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# AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW

No. 46 MARCH/APRIL 1975.

PRICE 50c. \*

Registered in Australia for transmission through the post as a periodical (Category B)

\* Recommended and maximum price only.

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## AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW

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### Subscriptions:

Single copies, 50 cents  
Yearly subscriptions (5 issues)

Yearly subscriptions (5 issues) \$2.25  
Two years (10 issues) \$4.25

Surface or airmail postage must be added to overseas subscriptions.

Australian Left Review, Box A247, Sydney South P.O., 2000.

Printed and published by Australian Radical Publications Pty. Ltd., at 21 Ross Street, Forest Lodge, 2037.

## IN THIS ISSUE .....

Our first issue for 1975, International Women's Year, has been delayed several months due to changes in the production of ALR. We apologise to our readers for our temporary absence.

As a contribution to International Women's Year we print the text of Fidel Castro's speech at the Congress of Cuban Women, held in December 1974. Castro recognises the need to both change the economic base of society and the ideas in people's heads if the liberation of women is to be assured.

This theme is reinforced in an extract from a speech given by Manuel Azcarate for the Spanish Communist Party at a recent meeting of West European Communist Parties in Italy.

That changes towards the liberation of women take place slowly and often in a restricted framework is reflected in an article by Magdalena Sokolowska on the family in Poland.

Tom Hayden, writing on Vietnam, expresses concepts which parallel those of the women's movement for liberation, namely, the role of subjective will and the force it becomes when people are convinced that they can control their own lives.

Events in Portugal are moving swiftly and have already outpaced those described by Wilfred Burchett in an interview in Australia last November. The background he provides helps to clarify current events and anticipates the leftward movement now proceeding.

Alastair Davidson continues his writing on Gramsci and the rise of the factory councils in Italy after the First World War.

In a review article by Tim Rowse of *Australian Cultural Elites*, *Intellectual Traditions in Sydney and Melbourne* by John Docker the traditional view of the differences between the cultural life of Melbourne and Sydney are challenged and an alternative analysis is offered.

# WILFRED BURCHETT ON PORTUGAL

*Since the end of April 1974, Wilfred Burchett has spent much of his time in Portugal reporting on political developments in that country. He is presently writing a book on his experiences.*

*Burchett gave this interview to Mavis Robertson in November 1974.*

**What were the social conditions which led to the changes in Portugal? In this context, could you comment on the following:**

- The pressure of the movement for liberation in the colonies
- The position of women, e.g. as in the case of "The Three Marias"
- Other causes particularly the position of the working class.

At the end of almost 50 years of fascist dictatorship the social conditions in Portugal were conditioned by a corrupt, inefficient regime which maintained itself in power by the terrorist organs of state repression - symbolised by the hated PIDE (secret police). Inflation was running at not less than 30 per cent by 1973-74. A feudal type agriculture, with vast landed estates of absentee landlords in the South and pocket handkerchief plots of the small-holders in the North, made life on the land impossible. It was this that forced hundreds of thousands of farm workers to migrate - a total of 1,500,000 Portuguese were working abroad by early 1974; the population of Portugal itself had

remained stagnant at about 9 million for the previous 10 years. Remittances of migrant earnings to their families provided Portugal's major foreign exchange earnings. A secondary reason for migration was that of young people seeking to evade military service.

Industry was also highly inefficient. Salazar's original policy had been to block the development of industry on the grounds that it would create an industrial proletariat and this would create communists. It was only after World War II that he was forced to permit a certain amount of development by monopolies protected from internal and external competition by the fascist regime. Three of the biggest of the monopolies were the CUF, concentrating on the main branches of heavy industry - steel, cement, electric power, ship building, heavy engineering, etc.; Champalimaud on medium and light industry and Banco Espirito Santo (literally, the Bank of the Holy Ghost) concentrating on banking. Naturally all three exploited the African colonies. They were protected from inside competition because they had an exclusive charter in

their own field, from outside competition by high tariffs; from labor troubles by the repressive organs of the fascist state.

The Ministry of Labor, for instance, was a 95 per cent police organisation engaged in trying to locate any "agitators" who sought to protect the workers' interests and handing the dossiers over to PIDE for action. Apart from local industry, the Caetano regime which followed that of Salazar opened the doors to the multinationals - American, West German, British, French, Swedish, Italian and other firms to establish plants in Portugal for the exploitation of the country's cheap labor. These plants contributed virtually nothing to the economy and were mainly engaged in assembling parts imported from abroad, the finished products then being exported. The technology remained entirely in the hands of the multinationals, workers did simple, repetitive assembly jobs, learning nothing which could be of use to local industry.

The situation of women was incredibly terrible. They had no rights whatsoever. They were doubly and trebly oppressed. It was entirely a male world, grounds for divorce, for example, being if a wife attended confession without the permission of her husband. The husband was the arbiter in all questions. Women had no right to vote - even in the phoney elections that took place from time to time. Their wages for doing the same work as men were usually about half. Women were forced to work in the factories and fields to fend off starvation, but there were no creches, nurseries, and practically no schools in the countryside for their children. There was a very high infant mortality rate due to lack of mid-wives, medical facilities, and a high rate of accidents to children at home (through fires) and on the roads from automobiles because the children were left at home, unguarded, while their parents worked. But the fact that women were alongside their menfolk in factory and field developed a great spirit of militancy among Portuguese women which I felt from the moment (April 25) when I set foot in the country. It is no accident that the

most publicised martyr among progressive circles is the young peasant woman Caterina Eufemia, shot down as she headed a group of striking agricultural workers in the South in an earlier phase of the struggle against fascism.

Wherever I went, in factories and farms, and among the sardine fishermen at Peniche, local progressive men spoke of the role of women in supporting strike actions and in the front ranks battling with the police. The case of "The Three Marias", in their literary protest ("pornographic" in the eyes of the fascist law) against the total suppression of women's rights in every field, including sexuality, was symbolic of the generalised spirit of revolt among women and was one of the indicators that the country was ripe - if not for revolt - at least to support any move to overthrow the regime.

Despite the great difficulties and penalties for militancy, the Portuguese working class, and particularly the illegal Communist Party, never ceased struggling for better conditions. The April 25 coup caught the country in a wave of strikes - including among the sardine fishermen at Peniche and the excellent organisation and working class solidarity became apparent with the mighty May Day celebrations six days after the coup.

**How much of the working class was in immigration? Have they now returned in large numbers?**

There are 800,000 Portuguese in France alone. They are mostly from the land and have been recycled into industry - often the building trade. Official policy is not to encourage their return at this stage. With swiftly rising unemployment at home - due mainly to economic sabotage by the leading monopolies and the multinationals - plus the necessity of re-absorbing demobilised troops returning from the colonies - it is considered better to leave the migrants where they are. At least they have jobs and their remittances are a precious source of foreign exchange. A couple of months ago, tens of thousands

of them, in an organised action, returned to have a look and there was a mass meeting of about 100,000 in Lisbon addressed by premier Goncalves. There was fantastic enthusiasm and it was clear the migrants thoroughly approved what had happened.

The gainfully employed in Portugal are divided almost equally into three groups - agriculture, industry, trade and commerce.

**What triggered off the change?**

Profound dissatisfaction with the regime and recognition that the colonial wars were a major factor in the social-economic conditions at home. Demoralisation within armed forces, despised at home and among the whites in the colonies for their failure to win the African wars. A growing conviction within the Armed Forces that the armed struggle was completely hopeless and that there was no military solution.

The precise event which transformed dissatisfaction into action and finally led to the coup was the promulgation of a decree in July 1973 which offended the prestige of the officers' corps. Due to battlefield losses and the general erosion in the officers' corps, the Defence Ministry decreed that university graduates could take a six months' crash course in military training and become officers with the same ranks, grades and privileges, long-service benefits, etc. as those who had done four years' service in the field.

It was this that provoked the first meeting of officers in Lisbon - and in Guinea-Bissau - to discuss the situation. At first they had thought it would be sufficient to demand a repeal of the decree and the Caetano government would see the light. The result was PIDE action to try to discover the ring-leaders and to transfer some officers away from Lisbon. There were some purely titular changes at the top, but nothing else. The young officers - almost exclusively captains - decided to discuss further. Discussions led to the whole question of the African wars, and eventually to the nature of the regime

which continued such senseless adventures. Finally, the conclusion was reached that the only way to change such a regime was to topple it by military force. The decision to stage a coup was taken in December 1973 after a step-by-step analysis and discussion on all available options.

An important factor in all this was the gradual change in the class composition of the officers' corps. Until the African wars started it was the exclusive upper class who sent their sons - at least one son - into the army. It was all glitter and braid and soft jobs in the colonies, etc. But when soldiering became an unpleasant and dangerous business, the upper class found other jobs for their offspring. The social levels were lowered and it was the sons of the petit-bourgeoisie, even in some cases the working class - who entered the military academy. By the time the officers' discussions had started there was a sharp class differentiation between those of up to captain's rank and those with the rank of colonels and above - with a few majors closer to to the captains than to the colonels.

Within the armed forces, at all levels and in all three branches, there were communist organisations. This had been true from the 1930s. Sometimes these organisations, or part of them were uncovered and leaders arrested, but they were never uprooted. In the discussions which led to the decision to carry out a coup, it can be taken for granted that communist party members played a role. The Program of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party in 1964 includes a passage to the effect that given the nature of the fascist regime, it could only be overthrown by armed insurrection in which part of the armed forces would participate and other parts would be neutralised.

It is logical to assume that from that time on the communist party worked to bring about precisely the sort of situation as erupted on April 25, 1974.

So what about the PCP - its work as an illegal organisation in the army, workplaces, rural areas - how did it exercise leadership from abroad?

In 1941 there was a big reorganisation of the PCP - in personnel, strategy and tactics. It was decided to organise a nucleus of clandestine, professional, full-time revolutionaries. There is here a distinction between illegal and clandestine. Clandestine members changed their names, often wore disguise, abandoned their families and their jobs, moved from place to place - in homes of trusted illegal workers who did not even know their true identity - and organised struggle against the regime at virtually every level - including among the intellectuals. When the first meeting of the Central Committee was held after April 25, it was calculated that those attending represented 240 years of prison and over 700 years of clandestine activity. One cannot say that the leadership was exercised from abroad. It was exercised from within the country - sometimes directly from the prisons. After secretary-general Alvaro Cunhal went into exile, he returned on several occasions to attend secret congresses, etc. I have met Central Committee members who spent between 15 and 21 years each in jail, but their activities as organisers never ceased during their prison terms.

It is said that the PCP is a pro-Soviet party and some claim that this is the source of its "conservatism". Is there any basis in such comments?

I consider the PCP is a party which, above all, has devoted itself to solving national problems in an original, revolutionary and national way. Under the most tremendous difficulties - cut off physically - from any contact with the international communist movement - except for those in exile - the PCP from 1941 onwards had engaged in revolutionary struggle with one aim - the overthrow of the fascist regime by armed insurrection. The step by step process which led to the April 25 coup had been followed by a step by step process since which has consolidated the alliance

between the armed forces and the progressive forces, and is also part of an accelerated process according to a carefully formulated program which has socialism at the end of the road. My strongest impression is that the PCP is first and foremost a pro-Portuguese party, sticking to its aims with enormous sacrifices and with very far-sighted leadership. In many ways I am reminded of the Vietnamese Lao Dong Party when I am in Portugal.

When one considers the enormous difficulties and sacrifices that the NLF of South Vietnam had to overcome to get arms in their hands - using hoes, clubs, and picks - to wrest arms from the hands of the enemy, the success of the PCP policy in surfacing with a large proportion of the country's armed forces siding with the country's progressive forces, one can give due value to the correct, long-range tactics of the PCP.

In this context, it has been reported that the PCP has opposed strikes. Can you comment?

The PCP has opposed some strikes. These were strikes in the sectors of public transport, the PTT, and bread-baking industry. It has also opposed unrealistically high wage demands.

From April 25 onwards there have been three major counter-attacks by Portuguese reaction. The first was around the end of May, beginning of June. This was the economic attack on a pattern surprisingly similar to what happened in Chile, as part of the "softening up" process to overthrow the Allende regime. It is now public knowledge that the CIA was behind this. In Portugal, millions of dollars were paid out in support of strikes in the transport sector. From the very first days of the coup some of the big monopolies and the multinationals (including ITT of notoriety in the Chilean affair) suddenly started offering very big wage increases whereas before they had been refusing to honor even the modest wage contracts negotiated during the Caetano regime. This had a three-fold aim

(a) to accelerate the process of swallowing up the medium and small enterprises by setting wage levels that the small and medium enterprises could not possibly pay; (b) creating mass unemployment by forcing the medium and small enterprises to close down, thus contributing to economic chaos; (c) by setting abnormally high wage levels the monopolies hoped to provoke a wave of strikes as workers strove to attain the high levels suddenly offered by the monopolies.

PCP policy was in line with that of the Armed Forces program which provided that the conditions of the "under-privileged" should be speedily alleviated. The PCP supported the proposal to set a minimum basic wage - set at 3,300 escudos per month on a basis of equal pay for equal work. This was adopted and immediately resulted in doubling the wages of over half of all employed. The overwhelming majority of workers quickly saw through the tactics of the monopolies. The trade unions, supported by the PCP staged a huge demonstration on the first Saturday in June calling for a halt to "wild-cat" strikes, under the main slogan: "No Strikes for the Sake of Strikes". In general, that demonstration ended that phase of the counter-attack on the economic front.

The policy of the fascists was to create the sort of economic chaos that would force intervention of the armed forces against the people. PCP policy was to preserve the unity between the Armed Forces Movement and the people.

The second counter-offensive was the government crisis in early July. Conservative prime minister Carlos Palmas threatened to resign unless the question of elections was more or less indefinitely postponed; that President Spínola was appointed virtually indefinitely heading a sort of presidential regime with increased powers and that parts of the AFM Program was shelved. (Essentially the AFM Program provided for the dismantling of the fascist structure; an end to the African wars; the creation of conditions under which democratic elections could be held by March 31, 1975.)

Carlos Palmas eventually had little support and was allowed to resign. Spínola wanted to appoint one of his own men, former defence minister Major Firmino Miguel, as prime minister. But he had played no role in the April 25 coup. The AFM rejected him and insisted on appointing their own man, Lt. Colonel Vasco Gonçalves who had supported the AFM from the beginning. (Spínola referred to him as "that communist Gonçalves"). On the day that Gonçalves was appointed, another decisively important thing took place. That was the setting up of COPCON, a special military command for territorial Portugal charged with ensuring the strict application of the AFM Program. In fact it was a sort of anti-coup command. Heading it was General Costa Gomes, the highly respected former chief of general staff, sacked by Caetano in the last days of the latter's regime, reappointed after the April 25 coup. Deputy Chief was a major (moved up to brigadier for his new appointment) Saraino de Carvalho who had been the technical military brain in organising and carrying out the April 25 coup. Saraino de Carvalho was also appointed commander of the Lisbon Command. The "captains" were beginning to see what they were up against and took measures accordingly. The July crisis resulted in the elimination of rightist forces from the government, the entry of members of the AFM into the government, a consolidation of unity between the AFM and the progressive forces.

The third counter-offensive, and by far the most important, was in the second week of September. Under the pretext of organising a monster rally in Lisbon to support Spínola and denounce the "forces of totalitarian extremism", a military coup was prepared. The intended rally was to be used as a cover to smuggle assault forces and great quantities of arms into Lisbon and stage a fascist restoration.

Without going into detail, this plot was thwarted by the mobilisation of the masses and the unity and solidarity between the people and the armed forces.

At least 100,000 people worked shoulder-to-shoulder with the armed forces in erecting barricades all over the country - blocking off all movement from the major centres and at the approaches to Lisbon. They searched and found arms which were then distributed among the activists. Spínola tried to call out troops he thought would be loyal to him, but apart from a couple of hundred parachutists, they refused to move without specific orders from COPCON. At a critical moment, Spínola thought he had decapitated COPCON by holding Costa Gomes and Saraivo de Carvalho incommunicado under virtual arrest - together with prime minister Gonçalves. But COPCON went into action. It reoccupied the radio and TV stations seized by Spínola's men and raced to the Lisbon barricades. It was here that the question of civil war was averted. The COPCON men reasoned with the parachutists, explaining the real situation. The parachutists decided to withdraw and leave the field in the hands of COPCON. (All this took place on the night of September 11 - 12.) The rally was called off - it had been physically stopped at the barricades in any case. Two days later, Spínola resigned and three of his supporters in the seven-member Military Junta of National Salvation were forced to resign and the remaining Spínola supporters within the cabinet were kicked out, including defence minister Firmino Miguel. The third counter-attack resulted in further consolidation of the unity between the AFM and the progressive forces.

**What is the present perspective of the PCP? What is its strategy for socialism?**

At this stage, the step by step process is to prevent the return of fascism, and pursue a national-democratic policy - a policy under which the maximum of anti-fascist, democratic forces can be mobilised and unity with the armed forces maintained and strengthened.

At the time I left Portugal, following the September crisis, the electoral law had not been approved, so PCP strategy for March 1975 elections could not be defined. I was told that the PCP was against a "Popular

Front" or "National Front" alliance, but favored a "Democratic Front" within which the maximum of anti-fascist democratic forces could be mobilised. The PCP felt also that the AFM should now be considered as a political movement. Its Program is essentially a political program. More and more the AFM - which now represents virtually all the armed forces in the country - has played a political role, even an administrative role and has earned the right to play a leading role in the political life of the country.

The AFM Program provides for restricting the economic powers of the monopolies and as the monopolies were clearly implicated in the attempted September counter-coup, it is certain that their wings are going to be clipped. The PCP supports the idea for creating conditions for a democratic choice at the forthcoming elections and believes that the progressive forces have nothing to lose from an electoral confrontation. No fundamental changes in the social-economic structure can take place before there is an elected government - this is inscribed in the AFM Program. An elected government, the PCP considers, will provide the base to push ahead towards socialism in a form suitable to the concrete situation in Portugal. The PCP attaches great importance to supporting the small and medium enterprises against the monopolies; the small and medium landholders against the absentee landlords. But to push ahead giving primacy to slogans about socialism in a country where the entire population has been brain-washed with anti-communist propaganda for half a century is not considered good tactics at the moment.

**A variety of left groups exist. What is their strength, their programs, their relations with the PCP, their prospects?**

Over 60 political parties sprang into life within weeks of the April 25 coup. Among them, 12 or 15 "leftist groups". These included three or four trotskyst groups, three or four so-called "maoist" groups. Virtually all of them highly critical of the PCP for its "revisionist" or "reformist"

line. These groups are very active in Lisbon, mainly restricted, as far as support is concerned, to the student community and in certain enterprises where the work force is predominantly "white collar". Most of them have not as yet published their programs. There have been various conferences at which some of the groups have tried to establish a "united revolutionary" movement, but up to the time I left, this had not resulted in anything concrete. As far as I could ascertain, these groups have no roots among the main working class organisations, nor among the peasantry. They have some influence among intellectuals but nothing compared to the influence of the PCP. Many of the adherents of these groups are devoted, sincere activists, very courageous - their analyses of the situation are often theoretically justified. But if they are strong in revolutionary theory they are weak in tactics, organisation and, above all, in experience. They tend to see problems in isolation from the overall situation, partially and not wholly.

