


W. T. Seaward. Score

the truth about ANZAC

KAM



By
L. P. FOX

With Foreword by
Captain W. JACKA
(LATE 14TH INFANTRY BATTALION A.I.F.)

Victorian Council
Against War and Fascism

3^D.

FOREWORD

By CAPTAIN W. JACKA

(late 14th Infantry Battalion, A.I.F.).

Probably at no time in the world's history has such superb courage been shown by a body of men as was shown by the Australian and New Zealand soldiers at Anzac.

Shattered by shells, riddled with bullets, and suffering the pangs of hunger and thirst, many of these men gave their lives, believing that in doing so they were making the world safe for democracy, and would end for all time the butchery known as war.

Twenty-one years have elapsed since those courageous lives were sacrificed, and to-day we know only too well that the world has not been saved for democracy, and that the last war was not a war to end wars. It is plain that the sacrifices of the men who gave their lives on the rugged slopes of Gallipoli will have been in vain, unless we—the people of Australia—unite in a determined refusal to do the bidding of the small minority that thrives on the business of war.

To the returned soldiers, the mothers and fathers, and the splendid young men and women who have grown up since the last slaughter, I appeal, as one who took part in the Gallipoli campaign, to let the rulers of Australia know that you will not tolerate a repetition of what occurred twenty-one years ago, that you will not allow your determination and heroism to be prostituted by the masters of the old world, whose only God is profit. Display your courage in refusing to fight in imperialist war under any pretext whatever, and join with those who fight only in the Cause of Peace, and give your hand to the task of building a new world wherein peace and liberty shall flourish, and men and women shall live in harmony with their fellows.

The Truth About Anzacs

By L. P. Fox



"The other day there was an armistice on the Peninsula to bury the dead. While it was going on a Turkish officer strolled up to our lines and found a chaplain reading a service over a large grave. When it was finished he took off his fez, looked down into the grave and said in a loud voice: 'God bless all true soldiers and eternally damn all politicians.'"—From the diary of Admiral Wester-Wemyss.

"Somebody in the House of Commons asked the other day, 'Why are the Australian troops being sacrificed in such large numbers at the Dardanelles?' It's about time somebody began to ask questions."

—General Monash, War Letters, page 70.

Twenty-one years have passed since April 25, 1915.

Looking back through the mists of the years, the picture that comes is one of a small boy waving his arm, and cheering, as the troopship swings away from the pier. There are tears in the women's eyes, and in the eyes of menfolk, too, for already they see the frightening spectre of the casualty lists, the gaps in the ranks that will never be filled. And they are not so certain as the boy is that it is all going to be worth while.

He sees only the glory of war, the sacrificing spirit and the courage of those khaki-clad figures. And to-day, twenty-one years later, we can agree that in so far as he did see, he saw truly. The self-sacrificing determination and heroism of the Anzacs will remain always as something of which the people of Australia and New Zealand will be proud.

The Anzacs were not soldiers—they were civilians forced into uniform. They enlisted for a multitude of reasons—some from a sheer love of adventure, some under pressure from their womenfolk, many under economic pressure, and others under a sudden emotional response to a patriotic speech. But behind all

View M. Seaward

this there was in the hearts of the overwhelming majority of these men the belief that a sacrifice was necessary for the cause of humanity, and that as men they had no choice but to offer themselves.

But to-day, twenty-one years later, it is also necessary to realise that there was much that the unthinking eyes of boyhood did not see. They did not see that there was another kind of heroism besides that of the Anzacs—the heroism of the men who were brave enough not to fight, who faced the full scorn of public opinion, and in many cases went to gaol because of their opposition to militarism in their own country. It is necessary to remember the heroism of the Conscientious Objector, the Militant Anti-War Fighter, and the Anti-Conscriptionist, and to give it its place beside the heroism of the Anzacs.

