Translated and with a Preface by
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# An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas

GATEWAY EDITIONS

# Chapter I

# What is Metaphysics?

## 1. ON THE DIVISION OF SPECULATIVE SCIENCE[1]

OBJECTIONS. 1. It seems that speculative science is not suitably divided into the three parts: natural science, mathematical science, and divine science. For the parts of speculative science are those firmly and freely established dispositions *(habitus)*[2] which perfect the contemplative part of the soul. But the Philosopher in the sixth book of the *Ethics*[3] states that the scientific part of the soul, which is the contemplative part of it, is perfected by three such dispositions, namely, wisdom, science, and understanding. Therefore the parts of speculative science are these three and not the three aforenamed.

2. Augustine says in the eighth book of *The City of God*[4] that rational philosophy, namely, logic, is contained under contemplative or speculative philosophy. Therefore the proposed division, since it makes no mention of logic, seems to be inadequate.

3. Philosophy is commonly divided into the seven liberal arts, among which neither natural philosophy nor divine science is included, but only rational philosophy [logic] and mathematics. Therefore natural philosophy and divine science ought not to be reckoned as parts of speculative science.

4. The science of medicine seems to be especially operative, yet in it one part is deemed speculative and another practical. So likewise, in all other operative sciences there exists a speculative part. Hence in this division mention ought to be made of ethics or moral philosophy, regardless of the fact that it concerns action, on account of the part of it which is speculative.

5. The science of medicine is a certain part of physics [or natural philosophy] and there are other arts that are called mechanical, as the science of agriculture, alchemy, and the like. Because these are operative sciences, it does not seem that natural philosophy ought to be classed without qualification under speculative science.

6. The whole should not be divided in opposition to any of its parts. But divine science seems to be a whole in relation to physics and mathematics, since the subjects of the latter sciences are parts of the subject of divine science. For the subject of divine science, which is first philosophy, is being, of which a part is mobile substance, which natural philosophy considers, and another part quantity, which mathematics studies, as is clear from the third book of the *Metaphysics*.[5] Consequently divine science ought not to be divided in opposition to natural philosophy and mathematics.

7. Sciences are divided as things are divided, as Aristotle points out in the third book of *The Soul*.[6] But philosophy is about being, for it is the knowledge of being, as Dionysius says in his *Letter to Polycarp*.[7] Now it is by the one and the many, by substance and accident, that being is first of all divided in accordance with its [ultimate and all-inclusive] division into potency and act; and thus it seems that the parts of philosophy ought to be distinguished in the same manner.



8. There are many other divisions of beings concerning which there are sciences more essential than those proceeding in accordance with the divisions into the mobile and the immobile, the abstract and the non-abstract. For example, there are the divisions into the corporeal and the incorporeal, the animate and the inanimate, and others of like nature. Therefore the division of the parts of philosophy should be made on the basis of differentiating factors of the latter sort, rather than through those proposed here.

9. That science upon which other sciences are based ought to be prior to them. But all other sciences depend upon the divine science as their foundation, because it belongs to it to prove the principles of the other sciences. Accordingly, divine science ought to be put in its proper order, before the others.

10. That mathematics is prior to natural philosophy in the order of learning is evidenced by the fact that children are able to learn mathematics easily, but not natural philosophy, which can be learned only by those advanced in age [or experience], as Aristotle states in the sixth book of the *Ethics*.[8] Hence, in the sciences the order of learning adhered to by the ancients is said to have been this: first, logic, then mathematics, thirdly natural philosophy, after that moral philosophy, and finally divine science. Therefore mathematics ought to come before natural science [or philosophy of nature]. The division proposed thus appears inadequate.

On the contrary, the adequacy of this division is proved by the Philosopher in the sixth book of the *Metaphysics* where he says that there will be three parts of philosophical and theoretical science, namely, mathematics, physics [philosophy of nature], and [natural] theology.[9]

Moreover, in the second book of the *Physics*[10] three

modes of scientific knowledge are distinguished, and these evidently pertain to the aforesaid division into the three philosophical and theoretical sciences.

Further, in the beginning of the *Almagest*[11] Ptolemy also makes use of the same division.

I answer: It must be said that the theoretical or speculative intellect is distinguished properly from the operative or practical intellect in this: the speculative intellect has for its end the truth which it considers, whereas the practical intellect orders the truth reflected upon to an operation as to its end. For this reason the Philosopher says in the third book of *The Soul* that the speculative and the practical intellect differ from each other in their end;[12] and in the second book of the *Metaphysics* it is said that the end of speculative science is truth, whereas the end of operative science is action.[13] Naturally the subject-matter must be congruent with the end; consequently the subject-matter of the practical sciences must be those things which can be made or done by our work, so that knowledge of them can be ordered to operation as to an end. But the subject-matter of the speculative sciences must be things that are not made by our own work. Therefore the contemplation of such things cannot be ordered to operation as to an end. And it is according to differentiations found within this order of things that the speculative sciences have to be distinguished.

It must be borne in mind, however, that while habitus or powers are distinguished by objects, they are not distinguished by just any kind of difference at all in these objects. They are distinguished, rather, in accordance with those differentiating characters that essentially belong to their objects precisely as objects. Thus it is merely accidental to the sensible as such that it be an animal or a plant.



It is not, then, on any such accidental ground that the senses are distinguished, but rather on the basis of color and sound.[14] Therefore the speculative sciences must be divided according to differences of speculable objects, precisely as such.

Now for that speculable entity which is the object of a speculative power, something is required on the part of the intellective power and something on the part of the habitus of science whereby the intellect is perfected. On the part of the intellect it is required that the object be immaterial, because the intellect itself is also immaterial; as regards the habitus of science, the object must be necessary, because science is of necessary things, as is proved in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*.[15] Every necessary thing, as such, is immobile, since whatever is moved, so far as it is moved, can be and not be, either in an absolute or in a qualified sense, as is said in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*.[16] Consequently, separation from matter and motion, and relationship to them, is essential to that speculable entity which is the object of speculative science. Hence it is according to the order of abstraction from matter and motion that the speculative sciences are distinguished.

