Interface volume 5 issue 1

Struggles, strategies and analysis of anticolonial and postcolonial social movements

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Photo credit: Adrian A. Smith is an activist-scholar and image maker based in Canada. His written and photographic work engages with law and resistance. Adrian teaches in legal studies and political economy and is a member of Justicia For Migrant Workers, an anti-capitalist activist collective which supports migrant worker struggles. The cover image is taken at a political demonstration on Parliament Hill in Ottawa. To see more of his work please visit www.adriansmith.ca.

About *Interface*

Interface: a journal for and about social movements is a peer-reviewed journal of practitioner research produced by movement participants and engaged academics. *Interface* is globally organised in a series of different regional collectives, and is produced as a multilingual journal. Peer-reviewed articles have been subject to double-blind review by one researcher and one movement practitioner.

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Struggles, strategies and analysis of anticolonial and postcolonial social movements

Aziz Choudry, Mandisi Majavu, Lesley Wood

As a political idea and a philosophical concept, postcolonialism has gained some level of popularity, particularly in academic circles. However, many grassroots activists and social movements from countries with colonial histories have not incorporated the concept in their vocabulary or political toolbox.   Yet besides the knowledge and analysis that they are producing in their own struggles, activists in some of these movements are paying renewed attention to the ideas of anti-colonial thinkers such as Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral, whose work calls into question the conceptual accuracy and appropriateness of the terms 'postcolonialism' and 'postcolonial' to describe the nature of the world today and the limits of liberation achieved. Theory building and critique is also coming from Indigenous scholars and activists (L.T. Smith, 1999; Venne, 2004; Jackson, 2004, 2007; Coulthard, 2011; Watson, 2007; A.Smith, 2005) and critical race feminists (Thobani, 2007) based in settler-colonial states such Australia, Canada, Aotearoa/New Zealand and the USA.

There may be many reasons for a less-than-enthusiastic embrace of the term 'postcolonial' by such social movements. One reason is that postcolonial theorists tend to use opaque academic jargon to discuss what some may consider to be commonplace concerns. Another may be, according to Dirlik (1994: 329), that the popularity of the concept 'postcolonial' has

> less to do with its rigorousness as a concept or with the new vistas it has opened up for critical inquiry than it does with the increased visibility of academic intellectuals of Third World origin as pacesetters in cultural criticism.

An example is that according to Henry Louis Gates Jr. (1991: 457), "Frantz Fanon has now been reinstated as a global theorist." This is partly because postcolonial theorists such as Homi Bhabha have made Fanon fashionable in global academic circles. Yet unlike those postcolonial critics who use Fanon to give their writings an element of authenticity and radicalism, many social movements are engaging with thinkers like Fanon and Cabral to search for liberating theory.

 Notwithstanding the insistence by some scholars that postcolonialism is not a temporal concept the term postcolonial remains, in part, a problematic concept because colonialism still exists, something which many movements are all too aware. Indian journalist and activist Chakravarthi Raghavan (1990), for example, described economic globalization through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT - now the World Trade Organization (WTO)) as 'recolonization' of the nominally independent states of the Third World.   This frame is quite common in both scholarly literature and activist networks in the

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Third World (Shiva, 1997; Bagchi, 2005; D'Souza, 2006) – although some, such as the late Eqbal Ahmed (interviewed in Barsamian, 2000) ask whether it is accurate to talk of recolonization when they question if there was ever 'decolonization' in any real sense of the word.

'Neo-colonialism' is also used to describe 21st century colonialism. According to Pan-Africanist and Ghanaian independence movement leader Kwame Nkrumah (1965), neo-colonialism occurs when a country's economic system and political policy is directed by outside forces. Although this direction can take various shapes, neo-colonialist control tends to be exercised through economic means. Radha D'Souza (2006) (see elsewhere in this issue) argues that the 'development project' is a post-war project of the elites, serving to reconstitute relations between the colonies and imperial powers and consolidate monopoly-finance capitalism, while also containing and undermining struggles against capitalism and imperialism.

In much of Africa, Latin America and Asia, neo-colonialism has manifested itself in the form of World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programmes during the past thirty years. At a macro-economic level, under neoliberalism, Faraclas (2001) sees the debt-driven model of colonialism imposed on the South through structural adjustment connected to the "repauperization of the North" (p.70). Eqbal Ahmad (2000) contended that for the most part, the structure of capitalism has not changed fundamentally, but that "its intensity and scope have" (p.113). Ahmad argues that globalization has changed neither the political nor economic reality of many Third World countries since the days of formal colonial rule. Rather, it is another phase of colonialism and imperialism. Ngati Kahungunu (Maori) lawyer Moana Jackson (1999 and 2007) argues that for Indigenous Peoples, in the global North and South, globalization is not a new phenomenon. As he (1999) puts it, "we are faced with a two-fold challenge, to struggle as best we can to deal with the immediate consequences of globalization. Secondly, and more difficult, to contextualize those problems within the 500-year-and-more history of the culture of colonization" (p. 105). Kelsey (1999) observes that conflicts between transnational corporations and Indigenous Peoples are rooted in colonization, with the former being new actors in an older, ongoing struggle for self-determination. "Yet", she argues, "power is also being transferred from the colonial state, which can be challenged at the very least on moral grounds…, to more remote international corporations whose sole responsibility is to their shareholders (p. 167).

As Jackson (1999 and 2007) and others (L. T. Smith, 1999; Venne, 2001; McNally, 2002; Bargh, 2007) have argued, key elements of modern-day neoliberalism – the commodification of peoples, of nature, and of social relations, the favouring of individual over collective rights, and indeed the forebears of some of its major beneficiaries, transnational corporations (in the form of charter colonizing companies such as the East India Company) are not new (Kelsey, 1999; McNally, 2002; D'Souza, 2006; M. Jackson, 2007).

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These dynamics play out in different forms across the world (McEwan 2001). In some contexts, neo-colonialism can be seen as an "arrested decolonization in the post-independence period" (Jeyifo 2007: 125). According to Edward Said (1989), poverty, underdevelopment, and various pathologies of power and corruption are some of the colonial legacies that characterise post-independent societies. "This mix of characteristics designated the colonized people who had freed themselves on one level but who remained victims of their past on another" (Said 1989: 207). Writing many years before, in the context of the liberation struggle against French colonial rule in Algeria, Fanon (1963) warned against the dangers and false liberation posed to newly independent territories by a bourgeois anticolonial nationalist elite describing its mission as being 'the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of neo-colonialism (152)

From land to water, to the corporate enclosure of nature through biotechnology and bioprospecting, Indigenous and other colonized peoples are at the forefront of both analysis of, and mobilizations against neoliberal capitalism which emphasize the way in which it commodifies everything, is fundamentally predicated on exploitation of people and nature, and embodies a colonial mindset. Richard Lee (2006) argues that the current prominence of indigenous social movements indicates a new global acceptance of Indigenous Peoples and the legitimacy of their claims. Lee (2006) adds that Indigenous Peoples use this global acceptance of their struggle to engage in 'the politics of embarrassment.'

> Land invasions, road blocks and guerrilla theatre, such as setting up an aboriginal tent camp on the lawn of the Australian parliament, send messages that official spin doctors find difficult to counter, the most eloquent of these being the ongoing Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas. (Lee 2006: 470)

The 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, and its subsequent articulation, transmitted worldwide via the Internet and other media, as an Indigenous Peoples' struggle rooted in resistance to centuries of colonial injustice now confronting the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)[1] and other neoliberal instruments also drew attention to the relationship between contemporary and older forms of imperialism (Gedicks, 2001; McNally, 2002; Flusty, 2004). Importantly, however, progressive organizations and movements, and the left in general have not always been inherently sympathetic or supportive of Indigenous Peoples' struggles for self-determination (Bedford and Irving, 2001; Churchill, 1983).

Indigenous Peoples' movements, in the global South and North, often express their resistance to this post-independence paradox, or assertions of sovereignty over their lands and lives by liberal social democracies, through struggles for

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[1] Free trade and investment agreement signed between Mexico, USA and Canada, which took effect on 1 January 1994.

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decolonization and self-determination or autonomy. The politics and the struggles of the Zapatistas are a well-documented example of how indigenous movements are grappling with these challenges in the 21st century. The Zapatistas' statements resonate with many Indigenous Peoples around the world when they argue that "more than 500 years of exploitation and persecution have not been able to exterminate us" (Subcomandante Marcos 2001: 75). Indigenous Peoples from diverse places like Australia, Aotearoa (New Zealand), Southern Africa and throughout the Americas can identify with that observation. Indigenous Peoples have in many cases been resisting corporate power, social and environmental destruction and militarization predicted as the scenario for the rest of the world under neoliberalism, for many years. For example, Dip Kapoor's work on Dalit and Adivasi struggles against mining and forestry 'development' in Orissa, India, and the knowledge produced within these movements is featured in this issue and elsewhere (Kapoor, 2013). To overlook, or underestimate the value of Indigenous Peoples' analyses and strategies of resistance in relation to capitalist globalization is to seriously constrain analysis and action to meaningfully transform the dominant economic, political and social order, locally and internationally.

Maori scholar Linda Smith (1999) highlights the way in which international indigenous networks with a colonial analysis of 'development' can offer and share alternatives to the dominant model. "The sharing of resources and information may assist groups and communities to collaborate with each other and to protect each other. The development of international protocols and strategic alliances can provide a more sustained critique of the practices of states and corporations." (p. 105). Burgmann and Ure (2004) suggest that in the context of the struggle for opponents of neoliberalism to theorize a convincing alternative, the contributions of Indigenous Peoples' struggles for self-determination are very useful. They assert that the practical critique of neoliberalism embodied in indigenous people's resistance to their incorporation into the global market is one informed by an often acute recognition of not only the global dimensions of such resistance but also an acknowledgement of anti-imperialist struggles stretching back over many hundreds of years (p. 57).

This has "enabled non-indigenous groups and movements to root their critique in an anti-capitalist perspective that emanates from non-Western sources" (p. 57). The authors argue that the desire for self-determination in the face of neoliberalism "often finds its most intense expression in indigenous struggles and that, as such, the role of indigenous peoples in struggles against neoliberalism has been crucially significant to its spread to other sectors of global society" (pp. 56-57).

 As new generations launch mobilizations with anti-colonial elements such as the Idle No More campaign in Canada, ongoing struggles for immigration justice in Europe as well as popular resistance movements in South Africa have illuminated the ongoing legacy of colonial injustice in different ways, the ideas of anti-colonial writers and activists such as Fanon and Cabral remain relevant. Younger movement activists and students – especially racialized people - are

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discovering their lives, works and struggles, sometimes for the first time in such work.

The current issue of *Interface* includes a number of articles that engage postcolonial scholarship and anticolonial critique to discuss various struggles happening in different parts of the world. Dip Kapoor's article explores the politics and the struggles of the Lok Adhikar Manch (LAM), a trans-local rural solidarity network of 15 social movements which include Adivasi (original dweller) and Dalit ("untouchable" out-castes) marginal and landless peasants, nomads, pastoralists, horticulturalists and fisherfolk, in Orissa, India. According to Kapoor, LAM is primarily located outside and against 'the state-market-civil society nexus'. LAM participants regard NGOs as subordinate partners in the state-corporate nexus. Kapoor points out that this nexus undermines anticolonial movements by constructing and deploying laws and institutions to 'legalise' and normalise displacement and dispossession. Simply put, "this article advances an anticolonial critique of post-colonial capitalist colonizations… exercised through a state-market-civil society nexus predominantly committed to the reproduction of a colonial capitalist-modernity/development."

In their article 'Fair Trade, neocolonial developmentalism, and racialized power relations', Ian Hussey and Joe Curnow explore ways in which North American fair traders reinforce racialized, neocolonial power relations between the between the Global South producers and Global North consumers. The authors argue that as Global North fair traders strive to "help" Global South producers, they re-entrench neocolonial narratives of white supremacy. Additionally, the article highlights the relationship between Fair Trade, commodity fetishism, and the developmentalist conception of space/time propagated by Fair Trade advocates.

It is important to note that the article does not suggest that "people involved in Fair Trade are intentionally racist or have bad intentions or that shopping for non-labeled products would be a better way of engaging in the world." Rather, the point is to highlight ways in which historical-geographical-material conditions shape the interaction between Global South producers and Global North consumers. as far as the authors are concerned, they "believe that the better we understand the ways the Fair Trade system and movement are shaped by and reproduce racialized, neocolonial power relations, the better able we can become to acknowledge and address them, so that we can strive toward anti-colonial relationships rooted in solidarity rather than help, charity, or developmentalism."

Julia Cantzler examines the neocolonial narratives of white supremacy in her article, which is called 'The Translation of Indigenous Agency and Innovation into Political and Cultural Power: The Case of Indigenous Fishing Rights in Australia.' This article underscores structural constraints that shape Indigenous-state relations in Australia. It does this by investigating the historical and contemporary conflict over Indigenous fishing rights in Australia. Further, the article argues that despite constraining legal and political obstacles,

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Indigenous Australians have been able to employ innovative strategies to achieve greater control over traditional aquatic resources on terms that are consistent with the values of Indigenous traditional laws and customs. By highlighting the discriminatory colonial legacies that continue to marginalise Indigenous Peoples and their aspirations within mainstream regulatory frameworks, this article "shines a light on these barriers and provides ammunition for those on both sides of the debate who seek to move beyond the past in order to construct more equal and bicultural blueprints for citizenship and governance in Australia."

In her article 'Starting from the Amazon: communication, knowledge and politics of place in the World Social Forum', Hilde Stephansen explores ways in which communication activists in Belém, Brazil, engaged with the 2009 World SocialForum and sought to make use of it for their own purposes. The logic that underpins the argument of the article is that although the WSF "has been conceived as an important site for the elaboration of alternative knowledge projects that can challenge dominant modes of thought, [it] is also criss-crossed by various axes of exclusion". Suggesting that one such axis relates to the role and status of place-based movements and their knowledges, and emphasising the centrality of place to the construction of alternative epistemological imaginaries that can contribute to decolonisation of knowledge, Stephansen analyses efforts of communication activists to facilitate autonomous knowledge production among movements in the Amazon. The article demonstrates that strengthening the capacity of "local" grassroots movements to communicate on their own terms is not simply a matter of enabling their inclusion within the "global" space of the WSF; rather, it is a matter of facilitating "the proliferation of alternative knowledge projects at different scales, within and beyond the social forum process".

The last article in the themed section of this issue of *Interface* comprises four short pieces discussing the legacy of Frantz Fanon for theory, education and action. A collaboration between Aziz Choudry, David Austin, Radha D'Souza, and Sunera Thobani, the article brings together personal, political and intellectual reflections on a series of themes and issues raised by or in relation to Fanon's writing. Each contributor was asked, "In what context did you first encounter Fanon and how did it impact you?" In addition to thinking together about these questions, each contributor also provides her/his own analysis of Fanon's writing and its legacy.

In addition to the themed section, this issue includes a number of articles that highlight the drawbacks and roadblocks to movement success. Cynthia Cockburn article, "A movement stalled: outcomes of women's campaigns for equalities and inclusion in the Northern Ireland peace process," revisits feminist activists in Northern Ireland who contributed to the peace process in the 1990s by developing a framework that envisioned a transformed society, one rid of the inequities of a colonial past and sought to address the poverty, disadvantage and exclusion afflicting the working class of both Catholic and Protestant communities. Twenty years later, her interviews reveal that these activists are

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deeply disappointed with the progress towards their earlier vision, and explores how policy work and institution building did not achieve intended goals. M. Dawn King's article, " The Role of Societal Attitudes and Activists' Perceptions on Effective Judicial Access for the LGBT Movement in Chile" explores by LGBT activists don't make greater access of the judicial system and finds that perceptions of widespread homophobia by these activists helps to explain their strategy. King argues that understanding the role of culture in movement strategy can allow us to transcend our understandings of legal opportunity.

Paul Sneed's piece "Infotainment and encounter in the pacification of Rocinha favela" uses anthropological analysis of 'dark tourism', concepts of relational philosophy, and auto-ethnography to show how 'infotainment' based approaches to learning that are intended to support movements, can inflict further violence by turning people and their suffering into objects, in contrast to "encounter"-based learning, in which people meet in dialogue, mutuality, reciprocity, and community.

Mark Stoddart and Howard Ramos' piece "Going local: Calls for local democracy and environmental governance at Jumbo Pass and the Tobeatic Wilderness Area," also highlights the role of perception on movement strategy, showing that Canadian environmentalists highlighted the 'local' aspects of their campaign because of the scale of the environmental problem, a perceived exclusion from environmental governance, and the potential for successful mobilization in the local context. We're also delighted to include a roundtable on radical publishing by Anna Feigenbaum and Stevphen Shukaitis.

Tomás Mac Sheoin's lengthy but satisfying special contribution on media framing of the anti-globalization movement will be an invaluable resource for those interested in the patterns and research surrounding this question. He reviews and consolidates the empirical evidence presented in the literature, showing the ways that the media dismiss and marginalize the anti-globalization movement and the implications of this framing for mobilization.

This issue includes reviews of the following books: Raúl Zibechi's *Territories in resistance: a cartography of Latin American social movements* (Colleen Hackett); Peter Dwyer and Leo Zeilig's *African struggles today: social movements since independence* (Jonny Keyworth); Roderick Bush's *The end of white supremacy: Black internationalism and the problem of the color line: from monocultural mestizaje to multiculturalism* (Hleziphi Naomie Nyanungo); Jean Muteba Rahier's (ed.), *Black social movements in Latin America* (Mandisi Majavu); and Christian Scholl's *Two sides of a barricade: (dis)order and summit protest in Europe* (Ana Margarida Esteves) and Alice Te Punga Somerville's *Once were Pacific: Māori connections to Oceania* (Ella Henry).

Finally, we draw your attention to the call for contributions to the May 2014 issue of *Interface* on the theme *The Pedagogical Practices of Social Movements*. The editors of this special issue will be Sara C Motta and Ana Margarida Esteves. The call for papers follows this editorial.

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Call for papers vol 6 issue 1 (May 2014)
The pedagogical practices of social movements
Sara C Motta and Ana Margarida Esteves

The May 2014 issue of the open-access, online, copyleft academic/activist journal *Interface: a Journal for and about Social Movements* (http://www.interfacejournal.net/) invites contributions on the theme of *The Pedagogical Practices of Social Movements*.

The pedagogical, understood as knowledge practices and learning processes, often takes a pivotal role in the emergence, development and sustainability of social movements and community struggles. In this issue of Interface we seek to explore the pedagogical practices of movements by expanding our understanding of knowledge and how movements learn beyond solely a focus on the cognitive to the ethical, spiritual, embodied and affective. Our aim is to systematize and document these practices and to provide conceptual, methodological and practical resources for activists, community educators and movement scholars alike.

Pedagogical practices can constitute important elements in the process of unlearning dominant subjectivities, social relationships, and ways of constituting the world and learning new ones. They can be central in the 'how' of movement construction and community building in spaces such as workshops, teach-ins, and through popular education. They can contribute to the building of sustainable and effective social movements through music, storytelling, ritual or through processes that surround strategy building, the sharing of experiences or simply friendship. They can help activists and organizers to learn through their participation in counter-hegemonic, grassroots initiatives such as community banks, local currencies and workers cooperatives. They can also be important aspects of movement relevant research.

In this special issue of *Interface* we ask the broad question, 'What role do pedagogical practices have in the praxis of social movements and their struggle for political change and social transformation?' The practices we would like to explore include formal methodologies such as Open Spaces for Dialogue and Enquiry (OSDE), participatory action research, as well as methodologies of popular and community education inspired by feminist, Freirean, post-colonial and Gramscian approaches, among others, but also the more informal pedagogical practices which remain under-conceptualized and theorized and which include the role of the affective, the embodied (the body and earth for example) and the spiritual.

However, we also understand the politics and dynamics of movement and community education and learning to be contested terrain. We see how mainstream institutions and actors have co-opted the language and methods of popular education and movement methodologies. These processes of co-

optation often neutralize their radical and political potential. We also understand that social movements often end up reproducing, through these practices, inequalities based on factors such as class, gender, race/ethnicity, educational level, expertise and role within movement organizations. Therefore, we would be very interested in receiving contributions based on "insider" knowledge about power dynamics behind knowledge production and learning within social movements (i.e. relationship between experts and non-experts, leaders and other members, impact of gender, class, race, educational level and expertise), and how such power dynamics determine whose "voices" end up being represented in the process and outcome of knowledge production and learning, and whose voices end up being silenced.