And if we are to be true to the men who lie on the barren slopes of Gallipoli, if their sacrifice is not to be in vain, then we must see not only their sacrifice, but also the reasons for that sacrifice. To see Anzac to-day with the eyes of a child is to fail the generation that gave themselves, and the generation of to-day. The spirit that we need is not one of unthinking hero-worship, but rather the spirit of the words with which Edmond Delage closes his book, "The Tragedy of the Dardanelles":

"Superb Anzacs, nimble Gurkhas, laughing Senegalese, sailors who fought under Guepratte and de Robeck, soldiers of France and of all the counties of Old England, you! all of you, what heroes! But—to what end did you die?"

THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION.

Through the dark days of 1915, as the casualty lists poured in, and the hoped-for capture of the Straits remained as remote as ever, up to the final days of the evacuation, there was a growing realisation that "someone had blundered."

But when, on the 10th of March, 1917, the citizens of Australia opened their morning papers and read the findings of the Dardanelles Royal Commission, it was difficult even for the clearest-minded to realise their full meaning. The revelations (even though the

report was only an interim one, and published in "a slightly censored form") were so staggering that it was difficult to accept them as the truth. C. E. W. Bean writes that "the subsequent enquiry by a Royal Commission into the conduct of the campaign was not approved by general opinion." What he means is that thousands of men and women, stricken by the tragedy of mutilation and death, were unable to face the further tragedy of the truth—the realisation that those young lives had been squandered recklessly—and vainly. It seemed incredible.

But tragic as is the truth about Gallipoli, there is one greater tragedy—that the younger generation of to-day should not know the truth. The older generation, who have suffered, may need to close their eyes. But the youth needs eyes wide open—if it is to escape the fruitless suffering that threatens it. Every young Australian should know the findings of the Dardanelles Commission, as they were first given in 1917, and as they have been confirmed and amplified by the exposures that have been made since.

THE BLUNDERING OF THE ARM-CHAIR GENERALS.

The Report of the Dardanelles Commission (which included Mr. Andrew Fisher, a former Australian Labour Prime Minister, as one of its members) is a story of one long series of blunders. And the blunders were committed, not by the men who paid for them with their blood, but by the arm-chair generals thousands of miles behind the lines—the "Brass Hats" and the politicians.

The Report indicates that Winston Churchill was the driving personality that inspired the Dardanelles campaign. Churchill, who was First Lord of the Admiralty, had the qualities of imagination and enthusiasm. Unfortunately, it seems, he had too much of both, and a lack of other qualities to balance them. Churchill had a number of junior Sea Lords beneath him, but the Report reveals that "None of them were consulted about the Dardanelles Expedition" (p. 11). "He was carried away," the Report

says of Churchill, "by his sanguine temperament and his firm belief in the success of the undertaking which he advocated." Lord Fisher summed up Churchill's attitude perhaps even more accurately when he wrote to him: "You are bent on forcing the Dardanelles, and nothing will turn you from it—nothing."

But if the report was damaging to Churchill, it was ten times as damaging to Lord Kitchener. Not only does the Report criticise Kitchener for undertaking "more work than was possible for one man to do," causing "confusion and want of efficiency," but it reveals that there was no meeting of the War Council between March 19 and May 14, 1915. It is, indeed, almost incredible.

And then, later on, in the critical final stages of the campaign, when all the previous blunders could have been retrieved by a final victory—Kitchener held back troops for three weeks without telling Churchill.

These were the two men who led the Anzacs to their death—an over-imaginative politician and an under-imaginative general who blundered on as their fancy dictated, without and even against the advice of experts, and even of each other.

THE PLANS FOR A NAVAL ATTACK.

The first plans—if it can be said that there ever were plans—were for a naval attack without the assistance of military forces.

The Gallipoli forts had been bombarded on November 3, 1914, the only result being, in the words of the Report, "to place the Turks on the alert."

But in January, 1915, the War Council arrived at a decision embodied in the following words:

"The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective."

The idea of grown men solemnly deciding that a fleet of battleships would "take" a peninsula sounds like a piece of Gilbert and Sullivan. But it happened in real life—and these were the men entrusted with the conduct of the war—and with millions of lives!

