Department of Defense

DoD Online Privacy and Operational Security Smart Cards: Smartphone EXIF Removal

EXIF (Exchangeable image File Format) is a standard format for storing and exchanging image metadata. Image metadata is included in a captured image file and provides a broad range of supplemental information. Some social networks and photo-sharing sites, such as Flickr, Google+, and Instagram, have features that share EXIF data alongside images. Others, including Facebook and Twitter, do not share EXIF data but my utilize the information internally. EXIF data is stored as tags, some of which reveal unique identifying information.

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Department of Defense

DoD Online Privacy and Operational Security Smart Cards: LinkedIn

LinkedIn is a professional networking service that allows you to establish connections with co-workers, customers, business contacts, and potential employees and employers. You can post and share information about current and previous employment, education, military activities, specialties, and interests. To limit exposure of your personal information, you can manage who can view your profile and activities.

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Department of Defense

DoD Online Privacy and Operational Security Smart Cards: Facebook Mobile

As of January 2015, Facebook Mobile hosts 745 million daily mobile active users who accounts for over 60% of all mobile posts published to any online social networking service. Though privacy can still be achieved, mobile users place their personal identity data at a greater risk when compared to users logging in via desktop computer. This is in large part due to the fact that mobile devices provide Facebook with a means to access additional location information, contact lists, photos, and other forms of personal data. Use the following recommendations to best protect yourself against oversharing.

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Department of Defense

DoD Online Privacy and Operational Security Smart Cards: Opting Out of Public Records Aggregators

To locate your presence on the web, search for your name, names of family members, email addresses, phone numbers, home addresses, and social media usernames using Google. Once you have located information that you want removed, record your findings to keep track of the removal process. Please note that the information presented here about how to remove personal details from data aggregators is subject to change.

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U.S. Army

Restricted U.S. Army Geospatial Intelligence Handbook

This training circular provides GEOINT guidance for commanders, staffs, trainers, engineers, and military intelligence personnel at all echelons. It forms the foundation for GEOINT doctrine development. It also serves as a reference for personnel who are developing doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; materiel and force structure; and institutional and unit training for intelligence operations.

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Russia, U.S. Army

Asymmetric Operations Working Group Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic States

Russia’s strategic objectives in the Baltic region do not focus on the Baltic States as final targets, but on using the Batlic States to discredit and dismantle the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and undermining the European Union (EU) by using the Baltic States. Experts in Russia and European security from the United States and the Baltic region agree that Russia could use the Baltic States toward this end by employing any one of a spectrum of actions, to include direct invasion with conventional forces, an incursion and occupation using irregular forces like the one witnessed in Crimea in 2014, or longterm fostering of social, political, and economic instability. Disagreement existed among experts as to which approach was more likely.

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Department of Defense

DoD-M 3025.01 Defense Support of Civil Authorities Volumes 1-3 August 2016

This manual is composed of several volumes, each containing its own purpose. In accordance with the authority in DoD Directives (DoDDs) 5111.13 and 3025.18 the manual assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and identifies authorities for DoD Components to provide support of civil authorities and non-DoD entities. For DoD support described in this manual that is not under the oversight of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)), this manual identifies the offices of responsibility and oversight.

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U.S. Army

U.S. Army Cultural Assessment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

What follows is an assessment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from a socio-cultural perspective. We have employed a modified PMESII-PT framework for analysis (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Terrain, Time). We have modified PMESII-PT in three ways to emphasize the socio-cultural aspect of this analysis. First, we have expanded the concept of Military to cover all coercive forces in the area of interest. The expanded category includes law enforcement, pro and anti-government paramilitaries, militias, external forces, etc. Second, we added Population and Culture as separate categories. Arguably, these categories could be covered in PMESII-PT under Society, but we saw them as sufficiently important to merit separate chapters. Third, we have expanded the concept of Information, which we have titled Communications, to account for both how information is communicated and how it is received within the society under analysis. With that as background, here is a synopsis of our major findings by category in our modified PMESII-PT framework.

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United States

U.S. House of Representatives Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command ISIL Intelligence Analysis Report

The Joint Task Force was created by the Chairmen of the House Armed Services Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense to investigate the allegations of a whistleblower that intelligence produced by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had been manipulated to present an unduly positive outlook on CENTCOM efforts to train the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and combat the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Although investigations into the whistleblower’s allegations continue, the Joint Task Force has conducted sufficient investigation to reach certain interim conclusions. Those conclusions are contained in this report. However, the Joint Task Force awaits the completion of the ongoing Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) investigation into this matter.

