

# THE KIWI THAT ROARED: NUCLEAR-FREE NEW ZEALAND IN A NUCLEAR-ARMED WORLD

by Wade Huntley

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On July 14, 1984, New Zealand elected its fourth Labour government and thus brought into effect its policy declaring the country "nuclear free," which included prohibiting port entry by any ships either under nuclear power or carrying nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup> The government's commitment to this policy reached a moment of truth the following January, when it denied a U.S. request for a visit by the *USS Buchanan*.<sup>2</sup> This decision led ultimately to U.S. suspension of its defense commitments to New Zealand under the ANZUS (Australia/New Zealand/United States) alliance treaty, and a breach in political relations between the two countries yet to be fully mended.

Establishment of the nuclear-free policy was the crowning achievement of the country's anti-nuclear peace movement. Accordingly, the

policy was widely criticized as a frivolous moral exercise indulging vocal anti-nuclear activists and playing on an impassioned and uninformed public, while needlessly jeopardizing the country's national interests and sacrificing its ANZUS alliance relationship with the United States.<sup>3</sup> This judgment is rooted in two converging claims. The first is that a small state can find security only by enlisting the protection of a larger (and, if it is lucky, benevolent) state's power.<sup>4</sup> By this reasoning, the nuclear age has not changed this circumstance; rather, nuclear threats induce small states to seek shelter under a nuclear state's deterrent "umbrella" (if not to acquire nuclear weapons themselves).<sup>5</sup> Thus, disruption of the ANZUS alliance was perceived by many to expose and endanger New Zealand *by definition*.

The second claim, also of rel-

evance to larger democracies, is that a mass public is ill-suited to make wise and prudent decisions regarding state security. Recent research on this subject indicates that popular opinion is not as volatile and incoherent, nor its effects on security policy as pernicious, as once thought. However, many of these tendencies obtain only because the public remains largely uninformed and inactive, and relatively unimportant in decisionmaking processes.<sup>6</sup> Hence, advocacy of greater democratization of security and foreign policymaking resting on these conclusions does not extend to approval of popular movements, whose aims to "activate" the public and effect drastic and immediate policy changes are still regarded with widespread trepidation.

This article addresses these issues by assessing the New Zealand

nuclear-free policy within a “realist” framework of thinking about international relations and foreign policy.<sup>7</sup> Adopting realist assumptions about power, interests, and security allows putting the nuclear-free policy to the “strongest test.” The article first outlines the core realist concern for threats to security and autonomy. It next traces the history of threat perception in New Zealand, indicating why by the 1980s the prospect of global nuclear war constituted the most serious threat to New Zealand’s security. The article describes how the nuclear-free policy sought to employ symbolic action as a power resource to induce nuclear-armed states to adopt more stable nuclear weapons policies, and to advance goals of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation more broadly. It then analyzes whether, with this intention, the nuclear-free policy constituted a “realistic” response to the threats New Zealanders perceived at that time. Lastly, the article compares the nuclear-free policy to the main available alternative: maintaining the ANZUS alliance in its traditional form. Comparison of the efficacy of the nuclear-free approach to that of working towards the same ends through ANZUS reveals important ways in which nuclear weapons considerations can affect strategies of alliance choice for smaller, non-nuclear states.

The article concludes that New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy largely “passes the test” of political realism—surprisingly so, given the idealistic aims of its strongest advocates.<sup>8</sup> The capacity of a popularly-inspired policy to pass such a test has important implications for addressing the prevalent skepticism about the capacity of democracies

to conduct competently their foreign relations when security and foreign policy decisionmaking is subject to popular influence. This finding also indicates how elements of complex interdependence among nuclear-armed states provide unique opportunities for non-nuclear small states to pursue their interests by remaining non-nuclear. In turn, this result brings into question the conventional view that small states can find security only in alliances with larger powers, and indicates instead how prudent consideration of their interests can induce smaller states to make arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation a priority.

### INTERNATIONAL REALISM

Despite the centrality of the concept of “power” in realist analysis, its meaning remains complex and ambiguous. Realist definitions of power thus tend to be broad and encompassing: for Hans Morgenthau, power means “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”; for Kenneth Waltz, power is “the ability of a state to affect the behavior of other states.”<sup>9</sup> Other core assumptions of realism follow from this conception. States are viewed as sovereign entities living in a Hobbesian anarchy that, as Waltz emphasizes, seek to use power to preserve their security and autonomy.<sup>10</sup> Toward this end, strong states wishing to “balance” the power of even stronger neighbors seek alliances with smaller states that can help them. Toward the same end, smaller states welcome the solicitation, and “if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side which threatens them.”<sup>11</sup> Importantly, the severity of these concerns “leads us to expect states to subor-

dinate domestic preferences to international necessity.”<sup>12</sup> This pressure imposes itself particularly on small states, whose relative impotence begets an even greater sensitivity to international conditions.<sup>13</sup>

Waltz explicitly notes that his theory is intended to explain international *outcomes*, not foreign policy decisionmaking.<sup>14</sup> Given this focus, a realist account of how states pursue security and choose allies requires certain refinements to Waltz’s basic premises, such as those provided by Stephen Walt. Walt argues that states seek to protect themselves “against threats rather than against power alone.” Determining threats requires also considering “geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions.”<sup>15</sup> A state making realist security choices is then responding to the overall *distribution of threats*, determined by the distribution of power mediated by the other factors Walt identifies.<sup>16</sup>

This logic extends to alliance choices. Whereas Waltz expects states to “flock to the weaker side,” Walt argues that “states may balance by allying with other strong states if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons.” Thus, Walt offers “balance of threat theory as a better alternative than balance of power theory” in accounting for the factors states consider in making alliance choices.<sup>17</sup> The following sections apply this formulation to the evolution of threat perception in New Zealand, adoption of the nuclear-free policy, and changing attitudes toward the ANZUS alliance.

## THREAT ASSESSMENT IN NEW ZEALAND

Of the mediating factors identified by Walt, the most consistent impact on threat perception in New Zealand has been the country's enormous geographic distance from virtually everything else in the world.<sup>18</sup> In early years this distance bred not isolation but a profound sense of the vulnerability and indefensibility of small South Pacific islands.<sup>19</sup> But-tressing this perception of vulnerability were New Zealand's continuing deep links to Great Britain, not only as its dominant trading partner, but also for protection of shipping routes more generally. Hence, New Zealanders perceived threats to their security through London's eyes, and accordingly designed defense policies to be "forward in emphasis, conceived and executed in a British framework, and European in orientation."<sup>20</sup> New Zealand's willingness to shed blood in a host of British wars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries testifies to its dedication to this posture.

With World War II, and in particular the fall of the British outpost in Singapore to Japan, New Zealand crossed a threshold in threat perception. The inability of British global power to meet the Japanese threat in Asia presented to New Zealand for the first time a tension between its regional and global interests. At the war's end, continuing concern over Japan induced New Zealand to join Australia in seeking a U.S. security guarantee, culminating in the ANZUS alliance. Lacking an affinity with the United States equal to that with Britain, New Zealand entered into this arrangement with decided reluctance.<sup>21</sup> Hence, this new

security orientation is an example of a nation bending domestic preferences to external necessity, in accord with realist expectations.

The end of World War II and accession to ANZUS did not end changes in New Zealand's security environment and perceptions of threat. As Japan became integrated into U.S. security structures, and perception of Japan as a threat abated, threat perception focused increasingly on the Soviet Union; thus, New Zealand's 1957 Defence Review concluded, "The threat arises today from the world-wide activities of the Communist bloc."<sup>22</sup> However, awareness of a regional dimension to New Zealand's security continued to develop, particularly given the emergence of numerous independent island states throughout the South Pacific, and the growing prominence of Maori and Polynesian New Zealanders with direct links to these states.<sup>23</sup> Diversification of trading links expanded New Zealand's foreign interests while providing greater scope for pursuing foreign policies less tied to trading interests.<sup>24</sup> The sour taste left by New Zealand's support of the United States in Vietnam, combined with President Nixon's "Guam Doctrine," signaling a new U.S. expectation that Pacific allies would provide for themselves in regionally-limited conflicts, reinforced the trend toward more independent and regionally oriented threat and security perspectives, as evinced by the 1978 Defence Review's call for focus "on the part of the world in which we belong, the South Pacific," and for armed forces able to "secure a range of national interests 'close to home.'"<sup>25</sup>

The most striking aspect of New Zealanders' growing regional aware-

ness was the perceived absence of serious regional threats, which came to be a consensus view in security debates and a staple premise in Defence Reviews from the late 1970s onward. This conclusion marked a virtual reversal of nineteenth century judgments of the bearing of geography on threat perception. Whereas regional isolation had been originally seen as a source of vulnerability, by the 1980s most had come to see it as a source of protection.<sup>26</sup> Of course, geography itself had not changed; threat perception had evolved in response to continuing changes in the distribution of capabilities and avowed intentions of states elsewhere in the world.<sup>27</sup>

### Emergence of the Nuclear Threat

At the same time that New Zealanders were gaining new confidence in the security provided by their unique geographical situation, however, they were also coming to pay increasing attention to the direct risks to New Zealand of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. This novel development marked the first time New Zealanders sensed their security to be imperiled by circumstances unrelated to direct attack on their territory or sources of livelihood.