"It is almost inconceivable," the Royal Commission

reported, "that anyone, whether military, naval or civilian, could have imagined for one moment that Constantinople would be captured without military help on a somewhat large scale" (p. 22). And Admiral Wester-Wemyss writes of this memorandum that: "It must for ever remain a monument of the ineptitude of the Council in whose hands lay the conduct of the War."

But the naval attack was made. After preliminary bombardments in February, the main attack was launched on March 18. Three battleships were sunk by mines, and the fleet retired.

It has since been learnt that the Turkish ammunition was all but exhausted. Major Endres, German Chief of General Staff to the First Turkish Army, has admitted that "If on the 19th or 20th a fresh attack with all available forces had been made, it would probably have succeeded." (Churchill, "The World Crisis, 1915," p. 267.)

THE PLANS FOR A MILITARY ATTACK.

The naval attack having failed, "We drifted" (these are the actual words used before the Commission by General Callwell, Director of Military Operations) "into a big military attack."

"Drifted" appears to be a suitable word.

"No preliminary scheme of operations had been drawn up. . . . No arrangements had been made about water supply. There was 'a great want of staff preparation.'" —(Evidence of Sir Ian Hamilton to Commission).

"The War Council never had before them detailed staff estimates of men, munitions and material, or definite plans showing them what military operations were possible."—(Memorandum of Mr. Roch, one of the members of the Commission, p. 59 of Report).

THE LACK OF MUNITIONS AND REINFORCEMENTS.

Those who have read John Masefield's "Gallipoli" will remember his vivid description of the Allied attack of August 6th to 10th. The desperate heroism of the exhausted, thirst-racked troops, struggling on through a hail of fire at Lone Pine, holding on for

five days and nights with the dead lying three deep and being trampled underfoot, and the hand-to-hand fighting continuing day and night with bomb, bayonet and knife. The bloody struggle for the vineyard at Krithia, and the main battle of Sari Bair. The tragedy on the crest of Chunuk, where our men were slaughtered by our own guns. And the last "roaring and blazing hour of killing" on the slopes of Chunuk.

And at the end? "Our thrust at Sari Bair had failed." And why? Masfield gives the answer:

"Even then, at the eleventh hour, two fresh battalions and a ton of water would have made Chunuk ours; but we had neither the men nor the water. . . . We had made our fight, we had seen our enemy beaten and the prize displayed, and then (as before at Helles) we had to stop for want of men, till the enemy had remade his army and rebuilt his fort."—(p. 155).

Winston Churchill and Sir Ian Hamilton say the same thing:

"Sir Ian Hamilton's army . . . fell down for want of shells and reinforcements, both of which, on the scale they required them, could at any time have been supplied."—"The World Crisis, 1915," p. 276).

"While the campaign progressed, men were actually taken from the Dardanelles to Salonika by the Asquith Ministry instead of being sent to us from Salonika. Just a few divisions of reinforcements and we should have gone right through and finished it. Yet the blindness of men whose minds were fixed on the Western front to the exclusion of all else prevented it."—"Argus," April 24, Report of interview with "Daily Telegraph").

WATER AND HOSPITAL SUPPLIES.

Without entering into this question fully, we give the following quotations:

"The provision for the evacuation of the wounded . . . proved insufficient."—(Commission, Final Report).

"During all this day of the 7th of August all our men suffered acutely from the great heat and from thirst. Several men went raving mad from thirst, others assaulted the water guards, pierced the supply hoses, or swam to the lighters to beg for water. . . . the distribution system . . . broke down."—(Masfield, "Gallipoli," pp. 139-40).

TOO LATE!

"A small force of a few thousands landed in time would easily have overwhelmed the wretched garrison. . . . in April, Turkish reinforcements had arrived. . . . We were always too late."

So writes Lloyd George in his War Memoirs. (Vol. I., p. 438.) Liddell Hart, in "The Real War," quotes from the Turkish Staff History to prove the same point:

"Up to 25th February, it would have been possible to effect a landing successfully at any point on the peninsula, and the capture of the Straits by land troops would have been comparatively easy."

But the tragedy was not, as some critics suggest, that the campaign was lost where it might have been won; the tragedy was part and parcel of the war itself—won or lost—as we see when we look beneath the fighting and blundering, and examine the reasons for the fighting and the blundering.