Among the more specific questions we would like to address in the issue are:

- What learning processes and knowledge practices are developed by movements?

- What is the role of formal methodologies and pedagogies in movement praxis?

- What is the role of informal pedagogies of everyday practice in the building of movements, the development of their political projects and fostering their sustainability and effectiveness?

- What is the role of the affective, embodied and spiritual in learning processes?

- What is the role of ethics in movement learning?

- What is the role of counter-hegemonic economic practices, such as those classified as "Solidarity Economy", in learning processes within social movements?

- In what way do activist researchers contribute to the learning of movements?

- What politics of knowledge underlie the politics of social movements?

- Do the processes of 'alternative' education within social movements and collective struggles transform, disrupt or replicate hegemonic social relations?

- What pedagogical and political insights can be gleaned from exploring education for mobilization and social change?

We are very happy to receive contributions that reflect on these questions and any others relevant to the special issue theme and that fit within the journal's mission statement (http://www.interfacejournal.net/who-we-are/mission-statement/).

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In this context, we welcome contributions by movement participants and academics who are developing movement-relevant theory and research. Our goal is to include material that can be used in a range of ways by movements — in terms of its content, its language, its purpose and its form. We thus seek work in a range of different formats, such as conventional (refereed) articles, review essays, facilitated discussions and interviews, action notes, teaching notes, key documents and analysis, book reviews — and beyond. Both activist and academic peers review research contributions, and other material is sympathetically edited by peers. The editorial process generally is geared towards assisting authors to find ways of expressing their understanding, so that we all can be heard across geographical, social and political distances.

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Trans-local rural solidarity and an anticolonial politics of place: Contesting colonial capital and the neoliberal state in India

Dip Kapoor

Abstract

Lok Adhikar Manch (LAM), a nascent trans-local rural solidarity network of 15 social movements or struggles in South Orissa including Adivasi (original dweller) and Dalit ("untouchable" out-castes) marginal and landless peasants, nomads, pastoralists, horticulturalists and fisherfolk in defence and affirmation of place-based ruralities (Zibechi, 2005) and enduring histories, advance a critique of post-colonial capitalist colonizations (Sankaran, 2009; Sethi, 2011) and a global/national coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000; Mignolo, 2000) exercised through a state-market-civil society nexus predominantly committed to the reproduction of a capitalist-modernity / development. LAM also identifies productive directions for anticolonial movements addressing capital, given the predominance of current capitalist colonizations.

The emergent analysis is instructive for parallel and amplifying activisms cognizant of the significance of an anticolonial politics of place against and beside the dominant cartesian-capitalist colonial conception of global space as terra nullius or as space emptied of histories, peoples and cultures and subsequently free for capital to exploit. Place-based rural anticolonial movements "as bearers of other worlds" (Zibechi and Ryan, 2012: 12) contest the process of capitalist accumulation typified by rural displacement and accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003), subsequently problematizing death of the peasantry (and other rural social groups, communal and indigenous modalities subsumed under and/or erased by this term) prognostications predicated upon Europe's experience with the enclosure movement and then proferred (by simple extension from the metropole outwards) as the inevitable fate of the contemporary global rural experience in all locations touched by capital.

Introduction: Coloniality, capitalism and rural anticolonial social movements/struggles

The complexity, peculiarity and differences of societies fragmented by colonization and neocolonization (postcolonial colonization) and related social struggles are not entirely comprehensible through European and North American social histories of working/peasant class cultures and movements. With reference to the Latin American experience and the trajectory of the *seringueiros* (rubber tappers in Brazil's Amazon forests) for instance, Raul

Zibechi (2005: 17-18) notes how new subjects emerge by instituting new territorialities, as Indians and landless peasants engage in prolonged struggles to create or broaden their spaces by seizing millions of hectares from estates or landowners or consolidating the spaces they already had (as in the case of indigenous/Indian communities) by recovering control over their own communities. He also observes that the "new urban poor movements are in tune with the indigenous and landless movements (and are in fact living through what rural movements have already experienced), operating with a very different logic from that of narrow interest-based worker associations" (2005: 18). Their political subjectivity is determined by its subordination to capital, i.e., as new urban occupants (*asentados*) they create forms of organization closely tied to territory while relying on assemblies of all the people in the urban settlement (*asentameinto*) to decide on the most important issues. The anti-systemic disposition and militancy of these movements is made possible by their partial control over the re/production of their living conditions (also see *Interface, 2012, Volume 4, issue 2* and the related question of wider movements of labour raised by Dae-Oup Chang with respect to urban workers' movements in the East Asian development context and similar deliberations in this issue around crucial questions facing workers' movements in the 21st century).

The revolt against capitalism and imperialism has much to learn and understand from these new urban-poor movements and social activism contesting colonial relations and accumulation by dispossession in rural geographies (Guha, 2001; Sarkar, 2000; Zibechi and Ryan, 2012) or "subaltern and indigenous mobilizations, their articulation with new and old political traditions, their amalgamation of democracy and collective interests and their simultaneous deployment of reform, insurgency and rebellion". This is what Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos Mariategui described in the 1920s "as the fruit of confluence between socialist objectives and indigenous political traditions and struggles" (Renique, 2005: 9) and Anibal Quijano references as the "anti-colonial ideological flags (*of the indigenous communities*) vis-a-vis both the national problem and democracy" (2005: 73). That said, there are significant differences between indigenous concepts like the communal and leftist notions of the commons and communes; differences that need to be acknowledged or by reading them from "within leftist and European logics, we perpetuate forms of violence and coloniality that indigenous movements have been fighting against" (Walter Mignolo http://turbulence.org.uk/turbulence-5/decolonial/). Indian leader Fausto Reynaga (1906-1994), an admirer of Karl Marx whom he called 'the genius Moor', drew clear lines between the project of the Bolivian left influenced by Marx's *Communist Manifesto* and his book on *The Indigenous Revolution* wherein the indigenous revolution is against western civilization as such, including the left which originated in the west, while Marxist revolution confronts the bourgeoisie from the perspective and interests of the working class and proposes a struggle within western civilization (a critical colonial analytic reminiscent of the works of Aime Césaire and Frantz Fanon, who for instance recognized the complicity of the European working class with the bourgeoisie "in their support of racism, imperialism and colonialism" Kelley,

2000:24), i.e., according to Walter Mignolo (referenced above), perhaps it is more accurate to speak of an indigenous de-colonial as opposed to an indigenous left. This political analytic is apparent in the contemporary context as indicated in a statement on land redistribution by the world's largest network of peasant and indigenous organizations, Via Campesina, which says, "No reform is acceptable that is based only on land redistribution. We believe that the new agrarian reform *must include a cosmic vision of the territories of* communities of peasants, the landless, indigenous peoples...who base their work on the production of food and who maintain a relationship of respect with Mother Earth and the oceans" (Available at: http://www.viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/agrarian-reform-mainmenu-36/165-final-declaration.)

In keeping with this line of analysis, it is generally understood that rural and indigenous anticolonial movements, with their respective contextual specificities and historical variations, have germinated in relation to a system of power which began to form five centuries ago and has become (variously) globally hegemonic since the 18th century--a global coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000; 2005: 56-57) defined by:

a) a new system of social domination built around the idea/foundation of 'race' (a modern European mental construct bearing no relation to previous reality) and racialization of relations between European colonizers and the colonized in order to normalize the social relations of domination created by conquest and the new system of capitalist exploitation;
b) the formation of a new system of exploitation (capitalism) which connects in a single combined structure all the historical forms of control of work and exploitation (slavery, servitude, simple commodity production, reciprocity, capital) to produce for the capitalist world market--a system in which a racialized division of labour and control of resources of production is foundational; and
c) a new system of collective authority centreed around the hegemony of the state or a system of states with populations classified in racial terms as "inferior" being excluded from the formation and control of the system.

In relation to the global coloniality of power and the foundational character of race (and racialization), according to Frantz Fanon (1963: 32), "When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies, the economic sub-structure is also a superstructure and the cause is a consequence." Stuart Hall (1980: 320) takes this further when explaining why pre-capitalist modes of production (e.g. slavery) persisted despite the emergence of industrial capitalism, i.e., what he alludes to as "an articulation between different modes of production, structured

in some relationship of dominance", given that the latter continues to benefit from older forms of exploitation (e.g. global coloniality and the racialized relationship between pre- and capitalist modes of production made evident in Adivasi/marginal rural-dweller ways of existence and the hegemony of the capitalist state in India and the selective imposition of modernization and capitalist development on the former). A racial project includes an effort to restructure the political economies of subordinate races in an effort to siphon, divert, destroy and selectively re-integrate resources along particular racial lines, subsequently helping to create and/or reproduce racialized relations (and associated essentialized race categories). As Fanon (1963:76) suggested, "Europe is literally the creation of the Third World...an opulence that has been fuelled by the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians and the yellow races". Others (Alavi, 1972; Galeano, 1972; Rodney, 1982) have demonstrated how the economies of the colonized were restructured to produce the requisite imbalance necessary for the growth of European industry and capitalism; a unique characteristic of modern European capitalist colonialism as distinguished from earlier pre-capitalist colonialisms.

In the latest round of colonial capitalist globalization, it is peasants (landless/marginal), indigenous peoples, nomads and pastoralists and fisher-folk belonging to racially marginalized social classes, groups and ethnicities (e.g. see -http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/omo-local-tribes-under-threat) that continue to be disproportionately targeted in the global South. For instance, "this period has witnessed a vast expansion of bourgeois land rights... through a global land grab unprecedented since colonial times...as speculative investors now regard 'food as gold' and are acquiring millions of hectares of land in the global South" (Araghi and Karides, 2012: 3); a process that has explicitly targeted these racially marginalized social classes/groups/ethnicities on a global scale (GRAIN, 2012) and in India (Menon and Nigam, 2007; Patnaik and Moyo, 2011). According to an Oxfam (2011) study some 227 million hectares--an area the size of Western Europe--has been sold or leased in the decade since 2001, mostly to international investors, the bulk of these taking place over the last two years alone (e.g. in Africa 125 million acres have been grabbed by rich countries for outsourcing agricultural production). International development aid (e.g. see- http://www.waronwant.org/about-us/extra/extra/inform/17755-the-hunger-games) is implicated in the process of dispossession of small and marginal peasants (including land grabs) through private-public partnerships (DfID (UK government's Department for International Development)-Monsanto, Unilever, Syngenta, Diageo, SABMiller) which continue to extend the power of TNC agri-business in agriculture in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean and exacerbate global inequality.

In the Indian context more specifically, the global coloniality of power was first realized under British colonization in the 1880s and the detribalization and de-peasantization or restrictions of tribal/subaltern rights over land and forest through the various Forest Rights Acts reducing them to encroachers on their own territories (Davis, 2002; Guha, 1997). In the post-independence period, the reproduction of this power has relied on an internal political-economic class

and caste elite (Alavi, 1972) who are not "white" nor "European" (Fanon's, (1963), warning in the African context) but are none-the-less associated with a global bourgeoisie (and civil society) "whose hegemony is European and white" (Quijano, 2005: 58). Subsequently, rural subaltern anticolonial movements and rebellions were faced with the daunting challenge of addressing what Ranajit Guha (2001: 11) identified, as the "double articulation" where dominance is predicated on two types of governance. One was by the British and the other by the Indian class-caste elites, as Hamza Alavi (1972) also noted in his analysis of the complicity of internal class elites and external western and corporate interests in continuing to perpetuate underdevelopment and colonial control in the postcolonial period. This remains the case today as the "double articulation" ties the politics of the local (national) to the global (international, colonial, imperial) and the old and new agents of the globalization of a colonial capitalism, i.e., "the colonial experience has outlived decolonization and continues to be related significantly to the concerns of our time (Guha, 2001: 41-42). Or, in the words of a Kondh Adivasi activist from the Niyamgiri Bachao Andolan (NBA) contesting Vedanta/Sterlite's (UK) bauxite mining project in Lanjigarh, Orissa, "We know all our problems today are because of colonialism (*samrajyobad*) and capitalism (*punjibad*) and these MNCs, NGOs, DfID/UK and the government are its forces" (L, NBA activist, interview notes, February, 2011). Adivasis and Dalits constitute 22 per cent of the population in Orissa while accounting for 42 per cent of Development Displaced Peoples (DDPs in state terminology) while Adivasi alone account for 40 per cent of DDPs at a national level (Fernandes, 2006: 113). The liberalization of agriculture has meant land and seed grabs (for example, Monsanto currently has patent control over 90 percent of the cotton seed supply in the country) and the neoliberal agro-industrial model approach continues to decimate peasants in India as the corresponding debt burdens have prompted some 198,000 to 250,000 farmer suicides since 1998 and up to 2008 and beyond (over a third clearly attributed to being debt-driven), based on different estimates (Patnaik and Moyo, 2011: 40).

Caste and tribe together impose an institutionalized system of discrimination and oppression (often based on pollution-purity divides and constructions of barbarism/primitives on the margins of civilization), potentially intensifying the foundation of racial discrimination and exploitation which continues to justify the redirection, redistribution and reorganization (in the interests of class-caste-urban-industrial dominance) and the destruction (via displacement and dispossession), of the material base and relations of so-called backward and polluted peoples or 'untouchables' in the interests of an Indian conception of Eurocentric-progress and modernization first imposed under British rule. Scheduled Tribes/Adivasis and Scheduled Castes/Dalits (in state parlance) and rural subalterns in India continue to experience the "colonial difference" (Mignolo, 2000: 7) and the global coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000), as the Indian state simultaneously works to establish alliances with metropolitan colonial powers (a process that has been accelerated since the adoption of the New Economic Policy or neoliberalism in 1991) while deploying an internal

colonial politics (Alavi, 1972; Guha, 1997; 2001) towards Adivasis and Dalits.

This is expressed in the words of a Kondh Adivasi elder from the east coast state of Orissa (the research context for this paper) who says, "We fought the British thinking that we will be equal in the independent India" (interview, January 2007). According to a Dalit leader, "where we live, they call this area *adhusith* (akin to a pest infestation) ... we are condemned to the life of the *ananta paapi* (eternal sinners), as *colonkitha* (dirty/black/stained), as *ghruniya* (hated and despised)" (interview, February 2007). An estimated 150 million semi-nomadic or nomadic tribes belonging to some 400 groups are still criminalized, harassed and humiliated by dominant society and the agencies of the state under the De-Notified and Nomadic Tribes Act, which replaced the Criminal Tribes Act devised by the British colonialists and is used to similar effect (Munshi, 2012). The Dilip Singh Bhuria Commission's Report (2000-01) unequivocally concluded that the state, which is supposed to protect tribal interests as per Constitutional guarantees, has contributed to their exploitation through the location of industries and other development projects in tribal areas which are rich in natural resources. It estimated that 40 percent of related displacement of 9 to 20 million people is accounted for by tribals alone (quoted in Munshi, 2012: 4) while some 75 per cent were still awaiting "rehabilitation" at the turn of the century (Bharati, 1999: 20). The colonial mentality and neoliberal response of the current class-caste elites towards these occurrences has been described as follows:

> There is no understanding of communities as the subjects of dislocation or ways of life that are destroyed. There is an abyss of incomprehension on the part of the Indian elites toward rural and tribal communities. Ripping them out from lands that they have occupied for generations and transplanting them overnight in to an alien setting (which is the best they can expect) is understood as rehabilitation and liberation from *their backward ways of life* (Menon and Nigam, 2007: 72-73).
>
> ... they are presented as inhabiting a series of local spaces across the globe that, marked by the label "social exclusion" , lie outside the *normal civil society*... their route back is through the willing and active transformation of themselves to conform to the discipline of the market (Cameron and Palan, 2003: 148)

These processes of colonial exploitation and capitalist accumulation by dispossession (including CPI(M)-led ex-Left Front governments in Bengal where recent land reforms under their watch, according to one estimate, have been accompanied by an increase of 2.5 million landless peasants--Banerjee, 2006:4719), exacerbated since the adoption of the New Economic Policy in 1991 (neoliberalism), continue to be contested across the country (Baviskar, 2005a, 2005b; Da Costa, 2009; Martinez-Alier, 2003; McMichael, 2010; Mehta, 2009; Menon & Nigam, 2007; Nixon, 2011; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Pimple & Sethi, 2005; Prasad, 2004; Sundar, 2007) and in the state of Orissa (IPTEHR, 2006; Kapoor, 2011a; www.miningzone.org; Munshi, 2012; Padel & Das, 2010;

www.sanhati.org), prompting one observer to note that these struggles are "moving from resistance to resurgence...reaffirming of tribal self, recapturing the control over resources, reclaiming political domain, and redefining development" (Prabhu, 1998: 247).

This paper advances an anticolonial critique of post-colonial capitalist colonizations (Sankaran, 2009; Sethi, 2011; Goonatilake, 2006) and a global/national coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000; Mignolo, 2000) exercised through a state-market-civil society nexus predominantly committed to the reproduction of a colonial capitalist-modernity/development. The critique is developed by a trans-local solidarity network (Da Costa, 2007) of Adivasi and Dalit marginal and landless peasants, nomads, pastoralists, horticulturalists and fisherfolk social movements and organizations in defence and affirmation of ruralities collectively referred to as the Lok Adhikar Manch (LAM), a network of 15 rural movement organizations and a nascent trans-local solidarity formation in the state (see Table 1). LAM (collectively and/or as specific network participants) also identifies productive directions for parallel and amplifying activisms cognizant of the significance of an anticolonial politics of place against and beside the dominant cartesian-capitalist colonial conception of global space as terra nullius, or as space emptied of histories, peoples and cultures and subsequently free for capital to exploit.

In terms of social movement cartographies and locations, the critique put forward by LAM problematizes (and distinguishes itself from) civil society movements and actors (e.g. NGO-led movements or mainly urban, middle-class/bourgeois ecology, human rights, civic responsibility, anti-corruption movements), including industrial/labour movements and medium-large farmer/agricultural movements (with feudal-capitalist and caste-specific interests) working within capitalist, modern time-space teleologies. In keeping with Zibechi's (2005; 2012) observations, numerous rural, subaltern and indigenous social action formations offer new insights and strategic possibilities in relation to social movement activism and the revolt against capitalist colonizations (Guha, 2001; Sarkar, 2000). Summarily dismissed or trivialized as scattered militant particularities (*read as*: politically impotent) only consumed with the politics of daily survival and the mundane and subsequently incapable of understanding the macro-politics of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003:168) or as a politics of localism that does not seek capture of the bourgeois state towards revolutionary ends and hence referenced as "anti-Marxist new populist postmodernist movements" (Brass, 2007: 584), such left-ideological positions fail to acknowledge or dodge a politics and a burgeoning critical indigenist anticolonial literature (Alfred, 2011; Bargh, 2007; Grande, 2004; Meyer and Alvarado, 2010; Smith, 2012) aimed at the coloniality of power which implicates the colonial projects (despite their variations and specificities around social/distributive and productive commitments) of both European Marxism and capitalism as externally-imposed alien developmentalisms (replete with the use of development/state-market sponsored violence to secure compulsory industrialization and modernization) (Kapoor, 2011a). Thus the class-warfare of the enclosure movement in Europe is erroneously equated and

conflated with similar processes of accumulation by dispossession in the (post) colonies or in indigenous contexts where the coloniality of power and the racialization of political-economic and socio-cultural relations understandably remains a primary ethico-political preoccupation. Similarly, indigenous, rural and peasant consciousness in colonial societies have also been dismissed by the dominant European (-centered) scholarship on the subject (arguably yet another act of colonial erasure) as being pre-political, automatic/natural phenomena or irrational/mad politics (Jesson, 1999). Hence "the insurgency is considered some thing external to peasant consciousness, and the Cause is presented as a ghost of Reason" (Ranajit Guha quoted in Zibechi, 2012: 61). This colonial position is exposed or at the very least problematized by the likes of LAM's political articulations. A case in point on a global scale, the indigenous and peasant movement of movements, Via Campesina (or *the peasant way*) came into being in 1993, a year before a similar dismissal in Eric Hobsbawm's publication of the *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World 1914-1991*. Paying attention to fallible rural movements and constituencies engaged in networks such as LAM is politically instructive and revealing given the magnitude of the existential crisis being confronted in these rural locations, if not their historical and contemporary experience with an anti/colonial politics now being waged in relation to capital over forests, land, water-bodies and ways of being (Kapoor, 2011a).