New Zealanders' earliest concerns about nuclear weapons stemmed from apprehensions about nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific. Initially, these concerns were regionally oriented and seen more as health and environmental questions, and so did not impinge on established threat perceptions or views of the nuclear weapons policies of its Western allies. Thus, New Zealand both supported nuclear test-

ing by Western powers generally and vehemently opposed French nuclear testing in the South Pacific.<sup>28</sup>

However, these concerns drew attention to other aspects of nuclear weapons issues, and by the 1970s, regionally focused concerns had evolved into more general, globally-focused concerns over the prospect of nuclear war itself.<sup>29</sup> The emergence of “nuclear winter” theories in the early 1980s lent scientific credence to the perception that New Zealand could not escape the consequences of nuclear war even if it were confined to the northern hemisphere.<sup>30</sup> By the 1980s, traditional concerns about conventional aggres-

sion had been overtaken by concerns about global nuclear war. The general prevalence of this perception was clearly evinced in one poll (see *Figure 1* below) that asked New Zealanders what threats they considered to be “a present worry.”

This popular view was supported by a consensus among officials and policy analysts, reflected in the initial premise of the 1986 Defense Review that nuclear war constituted “the most dangerous threat to New Zealand’s security.”<sup>31</sup> Prime Minister David Lange, acknowledging this view, added: “Quite apart from the moral imperative, simple self-interest dictates that we should seek

to eliminate the risks inherent in the present situation.”<sup>32</sup>

One writer terms the emergence of this view a “metamorphosis” in the country’s threat perception.<sup>33</sup> Ironically, this view, though originating in greater attention to regional security issues, ultimately served to reinforce New Zealand’s traditionally globalized security perspectives. Most importantly, the perception of the threat of nuclear war was neither utopian nor isolationist, but derived from realistic consideration of the security circumstances New Zealand then faced.

**REALISM AND THE NUCLEAR-FREE POLICY**

Given that New Zealand perceived the threat of global nuclear war as the country’s primary security concern, realist theory would then expect New Zealand’s foreign and security policies to attempt to reduce or counteract this threat. Importantly, although traditional realist analysis accords small states very little military ability to shape the international environment in which they find themselves, nuclear war was not for New Zealand a military problem. Rather, its prevention was a goal that could only be pursued within the complex web of peacetime interstate relations, a context that many assert offers smaller states greater opportunities for influence over stronger powers.<sup>34</sup> This section shows how the nuclear-free policy was intended to utilize such opportunities to pressure the superpowers into adopting less globally-threatening nuclear weapons policies, and then returns to realist arguments concerning the nature of power to assess the validity of this approach.

*Figure 1: Public Perceptions of Threat*

	All Respondents	Age 18-34	Tertiary Education
Nuclear War	48	55	53
Terrorist Attack on NZ	39	39	39
Conventional World War	24	25	23
Fisheries Poaching	23	18	26
Armed Invasion of NZ	11	12	8
Interference with Shipping	7	5	4
Communist Influence	4	3	nd

**Sources:** Figures are percentages of all respondents. Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want* (Wellington: New Zealand Government Printer, 1986), Public Opinion Poll Annex, pp. 11-16. This poll represents the best systematic measurement of public opinion on threat assessment during this period (most polling pertained specifically to views on ship visits). Note that concern for terrorist attack derived from French agents’ covert sinking of Greenpeace’s *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland harbor the previous year; concern for fisheries poaching reflects the country’s responsibility for the world’s fourth largest exclusive economic zone. For other polling analysis, see David Campbell, *The Social Basis of Australian and New Zealand Security Policy* (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1989), pp. 17-18, 23-24; James W. Vowles, “International Conflict: ANZUS and New Zealand Public Opinion,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (1987), pp. 420-437; and James W. Vowles, “The Growth of Antinuclearism in New Zealand,” *Australian Journal of Political Science* 26 (1991), pp. 472-487.

### Aim of the Nuclear-free Policy

For many nuclear-free advocates, the policy represented not simply a symbolic moral stand, but a practical action aimed at emboldening like-minded activists, generating public support in other countries, and encouraging other governments to adopt similar policies, toward the ultimate goal of inducing the superpowers to adopt nuclear weapons policies less threatening to the rest of the world. This potential power of New Zealand's nuclear-free declaration to impel like-minded governments to adopt similar policies became commonly known as the "kiwi disease." For many, the spread of this "disease" was the central intention of the policy; one advocate described it as "in every sense an international gesture.... The whole point is to try to jolt or lead the publics and governments of other nations to see nuclear weaponry differently."<sup>35</sup> Helen Clark similarly commented that New Zealanders "want to see what we have achieved in our sleepy corner of the world act as an impetus to similar movement elsewhere."<sup>36</sup>

The official position of the Labour government implementing the policy was to disavow any "export" aspirations. This position derived from the government's commitment to a "middle option" approach explicitly seeking to accommodate the nuclear-free policy within ANZUS.<sup>37</sup> Thus, Prime Minister Lange unequivocally declared, "New Zealand does not offer itself as an example to others."<sup>38</sup> However, Lange's disavowals were carefully worded:

We do not say to any country in the world, do as New Zealand does; all we say is that when the opportunity is given to any country to pur-

sue a serious and balanced measure of arms control, then that country has a duty to all of us to undertake that measure....<sup>39</sup>

In other words, other states were being urged not necessarily to copy New Zealand's nuclear-free policy, but at least to undertake the same security reasoning underlying it. The government took the position that, "whereas the policy is not for export, the analysis is."<sup>40</sup> Thus, the policy, itself a symbolic action, was intended for export *symbolically* rather than literally. While the government's "not for export" stance obscured this basic message, providing ample ammunition for critics' claims that the policy was internally inconsistent and inherently vacuous,<sup>41</sup> most observers recognized that the approach was intended to limit the inevitable damage done by adoption of the policy to relations with the United States.<sup>42</sup>

Such equivocation was largely absent among earlier proponents of the policy outside of the Labour party, many of whom were distinctly less concerned about ANZUS and relations with the United States, and openly welcomed the policy's potential to resonate in other countries, whether "intended" for export or not.<sup>43</sup> Neither was this potential lost on the Reagan administration: concern over the "kiwi disease" was the acknowledged primary inspiration for the ferocious condemnation and punitive retaliation with which the United States met New Zealand's policy, and continued to be a major obstacle to compromise from the U.S. point of view.<sup>44</sup> As one official put it, "unless we hold our allies' feet to the fire over ship visits, one will run away and then the next."<sup>45</sup> According to another:

[If] we compromise a major element of our policy in one area...it would tend to have a snowballing effect...[I]t could have an impact in other countries in Asia and Europe....[T]his was really a very major factor in our concerns.<sup>46</sup>

Importantly, by taking the "kiwi disease" seriously, the United States implicitly acknowledged the salience of symbolism as a power resource in international politics. The Reagan administration's ostentatious rebukes of New Zealand were in fact something of an attempt to muster its own "symbolic" resources, recognizing that political considerations foreclosed the exercise of more forceful and directly coercive tactics.<sup>47</sup> The U.S. reaction also belies critics of the policy who rejected by definition the potential efficacy of "symbolic gestures" in international affairs, contradictorily judging the policy to be *necessarily* a failure despite acknowledging its "catalytic effect on other states with a commitment to curb the military posture of the superpowers."<sup>48</sup>

Many advocates of the nuclear-free policy maintained that it achieved the political impact for that they had hoped. Certainly, New Zealand, for a time, became a center of the Western world's attention; on the other hand, no Western government adopted a comparably extensive nuclear-free policy. Between these two extremes, the particularly ephemeral nature of links of cause and effect for symbolic policies preclude definitive assessment of the policy's "effectiveness." However, as a small state, New Zealand is unlikely to have a decisive effect on world affairs in any event. In this light, the strongest indicator of the success of the nuclear-free declara-

tion may be the efforts U.S. policymakers deemed necessary to prevent the “kiwi disease” from spreading. Moreover, the considerable warming of the Reagan administration to arms control in the late 1980s should not pass without notice. If this development can at all be attributed to pressures generated by prominent anti-nuclear movements in the United States and Europe in preceding years, then New Zealand’s catalytic contribution to these movements bears attention.

### Symbolism and Power

The logic of the nuclear-free policy was that it manifested New Zealand’s concern over the threat of nuclear war in such a way as to encourage other peoples, other states, and ultimately the superpowers, to act to reduce the risks of such a war occurring. This logic implies the claim that the nuclear-free policy’s emphasis on symbolic expression over more direct military and diplomatic arrangements better fit New Zealand’s goals within the constraints and opportunities of the moment. The *realism* of the nuclear-free policy rests on this potential efficacy of “symbolic power” in the real world of international politics.