SUMMARIES OF THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

"Certain important political advantages . . . were secured by the Dardanelles expedition. Whether those advantages were worth the loss of life and treasure involved is, and must always remain, a matter of opinion."

This was the opinion of the Dardanelles Commission. Other critics have been less non-committal.

"Never were operations of such scope embarked on with such levity. There was no plan, either military or naval. . . . A few English politicians, seated round a table, carried away by the eloquence of the most brilliant of their number, despatched hundreds of thousands of soldiers to storm an impregnable bastion, protected by the sea, by forts, by entrenchments, and by field artillery. Thousands of men perished to no purpose."—(Edmond Delage, "The Tragedy of the Dardanelles," p. 251).

". . . the Dardanelles campaign with its incomprehensible blunders and its tragic failure."—(Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol. I., p. 438).

"Sired by strategic confusion and damned by naval negation, the landing on Gallipoli was born—and marred in delivery by muddled military midwifery."—(B. H. Liddell Hart, "The Real War," p. 173).

There are, and probably always will be, differences of opinion on some minor points, but all critics are agreed on the two main points—the tragic, almost incredible folly of the politicians, and the heroism of the men who had to pay the price of their folly. In the closing words of Admiral Wemyss's book:

"The campaign of the Dardanelles will remain through all ages to come an imperishable monument to the heroism of our race, to the courage and endurance of our soldiers and sailors, to the lack of vision and incapacity of our politicians."

WHY WERE THE BLUNDERS MADE?

There are many military and naval critics who blame the politicians for the blundering of the Gallipoli campaign (and the other campaigns of the war), and claim that this would not have occurred if the military and naval "experts" had been in charge.

Is this true? Can we expect that in a future war the blundering will be avoided by a slight reconstitution of the War Council?

The facts of Gallipoli answer NO! The records show that the majority of the military and naval leaders were not far behind the politicians in displaying what Compton Mackenzie describes as "the obstinacy of unimaginative men." It is of military men, and not of politicians, that General Monash writes as follows in his War Letters:

"In this island (Lemnos) one can see the cult of inefficiency and muddle and red-tape practised to a nicety. There are ever so many gentlemen earning their war medals on board luxurious transports, decked all over with forget patches and arm-bands and lace, acting as deputy-assistant - acting-inspector-general - of - something - or - other.

"There are some things which don't get into despatches. It is an undoubted fact that during the first forty-eight hours after the landing at Suvla, while there was an open road to the Dardanelles, and no opposition worth talking about, a whole army corps sat down on the beach, while its leaders were quarrelling about questions of seniority and precedence; and it was just this delay of forty-eight hours which enabled the Turks to bring up their last strategic reserve from Bulair and render futile the whole purpose of that landing. . . . Cheerful, isn't it?"—(pp. 70, 71).

The blundering of the Gallipoli campaign was no accident. It was, like the war itself, the natural outcome of a society built on privilege, where the privileged incompetents come to the top rather than the unprivileged competents. And so long as we have this society built on privilege, so long will war and blundering go together.

In fact, as T. H. Wintringham points out in his book, "The Coming World War," not only will the officer who plays polo continue to advance over the head of the one who studies metallurgy, but the new developments in the science of warfare will make the incompetents more incompetent, for it is easier than ever, under modern conditions of warfare, to sacrifice a hundred thousand lives in vain.

In the next war, if we allow it to come, we may expect not less, but more blundering than in the past, more vain sacrifices and wasted heroism. Such things are the very warp and woof of imperialist war.

FACTS OMITTED FROM THE SCHOOL-BOOKS.

There are some interesting facts about the Gallipoli campaign that are not to be found in our school-books.

One of them is that the Anzacs were sent—in Winston Churchill's words—by Lord Kitchener to the Gallipoli Peninsula "without consultation with their Governments or Parliaments." ("The World Crisis, 1915," p. 486.)

