The Green Ribbon

Corbyn, McDonnell, and the Irish peace process

As many people expected, the election campaign has brought rigorous scrutiny of Jeremy Corbyn's past statements on Ireland, as well as those of his shadow chancellor, John McDonnell. Both are London MPs with close links to the Irish community in the city, particularly significant in Corbyn's constituency of Islington North.

For some years it was my job as political editor, and then executive editor of the London-based Irish World to chronicle the political life of that community. As a result, I had some involvement with the kind of stories that are now filtering into national press cuttings and Tory opposition research. In 2003, I asked one of our freelancers, Paul Donovan, to cover the Bloody Sunday Commemoration where John McDonnell made his oft-quoted comments about the need 'to honour IRA members'.

When our story was picked up by The Sun, I could only complain, somewhat lamely, to the Press Gazette that our copy had been used without attribution, in a supposed 'exclusive'. Some have suggested that we were naive in publishing details of McDonnell's speech. My editor, the late Donal Mooney had instilled in us the that our role was to speak up for the best interests of the Irish community. As acting editor in Donal's absence, I had some apprehensions about the impact of the story, but I was also aware of criticisms circulating at the time that 'peace process journalists' were suppressing uncomfortable facts. Paul and I took the view, as Donal did when he was able to visit the office, that the story was newsworthy.

Following the Sun's coverage, McDonnell gave Paul a statement which sought to put his comments in the context of the crisis in the peace process at the time:

 In my speech I aimed to address republicans in terms they would understand. My message was that they had been successful in bringing about negotiations and that all those who contributed to this goal had won respect. Along with others, I am hoping to create the kinds of formulations through which the IRA, the loyalist paramilitaries and the British army can all depart the scene without a sense of abiding grievance. No side will move if movement is portrayed as humiliating surrender.

That effort has now been distorted into an alleged expression of support for the slaughter of innocent children. Let me be clear, I abhor and condemn the killing of innocent human beings. My heart goes out to all those who have lost friends and relatives in the Troubles.

How decisive an intervention by an MP at a small public meeting in London would have been in these terms is open to question, but as an analysis of the situation at the time it should not be dismissed. If the peace process was to get past the decommissioning logjam, it was IRA members who would have to be persuaded.

It is this internal dynamic within republicanism that is missed by Corbyn and McDonnell's critics. It is sometimes said that they were not working for peace because they engaged the leadership of Sinn Feín, rather than the SDLP, and that this encouraged republicans to continue the war. In reality, in working with Sinn Fein, they were working with the very people whose dialogue with grassroots republicanism was essential to the IRA ceasefire, and who needed to be able to demonstrate political influence to show that there was an alternative way forward. The SDLP itself tacitly recognised this through its own engagement with Sinn Fein in the Hume-Adams dialogue.

To dismiss the significance of republicanism's internal dynamics, it is necessary to assume that the Sinn Fein leadership could simply order the IRA membership into the very difficult position in which the Basque nationalist group ETA finds itself today: unilaterally disarming for no obvious political return. Given the history of IRA splits, this was always an unlikely scenario. 

Some years after the 2003 episode, I came across evidence that put the issue that McDonnell had alluded to, the status of IRA members, in a new light. It turned up at the National Archives in 30-year-old papers on the 1981 IRA hunger strike. At the height of a strike on 6 July, the night before the death of Joe McDonnell, Northern Ireland Secretary Humphrey Atkins set out the options for Mrs Thatcher. He recommended that the Government stand firm and wait for the strike to collapse. At the same time, he acknowledged that there were disadvantages to this course.

(v) The Provisionals need to settle the prisons problem on terms they can represent as acceptable to them if they are to go on - as we know some of them wish to do - to consider an end of the current terrorist campaign. A leadership which has "lost" on the prisons is in no position to do this.

(v) We should be discouraging the Provisionals from switching from terrorist to political activity at the very moment when we know they have begun to find political action attractive.

 What is striking about this is that there is no mention of a demand for a declaration of intent to withdraw by the British. The concerns which emerge in this and other contemporary documents, prisoner releases on one side, disarmament and the integrity of a ceasefire on the other, are not essentially different from those which emerged at the outset of the peace process in the 1990s.

If the peace party within republicanism was already in existence by 1981, and perhaps even earlier, Corbyn and McDonnell cannot have delayed its emergence, as their critics claim. Indeed, in engaging with Gerry Adams, they were probably already dealing with its leading representative at the time. Their sin was to recognise possibilities for political dialogue that the Government of the day was not yet ready to acknowledge.

While some of the criticism of Corbyn and McDonnell is driven by partisan cynicism, there is undoubtedly a sincere ideological element which finds the role of republican agency in the peace process difficult to acknowledge. Just as some Conservatives drank the Kool-Aid in their belief that Sadiq Khan was a dangerous Islamist, some perhaps expect a smoking gun that will show that Corbyn actually aided the IRA campaign. The fact that Corbyn reported the Sean O'Regan incident to the police as long ago as 1987 suggests this is most unlikely to happen.

Indeed what has been striking so far is the paucity of the opposition research delivered by the Tories and the right-wing press. The existence of an MI5 file, revealed by The Telegraph, puts Corbyn in the company of many Labour MPs from all wings of the party. It's biggest significance arguably lies in the fact that no action was taken as a result of its existence.

No more impressive was the Sun's promotion of Sean O'Callaghan, previously seen lending his counter-terrorist expertise to Tory think-tanks promoting Boris buses. O'Callaghan is no-one's idea of a compelling witness. In 1989, according to his own autobiography The Informer, he told the RUC and journalists that he killed Sinn Fein member Sean Corcoran. He then withdrew the admission, claiming he had been trying to draw attention to the case. By his own account, O'Callaghan is a proven liar, and he has for more questions to answer about the Troubles than those at whom he is pointing the finger.

Thin as they are, these attacks may yet work, on the old principle that if you throw enough mud some of it will stick. The fact remains that in the 1980s, Corbyn's approach to Northern Ireland did point beyond the orthodoxies that sustained what seemed at the time an interminable conflict. The 'War on Terror' cries out for similar scrutiny, and no less so because while the wars go on, the political class has largely ceded the term itself to the populist right.

