

# Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

BACKGROUND - October 2015<sup>1</sup>



Photo: Allyson Neville-Morgan/CC

## SUMMARY

The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) seeks to achieve a negotiated settlement between the government of Myanmar and non-state ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that paves the way for peace-building and national dialogue. Consisting of seven chapters, the “draft” text of the NCA agreed on March 31, 2015, stipulates the terms of ceasefires, their implementation and monitoring, and the roadmap for political dialogue and peace ahead. As such, the NCA, if signed by all parties, would represent the first major step in a longer nationwide peace process. While the government in particular hopes to conclude the NCA before national elections take place on November 8, demands for amendments in the final text, ongoing skirmishes, and the issue of which groups might be excluded from the agreement have proven stumbling blocks in negotiations.

## 1. Background to Peace Talks

Already prior to the semi-civilian government coming to power in 2011, Myanmar's long-running civil war saw several ceasefires signed between a number of EAOs and government forces. Notable


examples over the last 25 years were the 1989 agreement with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in 1994 (albeit which broke down in 2011), and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 1995. Upon coming to office as president in August 2011, U Thein Sein initiated an effort to end fighting on a nation-wide scale and invited a large number of EAOs for peace talks, with negotiations initially seeking to secure a series of bilateral accords. Upon concluding many of these, the government agreed in February 2013 to multilateral negotiations over a single-document national ceasefire agreement that encompasses the majority of EAOs. Significantly, this was the first time that the government had agreed to negotiate a multilateral ceasefire.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. Negotiation Structure and Actors

Union-level negotiations have been conducted through a tripartite structure of government, ethnic, and third-party representatives. In this structure, the government, the *Tatmadaw* (Myanmar Defence Services), and the *Hluttaw* (Parliament)

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have been represented through the dual Union Peace-making Committees. These consist of an 11-member “Central Committee” (UPCC) chaired by President Thein Sein, and a 52-member “Working Committee” (UPWC) running the actual negotiations, headed by Vice-president Sai Mauk Kham and composed of largely regional-level representatives. U Aung Min is one of four vice-chairmen of the UPWC and also the government’s chief negotiator.

Around 21 EAOs have been in some way engaged in the NCA process. Four of these groups—the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K), and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS/SSA-S)—were invited by the UPWC to participate in negotiations bilaterally, and although the RCSS/SSA-S has attended NCA meetings with the UNFC, these EAOs have chosen not to participate yet in the NCA negotiations. The remaining organizations have either directly or indirectly participated in negotiations through membership in or close affiliation to either the 13-member United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC),<sup>3</sup> and/or the loosely UNFC-based 16-member National Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT).<sup>4</sup> Over the course of negotiations the NCCT has effectively grown into the most prominent representative of EAO interests throughout the NCA negotiation process.

In later stages of negotiations, at the 2nd Law Khee Lar Ethnic Conference on June 2-9, 2015, the NCCT was replaced as the main ethnic negotiating body by a 15-member “Senior Delegation” (SD) of top armed group leaders; this so as to negotiate twelve amendments proposed by the EAOs at the conference, and in particular to press for the issue of inclusivity of all UNFC members in the NCA process (*see* Process and Amendments).

The overall peace process itself is coordinated by the multi-purpose Myanmar Peace Center (MPC)—a quasi-governmental body headed by Minister of the President’s Office U Aung Min and

run by various government and civil society representatives. The MPC was designed as a secretariat to support the chief negotiator and the UPWC as well as reporting to the President’s Office. It also facilitates some third-party involvement in the peace process and provides third-parties with a platform through which they can engage.


Table 1. EAOs, Bilateral Ceasefires, and NCA<sup>5</sup>

Groups invited by the gov’t to sign the NCA		Not invited	
Standing bilateral ceasefires		No bilateral ceasefires	
Non-NCCT	NCCT	NCCT	NCCT
ABSDF	ALP	KIO	AA
NDAA	NCF		ANC
NSCN-K	DKBA		LDU
RCSS/SSA-S	KNU/KNLA-PC		MNDAA
UWSA	KNPP		TNLA
	KNU		WNO
	NMSP		
	PNLO		
	SSPP/SSA-N		

