an E*Trade account;
- A September 2014 check payable to "Cash"

These are illustrative examples and not all of the financial outlays known to the government. Moreover, FORCE appears to have funded the business he opened on the side for speculating in Bitcoin, Engedi, LLC, with money from his personal checking accounts into which he had transferred ill-gotten proceeds. On May 7, 2014, FORCE opened a new bank account with Gardner Bank in the Engedi, LLC name, funding it 20 days later with an \$8,000 check from FORCE's personal M&T checking account. And on

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July 28, 2014, FORCE transferred \$93,000 from his personal M&T checking account to the Engedi account at Gardner Bank.

FORCE's False Statements and Obstructive Conduct

Upon learning he was the subject of this investigation, FORCE, through counsel, approached the government about meeting for a voluntary interview. FORCE signed the Northern District of California and Public Integrity Section's standard form Proffer Agreement, sometimes known as a "Queen for a Day" letter. This Agreement is standard in criminal investigations and provided, among other things, that if FORCE was truthful, the government could not make direct use of the information FORCE provided against him in a future case-in-chief. An important exception to the protections of the Proffer Agreement was that FORCE could be prosecuted for perjury, obstruction of justice, or false statements in the event he was untruthful during the session.

Pursuant to the Proffer Agreement, FORCE met with representatives from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California, the Public Integrity Section, the FBI, IRS, and DOJ OIG, on May 30, 2014. During that proffer session, FORCE was specifically asked whether he had ever used the moniker "French Maid." FORCE denied that he had. As demonstrated above, this was not truthful as FORCE had operated as "French Maid" in communications with DPR, among other personas.

Additionally, FORCE's conduct throughout the investigation obstructed the real proper purpose of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force which was to identify, locate and arrest DPR and other Silk Road users. At numerous points, FORCE corruptly obstructed the lawful investigation into DPR and Silk Road by pursuing his own personal and unlawful goals.

VIII. BRIDGES PROBABLE CAUSE

Bridges' Background

Former Secret Service Special Agent BRIDGES was also on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force and worked alongside FORCE. Until March 18, 2015, before he abruptly resigned, BRIDGES had been assigned to the Secret Service's Electronic Crimes Task Force. His specialty was in computer forensics and anonymity software derived from TOR. Another member of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force that has been interviewed confirmed that BRIDGES was the Task Force's subject matter expert in Bitcoin.

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 In these roles, BRIDGES had access to and used digital currency and was the affiant on various seizure warrants pertaining to digital currency. In fact, on May 9, 2013, BRIDGES was the affiant on one of the largest-ever seizures from a digital currency exchange. This was an approximately \$2.1 million seizure pertaining to the digital currency exchange Mt. Gox, purportedly because Mt. Gox had violated 18 U.S.C. Section 1960 by failing to register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and thus was engaged in operating an unlicensed money service business. This is not the only matter on which BRIDGES served as the affiant.

The Silk Road Theft and BRIDGES' Fidelity Account

C.G. was one of DPR's employees and functioned as a Silk Road customer support representative, under the username "Flush." In this role, C.G. had administrator access to the Silk Road website, ²¹ meaning C.G. had certain administrative privileges on the Silk Road website, including the ability to access vendor accounts and reset Silk Road user and vendor passwords and pins.

On or about January 17, 2013, FORCE and BRIDGES were part of a team that apprehended C.G. in a controlled delivery for a kilogram of cocaine. C.G. was arrested and soon thereafter began to cooperate with law enforcement, turning over his Silk Road login credentials in the process to members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. During this same timeframe C.G. also turned over access to his account and passwords to other digital currency accounts to include his Mt. Gox and Dwolla accounts. As a result of this controlled delivery, C.G. was charged with federal criminal narcotics charges.²²

One of the accounts that C.G. provided access to was a Silk Road administrator account named "Flush." C.G. acted as a Customer Service representative on the Silk Road site using the account name "Flush." But on January 17, 2013, C.G. turned over access to the "Flush" account to members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. C.G. also executed several consent forms authorizing law enforcement to use and assume the "Flush" identity.²³

²¹ This should not be construed as someone who had root access to the server.

²² It should be noted that C.G. is cooperating with law enforcement and is hoping for leniency in sentencing as a part of his cooperation. C.G.'s criminal history includes convictions for filing a fraudulent insurance claim and acquiring a controlled substance by prescription alteration.

²³ Because of concerns about C.G.'s whereabouts, DPR at some point cut off the "Flush" account's access, but through communications with DPR, C.G. was able to regain access to the account on January 20, 2013, and pass that information onto the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force.
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On January 25, 2013, C.G. debriefed with FORCE, BRIDGES, and other members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. According to BRIDGES' report of the interview, C.G. showed them how to log into Silk Road vendor accounts and reset passwords, how to change the status of a seller to a vendor, how to reset pins, and information about how the Silk Road administrative functions worked. BRIDGES' text messages indicate that he left the proffer session after one day, and a Silk Road Task Force member stated that BRIDGES told him that he left the latter part of the January 25, 2013, proffer.²⁴

On January 25, 2013, during the afternoon and into the night, the Silk Road website suffered a series of sizeable thefts. These thefts affected certain Silk Road vendors and overlapped with the time of the C.G. proffer session. The thefts were accomplished through a series of vendor password and pin resets, something that could be accomplished with the administrator access that C.G. had given to the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force.

On January 26, 2013, the proffer of C.G. continued. BRIDGES left early and did not participate on this day. At some point during that day, DPR communicated to Nob (FORCE) that Silk Road had suffered thefts and that those thefts were associated with C.G.'s account. Law enforcement questioned C.G. about this, and C.G. denied that he had committed the thefts. According to chats I have reviewed from the Silk Road servers and from Ulbricht's laptop (as well as communications between DPR and one of his employees at the time of the January 25, 2013 thefts) it appears that DPR and the employee believed C.G. was responsible for the thefts, because they managed to associate C.G.'s account, "Flush," with the theft.²⁵ As a result of DPR's belief that C.G. was responsible for the thefts, DPR communicated with Nob (FORCE) – whom he believed to be a major drug dealer with the ability to procure hit men – and hired Nob to have his associates kill C.G. DPR also communicated with another individual and commissioned a hit on C.G. For the hit that Nob's associates were to perform, DPR paid Nob a total of approximately \$80,000 through a bank wire transfer for the murder. FORCE and C.G., together with assistance from others on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, then faked C.G.'s death to make it look

²⁴ This Task Force member was not present for the C.G. debrief but indicated that BRIDGES had told him this information.

On or about January 26, 2013, according to chats between DPR and another employee, "Flush's" administrative account was shut down in order to prevent further theft.
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as if Nob's associates had killed C.G. BRIDGES was to assist with perpetrating this supposed murderfor-hire by working on "proof of death" photographs of C.G. that Nob (FORCE) was to send to DPR.

Based on my review of the data from the Silk Road servers, I believe the initial Silk Road thefts were likely committed by whoever was controlling a Silk Road account with the username "Number13." Prior to January 25, 2013, "Number13" had been an ordinary buyer account on Silk Road. On January 25, 2013, however, "Number13" was given vendor privileges. Also on January 25, 2013, the "Flush" account made a transfer of approximately 900 bitcoins into account "Number13." This appears to have been the first of multiple thefts that occurred that day from the Silk Road website.

My analysis of both the block chain and data recovered from the Silk Road servers reveals that, also on January 25, 2013, a single Bitcoin address received no less than 20,000 bitcoins. The first transaction into that Bitcoin address was a deposit by account "Number13." These transactions are demonstrated on the attached Exhibit F ("Liquidation of Silk Road Theft Proceeds").

I believe that BRIDGES controlled and/or had access with others to "Number13," the account that appears to have initiated the sizeable bitcoin thefts. I believe this for at least two reasons. First, in a DEA 6 that FORCE authored dated January 23, 2013, FORCE described how he had transferred 60 bitcoins into a DEA-controlled account known as "TrustUsJones." Data from the Silk Road servers demonstrates that on that January 23, 2013 date, there was a 60 bitcoin transfer from "Number13" into "TrustUsJones." Second, in an email dated January 23, 2013, FORCE emailed BRIDGES requesting that BRIDGES deposit bitcoins to replenish the "TrustUsJones" account. In other words, BRIDGES, in consultation with FORCE, appears to have been controlling "Number13" during the late January 2013 timeframe.

On January 26, 2013, my analysis of the block chain reveals that at least 2,430 of the bitcoins stolen from the Silk Road went into another single Bitcoin wallet address. These transactions are also depicted on the attached Exhibit F. I have conferred with an individual who has a substantial

²⁶ I believe that the aggregate total of the thefts was approximately 20,000 bitcoin. The dollar value of 20,000 bitcoin would have varied dramatically depending on when the value was calculated due to the fluctuating value of bitcoin. At the time of thefts in January 2013, 20,000 bitcoin would have been worth approximately \$350,000. At its peak price, however, it would have been worth far more, in excess of approximately \$20 million.

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background in block chain analysis who advised me that this wallet funded a Mt. Gox exchange account totaling 2,430 bitcoins. As noted, Mt. Gox was the world's largest digital currency exchange based in Japan.

Chats I have reviewed between DPR and one of his employees indicate that DPR and the employee launched an internal investigation into who was responsible for the January 25, 2013 theft. Those chats reveal that DPR's own internal investigation initially led him to account "Number13" as being associated with the thefts. Chats further reveal that "Number13" sent DPR a chat on January 27, 2013 saying "Whats [sic] going on . . . I really need that money back. What has happened to all my BC? Within the past day someone withdrawled [sic]²⁷ all my bc from my account without my permission. The fact they must have had a pin really confuses me and makes me think it was something on your end." This caused DPR to reply to "Number13" stating "Your account is under investigation I'm afraid. What is your relationship with the user [omitted]?" During a back and forth between the two, "Number13" wrote, "I don't know what any of that other crap in my history is. Look at my history, I am a buyer not a seller. What is going on man?" This caused DPR to reply, "You're all set, sorry for the trouble." DPR was physically present in San Francisco on the date of these communications with "Number13."

The Silk Road thefts were completed on January 25, 2013. Within days, BRIDGES began to text FORCE asking that FORCE (as Nob) get advice from DPR about liquidating bitcoins into dollars. For example, on January 30, 2013, BRIDGES texted FORCE: "Next time you chat with DPR do you think he would touch on the topic of how he moves bitcoins, meaning what exchange he uses? He should have some advise [sic] if you will be doing big drug deals on how to exchange all that back into US dollars." FORCE replied that he had asked DPR that before and DPR would not provide an answer. BRIDGES replied, "Roger. Just curious."

Approximately two weeks after the Silk Road thefts, on February 12, 2013, BRIDGES formed "Quantum International Investments, LLC," (Quantum) and registered it with the Maryland Secretary of

²⁷ The individual controlling "Number13" on this date spelled withdrawal as "withdrawled." When BRIDGES texted FORCE on February 23, 2013, as discussed herein, BRIDGES also spelled the word withdrawal incorrectly using the slightly different "withdrawlaed."

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State. On February 22, 2013, BRIDGES established a personal investment account at Fidelity in the Quantum name. That account was associated with BRIDGES' Social Security number and other accounts in BRIDGES' name. That day and the next, BRIDGES began to text with FORCE about getting C.G.'s help and transferring bitcoins. Specifically, BRIDGES texted FORCE on February 22, 2013: "Whenever you are working next can we talk. [The prosecutor] said you have the gift of convincing [C.G.] to do things and we need you to convince him to do something. Whenever your [sic] available can we chat." Then on February 23, 2013, BRIDGES texted FORCE: "Need your help with DPR if you can. I am trying to transfer out our USSS Bitcoins and they have not shown up in over 30 hours after being withdrawlaed [sic]. Can you hit up DPR and say one of your workers or financial guys bitcoins are not showing up? I am going to get my butt kicked if this money is missing. After 30 hours I am getting really concerned. Our one UC account is '[omitted name]' Can you use your raport [sic] and help me out? I did the transfer yesterday morning."

It is clear that during this time period both BRIDGES and FORCE were actively monitoring the price of bitcoin. On February 24, 2013, BRIDGES texted FORCE, "If you got bitcoins on SR [Silk Road] get them off...." By the end of March, BRIDGES and FORCE were texting about the value of bitcoin. On March 20, 2013, FORCE texted BRIDGES "Bitcoin just hit \$63 . . . what the slip [sic]?" to which BRIDGES replied "Ya!" and then FORCE replied, "[sp]eculation about big investors going in later this month. Along with the demand is exceeding supply." Then on March 21, 2013, BRIDGES texted FORCE "75 dollars now" and FORCE replied "Geez."

I have obtained and reviewed Fidelity records for BRIDGES' Quantum account. Those records demonstrate that between March 6, 2013 and May 7, 2013, the account received nine separate wire transfers originating from Mt. Gox in Japan. The wires totaled in excess of \$820,000, and were each less than \$100,000. Fidelity has confirmed that BRIDGES' Quantum account was funded solely by deposits from Mt. Gox and no other source.

The final wire from Mt. Gox to BRIDGES' Quantum account was on May 7, 2013. Just two days later, BRIDGES served as the affiant on a seizure warrant for \$2.1 million in Mt. Gox accounts. I know from my training and experience as a law enforcement officer that the process of putting together an affidavit in support of a warrant is time consuming and often takes several days, if not longer, to AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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prepare. In serving as an affiant for Mt. Gox bank accounts a mere two days after he had personally received a wire from Mt. Gox (the latest in a series of wires), BRIDGES had a conflict of interest.

In early 2015, by which time BRIDGES knew of the Northern District of California's investigation into the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, BRIDGES was working on an unrelated investigation. Under the guise of that other investigation, BRIDGES contacted Coinbase, a digital currency exchange based in San Francisco. However, instead of asking only questions concerning the other investigation, Coinbase representatives report that BRIDGES engaged them in a series of questions about whether and how Mt. Gox accounts could be traced. Coinbase found this odd, given that the stated purpose of BRIDGES' calls concerned an unrelated investigation.

Based on the foregoing, I believe that BRIDGES, or someone acting on his behalf, utilized the "Flush" and "Number13" accounts, but particularly the "Flush" account to fraudulently act as an administrator to reset pins and passwords on various Silk Road vendors' accounts, and then caused bitcoins to be moved from those accounts into a particular wallet and then into the Mt. Gox exchange. Moreover, I believe that BRIDGES, and/or someone working with him or acting on his behalf, used the "Number13" account to communicate with DPR and fraudulently represent that "Number13" was a buyer account on Silk Road who had nothing to do with the theft to stave off DPR's investigation into "Number13" and its activity. I believe these communications were material. At the time of these communications, DPR was in the Northern District of California, and the Bitcoin stolen as a result of the Silk Road thefts was in a Bitcoin address and had not yet been transferred to Mt. Gox. For all of these reasons, there is probable cause to believe that BRIDGES committed wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1343.

BRIDGES' Conduct During The Investigation

On April 29, 2014, Bitstamp's General Counsel advised BRIDGES by telephone from the Northern District of California that Bitstamp suspected FORCE of wrongdoing and intended to formally bring it to the attention of law enforcement via a Bank Secrecy Act filing. Bitstamp did so on May 1, 2014. By May 4, 2014, FORCE submitted a letter of resignation after 15 years of service to be effective later that month.

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On approximately May 2, 2014, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California opened an official investigation into FORCE concerning his activities with his Bitstamp account and bitcoin holdings. On approximately May 4, 2014, the Public Integrity Section opened an official investigation into FORCE concerning his improper use of a subpoena to Venmo. On May 8, 2014, the Northern District of California and Public Integrity investigations were merged.