The working class, Orwell said, are the most patriotic class of all, but it is perhaps the political class who are more prone to interpret patriotism in terms of fealty to the official orthodoxies of the day. Challenging that assumption is itself a patriotic task, one which puts Corbyn in a great English radical tradition.

Could there be a progressive pact against Brexit in Northern Ireland?

The Irish News is this morning reporting that Sinn Féin and the SDLP have held talks at Stormont in the context of a possible electoral pact. This is something that Sinn Féin have canvassed at previous elections. In 2010, SF unilaterally stood down in favour of the SDLP in South Belfast. The SDLP held the seat, and Sinn Féin was able to squeeze the SDLP vote in Fermanagh & South Tyrone, winning by 4 votes. There were no such moves in 2015, when Sinn Fein lost Fermanagh & South Tyrone and the SDLP barely held on in South Belfast.

The SDLP has traditionally opposed pacts but the threat to South Belfast may be concentrating minds, as well as the threat to its other two seats, Foyle and South Down, where it was outpolled by Sinn Féin in this year's assembly election.

The existence of an anti-Brexit majority in Northern Ireland also creates the opportunity to cast any pact in non-sectarian progressive terms, although the Irish News report suggests that active participation by non-nationalist parties will be limited, there could be unilateral withdrawals in their favour. It might also be worthwhile for nationalist parties to consider stating that they will not use the result of this Westminster election as a mandate for a border poll, but rather to assert Northern Ireland's special circumstances in relation to the EU.

A progressive pact could affect the result in a number of seats, including Fermanagh and South Tyrone, South Belfast, East Belfast, Upper Bann and North Down. It might draw in a number of nationalist seats where the pro-Brexit threat is more notional but anti-Brexit feeling is very strong.

The dilemma for potential participants is whether the opportunity to reassert the strong anti-Brexit mandate from the referendum in Northern Ireland outweighs the likely effect of cannibalising their overall vote ahead of what could still conceivably be the third Assembly election in two years. Part of the reason that a unionist pact is likely now, is the lock-in effect of having to defend seats won with past pacts. The resulting effect on vote-share may have contributed to unionist losses in the Assembly elections, which reflect overall shares much more closely than those to Westminster.

With that caveat, here's a look at how a pact could play out in individual seats.

Belfast East

A progressive pact here would likely imply Sinn Féin and SDLP standing down in favour of Alliance. Alliance is unlikely to reciprocate and might not see nationalist support in unionist East Belfast as an unmixed blessing. Nevertheless, the move would be essential if a pact were to be seen as progressive rather than simply nationalist.

Alliance has a chance of regaining this seat with Naomi Long as candidate.

Belfast North

A pact here might give Sinn Fein a free run against Nigel Dodds of the DUP. The nationalist divide is, however, deeper in Belfast than in more rural seats, and Gerry Kelly might not be well-placed to hoover up all SDLP votes. 

Dodds built up a significant lead in 2015 thanks to a unionist pact, but the electoral danger to him would be real.

Belfast South

The logic of a pact here might see Sinn Féin standing down in favour of the SDLP as they did in 2010. The Green Party have said they will consider arrangements with parties that take their seats, which might be relevant here, if anywhere. A Green withdrawal would be a significant signal if Alliance refused to play a role. Its difficult to see a quid pro quo for this, although the Greens might benefit in vote-share from nationalists standing down in North Down.

A pact here might make it significantly easier for the SDLP to hold the seat.

Belfast West

As a safe Sinn Féin seat, there is little logic to a pact here, unless, it is a quid pro quo to focus resources somewhere else. Indeed, a pact might actually benefit pro-Brexit People Before Profit.

East Antrim

A safe unionist seat. It's questionable whether a single nationalist candidate or withdrawal in favour of Alliance would produce a result that justifies the loss in vote-share.

East Londonderry

A decade ago this might have been the place to give the SDLP a target. As it is Sinn Féin is the largest anti-Brexit party, but Gregory Campbell might still be just out of reach of any conceivable progressive coalition. Update: Independent unionist Claire Sugden has been suggested as an anti-Brexit candidate here.

Fermanagh & South Tyrone

A unionist pact barely won this seat from Sinn Féin in 2015. Winning this border constituency back would be a key goal for the party in an anti-Brexit pact, and it may do it anyway given the political tide seen in the 2017 Assembly election.

Foyle

The threat to the SDLP here is from Sinn Féin and not the pro-Brexit DUP, but a deal here in the wake of Sinn Féin's strong assembly result might be one of the attractions of a pact to the SDLP.

Lagan Valley

A safe unionist seat with alliance the strongest of the anti-Brexit parties. Arguably not competitive enough to justify a pact that might weaken participants overall vote shares in a future assembly election.

Mid Ulster

Sinn Féin has seen off unionist pacts here without help from the SDLP, but a unionist pact involving the DUP might still draw this seat into any negotiations.

Newry & Armagh

A unionist pact cut Sinn Fein's majority in half in 2015, so this seat could come into play in negotiations with the SDLP.

North Antrim

Ian Paisley Jr is probably beyond the reach of any progressive candidate here. 

North Down

As a seat held by an anti-Brexit unionist, the approach taken to this seat would be a key test of the anti-Brexit nature of any progressive pact. Sinn Féin has just started to make a serious effort here for the Assembly, with little prospect of short-term reward. The question of long-term growth v. progressive hegemony is perhaps the key to the prospects for a pact.

South Antrim

Danny Kinahane's pre-referendum opposition to Brexit makes a progressive pact hard to justify on anti-Brexit grounds, unless there is a unionist pact involving the DUP, which there may well be. The seat would likely remain unionist in either scenario.

South Down

The prospect of a unionist pact involving the DUP might also create grounds for a progressive pact, the bigger threat to the SDLP here is from Sinn Féin and has been seen off in the past with tactical unionist votes. A progressive pact would be a significant shift in strategy, but anti-Brexit feeling might create the grounds for it.