Note: The ABSDF participates through UNFC affiliation and while the KIO has a bilateral agreement for cessation of hostilities, it does not have a formal bilateral ceasefire agreement

### 3. Process and Amendments

After seven rounds of negotiations, the NCCT and UPWC met on March 31, 2015, for an official signing of a “Provisional Draft NCA.” The parties had managed to overcome significant differences and deadlocks in the previous months to agree to the breakthrough provisional NCA text. A significant milestone was when, on February 12, the government made a commitment to a “federal” system,<sup>6</sup> requested by the NCCT, and which had previously been seen as tantamount to a disintegration of the Union. Most of the NCCT representatives, not having the authority to sign the agreement, referred this draft to the individual EAO leaderships for review and who subsequently proposed 12 amendments. These included, among others, that signatories come from the highest level on all sides, including the military and government, and that the NCA encompass all NCCT members. Indeed, the UPWC has invited only 15 EAOs to sign the initial NCA,<sup>7</sup> with an option for half of those excluded to negotiate their inclusion later on.



Other points of disagreement included the Tatmadaw's demand for an NCA to be in "accordance with" the military's "6-point guidelines" which has been resisted by EAOs, as this would imply an implicit acceptance of the controversial 2008 Constitution.<sup>8</sup> Another contentious issue between EAOs and Tatmadaw representatives has centered on implementation of "Security Reintegration." While the government side has emphasized Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of ethnic armed groups, the latter underline the necessity of Security Sector Reform (SSR) that involves the formation of a "federal army" comprising of ethnic combatants.

Over a series of subsequent ethnic summits and new negotiating rounds (round 8 on the July 22-24 and round 9 on August 6-7), most of the remaining 12 points of disagreement were negotiated or deferred for further discussion in later stages of the ceasefire and political dialogue and, as such, written into the text of the agreement (*see* Text of the NCA). The issue of inclusivity, however, continues to be the main obstacle to the final signing of the NCA by all EAOs (*see* Inclusivity: A Stumbling Block). It is furthermore important to note that the NCA as such embodies only the first step of the peace process. At the signing of the final draft on March 31, 2015, both sides agreed to a 7-step roadmap for peace and national reconciliation. The stages of this roadmap are: (1) NCA signing, (2) Drafting political dialogue and negotiating security reintegration matters, (3) Holding political dialogue and implementation of security reintegration, (4) Union Convention, (5) Union Accord Signing, (6) Union parliament approval, and finally (7) Implementation.

## 4. Deadlines

The government has indicated that it wants to sign the NCA before the November 8 elections. President Thein Sein has made clear that he desires the


NCA to be a part of his presidential legacy, and his chief negotiator Minister U Aung Min has given EAOs a final deadline of October 15. (Eight groups subsequently signed the NCA on this date.) NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, however, urged EAOs not to sign the agreement "in haste," calling for a "meaningful" accord. The constitutionally mandated elections will be held on November 8, and in order for the NCA to be shepherded through by President Thein Sein, it would need to be signed in advance of the vote and before the instatement of the new government. This however also constitutes an additional reason why some EAOs are reluctant to sign as it would bolster the president's bid before the election.

## 5. Text of the NCA<sup>9</sup>

The NCA consists of 7 chapters and 33 paragraphs which detail the NCA's (1) basic principles, (2) aims and objectives, (3) ceasefire premises, (4) guidelines and regulations governing the ceasefire, (5) guarantees for political dialogue, (6) future tasks and responsibilities, and (7) administrative obligations and guidelines for dispute settlement. In terms of inclusivity, the NCA states the aim to include all "relevant" EAOs in the signing of the NCA.

As stated in **Chapter 1**, if the accord is signed in its currently published form, signatories agree to the basic principle of establishing a federal union "in the spirit of Panglong,"<sup>10</sup> while upholding the principles of "non-disintegration of the Union and perpetuation of national sovereignty."<sup>11</sup> According to representatives of the Tatmadaw and EAOs, it was vital that the two main parties to the conflict agreed to respect the other's basic codes or aspirations as a basic foundation to enable the process to move forward. These principles will be implemented "in accordance with the outcomes of a future political dialogue." Chapter 1 affirms, furthermore, that the Union is to become a secular state which avoids misuse of religion for po-





litical interests, embraces a national identity based on diversity—an important point for ethnic nationalities who contend that the current national identity has been constructed and perpetuated by successive Burman-dominated governments—and speaks of equal rights and non-discrimination for all Myanmar citizens.<sup>12</sup> It also confirms an agreement to further discuss the issue of a Union Armed Forces (Pyidaungsu Tatmadaw), inclusive of and representing Myanmar citizens of all ethnic groups (non-Burmans are currently weakly represented especially in high-level positions).


