Northern Soul Classics - Soul Time - Shirley Ellis

Oh to be 17 again, living for Friday night at the Torch, and doing those back flips!  Roll back the carpets.

Friday Night Disco - Love Train - The O'Jays

Trump Played

When you are looking for an explanation for events to which you don't have all the facts its useful to use Occam's Razor.  I don't know what the truth is about the reported chemical attack on civilians in Syria.  No one else, including Donald Trump does either, other than those that were responsible.  That is why, before jumping to a response, it would have been at least useful to have had an inquiry into what actually happened.

But, using Occam's Razor the facts we do know suggest that the blame placed on Assad is probably wrong.  Yes, Occam's Razor would say, what seems the most obvious answer, and given that Assad's regime has chemical weapons, and warplanes there is certainly a case for coming to that conclusion, but as one US military expert has said, if it was, it must have been one of the stupidest moves by any political leader ever.  Given that Assad, and his Russian backers certainly are not stupid, and have shown themselves ahead of the tactical and strategic game all along, that at last ought to cause some further consideration.

Yes, Assad has chemical weapons and warplanes, but with the world, and particularly US satellites and other surveillance, in a world of instant citizen journalism, why would he think that it was possible to launch such an attack, and why would he or his Russian backers think it would go unnoticed, or that he could get away with it?

But, even if he thought there was a chance of getting away with such an attack why bother?  Why would he launch a chemical weapons attack that he knew would provoke a response, rather than continue using the barrel bombs, and other conventional weapons he has been using all along, which provoke no such response?

And, why bother when he is winning, or has effectively already won the war against his opponents?  ISIS has been more or less wiped out, as a result of the offensive against them by Russian, Syrian, Iranian, Turkish and Hezbollah forces.  The other Al Qaeda offshoots are also close to being wiped out, as Turkey as moved closer to Russia, and started to close some of the arms routes through to Syria.  The so called moderate Syrian opposition forces always were a mirage, a fiction created by western politicians to justify their intervention in Syria, just as they invented such forces in Iraq and Libya.  So, why would Assad, and still more, why would his Russian backers risk all that by unnecessarily using chemical weapons rather than simply using their overwhelming conventional military power?

Moreover, besides the fact that in recent months Turkey has moved closer to Russia and Iran, and thereby helped stem some of the flow of weapons and fighters into Syria from the Gulf states, and western Europe, the election of Trump, and his connections with Putin must have given the Russian and Assad the confidence that it was only a short matter of time before the remnants of any opposition were cleaned up.  Trump himself in a tweet from 2013, said that Obama's decision not to follow through on his promised attack on Syria, if it crossed his red lines, had saved the US from a costly and ineffective intervention.

And herein lies the obvious answer provided by Occam's Razor.  If there was no obvious reason for Assad or the Russians to launch a chemical attack on civilians, they probably didn't.  If Assad and the Russians had no obvious benefit from launching such an attack, they probably realised that given that they have been winning the tactical and strategic game all along.  The obvious answer here is that Assad and the Russians did not launch a chemical attack on civilians, but a naive Trump, at war with his own capitalist state, and particularly at war with his State Department, his CIA, and his Department of Defence, has been played, by the state, and driven quickly into a confrontation with his buddy Putin.

The evidence suggests that the civilians were affected by chemicals, but how is open to question.  For a long period, various opposition forces had control over large areas of the country, including military bases and weapons storage areas.  As they have lost ground its likely that any chemical and other weapons caches they came across would be moved, and given their propensity to site weapons in the middle of civilian areas, its quite probable that the cause was a cache of such weapons on the ground, being hit by bombs dropped by Assad's planes.

The Russians have suggested that it was actually Islamists that launched chemical filled shells that were responsible, but there is no more reason to believe that than to believe that it was Assad's forces that were responsible.  It could have been a false flag operation, of which the US is well equipped to undertake, and has done many times in the past, for example, with the USS Liberty.  Whatever the actual facts, its likely that it was not Assad's forces that were responsible, but that Trump has simply been played by his own state apparatus, thereby achieving their goal of driving a wedge between him and Putin.

As I said in my predictions for this year, the love affair between Trump and Putin would come to an end sooner or later, because all such relations always do.  Not only is the relation one between two narcissists, who currently massage the others ego, but it is a relation between two ultra nationalists, in the same way as the relation between Hitler and Stalin broke down, and between Stalin and Mao etc.

