

**Richard Sambrook-Internal**

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**From:** Barbara Kerr  
**Sent:** 07 August 2003 02:27 PM  
**To:** Richard Sambrook-Internal  
**Subject:** FW: In Confidence.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Peter Horrocks  
**Sent:** 04 July 2003 09:25  
**To:** Mark Damazer; Richard Sambrook and PA  
**Subject:** FW: In Confidence.

I know this is somewhat peripheral to the central issue in contention, but I thought you'd like to see this Mangold information. Norton Taylor reports something akin to this today.

If there is anything I can do to help with the battles you are fighting, please let me know.

Peter

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Tom Mangold-INTERNET  
**Sent:** 30 June 2003 20:23  
**To:** Peter Horrocks  
**Subject:** In Confidence.

Peter:

I had lunch today with [redacted] He mentioned something that may be old news to you or may help or hinder the BBC in its confrontation. I give it to you in the strictest confidence to do with as you think fit.

The spooks received intelligence from [redacted] who stated that Saddam had organised a C3 system that would enable him to authorise a WMD strike within 45 minutes. This information was included in the famous dossier. The verb matters.

Anyone who knows anything about biological warfare knows that it is a slow and cumbersome form of warfare, requiring careful mixing of precursor chemicals before loading and/or highly sensitive temperature controlled handling of bacteria before use. It would be well nigh impossible to deploy such WMD in 45 minutes from a standing start.

[redacted] speculated that it might have been possible that Campbell carelessly subbed the 45-minute material in such a way that 'authorised' became 'deployed'. This could have been done for reasons of sloppiness or for malign reasons.


I am planning a newspaper piece that will include these thoughts later this week.

Hope I'm being helpful.

Best wishes,

**Tom Mangold**

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Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence Memorandum from Dr Thomas David Inch SOME QUESTIONS PROMPTED BY THE IRAQ DOSSIER[ 1 ] --As requested below are ....

**updated:** 07/07/2003 **matching:** memorandum dr thomas david inch

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477

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10

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM DR THOMAS INCH

P17 para 2. *Was there any evidence that the attempts at procurement were successful?*

A: We are seeking an answer to this question.

P18 para 3. *What was the evidence that mustard could be made in weeks and nerve agents in months? This statement suggests the intelligence source knew the facilities to be used and how the facilities would be used.*

A: This was an assessment not based on specific intelligence but on such factors as the availability of precursors and the ease of production. We judged that it would take the Iraqis longer to start production of nerve agent because the process is generally more complicated. We did not know where production would take place.

P19 para 5. *It is important to find what the raw data actually said about 45 minutes.*

A: The JIC assessment said that some CBW weapons could be delivered to units within 45 minutes of an order being issued. That is why the dossier said they could be "deployed" within 45 minutes. A  
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P19 para 8. *If it is known that Iraq continued to produce nerve agent then it should be known where that was when the intelligence was obtained. Post event chemical analysis of the site should be able to confirm the allegation.*

A: P19 para 8 refers to chemical agent production, not just nerve agent production. But the intelligence did not identify specific sites where this had taken place. In general, we agree that post-event chemical analysis of sites may be able to confirm assessments, although it should be recognised that Iraq carried out a large campaign of site sanitation.

P20 para 3. *Similarly analysis should reveal whether there was misuse of the precursor chemicals at Fallujah 2.*

A: There was no specific evidence of CW precursor or CW agent production at Fallujah after the 1991 Gulf War other than the production of chlorine and phenol which could support CW agent and precursor production. Inspection and chemical analysis could reveal evidence of further CW-related activity.

4

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478