The concept of “symbolic power” means simply the capacity of symbolic expressions to exert “control over the minds and actions” of other individuals or states. Definitionally, the notion of symbolic power is fully consistent with realism’s necessarily broad, generic conception of power. The notion of symbolic power conflicts only with realism’s subordinate emphasis on quantifiable, material power resources, most specifically military capabilities. The subordinate nature of this assump-

tion must be emphasized: in its purest form, realist theory places the priority on state security, and power *generically* as the means to that end. The emphasis on military power derives from realists’ additional assumption that the “anarchy” among states renders their relations a Hobbesian “war of each against all,” in which only capabilities for force are meaningful. The viability of the concept of symbolic power depends upon the applicability of this latter assumption.

Few analysts—in fact few realists—adhere to this assumption absolutely. Rather, most accept that few power resources are infinitely fungible, and that modern peacetime international politics presents many circumstances in which the use of military force is highly constrained, threats of its use bear little credibility, and the possession of military resources can even become a *liability* rather than an asset.<sup>49</sup> Many contend that the relative “uselessness” of nuclear weapons exemplifies this point. Such analysts often also note that the “infungibility” of political power resources is of particular relevance to small states, which can find important opportunities for exerting influence in a context of great power competition if they remain “awake to their own interests and to conditions favorable to them.”<sup>50</sup>

Recognizing that in reality coercive resources are not limitlessly useful is the only significant qualification of realist postulates necessary to accommodate the notion of symbolic power. As noted above, New Zealand was pursuing its goal of reducing the risks of nuclear war in peacetime conditions in which a complex web of relationships in-

cluded crosscutting security issues among states and multiple channels of contact among societies. Because the focal point was ongoing public debates over nuclear weapons policies *within* the United States and other Western states, such conditions offered opportunities for policies aimed at “penetrating” those domestic debates—a form of influence of particular utility to small states.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the relevance of logic, reason, and conviction to such debates also enhanced the potential of symbolic actions, which acquire effectiveness from their *quality* rather than their quantity, offering openings particularly to small states whose very irrelevance in material terms allows them to garner reputations for objectivity and principle.<sup>52</sup>

That New Zealand is in many respects ideally positioned to exercise symbolic power efficaciously has been long recognized.<sup>53</sup> New Zealand’s position as a small state on the periphery of the Western community, and the convergence of its specific security concerns with the common concern of all states over the prospect of global nuclear war, was seen by many to present a unique opportunity—and urgent responsibility—for New Zealand to act singularly and independently.<sup>54</sup>

Thus, New Zealand’s assigning a high priority to the threat of global nuclear war in the 1980s constituted a realistic assessment of threats to the country’s security. Given the political context New Zealand then faced, and the power resources available to it, symbolic action (such as adoption of the nuclear-free policy) constituted a coherent and realistic option in attempting to meet and reduce this paramount threat. The remaining question is whether

such action constituted the *best* option; that is, whether the nuclear-free policy was likely to be *more* efficacious than other available courses of action.

**NUCLEAR FREEDOM  
VERSUS NUCLEAR  
ALLIANCE**

As noted earlier, traditional realist theory suggests that smaller, weaker states generally seek security in an alliance with a stronger patron (perhaps of their choosing, perhaps not), switching alliances from time to time (if they are free to do so) as changes in the distribution of threats dictate. Thus, smaller states, like their larger neighbors, seek to “balance,” and will, if possible, ally with the stronger state (or states) they deem least threatening.<sup>55</sup> As the danger of global nuclear war became New Zealand’s paramount security concern in the 1980s, realism thus expects that its ANZUS alliance with the United States would face new scrutiny and come to be assessed in terms of its ability to facilitate New Zealand’s goal of forestalling the nuclear threat.<sup>56</sup>

**Evolving Views of ANZUS**

Almost from the moment it was founded, the function and justification of ANZUS for all its partners has continuously evolved. As lingering anxiety about Japan in New Zealand and Australia gave way to concern over the threat of global communist expansion, ANZUS increasingly became regarded as a medium through which those countries could support the broader Western containment effort. Later, growing regional awareness in New Zealand combined with the U.S.

“Guam Doctrine” again impelled role redefinitions for the ANZUS partners. By the 1980s, the formal provisions of the treaty had become secondary to the myriad of associations among its members; for one analyst, it had “become a truism in the three countries to speak of it as only the legal expression of a very much wider relationship.”<sup>57</sup> In other words, the real importance of ANZUS was no longer formal, but *symbolic*.

For some, the ascendance of the threat of nuclear war did not conflict with this relationship. The expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union were seen to represent the greatest risk of nuclear war, and firm resistance led by the United States was viewed the only hope of one day alleviating this risk.<sup>58</sup> Thus, the rationale of ANZUS was once again amended to conform with prevailing perceptions of threat.

However, counter-arguments

emerged—paralleling (and drawing from) similar critiques of Western nuclear weapons policies being made in the United States and Europe—purporting not only that this primary concern for “strength” was now obsolete, but also that the approach itself was a source of strategies and policies contributing to heightened risks of nuclear war.<sup>59</sup> Such perceptions were firmly grounded in the emergence of the realist expectation of convergence of superpower military doctrines over the course of the Cold War.<sup>60</sup>

Support for this perspective was widespread among advocates of the nuclear-free policy. It was also gaining increasing support among the wider public, as indicated by one poll (see *Figure 2*) concerning specific countries New Zealanders thought might “pose a *military* threat to New Zealand in the next 15 years.”

Given the longstanding centrality

**Figure 2: Public Perceptions of Threatening Countries**

	All Respondents	Age 18-34	Tertiary Education
No country Cited	32	31	39
Soviet Union	31	30	24
United States	14	20	16
France	13	16	10

**Sources:** Figures are percentages of all respondents. Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*, Public Opinion Poll Annex, pp. 17-18. No other country received more than five percent mention in any of the categories cited here. The most popular response “no country cited” reflected the predominantly benign view most New Zealanders had of their own region. See also Stephen Levine, “New Zealand—United States Relations—A Political Appraisal,” in Roderic Alley, ed., *Alternatives to ANZUS, Vol. 2* (Auckland: New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies, 1984), pp. 27-28. This and other evidence show that the attitude was anti-nuclear, not anti-American. See Stuart McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny: The Nuclear Ships Dispute between New Zealand and the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 41-43.

of ANZUS to New Zealand's post-war defense posture, identification of its primary alliance partner as also its second-most threatening country is a startling finding. However, given the primary importance of the threat of global nuclear war, the results are quite explicable: the top three countries cited were the world's two contending superpowers and the country responsible for continuing nuclear testing in the South Pacific (as well as a recent terrorist attack on Greenpeace's *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland Harbor). The findings thus evince an association of the threat of nuclear war with the policies of the major nuclear powers themselves.

Realist balancing logic warns of the consequences of such perceptions: as a major power becomes more threatening, it drives away its friends and becomes less valuable as an ally, instead impelling other states into opposition against it. As Walt comments, "Strong states may be valued as allies because they have much to offer their partners, but they must take particular care to avoid appearing aggressive."<sup>61</sup> Thus, from a realist perspective, given the increasing perception of the United States as an instrument of New Zealand's chief security threat, a fundamental reassessment of its alliance relationship with the United States is fully expected.

### ANZUS and the Nuclear Issue

The perception that U.S. as well as Soviet policies were responsible for perpetuating the nuclear arms race and increasing the danger of nuclear war undermined the rationale for ANZUS as a contribution to Western vigilance in the face of So-

viet obduracy. However, this perception did not undermine the rationale for the ANZUS alliance *per se*. Rather, the key to assessing the value of ANZUS to New Zealand became the utility of the alliance as a tool for influencing the United States to change the nuclear weapons policies deemed so dangerous.<sup>62</sup>

Supporters of the ANZUS alliance contended that it provided New Zealand "special access" to decisionmakers in the United States—such access to the "inner circles of official Washington" constituted "the essence of the ANZUS alliance relationship."<sup>63</sup> Many who concurred that U.S. nuclear policies tended to undermine nuclear stability nevertheless held that this access provided New Zealand's most efficacious means to "try to exercise a moderating influence" on those policies.<sup>64</sup> From this perspective, the nuclear-free stand squandered this diplomatic tool while substituting no other practical positive impact on the danger of nuclear war. This claim constitutes a serious challenge to a realist justification of the nuclear-free policy, particularly in contrasting the indirect and ephemeral nature of the symbolic power the policy sought to exercise with the direct and tangible nature of the benefits potentially offered by "special access."

