TRANSNATIONAL STRUGGLE: ASIAN SEAFARERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE IN AUSTRALIA

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The struggle for Indonesian independence that arose in the aftermath of the Second World War did not only involve the Dutch imperial forces and Indonesian nationalists, nor did it occur strictly within the confines of the archipelago; the circumstances of the war meant that the independence struggle would, in part, be played out via a political campaign in Australia. The Australian aspect of the Indonesian independence struggle, which took place from August 1946 until November 1949, is usually portrayed as a campaign that was initiated by Indonesian 'rebels, refugees and exiles' within Australia, and received support from the Australian maritime unions.[1] In reality, the campaign waged within Australia in aid of an independent Indonesia comprised a far more diverse body of supporters and, moreover, it was transnational in nature. The often neglected transnational context of the Indonesian independence struggle is explored in this paper.

The role of Australian maritime unions in the campaign for Indonesian independence has been given considerable prominence in literature on Australia's political contribution to the struggle. The involvement of Australians in the Indonesian campaign has been interpreted as important in diplomatic terms, and the struggle did exercise pressure on the Chifley Labor government to eventually 'sponsor' the Indonesian republic to nationhood and membership of the newly founded United Nations.[2] More recently, the experience of Indonesians within war-time Australia and their mobilisation for independence has been explored by Jan Lingard in *Refugees and Rebels*.[3] The Lingard study concentrates on the Indonesian dimension of the struggle, and its focus is the Indonesian-Australian axis. This paper attempts a broader examination of the international nature of the Indonesian independence struggle.

The transnational context and dimension of the campaign for Indonesian independence found their origins in the disorder, chaos and eventual conclusion of the Second World War in the Pacific.[4] The Indonesian archipelago was seized and occupied by the Japanese armed forces in early 1942. As a Dutch colonial possession, Indonesian was known then as the Netherlands East Indies. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese continued their drive southward, disrupting and overwhelming many of the formal European empires in Asia, with the exception of British India. In Cochin-China, for example, the Vichy French responded to the Japanese annexation by pretending to maintain a semblance of empire while the occupation endured. For British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, however, the consequences of the invasion and occupation by Japan's imperial army were quite different. Unlike in Cochin-China, the Japanese seizure of the Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya effectively dislodged Dutch and British rule in these colonies. The Japanese forces took just weeks to capture British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.[5]

An immediate consequence of these lightning Japanese victories was the evacuation of imperial citizens, together with a smaller number of colonial subjects, to the sanctuary of nearby white Australia. The colonial rulers of the Netherlands East Indies established themselves in Australia as a government-in-exile, awaiting the end of the war and an anticipated return to power in the archipelago.[6] As these colonial rulers retreated to Australia, the mercantile vessels of British, Dutch and French shipping companies, too, sought sanctuary from the war-time disorder in Australian

ports. The Asian seafarers who manned these vessels were similarly stranded in Australia by the war, and made up the majority amongst the refugee subjects within the country at the time.[7] The presence of these Asian seamen within Australia's port cities would prove crucial in the winning of Indonesian independence in the aftermath of the Pacific War.

MERDEKA'S CALL

Agitation for Indonesia to become an independent nation began in earnest after the surrender of Japan's imperial forces in August 1945. The driving force in the political campaign for Indonesian autonomy was the Indonesian nationals who were located in Australia at the end of the war. Many of the Indonesians involved in the independence struggle within Australia were employees of the Netherlands East Indies government-in-exile, or were being held on Australian soil as the political prisoners of that displaced Dutch colonial regime. While the campaign for *Merdeka*, or freedom, for Indonesia began to strengthen in the years after the cessation of the Second World War, the Dutch remained steadfast in their resolve to re-take the archipelago.[8]