Addressing EAO concerns over political dialogue, **Chapter 2** outlines the intention of the signatory parties to begin a process of inclusive political dialogue. This is expanded upon in **Chapter 5**, where a roadmap is outlined according to which this dialogue is to take place, as well as planning for security reintegration (see below), within 90 days after the NCA is signed. Indeed, Chapter 5 of the agreement gives guarantees for the political dialogue which is of utmost importance for the EAGs as no ceasefire in Myanmar in the past has moved to a political dialogue phase. As of yet, however, no clear clauses are included outlining what is to be done if this dialogue does not commence, or fails to reach a conclusion.

**Chapter 3** of the agreement specifies activities that will not be allowed including: violence-inciting propaganda, armed conflict, troop reinforcement and recruitment, the establishment of new military bases, and the laying of landmines, all unless specifically agreed to by the parties to the conflict. There is a separate point emphasized regarding troop recruitment by EAOs, allaying accusations by government that EAOs are using the ceasefire negotiations to recruit as many soldiers as possible, and *vice versa*. This point also postpones further discussion of the “security reintegration process” which refers to matters related to security sector reform or development and disarmament,

demobilization, and reintegration. These processes are currently defined differently by both parties and further agreement as to how these will be implemented in the Myanmar context by these parties to the conflict is required. Chapter three also expands upon these provisions by highlighting the guidelines for the deployment of military forces, demarcation of areas of control, communications between the parties, movement of troops, the protection of civilians, and provision of humanitarian assistance. It also provides for joint work on landmine clearance and in the administration of rule of law in ceasefire areas.

The NCA’s third chapter further covers provisions establishing a ceasefire “joint monitoring committee,” comprised of members of the UPWC, EAOs, and “trusted, well respected individuals,” which is to implement and control adherence to a “military code of conduct,” as well as investigate violations and perform conflict resolution functions. The composition of the code of conduct is as yet unspecified. It has been pointed out that in effect there still is no formal Military Code of Conduct agreed on for the NCA that has been made public. The Tatmadaw has throughout the negotiation period managed to hold off any commitments in this regard, with some sources suggesting that such a code of conduct must refer to the Tatmadaw’s “six-point guiding principles” or needs to be drafted in line with the Tatmadaw’s existing general code of conduct. As yet, there are no provisions for independent or international monitoring. The chapter also states that the role of international actors including government representatives and international organizations already involved in the peace process “as observers, advisors or in the provision of technical assistance to the Committee will be jointly decided” by the parties to the NCA.

**Chapter 4** of the text lays out the roles and responsibilities of the joint implementation com-



mittee, which will reach decisions by consensus. The permission for the functioning of liaison offices is also clarified, which is important as contact with EAOs is currently not allowed under the 1908 Unlawful Associations Act, unless by special agreement of the government. It also states that the Military Code of Conduct and others rules and regulations applicable to the NCA will be enacted within a month of the signing.

**Chapter 6** lays out further tasks and responsibilities including confidence-building measures such as removal of signatory EAOs from listing under the Unlawful Associations Act, and the release of persons detained under this Act. Also of note in this chapter is that EAOs will be allowed to implement “interim arrangements” which include: health, education, and socio-economic service delivery, as well as environmental conservation, drug eradication, cultural promotion, international and national aid and private sector activities. **Chapter 7** contains miscellaneous points on overall implementation of the NCA.