There are certain objects of speculative knowledge which depend upon matter existentially because they cannot exist except in matter. These are distinguished as follows. Some of them depend upon matter both for their being and their being known, such as things in whose definition sensible matter is included, so that they cannot be understood without such matter. In the definition of man, for example, it is necessary to include flesh and bones. It is of such things that physics or natural science treats.[17] But certain other things, though dependent upon matter

for their existence, do not so depend for their being known, because in definitions of them sensible matter is not included. Such is the case with lines and number. And of such things mathematics treats.[18] There are still other objects of speculative knowledge, however, which do not depend on matter for existence because they can exist without matter: either they are never found in matter, as God and the angels, or they are in some cases in matter and in other cases not, as substance, quality, being, potency, act, one and many, and things of this sort.[19] The science that treats of all such things is [natural] theology, that is, divine science, its pre-eminent object being God. By another name this science is called metaphysics, that is to say, trans-physics, because it is properly to be learned by us after physics [or natural philosophy], for it is from sensible things that we must take our point of departure in order to arrive at the knowledge of non-sensible things. This science is also called first philosophy, inasmuch as all the other sciences, receiving their principles from it, follow after it. Now, it is impossible that there should be things which depend upon matter for their being known but not for their existence. For the intellect, considered in itself, is immaterial. Consequently there is no fourth generic division of philosophy in addition to the aforenamed three.

Answers to objections. 1. The Philosopher, in the sixth book of the *Ethics*,[20] deals with the intellectual habitus inasmuch as they are intellectual virtues. And they are called virtues so far as they perfect the intellect in its operation, for a virtue is that which makes its possessor good and his work good. Hence, according as the intellect is perfected in diverse ways by means of diverse speculative habitus of this sort, so are its virtues diversified. One way



in which the speculative part of the soul is perfected by the intellect is by the habitus of principles, whereby certain things are known self-evidently. It is perfected in another way when conclusions are known as demonstrated from first principles, whether the demonstration proceeds from lower causes, as in science, or from the highest causes, as in wisdom. Since sciences are distinguished precisely as habitus, they must be differentiated by their objects, that is, by the realities of which they treat. And in such wise are the three parts of speculative philosophy distinguished here and in the sixth book of the *Metaphysics*.[21]

2. As Aristotle makes clear in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*[22] the speculative sciences treat of those things the knowledge of which is sought for its own sake. The objects logic deals with, however, are not inquired into that they may be known for their own sake, but they are sought as a certain aid to the other sciences. For this reason logic is not classed under speculative philosophy as one of its principal parts, but as something reduced, so to say, to speculative philosophy, inasmuch as it provides speculation with its instruments—syllogisms, definitions and other such tools—which we need in the speculative sciences. Thus, as Boethius also observes in his *Commentary on Porphyry*,[23] logic is not so much a science as an instrument of science.

3. The seven liberal arts do not provide an adequate division of theoretical philosophy. Rather, as Hugh of St. Victor says in the third book of his *Didascalon*,[24] the seven liberal arts . . . are classed with the theoretical sciences simply because it was by them that those who wished to learn philosophy were first instructed. These arts were distinguished into a group of three called the *trivium* and a group of four called the *quadrivium*, so that (as Hugh

says) "by them, as by certain roads, the keen mind might enter into the secrets of wisdom." This pedagogical development is quite in accord with what the Philosopher lays down in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, namely, that the method of science ought to be sought before the sciences themselves.[25] The Commentator also, remarking upon the same text,[26] says that, before all the other sciences, one ought to learn logic, which teaches the manner of proceeding in all the sciences. And to logic the *trivium* pertains. Further, in the sixth book of the *Ethics*, the Philosopher says that mathematics can be learned by children, but not physics, which requires experience.[27] Thus are we given to understand that logic ought to be learned first, and then mathematics, to which the *quadrivium* pertains, so that by these pathways, as it were, the soul is prepared for philosophical disciplines of another nature. Now, among the other sciences, logic and mathematics are called "arts," for not only are they cognitive but they also issue in a certain work, which is immediately that of reason itself, such as the orderly arranging of thoughts, forming syllogisms, regulating speech; or [in mathematics] numbering, measuring, constructing [the mathematical bases of] musical harmonies, and computing the course of the stars. Other sciences, however, either are not ordered to making but only to knowledge—as are divine science and the science of nature, which cannot claim the name of art, because art is productive reason, as is said in the sixth book of the *Metaphysics*[28]—, or the sciences besides logic and mathematics are concerned with some corporeal work, as are medicine, alchemy and the like. Hence they cannot be called liberal arts, because in them man is engaged in operations belonging to that part of him wherein he is not free, namely, his body. But although moral science is ordered



to operation, that operation is not the act of science but of virtue, as is clear from what is said in the *Ethics*.[29] Moral science, therefore, cannot be called an art; rather, in moral operations virtue assumes the role of art. Thus the ancients defined virtue as the art of living well and righteously, as Augustine remarks in the fourth book of *The City of God*.[30]

4. As Avicenna states in the beginning of his book on *Medicine*,[31] the "theoretical" and the "practical" are distinguished in one way when philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical, in another way when the arts are divided into theoretical and practical, and in still another way when medicine is so divided. For when philosophy and even the arts are distinguished as theoretical and practical, this distinction must be taken in reference to their finality, so that what is ordered solely to the knowledge of truth is to be called theoretical, whereas that which is ordered to operation is called practical. However, when philosophy as a whole and the arts are thus classified, it is important that in the division of philosophical science reference be made to man's last end, namely, beatitude, to which the whole of human life is ordered. For, as Augustine says in *The City of God*,[32] quoting Varro,[33] "There is no reason why man should philosophize except that thereby he may be happy." So it is that a twofold felicity is claimed by philosophers: the one contemplative, the other active, as is pointed out in the tenth book of the *Ethics*.[34] And correspondingly they distinguish two parts of philosophy, calling moral philosophy "practical," natural and rational philosophy [i.e., philosophy of nature and logic] "theoretical." However, when certain arts are said to be "speculative" and others "practical," reference is being made to some special ends of these arts, as when we

say that agriculture is a practical art but that dialectics is theoretical. But when medicine is divided into theoretical and practical, it is not with reference to the end of medicine, since if that were the case the whole of medical science would come under the heading of "practical," medicine being [entirely] ordered to operation. The aforesaid division, on the contrary, is made on the grounds of the proximity to or remoteness from operation of the things dealt with in medical science. Thus, that part of medicine is called "practical" which teaches methods of healing; for instance, that in the case of such and such symptoms, such and such remedies are to be applied. But we call "theoretical" that part of medicine which teaches the principles by which the physician is guided in his operation, though not proximately; for example, that the [healing?] powers are three, and how many different kinds of fevers there are. Hence, if a certain part of an operational science is called "theoretical," that part need not be classed under speculative philosophy.