In the wake of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Dutch troops with support from British forces assembled in Batavia to prepare for the resumption of colonial rule. Armed youth throughout the islands of Indonesia were, however, determined to repel the attempted re-imposition of Dutch authority. These young Indonesians may have been inspired in their independence struggle by the Allies' Atlantic Charter, which had promised an end to colonial reign in return for support during the war.[9] While this undertaking was quickly and conveniently forgotten by the European powers in their eagerness to resume their imperial mission, young Indonesians, in particular, were unwilling to relinquish the opportunity to seize their independence. Sporadic fighting between Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch imperial forces soon developed into a stalemated war of position.[10]

While the conflict had reached a temporary impasse on the islands of Indonesia, the call for *Merdeka* had rallied the majority of Indonesians within Australia to engage in a political campaign for the archipelago's independence. The campaign found support amongst the Australian allies of Indonesia, especially the militant maritime unions in the main port cities of Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. Australia's maritime unions provided tangible assistance to the struggle for Indonesian independence by declaring 'black' all Dutch-owned and Dutch-chartered

ships that were intending to sail to Indonesia. The pronouncement of a black-ban on Dutch shipping meant that Australian waterside workers and seamen refused to crew Dutch vessels, to load or unload Dutch cargo or ferry Dutch troops to the archipelago. The black-ban hampered the Dutch forces' efforts to physically re-take the islands of Indonesia, although it did not prevent the Dutch from carrying out their so-called 'police actions' against Indonesian nationalists in this period. The boycott of Dutch shipping by Australia's maritime unions was nonetheless critical in helping to focus attention and intensify support for the Indonesian independence movement inside Australia.[11]

Although the Dutch colonial authorities attempted to carry out retribution and reprisals against Indonesian activists and, in particular, the Indonesian seafarers who mutinied aboard Dutch ships, Dutch officials were forced to grant limited concessions to the Indonesians. An agreement was brokered, for instance, between the displaced Dutch imperial regime, the Australian government and representatives of the Indonesian independence movement that would permit the majority of Indonesians who had been stranded in Australia during the Pacific War to be repatriated to nationalist-held areas of the archipelago. The Dutch reneged on this aspect of the repatriation agreement, however, and many of the Indonesian nationals returning from Australia were forced to disembark at the Dutch-controlled port of Kupang in West Timor.[12] The Dutch colonial regime, from its position in exile within Australia, had been reluctant initially to permit this repatriation. Allowing Indonesian nationals to return home did not prove, however, to be unfavourable to the imperialists' efforts to re-assert Dutch control over their contested possession. Once the repatriation agreement began to be implemented, there was a substantial reduction in the number of Indonesian nationals who were residing in Australia. With fewer Indonesians present, it seemed that the political campaign for an independent Indonesia had lost considerable momentum in post-war Australia.[13]

With the conflict at a virtual stalemate in the archipelago, the question of whether Indonesia would win its independence or again be subjugated as a Dutch colonial outpost appeared to be contingent not so much upon matters of politics and diplomacy, but on the material issue of access to shipping. The Dutch could not physically re-take Indonesia by force without the means of transporting troops and munitions. At the same time, the difficulty for those Australians and Indonesians who were in support of the independence struggle was how the boycott on the

transportation of Dutch troops and supplies could continue to be maintained. Many of the Indonesians who had been repatriated were seamen, and it was believed that with the numbers of Indonesian seafarers within Australia declining, the support for the black-ban on Dutch shipping may also start to wane.[14]

As Australian maritime unions, wharf-labourers and seamen maintained their embargo on handling Dutch cargo or crewing Dutch vessels destined for Indonesia, the Dutch authorities looked to the scattered bands of Asian seamen who were still marooned in Australia's port cities. The Dutch believed that these Asian seafarers could be easily press-ganged into providing their labour on Dutch ships, which would bring the black-ban to an end. Most numerous amongst these groups of Asian seamen in Australia were those from China and India. Dutch officials' expectations about putting these seamen to work were not unfounded, as the Australian government had made use of the labour of Chinese seamen while the war had endured. The work of stranded Chinese seafarers along the Australian coast and in the war zones was invaluable to the Allied war effort. Chinese seamen who were shore-bound had organised work brigades to build the Warragambah Dam on the outskirts of western Sydney, while others transferred to Balimba on the Brisbane River to prepare the American landing barges for the amphibious assault on the Japanese-occupied Philippines.[15] Once the war was over, however, the Australian Labor government was determined to resuscitate the White Australia Policy. In the immediate post-war years, the Chifley Labor government resolved to remove all non-European war-time refugees from Australia. A.A. Calwell, the Immigration Minister, was zealous in attempting to expel the Chinese majority of these refugees, especially Chinese seafarers.[16]