Between April 29, 2014 and May 5, 2014, an analyst with whom BRIDGES worked at the Secret Service, E.P., ran several queries in a government database looking for Bank Secrecy Act filings on both FORCE and BRIDGES. That analyst later ran another query on BRIDGES on or about June 27, 2014, this time using BRIDGES' Social Security number. I know from my training and experience that access to certain government databases is restricted and may not be used for personal matters. Based on my investigation, I believe that BRIDGES may have directed the analyst to conduct these queries because he was worried that a financial institution may have made a Bank Secrecy Act filing on him given the multiple transfers from Japan into his Quantum Fidelity account. 28

On May 28, 2014, BRIDGES was telephonically interviewed by a Special Agent with the FBI's Public Corruption Squad in San Francisco, as part of the Northern District of California's investigation. BRIDGES was joined by an attorney representing him and also by a high-level superior from the U.S. Secret Service. BRIDGES was advised of the nature of the interview and of the identity of the interviewer. During that interview, BRIDGES stated that although he knew FORCE through their work on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, they had minimal contact, and BRIDGES had no knowledge of any of FORCE's activity related to the purchase of bitcoins. BRIDGES added that FORCE was unprofessional and that after learning of the Bank Secrecy Act filing of which FORCE was a subject, BRIDGES briefed the most senior manager in his office, the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Baltimore Field Office. The SAC told BRIDGES not to discuss the matter with anyone. BRIDGES specifically denied during the May 28, 2014, interview that he ever told FORCE about the Bank Secrecy Act filing. He also denied having owned any Bitcoin in over a year.

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²⁸ I believe that the analyst, E.P., ultimately confirmed that she ran BRIDGES in the database, but essentially stated that she could not remember whether BRIDGES had specifically asked her to do so. E.P. had BRIDGES' Social Security number for the second query she ran. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

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On November 13, 2014, BRIDGES was again interviewed as part of the Northern District of California's investigation, this time by representatives from the Justice Department's Public Integrity Section and Office of the Inspector General. BRIDGES was advised of the nature of the interview and of the identity of the interviewers. BRIDGES advised he had been an affiant on a \$2.1 million seizure of accounts belonging to Mt. Gox, a digital currency exchange. He described himself as a subject matter expert on TOR, and stated that other members of the Silk Road Task Force would routinely consult him on security and undercover-type questions associated with ongoing Silk Road investigations. During this interview he reiterated what he had told the FBI Special Agent previously on May 28, 2014, namely that he and FORCE did not have a close working relationship. When questioned about Quantum International Investments, LLC, BRIDGES acknowledged that he created the LLC as a personal business venture, but stated that he had requested and obtained specific approval from the Secret Service Office of General Counsel (OGC) to establish the LLC and use it for investment purposes.

In contrast to what BRIDGES stated during these interviews, my investigation has revealed that several of BRIDGES' statements were not accurate. These statements were capable of and did influence the government's investigation.

On March 18, 2015, BRIDGES resigned after being told he was being suspended. USSS personnel advised BRIDGES to leave behind his two government-issued computers in the evidence vault. Although he properly tendered one computer where directed, he placed a second Apple brand laptop computer in a cabinet directly above an area that USSS Baltimore personnel use as a "wipe" station.²⁹ I do not believe BRIDGES would have any reason to store the laptop in this area, other than for it to be in close proximity to computers to be wiped, as USSS personnel has advised this is not a storage area for laptops. Moreover, after BRIDGES was advised of his suspension, he asked his supervisor if he could access his Dell laptop computer to copy electronic receipts of personal items he had purchased from internet merchants. However, instead of copying receipts, BRIDGES began copying a folder entitled "Bitstamp." Upon noticing what BRIDGES was copying, his supervisor secured the laptop and did not allow BRIDGES further access.

²⁹ Computers were left in the "wipe" station for the purpose of having their hard drives permanently erased.

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BRIDGES' Money Laundering

On June 2, 2014, just days after being interviewed by the FBI Special Agent in this matter, BRIDGES wired approximately \$225,000 in criminal proceeds from his Fidelity Quantum account to an account at PNC Bank. He later wired another approximately \$30,000 from the Fidelity Quantum account to the PNC account on or about July 7, 2014. The PNC account was in the name of a thirdparty with whom BRIDGES had a personal relationship, and BRIDGES' name was also on the account. As described above, BRIDGES' Quantum Fidelity only contained funds transferred from Mt. Gox, and based on the evidence described in the "Silk Road Theft" section above, I believe the Mt. Gox transfers represented criminal proceeds. Given that BRIDGES wired \$225,000 in criminal proceeds from his Quantum Fidelity account (representing proceeds of wire fraud, a specified unlawful activity) into a different account in the name of a third-party at another financial institution just days after being questioned in this matter, I believe that BRIDGES was attempting to conceal the source and nature of the proceeds and further impede the investigation. Given the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that BRIDGES' \$225,000 wire constituted money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956.

CONCLUSION

Based on my training and experience and the facts as set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE has committed violations of law to include Title 18, United States Code, Section 641 (Theft of Government Property), Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (Wire Fraud), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 208 (Conflict of Interest). There is also probable cause to believe that BRIDGES has committed violations of law to include Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (Wire Fraud) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering). I therefore request that you issue the attached arrest warrants and criminal complaint.

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REQUEST FOR SEALING

I further request that the Court order that all papers in support of this affidavit, including the affidavit and criminal complaint, be sealed until further order of the Court or until the apprehension and/or surrender of the subjects, whichever is earlier. These documents discuss an ongoing criminal investigation that is neither public nor known to all involved in the investigation. Accordingly, there is good cause to seal these documents because their premature disclosure may jeopardize that investigation by alerting the subjects in advance of apprehension and/or surrender. In addition, for the reasons stated in the attached Paragraph meant for inclusion at Page 11 of the Affidavit, I request that that Paragraph be sealed until further Order of this Court. The government will move to unseal that Paragraph as soon as practicable, as detailed in the sealed portion of that Paragraph attached. A Proposed Order is attached.

Respectfully submitted,

TIGRAN GAMBARYAN Special Agent

Internal Revenue Service

HONORABLE MARIA-ELENA JAMES

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 25th day of March, 2015


UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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


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
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Exhibit C (email).txt

280.8822 times \$607 = \$170,495

PATNO

regarding the seizure of 200 Bitcoin from DREAD PIRATE ROBERTS

the value of one Bitcoin on the date of transfer, August 4, 2013, was \$96.877083, that value times the 200 bitcoin equals \$19,735.4166

today Bitcoin is selling at \$607 ... times the 200 bitcoin which is the equivalent of \$121,400


here the government earned \$101,665

the 400 bitcoin that was paid by DREAD PIRATE ROBERTS in June/July of 2013 for the fraudulent UK identification was worth approximately \$44,000

today that same 400 bitcoin which is sitting out there in an on-line wallet is now worth \$242,800 (400 times \$607)

So the U.S. Government has made, to date, in appreciation \$198,800

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6		\$2,889.42	\$330.00	\$1,139.94	\$660.00	\$165.00	\$3,300.00	\$8,015.64	317,472.40	PC. / /28	\$277.54	927778	PC.7124	\$1.55	\$2,725	\$277.54 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$171.88	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$171.88 \$6,875.40	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$6,875.40 \$86,875.40 \$86,875.40 \$823.90	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$171.88 \$6,875.40 \$6,875.40 \$8,75.40	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$1,71.88 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$3,656.24	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$171.88 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$3,656.24	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$171.88 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$3,656.24 \$123.95	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$171.88 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$3,656.24 \$1,395.92 \$1,395.92	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$171.88 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$3,656.24 \$123.95 \$1,395.92 \$3,57	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$175.40 \$175.40 \$123.90 \$123.90 \$1,395.92 \$3,656.24 \$1,395.92 \$3,650.24 \$3,505.92 \$3,664.06	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$171.54 \$171.54 \$8,875.40 \$823.90 \$3,656.24 \$123.95 \$1,395.92 \$1,395.92 \$5,064.06 \$5,311.95	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$1721.28 \$6,875.40 \$823.90 \$923.90 \$3,656.24 \$1,23.95 \$1,395.92 \$3,640.06 \$5,041.95 \$3,640.06 \$3,640.06 \$3,640.06	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$175.40 \$175.40 \$86.75.40 \$823.90 \$1,23.95 \$1,395.92 \$3,656.24 \$3,656.24 \$3,656.24 \$3,656.24 \$3,656.24 \$3,656.24 \$3,656.24 \$3,656.24 \$3,656.24	\$1.55 \$2,72.28 \$6,875.40 \$1,54 \$8,875.40 \$823.90 \$923.90 \$3,656.24	\$1.55 \$2,72.28 \$2,72.128 \$6,875.40 \$177.88 \$923.90 \$3,65.24 \$3,65.24 \$3,65.24 \$3,65.24 \$3,65.24 \$3,65.24 \$3,65.24 \$3,63.95 \$3,64.06 \$5,311.95 \$3,64.06 \$5,311.95 \$3,64.06 \$3,6	\$1.55 \$1.55 \$2,72.128 \$6,875.40 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$3,656.24 \$3,656	\$1.55 \$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$177.88 \$823.90 \$3,656.24 \$1,395.92 \$1,395.92 \$5,084.05 \$5,084.0	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$171.88 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$1,395.92 \$1,395.92 \$3,504.06 \$5,311.95 \$3,504.06 \$29.86 \$1,395.92 \$3,504.06 \$29.86 \$29.86 \$29.86 \$29.86 \$3,895.43 \$21,24.78 \$3,895.43 \$3,504.30	\$1.55 \$5,875.40 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$923.90 \$1395.92 \$1,395.92 \$1,395.92 \$1,395.92 \$3,57 \$3,57 \$29.86 \$29.86 \$29.86 \$29.86 \$3,885.43 \$29.86 \$3,885.43 \$29.86 \$3,885.43 \$29.86 \$3,885.43 \$29.86 \$3,885.43 \$29.86 \$3,885.43 \$29.86 \$3,885.43 \$3,	\$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$1775.48 \$6,875.40 \$123.90 \$123.90 \$1,395.92 \$1,395.92 \$1,395.92 \$3,57 \$5,311.95 \$3,8	\$1.55 \$2,72.128 \$6,875.40 \$175.40 \$175.40 \$175.40 \$123.90 \$923.90 \$3,65.24 \$2,124.78 \$	\$1.55 \$1.55 \$2,721.28 \$6,875.40 \$17.1,88 \$8,75.40 \$8,75.40 \$1,395.32 \$1,395.32 \$1,395.32 \$1,705.30 \$1,705.30 \$2,124.78 \$2,124.78 \$2,124.78 \$2,124.78 \$2,124.78 \$3,541.30 \$3,541.	\$1.55 \$2,71.28 \$2,72.128 \$6,875.40 \$171.89 \$8,771.89 \$1,395.90 \$1,395.90 \$1,395.90 \$1,1305.90 \$1,13	\$1.55 \$2,77.28 \$2,77.128 \$6,875.40 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$3,65.24 \$1,395.92 \$1,395.92 \$1,396.40 \$2,104.06 \$5,311.95 \$3,640.12 \$2,124.78	\$1.55 \$5,875.40 \$1,7128 \$6,875.40 \$171.88 \$6,875.40 \$923.90 \$1,395.92 \$3,566.24 \$3,57 \$3,57 \$3,57 \$3,59 \$3,50 \$3,5	\$1.55 \$5.771.28 \$6.875.40 \$171.88 \$6.875.40 \$923.90 \$923.90 \$13.66.24 \$13.66.24 \$13.66.24 \$13.66.24 \$13.66.24 \$23.66.24 \$23.66.24 \$23.66.24 \$23.66.32 \$247.89 \$36.12 \$247.89 \$36.12 \$25.739 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.12 \$36.13 \$36
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BITC Price	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	\$391.48	-\$	-8-	\$415.16	\$415.18	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	\$415.16	-8-	\$428.13	\$428.13	\$428.13	\$428.13
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USD/from Sales of BTIC	\$1,051.26	\$3.91	\$740.89	\$66.61	\$195.74	\$1,435.54	\$195.74	\$242.72	\$540.24	\$195.74	\$232.00	\$1,082.83	\$237.40	\$968.32	\$1,155.27	\$195.74	\$24.89	\$195.74	\$3.99	\$4,026.53	\$15.06	\$2,941.96			\$88.43	\$3,321.28	\$207.58	\$18.64	\$8,386.23	\$207.58	\$211.73	\$1,009.05	\$2,906.12	\$251.37	\$1,581.44	\$207.58	\$1,245.48	\$207.58	\$122.48	\$140.37	\$627.14	\$7,113.16	\$207.58	\$2,581.98	\$18.20		\$214.06	\$2,283.71	\$12,935.32	\$1,883.77
USD/Used to Purchase BTIC																							-S-	-8-						1 200																				
	-2.68535	-0.01	-1.89254	-0.17015	-0.5	-3.66695	-0.5	-0.62	-1.38	-0.5	-0.59262	-2.76599	-0.60643	-2.47349	-2.95103	-0.5	-0.06358	-0.5	-0.0102	-10,2854	-0.03848	-7.51497	-	63	-0.213	8-	-0.5	-0.04491	-20.2	-0.5	-0.51	-2.4305	7-	-0.60547	-3.80923	-0.5	-3	-0.5	-0.29502	-0.33812	-1.51059	-17.1335	-0.5	-6.21923	-0.04384	97	-0.5	-5.33415	-30.2135	4.4
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BTICIBROS	\$428.13	\$428.13	\$428.13	\$428.13	\$428.13	\$428.13	\$428.13	4	\$400.00	\$438.00	\$438.00	e d	-64	6	*	64	-5-	\$845.00	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	\$1,000.00	-8-	44	\$1,100.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$835.00	\$835.00	\$965.00	\$965.00	\$965.00	\$965.00	\$965.00	\$965.00	\$965.00	\$965.00	\$965.00	\$965.00	\$985.00
Wires/Out.																(\$95,913.60)																																		
USDiffom/Sales ofBTIC	\$15,399.84	\$4,969.10	\$856.26	\$240.06	\$1,845.31	\$2,140.65	\$44.92			\$1.848.87	\$41.951.13							\$41,861,38	\$37,554.36	\$4,200.00	\$5,000.00	\$11,007.48	\$42,238.16		The state of the s	\$110,000.00		11	1																					
USD Used to Purchase BTC									(\$40,000.00)			-8-	-69	-9	-9		-9-							S-	-S-		(\$20,722.27)	(\$760.00)	(\$475.00)	(\$950.00)	(\$4,750.00)	(\$51,312.56)	(\$13,172.96)	(\$47.50)	(\$948.10)	(\$237.50)	(\$1,624.10)	(\$5,455.05)	(\$36,294,95)	(\$2,796.10)	(\$14,155.63)	(\$1,358.38)	(\$2,387.67)	(\$34,843.57)	(\$4,012.44)	(\$2,928.52)	(\$7,937.47)	(\$6,233.24)	(\$965.00)	(\$9.650.00)
BITC Sold	-35.97	-11.6065	-2	-0.56071	4.31016	-5	-0.10492			4.22117	-95.7788		0,		03	1	-	49,5401	-37.5544	4.2	2	-11.0075	42.2382	0.9	67	-100																								
BITC:Purchase								F	1001							0						K					21.81291384	0.8	0.5	-	S	54.01322617	13.86627786	0.05	0.998	0.25	1.70958213	6.53299793	43,46700207	2.897508	14,66904289	1.40764285	2.474267	36.10733017	4.15796731	3.03473875	8.22535693	6.45931108	-	10
Withdraw																			-			1									4																			
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BITC Price	\$965.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	\$986.00	2986.00	8050.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	. \$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$850.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	\$950.00	8950.00	-S-	\$775.00	\$775.00	\$775.00	\$775.00	\$775.00	\$775.00	\$775.00	\$925.00	\$925.00	\$925.00	\$925.00
Wires/Out	1										7.7																																					
USD/from Sales oriBIT©		\$13,635.11	\$106.52	\$10,985.03	\$3,980.10	\$1,920.29	\$67,545.85	\$13,158.42	\$673.67	\$15,837.01	\$9,769.03	\$32,941.16	\$2,126.74	\$4,254.24	2010,014	20,020,50																						\$7,480.43	\$1,937.50	\$6,743.28	\$35,693.31	\$748.25	\$40,888.54	\$61,508.69	\$3,258.64	\$1,387.50	\$2,447.07	\$286.75
USD/Usedfo	(\$22,742.00)															(\$1.435.01)	(\$9.500.00)	(\$1,032.13)	(\$9,255.60)	(\$4,750.00)	(\$44,000.24)	(\$19.00)	(\$2,375.00)	(\$1,266.81)	(\$1,900.00)	(\$19.00)	(\$1,881.00)	(\$475.00)	(\$570.11)	(\$14,280.66)	(\$34.75)	(\$19.00)	(\$21.85)	(\$95,000.00)	(31,731,63)	(\$19.00)	8-											
BITC Sold		-13.8287	-0.10803	-11.141	4.03861	-1.94756	-68.5049	-13.3453	-0.68324	-16.0619	-9.90774	-33.4089	-2,15694	4.31465	A 78331	1.1000																						-9.65217	-2.5	-8.701	-46,0559	-0.96548	-52.7594	-79.3661	-3.52285	-1.5	-2.64548	-0.31
Bir© Purchase Biro Sold.	23.56683502															1.51053612	10	1.08645454	9.74273684	5	46.31604	0.02	2.5	1.33348379	2	0.02	1.98	0.5	0.6001176	15.03227	0.03657777	0.02	0.023	100	0.43578334	0.02										letter and the second		
Withdraw																					15																			-								
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Dally Balance.	1			1	1	943.44	1	1	7	7			1	270 27	T		286.01	287.1	296.84	301.84	348.16	348.18	350.68	352.01	354.01	354.03	356.01	356.51	357.11	372.14	372.18	372.2	372.22	474.62	474 48	474.5	874.5	864.85	862.35	853.65	807.59	806.63	753.87	674.5	670.98	669.48	666.83	666.52
Type	2	2	2	2	2	7 6	7 0	2	7	2	2	2	7	36	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	7	7	2	7 6	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	7	2	2	2	2