## 6. Short-term Implementation

According to Chapter 3 of the NCA document, if the ceasefire is signed the following short-term timeframe applies: both sides must notify of the signing of the NCA and distribute military codes of conduct throughout their command structures within 24 hours. The provisions of the agreement must subsequently be explained to ethnic armed groups within a five-day period. Fourteen days after signing EAO and government representatives are to host a joint coordination meeting to define the exact timeframes governing the ceasefire and its implementation. Chapter 4 specifies that thirty days after the agreement the next timetable is to be laid out. At that point a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) and Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) must also be put together to carry the peace process forward. Chapter 5 dictates that ninety days after the agreement The UPDJC


must have drawn up a framework for political dialogue and begin to move towards its implementation. Finally within 90 days after the agreement political dialogue can begin, including discussions around security reintegration.

**Table 2. NCA Short-term Timeframe after Signing**

Time	Event
2015-10-15	Tentative date for NCA signing
Within 24hrs	Notify the signing of the NCA throughout the signatories’ respective command structures. Military codes of conduct distributed to government and EAO commanders.
5 days	Explain provisions contained in agreement to own organizations
14 days	EAOs and government: joint coordination meeting
30 days	Enact the military code of conduct and ceasefire related rules and regulations. Lay-out timetable and formation of Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) and Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)
60 days	Jointly adopt framework for political dialogue. UPDJC to start dialogues after having drawn up frameworks for political dialogues.
90 days	Begin political dialogue and negotiate security reintegration matters

## 7. Inclusivity: A Stumbling Block

The issue of inclusivity has proven to be the main stumbling block to the signing of the NCA by all EAOs. The government has consistently denied inclusion of six ethnic organizations in the initial signing of the NCA, some unless certain conditions are met. With ongoing fighting along the China border in the Kokang area of Shan State, the government maintains that bilateral ceasefires first need to be signed with the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Lib-



eration Army (TNLA). It further refuses to allow three smaller groups (Wa National Organization (WNO), Lahu Army (LA), and Arakan National Council (ANC)), to sign.<sup>13</sup> This position has been opposed by the SD and NCCT who emphasize that they want the NCA to be “all-inclusive.” Many EAOs believe that the government is practicing a divide-and-rule policy through its exclusion of some groups and that it is not respecting the whole SD bloc. Recent developments concerning the issue are outlined below.

The EAOs met in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on August 21-24 to reach mutual agreement on the inclusivity issue and the signing of the NCA. Agreement could not be reached, however, and five EAO representatives were selected to attend a meeting on September 9 with President U Thein Sein and Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing to agree on the final text and signatories. The ethnic representatives laid out a four-point plan for signing without the six groups including: no military offensives against these groups, their inclusion in political dialogue, access to humanitarian aid, and their removal from the unlawful associations list. The government side stated it will allow the ANC, LA, and WNO to participate in the political dialogue once the NCA has been concluded.

However, the government treats the three groups it is in armed conflict with, the MNDAA, AA, and TNLA, differently. Although the president remains open to an “all inclusive” agreement, these groups will be brought in progressively and through different routes. The president is in direct contact with the MNDAA leadership, the TNLA can join the NCA by signing a bilateral agreement, and the AA can either join the other Rakhine party to the NCA, the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), or the KIO (an organization it is allied with). In a joint statement, these EAOs rejected these arrangements, demanding that they be included directly in the NCA.

The EAOs subsequently requested that the president remove not only signatories to the NCA but those who *would* sign from the unlawful associations list. The president responded that these groups could be removed from the list in a phased approach as they negotiated individually. However, with the Commander-in-Chief travelling abroad, the EAOs felt that they could not obtain a military assurance that this would be followed, and a date for signing was again postponed until further compromise could be reached.

On October 15, in a ceremony in Nay Pyi Taw, the NCA was signed between the leaders of eight groups and the government.<sup>14</sup> The groups which signed are as follows: RCSS/SSA-S, KNU, CNF, ALP, PNLO, KNU/KNLA-PC, DKBA, and AB-SDF. The remaining groups continue to postpone their final decision on signing the NCA.

### 7.1 International Witnesses

While inclusivity has proven the main stumbling block, other problematic issues also exist. The government had originally agreed that China and the UN could be witnesses to the NCA process. Following the rounds of negotiations over the NCA, the EAOs requested an expanded list of witnesses, and the president agreed to invite the EU, India, Japan, Norway, and Thailand to the final signing of the agreement along with China and the UN. Since signing the “final draft” in March, it has been reported that tensions have arisen among EAOs over the list of final witnesses to the NCA, whereby allegedly “China-aligned” or “China-influenced” EAOs have expressed concern over undue U.S., U.K., EU, and Japanese “involvement” in the process. Notwithstanding, representatives from the UN, EU, China, India, Thailand, and Japan witnessed the October 15 signing of the NCA with eight groups.