The danger is with such figures, and their respective fingers on the nuclear button, the world has just become a more dangerous place than it has ever been.

Theories of Surplus Value, Part I, Chapter 4 - Part 32

Marx once again demonstrates here why it is that current reproduction costs, rather than historic prices must be used. He writes,

“For the part of the constant capital which is exchanged in kind, the position is the same as it was. The same quantity of iron, timber and coal as before will be exchanged in kind in order to replace the iron, timber and coal that has been used up, and in this transaction the higher prices will balance each other.” (p 195)

In other words, if we view the situation in terms of c + v + s, the value of c has risen, but it is the quantity not the value (as measured by the historic price) which must be reproduced and “which is exchanged in kind”. In Marx's words here (and he uses the same terminology in Capital III, in analysing social reproduction) it is replaced in kind. So, although the value here of iron, wood, and machines rises, they have to be physically reproduced in kind. Their value rises, and is passed on into the value of output, but the amount of value that must, therefore, be set aside for their physical replacement rises by an identical amount.

That is clear, for that part of the product which physically replaces itself directly. For example, if the value of corn rises, because more labour-time is required for its production, this does not change the quantity of that corn that must be set aside, as seed, to replace the seed used in production. It does mean, therefore, that the current reproduction cost of that seed, used as constant capital, is thereby raised relative to its historic cost. As Marx puts it, this constant capital is retrospectively revalued, in line with its current reproduction cost. It is irrelevant how much labour-time was used to produce that seed at some point in the past. It is how much labour-time that must be set aside now that is decisive.

The same thing is true of the coal taken from the output of the coal mine to directly replace the coal used to fuel its steam engines. Suppose a coal mine uses ten tons of coal to fuel these engines, and the coal it set aside from last year's production had required one hundred hours of labour to produce. The mine this year year produces one hundred tons of coal, but requires 1200 hours of labour to produce it, meaning productivity has fallen.

On this basis, to produce the ten tons of coal required to reproduce the constant capital, the ten tons required for the steam engines would require not 100 but 120 hours. The value of the coal used as constant capital would thereby be retrospectively revalued to reflect the 120 hours of labour currently required for its reproduction, as opposed to the 100 hours of labour actually expended upon the production of the consumed coal.

But, the same thing applies to that portion which is not directly replaced in kind. If the value of wood, iron or machines rises, so that more labour-time is required to replace the constant capital of the coal producer, this will be reflected as described above, in an increase in the value of the coal itself. The coal producer will sell all of their coal at this higher price, but a portion of the proceeds of that coal, sold to the consumer goods sector (whether used for consumption or production by the buyers from that sector) will now go not to fund purchases of consumption goods, by the coal producer, but will go to fund their purchase of the required quantity of wood, iron and machines, at their now higher price, which reflects the additional labour employed in those industries, due to the lower productivity.

In other words, whatever the historic cost of the wood, iron and machines used in current production, a greater proportion of current coal production will be required to cover their reproduction.

“But the surplus of coal which now forms a part of the constant capital of the coal producer and does not enter into this exchange in kind is, as before, exchanged for revenue (in the case given above, in part not only for wages but also for profit); this revenue, however, instead of going to the former consumers, accrues to the producers in whose spheres of production a greater quantity of labour is used, that is, the number of labourers has increased.” (p 195)

Back To Part 31

Social-Democracy, Bonapartism and Permanent Revolution - Chapter 4 – Permanent Revolution

Chapter 4 – Permanent Revolution

In the 1970's, social-democracy was prepared to envisage co-determination, as indeed it had existed without any serious threat to capital, for decades, in Germany, provided it was contained in a corporatist, bureaucratic framework, that limited workers real control of production, but, at a time of heightened class struggle, it was certainly not prepared to push that forward, against resistance from conservative political forces, representing the interests of share and bond holders and other money lenders, by mobilising the working-class to overcome their resistance.

And, social-democracy was itself fatally flawed by the fact that its left-wing was heavily influenced by the reactionary ideas of Stalinism and national socialism, most visible, in Britain, with the anti-EEC stance of the Bennite Left, and the ideas of the Alternative Economic Strategy.