This is interesting when we consider that there is no indication that the position is any different to-day. The secret military conversations that our politicians have attended in London are indications that the position is just the same—that the so-called "Australian Defence Forces" are in reality forces to be handed over to a small group of men in Downing Street whenever they want them, to use them as they desire. And the interests of these men are more concerned with world domination and the thousands of millions of British capital invested in the colonies, than with the real interests of the Australian people.

Another interesting fact is that many of the shells that blew the Anzacs to pieces had been made in

Britain—and helped to bring good profits into the pockets of British holders of armament shares.

“Vickers had been supplying the Turkish artillery with shells which were fired into the Australian, New Zealand and British troops as they were scrambling up Anzac Cove and Cape Helles. Did it matter to the directors of these armament firms, so long as they did business and expanded the defence expenditure of Turkey, that their weapons mashed up into bloody pulp all the morning glory that was the flower of Anzac, the youth of Australia and New Zealand, yes, and of the youth of our own country?”—(Mr. Hugh Dalton, in the House of Commons, March 11, 1926).

Still another interesting fact is that Gallipoli could have been taken for the Allies by a Greek army.

“When the Greeks offered to join the Allies earlier in the war they were prepared to send an adequate contingent to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula. . . . But for some inscrutable reason Sir Edward Grey rejected Greek overtures of help.”—(Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 390).

This was in August, 1914. The offer was repeated early in 1915. And again it was refused—this time because the Russian Government protested to the British Government that it “could not consent to Greece participating in operations in the Dardanelles, as it would be sure to lead to complications.” (Winston Churchill, “The World Crisis, 1915,” p. 201.)

The “complications” were that the Russian Government wanted Constantinople to become part of the Russian Empire; this had, in fact, been one of the main reasons for the War. (See Fay, “The Origins of the World War,” Vol. I, pp. 426, 529.) But the Greek Government also wanted Constantinople as part of a new and greater Grecian Empire. Hence the refusal of the Russian diplomats to allow the Greek troops to take Constantinople. This is a good example of how allied Powers, when they are fighting for selfish imperialist aims, hamper their cause by their petty jealousies—and both fail to win the goal for which they are so eager to sacrifice millions of lives.

THE REASONS FOR THE DARDANELLES VENTURE.

When Winston Churchill first put the idea of the Gallipoli campaign before the War Council, he contended that it would be “the true method of defending Egypt.”

There may be a certain amount of truth in this assertion. And there is also a warning. If in 1914 the defence of the Empire was interpreted to mean an attack on Turkey, then we may reasonably expect that those politicians who are justifying “Defence of the Empire” to-day, may to-morrow be using Mr. Baldwin’s phrase, “The only defence is in offence,” and calling on us to defend the Empire by sending our young men overseas to be slaughtered in an attack on a foreign country. Let us beware.

Another reason given for the venture was that it was intended to relieve the pressure on the Russian armies in the Caucasus. A request to this effect certainly came from the Russian Government, but Liddell Hart declares that the Russian weakness in the Caucasus was due to Grand Duke Nicholas’s objection to spare troops from the main front.

What were the real reasons for the Dardanelles venture? There are two reasons why it is almost impossible to tell. One is that those who conceived and controlled the venture scarcely seem to have made up their minds whether they were merely carrying out a “demonstration,” or whether they were attempting a crushing blow to decide the whole issue of the War. The other reason was stated by Sir Ian Hamilton in April, 1935, in an interview with the “Daily Telegraph”:

“Some day all the official archives of the secret history of the time will be published, and then there will be a great outcry; but while the families of certain statesmen are alive this is impossible.”—(“Argus,” April 24, 1935).

In other words, the whole truth about Anzac is so damning to certain men that it is “impossible” to publish it, and the full story of why those ten thousand Anzacs gave their lives on that barren peninsula

is still hidden away in the darkness of the official archives.