The pressure mounted on the Chinese seamen from both the Australian government and the Dutch authorities to either work the Dutch ships or be forcibly repatriated to a China engulfed in civil war. With the departure of many of the Indonesian seamen, the task of maintaining the ban to crew Dutch ships bound for Indonesia now fell directly on other Asian seafarers, the most vulnerable maritime workers in Australia, whom the Chifley Labor government was determined to expel. Along with the Chinese seafarers, Dutch officials turned their attention to the virtual impressment of Indian seamen in an attempt to evade the Australian maritime unions' black-ban on Dutch vessels.[17]

The armed struggle by Indonesians to resist the re-imposition of Dutch imperial rule was axiomatic to the eventual success of the Indonesian independence struggle, but the refusal of Indonesian seamen to work on Dutch ships also inspired resistance from Australian wharf-labourers and seamen and other Asian maritime labourers. The stand taken by these workers ensured that Dutch soldiers and supplies would be denied transport to Indonesia, which gave the initial impetus to the Indonesian independence struggle in Australia. While Rupert Lockwood and Jan Lingard have extensively examined the role Australian maritime unions and exiled Indonesian refugees and seamen played in the struggle for Indonesian independence, the contribution of other stranded Asian mariners needs to be explored. The involvement of Chinese and Indian seamen in maintaining the boycott of Dutch shipping was ultimately crucial in the campaign for an independent Indonesia. Why these Asian seamen chose to support the Indonesian independence struggle, and why that struggle should be understood as transnational requires closer investigation.

CHINESE SEAMEN

The most numerous of the seamen were the Chinese who had, despite the turmoil of Republican China, attempted to organise collectively as workers on foreign ships. Aboard ship, they shared a common experience of isolation. They worked under a regime of total control in which individual seamen had virtually no opportunity for collective action. On shore, in either their home ports or distant ones, they could attempt to organise industrially before being contracted to return to their ship work. Nevertheless, the Chinese Seamen's Union had been unable to raise the depressed wages or improve the deplorable working and living conditions experienced by their numbers aboard these ships. They were effectively a maritime indentured work force, without rights or redress. Only the exigencies of war in the Pacific changed their conditions of labour.

Despite their status as unwanted stateless aliens, Chinese seamen in every major Australian port in early 1942 staged sit-down strikes. They refused to work ships along the Australian coast or in Pacific war zones if their pay and conditions did not substantially improve. Nearly 2,000 Chinese sailors participated in the strikes. At Fremantle, Australian police and army units broke the strike, killing two mariners. The Fremantle strikers were arrested and re-deployed as a civilian works corps attached to the Australian army.[18]

In Sydney where most Chinese seamen were located, the Seamen's Union of Australia officials and the Chinese Youth League assisted the stranded, unpaid but unbowed Chinese seafarers in forming an Australian chapter of their existing union. Eventually it was unofficially recognised by the Curtin Labor government and the shipping companies. By the end of the war, the Chinese Seamen's Union had, through struggle and negotiation, improved working and living conditions aboard ship for their brethren, who also received wages which were nearly eighty per cent of a white Australian seaman's wage.[19]