Having failed to push through the necessary social-democratic measures, to limit the power of fictitious capital, social-democracy found itself incapable of keeping its side of the bargain with workers, to ensure that their living standards continued to rise year on year. And, so workers increasingly abandoned the social-democratic parties, enabling conservative parties to win elections and form governments. Those conservative governments then pursued policies that favoured fictitious capital over real, industrial-capital.

Asset price bubbles inflated in stocks, bonds and property, creating the delusion that wealth could be created by such paper capital gains, rather than the requirement for the expenditure of labour, in the production of real goods and services. Debt financed consumption was confused with affluence and wealth creation. It bred political delusions about the nature of wealth creation, and individual aspiration that fed conservatism. And, having rejected the idea of a political battle against conservative ideas in the 1970's, the social-democratic parties, desperate to win elections themselves, certainly were not going to undertake such a task in the 1990's and 2000's.

Having seen a large portion of their core vote desert them – the feature that has confronted Clinton in the rust-belt, and Labour in the decayed urban areas recently – the dominant social-democratic politicians instead sought to triangulate so as to win over conservative voters, which inevitably required promoting conservative ideas.

Finally, where the requirements of social-democracy did impose itself upon conservatism, the contradictions this implied were dealt with bureaucratically. Conservative governments, including notionally social-democratic governments implementing conservative policies, pursued the needs of extending the European Single Market (the same can be said for NAFTA, in relation to the US) not on the basis of a political campaign that carried along the working-class behind it, but by bureaucratic agreements over the heads of populations. Indeed, it would have been difficult to have implemented such agreements with mass working-class support, because in the form that conservative governments took forward these new arrangements, they were immediately hostile to workers interests.

That was illustrated by the rejection of the EU Constitution, drawn up by D'Estaing, and its subsequent adoption in the form of the Lisbon Treaty. But, it is also the reason that a pro-EU referendum campaign of the sort undertaken by Cameron and the Blair-rights was never likely to garner mass working class enthusiasm.

Table of Contents

Chapter 3 - Social Democracy

Theories of Surplus Value, Part I, Chapter 4 - Part 31

Marx assumes that wages have remained the same here, on the basis that a fall in productivity in just one area will have a negligible effect on the value of labour-power. But, as set out elsewhere, a change in wages does not, in any case, change the value of the commodity. It only creates a different split of the new value created, between wages and surplus value.

On the basis of unchanged wages, Marx also assumes that the rate of surplus value remains unchanged. Using his assumption that the amount of required living labour rises by 60%, Marx says the producers need 24 days labour, whereas previously they required 15. The workers work a 12 hour day, comprised 10 hours of necessary labour and 2 hours surplus labour.

The 24 workers provide 240 hours of necessary labour and 48 hours of surplus labour, where previously they provided 150 hours of necessary labour and 30 hours of surplus labour. As a result, revenue rises in these industries, because more labour-power is employed, and with the same rate of surplus value, the mass of surplus value thereby also rises. The coal producer, thereby hands over more linen to the producers of iron, wood and machines, who then use it to pay out the wages of these additional workers, and to cover the resulting additional surplus value.

As set out above, Marx's assumption that the amount of additional labour is only 60% is wrong, but this does not change the basic principle being described.

If the rise in value of iron, wood, and machines results from a rise in their own constant capital, then the same thing applies. Either the value of these have risen because of a fall in the productivity in the living labour used in their production, or else because the value of constant capital, which they in turn employ, has risen. Ultimately, the explanation for the rise in value must reside in a fall in productivity, and this means more labour is employed, and it is for the payment of this labour that the additional revenue is directed.

If wages remain constant, they only fall in relation to iron, timber and machinery, but wages are not spent on these capital goods. It would only be if the value of the constant capital rose so as to have an appreciable effect on the prices of wage goods that this would mean that wages would have fallen in real terms.

So far, Marx has only considered the effect on surplus value, and not the rate of profit. For the reasons discussed above, in those industries where productivity has fallen, so that more labour is employed, the amount of surplus value will have risen. If the rate of surplus value remains the same, and the mass of labour employed rises, the mass of surplus value must, by definition, also rise.

However, the rate of profit overall must fall, because the value of constant capital in all those industries which use that output, will have risen. In other words, if the cost of constant capital for the coal producers rises from £10,000 to £16,000, then assuming that the £20,000 of new value is divided £16,000 wages, £4,000 surplus value, the rate of profit falls from 4/26 (10c+16v) = 15.38% to 4/32 (16c + 16v) = 12.5%.