Nofes																																				Ĭ			9											
EEE	37	65.93	0.2	9.25	83.44	159.44	0	10.69	18.8	328.53	234.24	2.07	57.13	36.58	25.88	5.41	45.34	0.01	11.91	-	250.47	19.68	85.87	13.1	0.01	6.4	2.56	0.86	27.03	0.04	7.68	12.8	28.61	1.29	26.53	3.84	3.28	5.12	0.04	12.8	3.84	12,8	0.32	8.26	0.59	0.04	2,92	2.56	10.77	
BTC/Brice	\$925.00	\$925.00	\$925.00	\$925.00	\$925.00	\$925.00	4	\$895.00	\$895.00	\$895.00	\$660.00	\$660.00	\$660.00	\$660.00	\$680.00	\$680.00	\$680.00	\$680.00	\$680.00	\$680.00	\$680.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640,00	\$640.00	\$640,00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	00 01 00
Wirestout																					1																													
TOFIB TIC.	\$18,500.00	\$32,961.89	\$99.62	\$4,625.00	\$41,717.50	\$79,716.03									\$12,937.44	\$2,704.63	\$22,667.22	\$3.64	\$5,954,94	\$497.81	\$125,234,33						Reserve								1													4.4		
Purchase Bit C							,	(\$5,342.26)	(\$9,397.50)	(\$164,260,24)	(\$117,117,93)	(\$1,030.85)	(\$28,562.55)	(\$18,288.68)								(\$9,835.85)	(\$42,932.85)	(\$6,547,48)	(\$4.16)	(\$3,200.00)	(\$1,280.00)	(\$426.62)	(\$13,513.53)	(\$18.50)	(\$3,840.00)	(\$6,400.00)	(\$14,301.94)	(\$644.42)	(\$13,262.97)	(\$1,920.00)	(\$1,638.40)	(\$2,560.00)	(\$18.50)	(\$6,400.00)	(\$1,920.00)	(\$6,400.00)	(\$155.32)	(\$4,127.53)	(\$293.56)	(\$18.50)	(\$1,459.15)	(\$1,280.00)	(\$5,380.96)	
	-20	-35.6345	-0.1077	-2	-45.1	-86.1795	(A								-19.0256	-3.9774	-33.3341	-0.00535	-8.75726	-0.73207	-184.168										100															100				
Withdraw BITC/Purchase BitC:Said								5.96900788	10.5	183.5309921	177.4514061	1.56188975	43.27658887	27.71011532								15,3685139	67.08258157	10.23043183	0.006493	5	2	0.66658783	21.11489405	0.0289	9	10	22.3467777	1.00690194	20.72339	3	2.56	4	0.0289	10	3	10	0.24268132	6.44927	0.4586923	0.0289	2.27991858	2	8.40774347	
osit Withdraw							505														311												44									100								
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Balance	646.52	610.89	610.78	605.78	560.68	1	1				1356.95 1	1358.52 1	1401.79				7						7	٦	\neg				7						1		1	1		1					1400.82 1					
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Appendix B
Appendix B
ARL M FORCE BitStamp Account Analysis

Notes																																																		
	0.28	12.93	2.07	0.04	2.39	1.5	345	0	2.13	6.32	62.66	0.01	1.31	0.83	2.47	0.12	1.82	0.26	27.94	0.1	0.93	98.79	0.25	36.32	0.26	5.07	7.59	2.53	3.47	0.3	0.4	39.19	0.29	12.64	0.3	0.4	0.39	0.02	0.07	31.58	0.01	27.31	5.33	385.55	0,21	0.05	3.35	70.0	1.74	51.88
BTCIBITE	0	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$690.00	8-	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632,00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632,00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$632.00	\$738.00	\$738.00	\$738.00	\$738.00	\$738.00	\$738.00	\$738.00
Wirestout									1																																									
USD from Sales of BITC							\$172,500.00	-9	\$1,060.55	\$3,155.46	\$31,325.39	\$3.67	\$650.45	\$410.80	\$1,230.95	\$55.22	\$907.03	\$126.40	\$13,967,20	\$46.94	\$463.01	\$49,392.56	\$121.86	\$18,157.42	\$126.40	\$2,531.49	\$3,792.00	\$1,264.00	\$1,733.76	\$145.36	\$199.08	\$19,592.00	\$142.68	\$6,320.00	\$145.36	\$196.55	\$194.02	\$6.32	\$31.60	\$15,788.15	\$1.99	\$13,652.60	\$2,661.71							
USD Usedito	100	(\$6,464.00)	(\$1,030.43)	(\$18.50)	(\$1,191.81)	(\$746.80)		65																																			A CONTRACT CONTRACT	(\$192,771.07)	(\$101.08)	(\$23.61)	(\$1,671.05)	(\$31.51)	(\$865.74)	(\$25.935,94)
BITC Sola							-250		-1.67808	4.99282	49.5655	-0.00581	-1.0292	-0.65	-1.94771	-0.08737	-1,43518	-0.2	-22.1	-0.07427	-0.73261	-78.1528	-0.19282	-28.7301	-0.2	4.00552	9-	-2	-2.7433	-0.23	-0.315	-31	-0.22576	-10	-0.23	-0.311	-0.307	-0.01	-0.05	-24.9813	-0.00315	-21.6022	-4.21156							
BILC/Purchase	0.2004008	10.1	1,61003965	0.0289	1.86220627	1.16687579																																						261.2074141	0.1369616	0.03198572	2.26429855	0.04269106	1,17309414	35.14354486
Withdraw					100			-169.4989									1					100								10										ř	1		7							
BITC/Deposit		4																																																
Dafelline	12/20/2013 20:03	12/20/2013 20:03	12/20/2013 20:03	12/20/2013 20:03	12/20/2013 20:03	12/20/2013 20:03	12/22/2013 8:23	12/22/2013 23:18	12/23/2013 0:42	12/23/2013 0:42	12/23/2013 1:19	12/23/2013 1:19	12/23/2013 1:19	12/23/2013 1:19	12/23/2013 1:20	12/23/2013 2:13	12/23/2013 2:13	12/23/2013 2:13	12/23/2013 2:13	12/23/2013 2:13	12/23/2013 2:13	12/23/2013 2:13	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:14	12/23/2013 2:15	12/23/2013 2:15	12/23/2013 2:15	12/23/2013 2:15	12/27/2013 2:10	12/27/2013 2:12	12/27/2013 2:13	12/27/2013 2:13	12/27/2013 2:13	12/27/2013 2:15	12/27/2013 2:15
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1111	105.39	8.51	4.32	18.9	7.7	5.7	1.47	20.97	1.47	0.3	1 47	0.01	1.85	7.35	16.91	73.05	0.01	0.01	7.8	8.68	211.45	151.06	14.84	249.89	7.42	4.75	94.12	216.01	0.33	5.23	7.88	6.79	1.54	1.73	14.7	15.34	49.76	7.99	26.95	12.44	8.84	7.68	33.15	0.4	6.15	6.31	0.31	26.77	4.59	21.72
BITCERTON	10	\$724.00	\$724.00	\$724.00	\$724.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735,00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$735.00	\$725.00	\$725,00	\$742.00	\$742.00	\$742.00	\$742.00	\$742.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$768.00	\$802.00
Wires@ut												-																																			1			
USD:/from:Sales						\$2,846.39	\$735.00	\$10,480.78	\$735.00	\$147.00	\$735.00	\$4.99	\$924.33	\$3,675.00	\$8,452.50	\$36,524.79	\$2.33	\$4.99	\$3,896.82	\$4,335.08			\$7.420,00	\$124,942.71	\$3,705.46	\$2,374.47	\$47,057.35	\$108,003.79	\$161.28	\$2,611.20	\$3,939.50	\$3,394.52	\$767.54	\$860.16	\$7,349.76	\$7,668.56	\$24,875.62	\$3,991.22	\$13,471.91	\$6,219.74	\$4,416.84	\$3,840.00	\$16,573.44	\$200.00	\$3,072.00	\$3,154.76	\$153.60	\$13,382.40	\$2,292.16	
Rurchase/BTC	0	(\$4,250.84)	(\$2,158.97)	(\$9,449.06)	(\$3,848.10)																(\$105,722.98)	(\$75,527.02)																												(\$10,859.33)
BITC Sold						-3.87264	-1	-14.2596	17	-0.2	77	-0.00679	-1,25759	2	-11.5	49.6936	-0.00317	-0.00679	-5.3018	-5.89806			-10	-168.386	4.99389	-3.2001	-63,4196	-140.63	-0.21	-3.4	-5.12956	4.41995	-0.9994	-1.12	-9.57	-9.9851	-32,3901	-5.1969	-17.5415	-8.09862	-5.7511	-5	-21.58	-0.28042	4	4.10776	-0.2	-17.425	-2.98458	
Withdraw BTIC Purchase BTIC Sold	72.78043526	5.87132586	2.982	13.05119	5.31504888																145.8247988	104.1752012									1																			13.54031583
Withdraw.		1															- ×																																	
BITC Deposit			2.8	F													1																										1							
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Balance		1088.66		6	7	1106.13	1105.13	1090.87	1089.87	1089.67	1088.67	1088.67	1087.41	1082.41	1070.91	1021.21	1021.21	1021.2	1015.9	1010	1155.83	1260	1250	1081.62	1076.62	1073.42				\neg			855.22	854.1		834.54								738.72 0	734.72 0			8	7	723.54 0
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FEE	0.17	459.33	20.44	0.17	0.17	17.29	3.07	0.17	2.44	0.17	0.88	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.04	0.05	0.17	48.9	0.17	99.93	0.17	2.84	18.51	2.14	0.17	0.17	1.13	1.63	41.45	0.17	140.18	0.17	6.72	10.25	0.17	11.94	3.38	0.17	48.9	4.28	0.3	7.89	0.07	0.55	3.38	0.07	20.0	20.0	16.9	3.38
BITC RICE	\$802.00	\$802.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$815.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00
Wirestout																																																		
USD from Sales of BTC			\$10,216.56	\$81.50	\$81.50	\$8,643.95	\$1,532.00	\$81.50	\$1,218.38	\$81.50	\$438.52	\$81.50	\$81.50	\$81.50	\$16.37	\$22.00	\$81.50	\$24,450.00	\$81.50	\$49,962.68	\$81.50	\$1,467.00	\$9,250.25	\$1,069.42	\$81.50	\$81.50	\$561.08	\$815.00	\$20,724.93	\$81.50	\$70,090.00	\$81.50	\$3,356.51	\$5,121.56	\$81.50	\$5,965.80	\$1,688.83	\$81.50	\$24,450.00	\$2,135,17	\$149.40	\$3,990.57	\$33.80	\$272.00	\$1,690.00	\$33.80	\$33.80	\$33.80	\$8,450.00	\$1,690.00
USD Used to Purchase BTC	(\$80.20)	(\$229,660.47)																																																
			-12.5357	-0.1	-0.1	-10,6061	-1.87975	-0.1	-1,49494	-0.1	-0.53806	1.0-	1.0-	-0.1	-0.02008	-0.027	-0.1	-30	-0.1	-61.3039	-0.1	-1.8	-11,35	-1.31217	1.0-	-0.1	-0.68844	7	-25.4294	-0.1	-86	-0.1	4.11842	-6.28412	-0.1	-7.32	-2.07218	-0.1	-30	-2.61984	-0.1768	4.72256	-0.04	-0.32189	-5	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-10	-5
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Nofes	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.07	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.47	0.17	0.12	0.12	0.02	0.02	0.12	0.12	0.02	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.10	0.16	0,16	4.29	16.9	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.79	0.07	0.17	1.59	30.71	0.07	5.07	5.07	0.07	8.45	0.71	0.71		353.19
BITG/Price FEE	0	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	9045.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845,00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	8845.00	0042700	\$845.00			\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00	\$845.00		ŀ	\$845.00 3
Wires/Out		\$84.50	\$84.50	\$33.80	\$84.50	\$84.50	\$84.50	\$84.50	\$84.50	\$84.50	0.33	\$84.50	\$55.70	\$55.70	\$8.45	\$8.45	\$55.70	925.70	58.45	\$78.08	\$78.08	970.00	\$78.08	\$78.08	\$78.08	1.7.1	00.0	\$84.50	\$84.50	\$84.50	\$84.50	\$84.50	\$84.50	92	833.80	.50	84	34	\$33.80	00.	00.	\$33.80	.00	.21	.68		.05
S. OTBITC		\$84	\$84	\$33	\$8	284	28\$	\$84	\$85	285	\$230.33	384	\$56	\$55	69	69	209	CA	318	2/8	8/6	970	878	878	878	\$2,144.71	\$8,450.00	284	\$84	\$84	\$84	\$84	284	\$392.92	200	200	\$792.84	\$15,352,34	\$33	\$2,535.00	\$2,535.00	\$33	\$4,225.00	\$353.21	\$350.68	TOL OFTE	\$176,591.05
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BrcRice	0	\$935,00	\$935.00	\$935.00	\$835.00	\$935.00	\$935.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$624.00	\$024.00	8824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	\$824.00	ú,	
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USD from Sales																																																
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BTC Price	Г	\$799.00	\$799.00	\$799.00	\$799.00	\$799.00	\$799.00	\$820.00	\$820.00	\$820.00	\$820.00	\$820.00	\$820.00	\$820.00	\$820.00	\$810.00	-69	8-	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800,00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$800.00	\$785.00	\$785.00
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USD/from Sales of BITG							A	\$33,789.69	\$13,437,00	\$4,047.67	\$11,793.54	\$4,100.00	\$820.00	\$10,651.70	\$3,360.41		4	.s.	\$27,126.61	\$2,400.00	\$800.00	\$5,997.05	\$200.00	\$1,600.00	\$431.01	\$199.20	\$100,008.00	\$17.31	\$4,000.00	\$4,057,08	\$258.36	\$403.56	\$400.00	\$800.00	\$380.80	89,330.89	\$2,759.15	\$3,200.00	\$56,689,28	\$1,699.35	\$2,400,00	\$2,155.90	\$2,080.00	\$1,600.00	\$4,060.46	\$533,58	\$800.00	\$3,612.42		
USD/Usedfo Purchase BTC		(\$1,358.30)	(\$15,122.36)	(\$2,839.09)	(\$440.46)	(\$73.40)	(\$60,066.39)									(\$162,000.00)		01				150																1.1											(\$225,738.68)	(\$2,271.45)
BITC Sold								-41.2069	-16.3866	4.93619	-14.3824	-5	7	-12.9899	4.09805				-33.9083	5	7	-7.49631	-0.25	-2	-0.53876	-0.249	-125.01	-0.02164	-5	-5.07135	-0.32295	-0.50445	-0.5	7	-0.476	-11.6636	-3.44894	4	-70.8616	-2.12419	-3	-2.69488	-2.6	-5	-5.07557	-0.66698	7	4.51552		
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Notes 0.78 0.98 3.62 3.62 4.12 10.62 1.336 69.84 10.62 10.02 10.02 10.02 10.02 10.03 10.03 10.02 10.03 10.02 10.03 17.13 86.07 78.78 3.64 0.08 1.36 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.02 0.07 0.62 0.07 0.12 \$776.10 \$776.02 \$776.10 \$776.01 \$776.02 \$776.02 \$776.00 \$776.00 \$776.00 \$776.00 \$776.00 \$776.00 \$766.00 \$683.00 \$683.00 \$683.00 \$683.00 \$683.00 \$683.00 \$683.00 \$683.00 \$776.00 \$790.00 \$762.00 WiresiGut \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20.00 | \$20 \$43,521,46 \$393,45 \$3,926.64 \$52,04 \$52,04 \$1,433.19 \$823.63 \$11,490,00 \$13,846.61 \$393,37 \$766.00 \$51,140,42 \$99.58 \$3,930,00 \$13,788.00 \$1,378.80 \$49,908.81 \$8,560.25 \$43,031.82 \$248.90 \$275.93 \$307.89 \$248.46 \$6.83 \$34.15 \$307.35 (\$39,387.06) (\$1,819.71) (\$38.10) (\$677.62) (\$404,250.00) WSD/Wsedtto Purchase/B/IC (\$459,600. -2.33168 -2.34771 -2.64832 -6.83765 -8.60508 -6.83765 -0.01 -12.6792 -420.536 -0.62894 -0.21346 -171.81 -5.12616 -0.06794 -0.20699 -1.871 -1.07524 -150 -150 -0.0514 -55,0905 -66.763 -0.13 -0.404 -0.36378 -0.36378 -0.01 -0.05 -0.45 -0.5 7 -1.8 -65,1551 -11,1753 -56.1773 -0.36378 2.38807176 0.05 0.88927 BTC Purchase 0.07401767 51.68905747 Windraw 02/06/2014 1:12 02/06/2014 1:12 02/06/2014 1:12 02/06/2014 1:12 02/06/2014 1:12 02/06/2014 1:12 02/06/2014 1:12 02/06/2014 1:12 02/06/2014 1:12 02/06/2014 1:13 02/06/2014 1:13 02/06/2014 1:13 02/06/2014 1:13 02/06/2014 1:13 02/06/2014 1:13 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 2:158 02/06/2014 22:00 02/06/2014 22:00 02/06/2014 22:00 02/06/2014 22:00 02/06/2014 22:00 02/06/2014 22:00 02/06/2014 22:00 02/06/2014 23:49 02/06/2014 23:50 02/06/2014 23:52 02/07/2014 23:52 02/07/2014 9:45 02/07/2014 9:45 02/07/2014 9:45 02/07/2014 9:45 02/07/2014 9:45 02/07/2014 9:45 02/06/2014 22:00 02/06/2014 23:49 02/06/2014 23:49 475.1 477.49 477.54 478.5 1028.5 1027.74 1027.29 949.68 949.05 946.72 944.37 941.72 936.72 929.89 921.28 876.28 876.07 875.57 855.04 434.5 1034.5 979.41 807.6 807.09 562.72 557.72 555.92 490.77 801.69 801.69 799.82 798.74 648.74 630.67 630.61 629.61 562.85 867.73 867.72 423.41