Strangford

As with Lagan Valley and South Antrim, this DUP seat is arguably not competitive enough to make a pact worthwhile.

Upper Bann

The DUP's tenure in this seat would arguably justify a progressive pact here, especially as the DUP's lead over Sinn Féin was less than the SDLP's total vote. However, a likely unionist pact would put the seat beyond reach.

West Tyrone

This is a safe Sinn Féin seat, although a unionist pact might make it competitive enough to justify a progressive response.

Brexit Terms and the Commons - The Numbers for Round Two

Back in October, I looked at the likely voting numbers in the Commons ahead of Labour's motion for a parliamentary debate on Brexit strategy. Despite a notional Government majority of 16, the Government elected to accept Keir Starmer's opposition motion on 12 October, suggesting that they feared defeat.

I have updated the figures below ahead of Labour's opposition day debate on 7 December, which will call for the Government to publish a Brexit plan before invoking Article 50 to leave the European Union.

Relevant developments include by-elections in Batley and Spen (A Labour hold that was vacant in October following the murder of Jo Cox) and Richmond Park ( A Lib Dem gain), and the resignation of Stephen Phillips. The upshot is that the Government's nominal majority has fallen by 3 votes since October, although Phillips was a likely rebel.

If reports of at least 20 Tory rebels are accurate, then even with the DUP, the Government might need the support of Labour Brexiters and there are a limited number of those if the rebellion is any larger. The Government will no doubt attempt to mollify rebel backbenchers, but a climbdown may be harder than in October as Labour's demands become more concrete.

What price a life? May's rhetoric and the MOD's reality

This post originally appeared on Spinwatch on 16 November 2016.

In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, recent months have seen an increasingly chauvinistic tone in British politics. One aspect of this has been a concerted campaign against investigations of abuse by the Armed Forces. Conservative MPs have pressed Theresa May to curtail the activities of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, prompting the Prime Minister to warn of 'an industry of vexatious allegations coming forward' in comments to journalists in New York in September. May's conference speech, a key turning point in the post-Brexit political mood, featured the promise that "we will never again – in any future conflict – let those activist, left-wing human rights lawyers harangue and harass the bravest of the brave – the men and women of Britain’s Armed Forces." Her words were backed up by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) the with the announcement that it would seek a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights in future conflicts.

The irony is that these moves come at the very moment when new evidence suggests that the spectre of ambulance-chasing lawyers running rings around the MOD is almost the direct opposite of the reality in past conflicts. New light is being shed on MOD practices in the early years of the Northern Ireland Troubles in a trickle of documents obtained by the Pat Finucane Centre (PFC). They show that rather than being dragged to the courts, the MOD was often anxious to go down the legal route, an avenue in which the balance of power was very different from the one portrayed in the media, leaving bereaved families to settle for derisory sums, a fraction of the MOD's own private estimate of what was warranted.

The problem with the Quilliam Foundation

This post originally appeared on openDemocracyUK on 7 November 2016.

The Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC) has a long history of fighting racism, extending back to roots in the American Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, so its Field Guide to Anti-Muslim Extremists published last month, attracted widespread interest from those involved in combatting Islamophobia. Unfortunately, this latest publication has been controversial because it includes Maajid Nawaz, the co-founder of the UK counter-extremist think-tank Quilliam Foundation.

Nawaz has denounced this characterisation as 'Islam-splaining', describing himself as 'a brown, liberal, reform Muslim' and denouncing his critics as the 'regressive left', a charge echoed by Nick Cohen in the Spectator. Some elements of SPLC's critique of Nawaz were indeed questionable. It is not clear that the inclusion of some of his more personal peccadilloes shed any light on the charge of extremism. To accuse any self-identified Muslim of anti-Muslim extremism should always give one pause, given the risk of setting oneself up as arbitrator of others’ religious beliefs. There should be a high bar, and the scattershot nature of some of the SPLC's criticisms suggests that bar has not been met, even if other points do illustrate the profoundly illiberal impact of Quilliam's brand of counter-subversion.

This does not mean that a Muslim can never be said to be an anti-Muslim extremist. A good example is provided by a previous row involving Quilliam and a close British analogue of the SPLC, Hope Not Hate. In December last year, Hope Not Hate published a report on the so-called 'counterjihad movement', a self-identified coalition of hardline, far-right anti-Muslim groups, which spawned among other organisations, the English Defence League in Britain.

The Brexit bonanza for border smugglers

As Theresa May meets with representatives of the devolved governments of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales today, one key issue she will have to consider is the status of the Irish border after Brexit. Despite Westminster's focus on controlling the movement of people, the movement of goods could be an equally thorny problem

The issue was highlighted recently in a parliamentary question from the Ulster Unionist MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone:

Tom Elliott: I appreciate the Secretary of State’s point about an open border with the Republic of Ireland, given that four counties of the Republic of Ireland border my constituency, but how does he envisage stopping the smuggling that may take place after Brexit?

David Davis: That is a very good and difficult question. The simple truth is that we have to make a judgment, as is the case with all borders of that nature. Norway and Sweden have a good example of an open border, as do Canada and America. There are small-scale movements, but big-scale movements can be found and dealt with.

There may be good reasons for the Brexit Secretary's preference for an open border given the basic difficulty of mounting physical controls. This is what the British Army had to say on the matter in its review of Operation Banner, it's deployment to Northern Ireland during the Troubles: 

Brexicon - Defining the terms of negotiation

 On the BBC this morning Nick Clegg hit back at the 'remoaners' label for pro-Europeans, by labelling advocates of a hard Brexit 'breniers'. I wondered if I couldn't do a bit better. Apologies in advance.

Brexcellency: Non-EU trade representative prepared to offer favourable terms thanks to UK's improved post-Brexit negotiating position. Note irregular declension.

Brexceptionalism: Doctrine emphasising the over-riding importance of key trading relationships, such as those with Guernsey, the Isle of Man and the Cayman Islands. 

Brexchange: any currency transaction leaving one with fewer euros than one had pounds sterling.

Brexchequer: Middle English term, of Old French origin, designating David Davis' DExEU department.