5. One science is contained under another science in two ways: 1) as a part of it, because its subject is a certain part [or type] of natural body, e.g., the science of plants is comprised under natural science as a part; 2) subalternated to it, that is, when in the superior science there is assigned the explanatory cause *(propter quid)* of those things about which, in the lower science, it is known only *that* they are; thus is music, for example, placed under arithmetic. Medicine, then, is not classed under physics as a part of it, since the subject of medicine, as such, is not a part of the subject of natural science. For although the curable body is a natural body, it is not the subject of medicine so far as it is curable by nature, but so far as it



is curable by art. But since in the healing which is effected also by art, art is the minister of nature (because some natural power, aided by art, is the cause of healing), the essential explanation *(propter quid)* of the operation which is art must be based upon the properties of natural things. For this reason medicine is subalternated to physics, and so likewise are alchemy, the science of agriculture, and all other sciences of the same order. It remains, then, that physics in itself and in all its parts is speculative, although some operative sciences are subalternated to it.

6. Although the subjects of the other sciences are parts of being, which is the subject of metaphysics, it does not follow that those sciences are parts of metaphysics. For each science studies a part of being under a special intelligible aspect, distinct from that in which being is contemplated in metaphysics. The subject of such a science is not, properly speaking, a part of the subject of metaphysics, because it is not a part of being in that aspect wherein being is the subject of metaphysics.[35] Rather, in virtue of its own manner of viewing reality, each special science is rendered distinct from every other one. However, a science can be termed a part[36] of metaphysics if it be concerned with potency or act or unity, or anything of the kind,[37] because these principles call for the same mode of consideration as does being, of which metaphysics treats.

7. Those parts [or modes] of being require the same manner of treatment as common being[38] because they also do not depend upon matter. Hence the kind of science that deals with such modes of being does not differ from the science which treats of common being.

8. The various additional divisions of reality which the objection sets forth are not essential differentiating factors

of those things considered precisely in so far as they are knowable. Consequently, the sciences are not differentiated by such factors.

9. Although divine science is the first of all sciences, nevertheless for us other sciences are naturally prior. For, as Avicenna says in the beginning of his *Metaphysics*,[39] the position of this science is such that it is learned after the natural sciences, in which many things are established which this divine science makes use of: generation, for example, corruption, motion, and the like. So, too, it is learned after mathematics. Thus, for theology to acquire knowledge of separated substances, number and the order of the celestial bodies must be known, and knowledge of these things is not possible without astrology, a science to which, in turn, the whole of mathematics is prerequisite. Indeed other sciences—music and ethics, for example—contribute to the full development of divine science. Nor, because the same science [natural theology or metaphysics] which supposes those things that are proved in other sciences is the very science that proves the latter's principles, is there a vicious circle here. For the principles which another science, namely, natural philosophy, receives from first philosophy do not prove those things which the first philosopher appropriates from the natural philosopher. On the contrary, such things are proved by different, self-evident, principles. It is because the first philosopher does not prove the principles which he passes on to the natural philosopher by principles he receives from the latter, but by other self-evident principles, that there is no vicious circle in the first philosopher's definitions. Moreover, the sensible effects from which demonstrations in natural science or philosophy proceed are more known to us at first. But when through them we have arrived at a knowledge



of first causes, from these latter there will be evident to us the essential explanatory cause *(propter quid)* of those effects, proceeding from which, by way of demonstration of the fact *(demonstratio quia)*, the existence of the first causes was established. In this way natural science contributes something to divine science, and yet it is through divine science that the principles of natural science are made known. And for this reason does Boethius place divine science last: it is the ultimate science in the order of human knowing.

10. Although natural philosophy comes to be learned after mathematics, since the universal teachings of natural philosophy require experience and time for their understanding, nevertheless natural things, being sensible, are naturally more accessible to our knowledge than mathematical entities, abstracted as these are from sensible matter.

## 2. ON THE NATURE AND EXCELLENCE OF METAPHYSICS[40]

As the Philosopher teaches in the *Politics*,[41] when a number of things are ordered to a single thing, one of that number must be regulative or directive, and the others regulated or directed. This indeed is evident in the case of the union of the soul and the body, for the soul naturally commands and the body obeys. So too, within the powers of the soul, the irascible and the concupiscible, by a natural ordering, are governed by the reason. Indeed, all sciences and arts are ordained to one thing, namely, the perfection of man, which is his beatitude. Hence, among them that one must be the mistress of all the others which rightly

lays claim to the title of wisdom. For it is the office of the wise to order others.

What this science is and what it treats of can be ascertained if one carefully considers how a person is qualified to rule. Now, as the Philosopher says in the work alluded to,[42] just as men powerful in intellect are naturally the rulers and masters of others—whereas men physically robust yet deficient in intellect are naturally servile—, so, that science is by right naturally mistress of the others which is in the highest degree intellectual. This science, however, is the one that treats of the most intelligible things.

The latter we can regard in three ways: firstly, from the standpoint of the order of knowing, for those things that are the source of the intellect's attainment of certitude seem to be the more intelligible ones. Thus, since it is from causes that the intellect achieves the certitude of science, the cognition of causes apparently is in the highest degree intellectual. Consequently that science which considers first causes evidently is regulative of the other sciences.

Secondly, the supremely intelligible objects can be considered from the point of view of the intellect's relation to sense knowledge. For, although the latter is the cognition of particulars, intellect seems to differ from it in this, that intellect comprehends universals. Thus, the science which is maximally intellectual is the one which treats of principles supremely universal. Now, these are being and those things [or principles] that follow upon being, as one and many, potency and act. Such principles, however, ought not to remain completely indeterminate,[43] since without them full cognition of things proper to a given genus or species cannot be had. Moreover, since each genus of beings needs these principles for the very knowledge of itself, they would with equal justification be treated in



any particular science at all. It follows that principles of this kind are not to be dealt with in any one *particular* science. Therefore the task of dealing with such principles devolves upon that single common science which, being in the highest degree intellectual, is regulative of the other sciences.

Thirdly, the supremely intelligible objects of which we speak can be considered from the standpoint of the intellect's own cognition. Thus, since every thing has intellective power in consequence of its freedom from matter, those things must be pre-eminently intelligible which exist in complete separation from matter. The intelligible object and the intellect must be proportioned to each other, and must be of one genus,[44] since the intellect and the intelligible are in act one. Now, those things are in the highest degree separated from matter which abstract not only from signate matter, "as do natural forms taken universally, of which natural science[45] treats," but which abstract altogether from sensible matter—and not only according to reason, as mathematical objects do, but also in respect to actual existence, as with God and the intelligences. Evidently, therefore, the science that considers these things is supremely intellectual and the chief or mistress of the others.

Now the foregoing threefold consideration belongs by right not to diverse sciences, but to one science. For the separated substances referred to above are the universal and the first causes of actual being. But it pertains to one and the same science to consider the proper causes of a genus and the genus itself. So it is, for instance, that the natural philosopher studies the principles of the natural body. Of necessity, then, it is the task of the selfsame science to consider not only separated substances but also

common being,[46] which is the genus of which these substances are the common and universal causes.