Dally	Datetine	BTC:Deposit With	Withdraw Brig Purchase Brg Sold	BTC Sold	Burchase BTC.	OF BITC.	Wirestout	BITCIPACE	HEE	Notes
1025.73	02/07/2014 9:45	15		-0.5002		\$341.64		\$683.00	69'0	
1025.53	02/07/2014 9:45			-0.2		\$136.60		\$683.00	0.28	
1025.52	02/07/2014 9:45			-0.01		\$6.83		\$683.00	0.02	
1025.5	+			-0.02		\$13.66		\$683.00	0.03	
1025.05	+			-0.45		\$307.35		\$683.00	0.62	
1024.39	02/07/2014 9:45			-0.658		\$449.41		\$683.00	6:0	
1024.38	02/07/2014 9:45			-0.01		\$6.83		\$683.00	0.02	
1022.38	02/07/2014 9:45			-2		\$1,366.00		\$683.00	2.74	
1021.83	02/07/2014 9:45			-0.45		\$307.35		\$683.00	0.62	
1021.73	02/07/2014 9:57			-0.2		\$136.60		\$683.00	0.28	
868.39	02/07/2014 9:57			-53.3428		\$36,433.16		\$683.00	72.87	
967.89	02/07/2014 10:04			-0.5		\$340.00		\$680.00	0.68	
895.61	02/07/2014 10:04			-72.2762		\$49,147.84		\$680.00	98.3	
894.91	02/07/2014 10:05			-0.7		\$476.00		\$680.00	96.0	
893.64	02/07/2014 10:05			-1,27578		\$867.53		\$680.00	1.74	
889.64	02/07/2014 10:05			4.0002		\$2,720.14		\$680.00	5.45	
869.52	02/07/2014 10:05			-20.1142		\$13.677.64		\$680,00	27.36	
869.42	02/07/2014 10:05			-0.103		\$70.04		\$680.00	0.15	
860.51	02/07/2014 10:05			-8.90969		\$6.058.59		\$680.00	12.12	
800.03	02/07/2014 10:05			-80.4864		\$41.130.77		\$680.00	82.27	
790.13	02/07/2014 10:05			-9.9		\$6.732.00		\$680.00	13.47	
790.02	02/07/2014 10:05	4		-0.10243		\$69.65		\$680.00	0.14	
789.79	02/07/2014 10:05			-0.22901		\$155.73		\$680,00	0.32	
719.34	02/07/2014 10:05			-70.4565		\$47,910.39		\$680.00	95.83	
715.34	02/07/2014 10:05			4		\$2,720.00		\$680.00	5.44	
710.34	02/07/2014 10:06		1	9-		\$3,400.00		\$680.00	6.8	
704.2	02/07/2014 10:06			-6.13676		\$4,173.00		\$680.00	8.35	
688.61	02/07/2014 10:06			-15.59		\$10,601.20		\$680.00	21.21	
666.53	02/07/2014 10:15			-22.0818		\$15,015.64		\$680.00	30.04	
663.13	02/07/2014 10:15			-3.40014		\$2,312.10		\$680.00	4.63	
659.05	02/07/2014 10:16			-4.08096		\$2,775.05		\$680.00	5.56	
659.02	02/07/2014 10:16			-0.025		\$17.00		\$680.00	0.04	
354.51	02/07/2014 10:16			-304.514		\$207,069.85		\$680.00	414.14	
155.51	02/07/2014 10:16			-199		\$135,320.00		\$680.00	270.84	
150.51	02/07/2014 10:16			-5		\$3,400.00		\$680.00	6.8	
140.70	02/01/2014 10:16			-3.745/1		\$2,547.08		\$680.00	5.1	
128 A2	02/07/2014 10:10			286850-		\$677.16		\$680.00	1.36	
138 30	02/07/2014 10:18			3000		94,980.00		9000.00	0.00	
130 49	02/07/2014 10:18			7 90007		\$17.00 \$5.074.64		9000.00	40.04	
118 93	02/07/2014 10:18			14 5628		40.1 1.04 07 099 79		2000.000	10.73	
108 4	02/07/2014 10:10			40.000		\$7,862.72		\$680.00	15.73	1
100	02/01/2014 10:10			-12.0301		36,124,43		\$680.00	17.45	
36 79	02/07/2014 18:3E		28 TONAROSE	_	/640 A99 A01	900,344.70		\$580.00	130,09	
51.79	02/07/2014 16:36		45		(640,975,00)			9725.00	30.00	l
51.89	02/07/2014 16:36		0.09082857		(\$85.71)			\$725.00	0.14	
51,94	02/07/2014 16:36		0.05		(\$36.25)			\$725.00	0.08	
51.99	02/07/2014 16:36		0.05		(\$36.25)		7	\$725.00	0.08	
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62.68	02/07/2014 16:37		10.88418605		(\$7.753.28)			\$725.00	15.51	

Notes 0.03 0.01 1280.33 45.51 17.56 0.66 0.66 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.01 1.01 1.2.77 1.2.91 1.3.13 2.773 \$697.00
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1111	16.75	183.44	0.37	0.69	8.56	2.73	3.81	0.41	6.81	1.76	40.86	52.11	6.81	1.37	3.21	0.35	4.09	21.47	59.99	2.52	17.84	2.73	5.84	19.21	28.82	15.35	3.55	4.09	13.47	172.98	2.73	72.22	13.62	107.75	2.03	0.05	0.12	0.13	0.81	1.23	9.81	0.03	0.05	0.13	36.9	0.1	90.0	0.05	0.05	0.18
BTC Price	0	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681,00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681,00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$681.00	\$650.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00
Wires/Out																		1										1																						
USD/from Sales of BTG																																		\$53,873.05	\$1,012.99	\$22.29	\$58.29	\$61.50	\$401.95	\$615.00	\$4,950.75	\$14.76	\$22.29	\$61.50	\$18,450.00	\$49.20	\$22.29	\$22.28	\$22.28	\$87.01
USD Usedito.	(\$8,371.26)	(\$81,720.00)	(\$182.85)	(\$340.50)	(\$4,275.02)	(\$1,362.00)	(\$1,802.09)	(\$204.30)	(\$3,405.00)	(\$875.08)	(\$20.430.00)	(\$26,054,44)	(\$3,405.00)	(\$681,00)	(\$1,600.46)	(\$170.25)	(\$2,043.00)	(\$10,732.01)	(\$29,993.95)	(\$1,259.17)	(\$8,919.75)	(\$1,362.00)	(\$2,916.72)	(\$9,602,10)	(\$14,409.10)	(\$7,672,21)	(\$1,770.60)	(\$2,043.00)	(\$6,730.47)	(\$86,487.00)	(\$1,362.00)	(\$36,105.86)	(\$6,810.00)																	
BTG Sold	100			7																														-82.8816	-1.64714	-0.03625	-0.09479	-0.1	-0.65357	77	-8.05	-0.024	-0.03625	-0.1	-30	-0.08	-0.03625	-0.03625	-0.03625	-0.14148
Withdraw BITC:Rurchase	12.2925933	120	0,2685	0.5	6.27756795	2	2.79308915	0.3	5	1.285	30	38.25908897	5		2.35015427	0.25	3	15,75918895	44.0439854	1.849	13.09801194	2	4.28298988	14.1	21.15872992	11,2661	2.6	3	9.88322	127	2	53.01887715	10																	
BTC Withdraw																																																		
BITC Deposit			*																																	1														
Oatetime	02/10/2014 10:10	02/10/2014 10:10	02/10/2014 10:10	02/10/2014 10:10	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:11	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 10:12	02/10/2014 11:56	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:07	02/10/2014 12:08	02/10/2014 12:08	02/10/2014 12:08
Daily	143.46	263.46	263.73			272.51	275.3	275.6	280.6	281.88			355.14	356.14		358.74	361.74			423.4	436.49	438.49			478.04	489.3	491.9						8.969						611.39				602.28	802.18	572.18	572.1	572.06			571.85
Type	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	- 2	2	2	2	2	2	. 2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	.2	2