The insights and propositions advanced in this paper are based on: (a) the author's association with Adivasi, Dalit and landless/displaced peoples in the state of Orissa, India since the early 1990s; (b) a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada funded participatory action research (PAR) (Kapoor, 2011b) initiative between 2006-2009/10 (which derived its direction from several previous localized PAR efforts addressing forest, land and agricultural concerns and maturing political and organized assertions over time) contributing towards and simultaneously developing knowledge about social movement learning in Adivasi/Dalit movements in south Orissa; and (c) specific research assignments (e.g. collective examination of civil society/NGO-rural movement political relations with LAM--see Kapoor, 2013) conducted by the Centre for Research and Development Solidarity (CRDS), a rural Adivasi/Dalit people's organization that was established with the help of SSHRC funds in 2005/06.

Anticolonial movement analysis of colonial capitalist development and rural displacement and dispossession

Ranajit Guha (1989) suggests that the Raj never achieved hegemony and was based on coercion and a facade of legality and that the end of the universalizing tendency of bourgeois culture, based on the colonial expansion of capital, finds its limit in colonialism. That is to say that post/colonial capitalist development has relied primarily on violence and coercion, backed by a legalism embedded in colonial relations, to dispossess subalterns. According to LAM's manifesto [people's statement]:

> More than at any other point of time in our lives as traditional communities, today we feel pressurized and pushed hard to give up our ways and systems and give way to unjust intrusions by commercial, political and religious interests for their development and domination (*shemano koro prabhavo abom unathi*). We have been made to sacrifice, we have been thrown out throughout history by these dominant groups and forces for their own comfort and for extending their way of life while we have been made slaves, servants and subordinates (*tolualoko*). (LAM Statement, field notes, April 2009)

> We are gathered here today as Adivasi, Dalit and peasant and fisher folk, as people of nature.... We are also burnable [expendable] communities.... With the help of the big companies and industrialists and multinationals, the state and central governments want to continue to exploit our natural resources to the maximum and we know what this means for us. (Field notes, April 2009) They have the power of *dhana* (wealth) and *astro-shastro* (armaments). They have the power of *kruthrima ain* (artificial laws and rules)--they created these laws just to maintain their own interests ... (Dalit leader, interview notes, February 2007). Today the *sarkar* (government) is doing a great injustice (*anyayo durniti*)... and the way they have framed laws around land-holding and distribution, we the poor are being squashed and stampeded into each other's space and are getting suffocated (*dalachatta hoi santholito ho chonti*). This creation of inequality (*tara tomyo*) is so widespread and so true, we see it in our lives" (Kondh Adivasi leader, interview notes, January 2007).

"The advance made by the 18th century shows itself in this, that the law itself becomes now the instrument of the theft of people's land" (Karl Marx quoted in Menon and Nigam:61). "As a matter of fact, the methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic. ... Capital comes [into the world] dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt" (Karl Marx quoted in Whitehead, 2003:4226). Colonial capitalist development is recognized by LAM as violence against nature and people (Kapoor, 2011a). This violence is directly inflicted on Adivasis and Dalits by the state-corporate nexus or encouraged through inciting and dividing rural subalterns.

> We have people here from Maikanch who know how the state police always act for the industrialists and their friends in government who want to see bauxite mines go forward in Kashipur against our wishes, even if it meant shooting three of our brothers; we have people here from Kalinganagar where Dalits and Adivasis are opposing the Tata steel plant and there too, 13 of us were gunned down by police...many people have been killed by the state and industrialist mafias (Field notes, April 2009)

In relation to Kalinganagar, police fired on unarmed protesters on 2 January 2006 and the same incident involved the macabre spectacle of the return of six Adivasi killed by police whose hands were dismembered (see related coverage at www.sanhati.org). Similarly, four anti-POSCO protesters were allegedly killed

by police in a bomb blast on March 4, 2013 (POSCO project land acquisition
was re-commenced in Dhinkia panchayat, Gobindpur village) while the police
claim that they were blown up by a bomb being made by the victims themselves;
a public statement made by Jagatsinghpur Superintendent of police prior to
police personnel even making a site visit or investigating the incident (The
Hindu, Bhubaneswar edition, March 11, 2013). Similarly, in the case of Chilika
andolan (movement):

> ...there were some 5000 of us when they fired, I too was one of the 12 injured
> (pointing to scar) but I never spoke up for fear of police reprisals. I have endured
> my lot in poverty and silence and could not get treated...even in Chilika, after
> Tatas got shut down by the Supreme Court decision because they violated the
> Coastal Regulation Zone with their aquaculture project, their mafias came and
> destroyed people's fishing boats...it seems we act non-violently and use the law
> and the courts but they always respond with customary violence and break their
> own laws. (Focus group notes, February 2008)

As shared by several LAM activists (e.g. struggles related to Niyamgiri,
Kalinganagar, Kashipur, Dhinkia/Gobindpur etc.) violence is evident not just
through these specific spectacles (obvious displays) but on a daily basis.
Operation Green Hunt launched by the Indian government in November 2009,
ostensibly in pursuit of Maoists/Naxalites, has meant the constant surrounding
presence, pressure and interference by para-military and police in the daily lives
of villagers, as has the similar presence of corporate and political-party mafia
hired to wear down people and opposition to mining/industrial projects in
multiple locations. The constant stress of armed force in close quarters to (or
within) civilian areas is a more invasive strategy than the shooting and beating
spectacles at sites of protest. The Adivasi/Dalit recourse to human rights in this
regard (Kapoor, 2012), which for many in the west has emerged as "the sole
language of resistance to oppression and emancipation in the Third World"
(Rajagopal, 2003: 172), is of questionable utility in such instances of
development repression and market/economic violence as "human rights
discourse is not based on a theory of non-violence but approves certain forms of
violence (justified violence) and disapproves other forms" (Rajagopal, 2003:
174). Economic/market violence responsible for displacement and
dispossession is an example of justified violence explained away as a social cost
of capitalist development as colonialism and imperialism are not necessarily
problems for international law and human rights which assume imperialism
(Williams, 2010).

Where LAM actors have been successful in using the law and/or human rights
claims, one of the state-corporate responses has been to move to block these
"legal openings" available to movements. This is done by: (a) re-opening the
Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution (Panchayat Extension to
Scheduled Areas or PESA Act) which have been used successfully to defend
Adivasi rights in Scheduled Areas (e.g. Samatha Judgement); (b) de-notifying

Scheduled Tribes and having them re-categorized as Other Backward Classes who cannot make the same Constitutional claims as Tribes/Adivasi in protected areas (as has happened with Jhodia and Paroja tribes in South Orissa to facilitate land acquisition around the Kashipur UAIL mining project); and (c) nullifying court decisions by passing new Bills (e.g. after the success of the Chilika movements against Tata's aquaculture project in the 1990s as the Orissa High Court decision to ban aquaculture in the Coastal Regulation Zone/CRZ followed by a Supreme Court decision which upheld the same, industry lobbied the state to pass an Aquaculture Authority Bill in 1997 that makes aquaculture permissible within the CRZ).

The state-corporate nexus has, according to LAM participants, also relied on instigating conflict among Adivasi and Dalit or between Dalits and other subordinate caste groups to weaken the prospects for subaltern rural solidarity against developmental imperatives. Some recent examples cited in this context included the *Jungle, Jal, Jameen Hamara* (forest-water-land is ours/for Adivasi alone) campaign asserting Tribal/Adivasi rights in Scheduled Areas post-B.D.Sharma recommendations, instigating Adivasi-on-Dalit violence and a climate of suspicion, as Dalit were scapegoated (directly and indirectly by state departments and NGOs engaged in FRA-related popular education and the Bharat Jan Andolan) as usurpers of these Adivasi rights despite the long-standing Adivasi-Dalit relationship in forested regions of Orissa. The infamous case of the village of Mandrabaju in Mohana Block underscored what this meant as an entire Dalit village took shelter in the Mohana Tehsildar's office (magistrate-level revenue officer) for two years and then mysteriously disappeared without any official explanation for what had transpired. Similar violence was unleashed by Hindu religious right party-political groups and local cadres over Christmas (celebrated mainly by Dalit/Panos and some Adivasi Christians) in the Kandhamal region of South Orissa in 2007. This violence continued well into 2008 (August) with some 40,000 Dalits fleeing the area, while 25,000 were eventually sheltered in relief camps after a long overdue response from the BJD-BJP coalition government at the time, the latter party being known for its Hindu-right credentials. This alleged Adivasi-Dalit communal conflict was analyzed and discussed by ADEA movement activists as being a corporate land grab orchestrated with the assistance of Kondh Adivasis, given that the land in this region produces a unique (lucrative) variety of turmeric and was being considered for the establishment of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) (as per the SEZ Act of 2005, a key neoliberal intervention) at the insistence of a major Indian grocery retail corporation. According to these activists, given the growing resistance to SEZs, the state-corporate nexus is allegedly not beyond experimenting with other methods to displace subalterns who are in the way of capitalist development   (Prasant and Kapoor, 2010:203-205).

> There is communal conflict around land and forests because the political powers, in order to keep control and access to these vital resources, are promoting division and hatred among the communities [Domb/Dalit, Kondh/Adivasi,

Saora/Adivasi]. Our communities once had equal access to land and forests, which today have been controlled by outside methods of the *sarkar* [government] and the *vyaparis* [business classes] and upper castes [Brahmins]. They want to perpetuate their ways and ideas among us and always keep us divided. We are *garib sreni* [poor classes] and land and forest are vital for our survival. And if they succeed in controlling them, they also end up controlling our lives. As has been the case over the ages, they want us to live in disharmony and difference so that they can be the *shashaks* [rulers] all the time. (Adivasi elder, interview notes, February 2007)

Given that there are some 8000 NGOs (Padel and Das, 2010) operating in Orissa alone, NGOs are significant players in Adivasi/Dalit and rural subaltern contexts. While a majority of NGOs follow a state-prescribed and circumscribed role predominantly in terms of service provision in areas where there are DDPs, a few NGOs claim to support, if not represent social movement activism directed at mining and other industrial development interventions in the rural areas. LAM participants see NGOs as subordinate partners in the state-corporate nexus (Kapoor, 2013), undermining anticolonial movements by engaging in political obscurantism and engaging in active attempts to demobilize and immobilize movements opposed to these projects. "In the beginning there were no people called *sapakhsyabadi* or pro-displacement but after these so-called activist-NGOs worked to raise the amount of compensation, people withdrew from the movement and formed the pro-displacement forum" (PM, Kalinganagar movement activist, Bisthapan Virodhi Manch, interview notes, April 2010). NGOs attempt to demobilize and immobilize movements (Kapoor, 2013: 54-65) by derailing, obstructing, diverting and depoliticizing through numerous avenues including: corporate espionage; sowing the seeds of division in displacement-affected communities; through persuasion as corporate propaganda merchants and projectizing dissent; disrupting movement politics with a staged politics; and disappearing when movements engaged in direct action. In APDAM activist KJ's words, "education, health, Self-Help-Groups/SHGs have no relevance at the moment where we are in the process of losing everything (*ame shobu haraiba avosthare ehi prokaro kamoro kaunasi artha nahi*)" (Kapoor, 2013:59).

In Baliapal we fought against the missile testing range against the government during my youth. Here I learnt that NGOs are slaves of the system--they bring people on to the roads for small issues, within-the-system issues and not system-challenging issues like what we are talking about here today.... Ours is collective action from the people's identified issues and problems--our action is from outside the institutions and NGO action is institutional action (C, Adivasi Dalit Adhikar Sangathan activist, Focus groups notes, April 2009)

NGOs often try to derail the people's movement by forcing them into Constitutional and legal frameworks and by relying on the slow pace of legal avenues to make it seem like they are working in solidarity with the people but all the while using the delaying tactic to help UAIL. ... they make us into programme

managers and statisticians concerned with funding accountability and the
management of our people for the NGOs...what they fail to realize is that we are
engaged in an *Andolan* (movement struggle) and not donor funded programmes
(ADEA activist, Focus group notes, February 2008)

Colonial capitalist development imposed by the state-market-civil society nexus
is recognized by Adivasi/Dalits as an endless invasion of space--"We measured
a hand length but always walked a foot length (make do with less) but even my
ancestors would not be able to explain why they insist on the reverse (always try
for more)" (Dalit elder, quoted in Kapoor, 2009:19); "...we the poor are being
squashed into each other's space and are getting suffocated...our villages are
being submerged and we have to leave the place, leave the land and become
silent spectators (*niravre dekhuchu*)" (Kondh Adivasi man, quoted in Kapoor,
2009:18); and "They are selling our forests, they are selling our water and they
are selling our land and may be they will sell us also..." (Kondh Adivasi woman,
quoted in Kapoor, 2009:19). Despite the invasion, the attachment to place is
acknowledged with an apparent sense of certitude:

> We cannot leave our forests (*ame jangale chari paribo nahi*). The forest is our
> second home (after the huts). There is no distance between our homes and the
> forest. You come out and you have everything you need.... My friends and
> brothers, we are from the forest. That is why we use the small sticks of the
> *karanja* tree to brush our teeth--not tooth brushes. Our relationship to the forest
> is like a fingernail to flesh (*nakho koo mangsho*)--we can not be separated.... That
> is why we are Adivasi. (Adivasi elder, interview notes, quoted in Kapoor, 2011c)

The concept of abstract space (as opposed to local place-based histories
expressed by Adivasi/Dalit anticolonial movement actors), emerged with the
rise of colonial capital and the Enlightenment (drawing from Newton, Descartes
and Galileo), wherein space was conceived of as homogenous, isometric and
infinitely extended (Lefebvre, 1990). This conception provided a geometric
template of nature within which western science flourished and a grid upon
which the earth's resources could be mapped. As a result, place was
disempowered and all power now resided in space devoid of content. As LAM
participants have exposed in their own way about the space-place colonial
dynamic, in processes of primitive accumulation (or accumulation by
dispossession), concepts of abstract space are often forcibly imposed on local
places, i.e.,

> Primitive accumulation involves a rearrangement of space, since it constitutes an
> annihilation of pre-existing property and of customary ways of relating
> landscapes and waterscapes. It is usually accompanied by an erasure, or at least a
> denigration of pre-existing ways of relating to such resources, which are often
> defined as nomadic, unsettled, uncivilized etc. The concept of abstract space
> enables developers to maintain a highly objectified and external relationship to

the landscape, which becomes emptied of people, history, entitlements, myth and magic (Whitehead, 2003:4229)

Colonialists adopt a stance of *terra nullius* (empty space or land of no-one) towards territory inhabited by people whose social or political organization is not recognized as 'civilized'; an example of an extreme version of colonial racial objectification enabled through non-recognition and erasure, as opposed to asymmetrical recognition, which also characterizes racialized social relations (Fanon, 1963). Whitehead (2003: 4229) notes "that most of the maps of the areas surrounding the Sardar Sarovar Dam do not contain the names of villages that hold historical importance for the Tadvi, Vassawa, Bhils and Bhilalas, even ones they consider centres of their cultural history" (Narmada Bachao Andolan in western India--see Baviskar, 2005a). This act of erasure, expressed and acknowledged by LAM in the Orissa context was referenced in several ways. These include examples of state officials taking measurements of land in pre-displacement villages without explanation nor permission, "walking through their square/mandap or even through people's hutments going about their business as if there was nobody there", or in statements like "we are nothing to them, so they think they don't need to ask before taking and going ahead" (Kondh woman leader, quoted in Kapoor, 2009:19). The ensuing cultural violence is acknowledged as follows:

> After displacement we stand to lose our traditions, our culture and own historical civilization...from known communities we become scattered unknown people thrown in to the darkness to wander about in an unknown world of uncertainty and insecurity (Adivasi leader, field notes, April 2009)

Da Costa (2007: 292) points to the importance of "recognizing the dispossession of meaning as a core struggle uniting" these movements, a dynamic that does not find a place in Harvey's (2003) materialist-analysis of accumulation by dispossession nor the related implications pertaining to un/freedom of labour and the full extent and import of this un/shackling. An anticolonial politics of place is informed by a sense of the sacred and the spiritual, and a unity of the sacred and the political, often the subject of colonial dismissals as being an ineffectual pre-political anti-politics or an irrational mad politics (Jesson, 1999), euphemistically speaking, which fails to comprehend the political vitality of historical connectivity between ancestral anti-colonial struggles and current movement politics. Furthermore, spiritual oversight tempers an exaggerated sense of political mission and recognizes the limits of politics; a pedagogy of limits in relation to the political (material) -- an antithetical stance or understanding to an allegedly rational and informed politics characterizing an unrelenting (endless accumulation) capitalist/material colonization of place, people and ecology (Kapoor, 2011c: 140), i.e., a failure to appreciate self-restraint and self-imposed boundaries (and hence the coloniality of power) is also a mad politics/irrationality of sorts.

> We, the people's movements present here representing people's struggles from South and coastal Orissa have discussed and debate our issues and are hereby resolved to stand as a broad-based platform known as Lok Adhikar Manch (LAM) in support of the following manifesto (people's statement):

> ...we have nothing to gain from *mukto bojaro* (liberalization), *ghoroi korono* (privatization) and *jagathi korono* (globalization), which are talked about today. We want to live the way we know how to live among our forests, streams, hills and mountains and water bodies with our culture and traditions and whatever that is good in our society intact. We want to define change and development for ourselves (*amo unathi abom parivarthanoro songhya ame nirupuno koribako chaho*). We are nature's friends (*prakruthi bandhu*), so our main concern is preserving nature and enhancing its influence in our lives (LAM, People's Manifesto, April 2009).

Anticolonial contestations and claims on the Indian state

Anticolonial movements like LAM are primarily located outside and against the state-market-civil society nexus. This nexus (despite competing visions within capitalist/other versions of Euro-American modernity and commitments to a post-industrial society) constructs and strategically deploys laws and institutions (as per LAM's preceding analysis) to 'legalize' and normalize displacement and dispossession (colonize). It also encourages post-displacement disciplining into welfare, re-settlement and rehabilitation and related market-schemes or subjects Adivasi/Dalits and rural subalterns to abject poverty in urban slums and constant migration in search of precarious and exploitative work (re-colonize) (Kapoor, 2011c: 134). In the words of an ADEA leader, "They are fighting against those who have everything and nothing to lose. We will persist and as long as they keep breaking their own laws--this only makes it easier for us" (Focus group notes, February 2008).

> We are giving importance to land occupation (*padar bari akthiar*) and land use (*chatriya chatri*). We are now beginning to see the fruits of occupations. Before the government uses vacant state land (*anawadi*) to plant cashew, eucalyptus or virtually gives the land to bauxite mining companies, we must encroach and occupy and put the land to use through our plantation activities and agricultural use. This has become our knowledge through joint land action. This knowledge is not only with me now but with all our people--what are the ways open to us-- this is like the opening of knowledge that was hidden to us for ages (Kondh Adivasi man, interview notes, 2007).

> ..we will fight collectively (*sangram*) to save (*raksha*) the forests and to protect our way of life. ...this is a collective struggle for the forest (*ame samastha mishi sangram o kariba*)...our struggle is around *khadyo, jamin, jalo, jangalo o ektha* (food, land, water, forest and unity) (Kondh Adivasi woman, interview notes, 2007)

Since the agents of colonial capital rely on splintering the possibility of

solidarity between Adivasi, Dalit and rural subaltern social classes and groups, LAM (and specific movements in the network, like the ADEA) consciously engages people in popular and informal education directed at the importance of *ektha* (unity) as education and organizing mutually reinforce a movement development process that has matured and penetrated to different extents in and among the various and related rural movements as part of a continuous ongoing process. The knowledge and pedagogical basis for this process is primarily informed by "own ways learning" (Kapoor, 2009) and popular education efforts by Adivasi/Dalit activists from the movement villages, politically disillusioned by their engagements with civil society organizations for the most part or party-political experiences in formal political organizations at the state level. The emphasis on a political strategy of systematic pre-emptive direct action (e.g. occupations) and a politics of measured-confrontation in relation to mining activities that displace and dispossess Adivasi/Dalit and rural subaltern classes and social groups have already been alluded to, and remains front and centre in terms of political action and the deepening of organization, unity and learning. In the words of a Saora Adivasi leader (Kapoor, 2009: 26-28):

> If the government continue to control lands, forest and water that we have depended on since our ancestors came, then ...we will be compelled to engage in a collective struggle (*ame samohiko bhabe, sangram kariba pahi badhyo hebu*)... and building a movement among us from village to panchayat to federation levels. I think this movement (*andolan*) should spread to the district and become district level struggle. The organization is always giving us new ideas (*nothon chinta*), new education (*nothon shikya*), awareness (*chetna*) and *jojana* (plans). We believe this will continue (*ao yu eha kari chalibo amaro viswas*).