From what has been said it is apparent that, although this science[47] considers the three things just mentioned,[48] it does not take this one or that, indifferently, as its subject, but only common being. The subject of a science is precisely that whose causes and passions we seek to know, not the causes themselves of any genus that is inquired into. It is the knowledge of the causes of a genus which is the *end* of scientific thought. Although the subject of this science is common being, the latter is predicated of entities that are wholly separated from matter, existentially as well as logically. For among things said to be separated existentially and logically are found not only those that never can exist in matter, as God and intellectual substances, but also those that can be without matter, as common being.[49] This however would not be the case if they depended upon matter in their being.

Therefore, in accordance with the aforesaid three things from which the perfection of this science is derived,[50] it receives three names: "divine science" or "theology"[51] inasmuch as it considers the substances in question;[52] "metaphysics" inasmuch as it considers being and the things that follow upon it—for these transphysical principles are discovered in the process of resolution as the more common after the less common—; and "first philosophy" inasmuch as it considers the first causes of things. It is evident, then, what the subject of this science is, and how it is related to other sciences, and how it is named.

# Chapter II

# The Subject of Metaphysics

## 1. ON BEING AS BEING[1]

Because a science ought to investigate not only its proper subject but also the latter's essential attributes,[2] Aristotle says that there exists a science which takes as its subject being precisely as such, and "those things which belong to being in virtue of its own nature," namely, being's essential attributes.

Aristotle here uses the expression "being in so far as it is being" because the other sciences, which treat of particular beings, do indeed consider being, for all the subjects of sciences are beings, yet they do not consider being as being, but as this sort of being; for example, number, line, fire, or something of the kind.

Aristotle employs the phrase "and those things belonging to being in virtue of its own nature," not simply "those things which appertain to or exist in being," in order to point out that it is not the office of a science to consider those things that exist in its subject accidentally but only those that are present in it essentially. Thus, geometry is not concerned with the question whether a triangle is made of copper or of wood, but only with its absolute nature, according to which it has three equal angles.[3] It does not, therefore, appertain to the science whose subject is being to consider all that exists in it accidentally, since it would then be taking into account accidents which are investi-

gated in all sciences. For although all accidents exist in some being, not all accidents exist in a being inasmuch as it is being. Thus essential accidents of an inferior or a subordinate thing are accidental accidents in relation to the superior; for example, accidents essential to man are not essential to animal.[4]

The necessity of this science of metaphysics, which contemplates being and its essential attributes, is manifest; such things ought not to remain unknown because it is upon them that knowledge of other things depends, for on the knowledge of common or universal things hinges the knowledge of proper or individual things.

That this science is not a particular science, Aristotle shows by the following argument. No particular science considers universal being as such, but only some part of being cut off from its other parts, and of this separated part it examines the essential attribute. The mathematical sciences, for instance, investigate a particular kind of being, namely, the quantitative,[5] whereas the common science, metaphysics, considers universal being as being. Therefore it is not to be identified with any particular science.

No particular science treats of being as being, that is, being-in-common, nor does any particular science treat of any particular being, simply as being. For instance, arithmetic does not consider number as being, but as number. It is the office of the metaphysician, however, to consider any and every being, precisely as being.[6]

And because it pertains to the same science to consider being as being, "and, concerning being, what it is," namely, its essence (for every thing has actual existence through its essence), so it is that the particular sciences . . . are not concerned with the problem of determining what being



is—its quiddity or essence and its definition, which signifies the essence. Rather, from the essence such sciences proceed to other matters, using the presupposed essence, as if it were an already demonstrated principle, in order to prove other things.[7]

Just as no particular science determines the essence of its subject, so none of them says regarding its subject, that it is or is not. And understandably so; for it belongs to one and the same science to settle the problem of existence and to discover the essence. . . . It is proper to the philosopher, to him who studies being as being, to consider both problems. But every particular science presupposes concerning its own subject both that it is and what it is, as Aristotle states in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*. And this shows that no particular science treats of being as such, nor of any being precisely as being.[8]

## 2. THE MEANING OF BEING (*ens*)

### A. In Relation to the Act of Existing (*esse*)

That which first falls under the intellect's grasp is being *(ens)*. Thus the intellect necessarily attributes being to everything it apprehends.[9] *Being* means that-which-is, or exists *(esse habens)*.[10]

The verb *is consignifies* composition,[11] because it does not signify this principally but secondarily. *Is* signifies primarily that which the intellect apprehends as being absolutely actual, for in the absolute sense *is* means to be in act, and thus its mode of signification is that of a verb. But, since the actuality which *is* principally signifies is universally the actuality of every form, whether substantial or accidental, when we wish to signify that any form or

any act whatever actually exists in a subject, we express that fact by this verb *is*.[12]

The word *being (ens)* is imposed from the very act of existing, as Avicenna remarks, whereas the word *thing (res)* is imposed from the essence or quiddity.[13] *Being* properly signifies: something-existing-in-act.[14] *Being* means that-which-has-existence-in-act. Now, this is substance, which subsists.[15]

The act of existing *(esse)* is that by which substance is given the name of being *(ens)*.[16] This act is the actuality of every form or nature.[17]

What[18] I call *esse* is among all principles the most perfect; which is evident from the fact that act is always more perfect than potentiality.[19] Now, any designated form is understood to exist actually only in virtue of the fact that it is held to *be*. Thus, humanity or fire can be considered as existing in the potentiality of matter, or as existing in the active power of an agent, or also as existing in an intellect. But that which has *esse* is made actually existent. It is evident, therefore, that what I call *esse* is the actuality of all acts, and for this reason it is the perfection of all perfections. Nor is it to be thought that something is added to what I call *esse* which is more formal than *esse* itself, thus determining it as an act determines a potentiality. For the *esse* I speak of is essentially other than that to which it is added as a certain determining principle.[20]

Now, nothing can be added to *esse* that is extraneous to it, since nothing is extraneous to it except nothing *(non-ens)*. . . . *Esse*, then, is not determined by another as a potentiality is determined by an act, but *esse* is determined as an act by a potentiality. . . .[21] And in this way is one *esse* distinguished from another *esse*, namely, according as it is the *esse* of this nature, or essence, or of that.