Notes																																			7															
HEE	0.62	1.23	201.73	487.5	0	47.25	7.32	9.27	1.3	3.8	89.12	43.64	85.55	8.53	13	142.27	3.68	6.52	58.71	170.6	8.4	84	37.12	6.4	26.63	5.77	12.6	5.12	1.28	44.8	79.54	2.84	6.43	0.64	2.56	0.3	0.3	4.89	0.3	8.97	3.95	6.62	10.41	1.28	33.98	31.07	226.4	80.6	19.54	1.74
BTC Page	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	\$615.00	8-	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650,00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$650.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$640.00	\$608.00	\$608.00	\$608.00	\$608.00
Wirestout																														1										10000										1
USD from Sales	\$307.50	\$615.00	\$100,864.14	\$243,748.75		\$23,622,57	\$3,657.54	\$4,634.50	\$650.00	\$1,950.00	\$44,557.50	\$21,817.52	\$42,770.70	\$4,264.00	\$6,500.00	\$71,133.32	\$1,835.10	\$3,256.50	\$29,350.69																															
USD Usedfo					-S-															(\$85,298.03)	(\$3,200,00)	(\$3,200.00)	(\$18,560.00)	(\$3,200.00)	(\$13,312.00)	(\$2,880.42)	(\$6,297.37)	(\$2,560.00)	(\$640.00)	(\$22,400.00)	(\$39,765.84)	(\$1,419.22)	(\$3,212,80)	(\$320.00)	(\$1,280.00)	(\$147.20)	(\$147.20)	(\$2,444.80)	(\$147.20)	(\$4,481.47)	(\$1,974.75)	(\$3,308.40)	(\$5,204.59)	(\$640.00)	(\$16,986.27)	(\$15,532.44)	(\$113,196.11)	(\$4,538.91)	(\$9,766,06)	(\$865.76)
	-0.5	7.	-164.007	-396.339		-36.3424	-5,62698	-7.13	7	67	-68.55	-33.5654	-65,8011	-6.56	-10	-109.436	-2.82323	-5.01	45.1548																															
BTC bosit: Withdraw BTC/Purchase BTC Sold																				133.2781713	22	5	29	S	20.8	4.50066	9.83964	4	1	35	62,13412394	2,21752813	5.02	0.5	2	0.23	0.23	3.82	0.23	7.0022923	3.08554	5.16937721	8.1321787	1	26,541051	24.26943742	186.1778195	7,46530618	16.06259934	1.42395
BTC Withdraw																															100			100																
BITC: Deposit					399.9999						1									1				7		1	11	1.0																						
Datetime	02/10/2014 12:08	02/10/2014 12:08	02/10/2014 12:08	02/10/2014 12:08	02/10/2014 12:25	02/10/2014 14:36	02/10/2014 14:36	02/10/2014 14:36	02/10/2014 14:36	02/10/2014 14:36	02/10/2014 14:36	02/10/2014 14:36	02/10/2014 14:36	02/10/2014 14:37	02/10/2014 14:37	02/10/2014 14:37	02/10/2014 14:37	02/10/2014 14:37	02/10/2014 14:37	02/13/2014 17:58	02/13/2014 17:58	02/13/2014 17:58	02/13/2014 17:58	02/13/2014 17:58	02/13/2014 17:58	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 17:59	02/13/2014 18:00	02/13/2014 18:00	02/13/2014 18:00	02/13/2014 18:00	02/13/2014 18:00	02/13/2014 18:00	02/13/2014 21:21	02/13/2014 21:21	02/13/2014 21:22	02/13/2014 21:22
en		T	7		1	1	1						188.99	182.43				55.16	10	143.28	148.28							7	T									1	٦	1	1		362.19		389.73					625.13
Trype	2	2	2	7	0	N	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Type	Balance		BITC Deposit	Withdraw	Withdraw BITC Burchase BITC Sold	Sold	WSD/Wsed/fo	USD/from/Sales of BITC	Wires/Out	BTC Brice	HEE.	Notes
2	625.37	02/13/2014 21:22	0:		0.24073846		(\$146.37)			0	0.3	
2	669.37	02/13/2014 21:22	0.1		44		(\$26,752.00)	7		\$608.00	53.51	
2	678.56	02/13/2014 21:22	61		9.18479		(\$5,584.35)			\$608.00	11.17	
2	741.56	02/13/2014 21:22			63		(\$38,304.00)			\$608.00	76.61	
2	746.56	02/13/2014 21:22			S		(\$3,040.00)			\$608.00	80.9	
2	750.91	02/13/2014 21:22			4.35		(\$2,644.80)			\$608.00	5.29	
2	753.71	02/13/2014 21:22	117		2.8		(\$1,702.40)	7.0		\$608.00	3.41	
2	792.51	02/13/2014 21:22			38.8		(\$23,590.40)			\$608.00	47.19	
2	805.05	02/13/2014 21:22			12.54294711		(\$7,626.11)			\$608.00	15.26	
2	813.05	02/13/2014 21:22			89		(\$4,864.00)			\$608,00	9.73	
2	843.05	02/13/2014 21:22			30		(\$18.240.00)			\$608.00	36.48	
2	901,25	02/13/2014 21:22			58.20014515		(\$35,385,69)			\$608.00	70.78	
2	962.09	02/13/2014 21:22			60.83678914		(\$36,988.77)			\$608.00	73.98	
2	865.27	02/13/2014 21:22			3.17848767		(\$1,932.52)			\$608.00	3.87	
2	970.27	02/13/2014 21:22			9		(\$3,040.00)			\$608.00	6.08	
2	1026.34	02/13/2014 21:22			56.06985233		(\$34,090.47)			\$608.00	68.19	
2	1026.84	02/13/2014 21:22			0.50254181		(\$305.55)			\$608.00	0.62	
2	1027.34	02/13/2014 21:23			0.5		(\$304.00)			\$608.00	0.61	
2	1032.58	02/13/2014 21:23			5.23552532		(\$3,183,20)			\$608.00	6.37	
2	1037.22	02/13/2014 21:23			4.64490152		(\$2.824.10)			\$608.00	5.85	
2	1037.22	02/13/2014 21:23			0		-5			\$608.00	100	
2	1094.18	02/13/2014 21-23			56 96323708		(\$34 633 65)			8608.00	50.07	
2	1097.9	02/13/2014 21-23			3.72	Ī	(62 261 76)			00.000	4 50	
2	1098.4	02/13/2014 21-23			200	Ī	(4304.00)			2000.00	4.03	
0	10003	02/13/2014 21-23			200	1	(9504.00)			2000.00	0.01	
2	100041	02/42/2014 24-22			0.44000440	Ī	(4047.40)			\$500,000	1.1	
, ,	1100 50	02/13/2014 21:23			40 40440475	1	(11.704)			\$608.00	0.14	
40	4440 74	02/13/2014 21:23			10.10110473	1	(35,141,47)			\$608.00	12.28	
4 0	110.71	02/13/2014 21:23			1.19888	1	(\$728.92)			\$608.00	1,46	
7	1031.47	02/14/2014 3:35			1-	-/9.2422		\$47,545,35		\$600.00	95.1	
2	988.58	02/14/2014 3:37			4.	42.8909		\$25,734.52		\$600,00	51.47	
7	866.98	02/14/2014 3:38				-121.6	100	\$72,960.00		\$600.00	145.92	
2	854.05	02/14/2014 3:38			7	-12.9269	T. T	\$7,756.13		\$600.00	15.52	
7	804.05	02/14/2014 3:38				-20		\$30,000.00		\$600.00	09	
7	803.95	02/14/2014 3:38				-0.1		\$80.00		\$600.00	0.12	
7	019	02/14/2014 3:38			1	-193.95		\$116,370.00		\$600.00	232.74	
7	650.31	02/14/2014 18:06			40.30741878		(\$27,086.59)			\$672,00	54.18	
7	611.91	02/14/2014 18:07			27.66358109		(\$18,589.93)			\$672.00	37.18	
7	711.09	02/14/2014 18:07			33,11541565		(\$22,253.56)			\$672.00	44.51	
2	711.19	02/14/2014 18:07		3	0.1		(\$67.20)		2	\$672.00	0.14	
2	711.28	02/14/2014 18:07			0.1		(\$67.20)			\$672.00	0.14	
2	728.07	02/14/2014 18:07			16.78		(\$11,276.16)			\$672.00	22.56	
2	728.17	02/14/2014 18:07			0.1		(\$67.20)			\$672.00	0.14	
2	766.86	02/14/2014 18:09			38.68469538		(\$25,996.12)			\$672.00	52	
2	766.96	02/14/2014 18:09			0.1	1	(\$67.20)			\$672.00	0.14	
2	781.55	02/14/2014 18:10			14.59562433		(\$9,808.26)			\$672.00	19.62	
2	787.11	02/14/2014 18:10			5.56123809		(\$3,737.15)			\$672.00	7.48	
2	792.52	02/14/2014 18:10			5.41278875		(\$3,637.39)			\$672.00	7.28	
2	794.52	02/14/2014 18:10			2		(\$1,344.00)			\$672.00	2.69	
2	794.85	02/14/2014 18:10			0.32302027		(\$217.07)			\$672.00	0.44	7
2	796.67	02/14/2014 18:10			1,82689557		(\$1,227.67)			\$672.00	2.46	
					8.00							

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Norion																																																		Į.
398	5.91	0.15	0.1	0.02	0.12	90'0	1.19	60.0	0.12	0.6	5.2	0.04	0.06	90.0	90.0	5.91	2.48	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.84	4 73	F.R.7	3.55	5.91	0.00	0.06	1.19	11.81	70.36	0.07	1.24	0.12	0.04	0.44	9.0	6.2	0.03	0.48	0.08	25.15	11.81	23.61	29.86	0.03	90.0	13,35	70.83	0.06	1.82
RITCHERICO	1	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	S590 17	\$590.17	8500 17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17	\$590.17
Wirestour				1.0																																										R			1	
USD from Sales	\$2,950.85	\$73.27	\$47.21	\$6.02	\$59.02	\$29.51	\$580.17	\$41.31	\$59.02	\$295.08	\$2.596.75	\$18,30	\$29.51	\$29.51	\$27.76	\$2,950.85	\$1,239.36	\$59.02	\$29.51	\$59.02	\$317.84	\$2.360.68	£2 832 82	\$1,770.51	\$2 950 85	\$242 47	\$29.51	\$590.17	\$5,901.70	\$35,179.02	\$34.95	\$615.01	\$59.02	\$18.30	\$219.07	\$295.08	\$3,098.12	\$11.80	\$236.07	\$35.41	\$12,571.84	\$5,901.70	\$11,803.40	\$14,926,16	\$11.80	\$29.51	\$6,673.84	\$35,410.20	\$29.51	\$807.74
WSD Weed to																																																		
Series and		-0.12414	-0.08	-0.0102	-0.1	-0.05	7	-0.07	-0.1	-0.5	4.4	-0.031	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04704	-2	-2.1	1.0	-0.05	-0.1	-0.53855	4	4.8	e,	-5	-0.41085	-0.05	7	-10	-59.6083	-0.05921	-1.04209	-0.1	-0.031	-0.37119	5.0-	-5.24953	-0.02	-0.4	90.0-	-21,3021	-10	-20	-25.2913	-0.02	-0.05	-11.3083	-60	-0.05	-1.5381
Withdraw Birc Purchase Birc Sold																		İ								-							1	A							1									
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Datetime	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:28	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:28	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/18/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:26	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27	02/16/2014 19:27
Dally				7	1	1		1		798.07		П		\neg				Н		786.14		781.6			768.8	768.39	768.34	767.34	757.34					696.5								L		17	613.29	613.24				540.34
Type	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Notes		13																																10																
EBE	5.91	24.46	353.55	371.4	0.01	284.49	94.31	24.08	3.59	2.78	90.0	2.32	8.69	90.0	8.02	0.3	11.58	90.0	83.84	25.49	57.9	0.05	1.51	3.54	0.24	0.05	2.09	90.0	0.04	6.54	0.88	60.36	0.22	19.42	90.0	7.09	1.59	4.23	15.88	1.8	110.16	0.4	35.62	8.02	18.92	0.04	0.74	97.0	8.54	23.5
BITC. Picce	7	\$630.00	\$630.00	\$619.00	\$628.50	\$623.00	\$623.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$579.00	\$555.00	\$555.00	\$555.00	\$555.00	\$555.00	\$555.00	\$555.00	\$555.00	\$555.00	\$540.00	\$555.00	\$573.00	\$573.00	\$573.00	\$573.00	\$573.00	\$573.00	\$573.00	\$573.00
Wires Gut	1 -																																																	
USD from Sales	\$2,950.85	\$12,227.95	\$176,772.05																													\$30,176.43	\$108.23	\$9,709.36	\$27.75	\$3,540.80	\$792.15	\$2,114.65	\$7,937.43	\$888.12		\$195.08	\$17,808.29	\$4,008.23	\$9,458.45	\$15.96	\$367.29	\$375.89	\$4,269.81	\$11,746.50
USD/UsedNo Purchase/BITC				(\$185,700.00)	(\$3.99)	(\$142,240.23)	(\$47,151.77)	(\$12,038.06)	(\$1,794.91)	(\$1,389.60)	(\$28.19)	(\$1,158.00)	(\$4,340.21)	(\$26.94)	(\$4,006.68)	(\$146.24)	(\$5,790.00)	(\$25.75)	(\$41,918.88)	(\$12,742.74)	(\$28,950.00)	(\$23.08)	(\$751.32)	(\$1,768.27)	(\$115.80)	(\$22.06)	(\$1,042.20)	(\$20.18)	(\$19.29)	(\$3,267.66)	(\$435.54)										(\$55,080.00)									
-		-19.4094	-280,591																													-54.3719	-0.19502	-17.4944	-0.05	-6.37982	-1.4273	-3.81017	-14.3017	-1.61823		-0.35149	-31.079	-6.99517	-16,5069	-0.02786	-0.641	-0.656	-7.45168	-20.5
Withdraw BTC Purchase BTC Sold				300	0.00634845	228.3149817	75.68501826	20.79112079	3,1000115	2.4	0.04868991	2	7.49604007	0.04653051	6.92	0.25257536	10	0.04446756	72.39875552	22.00819477	50	0.03987007	1.29762344	3.054	0.2	0.03810205	1.8	0.03484683	0.03330803	5.64363	0.75223359										102									
Withdraw																				7 1																														
BITC: Deposit																											T. T.			11	1															10				
	02/16/2014 19:27	02/19/2014 4:44	02/19/2014 18:59	02/19/2014 22:17	02/20/2014 1:16	02/20/2014 3:12	02/20/2014 3:14	02/20/2014 17:09	02/20/2014 17:25	02/20/2014 17:25	02/20/2014 17:25	02/20/2014 17:25	02/20/2014 17:26	02/20/2014 17:26	02/20/2014 17:26	02/20/2014 17:26	02/20/2014 17:26	02/20/2014 17:26	02/20/2014 17:26	02/20/2014 17:27	02/20/2014 17:27	02/20/2014 17:27	02/20/2014 17:27	02/20/2014 17:27	02/20/2014 17:27	02/20/2014 17:27	02/20/2014 17:28	02/20/2014 17:28	02/20/2014 17:29	02/20/2014 17:29	02/20/2014 17:29	02/21/2014 0:45	02/21/2014 0:45	02/21/2014 0:45	02/21/2014 0:46	02/21/2014 0:46	02/21/2014 0:46	75/04/2014/0/20	02/21/2014 0:47	02/21/2014 0:47	02/21/2014 1:29	02/21/2014 2:03	02/21/2014 15:04	02/21/2014 15:04	02/21/2014 15:04	02/21/2014 15:04	02/21/2014 15:04	02/21/2014 15:04	02/21/2014 15:04	02/21/2014 15:05
					535.35	763.66		1					875.18							986.86	1036,86	1036.9			1041.45	1041.48		1	1043.35			995.38	995.18	977,69	977.64	971.26	909.63	20.005	27.168	950.1	1052.1			1013.67			1	7	T	967.89
Tiype	2	2	2	2	7	7	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	. 2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	7	7 0	7	7 0	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Notes																																																		
393	2	0.68	15.83	4,25	52.98	24.7	2.35	2.48	111.87	0.05	35.95	0.24	28.44	17.63	16.13	0.26	59.85	3.73	79.75	5.71	4.03	13.17	1.22	1.22	1,68	5.17	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	0.85	1.22	1.92	1,22	115.94	13.05	8.63	5.35	20.89	66.97	112.6	8.51	18.89	5.9	1.14	4.85	3.42	6.43	56.39	13
BTC.Bros	\$573.00	\$573.00	\$573.00	\$587.00	\$587.00	\$587.00	\$587.00	\$587.00	\$587.00	\$587.00	\$587,00	\$587.00	\$630.00	\$630.00	\$630.00	\$630.00	\$630.00	\$630.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610,00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$610.00	\$577.00	\$577.00	\$577.00	\$577.00	\$577.00	\$577.00	\$563.00	\$575.00	\$485.00	\$485.00	\$485.00	\$485.00	\$485.00	\$485.00	\$485.00	\$500.00
Wirestout																																				3														
USD/from Sales of/BTC	\$997.21	\$339.82	\$7,912.54	\$2,124.23	\$26,486.58	\$12,345.79	\$1,174.00	\$1,237.06	\$55,933.80	\$8.87	\$17,972.22	\$117.45	\$14,215.17	\$8,812,52	\$8,064.00	\$126.00	\$29,921.52	\$1,860.78																									\$9,444.86	\$2,948.30	\$566.32	\$2,425.00	\$1,708.85	\$3,214.26	\$28,192,41	\$6,497.23
USD/Usedifo Rurchase/BIIC									1					12					(\$39,870.07)	(\$2,854.42)	(\$2,011.18)	(\$6,584.55)	(\$610.00)	(\$610.00)	(\$838.69)	(\$2,580.80)	(\$610.00)	(\$610.00)	(\$610.00)	(\$610.00)	(\$423.82)	(\$610.00)	(\$956.48)	(\$610.00)	(\$57,965.82)	(\$6,520.19)	(\$4,314.29)	(\$2,674.78)	(\$10,444.90)	(\$33,480.01)	(\$56,300.00)	(\$4,255.00)								
BITC Sold	-1.74033	-0.59305	-13.809	-3,61879	45.1219	-21.032	-2	-2.10743	-95,2876	-0.01511	-30.6171	-0.20009	-22.5638	-13.9881	-12.8	-0.2	47,4945	-2.95362																									-19.4739	-6.07897	-1.16766	-5	-3.5234	-6.62734	-58.1287	-12,9945
Withdraw Bile Purchase Bile Sold																		A	65.36077499	4.67937293	3.29701593	10.79434			1.37490164	4.23082191		F		-	0.69478	1	1.5679926	1	100.4606941	11.30016176	7.47710656	4.6356691	18.10208678	58.02428172	100	7.4								
Withdraw																									9																					100				
BITC Deposit	Present Charles																									T	1																							-8-
Datetime	02/21/2014 15:05	02/21/2014 15:05	02/21/2014 15:06	02/22/2014 16:26	02/22/2014 16:28	02/22/2014 16:28	02/22/2014 16:28	02/22/2014 16:29	02/22/2014 16:29	02/22/2014 16:29	02/22/2014 16:29	02/22/2014 16:29	02/23/2014 16:32	02/23/2014 16:32	02/23/2014 16:33	02/23/2014 16:33	02/23/2014 16:33	02/23/2014 16:33	02/24/2014 0:08	02/24/2014 0:08	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:09	02/24/2014 0:10	02/24/2014 0:10	02/24/2014 0:10	02/24/2014 0:10	02/24/2014 2:23	02/24/2014 2:23	02/24/2014 2:24	02/24/2014 2:49	02/24/2014 2:50	02/24/2014 2:53	02/24/2014 6:05	02/24/2014 13:36	02/25/2014 3:17	02/25/2014 3:17	02/25/2014 3:18	02/25/2014 3:18	02/25/2014 3:19	02/25/2014 3:20	02/25/2014 3:20	02/25/2014 4:09
70					1	7	1	1	7	1									717.11	721.79	725.09	735.88	736.88	737.88	739.26	743.49	744.49	745.48	746.49	747.49	748.18	749.18	750.75	751.75	852.21	863.51	870.99	875.62	893.72	951.75	1		1039.67	1033.6	1032.43	1027.43	1023.9	1017.28	959.15	946.15
Туре	2	2	2	7	2	7	7	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	7	7	2	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Notes																						Š																												
HEE	9.83	0.01	8.76	2	20.91	8.49	0.25	1.51	-	10	4.42	0.08	10	6.81	20.52	0.64	22.37	18.37	18.56	15.92	20.29	0.07	6.39	23.87	1.35	0.22	13.13	75.96	0.17	0.01	0.01	0.57	66.02	181.03	1.16	5.61	1.16	1.16	11.65	0.27	0.52	1.16	1.16	0.35	10.41	1.16	0.15	0.58	10.24	1.18
BITC Price	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$500.00	\$470.00	\$470.00	\$470.00	\$470.00	\$470.00	\$470.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$520.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$578 DD
Wires Out																																																		
TUSD/from Sales of BITC	\$4,910.50	\$3.15	\$4,377.30	\$2,500.00	\$10,450.56	\$4,240.96	\$125.00	\$751.53	\$500.00	\$5,000.00	\$2,206.40	\$35.50	\$5,000.00	\$3,401.87						The second second	\$10,140,16	\$34.32	\$3,191.62	\$11,932.61	\$672.77	\$109.77	\$6,563.44	\$37,976.42	\$81.22	\$3,18	\$3.65	\$284.52	\$33,006.32	\$90,510.04	\$578.00	\$2,800.87	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$5,821.33	\$134.25	\$256.01	\$578.00	\$578.00	\$174.67	\$5,203.63	\$578.00	\$72.25	\$289.00	\$5,117.05	\$578.00
Purchase/BTG															(\$10,257.97)	(\$317.68)	(\$11,183.53)	(\$9,181.06)	(\$9,278.12)	(\$7,956.63)																														
BITG Sold	-9.821	-0.0063	-8.7546	9	-20.9011	-8.48191	-0.25	-1.50306	7	-10	4.4128	-0.071	-10	-6.80375							-19.5003	-0.066	-6.13773	-22.9473	-1.29378	-0.2111	-12.622	-73.0316	-0.1562	-0.00612	-0.00701	-0.54715	-63.4737	-156.592	7	-4.8458	-1	1.	-10.0715	-0.23226	-0.44292	٦	7	-0.3022	-9.00282	7	-0.125	-0.5	-8.85303	7
BITCIBurchase															21.82547817	0.6759183	23.79474311	19.53418	19.74069	16.92899042																													1	
BTC, Withdraw																																														-				
BITC Deposit		X					100					3																																			3			
Datetime	02/25/2014 4:09	02/25/2014 4:09	02/25/2014 4:09	02/25/2014 4:09	02/25/2014 4:10	02/25/2014 4:10	02/25/2014 4:10	02/25/2014 4:10	02/25/2014 4:10	02/25/2014 4:10	02/25/2014 4:11	02/25/2014 4:11	02/25/2014 4:11	02/25/2014 4:11	02/25/2014 4:33	02/25/2014 4:40	02/25/2014 4:53	02/25/2014 4:53	02/25/2014 4:53	02/25/2014 4:53	02/25/2014 15:08	02/25/2014 15:08	02/25/2014 15:08	02/25/2014 15:12	02/25/2014 15:15	02/25/2014 15:15	02/25/2014 15:15	02/25/2014 15:16	02/25/2014 15:16	02/25/2014 15:16	02/25/2014 15:17	02/25/2014 15:17	02/25/2014 15:44	02/26/2014 16:04	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05	02/26/2014 16:05
Dally. Balarice	936.33	936.33	927.57	922.57	901.67	893.19	892.94	891.44	890.44	880.44	876.02	875.95	865.95	859.15	880.97	881.65	905.45	954.98	944.72	961.65	942.15		4		911.7	911.49	ŝ						761.65		604.06		598.21	597.21	587.14	586.91	586.46	585.46		584.16			574.03			563.68