> We have to teach each other (*bujha-sujha*), explain to each other and that is how education has happened and made things possible for us...we organize workshops and gatherings and have created a leaning environment for all our people--I feel so happy and satisfied, I can not tell you--we have been creating a political education around land, forest and water issues and debating courses of action. We are expanding in terms of participation and we need to keep generating more awareness on more issues that affect us.

> We have taken up the need for unity between us. We have seen that if we have unity, nobody can take away anything from us, be it our trees and leaves, our land and *bagara* areas (shifting cultivation zones). ... we have been actively spreading the message that we must have communal harmony (*sampro-dahiko srunkhala*).

The claims on the state (which vacillate between being anti-statist and/or statist) are in relation to recognition, local control and autonomy and state support for development on local terms and in sync with a local political-economy which caters primarily to the rural regions and villages. Clearly LAM and similar rural movement formations in defence and affirmation of rurality are challenging the neoliberal Indian state's conception and power of eminent domain (Mehta, 2009) and questioning its predominant deployment on behalf

of colonial capitalist interests subsequently equated with the preferred 'public' interest. According to a Kondh Adivasi leader and a Domb/Dalit woman activist (Kapoor, 2009: 27):

> ...we are laying a claim on the government who is supposed to serve all the people in this land. We are demanding a place for ourselves--we are questioning the government and asking them to help us develop our land using our ways...our livelihood should be protected and our traditional occupations and relationship to the land and forest need to be protected as community control over land and forests in our areas and this is our understanding of our Constitutional rights too. There is no contradiction. Once this is understood we can cooperate and when necessary, work with the government to take care of the land and forests. If they can help the *shaharis* (moderns/urbanites) destroy the forests, then they can help us protect it and listen to our story too.
>
> In relation to land and forest and water, we want that the government must not have control or rights over our natural resources (*ame chaho je sarkar amo prakrutic sampader opera adhkar kimba niyantrano no kori*). For example, village organization has the right to manage forests. The land that people have occupied and need, the government should not put pressure for eviction. People have a right to cultivable land which they have been using in accordance with their knowledge and traditions. The government should rather help us to develop our agriculture by finding ways to support us. And instead of big dams, it should erect check dams (small scale irrigation) to help us in our cultivable land for irrigation.

Concluding reflections: Coloniality, trans-local solidarity and the defence and affirmation of rurality

In terms of the relationship between struggle and the disalienation of colonized subjects attempting to address an "arsenal of complexes" to restore their "proper place", authentic freedom in this regard cannot be achieved when colonized peoples "simply go from one way of life to another, but not from one life to another", i.e., become "emancipated slaves" because the terms of recognition remain in the possession of the powerful to bestow on their inferiors as they see fit. Subsequently, the best that the colonized can hope for is "white liberty and white justice; that is, values secreted by their masters" (read as: white-caste-class elites and consumer classes in the Indian context) (Fanon, 1967: 220-222). To identify with "white liberty and white justice" the colonized would have failed to re-establish themselves as truly self-determining, i.e., as the creators of the terms and values by which they are to be recognized or else they limit the realm of possibility of their freedom (Fanon, 1963: 9). Looking to "own ways learning" (in the words of some of the partners in LAM) and "turning away from master-dependency" from the colonial state and society is the "source of liberation" and transformative praxis that is underscored by Fanon (1967:221) and that proves to continue to be a challenge (for strategic and other reasons, including forms of "dependent thinking"--looking to the other for recognition-- which characterize experiences with sustained subordination) in

LAM contexts, as the concerned movements oscillate between a "complete break" (in practice and theory--anti-statist) or seeking "state recognition" (claims on the state--even racially and caste-motivated asymmetrical recognition as Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes). Self-recognition and anticolonial empowerment is, after all, a long term process of contradictory engagements given the parasitic and penetrating impacts of colonial structures; impacts that are recognizable along with resistances that have always tempered and limited colonial possibilities. The stress on unity (*ektha*), demonstrating strength in numbers and attempting to scale up Adivasi/Dalit and rural subaltern social action (hence the gradual emergence of formations like LAM) are clearly integral to the process of anticolonial contestations as is an anticolonial pedagogy of place and roots (historical, ancestral and/or spiritual) (Kapoor, 2011c). This subaltern domain of politics germinated in the pre-colonial period, has operated vigorously under the British, and continues to develop new strains in both form and content made evident in acts of protest, rebellion and sustained resistance (Guha, 1982: 4; 1997). As subjects and makers of their own history or "movements who are bearers of other worlds" (Zibechi and Ryan, 2012: 12) and who possess autonomy within encompassing structures of subordination (Arnold, 1984), trans-local rural solidarity and anticolonial social movement formations like LAM (as a network and as individual movements with their specificities) are actively engaged in a politics which exposes, derails, disrupts and resists colonial capitalist accumulation by displacement and dispossession in the forested and rural regions; *places* where over 80 percent of 37 million people in the state of Orissa live in 55,000 villages.

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Table 1: Lok Adhikar Manch (LAM)

Movement participant (year established)	Location / operational area	Social groups engaged	Key issues being addressed
1. Kalinga Matchyajivi Sangathana (Kalinga fisher people's organization) (early 1980s)	Gopalpur-on-sea (center) including coastal Orissa, from Gopalpur in Ganjam district to Chandrabhaga and Astaranga coast in Puri district	Fisher people (mainly Dalits) originally from the state of Andhra Pradesh called Nolias and Orissa state fisher people or Keuta/Kaivartas	• Trawler fishing, fish stock depletion and enforcement of coastal regulations/zones (Trans/national Corporate--TNC--investments) • Occupation of coastal land by defense installations (e.g., missile bases) • Hotel/tourism industry developments along coast (TNC investment) • Special economic zones (SEZ) and major port projects for mining exports (TNC investment) • Pollution of beaches and oceans • Displacement of fisher communities related to such developments
2. Prakritik Sampad Suraksha Parishad (PSSP) (late 1980s)	Kashipur, Lakhimpur, Dasmantpur and adjacent blocks in Rayagada district of Orissa Approximately 200 movement villages	Adivasis including Jhodias, Kondhs and Parajas and Pano/Domb Dalits	• Bauxite mining (alumina) (TNC investments) • Industrialization, deforestation and land alienation/ displacement • Peoples' rights over "their own ways and systems"
3. Jana Suraksha Manch (2007)	Adava region of Mohana block, Gajapati district including sixty or more villages	Saura and Kondh Adivasis and Panos (Dalits)	• Government/local corruption • Police brutality/atrocities • Deforestation and plantation agriculture (NC investment)

4. Adivasi Dalit Adhikar Sangathan (2000)	Jaleswar, Bhograi and Bosta blocks in Balasore district and Boisinga and Rasagovindpur blocks in Mayurbhanj including over 100 villages	Dalits, Adivasis, fisher people and Other Backward Castes (OBCs)	• Dalit and Adivasi land rights and land alienation • Industrialization, port development and displacement of traditional fisher people (TNC investment)
5. Adivasi-Dalit Ekta Abhiyan (2000)	Twenty panchayats in Gajapati and Kandhmal districts including 200 plus villages (population of about 50,000)	Kondh and Saura Adivasis, Panos (Dalits) and OBCs	• Land and forest rights • Food • Sovereignty/plantation agriculture (NC investment) • Industrialization, modernization and protection of indigenous ways and systems • Communal harmony • Development of people's coalitions/forums (no state, NGO, corporate, "outsider", upper/middle castes participants)
6. Indravati Vistapita Lokmanch (late 1990s)	Thirty villages in the district of Nabarangapur	Several Adivasi, Dalit and OBC communities	• Dam displacement (Indravati irrigation and hydro-electric project) (NC investment) • Land and forest rights • Resettlement, rehabilitation and compensation for development displaced peoples (DDPs) • Industrialization and modern development and protection of peoples ways
7. Orissa Adivasi Manch (1993 to 1994)	State level forum with an all-Orissa presence (all districts) with regional units in Keonjhar and Rayagada districts and district level units in each district	Well over forty different Adivasi communities	• Adivasi rights in the state • Tribal self rule, forest and land rights and industrialization (SEZs) (TNC investments)

8. Anchalik Janasuraksha Sangathan (2008)	Kidting, Mohana block of Gajapati district including some twenty villages	Kondh and Saura Adivasis and Panos (Dalits)	• Land and forest rights • Conflict resolution and communal harmony between Adivasis and Dalits over land and forest issues
9. Dalit Adivasi Bahujana Initiatives (DABI) (2000)	Five blocks in the Kandhmal district with ten participating local movements (networks)	Kondh Adivasis, Panos (Dalits) and OBCs	• Land and forest rights • Food sovereignty and livelihood issues • Communal harmony
10. Uppara Kolab Basachyuta Mahasangh (late 1990s)	Umerkote block, Koraput district (includes a thirty village population base displaced by the upper Kolab hydroelectric and irrigation reservoir)	Paraja Adivasis, Panos and Malis Dalits and OBCs	• Displacement due to the upper Kolab hydro-electricity and irrigation reservoir (NC investment) • Compensation, rehabilitation and basic amenities for DDP's • Land and forest rights
11. Jeevan Jivika Suraksha Sangathan (2006)	Three panchayats in the border areas of Kandhmal and Gajapati districts including fifty or more villages with a population of 12,000 people	Kondhs and Saura Adivasis and Panos (Dalits) and OBCs	• Land and forest rights/issues • Communal harmony • Food sovereignty and livelihood issues
12. Adivasi Pachua Dalit Adhikar Manch (APDAM) (2000)	Kalinga Nagar industrial belt in Jajpur district (twenty-five or more villages, along with several participants in the Kalinganagar township area)	Adivasis, Dalits and OBCs	• Industrialization and displacement (TNC investment) • Land and forest rights • Compensation and rehabilitation • Police atrocities/brutality • Protection of Adivasi-Dalit ways and forest-based cultures and community
13. Janajati Yuva Sangathan (2008)	Baliapal and Chandanesar block in Balasore district including thirty-two coastal villages being affected by mega port development (part of SEZ scheme).	Dalit fisher communities and OBCs.	• SEZs (TNC investments) • Industrialization and displacement • Land alienation and marine rights of traditional fisher communities

Source: Kapoor (2011a), p.132-134

Note: In addition to the above LAM movements, leaders from 2 other movements were also included in the research, both of which have expressed an interest in joining LAM. These include: (i) The Niyamgiri Bachao Andolan (NBA), a Dongria and Kutia Kondh (Adivasi) movement against Vedanta/Sterlite (UK) bauxite mine/refinery in Lanjigarh, and the (ii) anti-POSCO (South Korea/Wall Street owned) movement, Santal Adivasi wing from the Khandadhar region and the parent POSCO Pratirodh Manch which includes several wings including small and medium farmers (e.g. Betel leaf farmers), Adivasi, Dalits and fisherfolk affected (or potentially affected) at the plant site or due to port development (Jatadhar river basin area; this includes the Paradip Port Trust which would have to handle iron ore exports) and water-affected areas/groups in Cuttack district as water for irrigation and drinking in these areas is channeled through a proposed canal (going through 5 districts) to the POSCO plant.

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Fair Trade, neocolonial developmentalism, and racialized power relations

Ian Hussey and Joe Curnow

Abstract

The developmentalist gaze of the Fair Trade movement is on Global South producers. In this article we turn our analytic gaze toward North American fair traders to explore the racialized, neocolonial power relations in which these movement actors are implicated. Firstly, we offer a brief historical sketch of Fair Trade certification. We argue that the certification system is a multi-sited, global institution that is shaped by and which shapes neocolonial power relations in Fair Trade by exploring the consolidation and more recent splintering of the international certification system. Secondly, we provide a postcolonial critique of developmentalism, with a focus on the timing of development, in order to lay a foundation for the remaining sections. Thirdly, we analyze the spatiality of Fair Trade, with an emphasis on what and who are missing from or erased by the structural and conceptual frameworks of Fair Trade. Fourthly, we explore the relationship between Fair Trade, commodity fetishism, and the developmentalist conception of space/time propagated by Fair Trade advocates. we conclude with a critical analysis of the neocolonialist and racist discourse of Fair Trade, with a focus on the "helping" discourse. We contend that as Global North fair traders strive to "help" Global South producers, they re-entrench neocolonial narratives of white supremacy and the desire to develop.

Introduction

Fair Trade marketing and advocacy rely on the idea that Fair Trade increases connectedness between Global South producers and Global North consumers.[1] While Fair Trade does reduce the number of intermediaries in the supply chain for most certified commodities as compared to their counterparts in the conventional system (Raynolds 2000 and 2002; Nicholls and Opal 2005; Lyon 2006; Adams and Raisborough 2008), it also serves to reinforce racist distinctions between the poor Global South farmer or artisan and the

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[1] Throughout this article, we use the terminology of Global North/South. We realize that this dichotomy is not without its problems, and indeed, is indicative of the limitations of current global sociological discourse. This is as much a self-criticism as it is a criticism of others that is meant to point to the limitations of our current discourse that we try to grapple with throughout the article. The idea of Global North/South may be able to help us understand how particular people in particular places become poor and are kept poor, if it focuses attention, for example, on financial flows, power relations in the creation of international intellectual property regimes, trade and investment agreements, or relations between states and transnational corporations, but it can also easily lead to generalizations, the erasure of difference, and the flattening of history.

benevolent Global North consumer (Dolan 2005; Lyon 2006). Fair Trade may channel more income into a select number of Global South communities (Jaffee 2007), but it fails to interrupt, and indeed, further entrenches the neocolonial and capitalist structures that produce and maintain producers' impoverishment on an ongoing basis.

Social scientists began to study Fair Trade more intensely in the late 1990s. Much of the early work is uncritical of the claims Fair Trade advocates make, but more critical analyses have been produced in the last decade, including many case studies on producer cooperatives and on consumerism. Although there is a burgeoning body of social science literature on the increasing corporatization or "mainstreaming" of Fair Trade (Low and Davenport 2006; Fridell 2007a and 2009; Davies 2007; Fridell *et al.* 2008; Reed 2009; Hudson and Hudson 2009; Raynolds 2009; Jaffee 2007, 2010 and 2011), there is a paucity of critical work on the role of Global North advocacy NGOs in the Fair Trade movement. Recent significant contributions have interrogated the corporate response to Fair Trade in the coffee industry (Fridell *et al.* 2008), scrutinized the use of different business models by Northern traders who sell certified commodities (Reed *et al.* 2010), and argued that the value of Fair Trade is produced through affective labour on the part of activists (Wilson and Curnow 2012). Our work contributes to this growing body of critical social scientific knowledge on the organization and operation of Fair Trade in the Global North. We turn our analytic gaze toward Global North actors to interrogate the material and discursive relations that make up the Fair Trade movement, examining specifically the role of North American middle-class advocates and consumers in challenging and reproducing neocolonial and racist ideas and relations.

The end of formal colonialism is the condition of possibility for the invention of the neocolonial international development industry. Fair Trade is a global social movement rooted in the neocolonial development project that began in the latter half of the 1940s with SELFHELP Crafts (now Ten Thousand Villages) in the United States (US) and Oxfam in the United Kingdom. Following postcolonial theorist Robert Young (2001, 45), we use the concept of "neocolonialism" in this article to "denot[e] a continuing economic hegemony that means that the postcolonial state remains in a situation of dependence on its former masters, and that the former masters continue to act in a colonialist manner towards formerly colonized states." International development in general and Fair Trade specifically are neocolonial projects that involve state, "non-governmental" organization (NGO), and business actors working with complicit consumers.

We use the term "postcolonial" in this article to refer to postcolonial studies and thought, a critical field of knowledge that first emerged out of literary studies (Kapoor 2008), specifically Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978/2004), and which has grown in influence in the humanities and social sciences throughout the last thirty-five years. Postcolonial theory is critical of Western liberal modernity and places emphasis on critical politics and critical historical-global analysis. The

politics of postcolonial thought are predicated on the subaltern subversion of Eurocentric and Orientalist discourses. Postcolonial studies are inclined toward poststructuralist cultural theory that links "imperialism and agency to discourse and the politics of representation" (Kapoor 2008, 3). Some postcolonial thought (e.g. Spivak 1988) brings together Marxism, feminism, deconstructivism, and critical theories of hegemony and of colonialism to show how these theories bring each other to crisis. Postcolonial theory enables us to scrutinize the colonialist and racist discourses of Fair Trade. Fair Trade is a politico-economic phenomenon, so we also find occasion to draw on Marxist dialectics and Marx's concept of commodity fetishism. This theoretical framework enables us to interrogate various aspects of Fair Trade and show the dialectical relationship between the discursive and the material.

To date there is a lack of postcolonial commentary on Fair Trade. In a recent essay on coffee and commodity fetishism, Gavin Fridell (2011) claims to do a postcolonial analysis of Fair Trade but falls short, through his lack of engagement with postcolonial thought and his uncritical use of the Eurocentric development-underdevelopment binary. Our argument, by contrast, draws on postcolonial thought to critique this dichotomy, especially the temporal assumptions built into it. We contend that as fair traders strive to "help" Global South producers, they re-entrench neocolonial narratives of white supremacy and the desire to develop, both of which are rooted in bourgeois subjectivity.

Our argument is informed by ethnographic research and is shaped by our direct participation in the Fair Trade movement. Our engagement in Fair Trade includes our experience as National Coordinators of the Canadian Student Fair Trade Network (Hussey 2004-2008) and of the US-based United Students for Fair Trade (USFT, Curnow 2004-2008). The four years since our engagement puts us in the position of offering perspectives on the history and current state of Fair Trade in general, as well as the politics and problems of the Fair Trade movement in North America specifically. We also review the marketing materials, mission statements, and other texts produced by North American Fair Trade businesses and advocacy organizations. Throughout this analysis we pay close attention to the representation of farmers, Global South cooperative communities, and North American activists and consumers. We discuss the ways that these identities are dialectically related and draw on critiques of the "helping imperative" (Heron 2007) to locate the historic role of North American, (largely) white, middle-class activists within the Fair Trade movement.

A final note: where appropriate, we implicate ourselves in our analysis by using *we/our* and *they/their* to indicate our relative positions of dominance as white North Americans. This is not intended to universalize the experiences of all Northern fair traders, but is used to note the historical-geographical-material relations that shape our standpoint as authors. Our intention throughout the article is not to suggest that people involved in Fair Trade are intentionally racist or have bad intentions or that shopping for non-labeled products would be a better way of engaging in the world. Our critique is not about individual

actors, or businesses, or even certification schemes. Rather, we are trying to draw attention to the ways that historical-geographical-material conditions shape our ongoing relationships and cultural contexts. That is, as North American consumers and activists, our opportunities to engage in international poverty alleviation strategies and political consumerism are shaped and limited historically, geographically, and materially. Our actions are not only about our individual intentions. We are products of a colonial past and present that shapes how and why we engage – be it through the development of standards and institutions or in our individual purchasing decisions. We believe that the better we understand the ways the Fair Trade system and movement are shaped by and reproduce racialized, neocolonial power relations, the better able we can become to acknowledge and address them, so that we can strive toward anti-colonial relationships rooted in solidarity rather than help, charity, or developmentalism.

In the next section we provide a brief history of the international Fair Trade certification system as a central component of the movement's institutionalization process. The Fairtrade International (FTI) certification scheme is a global system of social relations through which certification practices organize the production, trade, and procurement of commodities that are designated as meeting the social and environmental criteria laid out in the Fair Trade certification standards. We argue that the organization of FTI's decision-making and governance structures are shaped by and shape neocolonial power relations in Fair Trade by exploring the consolidation and more recent fracturing of the certification system. In Section Two we outline a postcolonial critique of developmentalism, with a focus on the timing of development, in order to lay a foundation for our critiques of Fair Trade to come in the next three sections. In Section Three we analyze the spatiality of Fair Trade, with an emphasis on what and who are missing from or erased by the structural and conceptual frameworks of Fair Trade. In Section Four we add to the growing body of work on Fair Trade and commodity fetishism by bringing together this Marxist concept with postcolonial critiques of the timing of development. Section Five rounds out our critique of Fair Trade by scrutinizing its neocolonial, racist discourse, with a focus on the helping imperative.