*Esse* is what is innermost in each and every thing, and what is deepest in them all, for it is formal in respect of all that is in a thing.[22]

*Esse* itself is act in relation to both composite and simple natures. Composite natures are not made specifically what they are by this act, but rather by the form in them, for specification concerns a thing's essence whereas *esse* evidently pertains to the question whether a thing is. Nor are angelic substances so specified. Rather, their differentiation into species is based on those simple subsisting forms which they themselves are, and which differ specifically according to their own grade of perfection.[23]

Taken absolutely, as including in itself every perfection of being, *esse* is superior to life and to all other subsequent perfections. . . . Yet if *esse* is considered as it is participated in any thing whatever which does not possess the total perfection of being, but has imperfect being—and this is the case with all creatures—, then clearly *esse* in union with the superadded perfection is higher. Accordingly Dionysius says that living things are better than merely existing things, and intelligent things than merely living things.[24]

*Esse*, as such, is nobler than everything that follows upon it.[25] Thus, considered absolutely and in itself, this act is nobler than the act of understanding. . . . Indeed, that which excels in being *(in esse)* is purely and simply nobler than any thing which excels in any perfection consequent upon being. . . .[26]

## B. In Relation to Essence

Being *(ens)*, understood as signifying the entity of a thing *(entitas rei)*, is divided into the ten categories, and thus taken, being *(ens)* is convertible with thing *(res)*.[27]

The name *essence* is taken from being expressed in the first mode [namely, as it is divided into the ten categories], not from being expressed in the second mode [namely, as it signifies the truth of propositions]. For, as is clear in the case of privations, in the latter mode we call some things beings which do not have an essence. . . . Because *being* said in the first mode is divided into the ten categories, *essence* must signify something common to all natures, through which diverse beings are placed in diverse genera and species. For instance, humanity is the essence of man, and so with other things.[28]

Moreover,[29] since that by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus and species is what is signified by the definition indicating what the thing is, philosophers have taken to using the name quiddity for the name essence. The Philosopher frequently calls this the *quod quid erat esse*:[30] that by which a thing is a *what*. It is also called form inasmuch as form signifies the complete essential determination[31] of each thing. . . . Also, it is called nature . . . according as nature is said to be that which can be grasped by the intellect in any way; for a thing is intelligible only by its definition and essence. . . . But "nature" also seems to signify the essence of the thing as ordered to its proper operation, for nothing is without its proper operation. The name quiddity, on the other hand, is derived from that which is signified by the definition, whereas essence means that through which and in which a thing has its act of existing.

# Chapter III

# Modes and Divisions of Being (*ens*)

## 1. WAYS OF PREDICATING "BEING"

*Being* is spoken of in many ways. In one way, something is called a being because it subsists in itself;[1] in another way because it is a principle of subsisting being, as in the case of form; thirdly, because it is a disposition of a subsisting being—for instance, a quality; fourthly, because it is a privation of a disposition of a subsisting being, such as blindness.[2]

*Being*,[3] expressed in one way, is divided into the ten categories, and it then signifies something existing in nature, whether it be a substance, as man, or an accident, as color. In a second mode, *being* signifies the truth of a proposition, inasmuch as it is said that an affirmation *is* true when it signifies that that which is, *is*, and a negation is true when it signifies that that which is not, *is* not. *Being*, taken in this sense, signifies the composition which the intellect, composing and dividing, introduces. Thus, all things which are called beings in the first way are beings also in the second way, for everything that has natural being in things can be signified to exist by an affirmative proposition, as when it is said: color is, or man is. But not all those entities that are beings in the second mode are beings also in the first mode. For an affirmative proposition

is made regarding a privation, such as blindness, when it is said: blindness is. And yet blindness is not a being existing in the nature of things; it is the loss of some actual entity. In a word, even privations and negations are called beings according to the second mode, but not the first. As regards both these modes, however, *being* is predicated in diverse ways. Taken in the first mode, being is a substantial predicate, and pertains to the question, *what* a thing is; in the second mode, being is an accidental predicate . . . and pertains to the question, *whether* a thing is.[4]

*Being*[5] is not placed in the definition of *creature*, because being is neither a genus nor a difference. Being is participated in as a reality *not* existing *from* the essence of the thing; and for this reason the question, *whether* a thing is, is other than the question, *what* a thing is. Now, inasmuch as everything outside the essence of a thing may be called an "accident,"[6] that *esse* which pertains to the question, whether a thing is, is an "accident." The Commentator [Averroes] thus states . . . that the proposition, "Socrates is," belongs in the class of accidental predication, according as it imports the entity of real being, or the truth of proposition. Yet it is true that, so far as it implies the real subject *(res)* to which this act of existing belongs, the name *being* signifies the essence of such subjects, and is divided into the ten categories—though not univocally, because actual existence does not belong to all things according to the same concept.[7]

Note that *esse* is not an accident generically so called, where *esse* signifies the act of existing of the substance—for this is the act of the essence—, but *esse* is termed an "accident" because of a certain likeness, seeing that this act is not a part of the essence any more than an accident is.[8]



Being[9] is twofold: being-of-reason and being-of-nature. *Being-of-reason* is predicated properly of those intentions which the reason discovers in the things it considers, such as the generic, the specific, and other like intentions—which indeed are not found in the nature of things, but follow upon the consideration of reason. And this kind of being, namely, being-of-reason, is properly the subject of logic. Now, intelligible intentions of the sort spoken of are paralleled by beings-of-nature, since all beings-of-nature come within the purview of reason. The subject of logic thus extends to all the things of which *being-of-nature* is predicated. Aristotle therefore concludes that the subject of logic is paralleled by the subject of philosophy, which is being-of-nature, real being. Hence the philosopher proceeds from the principles of real being itself in order to prove whatever has to be taken into account respecting its common accidents. In the consideration of these matters the dialectician,[10] on the other hand, proceeds from intentions of reason, which are extraneous to the nature of things.

There[11] is, however, a fourfold division of being: into essential being *(ens per se)* and accidental being *(ens per accidens)*, into real being, or being-of-nature, and being-of-reason, into the ten categories, and into actual and potential being. Observe that the division of being into essential and accidental is not the same as the division of being into substance and accident. . . . It is by the absolute consideration of being that it is divided into substance and accident; e.g., whiteness, so considered, is called an accident, and man a substance. Accidental being, however, can be grasped [not absolutely or in itself, but] only through the comparison of accident to substance. And this comparison is signified by the verb *is*, e.g.: the man *is* white; a

predication which, taken as a whole, is an instance of accidental being. Thus it is evident that the division of being into essential and accidental arises from the fact that something is *predicated* of a thing either essentially or accidentally. The division of being into substance and accident, on the other hand, results from the fact that a thing *in its nature* is either a substance or an accident.