2.26 0.12 224.69 72.8 6.48 8.84 34.18 4.02 118.86 61.57 0.11 70.94 6.73 2.54 1.73 2.71 0.02 2.69 2.69 2.69 \$562.00 \$562.00 \$685.00 \$685.00 \$685.00 \$685.00 \$655.0 \$655.00 \$655.00 \$671.00 \$671.00 \$663.00 \$663.00 \$663.00 \$663.00 \$663.00 \$663.00 \$663.00 \$663.00 \$671.00 \$671.00 \$671.00 \$671.00 \$671.00 \$671.00 \$671.00 Wires Out #USD/from Sales of BirG \$48.15 \$1,126.75 \$118,000,00 \$36,385,30 \$3,238,52 \$4,415,47 \$1,486,85 \$12,377,40 \$6,850,00 \$3,726,45 \$1,847.73 \$53.68 \$6,108.30 \$23,829,45 \$35,468.88 \$3,361.46 \$1,268.30 \$862.75 \$6,730.55 \$1,350.58 \$5,355.00 \$770.17 \$1,342.00 (\$112,343.80) (\$327.17) (\$32.75) (\$3,990.10) (\$5,580.37) (\$16,313.89) (\$655.00) (\$655.00) (\$32.75) (\$39.96) (\$6.661.35) (\$33.86) (\$32.420.75) (\$314.40) (\$319.96) (\$1.317.18) (\$17,089.07) (\$2,005.83) (\$59,429.95) (\$30,784.73) (\$51,64) (\$320.40)IUSD/Used/to -53.1318 -4.72777 -6.44594 -2.18518 -18.0692 -5.44008 -2.7537 -0.08 -1.28577 -10.0306 -2.01293 -0.01022 -1.1478 -2. -200 -1.89017 -35,5133 -5.00962 8.51964185 199.9 0.0516892 49.49733426 0.48 0.061 2.01096604 6.0917556 BITC Purchase 3.02539 46.43247982 0.05 10.17 0.48940985 0.061 0.061 25.77536532 0.4995 Withdraw BTC Deposit 02/26/2014 16:05 02/26/2014 16:05 02/28/2014 14:37 02/28/2014 20:30 03/03/2014 18:38 03/03/2014 18:38 03/03/2014 18:38 03/03/2014 18:38 03/03/2014 18:38 03/03/2014 18:38 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:01 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 20:00 03/03/2014 22:42 03/03/2014 22:42 03/03/2014 22:59 03/03/2014 23:20 03/03/2014 23:20 03/03/2014 23:20 03/03/2014 23:20 03/03/2014 23:20 03/03/2014 23:20 03/03/2014 23:21 03/03/2014 23:21 03/03/2014 20:01 497.34 495.16 477.09 467.09 462.14 462.14 507.06 557.46 557.46 550.01 560.01 560.51 560.56 560.61 560.61 560.61 563.78 56 563.6 561.65 561.75 761.65 561.65 495.63 495.83 497.63 497.68 507.91 719.55 719.62 631.25 626.24 624.35 503.79 623.07 613.04 611.02 611.01

Nickse	MOICE																																																	
den	0.24	3.06	0.04	0.41	2.78	0.98	27.89	20.43	1.25	304.32	44.3	14.30	13.87	36.4	12.54	đ	181.22	2.58	1.44	4.22	2.99	2.99	41.3	79.41	4.99	0.48	0.48	14.81	11.84	4.02	103.34	214.5	78.94	0.88	0.81	1.12	0.77	2,19	5.5	1.08	9.98	2.47	0.05	0.1	0.04	17.57	2.59	141.53	4.93	6.39
BATE DHAS	10	\$671.00	\$671.00	\$671.00	\$671.00	\$671.00	\$671.00	\$671.00	\$671.00	\$671.00	\$663.00	\$863.00	\$663.00	\$663.00	\$663.00	\$663.00	\$663.00	\$668.00	.\$668.00	\$675,00	\$675.00	\$675,00	\$675.00	\$675.00	\$675.00	\$655.00	\$655.00	\$655.00	\$655.00	\$655.00	\$655.00	\$650.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$620.00	\$635.00	\$635.00	\$635.00
Wires	The contract of																																															7		
USD/from Sales	\$115.26	\$1,529.43	\$17.83	\$201.30	\$1,387.25	\$489.30	\$13,941.56	\$10,212.32	\$624.03	\$152,159,72										\$2,105.40	\$1,494.62	\$1,494.02	\$20,647.22	\$39,701.77	\$2,492.26								\$39,467.39	\$438.56	\$403.62	\$555.44	\$383.08	\$1,094.20	\$2,748.36	\$539.39	\$4,988.22	\$1,233.80	\$6.20	\$49.60	\$18.60	\$8,783.29	\$1,290.24	\$70,764.83	\$2,462.97	\$3,194.05
USD/Used to Rurchase BTC										77-12	(\$22.147.23)	(\$7.190.85)	(\$6.931.66)	(\$18,197,78)	(\$6,265.18)	(\$4,497.19)	(\$90,608.89)	(\$1,286.99)	(\$717.01)							(\$235.04)	(\$235.71)	(\$7,401.87)	(\$5,917.62)	(\$2,007.28)	(\$51,667.48)	(\$107,250.00)																		
_	-	-2.27933	-0.02657	-0.3	-2.06744	-0.72921	-20.7773	-15.2196	-0.93	-226.766										-3.11911	-2.21425	-2.21336	-30.5885	-58.8174	-3.69224								-63.6571	-0.70736	-0.65101	-0.89587	-0.61787	-1.76484	4.43284	-0.86998	-8.04551	-1.89	-0.01	-0.08	-0.03	-14.1666	-2.08104	-111.441	-3.87869	-5.03
BITC: Purchase BITC Sold											33.40457579	10.84593327	10.455	27.44763	9.44973704	6.783085	136.6649935	1.92662528	1.07337472							0.35883304	0.35987	11,30056	9.034538	3.0645445	78.88165446	165										A							10.00	
Withdraw		-																															75																	
BITC Deposit								1.0		1												5.																												
Datetime	03/03/2014 23:21	03/03/2014 23:21	03/03/2014 23:21	03/03/2014 23:21	03/03/2014 23:22	03/03/2014 23:22	03/03/2014 23:22	03/03/2014 23:23	03/03/2014 23:23	03/03/2014 23:24	03/04/2014 6:54	03/04/2014 6:55	03/04/2014 6:55	03/04/2014 6:55	03/04/2014 6:59	03/04/2014 6:59	03/04/2014 19:43	03/04/2014 21:00	03/04/2014 21:03	03/06/2014 3:08	03/06/2014 3:09	03/06/2014 3:11	03/06/2014 3:22	03/06/2014 3:38	03/06/2014 3:39	03/06/2014 14:08	03/06/2014 14:08	03/06/2014 14:08	03/06/2014 14:08	03/06/2014 14:08	03/06/2014 14:21	03/07/2014 8:43	03/07/2014 18:45	03/07/2014 18:47	03/07/2014 18:47	03/07/2014 18:48	03/07/2014 18:48	03/07/2014 18:48	03/07/2014 18:48	03/07/2014 18:48	03/07/2014 18:52	03/07/2014 18:52	03/07/2014 18:52	03/07/2014 18:52	03/07/2014 18:52	03/07/2014 18:54	03/07/2014 18:57	03/07/2014 20:06	03/07/2014 20:06	03/07/2014 20:06
Dally, Balance	69.009	598.41	598.39	598.09	596.02	595.29	574.51	559.29	558.36	331.6	365	375.85	386.3	413.75	423.2				569.65	566.53	564.32	562.1	531.51	472.7						2			1	1	1			1		7		T				8	1	1	1	516.65
Туре	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	7 0	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

82.08 42.56 38.4 87.61 68.18

\$628.00 \$617.00 \$617.00 \$600.00 \$600.00 \$683.00 \$583.00 \$583.00 \$583.00 \$583.00 \$583.00 \$583.00

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\$292.08 \$583.00 \$1,890.27 \$2,893.52 \$701.81 \$354.00

-151.772 -3.20384 -4.80426 -1.18951

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501.78 500.78 349 345.8 340.9 339.71

03/21/2014 6:40

\$2,764.48

-0.501

Wires/Out \$6,731.00 \$348.40 \$1,250.11 \$278.40 \$10,096.50 \$2,520.28 \$1,232.68 \$1,232.68 \$1,332.68 \$1,341.15 \$1,917.51 \$34,085.01 \$3,152.63 \$10,134.29 \$292.08 \$332.31 \$292.08 \$1,749.00 \$2,267.87 \$292.08 \$291.50 \$291.50 \$291.50 \$292.08 \$1,797.49 \$23,246.03 \$292.08 \$23,2466.79 \$292.08 \$2,346.10 \$83,200.00 NUSD FROM S. (\$20,665.37) (\$21,644.93) (\$41,038.83) (\$21,278.17) (\$19,197.83) (\$43,802.17) (\$41,523.59) Purchase/BIII@ -0.54866 -1.96868 -0.43843 -15.9 -10.237 -3.86894 -4.08387 -21.84 -5.10417 -3.89 -0.501 -0.501 -0.501 -0.36 -3.08318 -3.9.8731 -0.501 -5.94646 -58.4649 -5.4076 -17.383 -0.501 -0.57 -130 -96,2642 BTC Sold -3.73583 66.51350228 34.48649772 31.99638736 73.00361264 0.88347809 34,52141515 BTC Rurchase 33.93327918 Withdraw B.T.C. Deposit

03/07/2014 20:09 03/07/2014 20:09 03/08/2014 16:02 03/08/2014 16:04 03/11/2014 21:18 03/11/2014 19:38 03/17/2014 18:45

540

476.96 472.99 471.05 466.97

445.13 440.02 437 505.19 506.07

03/18/2014 4:46

508.48 543 446.74 443 509.52

41.34 166.4 123.5 43.29 120.91

\$609.00 \$640.00 \$627.00 \$628.00

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13.47 0.7 0.7 2.51 13.01 5.05 5.19 5.19 5.49 6.49 83.05 1.08

\$635.00 \$635.00 \$635.00 \$635.00 \$635.00 \$635.00 \$635.00 \$635.00 \$635.00

Appendix B
CARL M FORCE BitStamp Account Analysis

03/18/2014 4:46
03/20/2014 2:29
03/21/2014 6:30
03/21/2014 6:31
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544 576 580.54 580.54 580.77 565.18 568.18 568.28 558.28 5

