David Cameron was beaten by his backbenchers on the EU budget even before he lost Wednesday evening's vote. During prime minister's questions, several hours before the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of Labour MPs and Conservative backbenchers outwitted the government, Cameron gave way. Previously, his position had been that he would fight for a freeze in the budget. Suddenly he went further, telling the Commons that "at best we would like a cut, at worst a freeze". A cut in the budget was the demand of the rebels' amendment. The prime minister was trying to dampen the revolt. But instead, he merely inflamed it further. If Cameron now favours a cut – the rebels will have whispered to their colleagues – why not vote for our amendment, which actually proposes one?
Such manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres are an unstartling backdrop to Commons debates. But there was an emblematic significance to the prime minister's supple, appeasing and failed gambit. The story of his retreat and defeat yesterday is the story of his European policy since the coalition was formed – perhaps even since he became his party's leader. Trained as a special adviser during the Major years and Maastricht strife, Cameron understandably views EU policy as the source of Conservative division and defeat. His instinct, if it is raised, is to change the subject. But this has become impossible within his party – and would arguably be so even were there no crisis in the eurozone. Polls show that half of his party's members want to quit the EU altogether. So does a growing proportion of Tory MPs.
Until recently, the prime minister could rely on his Conservative cabinet colleagues to hold the line. No longer. Yesterday's events in the Commons must be seen in the light of Michael Gove's remarkable recent admission that, given an in-out referendum now, he would vote to leave. The education secretary's preferred position is for Britain to stay in the EU and gain a big repatriation of powers. But as other European countries are unlikely to agree to such a proposal, the effect of his words, whatever his intention, was to legitimise the view of those within his party that simply want out of the EU. Yesterday's debate was thus about much more than money. The EU budget, to those who moved and supported the rebel amendment, is a symbol of the perfidy of the EU itself.
It was likely even before yesterday that Cameron will veto a budget proposal in the event of no freeze being agreed – if, that is, France or Denmark or another country doesn't exercise the veto first for their own reasons: indeed, it is possible that the negotiations will simply be postponed. But such an event wouldn't solve the prime minister's Euro problems. At the least, Tory party members and MPs will demand that a major push to repatriate powers be written in to the next Conservative manifesto.
If Cameron wins a majority in 2015 but doesn't gain such a return of powers, they will argue, then an in-out referendum must follow. Such a venture would surely bring about the split that the prime minister fears. For while he might gain the support of Nigel Farage, he would lose that of Ken Clarke.
The Conservative Euro-enthusiasts are a furtive and dwindling band, whose failure to push the case for their views is a cause of the situation they bewail. But Ken Clarke and his allies might not be in such a small minority were a proposal to leave actually on the table. This only helps to illustrate the prime minister's agonising dilemma. If his party continues down the road towards withdrawal, he is likely to lose part of it. But if it does not take that route, he is likely to lose another part – and his own position will come under further threat. Not even a majority Conservative government in 2015 will slake the thirst for EU departure of the Eurosceptics. In such circumstances, they would push Cameron towards the EU exit door. And if his present form is anything to go by, he would bow gracefully to their command.
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