Accidental being,[12] again, is spoken of in three ways: firstly, when an accident is predicated of an accident—e.g., "the just [man] is musical"; secondly, when an accident is predicated of a subject—e.g., "the man is musical"; thirdly, when a subject is predicated of an accident—"the musical [person] is a man."

Further,[13] respecting the mode of essential being, Aristotle first distinguishes it into the ten categories, pointing out that being in this mode is extramental and is called "perfect" or complete being. Secondly, he notes another mode according to which being exists only in the mind. Thirdly, he divides being into potentiality and act. So divided, being is more common than perfect being, namely, than being as divided into the ten categories. For potential being is being only in a qualified and imperfect sense. Aristotle asserts that those things are said to *be*, in an absolute sense, which signify the categories. Now it must be well understood that being cannot be limited to some determinate entity in the manner in which a genus is limited to species through differences. For the difference, since it does not participate in the genus,[14] is outside the essence of the genus. But nothing can be outside the essence of being so as to constitute some species of being by addition to being; for what is outside being is nothing. . . . Hence the Philosopher had proved in the third book of his *Metaphysics*[15] that being cannot be a genus.



Therefore[16] being must be limited to diverse genera in accordance with diverse modes of predication—which themselves follow upon diverse modes of existing, because in as many ways as something is predicated, in just so many ways is something signified to *be*. And for this reason those things into which being is first divided are called predicaments, because they are distinguished according to the various modes of predicating.

There[17] are indeed some predications in which the verb *is* does not explicitly occur. Let it not be supposed that in such cases (e.g., in "the man walks") *being* is not predicated. Denying such a false inference, the Philosopher lays it down that in all such predications something is signified *to be*. In fact, every verb is reduced to this verb *is*, and its participial form [be-*ing*]. There is, then, no difference between saying that a man is convalescing and that he convalesces; and so in all other cases. It is therefore evident that in as many modes as predication is made, in just so many ways is being spoken of.

## 2. THE DIVISION OF BEING BY POTENCY AND ACT

The primary simple principles cannot be defined, for in definitions there can be no infinite regress. *Act* is such a principle. Therefore it cannot be defined. Yet, through the proportion of two things to each other, it can be seen what act is. So if we take the relation of the builder to the buildable, and of one who is awake to one asleep, and of that which sees to that which has its eyes closed while having the power of sight . . . , proportionally, from such particular examples, we can arrive at a knowledge of what act and potency are.[18]

Potency[19] is spoken of in relation to act. But act is twofold: first act, which is form, and second act, which is operation. As the common understanding of the term indicates, *act* was attributed first of all to action; almost everyone understands *act* to mean this. However, from this meaning the term act was transferred to signify the form, seeing that form is a principle of action, and an end. Potency, then, is likewise twofold: active potency, to which the act that is operation corresponds—and to this the term *potency*[20] seems to have been attributed primarily—and passive potency, to which first act, namely the form, corresponds—and to this the term *potency* was likewise, it seems, attributed secondarily.

Now,[21] in any two things whatever, if one of them completes the other, then the relation between them is that of act to potentiality; for nothing is brought to completion, fulfilled, except by its own act. . . . But it is the act of existing itself which completes, fulfills, the existing substance; each and every being is in act as a result of having the act of existing. It follows that in every one of the aforesaid substances[22] there is a composition of act and potentiality.

Moreover, in a thing that which is derived from an agent must be act; for an agent's office is to make something actual. But it was proved earlier that all substances except the first have existence from it. In every case it is because they receive their existence from something else that caused substances themselves *are*. This very existence, then, is present in caused substances as their act. That in which an act is present is a potentiality. Indeed act as such is referred to potentiality. Hence, in every created substance there is potentiality and act.

Again. Whatever participates in something is related to



that which is participated as potentiality to act.[23] For, through that which is participated [received] the participator is actualized in such and such a manner. But it was shown previously that God alone is being in virtue of His own essence, while all other things participate in the act of existing.[24] Every created substance, therefore, is related to its own existence as potentiality to act.[25]

Further. It is through an act that a thing becomes like its efficient cause; for an agent produces its like so far as it is in act. But every created substance attains likeness to God through the very act of existing *(ipsum esse)*, as was proved earlier. Therefore, existence itself *(ipsum esse)* has this status with respect to all created substances: it is their act. Thus, in every created substance there is composition of act and potentiality.

In[26] every composite being[27] there must be act and potentiality. Indeed no plurality can become one in an absolute sense unless in it something be act and something else potentiality. [Complete] entities actually existing do not form a unit, except, as it were, by way of conjunction or aggregation; and thus united they are not one in an absolute sense. But even in such wholes, the parts themselves are potential with respect to their unification, since they are unified actually after having been unified potentially. . . . Moreover, every composite, precisely as composite, is potentially dissolved, although in certain things something is present that resists dissolution. But what is dissoluble is in potentiality with respect to non-existence.

Every[28] thing other than God has being participatively; so that in it substance [or essence], sharing the act of existence, is other than this act itself which is shared. But every participator is related to that which is participated in it as potentiality to act. Hence, the substance of every

created thing whatever is to its own existence as potentiality to act. So it is that every created substance is composed of potentiality and act, or, as Boethius says, of what-it-is *(quod est)* and act of existing *(esse)*.

### 3. THE REAL COMPOSITION OF ESSENCE AND ACT OF EXISTING

It is clear from what has been said already that in every created thing essence is *distinct* from existence and is compared to the latter as potentiality to act.[29] Every created being participates in the act of existing;[30] God alone is His act of existing.[31] The act of existing of every finite thing is participated, because no thing outside God is its own act of existing.[32]

Whatever[33] is participated is related to the participator as its act. . . . But participated act of existing is limited by the [receptive] capacity[34] of the participator. Hence God alone, who is His own act of existing, is pure and infinite act. In intellectual substances, indeed, there is a composition of act and potentiality; not, however, of matter and form, but of form[35] and participated act of existing.

Now,[36] act of existing, as such, cannot be diverse;[37] yet it can be diversified by something extrinsic to itself; for instance, a stone's act of existing is other than that of a man.

God's[38] act of existing is distinguished and set apart from every other act of existing by the fact that it is self-subsistent, and does not come to a nature [or an essence] other than itself. Every other act of existing, being non-subsisting, must be individuated by the nature and substance which subsists in that act of existing. And regarding these things [namely all creatures] it is true to say that the act of existing of this one is other than the act of existing of



that one, inasmuch as it belongs to another nature. So, if there were one color existing in itself, without matter, or without a subject, by this very fact it would be distinguished from every other color; since colors existing in subjects are distinguished only through those subjects.