Brexclave: A Japanese car plant in the north-east of England.

Brexcise: Tax primarily applicable to Mercedes cars, Italian sparkling wines and other articles of the same class.

Brexegesis: Scholarly methodology for the interpretation of referendum mandates.

Brexile: Member of an elite body of international businessmen upholding British sovereignty from a series of island outposts around the world.

Brexclaim: to estimate one's chances of success in negotiation.A general term not covering those specialised situations where the other side and/or objective circumstances are taken into account. Usually noted in EU-27 documents by a brexclamation mark.

Brexcluded middle: Logical principle by which there is either hard Brexit or no Brexit.

Brexecutive order: Officially preferred process for the implementation of Britain's departure for the European union.

Brexistentialism: Philosophical doctrine that Brexit means Brexit.

Brexogamy: The process of obtaining EU citizenship by marriage.

Brexemplary damages: Legal terminology for the negotiating position of the European Commission.

Brextremism: Doctrine aimed at deterring immigration by eliminating unnecessary economic activity.

Brexculpate: to uphold a broad public duty to make a success of Brexit.

 

Brexit terms and the Commons - a quick back of the envelope calc

Labour's new shadow Brexit Secretary Keir Starmer has today called for the House of Commons to vote on the opening terms for negotiating Britain's departure from the European Union. The Prime Minister has ruled this out. However, Ed Miliband has reportedly had talks with Conservative MPs who believe that Parliament should have more of a say. The Observer's Toby Helm has suggested that this could prevent 'Hard Brexit' and the departure of Britain from the Single Market.

Are there enough MPs willing to force a vote on the terms? Below is a quick first look at the numbers. I will try and update it as developments unfold.

New Post - 6 December 2016. Update ahead of Labour's opposition day debate.

Parliament should accept the Brexit mandate, but test its limits

It was pointed out before the EU referendum that having a popular vote to defend parliamentary sovereignty was something of a quixotic exercise. Perhaps the fact that they majority of the public voted differently to the majority of MPs suggests that they were less worried about the parliamentary bit and quite happy to assert British popular sovereignty.

The implications of this are now beginning to play out. The Telegraph reports that Theresa May intends to give notice of Britain's intent to leave the EU, under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, without further reference to Parliament. To my unpractised eye, withdrawal from a treaty looks like the kind of thing that normally falls within the royal prerogative. Yet there remains the question of whether the Government could take such an irreversible step out of the EU without Parliament having repealed the European Communities Act. Might that not be one of the domestic constitutional requirements alluded to in Article 50 itself?

There are real dangers for continuity remain MPs in taking a stand on parliamentary sovereignty, if that means directly challenging the popular mandate for Brexit. Given that there is little sign of any favourable shift in public opinion since the referendum, it risks a backlash that would entrench the Brexit majority and make any prospect of winning a different mandate in the future even more distant than it is now.

A much better strategy is to focus on the limits of that mandate. The Leave campaign during the referendum deliberately avoided putting forward a single policy model for Brexit, which in itself suggests that any given model might be less popular than Brexit itself. Some Brexit campaigners, such as Dan Hannan, argued for a Swiss or Norwegian model that included freedom of movement, something that was anathema to many others.

It will be that the latter group included the great majority of Brexit voters, but the majority of a majority is not necessary itself a majority. Parliament therefore has every right to hold the Government to account over the type of relationship with Europe that it seeks. In this respect, today's statement from Labour's Barry Gardiner hit just the right note:

“Those commentators who argue that the Prime Minister should circumvent a parliamentary vote and use the Royal Prerogative to leave the EU should consider what constitutional precedent they seek to invoke.

“The logic of saying the Prime Minister can trigger Article 50 without first setting out to parliament the terms and basis upon which her government seeks to negotiate; indeed without even indicating the red lines she will seek to protect, would be to diminish parliament and assume the arrogant powers of a Tudor monarch.

"Parliament cannot be side-lined from the greatest constitutional change our country has debated in forty years.”

This amounts to a call for Parliament to have a say over the process, not a veto over the Brexit mandate. It might seem flawed, in that the Brexit process can only start when Article 50 has been invoked, but Theresa May has effectively conceded the point by saying that she will not trigger article 50 until a UK approach and objectives have been established. Parliament is surely entitled to satisfy itself that this is the case.

In this situation, a Corbyn-led Labour Party would need to raise its parliamentary game. But Owen Smith's strategy of calling for a second popular vote may not be ideal either. Launching a frontal assault on the Brexit mandate may be helpful to him in the Labour leadership contest, but it provides ammunition to populist euro-scepticism without actually strengthening Parliament's hand. If as Smith says, there is a anti-Brexit majority in Parliament, then the aim should be to challenge not the principle but the concrete implementation of Brexit, and to stand up for all those constituencies which the Leave campaign said would not be harmed by Brexit (workers, farmers, current foreign residents, Scotland, Northern Ireland, etc).

If the Government's plan failed to stand up to that scrutiny, it might be the Brexit camp which would be forced to seek a new popular mandate on a much more concrete prospectus. Euro-sceptics would undoubtedly feel aggrieved by such an outcome, but it would be the product of their strategy in the first referendum. Right now, they would probably win that renewed mandate, but it is impossible to know what the political landscape will look like in 2020.

Whether this strategy is realistic depends ultimately on whether that notional pro-European majority in Parliament still exists in the face of the referendum outcome and the disappearance of Cameron-Osborne patronage.

 

 

Labour's Scottish dilemma

The Herald is reporting that Jeremy Corbyn will rule out an electoral pact with the SNP during an upcoming visit to Scotland. Compass Chair Neal Lawson has criticised any such move in an article for Labourlist.

My thoughts from the Labourlist comments here:

A serious strategy for taking on the SNP might actually involve moving closer to them. Any strategy for winning in Scotland will have to involve a policy offer to the pro-independence voters who have left Labour for the SNP, and a willingness to work with the SNP at Westminster level if necessary is one way of signalling seriousness in that regard. Another might be accepting that the Scottish Parliament has the right to call an independence referendum.¹

At the moment, Labour has created a cordon sanitaire around the SNP that it doesn't have, for example, around the Liberal Democrats. That sends a signal that unionism trumps all other considerations, which is precisely the approach that has given a huge boost to the SNP and the Tories.