But there is one piece of secret history that has **secretly escaped from the official archives.** This is the **secret treaty signed between Britain and Tsarist Russia on March 20, 1915.** The treaty was published, together with other secret treaties, by the Bolsheviks after the October revolution. But the best insight into the signing of the treaty is given by Maurice Paleologue, who was French Ambassador to the Russian Court, in his book, "An Ambassador's Memoirs." Paleologue, describing the sumptuous banquet given by the Tsar to General Pau on March 3, 1915, tells how the Tsar took him aside and said:

"The city of Constantinople and Southern Thrace must be incorporated in my Empire. . . . You know that England has already expressed her approval. King George told my Ambassador quite recently: **Constantinople must be yours.** . . . I want France to emerge from this war as great and strong as possible. I agree beforehand to everything your Government wishes. Take the left bank of the Rhine; take Coblenz; go even further if you think it wise."—(p. 297).

Five days later, Paleologue notes that the French Government agrees as to Constantinople, but a few pages later we are told that the French Government also expects "to receive compensation in Syria," and that the Tsar agrees.

This is as much of the story as the British writer, R. B. Mowat, gives in his "History of European Diplomacy, 1914-25." He makes it appear that the **British Government is generously giving France and Russia large slices of the earth—without any return.** But Mowat has omitted something.

"As the price of its consent to Russia's designs on Constantinople and the Straits, the British Government has asked the Imperial Government to agree that the neutral zone in Persia (i.e., all the central part of Iran, including the Ispahan region) shall be incorporated in the English zone."—(Paleologue, p. 299).

Paleologue made this entry in his diary on March 12. He continues:

"Sazonov immediately replied to Buchanan: 'Certainly!' Thus the Persian question . . . has been settled in one minute!"

"Settled in one minute!" But it was not settled yet.

To use Mowat's own words:

"It was now the part of the soldier to complete the work of diplomacy. On April 25 the Allied troops made the memorable landing on the shore of Gallipoli. There, young life was sacrificed like water. . . ."—(R. B. Mowat, "A History of European Diplomacy, 1914-25," p. 32).

"Young life was sacrificed like water." And for the highest motives, if we search the minds of the men who were sacrificed. But if we search instead the minds of the men who were planning and controlling the sacrifice, then we must agree with Mowat that the soldiers were merely "completing the work of diplomacy," that they were fighting to win Constantinople for the rulers of Tsarist Russia, and large slices of Germany and Syria for the rulers of France—and a slice of Persia for the rulers of Britain.

Persia is a country famous for Romance—and Rugs—and Oil. But it was for neither the rugs nor the romance that young life was sacrificed like water on Gallipoli, but for oil.

Yes, doubtless there were many reasons behind the Dardanelles venture, but **undoubtedly one reason was the greed for oil—the same greed** that has driven thousands of Bolivians and Paraguayans to their deaths in the interests of British and American oil combines, the same greed that is one of the reasons why Italian fascist bombs are to-day dropping on the Red Cross hospitals in Abyssinia. It is true in a sense that on the hills of Gallipoli, as on many another battleground, rivers of blood were spilt for rivers of oil.

But finally, of course, Gallipoli must be seen in perspective as one battlefield among the many battlefields of the First World War. To know fully the reasons for the Dardanelles venture, we must know the reasons for the First World War. And to-day it is possible to see beyond the false official reasons with which we were deceived in 1914-18—the "Little Belgium" lie, the lie that Germany alone was responsible for the war, the lie that Britain was not fighting for territory, and the many other lies without which the War could not have been carried on.

In the official "British Documents on the Origin of the War" (edited by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley), in Professor Fay's "The Origins of the World War," in E. D. Morel's "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy," and in many another book, we can read the real reasons for the massacre of those forty million men, women and children. We see the long struggle for the domination of Egypt and Morocco and the road to the East, the secret diplomacy, the grouping into alliances, the secret military and naval conversations since 1906 between Britain and France, who were plotting to keep Germany out of Morocco, and thus treating the Madrid Convention of 1880 like a "scrap of paper." We see the Austrian greed for a bigger empire, the Russian greed for a bigger empire, the German greed for a bigger empire, the French greed for a bigger empire, the British greed for a bigger empire. And this greed, though it is the greed of a minority only, though it is disguised under many a sacred name, is the real driving force behind the struggle for markets and colonies that deepens and deepens until the moment comes when the war of trade develops into the trade of war, and brave men fall—and profits rise.