North	-																																																	
100	224.33	271.76	61.09	1.63	4.07	4.68	2.27	55.76	38.1	3.9	48.5	371	18 12	1.17	118.53	232.56	336	16.12	96.49	149.14	7.55	185.33	27.57	0.27	0.18	0.15	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.02	0.29	4.95	0.29	0.28	0.29	8.42	0.29	0.29	0.45	0.03	0.02	62.5	8.89	20.29	73.2	24.52	3.94	108.79	2.83	1.76
BITC Price	\$580.00	\$572.00	\$572.00	\$572.00	\$572.00	\$572.00	\$565.00	\$565.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$570.00	\$560.00	\$563.00	\$563.00	\$570.00	\$570.00	\$570.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580,00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$580,00	\$580.00	\$580,00	\$580.00	\$580.00	\$590.00	\$590,00	\$590.00	\$575.00	\$575.00	\$575.00	\$575,00
Wires Out																																																		
USD from Sales of BITC	\$112,160.41								\$19,048.65	\$1.948.13	\$24,249.52	\$1,850.27	\$9,057,86	\$584.35	\$59,261.22			\$8,058.55	\$48,241.45	\$74,565.55	\$3,771.31	\$92,663.14																						\$10,142.59	\$36,598.66	\$12,258.76				
WSD Wsedito Purchase BITC		(\$135,878.09)	(\$30,542.43)	(\$811.16)	(\$2,032.53)	(\$2,337.79)	(\$1,133.25)	(\$27,878.21)							T. S. S. S. S.	(\$116,280.00)	(\$168,000.00)			F			(\$13,782.62)	(\$133.40)	(\$88.38)	(\$73.08)	(\$145.00)	(\$145.00)	(\$145.00)	(\$7.97)	(\$145.00)	(\$2,471.09)	(\$145.00)	(\$145.00)	(\$145.00)	(\$4,206.96)	(\$145.00)	(\$145.00)	(\$223.41)	(\$10.33)	(\$6.96)	(\$31,247.87)	(\$4,442.92)				(\$1,965.86)	(\$54,392,40)	(\$1,413.25)	(\$878.39)
BITC, Sold	-190.102								-32.8425	-3.35884	-41,8095	-3.19011	-15.617	-1.0075	-102.175			-14.3136	-85,6864	-130.817	-6.61633	-162.567																					1	-17,1908	-62.0316	-20.7776				
BirciPurchase		237.5456084	53,39585233	1.41811985	3.55337884	4.08704255	2.00575307	49.34196407							1	204	300						23.76314511	0.23	0.15238594	0.12599994	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.01373667	0.25	4.2605	0.25	0.25	0.25	7.25337424	0.25	0.25	0.3851923	0.01781793	0.012	53.87564199	7.66020588			*	3.41905509	94,59548607	2,45782832	1.52763052
Milhdraw																																1																		
BITC Deposit																																																		
Datetime	03/21/2014 6:44	03/21/2014 11:00	03/21/2014 11:00	03/21/2014 11:00	03/21/2014 11:00	03/21/2014 11:00	03/21/2014 11:57	03/21/2014 11:57	03/21/2014 12:17	03/21/2014 12:17	03/21/2014 12:17	03/21/2014 12:18	03/21/2014 12:18	03/21/2014 12:18	03/21/2014 12:20	03/21/2014 20:28	03/22/2014 9:35	03/22/2014 17:05	03/22/2014 20:49	03/22/2014 22:07	03/22/2014 22:08	03/24/2014 17:54	03/24/2014 21:47	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:48	03/24/2014 21:49	03/24/2014 21:49	03/24/2014 21:49	03/24/2014 21:49	03/24/2014 21:49	03/24/2014 21:49	03/24/2014 21:49	03/24/2014 21:49	03/24/2014 21:50	03/24/2014 21:50	03/24/2014 22:37	03/24/2014 22:38	03/24/2014 22:39	03/25/2014 15:37	03/25/2014 15:38	03/25/2014 15:38	03/25/2014 15:38
Balance	149	386.55	439.95		444.92	٦				464.15	422.34		403.53	402.53						573.53			428.11	428.34		W.												1					504.35	487.16	425.13	404.35	407.77	502.37		506.35
Tiype	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Balance	Datetime	BITC Deposit	Withdraw	Withdraw, BitC/Rurchase BitC/Sold	BITC Sold	Purchase BTC	Of BITC	Wires/Out	-1	EEE	Notes
504.85	03/26/2014 17:24				0.48084		\$821.80		\$587.00	1.65	
504.58	03/26/2014 17:45				-0.00		\$117.40		\$587.00	0.24	
504.46	03/26/2014 17:46				-0.11871		\$69.68		\$587.00	0.14	
504.18	03/26/2014 17:47				-0.2862		\$168.00		\$587.00	0.34	
502.37	03/26/2014 17:48				-1.805		\$1,059.54		\$587.00	2.12	
62.200	03/26/2014 17:53				-0.08239		\$48.36		\$587.00	0.1	
489 36	03/26/2014 17-50				-12.4002		47,317.07		\$587.00	14.04	
489.16	03/26/2014 17:59				-0.2		\$117.40		\$587.00	0.00	
487.54	03/26/2014 17:59				-1,619		\$950.35		\$587.00	191	
486.86	03/26/2014 18:00				-0.67551		\$396,52		\$587.00	0.8	
486.53	03/26/2014 19:04				-0.33713		\$197.89		\$587.00	0.4	
486.47	03/27/2014 14:48				-0.06		\$30.90		\$515.00	20.0	
486.4	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.07		\$36.05		\$515.00	0.08	
486.33	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.07		\$36.05		\$515.00	0.08	
486.25	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.08		\$41.20		\$515.00	0.09	
486.17	03/27/2014 14:49			1	-0.08		\$41.20		\$515.00	60.0	
486.09	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.08		\$41.20		\$515.00	60.0	
486.01	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.08		\$41.20		\$515.00	60.0	
485.92	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.09		\$46.35		\$515.00	0.1	
485.83	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.09		\$46.35		\$515.00	0.1	
485.73	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.1		\$51.50		\$515.00	0.11	
485.63	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.1		\$51.50		\$515.00	0.11	
485.42	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.20878		\$107.52		\$515.00	0.22	
484.72	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.7		\$360.50		\$515.00	0.73	
484.65	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.07		\$36.05		\$515.00	0.08	
484.58	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.07		\$36.05		\$515.00	0.08	
484.49	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.09		\$46.35		\$515.00	0.1	
484.39	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.1		\$51.50		\$515.00	0.11	
484.28	03/27/2014 14:49				-0.1		\$51.50		\$515.00	0.11	
483.29	03/27/2014 14:50				-1,0002		\$515.10		\$515.00	1.04	
483.22	03/27/2014 14:50				-0.06841		\$35.23		\$515.00	0.08	
482.24	03/27/2014 14:50				-0.9743		\$501.78		\$515.00	1.01	
474.57	03/27/2014 14:52				-7.67574		\$3,953.01		\$515.00	7.91	
463.8	03/27/2014 14:52	A A			-10.7691		\$5,546.09		\$515.00	11.1	
460.33	03/27/2014 14:52				-3.47101		\$1,787.57		\$515.00	3.58	
451.32	03/27/2014 14:53				-9.00764		\$4,638.93		\$515.00	9.28	
450.4	03/27/2014 14:53				-0.92208		\$474.87		\$515,00	0.95	
450.3	03/27/2014 14:53				-0.1		\$51.50		\$515.00	0.11	
443.05	03/27/2014 14:53				-7.24786		\$3,732.65		\$515.00	7.47	
442.95	03/27/2014 14:53				-0.1		\$51.50		\$515.00	0.11	
386.53	03/27/2014 14:54				-56.4249		\$29,058.81		\$515.00	58.12	
377.74	03/27/2014 15:09				-8.79		\$4,623.54		\$526.00	9.25	
286.53	03/27/2014 15:12				-91.21		\$47,976.46		\$526.00	95.96	
388,53	03/27/2014 15:37			102	h,	(\$52,632.00)			\$516.00	105.27	
490.53	03/27/2014 23:02		f 	102	_	(\$51,510.00)			\$505.00	103.02	
490.45	03/27/2014 23:59				-0.08086		\$38.41		\$475.00	0.08	
490.08	03/27/2014 23:59				-0.36909		\$175.32		\$475.00	0.36	
										-	

Appendix B
Appendix B
ARI M FORCE BitStamp Account Analy

Notes					8																													- 0000																
	0.03	6.85	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.05	9.34	0.18	0.24	0.29	000	10	808	0.7	0.95	0.95	4 22	96 0	53.9	241	10.05	9 28	0.42	232	37.97	4 63	29 11	46.41	3.82	22	20.85	0.48	3.27	0.79	3,16	5.98	7.08	58.77	7.58	4.84	0.03	11.25	84	6.95	82.96	3.28	1.82	95.0	12.42	0.28
1																			L								1											Ĭ				Ì								
BTC:Price	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$464 00	\$464.00	\$464.00	\$464.00	\$464.00	\$464.00	\$464.00	\$440.00	\$440.00	\$440.00	\$440.00	\$440.00	\$440.00	\$452.00	\$452.00	\$452.00	\$452.00	\$452.00	\$452.00	\$452.00	\$452.00	\$452.00	\$470.00	\$455.00	\$455.00	\$455.00	\$455.00	\$455.00	\$459.50	\$459.50
Wiresiout				44																																												1	7	1
USD from Sales of BITC	\$13.56	\$3,423.39	\$62.66	\$59.84	\$76.10	\$23.75	\$4,667.00	\$86.83	\$119.94	\$142.50	\$446.08	\$950.00	\$4 035 37	\$348.92	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$2,109.26	\$475.10	\$26,600,00	\$1,201.65														\$393.29	\$1,577.48	\$2,986.26	\$3,538.10	\$29,384.52	\$3,788.08	\$2,417.61	\$11.40	\$5,623.26	\$47,000.00						\$6,206.11	\$137.85
Purchase Bric											100				25						(\$5.475.41)	(\$4,640.00)	(\$207.73)	(\$1,160,00)	(\$18,980.30)	(\$2,313.09)	(\$14,551.47)	(\$23,202.35)	(\$1,908.10)	(\$11,000.00)	(\$10,420.03)	(\$237.60)	(\$1,631.93)											(\$3,470.42)	(\$41,479.86)	(\$1,638.00)	(\$910.00)	(\$276.72)		
	_	-7.20714	-0.13191	-0.12598	-0.16022	-0.05	-9.82526	-0.1828	-0.2525	-0.3	-0.93912	-2	-8.49552	-0.73457	7	-	4.44055	-1.0002	-56	-2.52979	0													-0.87011	-3.49	-6.60677	-7.82765	-65.01	-8.38071	-5.34869	-0.02522	-12.4408	-100						-13.5062	-0.3
Withdraw BRC Rurchase BTC Sold																					11.80045309	10	0.4477	2.5	40.90581	4.9851	31,36093691	52.73261336	4.33658305	25	23,68187695	0.54	3.70892664	The second										7.62728845	91.16453641	3,6	2	0.60817514		
Withdraw										1									1 1 1 1 1	I L																														
BITCIDeposit																		100											P.																					
Datetime	03/27/2014 23:59	03/27/2014 23:59	03/27/2014 23:59	03/27/2014 23:59	03/27/2014 23:59	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/28/2014 0:00	03/30/2014 12:46	03/30/2014 12:46	03/30/2014 12:46	03/30/2014 12:46	03/30/2014 12:47	03/30/2014 12:47	03/30/2014 12:48	03/30/2014 16:23	03/30/2014 16:24	03/30/2014 16:25	03/30/2014 16:25	03/30/2014 16:25	03/30/2014 16:25	03/30/2014 17:08	03/30/2014 17:08	03/30/2014 17:08	03/30/2014 17:20	03/30/2014 17:22	03/30/2014 17:23	03/30/2014 17:23	03/30/2014 17:23	03/30/2014 17:24	04/01/2014 6:40	04/02/2014 14:55	04/02/2014 14:55	04/02/2014 14:55	04/02/2014 14:55	04/02/2014 14:55	04/05/2014 23:18	04/05/2014 23:19
Dally			479.56			479.23	469.4	469.22	468.97	468.67	467.73	465.73	457.23	456.5	455.5	454.5	450.06	449.06	393.06	380.53	402.33				456.18	461.17			549.6								1	u			504.97	492.53	392.53						\neg	483.72
Type	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Notes																						1							100		×												Į,	100						
N																																																		
1111	0.56	2.3	0.25	3.14	49.63	4.13	0.1	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.18	44.19	0.23	4.89	0.23	0.1	0.33	0.23	0.3	18.38	0.05	0.05	29.95	20.81	5.32	0.24	1.4	0.05	0.05	1.98	9.14	2.48	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.99	0.76	111.44	4.58	5.96	13.07	25.49	12.9	12.85	0.08	6.44	23.2
BATC PAGe	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459,50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$458.50	\$459,50	\$459.50	\$459.50	\$459,50	\$459,50	\$459.50	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446,00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$446.00	\$429.00	\$429.00	\$429.00	\$429.00	\$429.00	\$429.00
Wires out																																1		17																
USD/from Sales of BTC.	\$275.70	\$1,148.75	\$124.06	\$1,568.39	\$24,813.00	\$2,064.76	\$45.95	\$114.88	\$114.88	\$114.88	\$91.90	\$22,094.39	\$114.88	\$2,343,45	\$114.88	\$45.85	\$160.82	\$114.88	\$147.04	\$9,190,00	\$22.53	\$22.98	\$14,973.78	Į,						1																				
USD Wsed to												1												(\$10,400.77)	(\$2,659.68)	(\$117.82)	(\$699.77)	(\$22.30)	(\$22.30)	(\$986.62)	(\$4,567.17)	(\$1,237.65)	(\$17.84)	(\$17.84)	(\$22.30)	(\$22,30)	(\$22.30)	(\$2.23)	(\$483.34)	(\$375.09)	(\$55,717.79)	(\$2,288.35)	(\$2,975.73)	(\$6,530.80)	(\$12,741.19)	(\$6,449.29)	(\$6,424.28)	(\$39.47)	(\$3,217.50)	(\$11,597.48)
-	9.0-	-2.5	-0.27	-3.41326	-54	4.48348	-0.1	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	-0.2	48.0836	-0.25	-5.1	-0.25	-0.1	-0.35	-0.25	-0.32	-20	-0.04903	-0.05	-32,5871							10.																				
BITG Ruchase BITC Sold																								23,32011113	5.9634107	0.26417274	1,569	90.05	90.0	2.21215	10.24029149	2.775	0.04	0.04	90'0	90'0	0.05	0.005	1.10615	0.841	124.9277773	5.13083658	6.67204343	14.64305666	29.69973285	15.03332	14.975	0.092	7.5	27.03374474
Withdraw			-																	1							11																				1			
BTC Deposit																																																		
	04/05/2014 23:19	04/05/2014 23:19	04/05/2014 23:19	04/05/2014 23:25	04/05/2014 23:25	04/05/2014 23:25	04/05/2014 23:26	04/05/2014 23:26	04/05/2014 23:26	04/05/2014 23:26	04/05/2014 23:26	04/05/2014 23:26	04/05/2014 23:26	04/05/2014 23:26	04/05/2014 23:27	04/05/2014 23:27	04/05/2014 23:27	04/05/2014 23:27	04/05/2014 23:27	04/05/2014 23:28	04/05/2014 23:28	04/05/2014 23:28	04/05/2014 23:28	04/07/2014 15:33	04/07/2014 16:41	04/07/2014 16:42	04/07/2014 16:42	04/07/2014 16:43	04/07/2014 16:43	04/07/2014 16:43	04/07/2014 16:43	04/07/2014 16:44	04/07/2014 16:44	04/07/2014 16:44	04/07/2014 16:44	04/07/2014 16:44	04/07/2014 16:44	04/07/2014 16:49	04/07/2014 16:51	04/07/2014 16:53	04/07/2014 16:56	04/07/2014 16:56	04/07/2014 16:56	04/09/2014 12:14	04/10/2014 3:22	04/10/2014 3:22	04/10/2014 3:22	04/10/2014 3:22	04/10/2014 3:22	04/10/2014 3:23
Balance											417.39	369.31		363.96				363.01		342.89		342.59	310		339.29					343.43			356.49				356.68					488.69	495.36	510	539.7	554.74	569.71	569.8	577.3	604.34
Туре	. 7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Notes																									1																									
986	0.7	8.46	78.4	51.13	11.44	0.13	0.37	13.15	2.28	0.7	1,14	1.51	0.33	16.74	50.4	3.5	38.55	2.97	6.65	0.01	2.81	15.96	66.22	81.39	3.18	0.01	0.01	0.01	81.72	1.09	27.58	2.74	2.94	0.16	15.3	4.23	10.68	0.45	7.34	0.67	5.22	10.56	40.48	120.16	25.2	8.63	58.8	6.31	76.35	4.34
BITC.Price	\$429.00	\$429.00	\$392.00	\$381.00	\$381.00	\$381.00	\$381.00	\$381.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$350.00	\$369.00	\$369.00	\$430.00	\$430.00	\$430.00	\$430.00	\$430.00	\$430.00	\$439.00	\$439.00	\$439,00	\$439.00	\$439.00	\$439.00	\$439.00	\$439.00	\$439.00	\$439.00	\$439,00	\$439.00	\$420.00	\$420.00	\$420.00	\$420.00	\$420.00	\$420,00	\$434.00	\$434.00
Wires Out																																												18						
OFBIC			\$39,200.00																				\$33,105.77	\$40,694.23	\$1,587.20	\$3.67	\$3.67	\$3.67	\$40,857.34	\$544.45	\$13,789.58	\$1,367.08	\$1,466.44	\$76.47	\$7,645.26	\$2,110.61	\$5,338.26	\$221.04	\$3,667.22	\$333,49	\$2,607.66	\$5,276.88							\$38,174.54	\$2,170,00
Purchaselenc	(\$347.49)	(\$4,228.31)		(\$25,564.94)	(\$5,718.81)	(\$60.71)	(\$181.36)	(\$6,574.18)	(\$1,136.83)	(\$350.00)	(\$566.31)	(\$754.97)	(\$164.35)	(\$8,367.66)	(\$25,200.00)	(\$1,750.00)	(\$19,271,00)	(\$1,480.50)	(\$3,325.00)	(\$4.20)	(\$1,403.52)	(\$7,975.66)																				THE RESERVE THE PARTY OF THE PA	(\$20,236.10)	(\$60,077.01)	(\$12,600.00)	(\$4,314.94)	(\$29,400.00)	(\$3,151.95)		
			-100														14						-89.7175	-110,282	-3.69116	-0.00854	-0.00854	-0.00854	-95.0171	-1,26616	-31,4114	-3.11409	-3.34041	-0.1742	-17.4152	-4.80777	-12.16	-0.50351	-8.35358	-0.75966	-5.94	-12.0202			Ì	Ī		GI (5, 5, 5)	-87.9598	ç
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Balance	605.15	615	515		1	1	2		618.25	619.25	620.87	623.03	623.5	647.4	719.4	724.4	779.46	783.69	793.19	793.21	797.22	820	730.29	620			1	616.29	521.27	520	488.59	485.48	482.14	481.96	464.55	429.74	447.58	447.08	438.72	437.96	432.02				641.23	-			641.04	636.04
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Appendix B