It is very difficult to see the basis of an electoral pact with the SNP, but the cordon sanitaire approach won't stop the Tories scaremongering given the objective possibility of a hung parliament. The only thing that might blunt that attack is a mature dialogue in the years before the election, which should probably be focused in the first instance on the fallout from Brexit, and effective opposition in the current Parliament.

¹One constructive thing Jeremy Corbyn could do is endorse the comment by Conservative Scottish Secretary David Mundell that "if the people of Scotland ultimately determine that they want to have another referendum there will be one". If all sides accept that position in practice, then a hung parliament, electoral pact or coalition at Westminster can make no difference to the timing of another referendum.

Colin Wallace on the HIA Inquiry

The Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry in Northern Ireland recently completed its hearings on abuse at Kincora Boys Home in the 1970s. The hearings were notable for the absence of a number of key witnesses, among them former British Army information officer Colin Wallace. In his absence, Wallace's evidence came in for strong criticism at the inquiry, as reported by the BBC last month.

I'm grateful to Ciarán MacAirt for passing on the following statement from Colin Wallace in response to the inquiry's criticisms. For what it's worth, I tend to agree with the late Liam Clarke that over the years, 'Mr Wallace has tended to gain credibility as his central allegations have been put under more and more scrutiny.' On the issue of Wallace's evidence at the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, I believe that my own research at the National Archives supports the veracity of his account.

Statement by Colin Wallace in response to comments allegedly made by counsel for the HIA Inquiry
7 July 2016
My attention has been drawn to the contents of BBC NI website dated 7 July 2016 and to the comments allegedly made by Mr Joseph Aiken, Counsel for the HIA Inquiry Some of the reported comments are either totally inaccurate, or so misleading that they must surely give rise to serious concern about the neutrality of the HIA Inquiry. I believe the Inquiry should correct those inaccuracies as a matter of urgency, bearing in mind that the true facts are on public record and, therefore, freely available it. Failure to do so will indicate that there is a deliberate attempt to mislead the public on these matters and must surely call into question the Inquiry’s ultimate findings. The Inquiry should not be allowed to be used as a platform to disseminate incorrect information.

According to the BBC website, Mr Joseph Aiken, Counsel for the Inquiry, “also outlined in detail how, in other cases, evidence from Mr Wallace had been rejected by the Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday and by the Barron Inquiry in the Republic of Ireland.” This statement is totally false. My evidence was not rejected by the Barron Inquiry.

Labour's future: The case for a progressive alliance

The debate over Labour's future has seen a number of interesting contributions in the last day or two, looking beyond the immediate struggle between Jeremy Corbyn and Owen Smith. This is perhaps related to the fact that the faultline over the leadership runs straight through the soft left, from which this spate of contributions has come.

This is most apparent in the case of Owen Jones, whose critique of Corbyn is being heavily parsed on Twitter. Other key contributions come from Paul Mason and Neal Lawson, both of whom raise the possibility of a progressive alliance between Labour and other left of centre parties. It may be significant that this idea was also canvassed by shadow defence secretary Clive Lewis in an interview with Jones.

I think Ellie-Mae O'Hagan may be right to suggest that Jones's piece is less about an opening to Owen Smith's leadership challenge, than a reflection on the consequences of a very likely Corbyn victory. It is worth noting Neal Lawson's observation that ' The likely reality of course is not just that Jeremy will win, but that his successor will come from the same vein within the party.' Owen Jones has in the past canvassed the scenario that this handover might take place before a general election. Such questions may well come to the fore within Labour if Smith is defeated.

As regards the strategy rather than the personalities, I've left the following thoughts on a progressive alliance in a comment on Paul Mason's post:

The idea of a cross-party progressive movement against a hard Brexit is an important one, but it might be a mistake to present it as a short-term answer to the question of a Corbynite election strategy. Starting off with debates around electoral pacts and PR, pushes it straight into the arena where partisan interests are strongest.

Surely, it’s better to keep the focus on policies where common interests are strongest. One, maybe old-fashioned, model might be a platform like Charter 88, bringing together multiple parties with organised civil society institutions, unions etc, as well as stigmergic networks.

The role of those institutions would be to give the coalition sufficient heft to ensure that the various opposition parties voted together enough to exploit any cracks in the Tory majority. In effect, we need an extra-parliamentary movement for a parliamentary opposition.

As much as we shouldn’t fetishize Westminster, Tory hegemony may actually be weaker there than in the media. Indeed, Osborne’s strength may have been in using the latter to bolster the former, cultivating the lobby to psych the PLP about legislative ‘traps’.

A few Government defeats might improve morale across the board and open up space for larger discussions. This maybe assumes that there won’t be an early election, but it’s hard to see an electoral alliance being negotiatied ahead of an autumn poll, in any case.

I've also storified some similar thoughts on Twitter:

Spinwatch: 'Saving Labour' linked to NHS contractor

My latest post at Spinwatch:

In the days following the mass resignation of Labour MPs from Jeremy Corbyn's shadow Cabinet, a number of prominent Labour figures expressed support for Saving Labour, a website dedicated to signing up party members in support for Corbyn's departure.

Despite the backing of luminaries from Yvette Cooper to Robert Harris and J.K. Rowling, the site's provenance is remarkably opaque. The Labourlist blog has described its origins as 'uncertain' despite a claim by the Copeland MP Jamie Reed that 'Saving Labour is an organic initiative, as far as I’m aware'. 

Peter Edwards reported: 

The founders of Saving Labour are unknown. LabourList has been handed the names of several well-known activists who it is believed are behind the project but they have denied involvement or declined to respond to efforts to contact them.

According to WHOIS data, the website appears to have been registered by an anonymous client, on 25 June 2016, two days after the EU referendum, and the day before Hilary Benn's dismissal as Shadow Foreign Secretary.