During the war, the Chinese seamen forged a degree of proletarian unity with Australian maritime workers in every major Australian seaport. Nevertheless, ships on the Australian coastal run or in the war zones were crewed exclusively by either Asian or Australian seafarers. At sea, the colour bar remained unbroken. While European and Australian seafarers were always segregated from Asian or 'coloured' seamen, ship-owners never separated Asian crew members by race.[20] As importantly, the Chinese seamen's militancy and organising prepared the way for other stranded Asian seafarers, of which there were far fewer, to form chapters of their own unions in Australia, or, as in the case of the Vietnamese mariners, to simply establish unions.[21] Of these other Asian workers, Indians, mainly from the Gujurati coast, were the most numerous. Indonesian seamen, many of whom were ethnically Chinese, also formed their independent union.

While the Labor government sought to resuscitate its image as a white-settler exclusionary state by driving out Asians, the Chinese community in Sydney's Chinatown, along with Chinese seamen and the Chinese Youth League were providing food and shelter for Indonesians cast out of Dutch hostels and a tuberculosis ward in Turramurra. Moreover, Chinese seamen refused to crew Dutch ships at anchor in any Australian port.[22]

INDIAN SEAMEN

Indian seamen had worked on cargo and passenger ships coming to Australia via India from Britain since the late eighteenth century. Unlike the Chinese and other Asian seamen, they had traditionally formed the majority of seamen on ships coming to Australia.[23] Like the other Asian seamen working on British, Dutch or French lines, their working and living conditions aboard ship were appalling. They were non-European colonized people and stateless refugees without rights or status in an

alien land. Their common collective experience of race and class oppression at sea and on land built the bonds of solidarity.

As the struggles of national liberation swept through Asia in the aftermath of the Pacific War, the stranded Asian seafarers in Australian ports refused to serve their colonial masters. Throughout the 1930s, Indian seamen had formed a union which agitated unsuccessfully, until the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, for higher wages, better working and living conditions aboard ship and safety bonuses.[24] In 1936, Indian seamen with Australian Christians and Communist Party members had formed an Australian-India Association based in Sydney's Rocks on the waterfront. Run by Indian and Australian volunteers, the Association held Hindustani film nights, dances, picnics and other social events, including cricket matches. In 1944, its members collected money from Indian and other seafarers to send aid to the survivors of the Bengal Famine.[25]

Many of the Indian seamen in Australia were Muslims whose experiences working for the colonial shipping companies were shared by all Asian seafarers. Like the Chinese seamen, the Indian seamen had formed an independent chapter of their union, supported the Seamen's Union of Australia and unofficially recognised by the Australian government in the last years of the Pacific War. However, despite far larger numbers of Indian seamen in Australia, they lacked the community support and long associations that Chinese seamen found in the Chinatowns of Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane.[26] As the forced expulsion of Chinese non-residents (including seamen) from Australia accelerated, the vulnerability as well as the number of the Indian seamen, especially in Sydney, was seen by Dutch and British authorities as the means by which the Australian maritime boycott of Dutch shipping could be broken.

When Indonesian seamen had first called on 23 September 1946 to halt Dutch shipping, Indian, Chinese and other seamen had pledged their support to uphold the ban. They believed it was a contravention of the Atlantic Charter when Holland sought to re-impose a colonial administration on an emerging independent nation.[27] As the boycott continued and as Indonesian and Chinese seamen either were repatriated or refused to work on Dutch ships, the Indian seamen, despite their apparent weakness and vulnerability, devised a strategy of non-co-operation. They were forced to board Dutch vessels by the Dutch and British powers but they refused to work on any cargo, arms or supplies to be carried to Indonesia. They walked off

these ships immediately before disembarkation, creating significant delays for the Dutch authorities, who were forced to assemble replacement crews.[28]

Although this form of non-violent resistance could confuse and frustrate their Dutch adversaries, it would lead to greater repression for the Indian seafarers. This was a situation no other Asian seamen experienced. Nor was it sufficiently appreciated or understood by Australian maritime unions whose members could maintain their symbolic boycott without any fear of reprisals. Australian shipping was hardly affected by the boycott as Australia had no trade with post-war Holland or its contested Indonesian colony.[29]