PCP veterans take a tolerant attitude towards these parties and groups. They explain that their appearance on the scene is partly a reaction to the terribly authoritarian pattern of feudal family relations. Their revolutionary fervor against the old society can also be explained in those terms. Until the September crisis, there were virtually no relations at all between them and the PCP - except in the case of combating some of the wildest of the strikes. But when the call went out to build and man the barricades, many members of these parties came to the headquarters of the PCP and the MDP (Portuguese Democratic Movement supported by the PCP, the Socialist Party and other anti-fascist groups and individuals) and asked for guidance. They offered to work wherever the PCP decided they were needed and to do whatever was needed. They were among the most effective workers, and their services during this first effort at "unity of action" may pave the way for a drawing together of all anti-fascist forces. This is the concept of the PCP.

**Is there any discussion of, and practice of, the concept of workers' control?**

There have been instances where factories have been abandoned because, with the doubling of the minimum wage, the cheap labor power on which these factories were based was beginning to cost twice as much. In several such cases - tailoring businesses for instance - the workers have taken over and have run the factories themselves. These are only a few isolated instances. They could form a nucleus of a much broader movement if the monopolies or multi-nationals start abandoning their enterprises. I do not believe the PCP is pushing for workers' control at this stage. It could alienate the small and medium enterprises and have a bad effect on the type of anti-fascist national unity which the PCP strives to foster.

**How would you describe mass ideology towards (a) former colonies; (b) socialism?**

On the first question, there is almost a total mass opposition to the continuance of the African wars. In my travels and interviews I did not find a single person who was not in favor of ending the African wars even where people considered this meant total and complete defeat. The continuance of these wars is so clearly linked with the social and economic ills at home that mass opposition is total. This is so even in the most backward areas of the country - among the peasant small-holders in the North. After all, it is their sons who are taken off into military service. Even if they are not wounded or disease-ridden, when they return from the wars they no longer want to go back to their old homes and villages. They have a taste for "urban life", the "bright lights", and no longer want to return to the mediaeval, feudal conditions of the villages. The soldiers have no sympathy with the white settlers who accuse them of cowardice, inefficiency, failure to win the colonial wars. Even in the smallest villages in the most backward - ideologically - parts of the country there were slogans on the walls calling for an end to the wars in

Africa.

In respect to support for socialism, attitudes are developing among the agricultural laborers in the southern part of the country; many are expressing the idea that the absentee landlord estates should be taken over by the state and made into state farms. Even in the north, one heard many expressions of interest in co-operative farming. The property of the small-holders is always dispersed, because of the splitting up which occurs at the time of marriage, inheritance, etc. People with four or five acres may have up to 15 or 20 different plots of land. Sometimes they even share olive trees with a neighbour. So the idea of pooling these dispersed plots and pooling funds to buy a tractor and work the land more efficiently is becoming widespread even in the most reactionary areas of the country.

Among the working class, I believe the idea of a socialist system is gaining ground and this concept will undoubtedly have been given an impetus because of the exposure of the role of the monopolies in the counter-revolutionary attempted coup in September. Nineteen members of the Espirito Santo banking family fled to Madrid when the coup was thwarted, a member of the Champalimaud family (the second largest monopoly) was amongst those arrested. The Armed Forces Program provides for curbing the power of the monopolies. The idea of the state taking over such monopolies would be highly popular among the working class and progressive intellectuals. But the idea is not being pushed at this moment in the same general interest of mobilising the broadest possible mass of public opinion, preventing a fascist comeback, and enabling the electoral confrontation by the end of March 1975. It is felt that the progressive forces will have a clearer mandate after those elections. The PCP wants to be able to take the Armed Forces Movement with them in every step along the road to a national democratic revolution.

**One of Portugal's colonies is Portuguese Timor. Is anyone in Portugal conscious of this? Is there any program for Timor?**

Yes, people are conscious of Timor, as they are of Macao and other small pockets of Portuguese rule. Obviously as there is no fighting going on there and large numbers of troops are not involved, it is a question of secondary importance. The government - before the September crisis - did make a general statement that Portugal was now ready to accept various UN resolutions on the colonial question and grant self-determination to all the overseas territories. (This was contained in a statement made by Spínola at the insistence of the Armed Forces Movement last July.) On the decolonisation front, policy has been to settle the easiest one - Guinea-Bissau - first, with the idea that this would facilitate a settlement of the next easiest - Mozambique. It was hoped that the settlement of Mozambique would facilitate a settlement in the much more complicated problem of Angola. After these three major problems were settled, the settlement of territories where there has not been armed conflict would be tackled.

**Could you say how the PCP views the international communist movement, in particular their views on the Soviet Union and China, and their relations with the CP of Spain?**

My impression was that the PCP is so involved in the clear and pressing dangers of avoiding a fascist comeback and the organisation of all those progressive forces inside the country that can be organised, that the international movement seems very remote. References to the CPSU in the PCP press are more frequent than references to the CP of China. In general, I found a great curiosity as to what is going on inside China, matched with very scant knowledge. Relations with the CP of Spain, as far as I could discern, are very close indeed.

**CUBA:**

## **THE LIBERATION OF WOMEN**

*Extracts of the speech by Fidel Castro at the closing session of the 2nd Congress of the Federation of Cuban Women, Havana, December 1974.*

We have reached the end of this beautiful Congress. And it is not so easy to sum up an event so filled with accomplishments and hope.

In the first place it has not been entirely our congress; we have shared it amply with a worthy and representative delegation of the revolutionary women of the entire world.

Across oceans, boundaries, languages, the representatives of the progressive women of the entire world have joined hands in this congress. And there is no need to use the term "foreigner" to characterise these delegations, because at all times we have experienced the feeling that we are part of the same homeland, the human population. This proves that nothing except exploitation and injustice separates people, and nothing unites people more than the community of ideals and the aspiration to justice.

The topics that we have been discussing in this congress have a truly universal interest. They are not just the problems of Cuban women but the problems of the vast majority of women in the world.

It is clear that women need to participate in the struggle against exploitation, against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism; in a word: in the struggle for national liberation. But when the objective of national liberation is finally achieved, women must continue struggling for their own liberation within human society.

We have brought along some data from a report made by the United Nations Department of Statistics which reveals women's situation in most of the world. Women represent 34 per cent of the workforce, that is, 515 million workers. By the end of the present decade, it is estimated that this figure will rise to 600

million, and in the year 2000, to 842 million. In Western Europe and North America, women constitute between 30 and 40 per cent of the workforce.

In spite of the increasing number of women in the ranks of the employed, particularly in professional and technical posts, the United Nations report points out that they are underpaid in comparison to men.

"Although it is true", says the report, "that the legal barriers against equal job opportunities for women are few and the principle of equal pay for equal work is now universally accepted, in practice the situation demands the urgent application of measures to eliminate such discrimination.

In many industrialised countries, women's wages are approximately 50 per cent to 80 per cent of men's for the same hours of work. In the developing nations, the low salaries for women indicate that women are engaged in the lowest levels of work and jobs in terms of skill and pay.

In general, this report refers to the question of wages. Of course, it does not analyse the infinite number of problems that affect women in the class society of the capitalist world. Naturally, in the socialist countries women have advanced a long distance along the road of their liberation. But if we ask ourselves about our own situation: we who are a socialist country with almost 16 years of revolution, can we really say that the Cuban women have acquired full equality of rights in practice, and that they are absolutely integrated into Cuban society?

We can analyse certain data, for example, before the revolution, there were 194,000 working women. Of them, according to a report read here, 70 per cent were domestics. Today, we have three times more women working. The figure for women in civilian state jobs, which as you know include the majority of productive activities, services and administration, is 590,000 women out of a total of 2,331,000 persons working. That is, 25.3 per cent of the workers are women. Nevertheless, the number of women holding leadership

posts in all this apparatus of production, services and administration, is only 15 per cent. Only 12.79 per cent of our party members are women. A notably low figure. And the number of women who work as party cadres and officials is only six per cent.

But we have an example that is still more illustrative and is related to the elections held for People's Power in the province of Matanzas. The number of women selected as candidates was 7.6 per cent and the number of women elected was three per cent, to which the comrade from Matanzas referred. The figures are really something to be concerned about, to make us do something about this problem. Because in those elections the candidates were proposed by the masses, and the masses only proposed 7.6 per cent women candidates, when women make up approximately 50 per cent of the population. Only three per cent of those elected by the masses were women.

Who here at this congress, what invited delegate who has been here with you for a week can understand, imagine or conceive how, with such a strong and such a politically advanced women's movement, only three per cent of women were chosen in elections?

### THE REALITY IS THAT THERE ARE STILL OBJECTIVE FACTORS THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST WOMEN

And these figures reflect nothing more than the reality that after more than 15 years of revolution, we are still politically and culturally behind in this area. The reality is that there are still objective and subjective factors that discriminate against women.

Naturally if we compare our present situation with what existed before the revolution, the advances are enormous. It isn't even possible to make any kind of comparison between women's situation before the revolution and their present situation. And the situation which the revolution encountered fully justified the creation of the Federation of Cuban

Women. Because our experience teaches us that when an under-developed country such as ours liberates itself and begins to construct socialism, a mass organisation like this one is necessary, since women have innumerable tasks to face up to within the revolutionary process. And for this reason we believe that the decision to develop this women's movement, to create this organisation that was born on August 23, 1960, was really a wise decision because the work this organisation has done could not have been carried forward by any other means.

It is true that we have other magnificent mass organisations, such as the trade unions, the CDRs, the peasant organisations, the youth and student organisations, the Pioneers and even the organisation of the day-care centres. But what organisation could have fulfilled the tasks that the Federation of Cuban Women has accomplished?

Comrade Vilma\* gave a significant historical account of those innumerable tasks, but it is sufficient to recall, first of all, the struggle to develop culture and political understanding in Cuban women, because in capitalist society women really remain culturally and politically downtrodden, they have even fewer educational opportunities than men, and many times women in class society are deceived precisely because of that low political level and are frequently used against revolutionary processes.

It is enough to recall that among those tasks were some of great importance. In the first place, the tasks related to the defence of the revolution and the homeland, the struggle against illiteracy, the struggle for the education of peasant girls, the struggle in preparing domestics for doing productive jobs, the struggle against prostitution, the struggle to incorporate women into work, the struggle to create day-care centres, the tasks of support for education, the public health campaigns, the social work, the deepening

of political and ideological consciousness among women and the struggle for the development of an internationalist spirit in Cuban women.

The Federation has worked in all those fields and has successfully completed all its tasks. And only the women themselves could have carried out those activities with such efficiency. But now, in this present stage of the revolution, women have a basic task, a historical battle to wage.

What was the crux, the centre of the analysis and the efforts of this congress? the struggle for women's equality. The struggle for the full integration of Cuban women into society! And that is really a historical battle. And we believe that this objective is precisely the focal point of this congress, because, in practice, women's full equality still does not exist. And we revolutionaries must understand this, and women themselves must understand it. It is not, of course, only a task for women. It is a task for the whole society!

But no one need be frightened because women's equality in society is being discussed, although some were frightened when the discussion of the Family Code draft was launched. And Blas explained to us here the many conversations he has had with certain men comrades who didn't understand, and he summed up his ideas with a beautiful argument that man's happiness was not possible without woman's happiness.

And we don't see why anyone should be frightened, because what should really frighten us as revolutionaries is that we have to admit the reality that women still do not have absolute equality in Cuban society. What must concern us as revolutionaries is that the work of the revolution is not yet complete.

Of course, in this lack of equality, in this lack of full integration, as I said, there are objective factors and there are subjective factors. Naturally, everything that prevents the incorporation of women into work makes this process of integration

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difficult, makes this process of achieving full equality difficult. And you have seen that precisely when women are incorporated into work, when women stop performing the traditional and historical activities, is when these problems begin to show up.

In conversation with some of the delegates to this congress, they expressed their great satisfaction and joy that, during these days of the congress, many of their husbands had remained at home taking care of the children so that they could come to the congress. It is unquestionable that if those women had not been integrated into the Federation and had not carried out this work, if they had not been revolutionary militants and had not been participating in this congress, such a problem never would have arisen in their homes, and the opportunity for those husbands to become aware of such a necessity and of such duties would never even have existed.

Among the objective factors that still hinder women's incorporation into education and work, some were pointed out here, such as the lack of sufficient day-care centres, of sufficient semi-boarding schools, of sufficient boarding schools, problems concerning the hours in which the schools function, to which we can add such factors as the lack of sufficient jobs for women throughout the country and, of course, the fact that many women do not have the level of qualification for that productive work.

In this area, as far as the day-care centres and education are concerned, over and beyond the great efforts that the revolution has already made, during the next few years - and particularly in the next five years, from '76 to '80 - a still greater effort will be made in the first place, to satisfy the growing educational needs of our people and at the same time to facilitate the incorporation of women into work.

The present-day capacity of day-care centres is approximately 50,000 children. In the first version of the next five-year plan, the idea of constructing 400 day-care centres with state brigades has been

considered, apart from those the minibrigades construct in order to increase the capacity up to 150,000 children. That is, three times the capacity we now have.

We are also proposing to construct 400 semiboarding schools for 300 pupils each, or the equivalent, in order to increase the capacity by 120,000 children; to construct no less than a thousand high schools with a capacity of more than half a million additional boarding school students.

Special attention will also be given to a type of school that you know is very important, the social schools for pupils with certain problems. The proposal is to build capacity for 40,000 new pupils in this type of special education.

At the same time, the revolution will continue developing the public health sector in the next few years: 49 new hospitals, 110 polyclinics, 19 dental clinics, 51 homes for the aged, and 16 homes for the disabled will be built throughout the country.

The total investment in education and public health in the next five years will be approximately 1650 million pesos.

We believe this is good news for the members of the Federation. And it does not mean starting something new, but rather increasing the rhythm of what is now being built, because more than 180 high schools accommodating 500 students each are now being built per year.

The hospital construction program is moving ahead; the first brigades for the construction of day-care centres have also been organised. And the brigades necessary to construct the 400 day-care centres programmed and to construct the special schools, the polyclinics, the homes for the aged, for the disabled and the semi-boarding schools at the primary level, those brigades that are still lacking, will be organised beginning in 1975. This program is in progress and we are perfectly sure that it will be carried forward.

## EDUCATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH

During the discussion we could appreciate the enormous importance that you attach to these problems and especially to the problems of education. It can be said that a large part of the discussion in the Congress revolved around these questions. Yet in the fields of education and public health our country already occupies first place among all the countries of Latin America.

It is precisely in the last years that it has been possible to provide a great impulse to school construction. And there were not enough installations nor enough cadres, nor enough teachers.

And we are really just beginning. The Minister of Public Health explained what the infant mortality rate is now: 27.4 per thousand live births. In Brazil where there aren't even mortality statistics it is estimated that it may be between 150 and 200. And unfortunately this is what takes place in many other Latin-American countries. This means that, for every infant that dies in Cuba, four, five, six or seven infants die in other countries of Latin America. The same is true of many other problems: mortality at other ages - because we are talking about mortality in the first year of birth, medical care in general, education.

The Minister of Education explained the figures that reflect the progress of education in Cuba: all children enrolled in schools, the growing number of those graduating from the sixth grade and the explosion we are already having at the high school level, with the result that all the construction we're building aren't enough.

But now in the years to come the problem will be not only the number of children studying, but also the quality of our education. And our education will improve in quality year by year, with the new system that is being projected and with the growing number of young people studying to be teachers and joining the Pedagogical Detachment.

I have said all this, speaking of the objective factors that hinder the integration of women, referring to schools, hospitals, etc. And I really simply wanted to express to you the ideas and the projects related to the solution of these problems.

The question has been raised here as to whether the same measures were being applied to the junior high schools in the countryside as to the semiboarding schools with respect to the children of working mothers, and actually there are some regions where all the pupils, all of them, are now in the junior highs in the countryside, all the pupils of that level. There are various regions in the country where of course this problem no longer exists because all the young people are taken care of.

The Minister of Education explained the factors that hinder this, taking into consideration the objective of having not a single youth without a corresponding high school, not one 6th-grade graduate who does not go on to a higher level: the same principle for the difficulties involved can be applied to these schools as well. But we believe that, even so, something can still be done to favor the children of working mothers, high school students in certain regions, in certain provinces; because many times they take out a complete school in order to put a primary school there, for example, and they have to find locations for those pupils in any case.

But this proposal was just a proposal; that is the aspiration expressed here by some comrade delegates and at the same time it is also only fair that the Ministry's difficulties be taken into account since its number one problem is to make all the changes and combinations possible in order to achieve the objective of having no 8th-grade graduate left without a school.

We also believe that, in the long run, the question of auxiliary teachers will have to be solved. We believe that the country will have to face up to the necessity of employing a specific number of comrades in this task and that it will be necessary to



analyse the economic aspects and also the facilities that those auxiliary teachers must be given.

Given that there are presently close to 600,000 working women, and 250,000 more are to be incorporated in the next five years, there will be no other solution than to attack those problems related to the hour that the primary schools and the semiboarding schools begin to function, and the problems of Saturdays.

The question of vacations was also raised. And we believe that the country has the resources to deal with this problem of summer vacations, since we are building hundreds of junior high schools in the countryside, and those installations could also be used for vacation plans. They are magnificent installations, and we are analysing the possibilities of using them during the summer for vacation plans.

Many of these problems that you have raised here can be solved with what we already have today. And in the long run, all these questions that hinder the incorporation of women into work, as the most certain way for the advancement of Cuban women along the road of their own liberation; we will overcome all these objective difficulties sooner or later.

There are others that weren't mentioned, at least in the discussion at the Congress, such as questions relating to laundries, etc. etc. But we will go on solving these material difficulties.

And now there remain the other difficulties we mentioned before: those of a subjective character. And what are those subjective difficulties? The problem of an old culture, of old habits, of old concepts, of old prejudices.

There are administrators, for example, who, whenever they can, will give a job to a man rather than to a woman, for a number of reasons: because they begin to think of problems of job slotting, of problems of maternity, of the difficulties of absenteeism a woman may have. The reasons, the factors are many, but the fact

is that women are discriminated against in terms of job opportunities.

One day, Resolution 47 was decreed, which froze a number of positions, certain positions, to be filled only by women. Later, that question was analysed in the Workers' Congress and it was proposed that Resolution 47 be abolished and at the same time, that Resolution 48 which prohibited women from taking certain jobs, be studied more deeply.