Notes														Patno's BTC												¥																								
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BTCBrice	\$434.00	\$434.00	\$434.00	\$434.00	\$434.00	\$434.00	\$434.00	\$434.00	\$434.00	\$434.00	\$475.00	4	\$490.00	÷	\$484.00	\$484.00	\$484.00	\$484.00	\$484.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$475.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$465.00	\$450.00	\$450.00	\$450.00	\$450.00	\$450.00
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USD from Sales of BITC.	\$13,832.19	\$86.80	\$493.53	\$6,010.97	\$5,753.20	\$2,120.34	\$4,802.00	\$86.80	\$2,226.42	\$54,443.20	\$47,500.00																																							
USD/Used/to Rurchase/BTG											112	-8	(\$49,000.00)		(\$13,694.95)	(\$4,147.34)	(\$9,292,44)	(\$3,430.63)	(\$17,834.64)	(\$1,752.06)	(\$10,846.32)	(\$5,081.74)	(\$2,031.49)	(\$4.75)	(\$5,084,24)	(\$22,659.03)	(\$40.38)	(\$9,836.31)	(\$4,650.00)	(\$2,325.00)	(\$1,390.82)	(\$47.24)	(\$5,580.93)	(\$1,896.14)	(\$37.20)	(\$1,107.48)	(\$4,325.79)	(\$1,566.05)	(\$4,552.35)	(\$1,195.90)	(\$93.00)	(\$47.40)	(\$2,232.00)	(\$4,650.00)	(\$1,896.40)	(\$15,405.98)	(\$22,500.00)	(\$39.60)	(\$5,254.42)	(\$1,800,00)
_	-31.8714	-0.2	-1.13717	-13.8502	-13.2562	4.88558	-11.0645	-0.2	-5.13001	-125.445	-100																										0 =													
MATHATIAN BITC Purchase BITC Sold													100	0	28.29535967	8.56889	19.19926	7.08807	36.84842033	3.68853733	22.83435055	10.69839175	4.27682414	10.01	10.70367265	47.70322358	0.085	21.15334622	10	5	2,991	0.101582	12,002	4.07771979	0.08	2.38168	9.30276478	3.36785622	67.6	2.57183	0.2	0.101938	4.8	10	4.07828299	34.2355074	20	0.088	11.6764926	4
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Balance	604.17	603.97	602.84	588.99	575.73	570.84	559.78	559.58	554.45	429	Ţ			1	580.3	588.87	/08.0/	715.15	752	755.69	778.53	789.22	793.5	793.51	804.21	851.92	852	873.16	883.16	888.16	891.15	891.25	903.25	907.33	907.41	82.606	919.09	922.46	932,25	934.82	935.02	935.12	939.92	949.92	954	988.24		8		1054
Type	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	- 0	7	7	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Appendix B
Appendix B
ARI M FORCE Rifstamp Account Analysi


SA-224


13.3 10.82 27.23 27.23 2.16 0.24 5.74 5.74 0.18 0.28 \$445.00 \$445.00 \$445.00 \$462.00 \$462.00 \$428.00 \$428.00 \$428.00 \$428.00 \$428.00 \$428.00 \$428.00 \$428.00 \$428.00 (\$200,899.59) \$6,484,584.87 (\$518,109.74) WiresiOut \$75,076.58 \$3,710.49 \$171.29 \$111.29 \$1,079.19 \$1,079.19 \$1,079.19 \$1,000 \$1,000 \$1,155.60 \$1,15 USDIUSEGITO (\$32.443.00) (\$6.549.41) (\$6.549.41) (\$9,644,732.95) BITC/Furchase BITC Sold -29,4652 -10719,1 72.9056128 14.94249634 12.15189086 14495,66193 2775.380513 -1289.499 BTIC BTC Deposit 04/28/2014 4:33 04/28/2014 4:33 04/28/2014 4:33 04/28/2014 4:34 04/28/2014 4:35 04/28/2014 4:35 04/28/2014 4:35 04/28/2014 4:35 04/28/2014 13:12 04/25/2014 11:14 04/25/2014 11:14 04/25/2014 11:14 04/25/2014 20:12 04/25/2014 20:13 1154 1124.54 862.03 954 951.22 950.95 944.25 944.05 943.75 940.85 867.09 1126.91 863.19 433

Appendix B CARL M FORCE BitStamp Account Analysis


Ending Balance


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U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney Southern District of New York

The Silvio J. Mollo Building One Saint Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007

October 2, 2014

BY HAND Sam Braverman, Esq. 225 Broadway, Suite 715 New York, NY 10007

Re: United States v. Andrew Michael Jones, 13 Cr. 950 (TPG)

Dear Mr. Braverman:

On the understandings specified below, the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York ("this Office") will accept a guilty plea from Andrew Michael Jones to a superseding information charging him in four counts (the "Information").

Count One charges Jones with a violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846, in connection with his participation in a narcotics trafficking conspiracy as a site administrator on the Silk Road website from October 2012 to October 2013. This charge carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment, a maximum term of lifetime supervised release, a minimum term of supervised release of five years, a maximum fine of \$10 million, and a mandatory \$100 special assessment.

Count Two charges Jones with a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030(b), in connection with his participation in a conspiracy to commit and aid and abet computer hacking as a site administrator on the Silk Road website from October 2012 to October 2013. This charge carries a maximum sentence of 5 years' imprisonment, a maximum term of 3 years' supervised release, a maximum fine, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code § 3571 of the greatest of \$250,000, twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, or twice the gross pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant as a result of the offense, and a mandatory \$100 special assessment.

Count Three charges Jones with a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028(f), in connection with his participation in a conspiracy to traffic in fraudulent identification documents as a site administrator on the Silk Road website from October 2012 to October 2013. This charge carries a maximum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment, a maximum term of 3 years' supervised release, a maximum fine, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code § 3571 of the greatest of \$250,000, twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, or twice the gross pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant as a result of the offense, and a mandatory \$100 special assessment.

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Count Four charges Jones with a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h), in connection with his participation in a money laundering conspiracy as a site administrator on the Silk Road website from October 2012 to October 2013. This charge carries a maximum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, a maximum term of 3 years' supervised release, a maximum fine, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956 and 3571, of not more than \$500,000, or twice the value of the property involved in the offense, whichever is greater, and a mandatory \$100 special assessment.

The total maximum sentence of incarceration on all counts is life imprisonment.

It is further understood that prior to the date of sentencing Jones shall file accurate amended tax returns for the years 2012 and 2013, and will pay, or will enter into an agreement to pay, past taxes due and owing by him to the Internal Revenue Service, including applicable penalties, if any, on such terms and conditions as will be agreed upon between him and the Internal Revenue Service.

The defendant furthermore admits the forfeiture allegations with respect to Counts One through Four of the Information and agrees to forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853, any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the Jones obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the offense and any property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, the offense charged in Count One, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 982(a)(2)(B), any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the offenses charged in Counts Two and Three, and, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1), any property, real or personal, involved in the offense charged in Count Four, or any property traceable to such property. It is further understood that any forfeiture of Jones' assets shall not be treated as satisfaction of any fine, restitution, cost of imprisonment, or any other penalty the Court may impose upon him in addition to forfeiture.

It is understood that Jones (a) shall truthfully and completely disclose all information with respect to the activities of himself and others concerning all matters about which this Office inquires of him, which information can be used for any purpose; (b) shall cooperate fully with this Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and any other law enforcement agency designated by this Office; (c) shall attend all meetings at which this Office requests his presence; (d) shall provide to this Office, upon request, any document, record, or other tangible evidence relating to matters about which this Office or any designated law enforcement agency inquires of him; (e) shall truthfully testify before the grand jury and at any trial and other court proceeding with respect to any matters about which this Office may request his testimony; (f) shall bring to this Office's attention all crimes which he has committed, and all administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings, investigations, or prosecutions in which he has been or is a subject, target, party, or witness; and, (g) shall commit no further crimes whatsoever. Moreover, any assistance Jones may provide to federal criminal investigators shall be pursuant to the specific instructions and control of this Office and designated investigators.

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It is understood that this Office cannot, and does not, agree not to prosecute Jones for criminal tax violations, if any. However, if Jones fully complies with the understandings specified in this Agreement, no testimony or other information given by him (or any other information directly or indirectly derived therefrom) will be used against him in any criminal tax prosecution. Moreover, if Jones fully complies with the understandings specified in this Agreement, he will not be further prosecuted criminally by this Office for any crimes, except for criminal tax violations, related to his participation in: (a) a narcotics trafficking conspiracy as a site administrator on the Silk Road website from October 2012 to October 2013, as charged in Count One of the Information; (b) a conspiracy to commit and aid and abet computer hacking as a site administrator on the Silk Road website from October 2012 to October 2013, as charged in Count Two of the Information; (c) a conspiracy to traffic in fraudulent identification documents as a site administrator on the Silk Road website from October 2012 to October 2013, as charged in Count Three of the Information; (d) a conspiracy to commit money laundering as a site administrator on the Silk Road website from October 2012 to October 2013, as charged in Count Four of the Information; (e) the distribution of fentanyl and oxycodone as a drug dealer operating on the Silk Road website in or about 2012; (f) conspiring to commit narcotics trafficking, computer hacking, identification document fraud, and money laundering as a forum moderator on the Silk Road 2.0 discussion forum from in or about November 2013 up to and including in or about December 2013; and (g) distributing marijuana, cocaine, heroin, LSD, and other illicit drugs, from in or about 2009 up to and including in or about 2012, all to the extent that he has disclosed such participation to this Office as of the date of this Agreement. This Agreement does not provide any protection against prosecution for any crimes except as set forth above.

It is understood that all of the conduct set forth in subsections (e) through (g) of the preceding paragraph constitutes either relevant conduct, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") Section 1B1.3, or other conduct of the defendant, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4, that the Court may consider at the time of sentencing.

It is understood that this Agreement does not bind any federal, state, or local prosecuting authority other than this Office. This Office will, however, bring the cooperation of Jones to the attention of other prosecuting offices, if requested by him.

It is understood that the sentence to be imposed upon Jones is within the sole discretion of the Court. This Office cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence Jones will receive, and will not recommend any specific sentence to the Court. However, this Office will inform the Probation Office and the Court of (a) this Agreement; (b) the nature and extent of Jones's activities with respect to this case and all other activities of Jones which this Office deems relevant to sentencing; and (c) the nature and extent of Jones's cooperation with this Office. In so doing, this Office may use any information it deems relevant, including information provided by Jones both prior to and subsequent to the signing of this Agreement. In addition, if this Office determines that Jones has provided substantial assistance in an investigation or prosecution, and if he has fully complied with the understandings specified in this Agreement, this Office will file a motion, pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. §3553(e), requesting the Court to sentence Jones in light of the factors set forth in Section 5K1.1(a)(1)-(5). It is understood that, even if such a motion is filed, the sentence to be imposed on Jones remains within the sole discretion of the Court. Moreover,

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nothing in this Agreement limits this Office's right to present any facts and make any arguments relevant to sentencing to the Probation Office and the Court, or to take any position on post-sentencing motions. Jones hereby consents to such adjournments of his sentence as may be requested by this Office.

It is understood that, should this Office determine either that Jones has not provided substantial assistance in an investigation or prosecution, or that Jones has violated any provision of this Agreement, such a determination will release this Office from any obligation to file a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. §3553(e), but will not entitle Jones to withdraw his guilty plea once it has been entered.

It is understood that, should this Office determine, subsequent to the filing of a motion pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and/or 18 U.S.C. §3553(e), that Jones has violated any provision of this Agreement, this Office shall have the right to withdraw such motion.

It is understood that, should Jones commit any further crimes or should it be determined that he has given false, incomplete, or misleading testimony or information, or should he otherwise violate any provision of this Agreement, Jones shall thereafter be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation of which this Office has knowledge, including perjury and obstruction of justice. Any such prosecution that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement may be commenced against Jones, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution that is not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed.

It is understood that in the event that it is determined that Jones has committed any further crimes, given false, incomplete, or misleading testimony or information, or otherwise violated any provision of this Agreement, (a) all statements made by Jones to this Office or other designated law enforcement agents, and any testimony given by Jones before a grand jury or other tribunal, whether prior to or subsequent to the signing of this Agreement, and any leads from such statements or testimony shall be admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding brought against Jones; and (b) Jones shall assert no claim under the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or any other federal rule that such statements or any leads therefrom should be suppressed. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all rights in the foregoing respects.

It is further understood that this Office will not object to the defendant's continued release on the bail conditions as set forth by the Honorable Gabriel W. Gorenstein at the December 26, 2013 hearing. This Office reserves the right to move without notice to the defendant for a revocation or modification of such bail conditions should it determine that Jones has violated any provision of this Agreement or condition of his release, or should it determine that such a revocation or modification is otherwise appropriate. The defendant hereby consents to any such revocation or modification.

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The defendant hereby acknowledges that he has accepted this Agreement and decided to plead guilty because he is in fact guilty. By entering this plea of guilty, the defendant waives any and all right to withdraw his plea or to attack his conviction, either on direct appeal or collaterally, on the ground that the Government has failed to produce any discovery material, Jencks Act material, exculpatory material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), other than information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant, and impeachment material pursuant to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), that has not already been produced as of the date of the signing of this Agreement.

This Agreement supersedes any prior understandings, promises, or conditions between this Office and Jones. No additional understandings, promises, or conditions have been entered into other than those set forth in this Agreement, and none will be entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties.

Very truly yours.

PREET BHARARA United States Attorney

By:

SERREN TURNER

TIMOTHY HOWARD

Assistant United States Attorneys

(212) 637-1946, 2308

APPROVED:

ØON H. KIM

Chief, Criminal Division

AGREED AND CONSENTED TO:

ANDREW MICHAEL JONES

DATE

APPROVED:

SAM BRAVERMAN, ESQ.

Attorney for Andrew Michael Jones

DATE

09.04.2014