Three dull explosions rock the former presidential palace in downtown Baghdad. Windowpanes shake in nearby buildings and the cicadas on the banks of the Tigris River are quiet for a moment. But almost no one stops what they are doing or even takes cover.
"Mortars," says Muhanneth Djuburi, who is sitting in his pavilion on the other side of the river waiting for guests. He drops his newspaper to his knee for a moment. "Three of them. Not more than 1000 meters from here. Now the terrorists often fire on the Americans from the south of the city."
Young men come together to play soccer under the streetlights on Abu Nuwas Street, the city's former promenade, now blocked by wire and concrete barricades. The Iftar, the banquet held at the end of twelve hours of fasting, has passed and Baghdad's citizens are returning to their private lives.
Two helicopters appear and rattle across the site where the grenades exploded, but this keeps almost no one from enjoying their modest Ramadan feast. People have seen worse, and even the rumble of artillery fire in the center of the city has become part of the daily routine. For security reasons, the Office of Strategic Communication of the US civilian administration regretfully informs us, it is not possible to disclose the exact location of every rocket and mortar attack on the Americans' main headquarters.
Shortly before the attack last Tuesday, Paul Bremer, chief of the civilian administration and presumably the assassins' primary target, had left for Washington to attend a crisis summit meeting, where he received the news of an even more dramatic attack the next morning.
A car bomb exploded in front of the Italian headquarters in the city of Nasariya, killing 19 Italians and 9 Iraqis, and jolting Washington and its allies away from what has been a deceptive illusion: the guerilla war is by no means limited to the notorious "Sunni triangle" northwest of Baghdad. Militant opponents of the occupation are also active in the Shiite region south of Iraq which, like the Kurdish north of the country, had been considered largely pacified, and are capable of launching devastating attacks.
Italy is in mourning, and the first of America's allies are becoming nervous. In spite of the setback, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi vowed to continue the "important mission" in Iraq. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who expects George W. Bush to arrive in London next Tuesday for a state visit, also continues to show his unwavering support for the US president.
But others are less certain. In spite of ongoing praise from Washington, Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar has already withdrawn most of his embassy personnel from Baghdad. The Turks, who in late October were still planning to send the third largest contingent of foreign troops to Iraq, are now overjoyed that they withdrew their offer early enough.
Japan, which had planned to deploy troops to foreign soil for the first time in its post-war history, withdrew its offer after the Nasariya attack, citing the security situation in Iraq as making it impossible for its forces to fulfill their humanitarian mandate on the banks of the Tigris. And South Korea, Washington's other Asian ally, now intends to provide no more than 3,000 troops.
Last week Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, commander of the 130,000 US soldiers in Iraq, admitted that the occupation forces have arrived at a "turning point." In the month of Ramadan, which coincides with November this year, more than 40 American soldiers have already been killed. Two US Army helicopters were shot down, and soldiers have lost their lives every day as a result of grenade attacks and the detonation of improvised street bombs. Many other allies have also lost troops.
General Sanchez emphasized that America is at "war," and this only six months after US President George W. Bush announced the official end of combat operations.
According to Sanchez, the number of daily attacks, currently at about 35, will only increase. He believes that the enemy's objective is to "isolate the coalition forces from the Iraqi people and break the resolve of the international community."
The CIA station chief in Baghdad described the situation in the country in even more somber terms. His report, dated November 10, contradicts all attempts by Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz to gloss over the situation following their visits to Iraq.
The CIA report concludes that the resistance is becoming more powerful. The number of those actively involved in the resistance is estimated to be in the "tens of thousands." According to the report, the Iraqis are skeptical that a true alternative to the Saddam regime is developing, and do not believe that there is anyone who can assure peace and order in the long term. For this reason, the report states, anti-American sentiments are also growing among ordinary citizens, while the "Iraqi Governing Council" hand-picked by the United States suffers from a lack of authority.
The CIA man ends his report on a sinister note, writing that there is a great risk that yet another source of unrest is beginning to develop: The Shiites, the religious majority in Iraq, have kept a low profile until now but could soon join the Sunnis in their battle against American forces.
The American governor in Iraq, Paul Bremer, assesses the situation in similar terms, agreeing with the CIA's conclusions on the explosive mood in Baghdad. For this reason, the CIA report found its way to the highest ranks of the Bush administration, this time even receiving its undivided attention and triggering a general sense of alarm. The White House quickly summoned Bremer to Washington to discuss the consequences of the report.
This chain of events led to dramatic decisions, the results of which have been evident in the Sunni triangle between Baghdad, Faludja and Tikrit since the middle of last week: a resumption of bombing attacks and acceleration of the Iraqization process.
A fall offensive is intended to break the will of the insurgents. General Sanchez grimly announced: "What we are getting into here is the absolute necessity to conquer the enemy - with every weapon at our disposal."
"Operation Iron Hammer" began with an air attack on a warehouse in the south of Baghdad, which the insurgents supposedly had used as a base and meeting place. Two units of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 1st Tank Division sealed off the area surrounding Baghdad's Saidija neighborhood. An AC-130 gunship reduced the target to rubble with its 105 mm howitzer. Powerful explosions could be heard throughout Baghdad.
"We will prevail. We have a good strategy against these killers."