Throughout the duration of the boycott, Indian seamen had acted decisively. Indian crews on Dutch ships were the first to warn Australian waterside workers that Dutch merchant ships were carrying weapons and ammunition bound for Indonesia. Indian crew were both forced onto Dutch ships and made to work at gunpoint. Such impressment could be mistaken as strikebreaking. British shipping agents in Bombay recruited scores of Indian seamen, who knew nothing of the boycott, to sail to Australia to work the Dutch ships.[30] Others were flown to Sydney and Brisbane in British transport aircraft from various Indian seaports. On arrival, they were informed by Indian Seamen's Union officials and other Indian seamen that the Dutch ships were to be used to re-impose Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia.

Although Indian deckhands had walked off the freighter, *Patras*, the Indian engine crew were forced with Dutch guns aimed at them to sail out of the Sydney Heads. The *Patras* was chased by a small motor launch carrying Indian, Chinese and Australian seamen's union officials who called out in English and Hindi through a loud hailer to stop the engines. The cargo ship steamed out of the harbour. Within hours, the *Patras* had returned to port in Sydney. Off Newcastle, the Indian seamen had refused to stoke the engines. As the ship began to flounder, the Indian crew members agreed to work the ship only if it was returned to Sydney's Port Jackson. Dutch guns had not broken their resolve.[31]

As more Indian seamen arrived in Australian by British ships as replacement crews, Indian seamen organisers speaking in Hindi, Urdu, Goanese or Bengali explained the reason for the boycott and mobilised them into a growing mass of non-violent resistance. In an effort to break the boycott, Dutch contract employers and military forces attempted to drive groups of newly arrived Indian seamen onto trains at Sydney's Central Railway Station bound for the ports of Melbourne and Brisbane.

They too were confronted by organisers from the Indian Seamen's Union. Despite being assaulted and beaten by armed Dutch guards, they convinced their compatriots to leave the trains and join the struggle. As waves of Indian seamen refused to provide their labour for the purpose of Dutch colonialism, the boycott held. Their acts of non-violent mass disobedience and campaigning were crucial to the boycott's success.[32]

It was estimated that over 700 Indian seamen were involved in the open boycott during 1945 and 1946. Their international solidarity in the winning of Indonesian independence may indeed be counted in numbers, as, during the same period, the number of Indonesians remaining in Australia has been estimated at 500. These numbers alone, however, were no measurement of political success. The Indian seamen's actions in continually frustrating, delaying and finally ending the Dutch and British efforts to have ships sail to Indonesia was testimony to their collective solidarity and internationalism.[33] The struggle for Indonesian independence in Australia was a transnational one. At its forefront were poor, stateless Asian seamen in a white-settler society which sought to repatriate them, once their labour was no longer a war-time necessity.

BREAKING OF THE BOYCOTT

Responding to increasing pressure from Britain, Holland and the Menzies-led Opposition, the Chifley government, through the Attorney-General, Dr H.V. Evatt working closely with the leaders of the Australian Council of Trade Unions and Sydney's Trades Hall found a solution to the industrial impasse. Inevitably, the boycott on Dutch shipping to Indonesia was broken in July 1946 by the moderate leaders of the New South Wales Trades and Labour Council who convinced a virtual moribund, almost unknown union of thirty coal lumpers to provide Dutch ships with coal. Dutch troops and volunteers sailed these ships from Sydney Harbour. Demonstrations and ineffective bans by Australian maritime unions continued until independence was granted to Indonesia in 1949.[34] Australian trade union black bans on Dutch shipping did not indicate a broad popular support for Indonesian independence. A growing anti-communism and unquestioned racism allowed the boycott, sustained primarily by Asian seamen, to be broken.