In any case, this problem must be attacked, if not in the form of freezing these jobs which has raised certain difficulties, because many times the skilled female personnel for the job didn't turn up, at least in job slotting in work centres, the positions in which women will be given preference must be noted; and in every new industry, every new work centre, these job slots must be noted. And the Party, the workers' organisations, the mass organisations and public administration, in judging the efficiency of those work centres, must take into account whether the job slottings that give preference to women are really, in effect, occupied by women.

And in every new factory built in any Cuban town, it must now be indicated what work is to be given to women so there will be time enough to proceed with the selection and training of those women.

The rules and policy of the Party and of the mass organisations must be careful to maintain and insure the conditions for women to be incorporated into work. First, it is a question of elemental justice; and second, it is an imperative necessity of the revolution, it is a demand of our economic development, because at some point, the male work force will not be enough, it simply will not be enough.

And for that reason it is necessary to wage a consistent battle against that mentality of discriminating against women in their job opportunities.

Here, in the Congress, you pointed out other types of difficulties women have, related to the home, related to child care and related to old habits. And you

suggested ways to overcome those difficulties.

In the investigation that was made it was shown that there are attitudes held by men, negative attitudes, and that there are also negative attitudes held by some women, and that this requires a special educational effort.

We believe that this struggle against the discrimination of women, this struggle for women's equality and for women's integration, must be carried out by the whole society. And it is the task of our Party, in the first place, and it is the task of our educational institutions and of all our mass organisations.

We were very pleased by the statements made here in the name of our youth, and how they committed themselves to wage the battle to overcome prejudices and the mentality that still exists. Perhaps these subjective factors imply an even greater struggle than the objective elements. Because with the development of our economy, we will overcome the material difficulties and one day we will all have the day-care centres we need, and we will have all the semiboarding schools we need, and all the boarding schools we need, and all the services we need.

But we still have to ask ourselves when we will eradicate the age-old ways of thinking, when we will defeat all those prejudices. Of course, we have no doubt that those prejudices will be defeated. It also seemed very difficult to overcome the concepts on property that existed in our society before the revolution. It was impossible to conceive of life without private property. And today it really isn't possible to conceive of life without socialist ownership of the means of production.

But many habits remain from the times when women were also property within society. And these ways of thinking have to be eradicated. And we understand that the Family Code itself, which has produced so much discussion, is an important legal and educational tool in helping to overcome those habits and

those prejudices.

But in order to achieve those objectives women and men must struggle together, women and men have to become seriously and profoundly aware of the problem. They have to wage that battle together. And we are certain that it will be waged and that it will be won! And we believe that you are also certain of that. And the agreements of this Congress will be magnificent tools in that struggle.

One of the things that our revolution will be judged by in future years is how we have solved women's problems in our society and in our homeland, even though that is one of the revolution's problems that demands more tenacity, more firmness, more constancy and more effort.

On the question of prejudice, we told you once what happened in the Sierra Maestra when we began to organise the "Mariana Grajales" platoon, and the real resistance we encountered to the ideas of arming that women's unit, which reminds us how much more backward we were a few years ago. Some men believed that women weren't capable of fighting. But the unit was organised, and the women fought excellently, with all the bravery that the most valiant of our soldiers could have shown.

Nor was that the first time in history that this occurred. In the underground struggle women carried out an infinite number of tasks that, on occasion, placed them in greater danger than the dangers on the front line. And during World War II, during the fascist aggression against the Soviet Union, thousands of women fought in anti-aircraft units, in fighter and bomber planes and even with guerrillas, and at the front. But still the old prejudices seek to impose themselves.

Nature made woman physically weaker than man, but it did not make her morally and intellectually inferior to man. And human society has the duty to prevent this difference in physical strength from becoming a cause for discrimination against women. This is precisely the duty

of human society: to establish the norms of coexistence and justice for all.

Of course, the exploiting societies, the class societies exploit women, discriminate against them and make them victims of the system. Socialist society must eradicate every form of discrimination against women and every form of injustice and discrimination.

But women also have other functions in society. Women are nature's workshop where life is formed. They are the creators par excellence of the human being. And I say this because, instead of being the object of discrimination and inequality, women deserve special consideration from society.

I mention this point because there is something that we must bear very much in mind: that the struggle for women's security and full integration into society must never be converted into lack of consideration for women; it never means the loss of habits of respect that every woman deserves. Because there are some who confuse equality with rudeness.

And if women are physically weaker, if women must be mothers, if on top of their social obligations, if on top of their work, they carry the weight of reproduction and child-bearing, of giving birth to every human being who enters the world, and if they bear the physical and biological sacrifices that those functions bring with them, it is just that women should be given all the respect and all the consideration they deserve in society.

If there is to be any privilege in human society, if there is to be any inequality in human society, there must be certain small privileges and certain small inequalities in favor of women. And I say this clearly and frankly, because there are some men who believe they're not obliged to give their seat on the bus to a pregnant woman, or to an old woman, or to a little girl, or to a woman of any age who gets on the bus. Just as I also understand it to be the obligation of any youth to give his seat on the bus to an old man.

It is a question of the basic obligation we

have towards others: on a bus, in productive work, on the truck, others always have to be given special consideration, for one reason or another.

It is true with women and must be so with women because they are physically weaker and because they have tasks and functions and human responsibilities that man does not have.

It would be very sad if, with the revolution, there wasn't even the recollection of what certain men in bourgeois society did out of bourgeois or feudal chivalry. And instead of bourgeois or feudal chivalry, there must exist proletarian chivalry, proletarian courtesy, proletarian manners and proletarian consideration of women.

And I say this with the certainty that the people understand it and share it, with the certainty that every mother and every father would like their son to be a chivalrous proletarian, that type of man who is respectful of women and considerate of women, capable of making a small sacrifice that dishonors no man but on the contrary exalts and elevates him.

And here, at the closing of this Congress, in which the question of the struggle for women's equality and integration has become the centre of Cuban women's political and revolutionary activity for future years, I say this so that one thing isn't confused with the other, I am saying what I really feel.

And we constantly run up against even verbal, linguistic forms of discrimination against women. The comrade who spoke here in the name of the workers, Agapito Figueroa, spoke of the discriminatory terminology used. And we must be careful even about this. Because sometimes we use a slogan that seems very pretty, that says: "Woman must be man's comrade"; but one might also say: "Man must be woman's comrade".

There is the linguistic habit of always making the man the centre and this is inequality, it reflects habits of thinking,

although language is the least important in the final analysis, words are the least important. There are times when words remind us of something in the past although they no longer have that meaning. Deeds are what are really important.

The revolution's force lies in the proximity, in the identification between the masses and the government, between the masses and the state, between the masses and authority. This is what gives the revolution an invincible force, because the masses see in everything - in the state, in the government - something that is theirs: not someone else's, not a foreign thing or a strange thing. And no leader can view positions, functions, authority as his own. (But in any case, it has been highly flattering for us to see how our guests have commented about the form and character of the Congress.)

We are gratified to see the force the revolution has in women; we are gratified to confirm the revolutionary quality of Cuban women, their self-sacrifice, discipline and enthusiasm, their passion for the revolution, for just ideas, for the just cause of Cuban women demonstrating their virtues which - as we have said on other occasions - are virtues demanded of the revolutionary militant and that women have to a very high degree. And so we believe that our party must draw more from that force, that our state must draw more from that force, that our apparatus of production must draw more from that force.

The revolution has in Cuban women today a true army, an impressive political force. And that is why we say that the revolution is simply invincible. Because when women acquire that level of political culture and revolutionary militancy it means that the country has made a very great political leap, that our people have developed extraordinarily, that our country's march toward the future can't be stopped by anyone. That things will only be better all the time, that things will only be superior all the time. And that is why revolution is so strong; because of its mass organisations, because of the

people's political consciousness, and because of its vanguard Party.

And our country is doing well. Going ahead, going well and work on all fronts is improving. And this contribution you have made is a help, it is an aid that has an important material significance. But it has a still greater importance from a moral point of view. This is what is called political consciousness. This is what is called ideological depth. And after this, who is going to deceive us? Who is going to tell us stories? Who is going to detour us? No one.

And every year that passes will be better. Every year that passes we will have a more educated, more aware, more revolutionary and more internationalist people.

So these are the impressions we take from this historical Congress. We think that you are also happy, that you are satisfied, that you are proud of the Congress. I can tell you that our Party is also proud of the Congress, is satisfied with the Congress.

Sometimes you say that you have learned from us, but the reality is that we have learned much more from you, we have learned much more from the people, from the masses. Because they always renew and fortify our confidence, our faith, our revolutionary enthusiasm. You help to educate us, and when I say us, I speak not only as leader of the Party, I also speak as a man. You help us all, all men, all revolutionaries, to have a clearer awareness of these problems. And you help the Party and you help the leaders of the revolution; a Party in which there is a very high percentage of men in the leadership, a government in which there is a very high percentage of men, so that it might seem to be a party of men and a state of men and a government of men. The day has to come when we have a party of men and women, and a leadership of men and women, and a state of men and women, and a government of men and women. And I believe that all the comrades are aware that this is a necessity of the revolution, of society and of history.

## FAMILY PATTERNS

### MAGDALENA SOKOLOWSKA

This article, reprinted from Polish Perspectives (Vol. XVI, No. 4) is based on statistics and surveys conducted prior to its publication in 1973. In the following years, further changes may have taken place in the evolution of the family and the position of women in Polish society.

In Poland there is a striking disproportion between the tremendous changes that have occurred in the roles of men and women in public life and those they play in the home and family. The revolution has transformed relations between social classes but not between members of the family, an area, where change is much slower. While the gainful employment of married women has long become accepted as matter-of-course, rational distribution of household chores has not yet been so socially legitimized. Many husbands and wives are still attached to the traditional models of relationships between spouses, parents and children, to a patriarchal pattern of authority within the family - with its equally traditional division of duties. Yet the socio-economic base, which once provided a sufficient justification for such models, has undergone a radical change. In the new situation, in which the woman is a second breadwinner, a re-casting of the roles of husband-cum-father and wife-cum-mother has become of the essence. There is some evidence for believing that such a development is already taking place in this country.

The fact that women have become the co-providers has radically modified the old definition of 'head of the family'. In the National Census of 1970, the instructions issued to the census-takers specified that 'the head of the family is the earner of the whole or the greater part of the livelihood of a given household. Where there are two persons providing it in equal degree, the one chiefly responsible for its management should be regarded as the head of the family.'

The following question was put to 700 girls of sixteen and seventeen canvassed by the youth journal *Filipinka*: Would you like the attitude of your future husband to

be like that of your father to your mother? More than a half said No.

The girls do not accept a family model in which the mother is a 'skivvy', expected to look after the household and the children all by herself. An ideal husband is a father who 'does the cleaning and the washing up, goes for a walk with the children, helps them solve their crossword puzzles, and so on.' An ideal home is one in which all worries are shared and all decisions taken jointly. It seems clear from these answers that the up-coming generation of young women is beginning to absorb a new model of family life based on friendship, comradeship and equal partnership in everything. The views of young men are on the whole similar. The statement made by a 26-year-old arts graduate in a poll conducted by the daily *Zycie Warszawy* entitled 'Man and Wife' seems revealing.

'They begin their married lives from the same mark, equal in education, age, jobs, everything. In time he moves ahead, is promoted, gets extra training, goes abroad. She is stuck at home, bears children, does all sorts of chores, although she is still bringing money home. He is on the rise, she on the downgrade. Why? Natural inequality of the sexes? Go on. I don't want to do the dirt on my girl, I don't want her seeking peace of mind, as my mother did, in church or in novels or the cinema. I won't let my wife ever feel victimized on account of being a woman.'

#### HOUSEHOLD CHORES

Studies of time budgets conducted in various socialist (and not only socialist) countries invariably reveal that the total number of hours worked by women (both outside and in the home) is higher than that worked by men. As a consequence women have less time to spare for study, cultural activities, sports, social life and various forms of entertainment. From a national survey carried out in Poland in

1964-68 it is evident that as many as 54.5 per cent of all gainfully employed women in towns have no one to help them in the household. The rest are given a hand by their husbands (22.3 per cent); mothers or mothers-in-law (10.7 per cent); older children (4.5 per cent); other members of the family (1.6 per cent); strangers (1.1 per cent); and others (5.3 per cent). Only 0.9 per cent have no household duties. These data show how slow is the process of reorganizing the household by a more rational division of labour within the family, a greater modernization of everyday life and transfer of certain traditional duties to service centres outside the home. The same investigation has shown that although the woman's financial contribution to the family budget is relatively high (the husband's earnings are seldom more than 600 zlotys higher than the wife's, and 22 per cent of the women earn as much as, or more than their husbands), the greatest part of household duties is still the responsibility of women. In most families the wife does the shopping, cooks the meals, does the washing up and ironing, and above all - in 75 per cent of families - takes exclusive care of the children. When asked what could make it easier for them to fulfil these duties, most women said, better housing, housing. (1).

Sociologist J. Piotrowski believes that apart from all the external impediments to the rationalization of life in the household, the family itself is markedly unenterprising on this score. No attempts are made, for example, to shift the time of the main meal to the evening (and thus adjust it to the structure of the working day in Poland) or, even when practicable, to give up laundrying at home, etc. The network of services is inadequate, it is true, but so too is the family's readiness to change its habits. What is particularly perplexing is the fact that older children do practically nothing in the way of housework. What is more, despite the unanimous view that boys and girls should be brought up identically in this respect, the chores, if any, fall on the latter. The most that is expected of a boy is garbage removal, but even this is more often done by mothers or even fathers.

Though minor repairs remain the man's chief province, they are beginning to help with the washing up, housecleaning, etc. - although even this is not a matter of relieving their wives but only of 'giving them a hand.'

The younger the married couple the greater the husband's assistance in the home. In many such households it is *passé* to say 'my husband helps', which has been replaced by phrases like 'my husband participates' or 'shares the responsibility.' This applies above all to the care and raising of the children, particularly older ones, an area where the father's contribution is growing quickly, and he is playing a far more prominent part in such things as contacts with the child's school, play, exercise, visits to the theatre or cinema.

The findings of this national survey seem to show that women with a more advanced education and an outside job tend on the whole to cope with their household obligations better than ones who are solely 'housewives'. They are likely to display more initiative over rationalizing these duties - largely because they have that much less time in which to squeeze them in.

#### CHANGES IN THE FATHER'S ROLE

In a set of anonymous essays on 'How I Feel at Home' written by 150 boys and girls aged 12-14 from a Warsaw school a revealing emphasis was placed on 'both parents'. There was also a great deal about their jobs, all of it, as it happens, approving. Only one boy said he'd sooner his mother didn't go out to work. The others took both parents working for granted, their only reservation being a wish that they could get home earlier, less tired and out of sorts and have more time for the family. These children saw no reason why fathers couldn't do many of the household chores equally well. Nor do they associate upbringing exclusively with their mothers; on the contrary, they often place a higher value on their father's

help and advice, his contacts with their school etc. This ties in with the 1964-68 survey which revealed that marginally more husbands of working mothers played a positive part in the raising of the children.

The traditional stereotype of the father had him doing little more than providing the family's livelihood and punishing the children. For certain segments of society, 'a good husband and father' still means a man who does not drink or make scenes, and brings home his pay packet. If for good measure he also helps his wife with odd jobs around the house, he is also a veritable paragon. It is a formula which says little or nothing about his role in the upbringing of the children. In the past, all major decisions affecting them were his as of legal right; today, they are expected to be taken jointly, but instead, they are liable to become the sole domain of the mother. The Soviet sociologist A. G. Kharchev(2) writes that in many Soviet families there is a total absence of paternal care: the father 'lives in' but takes little or no part in the upbringing of the children (a phenomenon known in Poland as 'dad behind the newspaper'). Kharchev thinks that both parents are essential to the child's proper development; the role of the father and the mother is not identical, he adds, since there can be no doubt about the 'otherness' of the male and the female psyche, but both an exclusively paternal and an exclusively maternal upbringing must be considered incomplete.

The new status of women is freeing man of the stresses, realized or unrealized, inseparable from being the family's sole breadwinner. Consequently, there is emerging a new model of the husband and father in which he takes upon himself some of the responsibilities for the upbringing of the young generation - which is socially all to the good. At a time when most of the occupations that impinge on child-rearing are staffed by women the evolution and proper performance of the father's role become a problem of basic social significance. Summing up the results of a poll of fathers, the Catholic weekly *Wież* wrote:

'Fatherhood as a social role in our age is only now being rewritten by history ... An answer is slowly taking shape to the question: is the modern male a family creature? Yes, to the extent that he is up to performing an individualized, creative role as father and sees it as a chance of self-affirmation and a source of new values ... The father should not be a "mother's help" in the family, but above all a partner by reason of his different sex, something, in other words, that is incommensurable and irreplaceable in its distinctness and indispensability.'

### NEW FAMILY PATTERNS

Changes in approach to the roles of husband and wife are quickest in urban families, among men and women with a relatively high standard of education. These transformations will no doubt spread with the levelling of the life-styles of the various sections of the population.

One instance of these processes has been supplied by a study of a group of married couples, living and working in Warsaw, in which both husband and wife are qualified engineers.(3) They reveal the existence of genuine partnership reflected in a more equitable division of household duties, joint child-rearing shared holidays and entertainments, etc. An important place in their relationships is occupied by 'shop talk' and mutual assistance in their work. None of the wives contemplates the possibility of giving up her job, since they regard a career to be just as much part and parcel of being a woman today as having a family.

A similar picture emerges from a poll conducted by the daily *Zycie Warszawy* (1967) in which a large number of the respondents were pairs of academics (a group which has a high status rating in Poland). Here too there was a striking lack of sexual discrimination in the division of the innumerable, time-consuming tasks involved in running a household. The way these couples handle chores like washing, cleaning, cooking, shopping, looking after the children etc., affords grounds for guarded optimism that the rigid demarcation between husband and wife

will gradually disappear in the future and women's monopoly of nappies and the pots and pans will eventually become a thing of the past.

### LESS CHILDREN

The principal spur to the process of change within the family is the gainful employment of women. For its part the factor chiefly responsible for reducing the family obligations of married women at home and thereby enabling them to pursue a career is a drop in child-bearing. A smaller maternal work-load is a crucial element in dovetailing the demands of the home and employment.

In country as well as town the child-bearing rate is declining, though more pronouncedly in the cities. Large families are disappearing. In 1968, of all women with children under sixteen, 36 per cent had one, 32.8 per cent two, 18 per cent three, and only 13.1 four. During the past fifteen years there has been a considerable decrease in the number of women bearing three or more children - 32.5 per cent in 1968 as compared to 42.4 per cent in 1955. In big cities families of one or two are becoming the rule; and the evidence of all surveys seems to be that two is regarded as the ideal number of children for a family, rural or urban.