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China, Federal Bureau of Investigation

(U//FOUO) FBI Counterintelligence Note: Chinese Talent Programs

Chinese Talent Programs are a vital part of Chinese industry. Talent programs recruit experts to fill technical jobs that drive innovation and growth in China’s economy. National, provincial, and municipal talent recruitment programs provide opportunities for experts to work in industry and academic organizations supporting key areas deemed critical to China’s development. The talent programs recruit experts globally from businesses, industry, and universities with multiple incentives to work in China. Associating with these talent programs is legal and breaks no laws; however, individuals who agree to the Chinese terms must understand what is and is not legal under US law when sharing information. A simple download of intellectual property (IP) or proprietary information has the potential to become criminal activity.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBI Cyber Bulletin: Malware Targeting Foreign Banks

The FBI has obtained information regarding a malicious cyber group that has compromised the networks of foreign banks. The actors have exploited vulnerabilities in the internal environments of the banks and initiated unauthorized monetary transfers over an international payment messaging system. In some instances, the actors have been present on victim networks for a significant period of time. Contact law enforcement immediately regarding any activity related to the indicators of compromise (IOCs) in the attached appendix that are associated with this group.

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Russia, U.S. Special Operations Command, Ukraine

U.S. Army Special Operations Command Primer on Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine 2013-2014

This document is intended as a primer—a brief, informative treatment—concerning the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is an unclassified expansion of an earlier classified version that drew from numerous classified and unclassified sources, including key US Department of State diplomatic cables. For this version, the authors drew from open source articles, journals, and books. Because the primer examines a very recent conflict, it does not reflect a comprehensive historiography, nor does it achieve in-depth analysis. Instead, it is intended to acquaint the reader with the essential background to and course of the Russian intervention in Ukraine from the onset of the crisis in late 2013 through the end of 2014.

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Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Bulletin: Law Enforcement Vigilance and Caution Urged at Public and Political Events

This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide situational awareness concerning the domestic extremist threat to national public and political events. This JIB is provided by the FBI and DHS to support law enforcement in their respective activities and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and private sector security partners in deterring, preventing, or disrupting terrorist attacks against the United States.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBI Cyber Bulletin: Identification of Locky Ransomware

The ‘Locky’ malware is a ransomware variant, which has extensively utilized spam campaigns to distribute malicious files that download and execute code capable of encrypting numerous critical file types on both local and networked file stores. Encrypted files are renamed with a unique hexadecimal filename and receive the “.locky” extension. Each directory containing encrypted files contains instructions on how to utilize Bitcoin in order to pay a ransom for file recovery, and the system’s computer background is also changed to contain payment instructions. Recovery of encrypted files is impossible without data backup or acquisition of the private key due to the well-implemented, strong encryption. Historically, while payment of the ransom may result in receipt of the valid private key, enabling decryption of the targeted files, the FBI does not recommended the victim pay the ransom.

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U.S. Special Operations Command

United States Army Special Operations Command Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide

This guide is a quick reference of Unconventional Warfare (UW) theory, principles, and tactics, techniques and procedures. It is not a complete treatment of the subject. To guide further study, it includes (in annotated form) as many references as possible starting with established law, policy and doctrine, includes scientific studies, and finishes with recommended reading on the subject.

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Saudi Arabia, United States

Declassified 28 Pages From Congressional 9/11 Investigation

While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at least two of those individuals were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence officers. The Joint Inquiry’s review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of which has yet to be independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups. The FBI and CIA have informed the Joint Inquiry that, since the September 11 attacks, they are treating the Saudi issue seriously, but both still have only a limited understanding of the Saudi Government’s ties to terrorist elements. In their testimony, neither CIA nor FBI witnesses were able to identify definitively the extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBI Cyber Bulletin: United Cyber Caliphate Releases PII of U.S. Business Personnel Directory

As of 5 May 2016, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Sympathizer hacking group United Cyber Caliphate (UCC) defaced a Nigerian-hosted Web site, posting an html file containing the heading “USA Online Company Data Dumped by United Cyber Caliphate,” there was no other message or threat associated with the file. The file contained approximately 1,137 entries, many of which appeared to be US-based individuals with corresponding personally identifiable information (PII) fields such as name, company, e-mail, phone, city, state, and zip code. The PII was doxed from the personnel directory of a US business, according to FBI and open source reporting.

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