The US military leadership is grimly satisfied in its assessment of the new strategy. Commander Sanchez believes that it is better to wage the war with great intensity instead of being helplessly exposed to blood attacks and ambushes. The military leadership and the Pentagon have been at odds for some time over the issue of how to deal with the guerilla attacks. Now the CIA and the military have managed to gain the upper hand over the civilian administrators at the Defense Department.
However, this new strategy is more effective psychologically than militarily. It shows that America is demonstrating its will to fight the guerillas. The days of helplessness that were beginning to reflect poorly on President Bush are over, at least for now. "We will prevail," said the President, almost as if to motivate himself. "We have a good strategy against these killers."
The military value of such campaigns, however, is relatively insignificant. According to an official statement following the warehouse bombing, "the destruction of this infrastructure contributes to its no longer being available to the enemy." General John Abizaid, supreme commander of US troops in the region, added, more realistically: "It is very important that our military successes be accompanied by political and economic progress, so that we can get these angry young men off the streets."
Ever since Vietnam, the US military knows that a guerilla enemy cannot be defeated militarily. The key issue is always who gains the moral upper hand. But as long as there is war in Iraq, judicious reconstruction of the country is virtually out of the question. And as long as collaborators of the Americans are targets for assassins, political reconstruction will also remain incomplete.
Nevertheless, the American administration has managed to accelerate Iraqization. Bremer flew back to Baghdad with a mandate to organize democratic elections by mid-2004 and then to transfer civilian power to a transitional government. According to the US plan, it will only then be possible to draft a new constitution for the new Iraq.
Similar proposals were submitted by the "Iraqi Governing Council," the ethnically and religiously proportionate body that is expected to gradually assume authority from Bremer. However, the US administrator and the 24 members of the council have recently been reproachful of one another. Bremer accused the council of being incapable of adopting resolutions and of being constantly absent. According to Bremer, many of its members are more interested in handling their own personal and financial affairs than in the future of the country. The Americans were especially irked by Ahmed Chalabi, spokesman of the Iraqi exiles and protégé of the Pentagon, because of his arrogance and constant criticism. Chalabi, in return, accused the Americans of doing little more than throwing out ideas, while failing to pursue any plausible plan.
"The question is," said a high-ranking US government official in Baghdad, "how we can manage to get a transitional government that can carry the weight of sovereignty and authority, a government to which we can deliver the keys."
Should the Americans seriously entertain the governing council's ideas, many problems will already be programmed: The Kurds and the Arab Sunnis in the council, both minorities, prefer a transitional model that could guarantee them a greater share of power, at least for the foreseeable future, then that to which they would be entitled based on their proportions of the population.
In contrast, the powerful Shiite faction, which represents about 60 percent of the Iraqi population and would undoubtedly win any election, prefers elections sooner than later. Iraq's most politically influential man, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has been demanding just that for months. He strictly rejects proposals to expand the current governing council or to allow members of local councils to elect something along the lines of Afghanistan's Loya Jirga.
When the guerillas were less powerful and no one would have anticipated renewed air attacks on Baghdad, the United Nations gave the United States an ultimatum: A time plan for Iraqization must be on the table by December 15. Now it does exist, at least in rough form.
America is now far more willing than just a few months ago to share its power monopoly in Iraq. And if the new double strategy of bombardment plus Iraqization fails to produce the desired results, there will be only one option left: a trip to New York to ask the UN to step in and save what can still be saved.
There has been some movement among the members of the UN Security Council. Even Paris, once the leader of the antiwar camp, is changing its tone, announcing its willingness to provide assistance instead of stubbornly insisting that it was right all along. The dead end in which the United States now finds itself has prompted the French government to "extends its open hand" to the Americans, says Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, because global security is involved: "We welcome all meetings and votes. Let us sit down together and combine our experiences. It is not possible to wait any longer."
France is concerned that the United States will make the same mistake it made in Vietnam.
According to the French, the United States has now realized that its occupation regime does not create security, but instead feeds the hydra of terrorism. They believe that an advisory council must be convened in Iraq as soon as possible, and that the multinational force should serve under this council. This would mean that Iraqi sovereignty under UN jurisdiction could be recognized, effectively bringing the occupation regime to an end.
However, the French are apparently concerned that during the Iraqization of the conflict the United States could make the same mistake it made in Vietnam: simply transferring responsibility to overtaxed Iraqi authorities with their newly installed police force and army, and then leaving everything up to the Iraqis so that US troops could be brought home more quickly. Villepin believes that an overly hasty US withdrawal would be disastrous: "The Americans began the campaign, and now it must be brought to a successful close, but with a different concept."
Since last Wednesday, heavy explosions can be heard every evening in Faludja, Tikrit and on the outskirts of Baghdad, as helicopters and gunships bombard suspected insurgent meeting places and weapons depots.
By the weekend, Operation Iron Hammer had not been consistently successful, not to mention the fact that it did not hit Saddam Hussein, the despot on the run around whom the resistance has rallied.
Sanchez was asked how close he has come to Saddam. "Not close enough," the general responded, "by God, we have to get closer to him."
ROMAIN LEICK, GERHARD SPÖRL, BERNHARD ZAND
Translated by Christopher Sultan
Post to other social networks:
Stay informed with our free news services:
| All news from SPIEGEL International | Twitter | RSS |
| All news from SPIEGEL Magazine section | RSS |
© DER SPIEGEL 47/2003
All Rights Reserved
Reproduction only allowed with the permission of SPIEGELnet GmbH