There are very few new mothers in the over-35 bracket. By the age of 30, in fact, most women have borne all the children they are likely to have and can look forward to some 40 more years of life, since their average expectation in Poland is now 72.8 years.

Over the last fifteen years natural increase in Poland has been greatly reduced - from 19.5 per thousand in 1955 to 8.5 in 1971. The same is true of the average fertility of women. In 1955, there were 111 births per 1,000 women between the ages of 15 and 49, while in 1969 the ratio was only 63. This drop is found in all age groups, but it is most pronounced in the older ones, which means an earlier termination of child-bearing. It is chiefly due to the smaller size of families: there

has been an insignificant decline in the number of first births but a considerable one in that of second or third children. Similar trends can be observed in other central and east European countries, and in Europe generally. In Poland it was a relatively sudden development, and demographers, doctors, statisticians, planners and social policy-makers are trying to puzzle out what caused so rapid and radical a change and what kind of population policy should be followed in the near and more remote future. The discussion centres on drawing up a family model which would encourage less rigorous control of fertility, in other words on devising an effective pronatalist programme. Most demographers and many journalists are in favour of such a programme, although they differ on points of detail; others are sceptical.

One of the features of debates about the size of families is that they soon extend to the subject of the role of women, with particular reference to their gainful employment. This has been a fiercely vexed issue since certain commentators maintain that the goals of population policy are hard or even impossible to reconcile with professional aspirations - and accordingly call for a restriction of women's employment.

In Poland the gainful employment of women is not the decisive curb on the size of the family. Differences in the fecundity of working and non-working women are insignificant: in a representative sample of 100 working women in towns (between the ages of 21-47 years) there were 246 children, in a similar sample of non-working women, 257 children.

In western Europe there are basic differences in the influence of education on the number of children. Less education, more children is a pattern that seems to be on the decline; indeed, more and more often a woman with a university degree has two or three children. In central and east European countries such a change has not yet been noted. In a Polish family in which either husband or wife is a graduate the average number of births is 1.5, and there still remains a wide

discrepancy in the number of children in each education bracket. There are some grounds for supposing that this situation is beginning to change. For example, a recent study of a representative sample of town dwellers, made by the Chief Statistical Office, has revealed that the lower the standard of education (both among men and women and in all social groups) the greater the reluctance to have a larger number of children. Conversely a wish for more children (in addition to the ones already born) tends to grow with the educational level.

There is a view that a rational population policy should be based on two fundamentals: first, the spontaneous and growing participation of women in the country's economic life must not be opposed; and second, the living standards of families must be gradually improved.

The first of these premises implies making the provision of jobs for women one of the aims of employment policy. Cutting down the number of female employees may have advantages for one enterprise but on a national scale is totally undesirable. The greater number of special benefits to which women are entitled makes them seem less worthy of their hire. But expansion of creches and nurseries, development of services and promotion of the production of labour-saving appliances can all help to increase the productivity of women.

The second principle is, above all, a matter of more and better housing. A long-range plan for the development of housing construction, designed to provide a comfortable home for every family, has been recently launched and will, in the first place, improve the situation of young married couples. In addition, to counteract the decrease in the birth-rate, various incentives are provided in the form of family allowances and benefits. In the various socialist countries this system is being steadily expanded.

A sensible population policy aims not so much at raising the birth-rate as such but at increasing the number of wanted children. In 1956, a law was passed

permitting the termination of pregnancy on medical or social grounds. Recently, during the debate on the dwindling natural increase, it came in for criticism in some quarters. However an overwhelming majority of experts - demographers, doctors and journalists - have strongly emphasized its benefits. They regard its introduction as a very important achievement and one of the greatest of social gains. Abortion is not, of course, a good thing in itself and should as far as possible be avoided by means of contraception. 'But,' said Professor B. Gornicki, a well-known pediatrician and chairman of the Family Planning Association, 'I feel that our present regulations concerning the termination of pregnancy are sound ones, and any curtailment of them would mean a step back. I would even say that to do so would be to let down those countries which regard our measures as rational and progressive in the sense of the protection of man.'

To conclude, two more statements which in a way sum up the debate:

J. Piotrowski (sociologist): 'I feel that the measures being taken to increase the population are to be commended insofar as they serve the happiness of the family. On the other hand, they should not be assessed from the point of view of their impact on fertility - because they are mostly ineffective.'

S. Klonowicz (doctor): 'I do not want anybody to conclude that I see no hope of remedying the present downturn in fertility rates. I believe there is a chance, and it resides in comprehensive economic transformations, a radical improvement in the living standards which would make for even fuller satisfaction of non-essential wants, in the consistent implementation of the present social policy, in the development of the network of services, and in better housing. It is only then that - in my opinion - the effectiveness of various "incentives" can be increased, it is only in such conditions that one can launch an active pronatalist policy, and it is only then that it will not prove prejudicial to the welfare of women.'

## SPANISH COMMUNISTS AND THE LIBERATION OF WOMEN

The impact of the movement for the liberation of women was discussed in a meeting of West European Communist Parties held in Rome recently. This extract from a contribution of the Communist Party of Spain, concerns the ideological struggle in the labor movement on this question. The earlier part of the speech dealt with concrete experiences of struggle.

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There are times when we are forced into the realization that we are held back by old conceptions and habits, but these setbacks only help to make us more aware of the problems of women in our society. With the thrust of the struggle and its most immediate claims we must include the more general prospects of the fight on the part of women for complete equality. A movement exists today, but without doubt it will be larger tomorrow when in democratic conditions it will be easier to broaden the consciousness of women to finally put an end to the discrimination they have suffered, often camouflaged by

the myths of the supposed "quality" of women.

With regard to the ideological debate necessary to solve these problems, the Communist Party of Spain has confronted it openly and boldly, and without fear of recognising and denouncing the aspects which, between ourselves, must be modified.

At our last Congress, the Secretary General of our Party, Santiago Carrillo, declared in a document of the Central Committee, approved by the Congress: "If we Communists must turn 180 degrees to accomplish a goal, I believe it is in respect to the attitude to women for even amongst the most generous, advanced and dedicated comrades, a reactionary attitude is often encountered. We must call this by its real name. It is against women and their actual role in life and society." Why a turn of 180 degrees? It is because the possibility for an improved status for women is limited not only by the obstacles of capitalism, which oppose all improvement, but by a whole series of obstacles and discriminations. These find

expression both in respect to women at work and at home, within the family. They are reinforced by a long, very long, tradition. This exploitation has roots that are pre-capitalist, but have been used to the depths by capitalism for the super-exploitation of women in the most scandalous way.

On the ideological plane the oppression of women stems from education and childhood. A woman is conditioned from when she is a baby to accept an inferior role. The most brutal discrimination, seen through marxist eyes, is the series of ideas that legitimise the "double morality" in the usual way, that man is the superior being.

We examine this problem with an open debate in the party and with the masses, not because we are under the illusion that the problems will be resolved simply by discussing them. On the contrary. We know very well that in Spain our ideas have a small audience. No words are spoken of the emancipation of women either for individuals or groups. We must therefore give an answer which is both revolutionary and truthful, an answer which the young understand, in either words a communist answer.

We confront this matter because it is politically necessary for us in the struggle for democracy today and tomorrow to consolidate that democracy, to uplift women both socially and politically in the advance towards socialism. Women constitute half our population, half of humanity.

In the present economic crisis, and not only the economic one, all resulting from capitalism, it becomes increasingly necessary to mobilise the immense female masses. In Spain today our main object is the struggle against the cost of living. This is the centre of our struggle towards a national strike, and together with the alternative political path fixed by the Democratic Council, we shall go forward and finish forever the putrid fascist dictatorship. It is clear however that to conquer the problem of the female masses

for democracy and progress, it is necessary that the Party shall be more and more avant-garde.

In the ideological debate and going deeper into the debate, we should look at a few of the general lines outlined by Marx and Engels which, for certain historical reasons, we have not always sufficiently taken into account. We are in a period when there is a major growth in the strength of the party. Even though it is known that we are not legal, working people and students come to us in large numbers and an important point is that many of these people are women. We consider that in strengthening the party, we must reflect in our committees and responsible positions, a far greater number of women. We have obtained some results, for example, in the Young Communists and student organisations, the percentage of women is high and in some instances higher than that of men. But then, when a woman marries, it becomes difficult for her to be in a position of leadership. Sometimes a communist husband constitutes the obstacle. We must overcome these difficulties for we are the party of liberation of the working classes and all humanity. We must never forget, therefore, that we must also be the party of the liberation of women.

In the past all dominant classes have accepted and aggravated the inferior position of women. The workers and communists say - No More!

One of the dimensions of our historical and revolutionary role is to achieve the complete equality of woman with man. We know that this will require a great effort and a long time, but maybe it will be less than we now believe when we consider the atmosphere in vast sectors of the progressive and revolutionary young people. Compared with the traditional image of woman, the slave of folklore and the object of publicity for the monopolies, we wish to present the image of the new woman; the woman of tomorrow; the woman totally equal with man in both social and political life, in sexual relations, in culture, and in the arts. This equality will give a superior quality to all human relations in the society liberated from capitalist exploitation.

## VIETNAM: A VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE

TOM HAYDEN

Most visitors to North Vietnam return deeply impressed with the society they have seen. The Vietnamese revolutionaries seem epic in their achievements, legendary already in their moral stature. "Our struggle has a sacred significance in the revolutionary world", an official Hanoi spokesman said in winter 1973. They invoke an optimistic philosophy about human possibilities which many Westerners would label impossibly romantic.

*An abridged version of an article by a United States anti-war activist, first printed by the Indochina Peace Campaign, California.*

### A REVOLUTION WHICH CLAIMS ONLY TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF

Stories - hundreds of them - of Vietnamese heroism, portray the Vietnamese as such extraordinary people that a problem of credibility arises. American travellers returning from Hanoi find the Vietnamese hard to explain even to their friends, and perhaps eventually to themselves. Some listeners begin to think that the traveller from Hanoi is so emotionally moved by the Vietnamese (or the US-spawned destruction they have viewed) to no longer have balance of mind. Therefore, the traveller's opinions often are dismissed or taken lightly by others with anti-war views.

Credibility is a historic problem with regard to the stance American radicals have taken towards revolution abroad. Political radicals have over-identified themselves with the direction of another country, whether the Soviet Union in the 1930s or China in the 1960s, in such a way that their word and integrity are no longer credible. They are not only discredited as a result, but having over-identified with another country's revolution, they become disillusioned when the star of that country is tarnished by internal conflict or contradictory turns of policy. In some periods this has led to even more depression on the left than that caused by the policies of the American government, and thousands of people have burned out as radicals in the process.

One must approach the question of Vietnam carefully not to repeat these patterns of the past.

It becomes difficult to entertain the idea that the Vietnamese are exemplary because one doesn't want to imply that their institutions should be imported to the United States, nor should one's future, personally or politically, be tied to what may happen in another country. But fortunately, Vietnam is one country that makes few claims to have the answer to anyone's problems but their own. They do not issue Red Books, nor publish a Little Lenin Library in every language, nor do they encourage the growth of political parties following their line in other countries.

In fact, although the Vietnamese have their theories and theoreticians, much of their work remains in the Vietnamese language. Their leadership never puts forward the notion that they have the "correct line" for other countries. This may be because, while fighting a war requiring international support, the Vietnamese do not want to antagonise their various allies. But it is more than a forced modesty; it is conscious and deep.

The revolution of these "common people" (as they style themselves) is the most important at present in the world, and probably will affect much of our history in this century. It will affect the future of small

nations, the future of revolutionary movements, guerrilla warfare, the role of "small nations" in the world of Great Powers. It will help answer how powerful the "spirit of the people" can be in the face of unparalleled technological power.

All these issues are universal in scope and will be defined by this revolution which claims only to speak for itself.

#### HOW DO VIETNAMESE VIEW AMERICA?

The Vietnamese view of human nature and the revolutionary process determined what they think of American society. Many Americans are struck by the seeming simplicity, even naivete, in what the Vietnamese say about America. Again and again the Vietnamese make a distinction between the "American people" and the American government. They do not consider the American people their enemy, but rather the bearers of a progressive tradition of democracy and national independence which the American government is violating.

After all, they understand Americans well enough to fight them, they are acquainted with racism of both the American and French varieties, they have encountered Americans of all classes on the battlefield killing Vietnamese, they have experienced betrayals on the part of their allies in the West. Their views come from experience. So when they say something about the American people and American government, it would be short-sighted to conclude that they are wrong on so fundamental a question.

But what do they mean? This is a mystery that must and will be unravelled, perhaps not for many years. Already, however, theories are appearing. For instance, it is becoming fashionable and, I think, misleading, to believe that the answer to the mystery lies essentially in Vietnamese culture. In this view, the 4000 year tradition of Vietnam has produced a unique set of values which sustain the Vietnamese resistance today. The collective labor in building the dykes, the constant struggles against foreign

invaders, the Confucian tradition of seeking order under legitimate authority ("the mandate of heaven") are described as the factors which make Vietnam "special". These historical roots are vital to understand, but they can permit a too convenient explanation for the American failure in Vietnam which goes like this: since the Vietnamese are unique, it has been impossible for any American strategies to work there. This can mean that American strategies will work elsewhere, that the Vietnam war experience is not likely to be duplicated and that there is little of universal portent to learn from Vietnam.

#### A STREAM OF REACTIONARY TRADITION

As an antidote to this thinking, it should be pointed out that the Vietnamese have had to struggle against a reactionary stream of culture and tradition. They are not simply inheritors of a revolutionary way of life. For example, we should note that Buddhism and Confucianism contain extremely conservative tendencies, lest we accept the notions that Buddhist monks always have immolated themselves in protest or that Ho Chi Minh was simply a latter-day Confucian elder.

Buddhism rested historically on the idea, not unfamiliar to Americans, that suffering and oppression in the present will be overcome in the hereafter. Buddhism projects the transcendence of misery. If you are poor, you have always been that way and you should accept Buddha's grace, pass on into another life and be re-incarnated, for in a later time you may be more fortunate. That fatalism of the Buddhist philosophy was convenient to many an emperor, just as similar religious attitudes prop up authoritarian rule today.

The same was true of Confucian teaching: the Vietnamese revolutionaries were confronted with a doctrine which, as it was transmitted, fixed people in their places. The Confucian code, which became state doctrine during the feudal period, included the principles that a man's first duty was to the emperor, a woman's to her husband, a child's to the family. This was hardly a philosophy designed to promote unrest or

change, but one perfectly designed to ratify the status quo.

#### UNIVERSAL THEMES IN VIETNAMESE CULTURE

It is also true that they did not have to go entirely outside these cultural traditions to find a basis for revolution. There were progressive aspects of Buddhism and Confucianism which served to justify resistance. But this is possible in any culture, including ours. The progressive themes the Vietnamese found in their tradition were universal. The Confucian scholar and Buddhist monk had to reconcile fidelity to the state versus fidelity to the nation, charity in the hereafter with oppression in the present. Out of these contradictions grew desires to change society for the better. In Confucian doctrine, for example, was an idea of human nature that proved to be a liberating tool, one that should not be foreign to people in any country. It was the idea that the great majority of people are potentially good, the question of their self-improvement depending only on the level of education they receive about the world as it really is. They are surrounded by forces that keep information from them. At the root is a concept of virtue which appears in Vietnamese writing down through the centuries. People can become virtuous by desiring to be so, by learning to be so, by sacrificing to be so. You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.

Vietnamese of many political backgrounds have shared this view down through the twentieth century. In the 1920s for instance, a textbook on Confucian doctrine by a scholar who would later be Vietnamese prime minister under the occupying Japanese, included this opinion:

"The overwhelming majority of people become good or bad according to the education and customs they acquire. These average people, all of them, can be educated. This applies to every sort of person, in every position of society, from every race and every country. Everyone can be educated to be good. The aim of Confucianism is to educate people so they become human and devoted."

When Ho was in prison in the 1940s, he paralleled this doctrine in many of the poems sent to his comrades in Vietnam. One of them was called "Midnight", written about the sleeping prisoners in his cell:

"Faces all have an honest look in sleep.  
Only when they wake up does good or  
evil show in them.

Good and evil are not qualities born  
in man,

More often than not they derive from  
our education."

#### MARXISM-LENINISM: THE REVOLUTIONARY WEAPON

The Vietnamese revolution was not made simply by selective interpretation from Confucian doctrine, however: marxism-leninism had to be introduced as a revolutionary weapon. The marxism-side of this doctrine essentially divides society into two blocs, a small ruling class and a great mass of the powerless who are not responsible for what is done in their society's name, and who have to be educated to their true situation. To the Confucian doctrine of innate goodness is added a new class attitude: the rulers are not expected to be or become "enlightened" but presumed to be exploitative. The Leninist theme is that the situation can be changed, virtue asserted in the world, through a dedicated organisation of people who will awaken the consciousness of everyone. Through struggle, example and education the true nature of oppression will be exposed. In revolution people will not only raise their standard of living but uplift their behaviour as a whole. They will be born again, morally improved.

The language of marxism-leninism may pose a problem for Americans concerned to avoid foreign models, but no more so than it would be for Ho and his Vietnamese comrades. A doctrine coming out of Europe would be at least as foreign to them as to ourselves. But Ho found in this doctrine what he called a "light" which would clear the way forward for Vietnam, and so it was incorporated into the Vietnamese experience.

Explaining this integration of national tradition and outside ideology, a Vietnamese minister told me in 1965 -

"Buddhism taught us charity, and communism has given us a vehicle for bringing charity from the ethical stage to that of reality where people can actually practise it."

#### HUMAN WILL AND MATERIAL FORCES

The Vietnamese never have adopted the mechanical notion that progress is inevitable. For all their rich tradition of struggle, they least of all claim that triumph is due to cultural circumstance. They reject the fatalism of the Buddha and the inevitability theories of certain marxists. Instead they have stressed virtue, sacrifice, personal endeavour. Not only is this drawn from their tradition, but in marxist terms it means relying more on the "subjective" rather than the "objective", more on the element of human will than that of material forces.

The Vietnamese revolution was one of the first to appear in the under-developed nations of Asia, where European marxists of the early twentieth century least expected it. Many communists expected socialism to first appear in countries like Germany with a relatively advanced level of technology. The sharing of resources and development of communal social relationships were not thought possible until the economy had transcended "primitive accumulation" and scarcity. But in Vietnam, China and other countries the reverse has happened: of necessity, people have formed "communist" social relationships before seizing state power and transforming the economy. They are used to enduring hardships and making great sacrifices together, sharing their meagre resources like brothers and sisters. Seemingly "romantic" revolutionary relationships prove to be the only method of winning, and so they naturally provide a basis for the Vietnamese outlook on how revolution is conducted. Especially required is a faith that difficult objective conditions can be overcome through will and solidarity. Thus "favourable objective conditions" are created, not simply given.