Because[39] the quiddity of an intelligence[40] is that very intelligence itself, its quiddity or essence is that which it itself is, and its existence, received from God, is that by which it subsists in the nature of things. Some therefore have said that substances of this kind are composed of that-by-which-they-are (the *quo est*) and that-which-they-are (the *quod est*), or of that-by-which-they-are and essence. . . .

Whatever[41] does not belong to the concept of essence or quiddity comes from without and enters into composition with the essence, for no essence can be understood without its essential parts. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without anything being known of its actual existence. For example, I can understand what a man or a phoenix is and yet be ignorant whether either one exists in reality.[42] It is evident, then, that act of existing is other than essence or quiddity—unless, perhaps, there exists a reality whose quiddity is its very act of existing.[43] And there can be only one such reality: the First Being. . . . In every other being, act of existing is other than quiddity, nature, or form.

The[44] act of existing belongs to the first agent, God, through His own nature; for God's act of existing is His substance. . . . But that which belongs to something according to its own nature, appertains to other things only by participation. . . . Thus the act of existing is possessed by other things, from the First Agent, through a certain participation. But that which a thing has by participation

is not its very own substance. Therefore it is impossible that the substance of anything except the first agent should be the act of existing itself.

Now,[45] the composition of matter and form is not of the same nature as the composition of substance and act of existing, though both compositions are of potentiality and act. This is so, first of all, because matter is not the very substance of a thing. If it were, then all forms would be accidents, as the ancient Naturalists[46] thought. Rather, matter is a part of the substance. Secondly, this is so because the act of existing itself is not the proper act of the matter, but of the whole substance. For *esse* is the act of that whereof we can say: it *is; esse* is not said of the matter, but of the whole. Matter, therefore, cannot be termed that-which-is. On the contrary, the substance itself is that-which-is. Thirdly, the aforesaid compositions are diverse, because the form is not the act of existing, though between the two there exists a certain order. Form is compared to the act of existing as light to the act of illuminating, for instance, or as whiteness to the act of being white. Finally, there is this consideration: existence is act even in relation to the form itself. For in things composed of matter and form, the form is said to be a principle of existing because it is what completes the substance, whose act is *esse* itself; just as the air's transparency is the principle of illumination because it makes the air a proper subject [or receiver] of light.

To sum up: in things composed of matter and form, neither the matter nor the form can be designated as that-which-is, nor even can the act of existing be so designated. However, form can be called that-by-which-a-thing-is, or exists, *(quo est)*, inasmuch as it is a principle of existing. Nevertheless, it is the whole substance which is that-which-is *(quod est)*, and the act of existing is that by which the substance is denominated a *being*.



In intellectual substances (which . . . are not composed of matter and form, but form in them is itself a subsisting substance) form is that-which-is *(quod est)*, whereas *esse* is act and that-by-which the form is *(quo est)*. So in them there is but one composition of act and potentiality, namely, the composition of substance and act of existing, which by some is called a composition of that-which-is *(quod est)* and act of existing *(esse)*, or of that-which-is *(quod est)* and that-by-which-it-is *(quo est)*.

On the other hand, in substances composed of matter and form there is a twofold composition of potentiality and act: first, that of the substance itself, which is composed of matter and form; second, that of the substance, thus composed, and its act of existing. This composition also can be called one of that-which-is *(quod est)* and act of existing *(esse)*, or of that-which-is *(quod est)* and that-by-which-it-is *(quo est)*.

It is evident, therefore, that the composition of act and potentiality is more comprehensive than that of form and matter; matter and form divide natural substance, potentiality and act divide universal being. Accordingly, whatever follows upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to both material and immaterial created substances, as *to receive* and *to be received, to perfect* and *to be perfected.* Yet, all that is proper to matter and form, as such, as *to be generated* and *corrupted*, and the like, appertain to material substances only, and in no way belong to immaterial created substances.

# Chapter IV

# The Analogicity of Being

## 1. SOME PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS

All the things of which one common term is predicated analogically, not univocally, come within the field of one science. Now being *(ens)* is in this manner predicated of all beings. Consequently all beings are embraced in the scope of that single science which treats of being as being.[1]

In predications all univocal terms are reduced to one first non-univocal, analogical term, which is being *(ens)*.[2]

Being *(ens)* is not a genus, but is predicable analogically of all things in general; and the same must be said concerning the other transcendentals.[3]

There is something analogically common to being and non-being[4] because non-being is itself called being analogically, as is clear from the fourth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[5] Therefore the distance of nature between the creature and God cannot stand in the way of a community of analogy between them.[6]

As the Philosopher says, the term *being*, or *that-which-is*, is used in various senses. It must be borne in mind that a term is predicated of diverse things in several different ways. 1) In some cases the term is predicated according to a concept altogether identical, and then it is said to be predicated univocally, as *animal*, said of the horse and the cow. 2) In other instances the term is predicated according to concepts altogether diverse in meaning, and then it is said to be predicated of things equivocally, as *dog*, said of the animal of that name and of a certain heavenly body. 3) In still other cases the term is predicated according to concepts diverse in some respect and in some respect not—diverse inasmuch as they entail diverse relations, but one in that these diverse relations are all referred to some one term. A thing is then said to be "predicated analogically," that is, proportionally, each member of the analogy being predicated according to its relation to that one term.[7]



Now[8] a term is predicated analogically in three ways: 1) solely as regards the concept involved; 2) as regards the act of existing, but not the concept; 3) as regards both the concept and the act of existing.

The first mode of analogical predication[9] is present when one concept is attributed to a number of things by priority and posteriority, yet is realized in but one of them. Thus the concept of health is applied to the animal, to urine, and to diet in various ways, according to priority and posteriority, though not according to a diverse act of existing, because health exists actually only in the animal.[10]

The second mode of analogical predication[11] is in effect when several things are put on an equal footing under one and the same common concept, although the nature that they share in common exists diversely in them. Thus all bodies [however diverse they may be in their actual existence] are on a par so far as the concept of corporeity is concerned. Thus the logician, who considers intentions only, says that the term *body* is predicated univocally of all bodies, and yet corporeity does not exist in corruptible and in incorruptible bodies in the same mode. Hence, for the metaphysician and the philosopher of nature, who consider things in their actual being, neither the term *body*

nor any other term is said univocally of corruptible and incorruptible things, as is clear from what the Philosopher[12] and the Commentator say.