1. Fair Trade certification and neocolonialism

The Fair Trade movement originated as a hodgepodge of diverse interests, including anti-imperialist struggles, neocolonial developmentalist work, a variety of grassroots alternative economic activities, and more. Given this history, it is not surprising that fair traders – from producers to traders to certifiers to advocates – do not share a common set of values, and, indeed, these categories of Fair Trade actors are neither homogeneous nor unchanging. In the late 1980s, the diverse initiatives grouped under the banner of "alternative trade" began to institutionalize into the Fair Trade movement we know today. This section focuses on one of the major aspects of this institutionalization process: the invention and history of non-statist Fair Trade certification starting

in 1988 with Netherlands-based Max Havelaar to the creation of a consolidated international certification system with the establishment of FTI in 1997 to the fracturing of FTI with Fair Trade USA (FTUSA) leaving the system in 2011.

After World War II, Fair Trade was promoted as a statist regulatory model by some United Nations member-states, but in the last twenty-five years Fair Trade has operated as a non-statist, neoliberal system regulated by non-governmental agencies that create and monitor Fair Trade certification standards (Fridell 2004 and 2006). Fair Trade standards coordinate the work of producers, traders, and consumers by requiring that: (1) producer groups meet criteria for governance, democratic participation, labour standards, and sustainable farming; (2) Global North businesses pay a minimum price to producer groups for their products, sign long-term contracts with the producer groups they are buying from, and, if asked, provide up to sixty percent of the value of the contract in advance; and (3) the certification mark be used in particular ways on product packages and promotional materials to communicate to consumers that the product is Fair Trade Certified.

Fair Trade certification initially focused on coffee, but the system has gradually expanded to include many additional products, ranging from agricultural products (coffee, tea, sugar, and fruit (bananas, oranges, grapes, and avocados)), grains (rice and quinoa), nuts, oils, herbs and spices, flowers, cotton, wine, and chocolate, to other products including gold and sports balls. Until recently there were almost no empirical studies on the socio-economic benefits - or lack thereof - of Fair Trade for producers. The recent impact studies (Ronchi 2002; Hudson and Hudson 2002 and 2003; Bacon 2005; Utting-Chamorro 2005; Jaffee 2007; Ruben 2008; Bacon *et al.* 2008; Lewis and Runsten 2008; Wilson 2010) generally agree that Fair Trade results in the following benefits for participating producers: "higher household incomes and lower rates of indebtedness, greater food security, improved housing, higher rates of educational attainment, and greater use of environmentally sound agricultural practices" (Jaffee 2011, 90). These studies and others have shown that Fair Trade certification can have significant positive impacts on producer and artisan communities.

The institutionalization of non-statist Fair Trade certification has dramatically shaped the face of Fair Trade. Between 1988 and 1997, fourteen labelling initiatives (LIs) were established in three certification systems (Max Havelaar, TransFair, and the Fairtrade Foundation), predominantly across Europe and North America, to manage the certification of Fair Trade products. In 1997 these LIs and the larger certification systems they were a part of consolidated into FTI, whose central office is located in Bonn, Germany (FTI 2004). On 15 September 2003, in order to comply with ISO 65 ("the worldwide quality standard for certification organisations" (FTI 2004, 4)), FTI established FLO-Cert, a separate, independent certification company owned by FTI, which inspects producers and traders to verify their compliance with the newly consolidated international certification standards. In the consolidated international system, the national LIs license companies in their jurisdiction to

sell certified products and to ensure they are maintaining the standards for those products. There are now nineteen LIs and three marketing organizations covering twenty-seven countries in Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The FTI regulatory system spans the globe, but its centre of governance is in Europe. The system builds off the historical-geographical-material infrastructure of colonial intervention and is itself part of the larger neocolonial international development industry.

Decision-making and governance of FTI point to this legacy. Only in September 2003, about six years after the establishment of FTI, did FTI become a multi-stakeholder organization that includes producer representation on the board of directors (four of twelve seats) through three Producer Networks (PNs) representing producer organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.[2] Producers gained four seats on FTI's board of directors in 2003 because FTI changed its governance structure to comply with ISO 65 (Renard 2005; Tallontire 2009), not because the FTI certification bureaucrats suddenly had an epiphany about producer participation in a certification system that was supposedly set up to benefit them. The disparity in power in FTI between the LIs, traders, and producers came to a head in 2007 when producers organized themselves and fought for the right to be considered "members" of FTI. Until 2007, FTI's member-organizations were all LIs, but producers won the right to be considered members of FTI after much outcry in the movement. In mid-October 2011, FTI announced that producers now hold twelve of the twenty-four votes in the organization's General Assembly (GA), which functions like an annual general meeting, a significant increase from their previous total of three votes. FTI likes to claim that producers now "own" half of FTI because the PNs have half of the votes in the GA. The PNs do not actually own half of FTI: winning the right to formal political representation in a (now) multi-stakeholder organization does not equate to winning half-ownership of the organization. Although they have taken more formal political power for themselves within FTI, producers still do not have enough say when it comes to determining certification policies and the structure and direction of the Fair Trade movement (VanderHoff Boersma 2002; Lyon 2006).[3]

Lyon (2006, 452) sees the low level of producer participation and the reinforcement of differences between producers and consumers in marketing and advocacy materials as "negative trends" in Fair Trade. They are not trends that somehow just innocently happened in a power-vacuum. They are products

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[2] The PNs now have four of fourteen seats on the board. The PNs did not exist in 2003 in the form they do now - that organizational development occurred in the 2-4 years following producers gaining access to the board.

[3] A small producer label has been developed over the last six years by small producers in Latin America and the Caribbean in response to the increasing corporatization of Fair Trade, the increasing use of plantation production, and the persistent reality that small producers do not have enough say in the FTI system. See http://www.spp.coop/ for more details (accessed 23.8.2012). It is beyond the scope of this article to comment on this initiative in detail, but this is clearly an important topic for future research.

of the history of Fair Trade and its material and discursive composition. The institutionalization process structured participation in ways that secured positions of dominance for so-called consumer organizations, who would as a result make decisions in the interest of their stakeholders and institutionalize policies that promoted their vision of development and progress while benefitting their members or constituents. The consumer organizations have made decisions about how to frame Fair Trade for their audiences, which we explore more in later sections, including racist tropes and denying the coevalness of producers in product advertisements and campaign materials. Low participation on the part of producer organizations results from being systematically kept from decision-making and continually represented as inferior, yet producer organizations continue to fight to be seen as equal partners in Fair Trade both materially and symbolically. One ongoing struggle in the certification system relates to the involvement of transnational corporations (TNCs) and plantation production in Fair Trade.

The participation of TNCs in Fair Trade since 2000 has ushered in major qualitative changes in *which* producers are involved in Fair Trade and *how* their work and lives are organized. The most significant proposed change in the TNC-era of Fair Trade is the move by FTI under strong pressure by TNCs and by FTUSA to consider allowing coffee produced on plantations to be certified. FTI has yet to allow plantation production for coffee because of a successful lobby by the Coordinadora Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Pequeños Productores de Comercio Justo (CLAC), the organization that represents Latin American and Caribbean Fair Trade producers in political fora.[4] The CLAC's political organizing has maintained the current policy of FTI and its members that only small-scale coffee farmers organized into cooperatives or member-driven associations can have their beans certified. Despite this significant decision made to benefit small producers, FTI has made other decisions to cater to TNCs. For instance, the development and maintenance of long-term relationships between traders and producers and the arrangement of pre-harvest credit are no longer honoured consistently as a result of the increasing corporatization of Fair Trade (Jaffee 2011). Indeed, many producers in the Fair Trade coffee sector are living in a cycle of indebtedness (Hudson and Hudson 2009; Wilson 2010). Despite the increased involvement of TNCs in Fair Trade over the last decade and despite the bending of certain Fair Trade standards for TNCs, many of the producers who have access to the Fair Trade market are not able to sell all of their produce through it (Hudson and Hudson 2003 and 2009; Wright 2004; Fridell 2007b). Furthermore, having access to the Fair Trade market for coffee means less than it did twenty-five years ago: the Fair Trade minimum price for coffee only had one indirect price increase from 1988 to 2007, and Christopher Bacon (2010) has shown that, when inflation is taken into account, the Fair Trade floor price for coffee lost forty-one percent of its real value from 1988 to 2008.

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4 The CLAC has two votes on the FTI board, whereas the other two PNs only have one each, although this will change soon.

FTI does not allow plantation production for some other agricultural commodities, like cacao and sugar, but it does certify products from banana, tea, wine, and flower plantations.5 The introduction of plantation production in the certification system has been contested from the start. It makes it harder for advocates to claim that Fair Trade is an alternative economic system. The battle over the organization of coffee production in the certification system should be viewed in this historical trajectory.

FTUSA favours certifying plantation production for coffee, and perhaps cacao and sugar, so they split from FTI on 31 December 2011 (Hussey 2012a). FTUSA made this major decision without consulting the PNs (Sheridan 2011). In a deliciously ironic interview in May 2012, Paul Rice, the Chief Executive Officer of FTUSA, asks: "Don't we want to democratize fair trade? Don't we want fair trade to be more than a white, middle-class movement?" (Quoted in Sherman 2012). It seems doubtful that a more democratic Fair Trade movement can arise from the unilateral, undemocratic decision of one national LI, particularly when it directly contradicts the stated priorities of the PNs. FTI's political structure, while far from perfect, does not allow for such unilateral decision-making. Decisions on Fair Trade standards have to pass through the organization's standards committee. If the issue were significant enough, like whether to start including plantation production for coffee, then it would also need to be discussed and voted on by the General Assembly. The unilateral move by FTUSA led Jonathan Rosenthal, a co-founder of Equal Exchange, a pioneering, US-based Fair Trade cooperative, to make this comment about FTUSA's new "Fair Trade for All" initiative.

> [I]f you choose to look at who is making this decision to radically change the imperfect tool called fair trade, you might admit that it is nearly totally driven by well intentioned white folks in the US with lots of money and big dreams. The original idea of supporting the political and economic development process of organized small farmers has been tossed aside. The voice of those farmers and their organizations has been overridden in pursuit of this bigger dream.
>
> Change comes in many forms. To me, this feels like a move right out of the colonial playbook—we know best what is good for poor people.
>
> Perhaps this arrogance was an inevitable outgrowth of the success of fair trade, as we don't have a very evolved macroeconomic strategy. Still, to drive forward over the objections of so many of the farmer and activist organizations that have built fair trade is a sad and hurtful act. (Rosenthal 2012)

Rosenthal and other similarly-situated fair traders have contested the shifting and splintering vision(s) of Fair Trade over the last twenty-five years. What

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5 See FTI's webpages on specific products, on hired labour, and on standards for small producers for further details. See Hudson and Hudson (2009) for an analysis of the different ways production is organized for various commodities in the FTI system.

began for these fair traders as a leftist solidarity movement tied to revolutionary action in the Global South has been reduced to a neocolonial developmentalist initiative centred on the institutionalization and mainstreaming of certification. Fair Trade, within the current certification schemes, has become a wolf in sheep's clothing, providing political and marketing cover for companies to present themselves as sustainable and fair while continuing to act in a neocolonial fashion toward producers and extract value from them. The so-called development strategy has become a neoliberal imposition of free-market ideology that further entrenches Southern communities in unequal power relations. Very little is "alternative" about Fair Trade, and the recent schism in FTI seems to more deeply implicate Fair Trade in neocolonial power relations.[6] In order to further examine how the material and discursive relations of Fair Trade are shaped by and shape neocolonialism, we now turn to a postcolonial critique of developmentalism, with a focus on the timing of development, to lay a foundation for our analysis of the spatiality of Fair Trade, our theorization of the complex relationship between Fair Trade, commodity fetishism and the developmentalist conception of space/time propagated by fair traders, and our critique of the "helping" discourse in Fair Trade.

2. A postcolonial critique of developmentalism

In critical development studies, a sub-field of postcolonial studies, development as a project, and indeed an industry, is understood as having been invented after World War II, as many colonial projects were formally coming to an end (see Ferguson 1994/2007; McMichael 2000; Kothari 2005; Escobar 1995 and 1999). The Eurocentric ideologies of development and of modernization still coordinate much of the work done by national and multilateral "non-governmental" agencies. The major theme we investigate in this section is the timing of development and of modernity, an area of debate that goes to the heart of developmentalist and of modernizationist theories, development practice, and critical development studies.

Postcolonial theorists and critical development scholars have argued that developmentalism and modernizationism are Eurocentric, teleological notions of history which view the western European nation-state and the modern individuated subject as universal models for everyone to emulate (Chakrabarty 2000/2008; Cooper 2005). Anthropologist Johannes Fabian (1983/2002, 17) asserts that terms like "development," "modernization," "civilization," and

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[6] The future of Fair Trade certification within the US, both FTUSA and FTIUSA, is still somewhat unclear. A recent update from FTI (FTI 2012) is scant on details for the business plan being developed for the FTI system within the US. One concrete update is that FLO-Cert certified producer groups and exporters are able to sell to businesses registered with FTUSA, but the opposite is not true for producers and exporters working within the FTUSA system (the FTI seal cannot be placed on these products). Some US-based businesses have elected to continue to have their products certified by the FTI system and others have defected to the new FTUSA system. Past efforts of FTUSA suggest that they will allow plantations owned locally or by TNCs as long as they comply with FTUSA's new standards.

"Third World" derive their conceptual content from evolutionary Time. These sorts of concepts involve a temporal distancing that Fabian famously came to refer to as a "denial of coevalness," which he understands as "*a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse*" (1983/2002, 31). Coevalness is thus an epistemological problem, and the developed-developing binary is an example of a denial of coevalness.

Historian Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000/2008, 8) adds that a denial of coevalness like "development" is also historicist as it repeats "the 'first in Europe and then elsewhere' structure of time." The notion of "development" says "not yet" to non-Europeans and relegates them "to an imaginary waiting room of history" (*ibid*). This imaginary waiting room is an imperialist illusion. In Eurocentric capitalist transition narratives, the so-called Third World is understood as lacking, incomplete, and, perhaps, a failure, though not one beyond reform (Chakrabarty 2000/2008). Fair Trade, as a developmentalist project, is part of such reforms.

In fact, in a paradoxical fashion, Fair Trade is understood by many fair traders as a reform movement meant to create certain changes in the world, yet there is also a romantic view held by some fair traders who think Fair Trade is pristinely preserving or returning to what Eurocentric neoclassical economists and many Marxists would call "pre-capitalist," "pre-modern" or "backward" production. So, paradoxically, some movement actors see Fair Trade as being about reform and preserving certain socio-cultural relations. It is true that Fair Trade enables the continued maintenance of some family farms and thus reduces the number of people who have to sell or lose their farms and migrate looking for waged work; however, in many areas of the world, the smallholder production that now exists in Fair Trade is a result of historical struggles that led to land reforms. The romantic view flattens history and effaces the events that led to these reforms – for example, the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua. As we shall see in Sections Four and Five, this is not the only paradox related to space/time and Fair Trade. To further lay the groundwork for those sections, we turn to an interrogation of the spatiality of Fair Trade, focusing on who and what is missing from the conceptual and structural frameworks of Fair Trade.

3. The spatiality of Fair Trade

The distribution of power in the Fair Trade system is remarkably similar to imperial divisions of the globe. Fair Trade commodities are produced in various former colonies and sold predominantly in niche and mainstream markets in Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The movement by and large does not include production from Indigenous communities located in white settler colonies like Canada, the US, Australia, and New Zealand, nor non-Indigenous producers in places like Canada and the US who often exploit

migrant workers with little heed to basic labour rights.[7] The dichotomies used to describe the consumer-producer dialectic – Global North/South, developed/developing – gloss over much of the complexity of the relationship between imperial powers and colonized people(s) and territories (indeed, the political and economic elite of some former colonies have become imperialists themselves). These understandings of the world are not neutral, nor are they simply natural. They erase the existence and histories of various Indigenous Peoples who were and remain colonized in white settler countries.

Another example of such a process of homogenization lies in the practice of naming coffees from different areas of the globe using the name of the nation-state where the beans were farmed. This practice of naming does not question imperialist histories and nor acknowledges particular local histories and peoples. For example, a bag of coffee may be labelled "Mexican," even though its producers may be Indigenous Peoples. Various Indigenous Peoples are subsumed under the banner of the nation-state. The sovereign power of the nation-state, not the Indigenous Peoples, reigns supreme.[8]

In the Global North, the Fair Trade movement works to change the purchasing practices of individual and institutional consumers through marketing and advocacy that attempts to shift consumer consciousness (Goodman 2004 and 2010; Bryant and Goodman 2004; Barnett *et al.* 2005; Guthman 2007). That is to say, the "conscious" consumer is in part a product of marketing. This marketed consumer consciousness, which romanticizes the lives of producers and the effect Fair Trade has in their communities (Varul 2008; Adams and Raisborough 2010), fuels demand for Fair Trade and is coordinated by discourses of ethics, justice, international development and sustainability. Businesses that sell Fair Trade products do so by commodifying social justice (Fridell 2007b), morality (Fisher 2007; M'Closkey 2010) and consciousness in order to market them through images and discourses that render producers' lives and landscapes "knowable" and "authentic" to middle-class consumers (Wright 2004). Fair Trade coffee roasters across Canada and the US use slogans such as "coffee with a conscience," "brewing justice," "common ground," "level ground," and "higher ground" in trying to sell their products as ones that are "making a difference" and "helping to end poverty one purchase at a time." As Michael Goodman (2004, 896) quips: "Robin Hood comes to town, latte in hand."

Fair Trade products are personified, often touted in advertisements, packaging, and campaigns as having a conscience and the capacity to speak to consumers. Fair Trade advertising appeals to and tries to produce a specific type of

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[7] For a troubling example that complicates this point, see M'Closkey (2010) for an analysis of "how Novica, a fair trade artisan organization, supports the reproduction of historic Navajo designs by Zapotec weavers located in Oaxaca, Mexico" (259).

[8] For a different but related example, see Fridell (2011) for an analysis of the 2005-2007 battle Ethiopian coffee farmers' organizations won with global civil society support against Starbucks over the trademarking of Sidamo, Oromia, Harar and Yirgacheffe coffee beans.

"conscious" consumer who is called upon to "vote" with their money (Waridel 2002) and realize their imagined heightened connection to producers. One possible effect of this shift in consciousness is that some consumers of Fair Trade products may feel a sense of distinction vis-à-vis "unconscious" consumers (Wright 2004; Adams and Raisborough 2008; Cole 2008).

The composition of the affective relationship between the Global North middle-class and poor people pivots on proximity. The "politics of proximity", according to Adams and Raisborough (2008, 1177), is a spatial process of class distinction that involves a double dialectic. There is a dialectical relationship between the Global North middle-class and the local working class who are understood in the context of Global North de-industrialization and the rise of consumer society as being undeserving poor. There is a related dialectical relationship between the Global North, middle-class, conscious consumer and distant poor people who are understood as deserving in and through Fair Trade marketing and advocacy campaigns (*ibid*, 1174-1175) that commodify the colonial difference (Wright 2004; Goodman 2004; Lyon 2006). This points to Fair Trade's involvement in commodity fetishism, which we analyze in the next section before scrutinizing the "helping" discourse in Fair Trade in Section Five.

4. Commodity fetishism, developmentalist space/time, and producer-consumer relations

Several articles address the relationship between Fair Trade and commodity fetishism. Commodity fetishism is a Marxist term to describe the process endemic to capitalism in which the social relations involved in the production and distribution of commodities appear as relations among things – money and various other commodities – and through which commodities appear as abstract, independent products on store shelves and on the websites of e-retailers seemingly with their own intrinsic economic value and with no apparent connection to the people and work processes that produced them (see Marx 1867/1990). Fair Trade, for Fridell (2007b), symbolically challenges commodity fetishism, but this challenge is limited by Fair Trade's market-driven structure and by the structural imperatives of the global capitalist market. Commodity fetishism is an effect of the organization of the relations of production (Hudson and Hudson 2003), so disrupting commodity fetishism requires changing the organization of productive relations in the Global South *and* in the Global North into democratically run and regulated processes "in which *both* producers and consumers are involved and are accountable for the decisions they make" (Fridell 2007b, 93). Fair Trade falls short of disrupting commodity fetishism because it does not deal with the productive relations in the Global North and because Fair Trade consumers "remain alienated individuals who are disconnected from producers and who are unaccountable for their market decisions" (Fridell 2007b, 101).