Of course, the Vietnamese do not divorce these factors. They believe that "objective conditions" are favourable to them partly due

to socialist revolutions of this century. In their estimate, the socialist countries, while lacking the technological level of the capitalist ones, still have changed the world power balance in favour of more revolution. Strength, according to Nguyen Khach Vien, lies in "not just the output of steel" but is ideological and political at its root:

"The socialist countries have an objective impact on the evolution of the world, because they have changed the relationships of production, and their very existence gives favourable conditions to further liberation movements. The "subjective" attitude of socialist countries is very important too, but even where something is wrong and the "subjective" is not revolutionary, even where there are internal difficulties, we conclude our strength is greater than the capitalist camp, although we must fight on harder.

This requires the perfect use of the "subjective", a matter of timing, strategy, organisation, summarising experience. In another of Ho's prison poems it is compared with "Learning to Play Chess":

"Eyes must look far ahead, and thoughts  
be deeply pondered.  
Be bold and unremitting in attack.  
Give the wrong command, and two char-  
acters are rendered useless.  
Come the right moment, a pawn can  
give you victory."

When analysis is finished, therefore, and the right moment chosen, everything still depends on human will, initiative, readiness to take the necessary action. This has required a struggle against the whole conservative side of Vietnamese culture, a struggle American intellectuals should find familiar. It meant challenging the mandarin elite (the bureaucratic-scholar class of the Confucian state) who were applying their doctrines for the benefit of the few rather than the many. It meant telling the mandarins they were not living up to their own ideals, integrity, and standard of virtue. For a mandarin it meant changing from loyalty to the Royal Court to faith in people who were considered unlettered. Intellectuals

had to break out of their roles as transmitters of a precious ruling class culture. They were caught up in studying the fine details of the master language, exchanging verses with each other, engaging in diplomatic intrigues, fighting to stay on top of the competitive heap, while 90 per cent of the people lived in misery. In fact their "official language" was so effete and stylised that it was impossible to employ in speaking to ordinary people.

The mandarins, if they were true patriots, had to decide that the vast majority of the people were not the dirt they were conditioned to assume. Intellectuals had to change from thinking they were the quintessence of Vietnamese culture to realising they were nothing but educated slaves unless they linked themselves with the people who were poor, barefoot and never had been to Court. The intellectuals had to return to their original roots in the villages. It required changing their lives. In the anti-French resistance, it is told that the Vietminh had to carry certain upper-class Vietnamese gentlemen-turned revolutionaries into the jungle because they were too delicately conditioned to walk. There with the guerrillas they would learn how to walk on their own.

The call for personal, in fact romantic, decision was characteristic. A famous poem of the 15th century by Nguyen Trai, an intellectual who became a great military strategist, included these lines:

"Although we have been at times strong,  
Although we have been at times weak,  
At no times have we lacked heroes."

Even in the military field, Americans are likely to assume that Vietnamese are more "natural" fighters than Westerners. It is true that people's war traditions go back to the 13th century in Vietnam. But what Americans do not know is that this tradition had to be learned through overcoming great obstacles. The Vietnamese traditionally fear death without proper burial, for example. They fear the night and the jungle because of an inheritance of superstitions. They have overcome fear of superior and unknown technology through the centuries, down even to the



present time. In 1966, Pham Van Dong acknowledged to us:

"I was very anxious and concerned about what would happen when two hundred thousand American troops came .... It is more difficult to fight against the United States aggressors but the liberation movement in South Vietnam has become stronger than we expected. I personally could not have expected it .... The strength of the people is endless. Even the children are ready. This too has made me think hard ....."

Their stress on consciousness and will leads the Vietnamese to certain views of the potential of the American people, and to attempt to morally arouse world opinion. They often tell visitors that, in their position, any people would feel and react in the same way.

Early in 1966, they decided to call a War Crimes Tribunal in Europe. They were the first to raise the issue, going to Jean-Paul Sartre and Bertrand Russell as individuals they considered representative of a moral consciousness in the West. Meanwhile in North Vietnam wherever something is bombed, when someone is injured or killed, there is always a War Crimes Commission representative there to record in exact detail what happened. They do this partly because they do not fear knowing about suffering. They want to know exactly what has happened so they can conquer fear. But they also collect the information because they believe there is such a thing as a court of international public opinion, a world conscience, to which these facts can be taken. They believe that if anyone in the world knew about these facts, they would judge them to be war crimes.

#### MEETING THE "GOOD" AMERICANS

In early November 1972, I visited a cooperative in the remote Viet-Bac region, 100 kilometres north of Hanoi, approximately 18 days after it was bombed, and where the people had never before seen any Americans. Even our interpreters wondered what the reaction would be to our presence.

We found that even here people accepted the idea of a distinction between the American people and the government. They must have been impressed, after talking so much of this distinction, to find "democratic Americans" arriving in their villages so soon after the bombing. But they showed no impatience, no hostility. We met a barefoot old lady, 73 years old, standing by a caved-in house, where she still slept on a small pile of blankets a few feet away from her pig. What do you think of Americans, she was asked. Amused, slight puzzlement showed on her face and, looking at the ground, she answered politely: "All I saw were planes in the sky, but I knew they were Americans". She hadn't grasped the proper way to express the distinctions but she wished us well.

#### A POTENTIAL FOR DECENCY

Do these attitudes come easily or naturally? By no means. "We cry very much, but we have learned to keep our pain to ourselves", said one cadre after taking me through hospital wards.

Not only do the Vietnamese expect others to see and condemn war crimes in their country, they try to empathise with acts of sacrifice made in their behalf by foreign friends, for this, too, demonstrates, the existence of international conscience. The clearest illustration is in their memorialising of Norman Morrison, the American Quaker who burned himself to death on the steps of the Pentagon in 1965. Many more Vietnamese know about Norman Morrison than Americans do. They not only know about him, they study him. They want to know all they can about his life. Small children in schools discuss him. The leading poets write about him. One song concludes:

"The flame which burned you will clear  
and lighten life,  
And many new generations of people  
will find the horizon.  
Then a day will come when the American  
people will rise,  
For life."

What was to many Americans a "psychotic" act was a profound act of sacrifice and internationalism to the Vietnamese. They certainly don't want or expect thousands of Americans to burn themselves in protest, but in Morrison's seemingly isolated act they can see a potential for decency in all Americans, a set of troubles and contradictions that cause pangs of conscience. Nothing could be more Vietnamese in fact, than the lines left behind by Morrison when he died:

"Life is mightier than the book that reports it.

The most important thing in the world is that our faith becomes living experience."

#### A COMMON RESOURCE OF PRECIOUS MORAL POWER

Whether it is Nguyen Thai Binh's\* actions or that of Nguyen Van Troi, Hieu's peach tree or Norman Morrison's sacrifice, the Vietnamese see a common resource of precious moral power that they try to encourage. One spokesman explained it this way in 1967:

"It is a common tendency to judge actions by their practical effect. We don't judge things simply that way. It may be out of romanticism. History is full of romantic people who rise up. They know their action will be futile but their need is to express indignation.

"When you organise a movement, you must try to succeed. But where individuals are concerned, as when a student stands before a gun, the probability is that he will be killed and he may know nothing will happen. But he must show the rulers he opposes them, and he must set an example for others. The history of our struggle is that no patriotic action is futile."

The human spirit is important not only in the revolutionary process but in the development of society after state power is won. It is a permanently important factor in the Vietnamese view of their future. They say that overcoming under-development and poverty may be an even greater problem than

waging a successful resistance. In facing this problem they lay great emphasis on the rapid improvement of their scientific technique, level of technology, management and administrative skills, but also, once again, on the asset of human consciousness. As our jeep was bouncing down a rugged road in the countryside, I asked a Communist Party cadre how he thought about the problems of coping with materialist values once Vietnam was on the road of "modern development". Twenty years from now, he replied, they dream of a Vietnam where people have not only their material needs met but, he said, tapping his head for emphasis, "a happy mental and spiritual life". This, he added, is a cause of concern to them. Supposing there are some countries, he said, which have taken the revisionist or materialist path:

"Well, we don't have to march in their ruts. We already are searching for new paths, for instance in education, in love of each other. We try to promote the spirit of collective mastery instead of egoism. It's difficult but possible because mankind is always aspiring to improve. Even those who have been directed toward the bad, it's not fatal, they can be directed toward the good ....."

#### EVEN POWS CAN CHANGE

Their attitude towards American prisoners also stems from their convictions about human nature. Perhaps the Pentagon's greatest propaganda success of the war lay in the wide public acceptance of the torture claims by returning American POWs in March, 1973. To the extent that any of the stories are true, it would mean an understandable failure by the Vietnamese to live up to their own code when faced with Americans personally responsible for death and destruction. What would Americans do by comparison, one returned POW asked, with Vietnamese pilots caught bombing Pittsburgh? In fact, there were a few stories of Vietnamese guards actually being upset by occasions of brutality; one, told by an extremely hawkish American officer, James Mulligan, described the guards as "ashamed":

"They were always saying how they had a 4500 year-old history of humane treatment of their enemies, and said that the policy of leniency was just misapplied in our cases."

But history is likely to show that the American POWs were the best treated in any American war (including our own civil war where, for example, 12,000 Union prisoners starved to death in Andersonville in 1864). One pilot, Norris Charles, told of a Vietnamese guard nicknamed "Thank you Uncle Ho" whose philosophy Charles felt was typical of the Vietnamese:

"They just feed you, clothe you, shelter you, and take care of your medical needs, and they try to give you games to play and stuff to read. You've been there seven years and they really don't have anything against you. They feel that humans are basically good, you know, and that once they know the truth will then maybe react to it. And they don't care if you react or not, but they feel they should (treat you that way) because they are a very humane people."

#### THEIR MESSAGE SHOULD GIVE US HOPE

Vietnamese culture, history and national identity should not be mystified or seen as foreign because the kind of nationalism they exemplify is cosmopolitan and international in many respects. They are open to thinking and trends in the world, even from the culture of their invaders. They are not xenophobic. Before the Chinese invaders withdrew, the Vietnamese had taken in what they considered valuable in Chinese culture. They kept some language, some philosophy, some myths but they remained Vietnamese. They rejected what would have rejected them. They did that with the French as well. Ho Chi Minh left Vietnam early in this century, as was customary for alienated and radical young

patriots, looking for a philosophy abroad that could be incorporated into Vietnamese nationalism. His generation first studied Japan because Japan was the first Asian country to defeat an occidental one (Russia) in a test of arms in 1905. He spent 30 years outside Vietnam as a nationalist, even incorporating what he could from the United States. He wrote articles about lynching in the South but he ultimately took the preamble from our Declaration of Independence for his Declaration in 1945. From French political circles he first learned about a party, an organisation, and about revolutionary strategy for national liberation movements. From the Soviet Union he learned more about strategy and method, and studied the world situation during the rich period of the Comintern. In China he served as an interpreter and learned much about revolutionary warfare. He did not come back to Vietnam to lead a nationalist movement for nearly 30 years, an unparalleled experience among successful revolutionary nationalists. Thus Vietnam is very internationalist.

In this epoch of change when the "wretched of the earth" are becoming masters of their own destiny, it is possible to say that the Vietnamese experience will make a universal contribution on the level of values and principles. During the Christmas bombing of 1972, they did not compare Hanoi to Hiroshima or Guernica but called their capital the "city of human dignity". Just as in other historical epochs, certain peoples have defended human values for the sake of the world and future generations, and earned the later appreciation of humanity, the Vietnamese people today are the main defenders of human dignity and explorers of the human potential in the world. The winds of liberation and cultural change come no longer from Rome or London, as we in the West are accustomed to believe, but in this century from Vietnam and the Third World.

Their simple message should give us hope..

## GRAMSCI AND THE FACTORY COUNCILS

ALASTAIR DAVIDSON

\* This is the second instalment of a two-part article. Part One appeared in ALR No. 45.

Two thousand workers, anxious to do something, to impose themselves on the chaos and lack of leadership characteristic of Turin and Italy in 1919, met in the Fiat Brevetti works in September and elected thirty-two commissars, representing eleven sections of the works, as their factory council, in an election which was a model of democratic procedure. Despite reformist warnings that the wrong men would be chosen to lead the workers, the elected commissars were all chosen from acknowledged leaders in the organised labor movement. Indicating, on the other hand, that the factory council was not only a new version of the old *commissari interne*, was the statement by one Brevetti worker that the establishment of the factory council was the "first step in the revolution". (47)

It was, indeed, the first step in the spread of factory councils, as other workforces were inspired by the action of the Brevetti-Fiat workers and within a month the councils had spread to each of Fiat's forty-two divisions, and elsewhere. (48) In the middle of October the first assembly of the executive committees of the *consigli di fabbrica* met. It represented thirty thousand workers. A

long program of action was drawn up, declaring itself more than a program but an exposition of the concepts which informed the new organisations, and a coming to terms with the other institutions of the labor movement.

It started by asserting that the very existence of the councils was a negation of the trade union leaders' assertion that the trade union was the sole organisation giving expression to the social life of the workers. The councils were concerned with administering the means of production and the men who worked them and not with fixing the price of labor; they had the "potential aim of preparing men, organism and concepts through a continuous pre-revolutionary work of control, to ready them to replace the bosses' authority in the workplace, and to place social life within a new framework."

Consequently, in the declaration of principles it was asserted that:

1. "The factory commissars are the sole true social (political and economic) representatives of the proletarian class, because they are elected by the universal suffrage of all the workers at the place of work."
2. The electors recognised the role of the

trade unions and expected that all workers would become unionists.

3. But, the final power in the working class movement should lie with the factory councils.

4. And, they would therefore only obey the union in its traditional role only when the commissars endorsed trade union directives.

5. And, they would resist any attempt to oust them from control of their organisations on the factory floor.

6. They would support the establishment of a single national trade union federation directed to working along the lines of the class struggle, for the communist revolution.

7. And, they asserted, the constitution of the councils marked the first step in the communist revolution in Italy.

The council's long list of rules can be broken down into the following thematic contents:

1. The commissars, who had to work in the factories, would be nominated from each factory division in proportions to be decided. Only men who were union members and committed to the class struggle could stand, but all workers could vote in elections. Instant recall of a commissar was possible when a majority wished.

2. The commissars would have two tasks: to represent the unionists of his division by controlling the union; and to defend the economic and social interests of all the workers of the division.

3. They would submit any union agreement with the employers to the workers for ratification, and generally control such agreements.

4. They would encourage the workers to educate themselves to the realisation of their responsibility to work together as social beings.

5. All decisions would be carried out by an executive committee nominated by each factory council. (49)

The Assembly resolved to express the

will of the masses and called for the extension of the movement throughout Italy.

Gramsci and his followers inside and outside the factories were the authors of this program, and as such it represented the point of view of the most politically advanced sections of councils only (50). Moreover the councils were at first composed by a majority who were not followers of *Ordine Nuovo*. (51)

Gramsci was not disconcerted and applauded the rapid spread in the councils. He noted particularly what he had anticipated, the increase in militancy as the councils forced the removal of all "the agents of capitalism" from the factories, and the magnificent discipline which enabled them to bring the work of 16,000 men to a halt in five minutes in December. (52) These experiences brought the mass of the workers closer to the views of the more advanced members. Meanwhile, he and his followers engaged in intensive propaganda and education through their School of Culture and Social Propaganda, which brought their ideas about the transformation of the councils into the organs of the proletarian state before the workers. (53) Tasca recalled the intensity of his work in the last three months of 1919 in these words: "We must note the intense activity of Gramsci ..... *Avanti*, the Central Executive of the Party, *Ordine Nuovo*, *Sotto la Mole* lectures for the factory councils ..... prodigious activity, a sickly body and a steely will .... he is a leader."

The events which worked for the triumph of his group in the councils and in the Turin labor movement as a whole, in part were willed by him. On 1 November the 'the rigids' who headed the councils ousted the reformists from their controlling position in the FIOM. Ottavio Pastore, editor of the new Turinese edition of *Avanti*, practically turned the newspaper over to Gramsci and his supporters giving him the apparent support of the PSI. (54)

Consequently in December the local PSI

accepted the councils and set up a study group under Togliatti to examine how they could be further developed and the Camera del Lavoro voted full support of the movement announcing that:

"the movement which started spontaneously in the Turin workshops has shown that the majority of the workers are profoundly convinced of the need to begin concrete work for the communist transformation of the productive organism and affirms that it is a sign of the political maturity of the masses."

As the representative of 100,000 workers it demanded the extension of the councils throughout Italy, and affirmed that they should be used for the revolutionary transformation of society. (55)

These triumphs of the *ordinovisti* only redoubled the hatred and opposition of the reformist trade union leaders, who saw in the movement their own disappearance from pre-eminence. The CGL newspaper started a determined campaign against the councils in December, accusing Gramsci of anarcho-syndicalism and adventurism. Nasty reminders of his mistake in 1914 started to circulate. Embittered by the pettiness of the bureaucrats who controlled the paper, Gramsci replied shortly that any discussion with them was impossible. (56) He was forced to take an even more anti-unionist stand, where he had always been particularly careful to acknowledge the contributions of unions to the labor movement. (57)

The main object of his attack was the "bureaucratic spirit" which characterised the trade union officials and prevented their recognising that there was a crisis in the labor movement which paralleled that in the whole country. This crisis he typified as one of "power and sovereignty" - who should rule - and it determined developments in the whole socialist movement.

In this situation, where the question was one of where ultimate power lay, the workers felt that "their' organisational

complex has become such an enormous apparatus that it has ended up obeying laws of its own, internal to its structure and its complicated functioning, but external to the mass, which has acquired conscience of its historical mission as a revolutionary class."

This real feeling was rooted in real circumstances and produced real new institutional and organisational forms to give it expression. The factory council was the primary form of this reality and would culminate in the dictatorship of the proletariat. The union, on the other hand, despite its historical achievements, was, "the type of proletarian organisation specific to the period of history dominated by capital", and directed by technical expertise subordinated to a bourgeois overview.

This did not mean that the unions themselves had no role in the coming revolution. In fact, they would carry out the socialisation of industry after it occurred.

But to do this the bureaucratic mentality of the leaders, jealous of their power, would have to be replaced by a sentiment of solidarity. (Here Gramsci made specific reference to the disastrous experience in Hungary, where the lack of support from the union leaders had been one reason for the fall of the short-lived Soviet regime).

In sum, unions of the old sort belonged to the past, and a new sort, based on factory councils, would have to emerge. The main difference would be that the reformist leadership would be replaced not by other individualists but by representatives chosen by the workers themselves through the councils which were their class expression.

Mindful of the attacks made by the reformists that this made him a syndicalist, Gramsci also made it quite clear that he supported neither reformist nor revolutionary syndicalists. He claimed that the first were concerned only with bread and butter issues and could rise to no more than this, and the second

thought that they could make the unions a revolutionary weapon when they were not suitable for such a task.

His position of intransigent hostility towards the union bureaucracy was not merely a question of personalities, though there was a personal animus on both sides. Nor was it merely a negative estimation of the unions' potential role in the existing, and worsening, social situation in Italy.