After Australian union leaders broke the boycott maintained by Asian seafarers, the consequences for the Asian boycotters were severe. The Indian Seamen's Unions leaders and key organisers were forcibly deported. All of the Indian

seamen who had been sustained by the volunteers of the Australia-India Association and the Chinese Youth League during the boycott were left penniless and jobless. British and Dutch shipping companies listed them as 'deserters', which was recorded on their individual set of seamen's papers. They had 'failed to fulfil their contract' and were denied any future employment by any major shipping company. They had been black-listed for life. The colonial administration in India refused to acknowledge their plight. By mid-1947, British India was in turmoil as the British authorities prepared for the Partition of the sub-continent. Neither departing British officialdom nor Indian political leaders were concerned with the destitution of Indian boycotters in Australia.[35]

Most accounts of the struggle for Indonesian independence in Australia correctly stress the importance of the maritime boycott. Without the Indonesian seafarers' defiant stand against Dutch colonialism such a boycott was an impossibility. Australian wharfies and seamen who observed the boycott had little to lose. They could enforce bans on Dutch shipping without recrimination or repression. When trades hall officials connived with a group of Sydney coal lumpers to break the boycott, the maritime unions and the Australian labour movement generally were untroubled by this successful 'scabbing' operation. Those who had everything to lose would maintain the boycott until its betrayal. Their response to *Merdeka* transgressed the existing order of things as a new Asian world was coming into being.

[1] Rupert Lockwood, *Black Armada: Australia and the struggle for Indonesian independence, 1942-49*, Marrickville, NSW: Hale and Iremonger, 1982; Jan Lingard, *Refugees and Rebels: Indonesian Exiles in Wartime Australia*, North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2008; Terry Hogan, 'The Labour Movement and the Indonesian Republicans in Australia, August 1945-March 1946', BA Honours thesis, University of New England, Armidale, 1972, especially chapters 2 and 3; Brian Fitzpatrick and Rowan J. Cahill, *Seamen's Union of Australia, 1872-1972*, Sydney: Seamen's Union of Australia, 1981, chapter 14.

[2] Margaret George, *Australia and the Indonesian Revolution*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980, chapter 9; Alastair Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, London: Stevens, 1960, passim; Phillip Dorling (ed) *Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia's Independence, Documents, 1947*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990, pp. 171-174.

[3] Lingard, *Refugees and Rebels*, passim.

[4] Transnational histories are studies in the ways lives and events of the past have been shaped by processes and relationships which transcend the borders of nations. Transnational history seeks to analyse ideas, people and practices which crisscross national boundaries. The struggle for Indonesian independence is a complex interplay of relationships which crossed the local, national, regional and global boundaries. An introduction to the diversity of transnational history is Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake (eds) *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective*, Canberra: ANU E Press, Australian National University, 2005, pp. 6-20.

[5] Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, *Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Howard University Press, 2004, passim.

[6] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 49-57; Lingard, *Refugees and Rebels*, pp. 9-34.

[7] Drew Cottle, 'Forgotten foreign militants: The Chinese Seamen's Union in Australia, 1942-1946', in Hal Alexander and Phil Griffiths, (eds) *A Few Rough Reds: Stories of Rank and File Organising*, Canberra: Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, 2003, pp. 135-151.

[8] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 77-92; Lingard, *Refugees and Rebels*, pp. 116-119.

[9] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 111-117; Lingard, *Refugees and Rebels*, pp. 70-72; Douglas G. Brinkley and David Facey-Crowther (eds) *The Atlantic Charter*
The Atlantic Charter was issued as a joint declaration by the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt in Newfoundland, Canada in August 1944. It was an agreement which set goals for the post-war world. For the colonized people of the world it promised the right to self-determination, global economic co-operation and social advancement and freedom from want and fear. Many of the colonized believed it meant the end of empire. While Roosevelt died before the war in Europe ended, Churchill considered the Charter "an interim and partial statement of our war aims designed to reassure all countries of our righteous purpose and not the complete structure which we should build after victory".

[10] Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946*, Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 1972; Anthony Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-1950*, Victoria: Longman, 1974.