Ian and Mark Hudson tease out a contradiction in the relationship between Fair Trade and commodity fetishism. For them, Fair Trade "is an assault on

commodity-fetishism" because the movement does, to a certain extent, make it "more difficult to maintain a system of collective blindness concerning the relations of production and their pathologies" (Hudson and Hudson 2009, 250). However, as they point out, the FTI system also contributes to commodity fetishism by not only failing to accurately represent and make visible productive relations but by also putting extraordinarily different production processes, in some cases for the same commodity, under the same label. Yet, addressing the "collective blindness" of Global North consumers is not only about providing information about the people and productive processes behind a small portion of the commodities available in the market. It is also about what, whom, and how Global North consumers see when they look at a commodity, and how they understand the world and the various people in it. In this case that means the plethora of people, places, and processes involved in Fair Trade production – what and whom do hegemonic ears and eyes perceive?

Taken together, the studies on Fair Trade and commodity fetishism show that Fair Trade contributes to commodity fetishism in complex and uneven ways. While Fair Trade campaigns may partially defetishize certain products by making visible some of the unjust conditions of production in particular and partial ways (Hudson and Hudson 2003 and 2009; Fisher 2007; Fridell 2007b and 2011), many of these same campaigns also fetishize products and their producers by imbuing them with a reified exotic character (Wright 2004; Lyon 2006; Adams and Raisborough 2008). Many Fair Trade promotional materials rely on a perception of producers as primitive people from exotic, far-off lands. This understanding of producers is constructed and supported by the neocolonial international development industry. The developed-developing dichotomy is predicated on the dubious idea that industrialization equals progress and development. In the developed-developing denial of coevalness, those who are said to be developing are thought of as existing in a time previous to those who are considered developed, a simpler time that the developed world grew out of long ago. Developing people and places need to reform, to improve themselves and to emulate developed people and places, whose responsibility it is to help them reform, improve and emulate, or so the developmentalist story goes (Escobar 1995). This model assumes everyone in the world is working toward the same end, which the superior developed world has already reached, and that everyone understands development as the same thing. "Development," like other Eurocentric notions, such as "pre-capitalist" and "pre-modern," is claimed to be a universal concept, but it is not. Eurocentrism distorts representations of the past, present, and projected future in particular ways through conceptual practices of power (Amin 1989; Dussel 1998; Quijano 2000).

A central narrative of Fair Trade marketing and advocacy is that Fair Trade brings consumers and producers closer together. Logos abound in Fair Trade materials that show producers and consumers reaching across time and space to shake hands through the exchange of Fair Trade products (see the appendix for the USFT logo from 2003, the Fair Trade Los Angeles logo from 2012, and the Unidas Para Vivir Mejor (UPAVIM) logo from 2012). These images feature a

phenotypically white person in Western clothing holding the hand of a non-white farmer or artisan, as with the African-idealized mother or the Latin American campesino. These images point to the developed-developing dichotomy and a central paradox of Fair Trade: Fair Trade claims to bring people who are understood to be from two orders of humanity closer together. Global North fair traders extend a hand to producers while simultaneously banishing them to a previous social order. Consumers and producers cannot be brought closer together when they are thought of as existing in different times and worlds. Reducing the number of intermediaries in the global commodity chain cannot close this distance, and simply coming up with new terms to describe the relationship will not do it either. Eurocentric moralistic narratives of progress and development are what tug on the hegemonic sensibility of "conscious" consumers. Colonial relations are not just material, but also relate to specific systems of knowledge and discourse (Escobar 1995).

It is impossible to fully represent the actualities of producers in marketing and advocacy materials, but many Fair Trade marketing and advocacy campaigns romanticize the actualities of producers (Wright 2004; Varul 2008; Adams and Raisborough 2010). This romanticism is both a product of and reproduces colonial imaginaries and histories. Take, for example, the former certification mark of Fairtrade Canada and the current label used by FTI and its national LIs.

| | *The certification mark used by Fairtrade Canada until 2011* | | *The certification mark used by FTI and its national LIs* |

The certification mark used by Fairtrade Canada until 2011 (FTUSA used an almost identical label until October 2011) portrays a half black, half white person whose black hand holds a white basket at the same height as their white hand which holds a black basket. This label looks like Lady Justice with her blindfold and balanced scales, and promotes the idea that Fair Trade is about justice and equality. Since Fair Trade producers are not generally seen as white, this label racializes consumers as white and producers as black, portraying the relationship between two categories of people – consumers and producers, developed and developing, metropole and colony. The image suggests that North Atlantic imperialism is in the past, that Europe and its others are now fused as one. The FTI mark suggests a similar idea. FTI claims that the image represents a human figure with an outstretched arm (FTI n.d.), which could be a producer reaching toward a consumer's hand, or vice versa, invoking the fantasy that Fair Trade involves a heightened connectedness between producers and consumers. The mark also looks like the yin-yang symbol, and suggests a dialectical relationship between two seemingly polar opposites, which, when

viewed together, reveal their interconnectedness and interdependence. These images invoke the racialized, colonial tropes of difference and relationality that underpin much of the Fair Trade movement's ideology, discourse, and marketing.

The representations of producers and producer communities in Fair Trade marketing and advocacy materials are fraught with exoticized images and discourses of the "primitive" and the "traditional." These images and discourses are engineered for Northern audiences to evoke particular feelings, like pity and the need to help, and to paint a particular picture of the realities of producers and their communities. These images rely on Orientalist ideas of what the Other is and should be. Paige West's (2010, 701) critique describes one fair trader's representations of Papua New Guinea and his claims that through Fair Trade he reached "uncontacted tribes," bringing new levels of development to their primitive existences. While most representations within Fair Trade are not as overtly colonialist and racist, we find that the same sentiment underlies a significant amount of Fair Trade materials. It is common for growers and artisans to be asked to don their "traditional costumes" for pictures that enable businesses to market their difference and authenticity to Northern consumers so that they can "know" the producer and benevolently extend their wallet to help them.

Some people within and outside of the Fair Trade movement may argue that "it's just practical" that the need of businesses to move products and advocacy organizations to try to increase demand for Fair Trade and for both to appeal to the sensibilities of Global North consumers to be (financially) successful is the reason why many businesses and organizations propagate Eurocentric and racist ideas and discourses. That is, it is supposed that these businesses and organizations are not uncritically advancing these ideas and discourses, but doing so strategically in the context of a market-driven movement. Some movement actors argue that these representations are incidental, claiming that these images do, in fact, promote higher sales, and thus it is not the Fair Trade businessperson who is implicated, but the end consumer who drives this racialized, colonial production. We believe that these explanations misunderstand the complex relationship between colonialist cultural representations and capitalist markets that cater to those tastes. In reproducing those images, whether "strategically," intentionally or not, North American fair traders commodify and further entrench colonialist and racist ideas. In attempting to address the role of Canadians and US Americans in Fair Trade as a neocolonial developmentalist movement, we now turn our attention to the rationale and underlying ideology that coordinates most white, middle-class North Americans in their participation in Fair Trade.

5. Turning the gaze on Global North NGOs: Fair Trade and the helping imperative

A relatively small number of actors are involved in creating and sustaining the movement (see Hussey 2012b; Wilson and Curnow 2012). For most people in North America the limit of their engagement in Fair Trade is as end consumers.[9] Many of these consumers "look for the label," as they have been trained to do by the certifiers and some advocacy organizations. The role of consumers has been discussed elsewhere at length (Wright 2004; Bryant and Goodman 2004; Goodman 2004 and 2010; Barnett *et al.* 2005; Lyon 2006; Varul 2008; Adams and Raisborough 2008 and 2010), so here we shift our attention to some of the reasons why people are engaged, either as consumers or as activists. We do not question that individual actors are making choices in good faith out of a genuine desire to alleviate poverty, but we do suggest that this desire is culturally produced out of an historical narrative through which people's whiteness and related superiority emerge from their relationship with the Other. Whiteness only makes sense as a relational concept, and Fair Trade and many other strategies are ultimately ways of distinguishing oneself.

In trying to explore the ways that white-supremacy and neocolonialism are enacted within the Fair Trade market and movement, we have found Barbara Heron's (2007) concept of the "helping imperative" useful. Heron interrogates the implicit and explicit motivations, subjectivities, and their historical antecedents that white Canadian women indicate when discussing their decisions to become development workers in Africa. She argues that involvement in development work enables people to know the distant Other, to benevolently and innocently work to establish themselves as moral, and to claim a sense of agency, all of which serve to reinforce their own racialized bourgeois subjectivity.

Heron's analysis maps nicely onto ideas of Fair Trade activism, as mostly white and middle-class people from North America and Europe shop and promote others' shopping in order to satisfy an urge to help an unknown, homogenized Other, a colonialist idea with important and problematic assumptions embedded within it. First, there is the assumption that everything is so bad *there* all the time. This homogenizes the experiences of others and ascribes meaning to an unchanging, essentialized Other. In homogenizing massive areas of the world and the majority of the world's population as a uniform whole that is uniformly poor and marginalized, we lose our ability to usefully engage in the historical-geographical-material specificity of the experiences of various communities and, in so doing, entrench our likelihood of pathologizing poverty on the unknown and unspecified Other. Such homogenization in no way develops an understanding of the systemic ways that the poverty of particular

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[9] The North American Fair Trade movement is predominantly, but not entirely, white and middle-class. We are focusing on those movement actors here because the discourse in Fair Trade arises from a historically constructed discourse of whiteness and because this focus enables us to interrogate neocolonial relations in Fair Trade.

people in particular places is created and sustained, both in North America and beyond. Rather, it facilitates a process of de-historicization in which North Americans equate our ways of life with development and progress (while effacing the myriad differences among North Americans and the existence and histories of various Indigenous Peoples in North America), as detailed above, and assign inferiority to other ways of being and of knowing. Whiteness is reinscribed with development in a self-perpetuating cycle that reinforces dominance. Second, there is the assumption that these "othered" spaces and places are available to us (middle-class, white people), and that the people living there need and want our interventions, and that they are awaiting our help. Third is the assumption that something must be done and that we are the people to do it – indeed, that we are entitled to intervene. This is where many deeply held problematic ideas around Fair Trade present themselves.

Embedded within this assumption is the agency of North Americans to act. Most Fair Trade craft marketing is written in such a way to make artisans seem as needy as possible, but also empowered through their sales, thus implicating consumers as agents of change, benevolently bestowing gifts of empowerment, financial sustainability, and political agency upon otherwise helpless artisans. Take, for example, this excerpt from a Fair Trade craft organization:

> Each Freeset Bag tells a story of one woman's journey to freedom. She used to stand with 6,000 other prostitutes in a small but well known area of North Calcutta. She didn't choose her profession; it chose her. Poverty does that. It robs people of their dignity and children of their innocence.
>
> She still lives in the same area, but instead of selling her body she makes Freeset Bags. Now she has choices, the choice to work decent hours for decent pay, to re-establish her dignity in her community and to learn to read and write. Now her daughter won't have to stand in the street selling her body like her mother used to. Freedom has been passed on to the next generation. By purchasing a Freeset Bag, you become part of the story of freedom. Thank you!

In our review of Fair Trade craft promotional materials, descriptions like this frequently called for us to seize our potential to save some disempowered person (usually a racialized woman), employing our agency and guaranteeing her appreciation for our unquestionably benevolent action. Image after image from Fair Trade materials show the farmer or artisan as obviously poor, certainly by North American standards, yet smiling and grateful.

Global North consumers are not only able to act, but also entitled to act, interceding in the lives of Others. This strategy implicitly suggests that the farmers and artisans on behalf of whom Fair Trade claims to advocate lack the agency to make the changes to their lives that they/we seek. Many Fair Trade marketing materials try to combat this idea, claiming that Fair Trade is a grassroots development strategy and that farmers do have agency. Within this line of argument, the North Americans' role is in amplifying the voices of

farmers, and making their actions more effective (Wright 2004). Inherent in this strategy of intervention is the judgment that farmers' strategies are insufficient without us. We also assume here that we have the education and knowledge necessary to intervene and promote a development agenda that is appropriate to the myriad producer organizations involved in Fair Trade around the world.

Fair Trade activism and other "helping" actions directed at the Global South also serve as "containment strategies" where Global North actors can acknowledge colonial history while limiting their self-perceived complicity by positioning themselves as good (Heron 2007, 124-126). Many consumers recognize the relative poverty farmers live in; some even have a critique of the exploitation of farmers under capitalism. In supporting Fair Trade, they imagine themselves as "shopping for a change" rather than buying "sweatshop coffee." They see themselves as subverting the ills of global capitalism and doing what they can to end poverty. In doing so, many consumers absolve themselves of any greater responsibility to address the poverty they identify or to interrogate the ways that they perpetuate and benefit from the poverty of others.

Undoubtedly, some consumers recognize and struggle with the insufficiency of political consumption. There are yet other "conscious" consumers – we have met many of them over the last decade – that feel secure, even righteous at times, in their perceived morally superior position. Based on our involvement in Fair Trade and other trade justice movements, we assume there are nuanced and numerous – and at times contradictory – reasons for such actions. There is some evidence (Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti 2005) that for some people political consumption does not displace other forms of political engagement. Many people, including the two of us, participate in political consumption and other forms of political activity like street protests. We are not saying that buying Fair Trade necessarily displaces other forms of political engagement; however, we have also found that a significant portion of Fair Trade movement participants and organizations do not think of their work in explicitly political terms, but rather through a sentiment of helping/charity. Regardless of whether or not Fair Trade participants are politically active beyond their personal consumption or if they understand their actions in terms of helping or in terms of solidarity, none of us are innocent and all of us are implicated in historical and ongoing colonial relations. Unfortunately, the dominant practices and discourses of Fair Trade continue to hinge on neocolonial developmentalist ideas that reinscribe bourgeois status on the consumer while depriving farmers of agency.

In his classic book, Albert Memmi (1965/1991) argues that whether people ignore or deny their implication in the colonial past or work to reject colonial relations, they/we are inextricably bound to that history and present. Buying Fair Trade products is not an escape hatch out of our implication in neocolonial relations. Rather, buying Fair Trade for many is a manifestation of bourgeois subjectivity. It is a way to assert one's own desires to help a distant Other in order to establish oneself as good, effective, and empowered. Thus, we claim

that Fair Trade is a neocolonial developmentalist movement; one that relies on colonialist discourses and ideologies to reinscribe roles of racial supremacy and inferiority while affirming the "goodness" of white consumers, enabling them to abdicate their implication in ongoing colonial relations.

In positioning oneself as able, effective, knowledgeable, and good, one asserts oneself in contrast to the Other and secures a position of superiority and righteousness. Yet, how does this simultaneously exist alongside the promotion of Fair Trade as democratic, farmer-driven, alternative development? In the previous section we discussed the paradox of how Northern fair traders extend a hand to producers while simultaneously banishing them to a previous social order (the neocolonial developmentalist "waiting room of history", to borrow a phrase from Chakrabarty (2000/2008, 8) mentioned earlier).Here we want to highlight a related paradox, which Heron calls the "Paradox of the Other":

> Our ongoing justifications to ourselves for our presence 'there' are contingent on repeated assertions of racialized difference or Othering that cannot be acknowledged as such...because we are not supposed to engage in the process of Othering. We want some African people to be subjects with whom we can form equal relations and yet simultaneously we require Africans to take the position of Other. This Other can be construed, often, through putative 'cultural' limitations, as needing our presence in order to 'improve' in some way, affirming directly what racialized discourse in the North persistently infers: the superiority of the white bourgeois subject who bears the knowledge that counts. (Heron 2007, 150)

Although the Fair Trade movement is different from the context Heron describes, through our years of experience we have found the same contradictions embedded within Fair Trade. The movement at its core is about manufacturing and representing the relationship between producers and consumers in Fair Trade in specific ways through the marketing done by businesses, the educational materials that NGOs circulate, and the definitions and standards promoted by the certification and accreditation institutions. Because of this coordinated work directed at coordinating the consumption of individuals and institutions, engaged consumers want to know and be in a relationship with the farmers who grow their coffee, cocoa, and so on. Yet, the information in Fair Trade promotional materials racializes the relationship between producers, traders and consumers and sets producers apart as Other. These relationships between producers and consumers are not simply immaterial fictions designed to dupe consumers.[10] Rather, they are integral to the ongoing production of the Fair Trade system.

Fair traders critique helping narratives and counter them with messages of self-help and solidarity. Promotional materials tout Fair Trade as "empowering,"

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[10] Besides the fact that one should not think of discourse as somehow severed from materiality, there are, of course, myriad historical-geographical-material relations between producers and consumers in both Fair Trade and the conventional system.

"affirm[ing] human dignity by promoting fair wages", "telling [farmers and artisans'] own stories" and "support[ing] organizations in poor communities overseas in their struggle to secure basic rights." Yet, at the same time that fair traders reject the discourse of helping and embrace notions of solidarity and producers pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps, they employ implicitly and sometimes explicitly colonialist assumptions that producers' agency is dependent upon the actions of Global North businesses and consumers to be realized (Wright 2004). The very idea of intervention through conscious consumption reproduces that which fair traders deny: while we claim that we want to be in solidarity, supporting the agency of farming and artisan communities, our actions serve to reinforce difference and dependence.

Conclusion

There are serious problems and limitations with Fair Trade, some of which are inherent to the movement's neocolonial capitalist structure and cannot be overcome by minor reforms to the movement and its institutions. Some of these troublesome dynamics have worsened since the turn of the millennium with the institutionalization of international certification and the imposition of unequal decision-making and governance policies. Other dynamics have deteriorated since the introduction of TNCs in the certified system. FTUSA's unilateral move to leave the FTI system without farmer consultation and consent, indeed against the expressed concerns of the PNs and several Global North advocacy organizations, and the increased reliance on and promotion of plantation production only serve to deepen the problems of Fair Trade. These structural power differentials, in turn, have had significant consequences for the discursive relations of Fair Trade. Fair Trade is built upon and reinscribes colonial ideas of progress and development rooted in assumptions of evolutionary Time and the denial of coevalness of producers. Although Fair Trade claims to bring consumers and producers together, in the process of fetishizing producers and products as exotic, it reinforces the Otherness of producers and the bourgeois subjectivity of consumers. In seeking to know and be in relationship with producers, consumers and activists assert themselves as superior in relationship to producers who become the object of reform and development. If we as white North Americans want to be in this movement as allies in solidarity, we must reject the idea of development, which requires us to see our lifestyles as developed and to see certain others as in need of our help so they can become more like us.

There is a tendency amongst many social scientists that write critically about Fair Trade to qualify or retract their critiques in the conclusions of their articles and books and to express their continued support for Fair Trade in general. We are not going to do that here. We are not issuing a flat denunciation of Fair Trade in general; however, our support for Fair Trade is limited to producer-led initiatives and collaborations, co-op-to-co-op ventures, and anti-racist and anti-colonial trade justice organizing. Building and maintaining solidarity relationships is always difficult and fraught. We are not saying that cross-

cultural or transnational solidarity is impossible. Instead, we suggest that the helping imperative is antithetical to solidarity. Notions of help and development rely on and reinscribe power relations rooted in the colonial past and present that must be acknowledged and actively undermined if we aspire to working in solidarity. There are examples of solidarity through producer-led initiatives in Fair Trade. Take, for example, the CLAC's labeling initiative, Símbolo de Pequeños Productores (SPP), and companies that are buying SPP labeled products. Co-ownership ventures between producers and traders, like Divine Chocolate, provide other examples of solidarity in Fair Trade. These examples, and precious few others, demonstrate what solidarity relationships can look like – led by producer organizations, framed in terms of justice rather than charity, and benefitting producer communities in ways that they articulate as welcome and necessary for their own vision of "development." It is, however, too often the case that such examples are used to shield or deflect criticism from Fair Trade in general or from specific aspects of it. Furthermore, these initiatives are not without their own problems and these, too, should be scrutinized.[11] From our work in Fair Trade throughout the last ten years, we know that some producer cooperatives are accomplishing important things for their communities – practicing radical democracy, fomenting alternative forms of grassroots "development," and challenging FTI's and FTUSA's Eurocentric vision of development and "fair" trade. It is time for more North American advocates to follow the leadership of these producers as the Fair Trade movement and market struggle to reorient themselves.

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[11] Cafédirect, the company that Caroline Wright (2004) analyzes, can in many ways be said to be operating in solidarity with producers; however, Wright nonetheless critiques them, and is correct in doing so, for propagating racist and colonialist ideas in some of their advertisements.