However, many asserted that New Zealand's "special access" to Western decisionmakers had produced no tangible results. Both U.S. government reports and the testimonies of New Zealand's own officials depict New Zealand's posture as largely receptive and compliant, viewing the United States "as a superpower, acting as a superpower must."<sup>65</sup> As David Lange has observed, "what is now on public record about the

ANZUS meetings predictably suggests that the Americans did the talking and our side did the listening."<sup>66</sup> Most importantly, examples offered by defenders of the tangible benefits of "special access" had no bearing on U.S. nuclear weapons policies (and in fact little relevance to key U.S. interests at all).<sup>67</sup> Even then Defence Secretary Denis McLean, one of New Zealand's strongest advocates of the value garnered by New Zealand's "special access," acknowledged:

[O]ne of the clear lessons of the nuclear world is that the nuclear powers will not—cannot—share their responsibility for this ultimate weapon.<sup>68</sup>

Despite the impermeability of U.S. nuclear decisionmaking, some held that seeking to quell the nuclear arms race through both public demonstration and private persuasion were not in any event incompatible pursuits.<sup>69</sup> This viewpoint, supported by public opinion polling data consistently favoring both ANZUS and the nuclear-free stance,<sup>70</sup> lay at the heart of the Labour party's "middle option" policy (discussed earlier). This policy sought to *enhance* the alliance relationship by establishing greater equality in decisionmaking among the three ANZUS partners, and by incorporating nuclear-free stances in New Zealand and the South Pacific as a contribution to U.S. efforts toward global nuclear nonproliferation.

Skepticism that these two approaches could be undertaken simultaneously came from both sides of the debate. One analyst pointed to the additional prospect that in pursuing both courses of action, New Zealand might find itself successful in neither.<sup>71</sup> Some analysts further contended that the symbolic impact



of the nuclear-free declaration was undermined by New Zealand's continuing implicit support, through ANZUS, of the very nuclear policies it deemed to be so threatening, particularly given increasing U.S. definition of the alliance as a component of global strategies in which nuclear weapons played a vital part.<sup>72</sup>

In sum, the tangible benefits of New Zealand's "special access" to U.S. decisionmaking through ANZUS, minimal at best, appeared to end at the threshold of nuclear weapons issues. This "firebreak" between New Zealand's views as a non-nuclear state and the decisionmaking of its nuclear ally reveals something of a new dilemma of alliance politics in the nuclear age: non-nuclear states that are barred from participation in the nuclear weapons decisionmaking of their allies are nevertheless necessarily implicated in those decisions, whether they like them or not. This dilemma lay at the root of opposition in New Zealand to continuing the ANZUS alliance in its historic form, and helped propel the hope of many New Zealanders that by becoming more *publicly* critical, greater progress toward genuine arms control might be made.

### An Ephemeral Alliance

Prior to the dispute over the nuclear ship ban, an important element of support for ANZUS in New Zealand was the perception that the "price of the alliance has not been high."<sup>73</sup> Nor did Labour party leaders expect this to change, believing it to be "most unlikely that the United States would end ANZUS as a result of Labour implementing its anti-nuclear policies."<sup>74</sup> These expectations evaporated following

New Zealand's rejection of the *USS Buchanan*. The Reagan administration took the position that the nuclear-free policy was inconsistent with New Zealand's ANZUS obligations, and promptly suspended all military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and high-level diplomatic contacts. After negotiations lasting over a year failed to reconcile New Zealand's stance with the U.S. "neither-confirm-nor-deny" policy, the Reagan administration determined that the dispute was at an impasse and formally suspended its ANZUS defense obligations to New Zealand.<sup>75</sup> The Labour "middle option" was no longer tenable. The United States had now clearly established discarding the nuclear-free policy as the price of maintaining ANZUS; the question became whether New Zealand was willing to pay it.

As public debate over the merits of ANZUS continued, trends in public opinion indicated increasingly that the answer was "no." As shown in *Figure 3*, when asked to "choose between breaking defence ties with the United States, or allowing ships that could be nuclear armed into

New Zealand ports," a clear shift of preference emerged. This trend in public opinion was widely acknowledged, and bolstered the Labour government's initial decision in 1985 to put a priority on adherence to the nuclear-free policy above acceding to U.S. definitions of its ANZUS obligations.

David Campbell explains this superficiality of support for ANZUS by contending that, because many New Zealanders did not perceive their nation to be directly threatened, they manifested less of an emotional response to security issues and so felt less anxiety about exploring unconventional security alternatives.<sup>76</sup> This argument intriguingly reverses the common accusation that New Zealand's relative security allowed it to indulge an emotive preference for a quixotic moral crusade against nuclear weaponry. However, both of these interpretations overlook the sense of *insecurity* produced in New Zealand by the direction of the nuclear arms race. Hence, neither can account for why, despite the superficiality of support for ANZUS, the alliance was not seriously challenged sooner. Even a house of straw

**Figure 3: Public Perceptions of Nuclear-Free Policy and ANZUS**

	October 1985	June 1989	May 1991
<b>Break U.S. defense ties</b>	44	52	54
<b>Allow nuclear ships</b>	48	40	39
<b>Don't know</b>	9	8	7

**Sources:** Figures are percentages of respondents. One Network News / Heylen Poll, Heylen Research Centre, 1991; Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want* (Wellington: New Zealand Government Printer, 1986) Public Opinion Annex, p. 40-43; Campbell, *The Social Basis of Australian and New Zealand Security Policy*, pp. 18-19 and Clements, "The Defence Committee of Enquiry," pp. 231-233.

will stand until the wolf blows.

### ANZUS and Realism

One of realism's most familiar aphorisms is that "a state has no permanent friends, only permanent interests." Herein lies the driving force of balance-of-power politics: states form and dissolve alliances in response to changing security demands, not to indulge emotive preferences or moral crusades. Only by keeping first in mind its own interests and pursuing them vociferously can a state expect to receive its due from its alliance partners.

This is especially true in asymmetrical alliances, of which that between the United States and New Zealand is an extreme example.<sup>77</sup> Major powers do not look out for the interests of their smaller partners:

In alliances among unequals, the contributions of the lesser members are at once wanted and of relatively small importance; ...alliance leaders need worry little about the faithfulness of their followers, who usually have little choice anyway.<sup>78</sup>

If the loyal ally appears entirely satisfied, it will be ignored. American policy makers are too busy to think up grievances for states that cannot manufacture their own.<sup>79</sup>

Thus, the quality most wanted by small states in alliances with larger powers is not fidelity but "independence" and self-interest. As Wolfers observes:

[P]ower accrues to a weak country if it can credibly threaten to switch its allegiance from one side to the other. The mere belief on the part of one great power that it would suffer a serious loss if a weak country with which it was dealing shifted either from one camp to the

other or from alignment to neutrality gives the weak country a far from negligible coercive asset.<sup>80</sup>

These points suggest that New Zealand could be sure of securing its interests within ANZUS only by assiduously asserting its independence and preventing the United States from taking it for granted. However, members of New Zealand's military, diplomatic, and political elite—its purported "realists"—consistently displayed an exactly opposing attitude. Remarkably, many asserted that the ANZUS relationship had metamorphized from a traditional defense alliance into a "security community" whose members no longer follow the rules of *realpolitik*, but instead, "view one another on matters of security as though each were virtually part of the other."<sup>81</sup> This viewpoint is evinced no better than in the description offered by Denis McLean, then New Zealand's secretary of defense:

The individual national roles and capabilities of the three partners merge upwards as the direct national interests involved draw together into the wider community of interests of the ANZUS partners....An alliance of this kind is a genuine partnership—from each according to his means, to each according to his needs.<sup>82</sup>

No doubt such statements to some extent reflected not a genuinely "idealistic" conception of ANZUS, but rather a strategic choice to act differentially to a much larger ally, raising disagreements politely and privately (if at all), in the belief that unflinching fidelity would enable New Zealand to accumulate American "good will" that it could call on in time of need.<sup>83</sup> However, depicting ANZUS as a "security community"

that resulted in "merged interests" indicates the extent to which this posture defined New Zealand's interests in terms of the alliance, rather than vice versa, undermining the aim of using "special access" to exert meaningful influence over important policy decisions. More fundamentally, realist theory suggests the folly of relying on "good will" in any alliance. The quite "realist" willingness of the United States to jettison its ties to New Zealand in order to protect what it perceived to be more important interests elsewhere—New Zealand's past staunch support of the United States and the Western alliance notwithstanding—demonstrates this point convincingly.<sup>84</sup>

As one analyst pointed out well before the nuclear-free policy dispute erupted, "the interests of a large global power and a small isolated island nation cannot always coincide."<sup>85</sup> Perceptions of ANZUS more as a community than an alliance among its strongest supporters, and as an ambiguous identity link among the general public, evoke just the sort of inertial and emotive considerations states are expected to put aside in pursuit of their interests, not a "realist" foundation for an alliance. That ANZUS depended upon such perceptions in New Zealand suggests its already weakened foundation; growing concern over nuclear war and support for the nuclear-free policy in the 1980s merely revealed this weakness. Perhaps the most powerful irony to emerge from the nuclear-free episode is that parochial interests and bureaucratic inertia seemed to blind many of New Zealand's governing officials to the hard politics of alliance relationships, devolving to the country's "idealist" nuclear-free advocates the task of pointing out the need for New

Zealand to define its interests independently and resolutely, and to subject its alliance relationship continually to the test of its service to those interests.