It was based on the belief that hierarchy of the sort unionism typified was innately anti-revolutionary. He believed that through making decisions for himself in the factory council, the worker obtained a consciousness of his own worth and ability to control his destinies and a feeling of inter-dependence with his fellows which he could not otherwise obtain.

*"Even the most ignorant and backward of the workers, even the most vain and 'cultured' of engineers, ends up being convinced of this truth in the experience of the factory council."* (58)

By 1920 Gramsci had thrown down the gauntlet before the trade union officials and their time-honored methods, and, by implication, before all the traditional methods of the Italian socialist movement. This meant that he had an uphill battle and had to find suitable allies where he could, without troubling himself about traditional hatreds and enmities. Most of the allies he found were therefore either outside the PSI or had adopted positions which conflicted with traditional PSI activity.

Among the first group were a large number of anarchists, who either belonged to the anarchist USI or were unattached. He associated himself with these people because he believed that common experience in the struggle would bring them over to the communist position. For this reason he did not include anarchist intellectuals among possible allies. Typical of his allies was Garino, Parodi's comrade in the intransigent leadership of the FIOM. (59)

Among the second group were the "abstentionists" of the PSI like Parodi and Boero, who took seriously the anti-parliamentary quality of Leninism as propounded by Bordiga, and demanded that the PSI give up participating in elections and concentrate on a revolutionary path to power.

Both groups were firmly established in the factory councils, and though Gramsci did not at first share their opinions at all, he was influenced by working in unity with them, and because the triumph of his group in the councils was by allying himself with them. Their influence became ever clearer in 1920 as they helped him become the acknowledged intellectual leader of the conciliar movement and loved and respected by the masses, whose attitudes these anarchist and 'abstentionist' leaders embodied - attitudes which were increasingly in favor of a solution which was extra-parliamentary and typified by participatory democracy. Each time there was a dispute or strike in Turin, Gramsci and his followers were the first to know about it and to develop its theoretical implications - which became increasingly anti-party.

His discovery, when in 1920 the councils started to concentrate and build up their attacks on capitalism, that capitalism had allies within the PSI, only encouraged this "anti-jacobinism".

#### IV

The capitalists had never looked favorably on the *Commissioni* and were even more dubious about the development of these organisations in factory councils. At first they tried to compromise the factory councils' leaders by barely hidden bribes and presents. When they had no success with men like Parodi, who won their grudging respect, they realised that the new conciliar movement would not be incorporated into the system like earlier institutions. (60) They realised that these organisations were, as Gramsci stated, concerned not only with economic gains but with making social revolution and decided that they were not to be tolerated.

Having emerged from the war stronger and more united, and soon to establish their own nation-wide confederation (the *Confindustria*) the capitalists prepared to take offensive measures to crush the movement. Impelling them to immediate action was the occupation, near Turin, of factories by factory workforces in February 1920. On 7 March, Gino Olivetti, secretary general of the new employers' federation, pronounced that two different powers could not exist in the factories. On 20 March he and de Benedetti, president of the Industrial League and Giovanni Agnelli, head of the Fiat works, informed the prefect of Turin that they proposed to conduct a general lockout to smash the movement as soon as the time was opportune. (61) Their opportunity came a few days later. The workers were opposed to the proposed daylight saving change in hours, from which they expected to lose, and upset by the reduction in the wages of some commissars. A factory council altered some of the bundy clocks in protest and the management reacted by dismissing three commissars. Immediately the local FIOM and PSI sections lent support. A general withdrawal and lockout ensued at FIAT.

Both sides were quite aware that it was a struggle between proletarian and capitalist power (62) Gramsci had set the scene on the day the dispute began with his article "The end of a power". He described Agnelli as a "hero" of capitalism who ruled like an autocrat in a little capitalist state of fifteen thousand men. But he warned Agnelli that it was a difficult state to rule autocratically because of its size, and because it created its own antithesis in its working class, who found unity in the factory councils and who had sixty thousand mouths to feed.

Within days the other workers' organisations of Turin had started to galvanise support for the locked out men. The owners retaliated and by April 3, 90,000 men were idle. The will of both sides hardened, as they saw that what was at stake was a crucial moral victory. Early hopes of moderation were dashed. Rumors started to fly around the city, as first the province, and then the whole of Piedmont,

were involved: "fifty thousand soldiers, on the hills around a battery of artillery, reinforcements in the surrounding countryside, armored cars in the city, and machine guns trained on private houses". Indeed, troops were moved into the vicinity of the city until railway workers in other cities prevented further dispatches.

Gramsci sarcastically thanked "the industrial lords for making clear to everybody, even though it wasn't needed, what the terms of relative strength were"; and he warned that there could be no favorable resolution for the Turin workers if they did not extend the strike throughout Italy. On April 13 a general strike was declared in Turin and the province and 500,000 workers stopped work.

Gramsci and the Turinese leaders then turned to the "fire-breathing" maximalist leaders of the Socialist Party, and to their rivals in the General Confederation of Labor, with an appeal to extend the strike; this was essential to the success of the Turinese workforce. The Party and the CGL refused to support the extension of the movement and ten days later the workers returned to the factories on the owners' terms. (It was a disaster.)

Gramsci had learnt a further lesson about the PSI and the CGL and he wrote: "The Turinese working class has been defeated. Among the conditions determining this defeat .... was the limitedness of the minds of the leaders of the Italian working class movement. Among the second level conditions determining the defeat is thus the lack of revolutionary cohesion of the entire Italian proletariat, which cannot bring forth .... a trade union hierarchy which reflects its interests and its revolutionary spirit. Among the first level conditions which determined the defeat we must therefore place the general state of Italian society, the conditions of life in every province and every region in which the Confederation of Labor has a branch. And it is certain that the Turinese working class was defeated because in Italy there do not exist, or have not yet matured, the

necessary and sufficient conditions for an organic and disciplined movement of the working class and peasants together (my emphasis - A.D.). This immaturity, this inadequacy of the Italian working people is undoubted evidence of the 'superstition' and mental limitedness of the leaders responsible for the Italian working people."

Though the capitalists had made minute and extensive preparations to crush the working class from the time of the Milan conference of the Confindustria, the leaders of the Socialist Party had done nothing about it, giving the workers a tremendous disadvantage.

The solidarity of workers both inside and outside Turin after the general strike had been declared had led to a belief in "the possibility of a general insurrection of the Italian proletariat against the State" but it was thought bound to fail because of inadequate preparation.

Forced, and still forced after the defeat, into specific forms of organisation by the objective conditions, the workers were also forced into their action - something little understood by the "cold unenthusiastic bureaucrats" who ran the workers' organisations, who had been placed there by nepotism and bureaucracy and not by the workers themselves.

Gramsci concluded that the PSI leaders who could have, if not secured the success of the strike, at least maintained and secured the gains the workers had made in the factories, had done nothing, and the Turin workforce would now have to fight on two fronts: for the conquest of industrial power and for the conquest of the trade unions and proletarian unity. (63)

V

Gramsci and his friends had been forced into a position of opposition to the maximalist leaders of the PSI like that towards the trade union leaders. It was not the first time that Gramsci and his followers had taken a position of criticism vis-a-vis the maximalist leaders of the

party. In January he had called on them to "renew the party" if they did not wish to be left behind by events. On 11-13 January at a PSI conference in Florence, Terracini had criticised Serrati for advancing a "maximalism" which is no more than a "literary exercise and a theoretical proposal", and told him to work in the factories or return to the "melting-pot" of centrism. (64)

But it was with their lack of support from the locked-out workers in April that Gramsci moved into a position of more extreme criticism, and an ever-widening rift developed between him and the party leaders.

The party leaders had done nothing to implement the decisions of December 1918 despite an increasing disimprovement in conditions among the working class. The first step in this implementation should have been the expulsion of the reformists from the party because after the leadership had decided in favor of creating a dictatorship of the proletariat in Italy. The reformists, who openly supported the reconstruction of capitalism in Italy decided, at a meeting held on 22-23 December 1918, to oppose the leadership's commitment to the Russian revolution. Their leaders, Turati and Treves, wrote and spoke in denigration of the revolution and Lenin, and denied the appropriateness of Bolshevik methods in Italy (65) throughout early 1919, but Serrati tended to be affected by their vigor and his campaign against them was weak. Though the reformists themselves challenged him to expel them, he and his supporters made no attempt to do so. It appears that Serrati was so fearful of splitting the party he had united five years before that he was prepared to advance views little different from those of Treves in *Critica sociale*, and which blatantly ignored the party's commitment to revolution. Indeed, in January 1919 Serrati said that: "The fact that we won the war has made impossible in Italy the methods used in Russia and Germany - in Italy the consequences of the war have created a reformist and democratic situation." (66)

This policy of concessions to the anti-revolutionaries did not correspond with the increasing class consciousness among the workers and the obviously imminent frontal clash between capitalism and the proletariat, which the party leaders ignored in the interests of maintaining unity with the reformists.

As a consequence of their wilful blindness to reality, the maximalists made no preparations for the revolution to which they were committed. No increased expenditure was made on organisation and propaganda. Even the most intransigent of the maximalists, those of Turin, suffered from a form of fatalism and waited for the revolution to happen as the result of one of the many revolts, strikes and killings of the first half of 1919. Nenni himself was forced to admit: "Nobody placed himself at the head of the mass, nobody tried to provide a political outlet to the malcontent." (67) The masses, when they fought, therefore fought for petty-bourgeois objectives. (68)

After July the first post-war wave of unrest died down, and the various sections of the party started to prepare for the party congress in Bologna in October, and the Italian general elections in November. The polemic between the maximalists and the reformists continued without resolution. The first had now committed themselves to the Third International, which was formed at Moscow in January 1919 and whose aim was to destroy social-democracy and conduct the world revolution. The second replied by attacking the maximalist program for Italy as "the complete destruction of the party". (69) Even now Serrati's response was limited to words. He reproved Turati for "anti-revolutionary" activity when "he well knows that almost all of the party maintains that bolshevism is the purest expression of its doctrine" (70) and called for "a sharp turn of the helm to the left". He even started a new journal, *Il Comunismo* to propagate the ideas of the Third International.

In its first number he specifically called for the expulsion of the reformists and a complete centralisation of the party as necessary so that the PSI could ".....

gather with all its forces, in a fully conscious manner, the collapsing bourgeois regime" in a revolution. (71)

Yet he never got beyond verbal attacks. Although at the Bologna congress the party accepted bolshevism and adhesion to the Third International by an overwhelming vote of 48,411 to the reformists' opposing 14,880, Turati and his followers were not expelled and rushed off to tell their electors that these new views would be opposed. Turati publicly stated that he and his followers would stay in the party to temper the "foreign influence". He denied that there was any revolutionary situation in Italy, or that there was any possibility of one developing. (72) He referred to the dictatorship of the proletariat as "a mean ideal of brutal and armed violence".

Serrati, despite Lenin's urging that he expel the "open and masked opportunists - and there are many of them in the Italian parliamentary group", still only engaged in verbal polemics with Turati. He denied that his group had thought of making "a systematic doctrinal defence of violence, to found on violence the new order of communism" but recognised "our practical and contingent adhesion to the use of violence." (73) "The regime of the Soviets, of the councils of workers, is already a fact, not only in Russia, but everywhere". So Turati's defence of the traditional methods of the PSI in their stead was a "puerile illusion". (74)

This lip service to the conciliar system hid the truth that Serrati had not approved of the factory councils of Turin. He did not believe that they should be elected democratically, and thus include anarchists and syndicalists. In November 1919 he called them an "aberration". (75)

Thinking like a blanquist, he did not believe in the revolutionary potential of the "amorphous mass" and thus thought that the councils could be only "technical" organisations, leaving making revolution to the party. (76)

Gramsci had bitterly opposed the reformists and supported the maximalists

through 1918-19, but this hostility of Serrati caused him to reprove:

*"The Socialist Party hasn't even attempted to get out of the realm of verbal affirmations, it has not given the workers and peasants the concrete guide to make real institutional innovations. For the Third International, 'making' the revolution means 'giving' power to the soviets, means struggling to attain a communist majority in the soviets; for the Third International being revolutionary means getting out of the realm of trade union corporativism and party sectarian activity and seeing the movement in masses of human beings which is seeking a form, and working so that that form is the system of councils. Lenin's letter (in support of maximalism) sanctions a rather unhappy and unreassuring situation; we totter between catastrophe .... and a worse catastrophe - a Constituent Assembly."* (77)

A month after, in January, he called for a renewal of the Socialist Party because it had not organised the masses whom it had aroused with its revolutionary speeches, when its task was to prepare conditions favorable for a proletarian democracy. (78) In particular, he wanted the party to expel the reformists. When this desire was coupled with his association in Turin with found himself very close to the positions and members of the "abstentionist" group in the party, which was led by Bordiga.

Bordiga had been greatly disconcerted by Serrati's refusal to take concrete action against the reformists. Through the journal he and his followers had set up in December 1918 he engaged in savage condemnation of the reformists and opposed all maximalist compromises with them. (79)

In February 1919 he came out openly in favor of violent revolutionary action and eschewal of all parliamentary activity, earning the denomination "abstentionist". When the maximalist leaders refused to consider this policy, despite their adhesion to the Third International, which demanded similar

action, Bordiga condemned them, as Gramsci did later in the year, for lack of "precise directives". (81) By the middle of 1919 his group had won many regional sections of the PSI to their intransigent position. (82) At the Bologna conference, Bordiga expressed the position of himself and many of his followers clearly:

*"We, comrades, have been badly misunderstood: people in many quarters have spoken of anarchism and syndicalism. Instead we are - and we will be - marxist socialists; we hope to show that our present position corresponds completely with what are the basic doctrines of the party, laid down by the classic Manifesto of 1848. Socialism was elaborated as a doctrine substantially through a critique of bourgeois idealist and utopian conceptions, an interpretation of history which made the emancipation of the proletariat no longer a problem of ideal Justice but a complex historical development which was studied in all its developments, from which was deduced the origins in history of societies which have preceded us, and in the organism of contemporary society, and thus could be foreseen its coming end."* (83)

He went on that as marxists, he and his followers believed that parliamentary democracy was a bourgeois sham, though 'social-democrats' had ignored this fundamental marxist tenet. The Russian revolution had belied parliamentary practice by showing what methods marxists should use. He concluded by demanding the expulsion of any socialist who would not accept bolshevism, adding that he feared that the maximalists would not do this as they were too concerned with electoral success to split the party. (84)

Bordiga's dark expectations were fulfilled. Serrati did nothing to expel the reformists, as we have seen, and despite disclaimers that he was interested in success in the November elections, started to gather parliamentary aspirants around him after October.

By 1920 Bordiga was so bitterly hostile to the reformists and maximalists that *Il Soviet* printed these words: "In our view, nothing does so much good as a split. The first things must be to put everyone in his proper place. One will know in this way exactly who is a communist and who is not: there will be no more confusion on this score .... A good split clears the air. Communists to one side, reformists of all persuasions and gradations to the other." (85)

This general convergence of Gramsci's and Bordiga's views should not mislead us about their differences. Despite the leading role played in the factory councils by "abstentionists", Bordiga was as opposed to them as Serrati. Misunderstanding Gramsci's notion of their role, and, perhaps chagrined by the Turinese support for electoral activity in November 1919 (even the local "abstentionists" supported this, support which spelled defeat for his group in early 1920, Bordiga attacked the councils as a concession to gradualism, based on the error that fundamental gains could be made on an economic terrain rather than in a frontal assault. (86)

Despite such abiding differences, by April Gramsci had come over to Bordiga's position on the party. Faced by the blatant PSI opposition to the councils during the lockout, Gramsci expressed a sneering hostility at the party's meeting in Milan, when it had planned to meet in Turin. He demanded that the party clean itself up. Except in Moscow, where Lenin read his report with approval; his attack was ignored. (87)

The defeat of the strike, the disastrous setback to the councils, and the negative role of the party symbolised in the shifting of the venue of the party meeting from Turin to Milan, brought home to Gramsci the all important role the party could play in the success or failure of a revolutionary movement. Henceforth he directed as much attention to the party as to the councils. At the time of the strike he had indicated that the efficacy of the councils would be nil unless the party played a positive role in extending them to other areas and supporting their activity. Henceforth, while keeping the councils going, the foremost immediate task was to renew the party. The party he proposed in May 1920 was something fundamentally and radically new, and a complete departure from previous PSI traditions. (88)

## FOOTNOTES

47. *Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 455-7.
48. Gramsci had a clear intuition that this would happen. See *Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 31-34.
49. This declaration was promulgated on 31 October 1919. See *Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 192-3.
50. *Ordine Nuovo*, p. 129.
51. Battista, Santhia, p. 70.
52. *Ordine Nuovo*, p. 184, p. 463.
53. P. Spriano, ed., *L'Ordine Nuovo* (Einaudi, Turin, 1973), p. 37 n.l., *Tasca* in Berti, p. 67.
54. O. Pastore, "Il problema delle commissioni interne", *Ordine Nuovo*, 1, 14, 15 August 1919. See Spriano, *Gramsci e l'Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 54-8.
55. Guarnieri, pp. 28ff.
56. *Ordine Nuovo*, p. 386.
57. See e.g. the decisions of the Camera del Lavoro in Guarnieri, p. 28, pp. 49-50; Caracciolo in *Mondo operaio*, op. cit.
58. See "Sindacati consigli", 11 October 1919; "Sindacati e dittatura", 25 October 1919, "Sindacalismo a consigli", 8 November 1919; in *Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 34-48.
59. *Ordine Nuovo*, p. 185; "Discorso agli anarchici", 3-10 April 1920, *Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 396-401.
60. Montagnana, pp. 148-9.
61. See *Ordine Nuovo* p. 109 for Gramsci's description of the Milan meeting of Confindustria; Guarnieri, pp. 60-8; Spriano, *Gramsci e l'Ordine Nuovo*, p. 103.
62. See e.g. the Camera del Lavoro's motion in Guarnieri, p. 74.
63. "Superstizioni e realta", *Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 108-114.
64. Spriano, *Gramsci e l'Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 104-5.
65. Turati wrote in a reply to an article by Antonio Labriola in support of leninism, "that 'Viva Lenin' meant 'death to socialism' ", *Critica sociale*, op. cit., p. 435.
66. *Avanti*, 5 January 1919.
67. Nenni, p. 31; Davidson, p. 359.
68. Cortesi, p. 709.
69. *Critica sociale*, 1-15 September 1919.
70. *Avanti* (Rome edition), 10 October 1919.
71. *Il Comunismo*, 1 October 1920, p. 2ff.
72. See *Agli elettori di Milano* (*Critica sociale*, Milan, 1919) *passim*; *Trent'anni di Critica sociale* in Valeri, pp. 523-530.
73. *Il Comunismo*, 1 November 1919, p. 184.
74. *Ibid.*, 1 December 1919, p. 428.
75. Spriano, *Gramsci e l'Ordine Nuovo*, p. 91.
76. *Il Comunismo*, 15-20 December 1919. 77. "Il rivoluzionario qualificato", 20 December 1919, *Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 387-9.
78. "Primo: Rinnovare il Partito", 24-31 January 1920, *Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 389-392.
80. *Il Soviet*, 2 February 1919. 81. *Ibid.*, 18 May 1919.
82. Cortesi, p. 708.
83. Cortesi, p. 735.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 735-742.
85. Fiori, *Vita*, p. 153.
86. Guarnieri, pp. 52ff.
87. *Ordine Nuovo*, p. 186; *Tasca*, *Il Mondo*, 1 September 1953.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*AUSTRALIAN CULTURAL ELITES: Intellectual Traditions in Sydney and Melbourne*, by John Docker, Angus and Robertson, 1974 (165 pages, bibliography, notes, index).