The third mode of analogical predication[13] is found where there is no equality either with respect to the common concept involved or to actual existence. It is in this mode that being *(ens)*, for instance, is predicated of substance and of accident. And in all such cases[14] the common term must exist in some way in each of the things of which it is predicated, while differing with respect to greater or lesser perfection.[15]

It[16] happens in two ways that a term is predicated of a number of things according to different concepts. In one way, according to concepts completely diverse, having no relationship to one [common meaning]. And such things are said to be equivocal by chance, because it is only fortuitously that a man applies one name to one thing and another name to something else, as is particularly evident in the case of different men who are called by the same name. In another way, one name is predicated of a number of things according to concepts not totally other but agreeing in some one thing—sometimes, indeed, in the fact that they are referred to one principle. Thus a thing is called *military* either because it is a military man's instrument—a sword, perhaps—or because it is his clothing, such as a cuirass, or because it is his vehicle, for example, a horse. But sometimes those concepts agree in being all referred to one end, as medicine is called *healthy* because it produces health, diet because it conserves health, urine because it indicates health. In other instances, however, terms agree according to different proportions to the same subject, as a quality is called a *being* because it is a disposition of per se being, namely, of substance, quantity because it



is a measure of substance, and so forth.[17] Finally, the terms may agree according to one proportion to diverse subjects.[18] Thus sight is in relation to the body what intellect is in relation to the soul, so that just as sight is a power of a bodily organ, so intellect is a power of the soul in which the body does not participate. Aristotle therefore says that *good* is predicated of many things, not through concepts completely different, as with things equivocal purely by chance, but rather by way of analogy, that is, by the same proportion, seeing that all goods depend upon one first principle of goodness, or are all ordered to one end. For Aristotle did not mean that that separated Good was the idea and intelligible form *(ratio)* of all goods, but their principle and end. Or, again, all things are said to be good according to analogy or the same proportion in this way, that just as sight, for example, is a good of the body, so intellect is a good of the soul. Indeed Aristotle prefers this third mode of analogy[19] because it is based upon the goodness inhering in things. In the first two modes, involving as they do predication in respect to the *separated* good, a thing is not so properly denominated *good* as it is in the third one.[20]

## 2. APPLICATIONS: THE PROBLEM OF THE ANALOGICAL COMMUNITY BETWEEN CREATURES AND GOD

It[21] must be said that nothing can be predicated univocally of the creature and God; for in all univocals the intelligible nature signified by the name *(ratio nominis)* is common to each of the things of which that name is univocally predicated. Thus, with respect to that nature, univocals are

equal, although in its actual existence one can be prior or posterior to another. For example, so far as the concept of number itself is concerned, all numbers are on a par, yet in fact one number may be prior to another. Now, however much it may imitate God, no creature can ever attain to this, that anything the same in its very intelligible essence should be common to it and to God. For, those things which, as regards the same intelligible essence, are present in diverse subjects, are common to them in point of substance [second substance] or of quiddity, but are distinct in point of existence *(esse)*. But whatever is in God *is* His own proper act of existing; for just as essence in Him is the same as act of existing, so science *(scientia)*, for example, is the same in Him as His actual scientific knowing *(scientem esse)*. Consequently, since the act of existing proper to one thing cannot be communicated to another, it is impossible that the creature should have anything in common with God quidditatively, even as it cannot possibly acquire the same act of existing as His. Similarly in our case: if for instance in Peter, man and the act of being a man did not differ, it would be impossible to predicate *man* univocally of Peter and Paul, whose very existences are diverse.[22] Yet it cannot be asserted that whatever is predicated of God and creature is predicated in a purely equivocal sense, because if there existed no real likeness of creature to God, God's essence would not be the likeness of created things, and thus in knowing His own essence, He would not know creatures. Likewise, in that case we would be unable to attain to any knowledge of God from creatures. Nor, then, among names befitting creatures[23] would any one of them be predicable of Him in preference to any other; for in regard to terms purely equivocal it matters not what name be used, seeing that there is no likeness in reality between them. Therefore it must be said that the name *science*[24] is said of God's science and of ours neither in an altogether univocal sense, nor purely equivocally, but by way of analogy; which simply means according to a proportion.



Now proportional likeness can be twofold, giving rise to a double community of analogy. 1) There exists a certain conformity among things proportioned to each other because of a mutual determinate distance or some other [determinate] relation between them, as two is proportioned to one by being the double of one. 2) Sometimes we find a mutual conformity of two things between which there is no [determinate] proportion, but rather a mutual likeness of two proportions; e.g., six is "like" four in this, that just as six is the double of three, so four is the double of two. The first kind of conformity is thus one of proportion, the second, of proportionality. So, in accordance with that first kind of conformity we find something predicated analogically of two things one of which is related to the other, as being *(ens)* is said of substance and of accident through the relation that substance and accident have to each other, and as *healthy* is predicated of urine and of animal because urine has a certain likeness[25] to the health of the animal. But sometimes a term is predicated analogically according to the second kind of conformity [proportionality], as the name *vision* is said of corporeal vision and of intellectual vision by reason of the fact that just as sight is in the eye, so intellect is in the soul. [As was said], in things predicated analogically in the first way [according to proportion] there must be some determinate relation between the entities to which a term is common by analogy. It is therefore impossible for anything to be said of God and creature by this mode of analogy. For no

creature has a relation to God such that, through it, the divine perfection could be determined.[26] But in the second mode of analogy no determinate relation exists between those things to which something is common by analogy. Therefore nothing prevents some name from being predicated analogically of God and creature according to this mode of analogy.

There are, however, two modes of predication by way of proportionality. 1) Sometimes the name to be predicated implies in its primary meaning something respecting which no likeness can obtain between God and creature. . . . Such is the case in all things predicated of God symbolically, as when words like *lion* or *sun* are said of Him.[27] For in the definition of such terms is included matter—which cannot be attributed to God. 2) Sometimes the name predicated of God and creature involves in its principal signification nothing that could prevent the aforesaid mode of community [proportionality] from existing between the creature and God. Such is the case with all names whose definition entails no imperfection,[28] nor any actual dependence upon matter. This [absence of limitation] we find in the terms being, good, and the like.[29]

## 3. THE BASIS OF METAPHYSICAL ANALOGY: DIVERSITY IN ACT OF EXISTING

. . . two principles are to be considered in a thing, namely, its nature or quiddity and its act of existing. Now in all univocals there must be community according to nature and not according to act of existing, because one act of existing only is present in each thing. Thus human nature does not exist in two men according to the same act of existing. So it is that when the form signified by a name



is the act of existing itself *(ipsum esse)*, it cannot appertain to things univocally; neither therefore is being *(ens)* predicated univocally.[30]

The act of existing of each and every being is proper to it and is distinct from the act of existing of every other being.[31]

Diversity with respect to act of existing prevents the univocal predication of being *(ens)*. . . . A diverse way of existing *(diversus modus existendi)* bars such predication.[32]