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Appendix: images

Image 1: The USFT logo from 2003

Image 2: The Fair Trade Los Angeles logo from 2012

Image 3: The UPAVIM logo from 2012

The translation of Indigenous agency and innovation into political and cultural power: the case of Indigenous fishing rights in Australia

Julia Miller Cantzler

Abstract

This paper examines the historical and contemporary conflict over Indigenous fishing rights in Australia to demonstrate that, despite resilient and constraining legal and political obstacles, Indigenous Australians have been able to employ innovative and culturally-relevant strategies to achieve greater control over traditional aquatic resources on terms that are consistent with the dictates of Indigenous traditional laws and customs and that adhere to the needs of Indigenous communities as they define them. These revelations contribute to an undertheorized area of social movement research by demonstrating the power of human agency through the innovative deployment of alternative tactical solutions in order to sustain political challenges and affect change. Further, the findings reveal that Indigenous tactical innovation is a fundamental ingredient in the broader process of decolonizing culturally and economically significant Indigenous resources.

Introduction

Because Indigenous Peoples in many settler societies continue to occupy remote territories or remain marginalized within urban populations, it is easy for non-Indigenous citizens to hang onto antiquated beliefs that native societies are "disappearing cultures." Despite these beliefs, Indigenous communities have not disappeared, nor have they been fully assimilated into mainstream societies. While Indigenous Peoples continue to confront huge challenges when it comes to disparities in their education, overall health and poverty levels, many are starting to experience positive changes in their abilities to control their own destinies while achieving culturally relevant solutions to the obstacles they face. Much of this positive change is directly linked to the significant political, cultural and economic revitalization that is occurring within Indigenous communities (Nesper 2002). At the heart of revitalization efforts are claims to greater self-determination over traditionally harvested natural resources that remain central to Indigenous Peoples' cultural identities, their subsistence needs, and their economic aspirations. These claims are contentious, however, due to the fact that many traditionally harvested Indigenous resources are often highly valued by non-Indigenous stakeholders for predominantly economic reasons. This is certainly the case with Indigenous fisheries, which have been systematically dismantled by laws and policies aimed at removing them from

Indigenous Peoples' control and placing them into the hands of non-Indigenous commercial and recreational stakeholders.

Notwithstanding the evidence of Indigenous revitalization and the relevance of Indigenous activism in bringing about broader political transformations, relatively little theoretical work within the social movements literature has explored the dynamics of political contention between states and Indigenous actors (A few notable exceptions include Cornell 1988; Fenelon 1998; Nagel 1996; Petray 2010; SinghaRoy 2012; Stotik, Shriver and Cable 1994). Much of the earlier work that focuses on these types of political interactions tends to highlight the formidable structural factors that influence the rise and fall of Indigenous social movements, while underemphasizing the importance of Indigenous agency in shaping the dynamics of contention (Fenelon 1998; Johnson, Nagel and Champagne 1997; Stotik et al. 1994). While this work has provided valuable insights into the power-laden dynamics of ethnic conflict during early colonial periods and at the inception of modern day Indigenous activism, such a framework may not be well-suited to capture contemporary realities of Indigenous mobilization through which native peoples are achieving greater local autonomy over their lands and resources and increased influence within mainstream decision-making arenas. Recognizing these limitations, a small but growing body of research has begun to focus more explicitly on the tensions between the structural and agential dynamics of contention involving Indigenous political actors and the state (Cornell 1988; Gedicks 1993; Maaka and Fleras 2005; Petray 2010; SinghaRoy 2012). Such research reveals the implications of Indigenous agency for native peoples' continued, and in many cases, increasing autonomy over their own political affairs.

This article synthesizes this small but important body of research on Indigenous agency while contributing new theoretical insights into the dynamics of political contention between Indigenous actors and the state. I specifically examine the historical and contemporary conflict over Indigenous fishing rights in Australia. My findings demonstrate that, despite resilient and constraining legal and political obstacles, Indigenous Peoples have been able to employ innovative, culturally-relevant strategies to achieve greater control over traditional aquatic resources on terms that are consistent with Indigenous traditional laws and customs and that adhere to the needs of Indigenous communities as they define them. These revelations contribute to an undertheorized area of social movement research by demonstrating the power of human agency through the innovative deployment of alternative tactical solutions to sustain political challenges and affect change. The findings reveal that Indigenous tactical innovation is fundamental to the broader process of decolonizing culturally and economically significant Indigenous resources.

In addition to its theoretical contributions, this article seeks to encourage dialogue between academic research and movement practitioners, as well as facilitating greater engagement between Indigenous activists and state actors currently embroiled in struggles for control over vital natural, cultural and economic resources. First, the findings in this study reveal the tactical

approaches that have been most effective for Indigenous fishers in achieving modest yet important transformations of the laws and policies that impact their rights. It is hoped that this information will assist Indigenous parties in becoming more central players in political decision-making processes over matters that are fundamental to their cultural, political and economic well-being.

Second, this study reveals the formidable structural constraints that shape Indigenous-state relations in Australia. In so doing, it reveals the institutional obstacles that hinder negotiation and resolution of resource disputes as well as the sites of structural vulnerability most susceptible to Indigenous claims of rights. By exposing the discriminatory colonial legacies that continue to present obstacles to the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and their aspirations within contemporary regulatory frameworks, this study highlights these barriers and provides ammunition for those on both sides of the debate who seek to move beyond the past in order to construct more equal and bicultural blueprints for citizenship and governance in Australia.

Why fishing rights?

Struggles over natural resources, whether they involve access to land or competition over fish and game, have long been primary sources of conflict between European settlers and Indigenous Peoples (Fenelon 1998; Wilmer and Alfred 1997). Traditional subsistence hunting and fishing activities are particularly crucial to the cultural continuity and political and economic self-determination of Indigenous communities (Freeman, Bogoslovskaya, Caulfield, Egede, Krupnik, and Stevenson 1998; Nesper 2002; Wilkinson 2000). Oftentimes, however, Indigenous Peoples' long-standing interests in animal and fish species come into direct conflict with the ever-changing, but predominantly economic, interests of mainstream corporate and governmental actors. Not surprisingly, the operation of non-Indigenous recreational and commercial fisheries directly conflicts with the interests of Aboriginal Peoples who have long relied on access to fisheries to satisfy their own subsistence, spiritual and economic needs. In addition to maintaining significant economic and regulatory interests in fisheries, State and Commonwealth (i.e. federal) governments in Australia are increasingly answering to a growing constituency of environmental advocates who demand preservation of the fisheries in light of mounting evidence of resource depletion. Some vocal preservationists, as well as representatives of the fishing industry, contend that Indigenous harvests of marine resources are to blame for declining fish stocks, despite little evidence of this.

Fishing and hunting marine animals is deeply rooted in the traditional identities of Indigenous Peoples, who view these activities as integral to their political, cultural and economic self-determination (Ross and Pickering 2002). While fishing and hunting provide for their subsistence needs and present opportunities for economic self-sufficiency, the actions themselves, and the

bounty that they supply, are fundamentally linked to deeply-held notions of the sacred that continue to shape their worldviews and practices. Through creation stories and oral traditions that root Indigenous Australians[1] to the sea, a body of law is derived that establishes Aboriginal Peoples as stewards of their sea country with enduring and definitive obligations to protect it from destruction (Coombs 1994). Aboriginal traditional laws remain at the heart of Indigenous cultural meaning systems and provide the motivation and moral authority for challenges to non-Indigenous incursions into their sea country. The maintenance of traditional fishing and hunting practices implicates the very survival of Indigenous communities because it ensures that sacred knowledge regarding their sea country will be passed down to future generations. Given the centrality of marine resources to Indigenous Peoples' way of life, it is not surprising that infringements upon their customary fishing and aquatic hunting practices are viewed as unacceptable threats to the preservation of traditional knowledge and their communities' health and welfare.

In light of these conflicting interests, struggles over fishing have developed into intense battles, the outcomes of which have the potential to alter the playing fields upon which the political relationships between Indigenous Peoples and the Australian government are structured. After centuries of colonial domination, however, these playing fields are in no way equal, with the Australian state wielding significant institutional and ideological authority over Indigenous affairs. While on a superficial level state authority in Australia and other settler states appears impermeable, a deeper examination of these types of struggles reveals that Indigenous Peoples around the world are often able to exert meaningful influence over processes of resource allocation in colonial societies and, in many cases, they do so on terms that they define as culturally meaningful (Freidman 1999; Nesper 2002; Maaka and Fleras 2005). This, however, begs the question of how, in the face of such lopsided political power structures, Indigenous Peoples are able to remain relevant players in struggles over natural resources.

Data

Capturing the strategic and interactive dynamics of contention that emerge during struggles over Indigenous fishing and aquatic rights requires multiple levels of data. To capture aspects of the broader political landscape as well as movement level dynamics, I drew primarily from archived legal documents such as treaties, legislation, and court decisions as well as legislative debates, court transcripts and newspaper articles that explicitly deal with the controversy over

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[1] Indigenous Australians also refer to themselves as Aboriginal Australians and Traditional Owners, which implies their original and uninterrupted autonomy over traditional lands and natural resources. In addition, many Indigenous Peoples in Australia choose not to refer to themselves as "Australian," preferring instead to identify as Peoples or as a Nation. These terms will be used interchangeably in this article to refer to the indigenous inhabitants of what is presently Australia.

Indigenous fishing. Primary and secondary sources, including anthropological literature and official documentation from Indigenous organizations and representative bodies, including press releases and policy statements, as well as interview data from Indigenous activists and experts on Aboriginal fishing and economic development were also analyzed to reveal the repertoires of contention activated during these political campaigns. These analyses take a particularly expansive view of who comprises the Aboriginal fishing rights movement in Australia, and have incorporated viewpoints from local Traditional Owners with a direct interest in their traditional fisheries, as well as their representatives and advocates. The latter include attorneys who represent Traditional Owners in native title cases, Indigenous Land Council representatives, Indigenous Land Management Facilitators, and experts affiliated with the Northern Australia Land and Sea Management Alliance (NAILSMA) and the Torres Strait Regional Authority, among others, who all have an interest in restoring and advancing native peoples' cultural, political and economic rights to their sea countries.

Archived documents were collected from comprehensive online and library databases managed by the Indigenous Law Centre at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, the Native Title Studies Centre and the Cape York Land Council in Cairns, Queensland, the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies in Canberra, the Queensland Department of Primary Industries in Brisbane, CRC Reef Research Centre Limited and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority in Townsville, Queensland, the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research in Canberra, the National Native Title Tribunal in Perth, Western Australia, and NAILSMA in Darwin, Northern Territory. Supplementary interviews were conducted with Indigenous and non-Indigenous stakeholders in the government, public and private sectors, as well as with legal, political and economic experts, during a two month research trip to Australia (January-March 2008).

Analytical approach

In order to capture the structural and agential tensions that persist in Indigenous Australians' political struggles for fishing rights, I focus on the interactions that occur between the political opportunity structure, on the one hand, and the mobilizing strategies activated by Indigenous political actors, on the other. My primary objectives are to reveal: the role of human agency in driving the tactical choices of Indigenous actors despite formidable institutional constraints; how the cultural, economic and political prerogatives of Indigenous challengers inform their tactical solutions; and, how the tactical breakthrough of Indigenous claimants in more receptive settings impacts the sustainability and outcomes of challenges to enduring colonial structures of domination.

To facilitate these objectives, this study utilizes Tilly and Tarrow's (2006) interactional, mechanism-process approach for explaining episodes of contention. This approach was developed as a companion to McAdam, Tarrow

and Tilly's (2001) *Dynamics of Contention,* in order to provide a methodological foundation for exploring and understanding interactions between fundamental, relational mechanisms of contention -- namely, political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. During episodes of contentious politics, groups make claims through coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs that essentially involve interactions with agents of the government. Through analogy or comparison of similar episodes of contention, or through in-depth case immersion, the mechanism-process approach is able to provide a more general account of the broader processes at work during periods of political conflict. In-depth case analysis is facilitated by identifying the central mechanisms that operate during periods of political contention. Mechanisms are interactional events "that alter relations among sets of elements in similar ways over a variety of situations" (Tilly and Tarrow 2006:29). Depending on the political contexts in which they operate (i.e. the political opportunities afforded by particular state regimes), and the social resources available to challengers (such as their mobilizing structures, cultural predispositions, and political and ideological traditions regarding contention), such mechanisms will combine in particular ways to produce divergent forms of contention across sites. As such, this approach is ideally suited to comparative analyses. This paper is part of a larger study that applies this method in a comparative fashion, seeking to explain divergent trajectories of contention across national contexts.[2]

These analyses were facilitated through the use of the NVivo software package. NVivo provides an interface through which documents and interview data can be easily coded and managed, and through which analytical concepts, rhetorical frames, and historical episodes can be linked in a manner that is theoretically meaningful. Prior to analyzing any of the 250 documents or 28 semi-structured interviews, I created general codes, which were inductively extracted from the broad themes revealed in the social movement literature. Codes pertaining to political opportunities include references to colonial histories, prevailing policies for managing Indigenous fishing rights, institutional structures for making claims, state responses to Indigenous claims-making, and mainstream and political discourses regarding race, ethnicity and indigeneity, as well as dominant beliefs regarding the causes of environmental and species' declines. General codes pertaining to mobilizing structures include references to decisions about where to address Indigenous fishing rights claims, the content of those claims (whether politically, economically, or culturally focused), and any innovations in the ways that Indigenous groups pursued their interests. After reviewing and coding the data and identifying the general themes, I created additional sub-categories to flesh out the general themes and aid in the analyses. These subcategories were coded in accordance with themes revealed in the literatures on Indigenous movements, culture, and racial and ethnic

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[2] The larger project compares episodes of political contention between Indigenous political actors and the state over access to and development of traditional fisheries in Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

identities, and also reflected the political and cultural mechanisms that emerged through data immersion. These codes were then systematically applied to the archival and interview data. Once the coding was completed, an in-depth narrative was constructed that provides a detailed snapshot of the political and legal landscape confronting Indigenous activists and the strategic ways that Indigenous claims-makers innovate in the face of broader constraints in order to maximize their potential to achieve greater authority over traditionally-significant aquatic resources.

Indigenous mobilization

While a growing body of research by Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars focuses on Indigenous political action both locally and globally (Barker 2005; Bergeron 2010; Gedicks 2001), few empirical studies have grounded Indigenous activism within the framework of social movement theory (notable exceptions include Bobo and Tuan 2006; Cornell 1988; Fenelon 1998; Hall and Fenelon 2008; Johnson, Nagel and Champagne 1997; Merlan 2005; Nagel 1996; Petray 2010; SinghaRoy 2012; Stotik, Shriver and Cable 1994). This is unfortunate, as the topic can reveal important theoretical insights into key cultural dimensions of political contention, particularly as they inform the role of human agency in sustaining political challenges, as well as the social mechanisms that facilitate broad political and cultural change. Indigenous mobilization is a uniquely cultural phenomenon. Instead of seeking inclusion within, or accommodation by, the broader society, Indigenous Peoples often demand rights to political self-determination and cultural autonomy. Research on Indigenous activism can contribute to the broader social movement literature by highlighting the influence of culture on repertoires of contention, including the unique strategies of action and movement objectives of Indigenous activists (see, for example, SinghaRoy's (2012) study of Indigenous environmental activism in New South Wales). It can also provide unique insights into the interactional and, fundamentally, agency-laden mechanisms of contention that make it possible for the alternative logics of Indigenous activists to transform long-accepted and institutionalized discourses regarding citizenship, democracy and multiculturalism (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998).

According to Alvarez (1998) and Maaka and Fleras (2005), contemporary Indigenous mobilization is marked by the infusion of democratic politics with discourses of culture and identity. Indigenous Peoples mobilize around deeply alternative views of citizenship and identity, and demand that states recognize their "right to live together differently" with members of the dominant population (Maaka and Fleras 2005:12). While these claims are often rooted in local cultural identities and are based on the continual or original occupation of geographic spaces, they do not relegate native lifestyles to traditional ways of the past. Instead, claims by Indigenous Peoples are simultaneously rooted in the past, where their legal, ethical, and cultural legitimacy is based, and oriented toward the future, in their emphases on economic opportunities, cultural

revitalization, political autonomy and co-governance within broader governmental regimes.

The fact that Indigenous Peoples, especially those in British settler societies, occupy politically, culturally and geographically distinct spaces within larger nations is highly relevant for understanding key mechanisms that drive counter-hegemonic resistance, including the significance of oppositional culture, the construction of alternative political identities, and the activation of culturally consistent tactical solutions. According to Gramsci (1971), hegemony consists of the power to dominate through unseen structures and the uncritical acceptance of dominant ideologies by oppressed groups. To the extent possible, hegemonic power seeks to neutralize dissent and promote political passivity. Resistance, then, requires the ability to see through these systems of domination. This can only happen when a population acquires historical perspective and political consciousness. Indigenous Peoples' unique and separate political and geographic positions in many settler societies have resulted from their historical struggles and, oftentimes, this is written directly into the law. As such, Indigenous Peoples, more than other politically marginalized groups, may already have the historical perspective and political consciousness necessary to engage in active, counter-hegemonic resistance.

Billings (1990), expanding upon Gramsci, asserts that in order to engage in resistance, individuals must experience a "conversion." This is only possible where there are autonomous organizations operating outside of hegemonic control (what Fantasia and Hirsch (1995) and others refer to as "free spaces"), where organic intellectuals are able to activate alternative ideologies, and where existing networks operate to legitimize the plausibility of counter-hegemonic views. In Australia, many Indigenous communities occupy remote territories that remain relatively removed from non-Indigenous interference and within which traditional systems of knowledge are fostered. Semi-autonomous Indigenous communities are agency-laden institutions through which alternative cultural meaning systems are sustained, solidarity is produced and tactical solutions are derived. Moreover, the past thirty years have witnessed the emergence of new Indigenous leaders in Australia who have played an ever more important role in reimagining and reasserting Indigenous Peoples' claims for increased political and cultural autonomy. Within these geographically bounded communities, as well as in the growing urban Indigenous population, are likeminded individuals who reinforce counter-hegemonic claims and mobilize around them.

Mara Loveman (2005) contends that state-making is an inherently cultural and symbolic endeavour. State power consists of the naturalization of state legitimacy in particular bureaucratic realms as well as the imposition of ideological power through the assertion of cultural myths and nationalistic identities. Loveman asserts, however, that state hegemony is not inevitable and it does not occur all at once. Rather, it happens as a result of conflict over state legitimacy in different bureaucratic realms. State victories in a particular realm tilt the playing field in favour of the state such that all future conflicts happen on

its terms. While most settler governments have achieved legitimate authority in the vast majority of bureaucratic realms, state legitimacy over Indigenous affairs remains contested, as the undiminished stream of lawsuits concerning Indigenous rights illustrate. In the Australian case, the unsettled nature of Indigenous policy has been reinforced by the government's shift to a more reconciliatory approach toward Indigenous Peoples, which was influenced by Indigenous activism from below and United Nations pressure from above (SinghaRoy 2012). According to SinghaRoy, "The policies of accommodation and reconciliation that have been introduced in the wake of proliferation of self-conscious indigenous movements since early 1970s have opened up new possibilities and challenges in re-establishing linkages between indigenous culture and environment" (2012:6). These recent trends are meaningful to Indigenous fisheries activists, providing them with new openings from which to dismantle and reframe the cultural discourses and structural hierarchies that have historically oppressed them.

Issues of Indigenous sovereignty, self-determination, and decolonization remain hotly contested by Indigenous activists and scholars who have widely divergent views on not only what these ideas stand for, but whether or not they are advantageous pursuits for Indigenous communities seeking to live their lives on their own terms (Alfred 1999; Barker 2005; Falk and Martin 2007; Ontai 2005). These debates have far-reaching ramifications for Indigenous social movements. They must decide whether to pursue tactics within mainstream legal and political channels, or focus their efforts on more autonomous and non-hegemonic strategies for achieving meaningful cultural, political, and economic autonomy that is not necessarily reliant on the state's formal recognition of Aboriginal rights. Some persuasively argue that the utilization of dominant discourses and institutions by Indigenous activists reinforces hegemonic power and formal structures of racial domination (Alfred 1999; Petray 2010 *citing* Maddison 2008, 2009; Barker 2005 *citing* Morris). While these more accommodating strategies of action may not be best suited for Indigenous aspirations of independent sovereignty, they are in line with a vision of decolonization that foresees more moderate transformations of colonial systems of governance to shared governance regimes "based on overlapping jurisdictions within a joint sovereignty rather than on the absolute and undivided sovereignty of the state" (Maaka and Fleras 2005:59). According to Young,

> ... few Indigenous peoples seek sovereignty for themselves in the sense of the formation of an independent, internationally recognised state with ultimate authority over all matters within a determinately bounded territory. Most Indigenous peoples seek significantly greater and more secure self-determination within the framework of a wider polity (2000:252).