## CONCLUSION

By the late 1980s, the political climate in New Zealand for the treatment of national security and defense issues had been transformed. The 1987 elections returned the Labour party to government despite turmoil over its economic policies, in the wake of polls indicating an increasing importance for nuclear issues in voting decisions.<sup>86</sup> Although the ANZUS dispute catalyzed a reevaluation of many associated security and defense policies,<sup>87</sup> the nuclear-free policy itself was becoming increasingly inviolable. Consensus on this position was consummated on March 8, 1990, when New Zealand's conservative National Party declared its support for the nuclear-free policy and its warship ban.<sup>88</sup> Scarcely a decade earlier, such a development was hardly imaginable.

Since adoption of the nuclear-free policy, continuing changes in world politics—and hence in New Zealand's threat environment—have reinforced the rationale of the stance. The end of the Cold War eliminated the last vestiges of justification of ANZUS in terms of Soviet containment. The subsequent U.S. decision to remove all nuclear weapons from its surface naval vessels eliminated the “neither-confirm-nor-deny” policy that had been the major point of contention of the ship ban dispute. In the midst of these developments, the United States resumed certain high-level contacts with New Zealand in 1990. However, the

United States continued to classify New Zealand in the unique category of “former ally.”<sup>89</sup>

This U.S. posture is particularly incongruous given new U.S. acceptance of the nuclear-free zone concept, evinced by its recent decision (along with France and Great Britain) to endorse finally the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ). The Treaty of Rarotonga, which established the SPNFZ in 1985, included protocols committing affected nuclear-armed states to the nonproliferation and non-use of nuclear weapons in the vast ocean region. Although the treaty's provisions had been made looser than New Zealand's policy—specifically to gain support from interested nuclear powers (it allows transit and visits to member states by nuclear-armed ships and planes, for example)—the United States had refused to sign the protocols, on the same grounds that it objected to New Zealand's policy: the SPNFZ “would encourage other areas to adopt similar or more strict nuclear-free zones.”<sup>90</sup> With the end of the Cold War, such encouragement now appears more welcome: the United States credited its decision to accede to the Treaty of Rarotonga to its contribution to progress in establishing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime in the region and its role in “advancing arms control and non-proliferation” more generally.<sup>91</sup>

The U.S. decision acknowledges growing recognition that the Treaty of Rarotonga, and even more so its predecessor, the Treaty of Tlatelolco (establishing a nuclear-free zone for Central and South America), have supplemented and reinforced nuclear nonproliferation and the NPT regime

both within their regions and elsewhere in the world. This success has recently inspired new nuclear-free zones in Southeast Asia and Africa as well as proposals even in South Asia and the Middle East.<sup>92</sup> The spreading popularity of the nuclear-free concept among non-nuclear states, and a new awareness of its value among nuclear-armed states, evinces just the sort of emulation many New Zealanders sought in adopting their own nuclear-free policy. Hence, for many long-time nuclear-free advocates, such events confirm that New Zealand's action simply was ahead of its time.

However, this article does not argue that recent transformative developments in world politics and presently expanding support for nuclear-free zones justify New Zealand's nuclear-free policy *ex post facto*. Such an argument would leave open that New Zealand was “saved” from its folly by fortuitous changes in its external circumstances that it could have neither controlled nor anticipated, and (more broadly) that today's nuclear-free zone initiatives make sense only because of the relatively more “relaxed” conditions following the end of superpower nuclear confrontation. Rather, this article argues that New Zealand's nuclear-free policy is defensible within the framework and logic of realist approaches to international politics *even given the more trying Cold War context* within which it was adopted.

The related question of whether New Zealand's action made a contribution to increasing the popularity of the nuclear-free zone concept, or to other events that have reduced the risks of nuclear war in recent years, is difficult to answer. How-

ever, the question of whether New Zealand's nuclear-free policy had the global impact it sought must be kept in proper perspective. Realism does not expect even great powers to dictate international circumstances unimpeded, and small states seldom influence courses of events decisively regardless of their policy choices. Rather, realism expects only that states remain alert to the threats that surround them, perceptive of the resources, constraints, and opportunities at hand, and wise in choosing among alternative responses.

Returning to the theoretical questions posed at the outset of this article, there are then two implications of this conclusion. First, this case shows that the impact of popular opinion on security policies is not necessarily always pernicious, even when mobilized through participatory organizations operating outside institutionalized electoral processes. Rather, to the extent that such activism reopens long dormant topics of debate, it can serve as a valuable corrective to institutional inertia and bureaucratic parochialism, bringing the national consensus on basic security outlooks back in line with ever-evolving international circumstances, national interests, and common sense. This finding brings into question conventional lessons drawn from past "failures" of democracy (e.g., British pacifism in the 1930s). Participatory theories of democracy emphasize that the "quality" of public opinion is a function of interest and knowledge, which are themselves functions of decisionmaking responsibility, suggesting that the remedy for erratic influences of public attitudes on foreign policymaking may be not less democracy, but

more.<sup>93</sup>

Second, the New Zealand case indicates that the increasing complexity of contemporary international politics and the introduction of nuclear weapons have not relieved states (especially small states) of the imperative of assuring their own security, but have altered the context in which that goal is pursued. Specifically, in peacetime conditions marked by high levels of issue linkage, paradoxical nuclear strategies, and numerous avenues of political access in pluralist societies, states encounter numerous constraints on the use of conventional power resources, but also numerous opportunities for cleverness and originality in diplomatic tactics.

As decisive encounters in international politics move from battlefields to strategic think tanks and network television studios, symbolic actions in particular gather salience. In such a world, small states remain inherently vulnerable. However, flight into alliance with a stronger power, particularly when it entails the Faustian bargain of accepting uncritically that power's nuclear strategies, no longer constitutes the ideal remedy to this condition. Ironically, complex interdependence creates greater opportunities for small states to maintain and preserve their *independence*. Moreover, such circumstances can provide opportunities to such states, in the right place and at the right time, to prove surprisingly influential—or "powerful"—as well. The cause of securing the world from the threats of nuclear weapons may owe much to the states that discover and pursue those opportunities.

<sup>1</sup> Defections from among the governing National party's ministers over the nuclear ship ban issue in fact impelled Prime Minister Robert Muldoon to call a "snap" election six months early. Parties supporting the ban on nuclear ships garnered 64 percent of the vote, giving Labour a clear electoral mandate to implement the policy. See Kevin Clements, *Back From the Brink* (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 123-129; Stuart McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny: The Nuclear Ships Dispute between New Zealand and the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 10-17; and Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*, Public Opinion Poll Annex, p. 106.

<sup>2</sup> The *Buchanan*, a Charles F. Adams class destroyer, was conventionally-powered but equipped with ASROC anti-submarine weapons which could be fitted with either conventional or nuclear warheads. This particular ship, and its itinerary, were selected to indicate that it was *unlikely* to be carrying nuclear weapons, thereby signaling "respect" for the nuclear-free policy without compromising the U.S. policy to "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons on any U.S. warship. Ironically, the *Buchanan* had been one of the few U.S. warships to visit New Zealand in the late 1970s that, being conventionally powered, did not incite a protest. See Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 132-135; McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, pp. 79-87; Hyam Gold, "Labour's First 300 Days," in Hyam Gold, ed., *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*, p. 1-11; and Roderic Alley, "ANZUS and the Nuclear Issue," in Jonathan Boston and Martin Holland, eds., *The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 205.

<sup>3</sup> McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, p. 17. While the nuclear-free policy was undoubtedly inspired by moral and idealistic outlooks, this article demonstrates the inadequacy of such a simple characterization in this case. McMillan usefully notes that previous "moral" actions by Labour governments also inherited potential for effectiveness, "an important [point] in New Zealand, where the practical approach is highly valued." (p.21)

<sup>4</sup> See Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 24; Michael I. Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp. 120f, 171f; and Ulf Lindell and Stefan Persson, "The paradox of weak state power: a research and literature overview," *Cooperation and Conflict* 21 (1986), pp. 85-86.

<sup>5</sup> For discussions of the how the advent of nuclear weapons has affected the international constraints and opportunities of small states, see David Vital, *The Survival of Small States* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 3-4; Handel, *Weak states in the International System*, pp. 195-197; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, pp. 249-250, 267-268; Wiberg, Haakan, "The security of small nations: challenges and defences,"

*Journal of Peace Research* 24(4) (1987), p. 341; Annette Baker Fox, "The small states in the international system 1919-1969," *International Journal* 24 (1969), p. 753; Amry Vandebosch, "The small states in international politics and organization," *The Journal of Politics* 26 (1964), p. 309; and Robert Keohane, "Lilliputians' dilemmas: small states in international politics," *International Organization* 23 (1969), p. 293.