-- TIM ROWSE

One of the great weaknesses of Australian political life is the miserable failure of marxist analysis to make a positive impact on most of our secular intellectuals. By intellectuals I mean that more or less coherent and continuous group of people who write for our quarterlies, churn out weekly columns in our newspapers, present Australian society to us in books and essays, and occasionally comment on the affairs of the nation and/or the 'human condition', for television or radio. Sometimes their books are set for schools (such as Donald Horne's *Lucky Country*). They are not always household names but they are immensely influential since their function is to produce the ideas with which most Australians know their society and its place in the world. Naturally I'm using 'know' with my fingers crossed: the knowledge presented in these different media is ideological, with its characteristic presumptions of pluralism, consensus, affluence and its comfortable and indulgent fatalism about human nature.

'Class' is a word rarely used by these commentators; when it occurs it is used descriptively as a socio-economic category or to explain some 'breakdown' of industrial relations. In their literary and artistic criticism the mainstream writers are rarely concerned with art as a reinforcer of the ideologies of capitalism. The universities, with a few 'ratbag' exceptions, treat marxism as an historical topic, an intellectual curiosity, but not as a way of understanding society and history.

A genuine challenge to Australian capitalism will require that analysis of all social activities be made from the point of view of the working class. There needs to be a struggle against ideology itself contesting the orthodoxies which clutter our media and reinforce class domination. My impression of 'the Left' in Australia is that it has often failed to distance itself from non-marxist orthodoxies about Australian social life. Most writers are still too comfortable with images of Australia

which posture as unorthodox and Leftish, but contain little to question the class power of the bourgeoisie. There are marxist parties, unions and student groups but there is not an effective marxist analysis of our indigenous cultural streams coming from any of them. There have been some faint stirrings in this direction from writers in *Arena* (Melbourne), in the 1960s, echoed in Richard Gordon's anthology *The Australian New Left* (1970), but nothing has come from this quarter since.

Nothing, that is, except John Docker's book, which in some respects reflects its association with *Arena*, where some of its material was first published. In this volume, Docker has written about some of the most important producers of bourgeois ideology in Australia this century, though he never conceives them in these terms. His concern is, rather, to argue that Australian culture is not a monolithic tradition, but contains at least two distinct traditions of assumptions about society, politics, education and creativity. Docker locates these traditions geographically; one is characteristic of Melbourne, the other of Sydney.

The Sydney tradition is one of 'elite pluralism': society is composed of many groups and subcultures of which the artistic/intellectual/bohemian one is more free, uncompromised, creative, sexually honest. The life-style of the intellectuals is self-consciously antagonistic to the rest of society which is wowsery, dull, utilitarian, conformist, materialistic, etc. Their political practice is *laissez-faire* and anarchist. This tradition has both a literary (Brennan, Slessor, Lindsay, A.D. Hope, Patrick White) and a philosophical component (John Anderson and the Freethought/Libertarian tradition). Basic assumptions about society and nature are shared by the poets and the philosophers.

The Melbourne tradition is more historically conscious than the Platonic Sydneites, more engaged with a distinctive Australian tradition which they formulated and wanted to see flourish. "The Melbourne intellectual will characteristically think that an Australian, nationalist derived, social democratic ethos and egalitarian ethic are compatible with what are seen as central values of European civilisation. Melbourne intellectuals feel at the centre of their society, both because they are spokesmen for, or social activists on behalf of, the social democratic spirit of Australia's past, and because they are bringing to Australia European standards of sophistication and relevance." (p. IX). Their political practice is more activist, favoring the ALP, though a considerable number were CPA members

before 1956 (some of them are now associated with *Overland*). This tradition is analysed by Docker in terms of the work of Vance and Nettie Palmer, and C.B. Christesen's *Meanjin*. It is a more self-conscious tradition than the Sydney literary one, from Brennan to White. The Sydney poets and novelists are not conceived as a tradition in the same sense as the Andersonians and the Meanjin intellectuals. The Sydney literary tradition is elucidated by Docker through a detailed literary exegesis which is perceptive, even ingeniously so, but which is not historical. Chapter Four is called "Patrick White's Australian Literary Context", but it is precisely not about any 'context'. The critical reception of White and the illustrative use made of him by some social commentators would have been good material for this chapter. Instead we get an extended description of the thematic imagery of *The Vioisector* and *Riders in the Chariot*. This literary-critical framework encompassing chapters 1-5 excludes the social impact of these poems and novels from its focus, treating these works as art-objects whose cultural significance is internal; this is an aesthetic rather than historical approach, despite the chronological ordering of the discussion.

The second half of the book is about literary critics and social commentators of both traditions; it is more readable and it necessarily begins to confront questions of historical interpretation. In these chapters, Docker deals with *Meanjin*, Vance and Nettie Palmer, the difference between *Meanjin* and *Southerly* (Sydney's major literary journal), and "John Anderson and the Sydney Free Thought Tradition", a fascinating account of the strange avenues into which intellectual radicalism can turn. The interest in these chapters is more due to the material itself than to Docker's approach, however. He is concerned with elucidating the different accounts of society and the different cultural projects of each tradition. It is still an internal approach. Docker's treatment of the historical context of his intellectuals (mainly 1940 to the present, apart from a discussion of the Palmers between the wars) is frustratingly cavalier. For instance in his Introduction we can read these two sentences, two pages apart:

Although spread over a number of decades, these Sydney writers share a continuous historical situation. (x)  
and

The thinking in both of the Sydney traditions represents intellectual choices in terms of 'international' movements and doctrines,

literary philosophical and political, but these intellectual choices emerge at the same time as a response to specific Sydney historical situations. (xii)

I think the first sentence is meant to paraphrase the view of the intellectuals themselves, while the second is Docker's own summary comment, later fleshed out a little. (i.e. in his description of the Sydney hostility to Labor's post-war planning proposals.)

But importantly, the first sentence requires my gloss, for Docker does little to place his intellectuals historically. This should not surprise us, since the book's intention never really involves anything but a close reading of selected texts and a differentiation of their themes into two categories or 'traditions'. And I think he has clearly established the presence of two thematic streams, two self-images of literary, artistic or scholarly activity. My argument against the book is that this question of cultural homogeneity and Docker's answer of duality or plurality evades the most important questions about Australian intellectuals, their function as producers of ideology in a class society.

We can locate Docker as a Sydney pluralist by referring to the three most critical themes in the book: (1) the critique of patriarchy (in the comments on Lindsay's and Hope's sexist image of women, and in the acquiescence of Nettie Palmer and Miles Franklin to a male-centred account of the tradition); (2) the attack on the *Meanjin* intellectuals' aspiration to reform the culture through their critical and literary efforts; and (3) "the degeneration of free-thought" (p. 153). The third argument implies some commitment to the original value of Anderson's pluralist scepticism; the second and the first show the pluralist critique in action. Docker writes of *Meanjin*:

To see Australian society as it wanted, *Meanjin* intellectuals had to deny in Australian history evidence and expressions which did not fit into a corporate tradition. They could not see that historically the values they admired were not incompatible with acquisitive individualism and a liberal hegemony, and that in the name of these values women and other 'races' and cultures were excluded. (p. 109).

Tepid pluralism, locating heterogeneity in our 'tradition', is the only critical standpoint adopted by the author, though there is a kind of unspoken ironical distance between Docker and all his material. But this is so in any

account of someone's 'assumptions'; and it is part of the convention of historical narrative that previous lived experience is compressed and reformulated, and held at a distance - a rhetorical, rather than theoretical distance in this case. Lastly, the first five chapters of the book are just the kind of literit exegesis that *Southerly* critics are characterised by, in that it does not look outwards to the conditions which nurtured this common creative project.

But what would a marxist approach to this material look like? The marxist historiography of culture is not in very good shape at the moment, but it seems elementary to start by looking at these writers as producers of knowledge. Although Althusser has recently asserted that ideological practice has its own historical path, which does not necessarily reflect contemporary economic and political developments, this "autonomy" must not become a slippery-dip back into the history of ideas. For the history of ideological practice to be properly constituted, we must take seriously the notion that ideology is produced and involves a means of production. It is the critical task of historians like Docker to discern the basic intellectual apparatus with which Australian intellectuals have produced their picture of Australian society.

To give Docker his due, the chapters on the Sydney literary tradition do elucidate common assumptions about nature and society. However, the relationship between literature (i.e. that which is commonly called literature) and popular social thought is that the former provides "social" insights according to categories provided by the latter. Thus, the chapter on Patrick White could have discussed the way his novels have been used to uphold certain images of Australian political culture such as "suburbia". The historical significance of White is not purely internal to his novels, as Docker implies by his focus, but consists just as much in the prevailing readings of his work. As marxists we need to approach these writers as the disseminators of a knowledge which assists the people to accept more or less willingly the goodness and rationality of the capitalist social relations in which they find themselves. All sorts of ideas can play this role, which is one reason why capitalist societies can be culturally heterogeneous. Religious fatalism, cynical pragmatism, sexist or anti-working class humor, bourgeois economics, etc., all help to rationalise to individuals their behaviour in a capitalist society. The ideas dealt with in Docker's book mostly tend to be about the way we conceive Australian society and history, "character", and art. Both traditions mystify and frustrate by their pervasiveness a marxist

comprehension of Australian society.

By reading these writers we do not come to a clear understanding of the process of class struggle in Australian society, the role of the ALP and the media, the activities of Australian imperialism. Some writers are explicitly conservative, but more dangerous are those who vividly articulate certain anti-capitalist sentiments. Their arguments are usually rooted in an Enlightenment Humanism, a confident assertion of rational and humane values, an ethical protest against a diffuse family of modern juggernauts: technology, the USA, the power elite, greed. Characteristically this critique ignores or dismisses the presence of material forces which could challenge and disintegrate the source of their anxiety.

However, it would not be entirely fair to lump Vance Palmer with Norman Lindsay, nor Ian Turner with Peter Coleman. Palmer and Turner have been active partisans of a kind of socialism in their different ways, and the Melbourne tradition, as formulated by Docker, must have nourished the huge Moratorium movement in that city. *Meanjin* has a good record as an opponent of Australian McCarthyism when such opposition required personal courage. An adequate marxist account of Australian intellectuals must recognise the limited virtue of the Melbourne social-democratic affiliation and the sturdy anarchism which still survives in Sydney. The strength and weakness of Australia's "Left-Intelligentsia" are largely derived from these two currents. The weakness of both is their denigration of marxism and their subsequent disdain for revolutionary politics and particularly revolutionary parties. Some intellectuals, like Ian Turner and Steven Murray-Smith have had unfortunate experiences of the CPA in the mid-fifties, when it was so slow to respond to the international disintegration of stalinism. Their position is now a kind of radical disenchantment, with spasmodic and nostalgic enthusiasm for the ALP.

While not wanting to trivialise the personal acts of dissent from dominant Australian values by some of the intellectuals in Docker's book, we must remember that the political practice of these intellectuals qua intellectuals is the production of knowledge. The political and historical significance of these writers is to be found in what they said and wrote.

This introduces my chief quarrel with Docker: in stressing the two different streams he has overlooked thematic continuities between the two traditions of social



commentary and literary criticism, continuities which stem from constituting themselves as elites. In the remainder of this review I will try to illustrate this criticism.

The production of knowledge, like the production of things, requires a means of production. The creativity of any writer is not reducible to some ineffable personal essence, as many Romantic theorists say. Writers use a certain intellectual apparatus in their work, their means of production of knowledge, which they do not necessarily affirm. It consists of certain assumptions, an intellectual framework or "problematic" within which certain questions and types of evidence make sense, and others do not. The continuity between these two traditions, I would argue, is their sharing of a basic problematic, rooted in their identification of themselves as intellectuals. Both traditions share basic assumptions about what an intellectual is, and the place which intellectuals typically occupy in their society. I refer to the enduring assumption that the intellectual is declassé, alienated, a privileged observer from outside who can discriminate between truth and myth, knowledge and socially-derived prejudices. Marxists who claim to be able to make this discrimination do so on the basis of a conscious philosophical theory, which is external to their personal or political identity. In Docker's writers, however, their perspicacity and legitimacy as commentators is derived from an established social acceptance, a corporate confidence, and, in the case of the Andersonians, an empiricist theory of knowledge, substantiated for some by a necessary bohemian elitism.

Docker would see this assumption of intellectual alienation as characteristic of the Sydney tradition but rather foreign to the Melburnians. He sees the latter according to their own estimate, as central to society, engaged and proselytising the social-democratic ethos. But this account of the Melbourne stance is taken from some of the most optimistic of *Meanjin's* articles, and is insensitive to the gap between identification with the tradition, and estrangement from the present. In the 1960s *Meanjin* published several articles arguing the modern alienation of intellectuals or "Reason". Docker notes the rapid alternations between optimism and pessimism throughout *Meanjin's* (Christesen's) history but does not seem to realise that this came from a deep-seated insecurity about the efficacy of their cultural project. Docker also quotes statements of frank elitism, not able to place them. If the *Meanjin* intellectuals saw themselves as central to

anything it was to a hopefully-awaited democratic destiny, not to a persistently uncongenial present. Vincent Buckley, a Melbourne intellectual from head to toe, in 1962 criticised Australian intellectuals for being job-oriented and for living in "suburbia" and gave as his definition of a true intellectual someone "who would think about the destiny of man and recall some lines of poetry even in a prison-camp".

I think that intellectuals from both traditions see this element of estrangement, of brave universalism in the face of the overwhelmingly contingent, as an essential part of their raison d'être as writers and teachers. It is a personal affirmation which has the impersonal currency of a profession, in the old sense of the word. And it is this affirmation which binds them all to a particular epistemological stance and certain common tendencies in their theory of society.

The epistemological position is rarely asserted, especially in Melbourne, but it is basically that the intellectual's task is to step back from social engagement, and see through the myths, knock the sacred cows, rise with ethnographic majesty and see the overall reality. These perspicacities are the prerogative of those who by their own affirmation can step outside of history, away from power, money, and mundane concerns.

The characteristic project of intellectuals in both traditions is to deal creatively and critically with society's "mythologies". For both streams society is held together by basic mythologies about itself; for Melbourne, myth and traditions are signs of cultural maturity. For Sydney intellectuals, myths are the inevitable sustenance of most of (benighted) society. Whether celebratory or critical, the privileged perspective of the historian and philosopher, as the custodians of what is deemed mythical, is the same.

For Melbourne intellectuals (and Max Harris) myth needs to be continually criticised and reformulated in social commentary and literature, art and satire. Docker deals with this project of the sustenance of myth as a *Meanjin* intention.

Their explicit ambition was to make Australian society as rich in mythology as aboriginal culture. This was the task of artists and intellectuals. It was discussed in the series "Letters to Tom Collins" in the 1940s. Historians Russell Ward and Vance Palmer celebrated the 1890s as the Eden of our democratic, socialist, egalitarian character, subsequently undermined by the urbanising trends of the twentieth century. Manning

Clark's history bemoans the crushing of a native bush tradition by British gentility in the second half of the nineteenth century. Each of these writers has been allowed to be evasive about the factual truth and literary tendentiousness of their descriptions. They have usually been exonerated by a critical consensus that sees history as an expression of a personal vision and as a formulation of society's necessary mythology. The formulation is celebratory and sympathetic, but includes the possibility of criticism of "outmoded mythologies".

It is significant that in the less optimistic 'sixties *Meanjin's* attempt at seven surveys of "Australian society after Menzies" were published under the "Strine" rubric of Godzone (God's own country). Strine, a new mythology with a necessary protective irony; celebration from a slightly disenchanted distance. This irony germinated from an a priori detachment from the myth which always lay at the heart of the most confident *Meanjin* writing of the 'forties.

Sydney's characteristic detachment from social mythology has always been much more scathing; and it has often been backed up by a proud bohemianism and attempts at a sexual honesty whose deficiencies Docker correctly criticises. Anderson's militant scepticism is the seminal influence here. The homage which Anderson and his confidently-empiricist followers paid to Sorel and Freud was based on their alleged realism, naturalism and objectivity, as opposed to the "metaphysics" of other theories. Anderson quotes Sorel as a source of his own ethics, a realist ethics in which "good" was not a notion but an actual historical force (the proletariat in the pre-war Anderson). This ethical theory was superior to other idealist ones in its realism, he argued. From Sorel, Andersonians also derived the confidence to classify behaviour as "rational" or "irrational", "disinterested" or "interested". Reasoning consisted of observation, uncluttered by categories, and worked over by a prior and irreproachable Logic. As for Freud, Anderson thought that psychoanalysis was revolutionary because of its naturalism, its ability to point out the link between an idea and "unconscious" interests, an improved theory for distilling the rational and objective from the irrational and subjective in human thought.

Armed with these critical tools, Anderson could look forward to effective revolutions in thought:

*The only revolution properly so-called is an intellectual revolution, "a revolution in ideas".*

*not any rearrangement of externals. This is what the work of the intellectual producer (of the realist or empiricist philosopher) resides in; not "social levelling" or any other practical understanding but simply making discoveries .... and being concerned with following an intellectual tradition within an intellectual institution. (J. Anderson, Studies in Empirical Philosophy, 1962, p. 359.)*

This quote could serve as a manifesto for Libertarians whose principled passivity and intellectual elitism Docker describes. The intellectual project is a non-ideological concern with the ideology of others. Docker laments its decline into a technique of personal authoritarianism (Libertarian women who criticised sexism were accused of penis-envy).

But the more substantial case against this project is that it discourages a commitment to a materialist interpretation of Australian society. They cannot see that the myths which sustain society have as their basis, not the herd-like gullibility of "the masses", but objective conditions of existence, and particularly the conditions of existence, and particularly the ideological apparatuses of capitalist state power: the family, the churches, the mass media, and educators and writers like themselves. They are thus left with an elitist fatalism about society which suits political preferences right across the spectrum, except for those who see in objective circumstances the possibility of revolution.