Behind the Gallipoli venture lies a long political and commercial struggle whose roots draw their life from the very nature of our present chaotic, competitive social system itself. Until we understand this, we do not understand the story of Anzac.

WERE THE SACRIFICES MADE IN VAIN?

Must we admit, then, that the sacrifices of the Anzacs were made in vain?

They thought they were dying for liberty. We can justly be proud of what liberties we do enjoy to-day, and the struggles of the past through which they were won. But is liberty secure, is it a reality, in a country suffering from a political censorship of books, a country where overseas anti-war delegates are forbidden to land, a country where the political amendments to the Crimes Act threaten every progressive thinker with imprisonment for one or two years (or "during the Governor-General's pleasure"), without the right to trial by jury, without the right to cross-

examine witnesses, and without the right to be considered innocent until proved guilty? They died for liberty. But liberty has yet to be won.

They thought they were dying to make a world fit for heroes to live in. And in our newspapers we read articles like this:

IN THE FRONT LINE, AT LEAST THEY WERE FED.

ONCE FOUGHT FOR FREEDOM:
NOW THEY SCAVENGE FOR FOOD.

Down-and-out Diggers Jest Grimly and Mobilise for Comfort.

While Lyons and Co., including even typists, have been junketing over Europe, gaunt-faced, starving Diggers have been rattling the lids of Melbourne dustbins, searching for discarded morsels of food.

One evening last week "Smith's" paid a visit to a lane leading off Howey Place, one of Melbourne's most fashionable shopping arcades, and found about 30 men lined up waiting for the day's garbage to be put out.

All were poorly clad. . . .

A "Smith's" representative watching the scene was approached by a man with two battered saveloys and four slices of brown bread in his hand. . . .

He said that he had had four years' service in the A.I.F., and that over "the other side" they at least had good food to eat. . . .

"Terribly funny, isn't it?" asked one man wearing a returned soldier's badge, of "Smith's." "Very few people realise we exist. Many of us really don't know why we are living. And the hardest part of all for us is that the future is just as black as the present."—("Smith's Weekly," July 20, 1935).

A world fit for heroes has yet to be built.

They thought they were dying to end war. And to-day civilisation is nearer to being wiped out of existence by war than it ever has been. A world free from the constant terrible danger of war has yet to be built.

Whether the sacrifices of the Anzacs were made in vain depends on us—on whether we allow another generation to be sacrificed in imperialist war as they were, or whether, having learnt the lesson of their sacrifice, we unite to prevent its repetition, and unite to accomplish the aims for which they died.

THE TRADITIONS OF ANZAC—

WHOSE ARE THEY?

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Who are the real inheritors of the traditions of Anzac? The militarists, of course, are attempting to monopolise these traditions, to use them to help lead another generation to the slaughter. Lieutenant-Colonel Savige, speaking to 1,500 children at the Melbourne Cenotaph on April 24, 1935, after telling the story of a young soldier killed in action, went on to say:

"The children of to-day were now reaping the benefits of those sacrifices, and he urged the boys and girls present to be prepared to make equal sacrifices for their country and the safety of the Empire."—"Argus" report).

But to use the traditions of Anzac to bring about a repetition of the blunders and the tragedy of Anzac is to degrade and prostitute them.

No, there is only one way to carry on the tradition of Anzac, and that is to continue the struggle in which they honestly thought they were engaged—the struggle against militarism. But, having learnt the lessons of their sacrifice, we must carry on their struggle in a new way—by opposing militarism in all lands, and in our own land first, by helping to unite and organise the vast peace-loving, toiling majority of the Australian people into a force powerful enough to prevent (or quickly stop, if prevention is impossible) any repetition of 1914-18—a movement worthy to take its place in the rapidly growing world movement for peace and social justice.

There is no reason to doubt that the young Australians of to-day are capable of the same determination and heroism that the Anzacs displayed. But it is necessary, urgently necessary, that they should let the rulers of Australia know that they refuse to have their determination and heroism wasted and prostituted by the rulers of the old world in another sordid struggle for markets. Rather should it go, and rather must it go, to the building of a new world on whose soil peace and liberty shall flourish.



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