<sup>6</sup> Space prevents listing the copious literature. For a good recent overview, see Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (December 1992), pp. 439-466.

<sup>7</sup> Analyses that have discovered unique characteristics in small state security and foreign policymaking do not contradict the application of realist standards because these differences concern the *internal* nature of small states, not in the *external* conditions they face. See Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," *World Politics* 25 (July 1973), pp. 556-557; cf. John Henderson, "Foreign policy decision making in New Zealand: an insider's view," in Richard Kennaway and John Henderson, eds., *Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s* (Auckland: Longman Paul Ltd., pp. 211-225.

<sup>8</sup> I discuss the evolution in the views of nuclear-free policy advocates as the movement grew in strength, and its implications for theories of participatory democracy, in "Progress of a Peace Movement: Participatory Democracy in Nuclear-free New Zealand" (publication pending).

<sup>9</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948), p. 30; Kenneth Waltz, "Balance of Power," in J. Salomon, et al., *Power, Principles, and Interests* (Lexington, MA: Ginn, 1985), p. 55. See also Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 82; Stanley Hoffmann, "Notes on the Elusiveness of Modern Power," *International Journal* 30 (Spring 1975).

<sup>10</sup> See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 119-126, for an explicit critique of Morgenthau's definition of states' interests in terms of power alone, rather than the security this power aims to obtain.

<sup>11</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 126-127. Cf. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 61.

<sup>12</sup> Waltz, "Balance of Power," p. 59.

<sup>13</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 184-185, 195; Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, pp. 13-16; and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), pp. 172-173. Most analysts of small states concur with this realist supposition: see Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, pp. 3, 36, 261; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, pp. 181-182; East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior," pp. 557-558; Eric J. Labs, "Do weak states bandwagon?," *Security Studies* 1 (1992), pp. 385-386; Hans Vogel, "Small states efforts in international relations: enlarging the

scope," in Otmar Holl, ed., *Small States in Europe and Dependence* (Vienna: Braumuller, Elman, 1983), p. 57; R. P. Barston, "Introduction," in R. P. Barston, ed., *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973), p. 19; T. V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 176; Erling Bjol, "The small state in international politics," in August Schou and Arne Olau Brundland, eds., *Small States in International Relations* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), pp. 32-34; Lindell and Persson, "The paradox of weak state power," p. 81; and Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne, "Lilliput under threat: the security problems of small island and enclave developing states," *Political Studies* 41 (1993), pp. 591-592. For a critique of these views, see Miriam F. Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its Own Backyard," *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (April 1995), pp. 175-180.

<sup>14</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 72, 119, 122; and Kenneth Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*: A Response to my Critics," in Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 338-339.

<sup>15</sup> Stephen Walt, *Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 5, 21.

<sup>16</sup> This account is consistent with Waltz's basic argument that states concern themselves with their security (and threats to it), rather than power itself. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 117. Nor does Walt's substitution of "threat" for "power" modify other basic realist tenets; in particular, Walt's notion of "perceived intentions" is rooted in actions of other states, not a concern for "perception" *per se*. Cf. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Keohane, "Lilliputians' dilemmas: small states in international politics," p. 296.

<sup>17</sup> Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 5, 19n, 21-22. Walt explicitly presents this alternative as a refinement rather than a replacement of basic realist balance of power theory; Walt's own arguments concerning the alliance behavior of small states are considered below.

<sup>18</sup> The "New Zealand hemisphere" excludes North America, Europe, Russia, and almost all of Asia. See Denis McLean, "New Zealand's Strategic Position and Defence Policies," in Desmond Ball, ed., *The ANZAC Connection* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 1.

<sup>19</sup> Keith Sinclair, "Life in the Provinces: The European Settlement," in Keith Sinclair, ed., *Distance Looks Our Way: The Effects of Remoteness on New Zealand* (Auckland: Paul's Book Arcade, 1961), p. 39.

<sup>20</sup> Ian MacGibbon, "History of New Zealand Defence," in Erik Olssen and Bill Webb, eds., *New Zealand Foreign Policy and Defence* (Dunedin: University of Otago, 1977), pp. a9-20.

<sup>21</sup> George Laking, "The Evolution of an Independent Foreign Policy," in John Henderson,

Keith Jackson, and Richard Kennaway, eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980), pp. 11-12; and MacGibbon, "History of New Zealand Defence," p. 22-31.

<sup>22</sup> John Henderson, "The Changing Objectives of New Zealand Defence Policy," in John Henderson, Keith Jackson and Richard Kennaway, eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980), p. 44.

<sup>23</sup> Richard Herr, "American Policy in the South Pacific: The Transition from Carter to Reagan," *New Zealand International Review* 8 (March-April 1983), p. 11; Keith Jackson, "The Pacific Rim," in John Henderson, Keith Jackson, and Richard Kennaway, eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980), p. 152; James Rolfe, "Securing the South Pacific," *New Zealand International Review* 10 (November-December 1985); Witi Ihimaera, "New Zealand as a Pacific Nation (Or 'The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Pacific')," in Hyam Gold, ed., *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy* (Dunedin: Benton Ross, 1985), p. 133; Rangi Walker, "The Maori and N.Z. Peace Policy," *Peacelink* 44 (September 1986); and Mahuta, Robert and Manuka Henare, "The basis for a Maaori foreign policy," in Richard Kennaway and John Henderson, eds., *Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s* (Auckland, NZ: Longman Paul Ltd., 1991).

<sup>24</sup> M. Norrish, "The changing context of New Zealand's foreign policy," *Australian Quarterly* 58 (Winter 1986), p. 192; and Ramesh Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand* (Wellington: Institute of International Affairs, 1984), pp. 6-7.

<sup>25</sup> Keith Jackson, "New Zealand and the Vietnam War: A Retrospective Analysis," in John Henderson, Keith Jackson, and Richard Kennaway, eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980); David McGraw, "Reluctant ally: New Zealand's entry into the Vietnam War," *New Zealand Journal of History* 15 (April 1981), pp. 49-60; and Thomas-Durrell Young, "The Nixon Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution Revisited," *New Zealand International Review* 10 (July-August 1985), p. 11.

<sup>26</sup> This accords with more general expectations of the effects of geography on the security perceptions of small states. See Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, pp. 72, 76; Lindell and Persson, "The paradox of weak state power," p. 83; William E. Paterson, "Small states in international politics," *Cooperation and Conflict* 4 (1969), p. 121; and Bjol, "The small state in international politics," p. 32.

<sup>27</sup> Other sources for material in this section include: Reg Harrison, "New Zealand foreign policy," in R. P. Barston, ed., *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973), pp. 289-297; John Henderson, "Changes in New Zealand defence policy," in Richard Kennaway and John Henderson, eds., *Beyond New Zealand*

II: *Foreign Policy into the 1990s* (Auckland: Longman Paul Ltd., 1991); Richard Kennaway, *New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951-1971* (Wellington: Hicks Smith & Sons, 1972); David J. McCraw, "New Zealand's foreign policy under National and Labour governments: variations on the 'small state' theme?" *Pacific Affairs* 67 (1994); W. David McIntyre, "New Zealand and the Commonwealth in the 1970s," in John Henderson, Keith Jackson, and Richard Kennaway, eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980); W. David McIntyre, "Labour Experience in Foreign Policy," in Hyam Gold, ed., *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy* (Dunedin: Benton Ross, 1985); Malcolm McKinnon, "The richest prize?" *New Zealand International Review* 11 (May-June 1986); Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand* (Great Britain: Allen Lane & Pelican Books, 1980); Keith Sinclair, *Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity* (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1986); and Malcolm Templeton, *Defence and Security: What New Zealand Needs* (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1986).

<sup>28</sup> For a good discussion see Clements, *Back From the Brink*, pp. 33-84.

<sup>29</sup> Owen Wilkes, *Protest* (Wellington: Alister Taylor, 1973), p. 6; and Helen Clark, "Establishing a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific," in Hyam Gold, ed., *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy* (Dunedin: Benton Ross, 1985), pp. 121-122.

<sup>30</sup> Council of the New Zealand Ecological Society, "The Environmental Consequences to New Zealand of Nuclear Warfare in the Northern Hemisphere," (Wellington: New Zealand Ecological Society, December 1984); and Wren Green, et al., *New Zealand after Nuclear War* (Wellington: New Zealand Planning Council, 1987).

<sup>31</sup> Templeton, *Defence and Security*, pp. 1, 7.

<sup>32</sup> David Lange, seminar address, Victoria University, Wellington, February 22, 1985, as quoted in McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, p. 76; see also Lange's "Address to 'The New Zealand Connection,'" Los Angeles, CA, February 26, 1985, and "Oxford Union Debate," Oxford University, March 1, 1985, both reprinted in *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 35 (January-March 1985); and "Facing Critical Choices," *New Zealand International Review* 12 (July-August 1987).