But, if in some of these industries, such as coal, their own productivity falls, so that more labour is employed, this would cause their own mass of surplus value to rise. If this rise in surplus value was greater than the rise in the value of their constant capital, these industries would see their rate of profit rise.

“An increase in the value of the constant capital (arising from lowered productivity in the branches of labour which supply it) raises the value of the product into which it enters as constant capital, and reduces the part of the product (in kind) which replaces the newly-added labour, thus making it less productive in so far as this is reckoned in its own product.” (p 195)

In other words, as described above, if the price of constant capital, used in coal production, rises, this will raise the value of coal. But, more coal will now have to be set aside to cover the replacement of this constant capital. It may not be that more coal is directly exchanged for this constant capital – though it may be as described above, where lower productivity means that more workers are employed in the iron, wood, and machine industries, and these additional workers buy coal with their wages – but even where coal is exchanged for say linen, a portion of this linen would then have to be exchanged for constant capital.

In reality, as shown earlier, coal would continue to be sold to the consumer sector, but a portion of the proceeds of this sale would then be used by coal producers to pay for constant capital, rather than being used as revenue to buy consumer goods.

Back To Part 30

Forward To Part 32

Theories of Surplus Value, Part I, Chapter 4 - Part 30

Marx explains this by a less clear and more circuitous route, which is, however, closer to the actual exchange relations. In other words, we can assume that the iron, wood and machine producers demand for coal, and that of other consumers remains unchanged. So, the former will continue to demand 10,000 tons of coal, and other consumers 20,000 tons. In that case, at £1.20 per ton, sales to the iron, wood and machine producers will be worth £12,000 and sales to other consumers £24,000. But, the coal producer needs to pay £16,000 for constant capital to the former leaving a shortfall of £4,000.

Marx sets out these exchanges as actual exchanges of commodities. So, the coal producer gives £12,000 of coal to the producers of iron, wood and machines, and gets £16,000 of commodities from them. Similarly, the coal producer gives £24,000 of coal to the producers of consumer goods, which could be represented by a linen producer, and obtains £24,000 of linen back.

But, then the coal producer must give £4,000 worth of linen to the producers of iron, wood, and machines, thereby making good the £4,000 deficit they had with them. This leaves the coal producers with £20,000 worth of linen, equal to the new value created, to consume as revenue.

In reality, with money transactions the coal producer would buy £16,000 worth of constant capital, and hand over £16,000. They would sell £12,000 of coal to the producers of constant capital. They would then sell £24,000 of coal to the linen producer, and obtain £24,000 in money. Out of this they would spend £20,000 to buy linen, thereby leaving their accounts and income and expenditure all square. The £4,000 deficit of their expenditure over income in relation to constant capital, would be matched by their £4,000 surplus of income over expenditure in the purchase of consumer goods.

But, there seems to be a problem here, as Marx describes. As a result of these relative price movements, whether we take it that the coal producer hands over £4,000 of linen to the producers of constant capital, or whether they hand over an additional £4,000 in money, which can be used to buy linen, this seems to provide an additional £4,000 of revenue to the producers of constant capital.

“However, it is not prima facie evident how the lowered productivity in the ironworks, machine building, timber-felling, etc., is to enable their producers to consume a larger revenue than before, since the price of their articles is supposed to be equal to their values, and, consequently, to have risen only in proportion to the diminished productivity of their labour.” (p 194) 

There are only two possible causes for the value of the iron, timber and machines to have risen. Either the productivity of the labour employed in these industries has fallen, or else the cost of their own constant capital has risen. If it is the former, Marx says, then these producers must use 60% more labour than before. In fact, this is wrong. If the value of their output has risen by 60%, the amount of additional living labour they use will depend on the organic composition of capital (actually the technical composition). So, the value of the constant capital was £10,000 and is now £16,000. It originally comprised one third £3,333 constant capital, and two-thirds, £6,666 living labour.

If the increase in value is due solely to a reduction in the productivity of living labour, in the production of wood, iron and machines, that means the division becomes £3,333 constant capital, and £12,666 living labour, so that the additional living labour rises not by 60% but by 6000/6666 = 90%.

Back To Part 29

Forward To Part 31