The website's privacy policy allows it to combine information collected on Labour supporters with data from commercial suppliers, and to share it with 'any member of our group, which means our subsidiaries, our ultimate holding company and its subsidiaries' as well as 'business partners, suppliers and sub-contractors'. The policy also states: 'the data controller is Saving Labour of International House, 24 Holborn Viaduct, London EC1A 2BN.' There are ten different companies registered at this address. However, it is also the home of a hot-desking club.

Brexit and Irish nationalism

Only two years after the narrow defeat of Scottish independence in the last major referendum in Britain, nobody should be surprised that the vote for Brexit has opened up new questions about the territorial integrity of the UK.

The Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has said she will begin preparing legislation for a second independence referendum. Northern Ireland's Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness has called for a border poll on Irish unity. However, the two calls have received very different responses from the British Government. The Scottish Secretary David Mundell has said that a referendum will happen if the Scottish people want it, while the Northern Ireland Secretary Theresa Villiers has rejected the call for a border poll outright.

Indeed, the call for a border poll hasn't even met with universal enthusiasm from Irish nationalists. In the Irish News, commentator Brian Feeney suggested it would be illegal at the present time:

Look, as you’ve read here repeatedly the Northern Ireland Act 1998 empowers a secretary of state alone to call a referendum only if it appears likely a majority will vote for a united Ireland. Currently that means if a proconsul called a referendum the decision would be overturned in court. Get real.

If anything the evidence of recent elections in Northern Ireland is that nationalism is becalmed because voters are disillusioned with tokenistic gestures towards Irish unity and an absence of policy delivery. It may be that the wheel of fortune is now turning, but exploiting such opportunities through short-term populism rather than long-term planning has its dangers, as Boris Johnson is currently finding out. Dealing with the results of romantic English nationalism may require a strong dose of hardheaded Celtic pragmatism.

Slugger O'Toole's David McCann has some clear ideas about what the nationalist response to Brexit should involve:

We have real debates coming up as a community such as when will Article 50 be activated? What role will the Executive have in these negotiations? How will our interests be protected and respected? Most importantly, how will our relationship with the South change after the UK leaves the European Union?

All of these will take time to get through and answers will be needed before any border poll happens.

Likewise his Slugger colleague Chris Donnelly is also arguing for a focus on an all-Ireland plan to deal with the fallout from Brexit rather than an early referendum.

For now, the priority for Sinn Féin and the SDLP, as well as the Irish government, should be to ensure that the new post-Brexit border remains as invisible as it is today, with all that entails for trade and movement between both parts of Ireland, as well as negotiating for strengthened formal relationships between the Executive and Irish Government.

Martin McGuinness should be using his status- if not formally his office- to demand an agreed strategy with the Irish government (with or without Arlene’s approval) to protect Irish interests, whilst continuing to make the case as to why EU membership was and remains the best option for the Irish people, north and south.

There were signs that McGuinness was moving in this direction in a BBC interview today. While not resiling from Sinn Féin's call for a border poll, he emphasised that 'in the immediate future the focus needs to be on the whole issue of how we can maintain our relationship with Europe which has been so beneficial to us over the course of the last number of decades,' adding that 'there needs to be special arrangements which take account of the democratically expressed wishes of the people of the north of Ireland and Scotland.'

While Scotland may appear to have an advantage in being closer to, and better prepared for constitutional change, it is not yet clear that the polls are strong enough for Sturgeon to make the big call for a second referendum. In the meantime, Scotland and Northern Ireland are both in the market for some kind of variable geometry settlement, perhaps on the lines of the 'reverse Greenland' solution canvassed by OpenDemocracy's Adam Ramsay. Indeed some centrist figures in Northern Ireland politics have already expressed interest in similar ideas, and Northern Ireland may actually have an advantage over Scotland in pursuing them, thanks to its relationship with a continuing EU member state in the south.

It would be unwise to assume that people applying for Irish passports in Carrickfergus or voting for Remain in Bangor are signalling a deeper change in constitutional attitudes, but there may be a new openness to extending existing all-island relationships to contain the fallout from Brexit and preserve Northern Ireland's access to the EU. Brexit poses new problems for the north-south relationship, but it may also make its practical value more apparent, on both sides of the border. 

Referendum night links

A few links that may be of interest to those following the referendum results on Thursday night.

• Estimated declaration times around the UK from the Press Association: The list in time order is most helpful for following events. To find your local area use the list in alphabetical order.
• For a good steer on what those declarations will actually mean what they come in, read the New Statesman's Hour-by-Hour Guide to the results by Stephen Bush.
• An even more detailed guide by Nicholas Whyte has predictions for each counting area on the assumption that the national picture is a 50/50 split. That should help make it clearer where one side is doing well enough to win.
• Keep abreast of the emerging national picture with the BBC's results page.
• If the UK does vote out, the New Statesman has a good pointer to the likely emerging situation from Friday. That's also from Stephen Bush, who is definitely worth a Twitter follow.

A common concern - Brexit and the Irish border

It is not often you see a Government intervening directly in a domestic political debate in another country, but the potential impact of Britain's EU referendum on Ireland has seen the usual protocols thrown out the window - no doubt with the discreet approval of the Cameron Government.

The Irish Government has made a strong effort to get its analysis of the dangers of Brexit across to the Irish community in Britain, through the media (including the Irish World and the Irish Post), as well as through public events. The most notable example of the latter was Enda Kenny's appearance alongside Irish4Europe campaigners at the London-Mayo Gaelic Football match in Ruislip, West London, a significant focal point for the Irish community.

On that occasion, some in the media noted that there was a significant constituency for Brexit among the match patrons. As someone who grew up in a North West London Irish community that was very much centered around the construction industry, conversations with the fathers of many of my contemporaries lead me to believe that this is driven by a very specific demographic, older Irishmen in skilled and semi-skilled manual trades; plumbers, carpenters, electricians, builders; who came to Britain in the 1960s and 1970s and at the end of their careers are facing significant competition from younger European immigrants.

The irony that this group were themselves beneficiaries of freedom of movement via the Common Travel Area (CTA) between Britain and Ireland has been widely remarked, even if it is unlikely to prove a persuasive counter-argument on its own. The future of the CTA itself however, is an issue that affects the Irish community across the board.