Donald Horne and Peter Coleman would be the most influential commentators to have come from the Sydney milieu. (Both have been editors of the Bulletin.) Their criticism is strictly of the iconoclast variety. Never ill at ease with Australian capitalism, they align themselves intellectually with a broad coalition of anti-Establishment tendencies (anti-monarchist, anti-politician, etc.) in which union leadership, self-seeking politicians, bishops, and protectionist business interests seem to share blame equally for any Australian malaise. With this pluralist framework they can only identify obvious "interests" and "irrational" tendencies a fundamentally reformist social criticism.

The Andersonian commitment to the irrationality of society's beliefs and behaviour was handled in different ways. The stance of Left-Libertarians has been more critical, and celebrates a more "rational" Bohemian ethic. Others, like Horne, Coleman and P.H. Partridge, more engaged in the social sciences, were influenced by American theories of mass society, and the unattached and besieged intelligentsia. The early Cold War was the time

in which they began to publish, and they were clearly influenced by the anti-communism of Anderson and American theories of social collapse through mass hysteria. Except of course that in Australia, rather than any dangerous swing to the left, we saw the entrenchment of a firm anti-communism; and so these theories became an opportunity to celebrate the retention of a "healthy" conservatism. They wrote benevolently and half mockingly of the myths that allegedly sustain social peace in Australia.

Thus Horne (on Anzac Day): "It is not a patriotic day, but, as Peter Coleman said in *The Bulletin*, a 'tribal festival', the folk seeing itself as it is - unpretentious and comradely."

Coleman, defending censorship: "It had come to the view that censorship was symbolically useful as a form of community protest against degradation."

That the Sydney presumption of community irrationality could cease being contemptuous and become ironically approving underlines the basic similarity between the Melbourne and Sydney problematics. The above quotations reveal a definite convergence between Andersonian and Meanjin social commentaries. Docker can illustrate a conflict between the two over concrete issues in the 1940s but this conflict did not last any longer than *Meanjin's* fragile optimism about Australia's progress to an ALP, Furphy-inspired, democracy. Once this confidence in the Australian radical ethos died, new sustaining myths took its place. But the new myths were more and more derived from satire, the new social archetypes of Barry Humphries and the celebration of 'strine' noted above. The commitment to myth always contained some degree of critical reserve, and by the 1960s the reserve had more to feed on. Optimism became satirical celebration, a platform where Ian Turner's lecture on Aussie Rules, Boyd's description of "suburbia" and Horne's patronising approval of Anzac Day could meet with little discomfort. All three accounts of Australian society incorporate the same posture of intellectual pessimism about the masses. In 1972 they were united over the ALP, on the one hand a mellow iconoclasm towards the epigones of Menzies, on the other a rather desperate optimism about social democracy.

There has been one outstanding example of the convergence of the two traditions in their social criticism which illustrates the common irony about mass society, in the popularity of "suburbia" as an image of postwar Australian civilisation, and of "classless", post-Keynesian affluence.

The term "suburbia" has its origins in the

social commentary of Edwardian England, to describe the lower middle class civilisation of suburban London, with its desperate emulation of the gentility of the wealthy and powerful. It quickly passed into the vocabulary of contemporary Melburnians Louis Esson and Vance Palmer. In 1921 the latter bemoaned the decline of the ethos of Australian radicalism (the Legend of the Nineties). He was reacting to the failure of the working class to force a transition to socialism after World War I, a betrayal of pastoral radicalism by a spiritless urban culture, he thought. He called it "dominance of villadom". He contrasted "sophisticated villadom" with the radicalism of the bush and complained that the energy of the nation was now being wasted on the "supply of boots and chocolates to the suburbs". Between the wars, a contempt for suburbia was part of the corporate assurance of Sydney bohemians. After World War II, when "socialist aspirations" were again disappointed, "suburbia" was again taken up as an image of an electorate preoccupied with domestic trivia, rather than political affairs. For Robin Boyd it was an image of an aesthetically-conservative ethos; in Patrick White it became a symbol of the dispirited materialism which surrounded and thwarted the spiritual heroes and heroines of his novels - very much a Vance Palmer antithesis. Finally, in the 'sixties, "suburbia" became an explanatory image of social complacency, in the work of both Horne and the Godzone writers.

"Suburbia" is not just an image of some intellectuals' estrangement and elitism however. It is a "concept" of great currency among intellectuals who regard themselves as social critics. It contains an assumption and a conviction of social consensus. (Horne: "The genteel have been vulgarised, the vulgar made more genteel. People now enjoy themselves more in the same kind of ways.") Here is a popularised cliché of modern sociology, the end of class conflict. Because the problematic within which these intellectuals work focusses so exclusively on the subjective side of social life their interpretations are easily bemused by similarities of life style. They neglect the objective divisions between capital and labor which have never left Australian society, despite the appearance of social peace in the 'fifties and 'sixties. It is the Australian version of the Cold War "mass-society" thesis.

The word "elites" in Docker's title is more than a reference to the personal elitism of certain intellectuals; it refers to the basic assumptions by which most Australian social critics, even on "the left", have produced knowledge of our society.

## DISCUSSION

The initiatives taken by the Whitlam government in the field of social welfare should prompt the left to take a new look at the role played by social welfare schemes in modern capitalist society. It should be of some concern that Australian Government schemes such as the Australian Assistance Plan aim to "organise" local, working class communities and place social workers and members of related professions in positions of real power and influence in local communities.

I have attempted to set out below what I believe are the inherent dangers in some of these schemes and demonstrate the potentially reactionary nature of much social welfare philosophy. As a social worker, I have tended to focus upon my own field, but I believe much of what is said pertains to all the "helping professions".

Much of the danger stems, I feel, from the sort of education offered to people working in these fields. In all Australian schools of social work, for example, the orientation remains overwhelmingly one of the study and treatment of "individual maladjustment". The very structure of these schools (as with virtually all university departments) is hierarchical and rigid and acts to keep students "in their place". Demands for self-management are dismissed as unworkable and often students are pressured into forgetting social activism to uncover the "causes of rebelliousness" within themselves.

After four years of education which consistently supports the conventional wisdom, traditional sex roles and the search for profit, university graduate social workers have to be learned to behave the "correct" way: to be a defender of the family, the society, the church, the nation. In general, the welfare workers' morality is conventional and therefore repressive. The education given to social workers gives almost no understanding of the real social and political issues but, rather, it prepares people for a profession whose

financial and status rewards are not inconsequential. Social workers learn to patch up, not to challenge, the fabric of the system which sustains them.

The ease with which these people can be used to deflate challenges to the system stems from a lack of theoretical understanding of how societies work or how social changes come about. The line adopted in the university departments in which these people receive their training is strong opposition to marxism. One is told that the conclusions of the marxist method are unacceptable and "unprofessional". This is typified by the statement in one text still widely used in Australian social work schools. It states:

"..... there are no historical laws but only sociological and economic ones; there can be no scientific insight into social forces moulding the future." (1)

Along with this openly reactionary outlook, there is the myth of "value free social science". This leads to denial of the fact that to be involved with questions of social and mental health is to take a political stance. As a group, social welfare workers continue to focus upon problems of adjustment rather than change and upon social statics rather than dynamics. What they fail to see is that the problems of disadvantaged communities stem far less from individual neuroses than from an objective lack of opportunity and from a social system which perpetuates oppression and exploitation.

A US group calling themselves the "Radical Therapists" has formulated a critique of this "professional impartiality", putting the blame for the failure of welfare workers to make any real advances precisely on their commitment to retaining the status quo. Social workers' emphasis on the individual does a positive disservice by turning people's focus from the society which oppresses them to their own "hang ups" and by making them into sick people who need treatment rather than oppressed people who must liberate themselves. The Radical Therapists say:

"Current psychotherapy offers 'solutions' only to those that accept the system and want to maintain their place in it. Which is another way of saying current therapy serves the system." (2)

What is needed is an outlook which sees psycho-social problems as the result of alienation, as the outcome of the oppressive nature of capitalist society. The problem then confronted is that alienation arises from

oppression about which the oppressed has been mystified or deceived. In capitalist society, oppressed people are usually persuaded that they are not oppressed or that there are good reasons for their oppression. The result is that the individual, instead of being angered by her or his own oppression decides that her or his problems are her or his own fault and responsibility. It is this process which social workers are encouraging in most cases.

We must work so that people can see that within any declaration of neutrality lies a basic acceptance of prevailing social and political values. An acceptance which, in most cases, makes the activity of the professional "community organiser" detrimental to the interests of local communities. We must also be aware of the tendency for modern capitalist states to use welfare programs in the same way as the Romans used bread and circuses to keep the exploited happy and non-threatening.

If the US experience is duplicated in Australia, federally-funded community programs will serve to pacify the neighbourhood to mystify justifiable outrage and thereby prevent movements for change by diverting community concern towards problems of "mental health" and away from efforts to confront the basic oppressive institutions in our society. Such programs function to maintain the status quo rather than to advance the interests of the oppressed community. Because such programs are sponsored by governments or their instrumentalities, "community involvement" programs of this sort have a built-in brake on their effectiveness since, as has frequently happened in North America, funds will be cut off as soon as people involved in the project find that the capitalist state and institutions which oppress them do not yield to the force of moral indignation. As more challenging stances are adopted, a pretence is found to end the funding or remove the leaders.

Analyses can be drawn between techniques developed by the US in Indochina and some of the activities of social workers in the urban communities of America. The "battle for hearts and minds" and "pacification programs" have been developed as diligently in Harlem as in Vietnam in removing threats to US capitalist imperialism. The co-optation of the indigenous leadership, the mystification and brainwashing of the people, material inducements for those who can be won over and repression for those who cannot, all form part of this approach. With the active collaboration of social workers, ghetto uprisings, though first met with armed might,

have later been buried under a deluge of social welfare programs leaving the real position of the people relatively unchanged.

The Radical Therapists have called this process the "psychologisation of discontent". In an environment of poverty and exploitation, to focus upon individual problems of mental health is to deflect community energies from the essential task of winning a form of local control and building a sense of community power.

But I believe we should not stand aloof from the social welfare programs which the Whitlam government has begun. Within the system, marxists must refuse to see social reality as a reflection of people's minds, but rather present individual problems as a reflection of social reality. We must strive to make social action the focus of social welfare projects.

Marxism-leninism must be presented to people as a methodology with which to interpret society and social change. Of course, because of the exigencies of revolutionary struggle, Marx did not develop a complete theory of the relationship between social problems and the individual. It is up to us to use his methodology to advance our contemporary understanding of these problems. Marx showed us the way forward in his writings on alienation when he demonstrated how humankind has been deprived of the ability to determine her/his own life under capitalism. He showed how capitalist production results in the workers' alienation from the product of their labor power then from the labor process and finally from fellow workers and the social system. Marx thus captured each individual's feelings of depersonalisation and hopelessness in capitalist society, and rather than seeing them as some sort of inevitable "human condition", his theories can give social means and collective hope for an historical transcendence of what bourgeois ideology (e.g. existentialism, psychoanalysis) sees as "man's fate".

-- BRIAN MCGAHEN

When the marxist economist Ernst Mandel toured this country recently, I remember reading a mocking editorial in *The Australian* to the effect that Mandel was on the old "crisis of capitalism" kick, a favourite line with the marxists, and was not to be taken seriously.

There was the usual stuff about the failure of Marx's "predictions" concerning the trajectory of capitalist development, and an obvious ignorance of Mandel's widely respected works. While I, for one, disagree fundamentally with Mandel's economic analysis, and more importantly with the political strategy flowing from it, he has written nothing to my knowledge in the way of simplistic "crisis mongering".

But how do the bourgeoisie see the present crisis? I want to argue that it is in fact *they* who have a bad case of that malaise we socialists are supposed to suffer from that is, they have a dose of the Doomsday Blues, and rightly so.

One newspaper correspondent recently noted, in an article headed "West faces a permanent decline in its life style":

*The western world has been shocked to discover that it is not its freedoms which guarantee its prosperity and development.*

*Its liberties depend on economic growth and that in turn can only flourish with abundant supplies of energy to run the machines.*

*The true social contract which underpins the western democracies is that, in return for the growth which makes them richer, the working classes agree to let the middle classes run things in more or less their own way. Stifle growth and you stifle democracy.* (David Adamson, *The Australian*, Oct. 1, 1974.)

I won't quibble about the pseudo psychology of this passage, but just mention in passing what the author hasn't grasped. And this is best expressed in Marx's aphorism which claimed that the main barrier to the growth of capital is capital itself. It is precisely the logic of the "liberties" of the "free enterprise" system which leads to its cyclical crash into social and economic crisis.

But returning to my main theme, trying to establish just who has visions of the apocalypse, Adamson's prospectus for capitalism is relevant. Observing that the world "depression" implies a "recovery after hitting the bottom of the trough", he continues:

*But what we are faced with now may be a permanent decline, relative and absolute, in all aspects of Western life.*

An even more accurate reflection of the fear felt by the ruling classes can be seen in these comments from the *Wall Street Journal*:

*"The US economy, that marvellous machine of plenty, has suddenly turned into a cornucopia of trouble, pouring forth an agonising abundance of distress .... A bewildering combination of frightening economic developments is tumbling out: soaring prices and eroding wages; topless interest rates and a bottomless stockmarket; a mortgage-money crunch and a home building crash; a menacing explosion of world oil prices and a flood of surplus Arab oil wealth threatening international money markets; swelling business inventories and sinking crop production."* (Quoted in *The Financial Review*, Sept. 6, 1974.)

And this is straight from the dinosaur's mouth. But the bourgeois class is not merely scared at this ominous horizon, it is also perplexed. The same editorial continues that, in this atmosphere of "jitters and gloom", the Ford Administration is

*groping for new approaches to deal with two economic evils that aren't supposed to co-exist; inflation and recession.*

Doomsday is looming, but in an allegedly logically impossible form.

Finally, Otto Eckstein, a former economic adviser to President Johnson, is cited by the *Journal* as saying that the American economy stands in danger of the worst recession of the post-war period.

If, for Eckstein, the US economy faces a recession, for Dr. Alfred Schaeffer, Chairman of the Union Bank of Switzerland, it is the western economy as a whole which is at stake, and the problem is that of an extensive depression. He is quoted as saying in one report:

*Since the thirties there was never as much fear, uncertainty and disturbance in the world economy as now .... The political consequences of gliding from a recession into a new economic crisis would be considerably more disastrous than those resulting from the depression of the thirties.* (Warren Beeby, *The Australian*, Sept. 13, 1974.)

The general thrust of Schaeffer's message was then summarised as follows:

*Dr. Schaeffer concluded that even a partial dislocation of the West's free economy owing to monetary and currency factors would place a heavy strain on the free-enterprise system .... in fact, a strain which would adversely affect the entire system as we know it.*

According to this authority even a partial dislocation would precipitate the final crisis of world capitalism. Perhaps marxists have attributed too much stability to this economic system rather than the converse.

To the accompanying din of the crash of banks in New York, West Germany and Switzerland, the International Monetary Fund issued a sombre annual report. Unless some measure of international co-operation is attained (and what is more, co-operation "of a quality rarely achieved in the past"), then we will experience an intensification of the woes presently afflicting us: a virulent and widespread inflation, a deceleration of economic growth in reaction to the preceding high rate of expansion, and a massive disequilibrium in international payments. (The Australian, Sept. 16, 1974.)

And echoing the Eckstein report characterises the situation as constituting the most complex and serious set of economic problems to confront national governments and the international community since the end of World War II."

And it is interesting to note in passing that the IMF (following Dr. Schaeffer) sees as one of the main weapons and policy measures in the struggle against the decline a massive increase in unemployment, and large cuts in government spending. The logic is familiar: if there is to be a crisis, as there obviously is, then let the working class bear the brunt of the burden. Reading the IMF report, and Dr. Schaeffer's comments, it is almost as explicit as that.

The managing director of the IMF, H.J. Witteveen, is not merely despondent at the actual condition of the world economy, but is even despairing of the possibility of his suggested solutions proving efficacious. The vital necessary condition for a viable strategy of recovery is supposed to be the "formation of a world-wide anti-inflationary political consensus". And this "consensus" can embrace everything from the above-mentioned administered rises in unemployment through to an overall cut in hard-won living standards, military intervention in the Middle East to secure cheap unhindered oil flows and CIA sponsored coups in those capitalist nations

threatened with economic disaster (the one specifically cited by Kissinger being Italy). If all this is not forthcoming then the world economy most certainly faces "serious and prolonged damage". Yet even if it is achieved it may not prove effective since inflationary pressures have become so deeply imbedded in public attitudes and expectations, they are likely to persist for some time even if the stance of financial policies in all the large countries were presumed to be wholly appropriate in the light of all legitimate domestic concerns.

As warden of one of the central financial institutions of the American empire, Witteveen is obviously spending some sleepless nights over the prospects he sees facing the US "international community".

Moving closer to home the outlook of the bourgeoisie seems to be the same. J.K. Galbraith noted in his *The Great Crash* that the stockmarket is the mirror of the fundamental economic situation. If this is so, as Michael Blendell writes in an article aptly entitled "Capitalism in the Balance?", then the "implications for everyone in Australia .... are alarming". Commenting on the movement of the share index late this year he said:

*Last night's close of 294.78 puts the index back to its 1962 levels. And if any allowance is made for the dwindling purchasing power of money, it is running closer to its early 1950s levels.*

*Which carries with it the astonishing implication that Australian industry in 1974 is worth less than it was in 1954. (The Australian, Sept. 17, 1974.)*

But this is not merely a national phenomenon: *All the world's leading bourses are pointing inexorably downward. Once again, Doomsday looms. This implies a cataclysm of social and economic dimensions unparalleled this century, or world war ....*

All this reads like something straight out of Lenin's *Imperialism!* And to cap it off Blendell reports: *According to the more objective stockmarket observers, no end to the downward trend is in sight.*

If the objective observers see no end to the plummet down, the subjective ones do (and these include many of the world's leading economic authorities). The end is quite simply capitalism in ruins. One doesn't need to be an economist to see some of the basic tensions involved. Capital formation (and thus growth) is on the decline due to high interest rates, while

reserves and profits on hand are also declining due to the erosion of their real purchasing power, and so on. (For closer analysis see the *New York Times* (International Ed.), Sept. 8 29, Oct. 27, 1974.)

It thus seems that the functionaries and members of the international bourgeoisie are suffering from that affliction (the Doomsday Syndrome) usually confined to lesser mortals and socialists, and for good reason. Their economic system has run amok in a very dangerous manner. Its irrationality can no longer be dismissed (as is possible in times of periodic stability) as a figment of the marxist imagination. And if the fate of the proletariat (and thus the whole of humanity) was not so

closely bound up with the fate of contemporary capitalism, one could almost enjoy the plight of these once smug social parasites.

It is indeed as Marx observed in one of his most profound works, *The Communist Manifesto*:

*Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.*

At least one of his predictions has come true, again.

-- D. MORAN