[11] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 92-117; Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, chapters 6 and 7.

[12] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 142-144; Lingard, *Refugees and Rebels*, pp. 173-177.

[13] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 135-148; Frank C. Bennett, *The Return of the Exiles: Australia's Repatriation of the Indonesians, 1945-1947*, Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 2003, pp. 30-41; Lingard, *Refugees and Rebels*, pp. 161-181.

[14] Lingard, *Refugees and Rebels*, pp. 215-219.

[15] Cottle, 'Forgotten foreign militants', pp. 135-151.

[16] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 169-171; Cottle, 'Forgotten foreign militants', pp. 135-151; Glen Nicholls, *Deported: A History of Forced Departures from Australia*, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2007, pp. 84-86.

[17] Heather Goodall, 'Port Politics: Indian Seamen, Australian Unions and Indonesian Independence, 1945-47', *Labour History*, volume 94, May 2008, pp. 1-27, especially pp. 14-15, Date accessed: 17 September 2008, <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/lab/94/goodall.html>

[18] Cottle, 'Forgotten foreign militants', pp. 135-151.

[19] Cottle, 'Forgotten foreign militants', pp. 135-151.

[20] Julie Martinez, 'Coolies to Comrades: Internationalism between Australian and Asian Seamen', in Ray Markey (ed) *Labour and Community: Historical Essays*, Wollongong: University of Wollongong Press, 2001, pp. 295-312.

[21] Vietnamese seamen worked as members of mixed Asian crews on British ships. Others joined British and Free French merchant ships when Japan invaded and occupied Cochin China in July 1940. Although fewer in number than other Asian seamen, the Vietnamese from Hanoi and Saigon formed their own union when they walked off French ships chartered by the Dutch in 1946. Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 170-171. The Vietnamese seamen saw the winning of Indonesian independence as the way to free Vietnam from the re-imposition of French colonial domination. This was a conclusion drawn from a 1946 security report on Vietnamese boycotters found in 'Employee organisations – Australian Chinese Seamen's Union of Australia – ASIO file', National Archives of Australia, A6122, (A6122/47), 1850, folios 87-88.

[22] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 168-169; Cottle, 'Forgotten foreign militants', pp. 135-151.

[23] Heather Goodall, 'Port Politics, Race and Change: Indian Seamen, Australian Unions and Indonesian Independence, 1945-1947', Paper presented to the Trans Tasman Labour History Conference, Auckland University of Technology, February 2007, pp. 1-5.

[24] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 149-158; Goodall, 'Port Politics', *Labour History*, pp. 9-10.

[25] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 159-161; Goodall, 'Port Politics', *Labour History*, p. 12.

[26] See Drew Cottle and Angela Keys, 'Red-hunting in Sydney's Chinatown', *Journal of Australian Studies*, no. 91, 2007, pp. 25-31, especially p. 26.

[27] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 111-124.

[28] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 149-158.

[29] This point is not sufficiently emphasised in the other accounts of the boycott of Dutch shipping in Australian ports. See Drew Cottle and Angela Keys, 'From Colonial Film Commissioner to Political Pariah: Joris Ivens and the Making of *Indonesia Calling*', *Senses of Cinema*, Issue 41, October-December 2006, pp. 5-7, published online: <http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/06/41/ivens-indonesia-calling.html>

[30] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, p. 149.

[31] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 161-163.

[32] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 151-155; Goodall, 'Port Politics, Race and Change', Trans Tasman Labour History Conference paper, pp. 14-16.

[33] Lockwood, *Black Armada*, pp. 166-167; Goodall, 'Port Politics, Race and Change', Trans Tasman Labour History Conference paper, p. 23.

[34] Goodall, 'Port Politics, Race and Change', Trans Tasman Labour History Conference paper, pp. 27-29.

[35] Goodall, 'Port Politics, Race and Change', Trans Tasman Labour History Conference paper, pp. 30-33.