So I took the opportunity to ask a question on it last night at a referendum event in Haringey Irish Centre, organised by local Labour activists Owen Sloman and Katja Richer, which was addressed by the Irish European Affairs Minister Dara Murphy and Ambassador Dan Mulhall, alongside Deputy Mayor of London Joanne McCartney and Tottenham MP David Lammy.

Minister Murphy said that while EU countries would want the common travel area to continue, it would have to be negotiated between the EU and the UK, and 'it's inconceivable that there wouldn't be changes.' Ambassador Mulhall noted that while the Irish Government would still want to see open borders within the CTA 'it wouldn't be up to us.' Controlling Britain's borders, as the rhetoric of the Leave campaign has it, implicitly means controlling the Irish border. 'We simply don't know what would be the impact of the Irish border becoming an external border of the EU,' he said, adding that the there was no precedent for a situation where one member of the common travel area was in the EU and one was outside. One possible development he did point to, was the need for some kind of customs control on the Irish border (i.e. between Britain and Ireland and between the Republic and Northern Ireland), if the UK chose to leave the single market and its freedom of movement requirements. 

Taoiseach Enda Kenny reiterated some of the same points in a speech on the issue today: 

We are standing here today less than fifty miles from the United Kingdom's only land border. Can anyone credibly suggest that nothing would change if that became the western border of the European Union ? We remember when it was a hard border. We remember the delays, the cost and the division. One of the most beneficial effects of the peace process and our common membership of the EU has been the virtual elimination of that border.

The bottom line, it seems to me, is that nobody in the Irish community should vote for a change in the UK's relationship with Europe without realising that means a major change in the UK's relationship with Ireland.

The case for a full inquiry - A round-up of Spinwatch coverage of Kincora

Cross-posted from Spinwatch:

On Friday, the Belfast high court rejected calls for the Goddard Inquiry into child sexual abuse to look at abuse at Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast in the 1970s. Instead, the issue will remain with the Northern Ireland-focused Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry. Victims of abuse at the home have vowed to fight the decision, arguing that only the Goddard Inquiry has the powers to examine evidence linking Kincora to the intelligence services and to institutional abuse in Britain.

Over the past two years, Spinwatch has published a series of reports which point to the need for an inquiry with sufficient powers to follow up evidence of official collusion in abuse which is already in the public domain.

• Morris Fraser: Child abuse, corruption and collusion and Britain and Northern Ireland, by Niall Meehan, 31 March 2016. An in-depth report on the career of paedophile child psychiatrist Morris Fraser, a key figure linking the Kincora scandal and institutional child abuse in Britain, which revealed that Fraser was able to continue his medical career even after being convicted of abuse.
• From Saville to Goddard: How MI5 vouched for a key Kincora witness, 23 March 2016. An analysis by Tom Griffin showing that Observer B, the source of key evidence presented by MI5 to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, was Kincora whistleblower James Miller, and arguing that the same types of evidence presented to the Saville Tribunal should be made available to abuse inquiries.
• Kincora - A need for transparency, by Colin Wallace, 22 October 2014. The former Army information officer who tried to blow the whistle in the 1970s explains why Kincora needs to be examined by a UK-wide Inquiry.
• The Boys from Berlin: The MI5 officers who covered up Kincora, 12 August 2014.  Tom Griffin looks at the career of Ian Cameron, the MI5 officer accused of turning away Army officers who tried to raise concerns about Kincora.
•  From Kincora to PIE: Why the abuse inquiry needs access to intelligence documents, 5 August 2014. The case for an investigation of key threads linking Kincora to organised abuse in Britain.
• Why the abuse inquiry needs to hear from Colin Wallace, 10 July 2014 - An examination of Wallace's attempts to raise the issue of abuse at Kincora over 40 years.

England's New Money Lords: the implications of private wealth and political power for personal privacy

In the wake of the Panama Papers, a number of commentators have expressed an unease at the scrutiny of the Cameron family's financial affairs, even while acknowledging the significance of the issue of offshore tax avoidance.

I couldn't help but be reminded of a very apposite comment by the 1930s muckraking journalist Ferdinand Lundberg: 

The family today, in no slighter degree than two or three centuries ago or in imperial Rome, is supreme in the governance of wealth, amassing it, standing watch over it, and keeping it intact from generation to generation. Because it is (unlike that relatively new device, the corporation) a private entity which in the strictest legality may resist public scrutiny, the family lends itself admirably to alliances of a formal character and serves as an instrument for confidential financial transactions. By definition the family is a sacrosanct institution, and no agency of government may pry into it without offending inculcated prejudice. The partnership, it is true, offers some refuge, and is certainly more of a private affair than is the corporation; but it, too, is now quite open to political inquiry. The family alone provides a safe retreat from democratic processes, not outside the law, but, for practical financial purposes, above the law. (America's Sixty Families, 1937).

From Saville to Goddard: How MI5 vouched for a key Kincora witness

On April 8th, the High Court is due to rule on whether the Goddard Inquiry into child sex abuse should look at the Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast.

Several people have come forward over the years, claiming that MI5 was informed about abuse by Kincora housemaster William McGrath in the 1970s, and did nothing. Witnesses include former Army information officer Colin Wallace and former Army intelligence officer Brian Gemmill, the latter of whom gave MI5  reports on Kincora from three men, Roy Garland, Jim McCormack and James Miller. Miller is now dead, but there is particular reason to regard him as credible. For one thing, it appears that MI5 vouched for him during the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.

Tottenham in the nuclear balance of power

Just back from The Beehive in Tottenham where my local Labour Party hosted a debate on Trident tonight, between John McTernan the former political secretary to Tony Blair, and the former Director of the National Peace Council, Timmon Wallis. Given the media's dire predictions of party bloodletting over the issue, the old journalist in me couldn't resist going along.

For the most part, it was a very comradely discussion, although McTernan did come in for some heckling as the meeting wore on, which he dealt with politely but robustly. With the exception of one question about the impact on defence jobs, the balance of comments from the floor seemed fairly strongly anti-Trident.