<sup>33</sup> Kennedy Graham, "After deterrence—what?" *New Zealand International Review* 11 (May-June 1986), p. 7; and Kennedy Graham, *National Security Concepts of States* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1989), pp. 95-96. For other discussion on the consensus perception of nuclear threat in New Zealand, see Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand*, p. 50; Lawrence Jones, "Cracks in the Consensus: Shifting Attitudes to New Zealand Defence," in Roderic Alley, ed., *Alternatives to ANZUS*, Vol. 2 (Auckland: New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies, 1984), p. 45; Wallace Rowling, "New Zealand foreign policy: time for a change?" *New Zealand International Review* 9 (May-June 1984), p. 8; and Clark,

"Reviewing New Zealand's Defence and Security Policies During IYP," *Peacelink* (March 1986).

<sup>34</sup> Lindell and Persson, "The paradox of weak state power," p. 88; Vandenbosch, "The small states in international politics and organization," p. 294; V. V. Sveics, *Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts* (New York: Jericho, 1970), p. 54; Arthur Andrew, *Defence by Other Means: Diplomacy for the Underdog* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1970), p. 117-118.

<sup>35</sup> Nicky Hagar, Submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry, 1986.

<sup>36</sup> Clark, "Reviewing New Zealand's Defence and Security Policies During IYP." Clark was chair of the parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs/Security, 1984-1987, which drafted the subsequent legislation of the nuclear-free policy.

<sup>37</sup> Wallace Rowling, former Labour prime minister and then Labour spokesperson on foreign affairs, spearheaded this approach, which represented an effort to establish a consensus among disparate views within the party. See Rowling, "New Zealand foreign policy: time for a change?," pp. 7-8; also Lange, *Nuclear Free—The New Zealand Way* (Auckland: Penguin, 1990), pp. 35-36, 46-48; and Clements, *Back From the Brink*, pp. 124-126.

<sup>38</sup> David Lange, Address to "The New Zealand Connection," p. 16; see also David Lange, "Disarmament and security: the Government's perspective," *New Zealand International Review* 10 (May-June, 1985), p. 14.

<sup>39</sup> David Lange, Address to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland, March 5, 1985, *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 35 (January-March 1985), p. 17.

<sup>40</sup> Graham, *National Security Concepts of States*, p. 106; see also McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, p. 75; and Richard Kennaway, "The ANZUS dispute," in Richard Kennaway and John Henderson, eds., *Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s* (Auckland: Longman Paul Ltd., 1991), p. 68.

<sup>41</sup> E.g., see Michael McKinley, "Labour and ANZUS: heroic stand or ascetic self-indulgence?" *New Zealand International Review* 10 (November-December 1985), pp. 9-10; and Michael McKinley, *The ANZUS Alliance and New Zealand Labour* (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1989), pp. 38-40.

<sup>42</sup> See McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, pp. 76-77, 104.

<sup>43</sup> On the early roots of the nuclear-free idea in New Zealand, see Elsie Locke, *Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand* (Christchurch, NZ: Hazard Press Ltd., 1992), pp. 180-188.

<sup>44</sup> See McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, pp. 89, 96-106.

<sup>45</sup> Quoted in Andrew Mack, "'Nuclear allergy': New Zealand's Anti-nuclear Stance and the South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone," Working Paper No. 26, Peace Research Centre, Australian

National University, Canberra, Australia, February, 1988, p. 8.

<sup>46</sup> Quoted in Templeton, *Defence and Security*, p. 16.

<sup>47</sup> Disruption of trade was a major worry in New Zealand, but never took place. See McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, pp. 96, 109, 134-135.

<sup>48</sup> Jim McLay, "Disarmament and security: an alternative viewpoint," *New Zealand International Review* 10 (May-June 1985), pp. 17, 20-22; cf. Mediansky, "ANZUS in crisis," *Australian Quarterly* 57 (Autumn/Winter 1985), p. 19; and Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand*, pp. 68, 126, 146.

<sup>49</sup> Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, p. 110, 113; David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979), pp. 164-167; Robert S. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd. ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1989), p. 252. Acknowledging the infungibility of power does not necessarily entail adopting other tenets of Keohane and Nye's concept of "complex interdependence," which they present as an *alternative* to realism. Realism can accommodate interdependence (indeed, realists cite it as an important source of conflict) and suggests that if states seeking security face situations which both constrain the use of force and create other opportunities for influence, they must grapple with the power relationships given by those conditions. Hence, as Keohane and Nye comment, such conditions as "are as relevant to a realist world as to one of complex interdependence." (pp. 23-30, 247, 255) Cf. Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in Charles Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970).

<sup>50</sup> Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, p. 111-112; cf. Keohane, "Lilliputians' dilemmas," p. 300; Robert Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy* 2 (1971), p. 162-163; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*; Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics," pp. 163-164; Lindell and Persson, "The paradox of weak state power," p. 80; Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers: the Dynamics of International Relationships* (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 54-55.

<sup>51</sup> Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies;" cf. Keohane, "Lilliputians' dilemmas," p. 306; Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, pp. 30-36, 224-226, 253; Handel, *Weak states in the international system*, p. 124; Lindell and Persson, "The paradox of weak state power," p. 89; Fox, "The small states in the international system 1919-1969," p. 753

<sup>52</sup> On the notion of "reputation power," see Gunnar Sj'stedt, "The exercise of international civil power," *Cooperation and Conflict* 12 (1977), p. 35; and also Annette Baker Fox, *The power of small states: diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 2; Erling Bjol, "The power of the weak," *Cooperation and Conflict* 3 (1968), pp. 164-166; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 20; Keohane, "Lilliputians' dilemmas," p. 296-297; and

Lindell and Persson, "The paradox of weak state power," p. 84, 90.

<sup>53</sup> For a particularly eloquent expression of this vision, see R. M. Chapman, "No Land is an Island: Twentieth Century Politics," in Keith Sinclair, ed., *Distance Looks Our Way: The Effects of Remoteness on New Zealand* (Auckland: Paul's Book Arcade, 1961), p. 62. See also Wallace Rowling, "An Official Assessment," in Ray Goldstein and Rod Alley, eds., *Labour in Power: Promise and Performance* (Auckland: Price Milburn, 1976), p. 21; John Henderson, "The Foreign Policy of a Small State," in John Henderson, Keith Jackson, and Richard Kennaway, eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980), p. 6; and Richard Cain, "New Zealand's international role: towards a new significance?" *New Zealand International Review* 10 (July-August 1985), p. 24.

<sup>54</sup> G. F. Preddy, *Nuclear Disaster: A New Way of Thinking Down Under* (Wellington: Asia Pacific Books, 1985), p. 137; Graham Kennedy, "Common security—a link to the global age," *New Zealand International Review* 11 (July-August 1986), p. 16; Kennaway, *New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951-1971*, p. 103; and John Henderson, "New Zealand and the foreign policy of small states," in Richard Kennaway and John Henderson, eds., *Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s* (Auckland: Longman Paul Ltd., 1991), p. 11.

<sup>55</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 126-127; Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 29-31; Cf. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 61. Walt argues that "small and weak neighbors of the great powers may be more inclined to bandwagon." However, such a tendency evinces not a different weak state alliance rationality but simply the lack of Waltz's "freedom to choose," indicating what Robert Keohane has termed an "Al Capone alliance" in which a small state remains a faithful ally to protect itself "not against an outside threat, but rather against the great power itself." Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," p. 180; cf. Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States," p. 177; Handel, *Weak states in the international system*, p. 36, 119-156, 262; Vandenbosch, "The small states in international politics and organization," p. 301; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 11; and Lindell and Persson, "The paradox of weak state power," p. 86.

<sup>56</sup> Debate over ANZUS addressed many other questions as well. Space prevents discussion of them in this article except where they apply to the argument.

<sup>57</sup> McKinley, "Labour and ANZUS: heroic stand or ascetic self-indulgence?" p. 9; see also Roderic Alley, "The Alternatives to ANZUS: A Commentary," in Roderic Alley, ed., *Alternatives to ANZUS*, vol. 2 (Auckland: New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies, 1984), pp. 14-15; Kennaway, "Changing views of ANZUS;" Kennaway, "The ANZUS dispute."

<sup>58</sup> McLay, "Disarmament and security," p. 20.

<sup>59</sup> See Andrew Mack, "The Pros and Cons of

ANZUS: An Australian Perspective," in Hyam Gold, ed., *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy* (Dunedin: Benton Ross, 1985), p. 79; John Turner, "Rethinking New Zealand's defence policy," *New Zealand International Review* 8 (March-April 1983), p. 17; and Terry Hearn, "Arms, disarmament and New Zealand," *New Zealand International Review* 8 (July-August 1983), pp. 14-15.

<sup>60</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 127; "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," p. 46.

<sup>61</sup> Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, p. 27; cf. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 127 and "Balance of Power," p. 59.

<sup>62</sup> For Keohane, obtaining such influence is "almost essential" to balance a small state's inevitable dependence and hence make the alliance worthwhile. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," pp. 165, 181.