## 8. Scenarios and Spoilers

In a scenario where the NCA is signed by all EAOs it is important to note that the NCA is simply a prelude to political dialogue and a substantial peace-building process, where difficult questions such as the constitutional makeup, power and resource-sharing, and “security reintegration” will come under discussion. Thus, addressing the underlying issues of the conflict will represent the real test of all parties’ commitment to peace. Failure to find consensus on these issues could lead to the resumption or continuation of armed conflict. In particular, guaranteeing autonomy under a federal system is a cornerstone of EAO demands. So far the government has agreed to an “open dialogue,” and building a Union according to federal principles, as stated in the Deed of Commitment from February 12, 2015, which would seemingly represent a significant shift from its previous position on a more unitary state with some power devolved to the states and regions (see the 2008 Constitution). A further challenge regards the immediate implementation of the NCA. This could be complicated, for example, by overlapping territories between EAOs and government forces, which would have to be clearly demarcated and upheld to avoid potential skirmishes that could undermine a newly minted NCA.

With EAOs split between those willing to sign and those holding out until the inclusivity issue is resolved, another scenario to consider is one where, initially at least, NCA is signed by some groups but not by others. If the NCA is signed without the participation of non-signee groups, then conflict could continue especially in Shan State along the China border, undercutting the success of the NCA; there could even be an increase in fighting as the government would be free to focus its resources on the KIO, AA, TNLA, MNDAA, and others. The use of selective ceasefires to target other groups has a long and well-documented history in Myanmar. An NCA without these groups would

be incomplete, and more importantly the fighting may spill over into other regions, which could potentially drag in other ethnic armed groups which share territories and alliances. Indeed, in recent weeks there have been reports of an escalation in fighting between the Tatmadaw and EAOs around KIO and SSPP/SSA-N-held positions. Non-invited groups such as the TNLA and MNDAA have also seen increased fighting.

Finally, if the NCA is not signed in the near future, one can expect the same ongoing skirmishes, battles, and wartime behaviour that have characterized the country for the past half century, especially along the China and Indian borders. The EAO areas will continue to be largely inaccessible to government forces and economic opportunities in these regions will remain scant allowing conflict economies to continue to flourish. It would also have implications for the elections as several areas in Shan, Kachin, and Kayah states, and potentially others, will be declared ineligible for voting due to security concerns, thus disenfranchising thousands and placing into question the legitimacy of the elections especially among ethnic groups. Furthermore, existing bilateral ceasefire agreements with some groups may also be undermined if EAOs see that progress towards political dialogue—for which an NCA is first necessary—is not made.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Issued on October 2, this backgrounder seeks to establish basic facts and provide a general overview of the NCA. However, events and information in Myanmar can be opaque and subject to rapid change. It was updated on October 19.

<sup>2</sup> Following the coup d’état of 1962, many of the EAOs had wanted to negotiate as a bloc in various alliances from at least 1976. Through bilateral negotiations in 2012 and 2013, members of the United Nationalities Federal Council requested that the government negotiate with them as a bloc.





<sup>3</sup> The UNFC represents 13 ethnic armed groups including: KIO, NMSP, SSPP/SSA-N, KNU, KNPP, CNF, LDU, ANC, PNLO, TNLA, WNO, MNDAA. Note: the KNU suspended membership in September 2014.

<sup>4</sup> The NCCT represents 16 ethnic armed groups including: AA, ALP, ANC, CNF, DKBA, KIO, KNPP, KNU, KNU/KNLA-PC, LDU, MNDAA, NMSP, PNLO, SSPP/SSA-N, TNLA, and WNO.

<sup>5</sup> See Appendix 1 on p. 9 for a more extensive overview of EAOs engaged in the NCA process.

<sup>6</sup> Known as the Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation.

<sup>7</sup> In spite of being members of the NCCT, the government refuses to recognize six groups including: AA, ANC, LDU, MNDAA, TNLA, and the WNO.