I got in early with a question about whether Trident was really an independent nuclear deterrent, something that was also raised by several other questioners. In response, Wallis argued that there were multiple lines of dependency on the US, including the leasing of the missiles, parts of the warheads, and the targeting software, and that Trident is specifically assigned to NATO where a US general is in charge. McTernan argued that Trident was an independent deterrent, controlled by the British armed forces and the British Government, although he also argued for the value of Britain's unique relationship with the US in terms of nuclear development and mutual defence treaties. One interesting argument McTernan made was that Trident was an insurance policy against the election of an isolationist President in the Donald Trump mould, who might abandon US commitments in Europe.

I got the feeling that the speakers were operating with different definitions of 'independence'. There were some opaque references to treaty commitments, which could perhaps be seen both as freely-given or as constraints on independence, depending on one's preferred emphasis. Wallis argued that the US would not cooperate with the UK if it did not have some means of being sure that the UK could never bomb the US. McTernan ridiculed the idea of the UK wanting to bomb the US, but beyond reaffirming the independence of Trident, didn't specifically address the question of whether it could be used without US approval.

In any case, the weight of McTernan's argument perhaps rested more on the proposition that 'if you're against Trident, you're against NATO,' and that a Britain that had abandoned nuclear weapons would not be able to remain in a nuclear alliance. 

Some in the audience suggested that the alternative of multilateral disarmament was little more than a fig leaf. McTernan argued that the Non-Proliferation Treaty showed the success of multilateralism, and suggested that if Bill Clinton had been succeeded by a Democratic President, an Iran-style deal would have prevented a North Korean bomb.

It is this aspect of the debate that I think forms the context for the controversy sparked by this tweet from McTernan:

@johnmcternan 5h5 hours ago

Apparently suspicious that I haven't mentioned Israel at @TottenhamLabour. When I said I was a supporter of Israel it was a 'gotcha' moment

I have to admit, it had struck me, even before it was raised, that McTernan had mentioned pretty much every nuclear power except Israel. I think part of the reaction to his comments was based on his assertion (as my hastily scribbled note has it): 'we do not know whether Israel has a nuclear bomb.' Surely, Israel's policy of maintaining deniability for its nuclear arsenal presents its own challenges for multilateralism.

It would be wrong therefore to use such comments to portray Tottenham Labour members as out of touch. Certainly some were cynical about opinion polls, but some critics of Trident were keenly aware that their concerns do not necessarily reflect a wider debate in the country.

McTernan argued that Labour needed to focus more on domestic issues rather than defining itself on defence policy. Few in Labour would necessarily disagree with that, but issues such as Syria and Trident renewal will come down the track regardless and the Corbyn leadership can only really avoid controversy by conceding the argument, to the detriment of its own base.

At a minimum, it ought to be possible to agree that Trident is a fit subject for democratic deliberation and that a decision on its renewal deserves proper scrutiny by the opposition, a task which will now fall to Emily Thornberry. I hope she will at least be able to establish what the real case for Trident is. Is it an independent nuclear deterrent or is it rather Britain's contribution to maintaining an American nuclear deterrent in Europe?  What are the real implications of Trident renewal for multilateralism and the NPT? These questions are important enough to merit debate within the Labour Party, and too important to be reduced to a debate about the Labour Party.

 

Tax credits in the House of Lords - The balance of forces

With a motion in the Lords looking like the best chance of forcing the Government to rethink its cuts to tax credits, here's a quick back of the envelope calculation of the balance of forces in the upper house. No doubt the whips will be aware of factors like pairing, illness etc that will affect these numbers, but they should be a useful indicator, nonetheless. Any information that could help update this over the next few days is welcome.

What this analysis shows is that the Government needs a substantial number of non-Conservatives to vote with them in order to outvote Labour and the Lib Dems. Abstentions are not enough. Talk of a constitutional crisis reflects this need for leverage over the key crossbenchers.

Update 22/10

One thing that will complicate the numbers below is the proliferation of motions against tax credits. There are now at least three:

Crossbench Peer Baroness Meacher: Has withdrawn her fatal motion, but believes her new proposal would force a new debate in the Commons which the Government would lose.

Labour Peer Baroness Hollis: Has put down a motion call for the implementation of tax credit cuts to be delayed until the Government has reported to Parliament on a transition plan. 

Lib Dem Peer Baroness Manzoor: Has put down a fatal motion that would block the tax credit cuts and force the Government back to square one.

All of these motions intend to force the issue back to the Commons, one way or another, but according to Paul Waugh, the Government feels less threatened by the Meacher and Hollis motions, than the Lib Dem one, which includes the 'fatal' word. 

At this stage the numbers below are best taken as an indicator of what would have happened if there had been a crossbench 'fatal' motion. It remains to be seen whether the opponents of tax credits can line up behind a single motion, and how strong that motion will be.

The Numbers

806 total peers

For a motion against tax credits

209 Labour

109 Lib Dems

1 Green Party

2 Crossbenchers including:

• Lord Adebowale - confirmed on twitter he is prepared to vote against tax credit cuts.
• Baroness Meacher: initially put down a fatal motion but under Government pressure has put down a motion calling for a new debate in the Commons.

Total: 321

Against a motion against tax credits 

Conservatives 248

Total: 248

Position not yet clear

173 remaining crossbenchers

• Baroness Campbell of Surbiton has said: 'I will be at the debate and currently looking at all the figures - I am deeply concerned re child poverty effect.'

25 Bishops - reported to be sympathetic to Baroness Meacher's original fatal motion.

• The Bishop of Leeds, Nick Baines, is currently in Sri Lanka.

23 non-affiliated

4 DUP (Voted against tax credit cuts in the Commons)

3 UKIP (Voted for tax credit cuts in the Commons)

2 Independent Labour

2 Plaid Cymru (Voted against tax credit cuts in the Commons)

2 Ulster Unionists (Tom Elliott voted  against tax credit cuts in the Commons)

1 Independent Liberal Democrat

1 Independent Social Democrat

1 Independent Ulster Unionist

Total: 237