<sup>63</sup> Kennaway, *New Zealand Foreign Policy, 1951-1971*, p. 103; McLean, "The Case for Defence," p. 19.

<sup>64</sup> Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand*, p. 67; cf. McLay, "Disarmament and security," p. 20.

<sup>65</sup> United States government, "Security Consultations and Joint Defence Planning with East Asian and Western Pacific Allies," June, 1981, as quoted in Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 177; cf. Henry Albinski, "New Zealand and ANZUS: a United States Perspective," in John Henderson, Keith Jackson, and Richard Kennaway, eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980), p. 47.

<sup>66</sup> Lange, *Nuclear Free—The New Zealand Way*, pp. 66-67.

<sup>67</sup> E.g., Henry Albinski, "New Zealand and ANZUS: a United States Perspective," p. 47; Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand*, p. 64.

<sup>68</sup> McLean, "New Zealand's Strategic Position and Defence Policies," p. 7.

<sup>69</sup> Kennaway, "Changing views of ANZUS," pp. 2-5; Clements, "The Defence Committee of Enquiry," p. 233.

<sup>70</sup> In 1986, a year after rejection of the *USS Buchanan*, the Defence Committee of Enquiry poll found that 73 percent supported the nuclear-free policy while 66 percent favored remaining in an alliance with Australia and the United States. (p. 43) See James W. Lamare, "International conflict: ANZUS and New Zealand public opinion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (September, 1987), and James W. Lamare, "The growth of antinuclearism in New Zealand," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 26 (1991).

<sup>71</sup> Alley, "The Alternatives to ANZUS," pp. 12-13; see also Kennaway, "Changing views of ANZUS;" pp. 2-5.

<sup>72</sup> Alley, "ANZUS and the Nuclear Issue," p. 199; Herr, "American Policy in the South Pacific," pp. 10-14; Lange, *Nuclear Free—The New Zealand Way*, pp. 31, 40; Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand*, p. 147; Alley, "The Alternatives to ANZUS," p. 12; Peter Jones, "Defence: A Radical View," in John Henderson, Keith Jackson, and Richard Kennaway, eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland:

Methuen, 1980), p. 61; Peter Hayes, Walden Bello, and Lyuba Zarsky, "The Nuclear Peril in the Pacific," p. 56; and Owen Wilkes, "ANZUS and New Zealand," p. 72-73.

<sup>73</sup> Harrison, "New Zealand foreign policy," p. 326; see also Preddy, *Nuclear Disaster*, p. 57; Ronald Spector, "The Origins of ANZUS: New Zealand—American Relations in Happier Times," in Hyam Gold, ed., *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy* (Dunedin: Benton Ross, 1985), p. 46; Wilkes, *Protest*, p. 61-62; Levine, "An Alternative View of ANZUS," p. 54; and Levine, "New Zealand—United States Relations," p. 26.

<sup>74</sup> Wallace Rowling, Memo to the Members of the Labour Party Policy Council on ANZUS options, 1983, as quoted in Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 125; cf. Lange, *Nuclear Free—The New Zealand Way*, p. 47.

<sup>75</sup> McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, pp. 94f.

<sup>76</sup> David Campbell, *The Social Basis of Australian and New Zealand Security Policy* (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1989), p. 32-34.

<sup>77</sup> For an argument that an ANZUS-type alliance is the worst possible for a small state, see Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, pp. 127, 177; cf. Keohane, "Lilliputians' dilemmas," pp. 301-304.

<sup>78</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988), p. 621.

<sup>79</sup> Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," p. 168.

<sup>80</sup> Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, p. 111-112. Cf. Christer Johnsson, "Bargaining Power: Notes on an Elusive Concept," *Cooperation and Conflict* 16 (1981), p. 255; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, pp. 50, 246-247; Sutton and Payne, "Lilliput under threat," p. 588; Lindell and Persson, "The paradox of weak state power," p. 86-87.

<sup>81</sup> Levine, "An Alternative View of ANZUS," p. 53.

<sup>82</sup> Denis McLean, "The Case for Defence," *New Zealand International Review* 8 (May-June 1983), pp. 17-18 (emphasis added). The ironic—and likely unintentional—reference is to Karl Marx's well-known communist dictum: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" ("Critique of the Gotha Program," in Robert Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 531.)

<sup>83</sup> McCraw, "New Zealand's foreign policy under National and Labour governments," p. 23; Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand*, p. 96. Unlike NATO, the ANZUS treaty does not formally bind its members to each others' defense, but only, in the event of an "armed attack" on one party, to "act...in accordance with its constitutional processes."

<sup>84</sup> If the primary advantage of an alliance for a small power is "the ability to commit its ally" (Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 261), the willingness of the United States to dispose of ANZUS suggests New Zealand accrued very little advantage from the arrangement even before the ship ban dispute. Attenuation of

the importance of a U.S. security guarantee in any event was buttressed by suspicions that any U.S. decision regarding “defending” New Zealand would be made on the basis of its judgment of its interests and the circumstances of the moment, regardless of the status of the treaty—suspicions confirmed for many New Zealanders by U.S. deference to France following French agents’ bombing of the *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland harbor (see McMillan, *Neither Confirm nor Deny*, pp. 149-150). Such considerations largely dispel the claim that New Zealand’s course of action constituted “free-riding” on the United States.

<sup>85</sup> John Henderson, “The Future of New Zealand-United States Relations,” in John Henderson, Keith Jackson and Richard Kennaway, eds., *Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State* (Auckland: Methuen, 1980), pp. 181-182.

<sup>86</sup> Defence Committee of Enquiry, *Public Opinion Poll on Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*, Annex, p. 105-106; Clements, *Back From the Brink*, p. 160, 181.

<sup>87</sup> Space constraints prohibit discussion of many issues and events, such as the proceedings of the Defence Committee of Enquiry, changes in New Zealand’s relationship with Australia and other South Pacific states, and the controversy over the purchase of new frigates for the New Zealand Navy.

<sup>88</sup> Press Release Statement by Hon. Jim B. Bolger, Leader of the Opposition, New Zealand House of Representatives, Wellington, March 8, 1990. The National party was the last of New Zealand’s political parties to accept the policy. As one prominent National minister put it, “Ultimately, politicians are servants of the public...and it was clear even to those of rudest intellect that...most New Zealanders would prefer to remain nuclear free and outside of ANZUS than vice-versa.” (Winston Peters, “There’s no turning back to the old nuclear pacts,” *Auckland Star*, March 6, 1990. On the entrenchment of public support, see Lamare, “The Growth of Antinuclearism in New Zealand.”)

<sup>89</sup> When asked at a 1993 news conference whether the time had come for the United States to move to restore fully its relationship with New Zealand, President Clinton responded, “I’ve given absolutely no thought to that question. And I’m afraid if I give an answer to it, I’ll be in more trouble tomorrow than I can figure out.” *The New York Times*, June 18 & 19, 1993.

<sup>90</sup> James Lilley, then the deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State, statement to United States Senate in September, 1986, as quoted in Keith Suter, “U.S. Signs On At Last,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 52 (March-April 1996). See also Kevin Clements, “New Zealand’s Role in Promoting a Nuclear-free Pacific,” *Journal of Peace Research* 25 (December 1988); Ramesh Thakur, “Disarmament Before the Fact: The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone,” *New Zealand International Review* 17 (March, 1992); Keith Suter, “The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: The Case for Acceptance,” *Medicine and War* 9 (April 1993); and Evan S. Medeiros, “U.S.,

Britain, and France Ready to Join South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone,” *Arms Control Today* 25 (November 1995).

<sup>91</sup> “South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone Treaty,” Statement by Department of State Spokesman Nicholas Burns, Washington, D.C., October 20, 1995, in *Department of State Dispatch* 6, October 30, 1995, p. 806. The United States, Great Britain, and France formally signed the SPNPFZ protocols in Suva in March 1996.

<sup>92</sup> For a good discussion of the utility of nuclear-free zones not only as a tool of regional nonproliferation, but also to advance broader goals of nuclear arms control and disarmament, see Jon Brook Wolfsthal, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Coming of Age?” *Arms Control Today* 23 (March 1993). Wolfsthal observes that the “motivation common to all zones is the belief among states that they would be more secure if their region were free of nuclear weapons” and the “fear that they could fall victim to the consequences of nuclear war despite their non-nuclear status.” See also Salamat Ali, “South Asian NFZ?” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 154, December 5, 1991; Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, “How To Think About—And Implement—Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East,” *Washington Quarterly* 16 (Spring 1993); Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, “Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil,” *Arms Control Today* 24 (March, 1994); David Fischer, “The Pelindaba Treaty: Africa Joins the Nuclear-free World,” *Arms Control Today* 25 (December-January 1995); and Evan S. Medeiros, “Southeast Asian Countries Agree to Create Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,” *Arms Control Today* 25 (December-January 1995).

<sup>93</sup> For a discussion of this point, see my “Progress of a Peace Movement.”