<sup>8</sup> The Tatmadaw adopted “six principles” to serve as its guideline and position towards the ceasefire process. Although precise translations may vary, they broadly encompass the following: (1) To have a keen desire to reach eternal peace; (2) to keep promises agreed to in peace deals; (3) to avoid capitalizing on the peace agreement; (3) to avoid placing a heavy burden on local populations; (4) to avoid placing a heavy burden on local people; (5) to strictly abide by the existing laws; (6) to “march” towards a democratic country in accordance to the 2008 constitution

<sup>9</sup> The NCA text is available at the following link: <https://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2015/10/14/myanmar-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-doc-english/>.

<sup>10</sup> This refers to the Panglong Conference and agreement in 1947 between the independence leader General Aung San on behalf of the then Government of Burma and representatives of three main ethnic groups (Chin, Kachin, and Shan) at which administrative autonomy for ethnic states and financial- and wealth-sharing arrangements were agreed upon.

<sup>11</sup> Two of the three national causes of the country as laid down by the government in 1988, the third


of which being “the non-disintegration of national solidarity.” These are defended by the *Tatmadaw* or defence services.

<sup>12</sup> The definition of “citizen” and the manner in which ethnic populations are or are not to be considered citizens is currently based on the controversial Myanmar citizenship law of 1982.

<sup>13</sup> The government contends that including them would open the door for a slew of other small groups to the NCA, all of whom cannot be accommodated. The legitimacy bestowed by a ceasefire could also enable these smaller groups to recruit combatants and could encourage other groups to seek violent means if they want government attention. The NCCT argues, on the other hand, that these groups have been alliance members for decades and that despite their smaller size—and lack of weapons—that their stance and presence has validity.

<sup>14</sup> On October 12, the government removed the KNU, ABSDF, and RCSS/SSA-S from their listing under the Unlawful Associations Act. According to the government, the other five groups had not been on the list.





Appendix 1. Overview of Ethnic Armed Organizations

Full Name(s)	UNFC member	Area of operation	Est. Strength
<b>Groups invited by the government to sign the NCA</b>			
<b>Groups with standing bilateral ceasefires with the government</b>			
<b>Non-NCCT Members</b>			
All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSFD)	Semi-aligned; represented in SD	KIO, KNU and KNPP controlled areas	400+
National Democratic Alliance Army - Eastern Shan State (NDAA)	Not member	Eastern Shan State	4500+
National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K)	Not member	Chin State; Sagaing Region	<500
Restoration Council of Shan State / Shan State Army - South (RCSS/SSA-S)	Not member	Southern Shan State	8000+
United Wa State Army / Party (UWSA)	Not member	Wa Self-Administered Division; Eastern Shan State	30,000
<b>NCCT members</b>			
Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)	Member	Northern Rakhine & Kayin States	60-100
Chin National Front (CNF)	Member	North-western Chin State; Sagaing Region	200+
Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)	Not member	Eastern Kayin State	1500+
KNU/KNLA-Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC)	No member	Central Kayin State	<200
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)	Member	Kayah State	600+
Karen National Union (KNU)	Member	Kayin and Mon states, Tanintharyi Region	5000+
New Mon State Party (NMSP)	Member	Mon and Kayin States; Tanintharyi Region	800-2000
Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO)	Member	Southern Shan State	400+
Shan State Progress Party / Shan State Army - North (SSPP/SSA-N)	Member	Northern Shan State	8000+
<b>Groups with no bilateral ceasefires with the government</b>			
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)	Member	Kachin State; Northern Shan State	10,000+
<b>No bilateral ceasefire signed and not invited by the government to sign the NCA</b>			
<b>NCCT members (larger groups)</b>			
Arakan Army (AA)	Not member	KIO controlled areas; Chin State; Karen State; Rakhine State	2000+
Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army (MNDAA)	Member	Kokang Region, North-eastern Shan State	3000+
Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)	Member	(Northern) Shan State	4500
<b>NCCT members (smaller groups)</b>			
Arakan National Council (ANC)	Member	n/a	n/a
Lahu Democratic Union (LDU)	Member	n/a	n/a
Wa National Organization / Army (WNO)	Member	n/a	n/a

Note: Estimates on strength derived from figures published by Myanmar Peace Monitor (2015).