I contend that Indigenous mobilization strategies that utilize and innovate within dominant political structures for the purpose of asserting culturally relevant alternatives that embrace Indigenous rights and autonomy over

traditional lands and resources are consistent with these broader aspirations. They also provide insights into the agency-generating mechanisms that can sustain political challenges and produce positive outcomes despite a relatively closed political system.

Mainstream structural and cultural barriers to meaningful recognition of Indigenous fishing rights

In general, broad-based Aboriginal mobilization over fishing rights has been relatively rare in Australia. Instead, resistance against unilateral state and industry control of marine and estuary resources has been far more localized and piecemeal. One explanation for this is that the Australian government has favoured the native title system –a single, overarching institutionalized process for adjudicating Indigenous rights to land and sea resources. Because this system is particularly ill-suited to address the cultural and economic facets of Indigenous aquatic rights, Traditional Owners have little choice but to mobilize their efforts elsewhere if they hope to achieve recognition of the full-breadth of their authority.

Contemporary native title law in Australia evolved out of the landmark case of *Mabo and Others v. The State of Queensland*. In the *Mabo* decision, the Australian High Court struck down the longstanding legal fiction of *terra nullius*, which had provided the philosophical foundation upon which the Australian colonial state was built. Specifically, "the High Court held that the Indigenous inhabitants of Australia held customary native title in their traditional lands … so long as [it has] not been validly extinguished by legislative or executive action, provided that they have not surrendered their title or lost their connection with the land" (Horrigan 2003 *citing* Mason 1996:3).

Despite its promise, the native title process poses major obstacles to meaningful assertions of Indigenous authority over traditional natural resources. Firstly, native title tribunals deal with the claims of Indigenous Peoples separately, hindering cooperation between Indigenous communities and the pooling of resources in order to achieve shared benefits. Secondly, native title courts have the authority to determine whether Indigenous groups have proven a continuous application of traditional law over a particular resource. This gives primacy to determinations by non-Indigenous judges about the content and the authenticity of "traditional" Aboriginal culture (Brennan 2007). By anointing the courts as the final arbiters of traditional culture, the native title system thereby reduces Indigenous Peoples' power to define their own cultural prerogatives.

In order to maximize their chances of achieving meaningful authority over valuable marine resources, Traditional Owners often choose to assert their rights through political channels outside the native title system. This presents its own challenges. Generally, the regulatory structure for

managing natural resources in Australia is divided between the states and the Commonwealth (Reilly 2006). Within these regimes, authority is further spilt amongst a number of bureaucratic agencies with conflicting agendas. This has resulted in a hodgepodge of incongruent fishing regulations and rulings that, for the most part, have given short shrift to Indigenous customary rights and have proscribed commercial fishing altogether. Traditional Owners are thereby compelled to negotiate individually with Federal and State governments with no guarantee of a consistent outcome (National Native Title Tribunal 2005). The tendency of administrative agencies to deal with Indigenous interests at the local level only has also inhibited the assertion of rights in a unified fashion. Ross and Pickering (2002) contend that, "by recognizing hundreds of separate individual communities and governments, there has been less structural space for one powerful Indigenous voice to emerge and demand access and input into natural resource agencies" (p. 208).

Another major obstacle facing Indigenous activists is that agencies with authority over Aboriginal affairs are predominantly staffed by non-Indigenous people who fail to advocate effectively for Aboriginal Peoples' needs. The same can generally be said for native title judges and the experts who testify to the presence or absence of unbroken Indigenous authority over particular resources. In light of these demographics, it is perhaps unsurprising that management regimes and regulatory frameworks tend to favour Western scientific definitions of conservation over more holistic Indigenous notions regarding sustainability.

The privileging of Western scientific paradigms in natural resource management and in the legal frameworks used to determine Aboriginal fishing rights is exhibited in several crucial ways. First, mainstream legal systems separate land and sea rights, applying different standards to each. While the native title system specifically recognizes the potential for exclusive Aboriginal title over land, the same does not hold true for Aboriginal rights to sea territory. "The government has not minced any words in relation to native title in the sea: 'native title is not recognized in the sea.' This of course is a presumption of epic proportions that flies in the face of aboriginal assertions now and forever" (Roberts and Tanna 1998:3). The disparate treatment of sea rights is based on the European legal fiction that the sea is part of the commons and cannot be owned or exclusively possessed (Glaskin 2002). Sharp (1998) describes this philosophical tension in Aboriginal and European definitions of sea country as follows:

> In Aboriginal terms, northern coastal marine space is a series of common property areas owned by identifiable Indigenous groups with restricted memberships, each with its own geographical locale; and these are handed down as part of land-sea inalienable tenures in regimes based on local law and custom. In Anglo-Australian law state territorial marine space is an area of 'open access' based on the public rights of all Australian citizens conceived as isolated individuals" (p.3).

The Yolnu people of the Northern Territory clarify their integrated view of their land and sea countries straightforwardly, stating that "all Yolnu lands are connected to the sea and we make no distinction between sea and land estates when we exercise our customary rights and responsibilities" (Dhimurru Land Management Aboriginal Corporation 2006).

Second, non-Indigenous natural resource managers tend to take a divided approach to ecosystem management that is based on bureaucratic jurisdictions, rather than ecosystems, which is the norm within Aboriginal societies. Where Indigenous Peoples are able to acquire governmental funding for the management of marine resources, they are commonly expected to participate in established co-management protocols that require adherence to Western scientific expectations. Thus, even where Indigenous Peoples take the lead in resource management efforts, they are often unable to exert meaningful substantive control over the process. An Indigenous resource manager echoed this sentiment when he explained that, "the word governance is a tricky one - some might even call it a weasel word. In Natural Resource Management when people talk of Indigenous governance more often than not they use blackfella names to refer to whitefella ways" (NAILSMA 2008:49).

Further inhibiting broad-based mobilization is the fact that Aboriginal activists confront a general population that is, at best, indifferent and, at worst, hostile to their plight. General hostility toward Indigenous claims is emanating with increased vigour from the growing environmental and conservation movements. As conservation of the marine environment becomes a paramount concern for Australians, many are quick to target Aboriginal consumptive practices as in need of reform, rather than considering the far more destructive activities of commercial and recreational fishermen. A primary focus has been on the traditional hunting of dugongs for subsistence and ceremonial purposes. While experts historically recognized dugong population decline as incidental to non-Indigenous recreational boating and commercial fishing endeavours, many have now shifted their stance to suggest that Aboriginal hunting is principally responsible for the decline (National Native Title Tribunal 2004). This is despite findings by the National Recreational and Indigenous Fishing Survey that recreational fishers harvested approximately 136 million aquatic animals during 2000 and 2001, while Indigenous fishers harvested only 3 million aquatic animals (Durette 2007). Notwithstanding the conflicting evidence, Australian policymakers have responded with greater regulation of Indigenous dugong hunting, while placing few meaningful restrictions on incidental kills by commercial and recreational fisherman (National Native Title Tribunal 2004; Ross and Pickering 2002). The baseless accusations of non-Indigenous conservationists and the over-regulation of Indigenous dugong hunting provide glaring examples of latent forms of racism that persist in Australia at the public and institutional levels. Within this context of intolerance, Aboriginal activities alone are constructed as a social problem (Petray 2010).

Finally, Aboriginal activists must contend with non-Indigenous Australians' static views of Aboriginal culture, which constructs "authentic" Indigenous

culture as attached only to stereotypical Indigenous ways of life that are rooted firmly in the past. While these attitudes are slowly changing, some non-Indigenous policymakers cling to the belief that traditional Indigenous culture essentially stopped at the time of contact with European settlers (Ross and Pickering 2002). According to this logic, commercial fishing is considered an inherently modern economic endeavour that is incompatible with non-Indigenous perceptions of pre-contact Aboriginal ways of life. Although anthropological and historical evidence suggests that as early as the 1700s Aboriginal fishermen from Northern Australia traded fish with Macassan fishermen from the Indonesian archipelago, such evidence has not been accepted by the courts or by policymakers as proof of the existence of "traditional" commercial fishing by Aboriginal Peoples (Durette 2007). Indeed, no native title rights to engage in commercial fishing have been recognized in Australia and, at present, Aboriginal and non-Indigenous commercial fishermen are regulated identically. As a result, Indigenous customary fishing rights have been relegated to a subsistence level only and viable opportunities for economic independence have been closed to Aboriginal Peoples. While these formidable structural obstacles that stand in the way of the state's recognition of broad-based Aboriginal fishing rights may appear insurmountable, Aboriginal Peoples have not abandoned their claims to these vital traditional resources. Instead, as the following sections reveal, Aboriginal activists have responded by innovating within existing bureaucratic channels and focusing on local initiatives, such as the negotiation of co-management and resource access plans with state and regional agencies, rather than utilizing their limited resources to mobilize for sweeping national-level changes.

Indigenous Australian response and mobilization

In light of, or in spite of, the structural limitations confronting them, Indigenous Peoples in Australia have pursued an array of strategies to secure greater recognition of their traditional fishing rights. This section highlights the goals asserted by Indigenous fishermen, the institutional and extra-institutional arenas through which they assert these goals, and the tactical innovations that Indigenous Peoples employ to maximize their opportunities for achieving their political and economic objectives, while also ensuring that their cultural needs are met. This final point is perhaps the most compelling since the cultural concerns of Indigenous fishermen, including their ability to engage in traditionally significant hunting and fishing of aquatic resources, their management of these resources according to culturally-prescribed, sacred obligations, and the passing of traditional knowledge down to future generations, are of paramount concern and provide the moral framework for the breadth of their claims.

Goals asserted

Indigenous Australians emphasize three primary objectives regarding their traditional sea countries. First, they assert rights to access and take aquatic resources according to traditional laws and customs. These rights include the ability to hunt endangered and threatened species of dugong, sea turtles and, sometimes, saltwater crocodiles. Given the sensitive condition of dugong and turtle populations, and the general belief by non-Indigenous Australians that traditional methods of hunting these creatures are outmoded and barbaric, Indigenous Peoples face ongoing opposition to their basic rights to access and harvest these traditional species. This is the case despite Traditional Owners' customary obligations to protect dugongs and turtles and despite the more devastating threat posed to these species by non-Indigenous recreational and commercial activities. Indigenous claimants also demand access to traditionally harvested finfish, such as barramundi, and shellfish, including abalone and oysters. Access to finfish and shellfish remains important to meeting the subsistence needs of coastal Indigenous Peoples, who comprise approximately half of Australia's Indigenous population, and Torres Strait Islanders, whose seafood consumption is among the highest in the world (Smyth 2001). Opposition to these claims generally comes from members of the commercial fishing sector who view Indigenous fishing without a license as an unfair incursion into their economic interests.

Second, Indigenous fishers demand meaningful participation in the management of fisheries and aquatic resources. While Traditional Owners prefer to be primarily responsible for managing traditional resources, when this is not possible, joint management arrangements with other stakeholders and management agencies are seen as workable, secondary options (Nursey-Bray 2001). At minimum, Indigenous Peoples seek active participation in management regimes where they are able to assert influence within policy-making bodies and engage in management practices that are in line with their traditional laws and customs. The Yolnu people, who reside on their traditional lands in north-eastern Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory, explain why the sustainable management of their sea country is so vital to their cultural continuity:

> We continue our care and guardianship as our ancestors have done. We have an intimate knowledge of the environment and ecology in the places for which we have rights and responsibilities. We want our children and grandchildren to receive this knowledge so they can look after sea country. We do not come and go like most non-Indigenous people do. We want to continue to stay here permanently. However it is becoming increasingly difficult to undertake this work because our interests are often ignored or seen as secondary to non-Indigenous issues of open access, economic exploitation and the welfare of the well known and loved marine animals like turtles, dolphins, dugong and whales (Dhimurru Land Management Aboriginal Corporation 2006).

Indigenous Peoples' desire to meaningfully participate in marine resource management is driven by their appreciation of the link that exists between the relative health of their traditional resources and the health of the local communities that rely upon them for their subsistence, economic and spiritual needs. When talking about sea turtles, the Yolnu people of Northern Australia note that, "We believe our wellbeing and turtle (miyapunu) wellbeing are inseparable. To put it another way, we belong to turtles and turtles to us; we sustain them and they us" (Dhimurru Land Management Aboriginal Corporation 2006:25). A Traditional Owner from the Northern Territory expressed similar concerns: "Country needs[s] laughter. If we don't look after country, we'll shrivel up" (North Australia Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance 2005:6). A project officer from the North Australia Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance went further to emphasize the importance of culture and traditional knowledge in sustaining healthy resources and healthy Indigenous communities: "[F]or many countrymen caring for country includes a whole cultural dimension – ceremony, ritual, hunting, harvest, family, fire, and knowledge – where all things are connected and make an essential contribution to the maintenance of healthy people and healthy country" (North Australia Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance 2005:6).

A third goal of Indigenous stakeholders is to make a reasonable living from the traditional aquatic resources that they have harvested for thousands of years. Indigenous Australians do not separate their economic aspirations from their social, cultural, and political interests in sea country. Such divisions are seen as purely artificial categorizations imposed by White Australians according to Western cultural and legal norms that favour the interests of non-Indigenous stakeholders. The economic development of aquatic resources is viewed as natural for Indigenous Peoples, who have historically cultivated, harvested, and managed these resources to provide for their material needs, both through consumption and trade. According to the Yolnu people, the historical cultivation of traditional marine resources should form the foundation of legal recognition of their contemporary economic rights as well: "We argue that our prior ownership should give us an economic stake in the regional industries that rely on our sea country" (Dhimurru Land Management Aboriginal Corporation 2006: 52).

Moreover, commercialization of traditional fisheries offers opportunities for Indigenous Australians to achieve economic independence and reduce their reliance on public assistance. While Indigenous Peoples' dependence on the Australian welfare system remains a source of contempt for many non-Indigenous Australians, few are willing to concede to Indigenous Peoples a meaningful place in the commercial fisheries market, arguing that commercial activities are not "traditional" enough to justify exempting Indigenous fishermen from commercial licensing regulations. This is particularly frustrating for Indigenous Peoples who feel that non-Indigenous Australians are benefitting exclusively from traditional Indigenous resources. Peter Yu, an Indigenous leader from the Yawuru community in Western Australia, contends

that northern Australia is currently experiencing a resources boom and that Indigenous Australians, as major land owners and resource custodians, should benefit from this with "innovative and culturally appropriate planning for commercial development (North Australia Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance 2005:5)." According to Yu, "now is the time to build on and move to the next phase of claiming and defending our rights to country, to a time when our people can get relief, enjoyment and benefits out of exercising these rights (North Australia Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance 2005:5)."

In light of these general attitudes and the legal barriers that preclude Indigenous commercial fishing based on native title rights, Indigenous economic pursuits often remain secondary to their efforts to achieve greater access and management authority over their aquatic resources. Jon Altman, from the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, believes that greater advocacy by Indigenous Australians for commercial opportunities based on customary marine native title rights might bear fruit, and that Indigenous Australians have yet to put their full legal might behind the notion that traditional economic pursuits should have a place in contemporary markets (Altman Interview, Feb. 28, 2008).

Perhaps most striking about these three objectives – the right to access, manage, and economically develop their traditional marine resources -- is that, running through each of them, is an over-arching concern with sustaining and preserving Indigenous cultural and normative systems. This is revealed through the emphasis Indigenous activists place on passing down traditional knowledge regarding ceremony and stewardship to future generations, restoring Indigenous communities through the fortification of Indigenous belief systems, empowering Indigenous youth as future leaders, promoting economic self-sufficiency, and conserving the traditionally-significant resources that comprise their ancestral country. The Yolnu people acknowledge the pre-eminence of their cultural interests in their sea country while highlighting how these are inseparable from their political and economic aspirations:

> The interests of most other users are in preserving and conserving bio-diversity, in making an economic return or enjoying the sea and shores for recreation and pleasure. All of these reasons for valuing sea country are important to us, but for Yolnu and other Indigenous salt water people, our cultural survival and wellbeing is at stake. We are not just another stakeholder; we are the first Australians whose identity and essence is created in, through and with the sea and its creatures. We wish to contribute to regional and national economic development, in keeping with our time honoured responsibilities to care for the land and sea (Dhimurru Land Management Aboriginal Corporation 2006: 17).

Settings and strategies for claims-making

Decisions regarding where to assert claims of rights to access, manage and economically develop marine resources are strategic in nature and demonstrate Indigenous challengers' keen understanding of the political opportunities and obstacles that they confront. With their three primary objectives in mind, Indigenous actors choose to assert their claims in a variety of institutional and extra-institutional settings. The choice of where and how to pursue their claims depends on the nature of the institutional processes available to them, the opportunities for negotiated agreements, the likelihood of success for self-directed, independent ventures and, above all, the suitability of each strategy to meet the political, economic and cultural needs of Indigenous communities. The following section highlights the five primary strategies that Indigenous fishers in Australia have pursued: litigation, negotiated settlements and local co-management agreements, local management of federally-funded programs, commercialization of aquatic resources, and civil disobedience.

Litigation

The principal institutional settings available to adjudicate Indigenous Australians' rights to land and sea resources are native title tribunals. While initially established to reconcile claims to lands and resources in a manner that privileged Indigenous knowledge and traditional law, it has become increasingly evident that the native title process favours non-Indigenous economic interests over the competing claims of Traditional Owners (Foley 1997; Horrigan 2002). In light of this major limitation, many Indigenous stakeholders utilize native title tribunals for the narrow purpose of determining only the presence or absence of native title rights. Traditional Owners reserve the work of fleshing out the content of those rights for smaller-scale negotiated settlements where they have more persuasive power, or through bureaucratic channels that can be more easily influenced by Indigenous stakeholders. Because the native title system is relatively new, many non-Indigenous Australians remain somewhat anxious about the potential for native title determinations to usurp broad swaths of conflicting non-Indigenous interests to land and sea resources. While such an outcome is unlikely, Indigenous stakeholders are able to capitalize on this fear of the unknown in order to secure favourable outcomes through negotiation.

Despite the limitations of native title tribunals, Indigenous Australians have remained willing to test the boundaries of native title law's application to traditionally harvested marine mammals and fisheries. Indeed, decisions in several early test cases came down on the side of Traditional Owners, although these rulings were limited in scope to specific animals that could be harvested and the appropriate methods for doing so. Even so, they effectively handed Indigenous activists a legitimate tool by which they could negotiate access to traditionally harvested marine resources (See e.g. *Yanner v. Eaton* (1999); *Stephenson v. Yasso* (2006)). Beyond focusing on individual species, a few

Indigenous Peoples have utilized the native title system to assert more general claims to large areas of their traditional sea country. The foundational case which addressed this matter was *Yarmirr v. Northern Territory* (2001), in which the Australian High Court affirmed the existence of Aboriginal native title over sea country. This apparent victory for Traditional Owners was severely curtailed, however, by the way these rights were interpreted by the courts. Despite the existence of native marine title, common law rights of navigation and fishing could not be interfered with, meaning that Aboriginal marine title is considered *non-exclusive*. While native title rights were held to co-exist with the rights of licensed commercial and recreational fishermen, in the event of a conflict between them, non-Indigenous fishing rights would trump (Smyth 2001; See also *Akiba on behalf of the Torres Strait Islanders of the Regional Sea Claim Group v State of Queensland* (No 2) (2010) FCA 643; *Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust* (2008)). The Yolnu people of the Northern Territory recognize the ramifications of this problematic distinction by the courts:

> Our cultural rights including the rights to hunt, fish, gather and use resources allowed by and under our customary laws and customs are confirmed and recognised. However the court ruling [in *Yarmirr*] defines our rights as non-exclusive. The court found that our rights sit alongside those of others who currently use our sea country. Yet without exclusive control over our country we are still faced with the problems of unlawful intrusion, overfishing, habitat damage and disruption to our coastal communities. We still have difficulty seeing how the rights to fish - only recently exercised by non-Indigenous people in our sea country - can sit equally with our requirements of cultural survival and wellbeing. There are inconsistencies between our rights and responsibilities under our customary law and those recognised under contemporary Australian law. We are struggling to have our sea rights recognised in the same way as our rights on the land are recognised (Dhimurru Land Management Aboriginal Corporation 2006: 14).

The courts have also been extremely clear that native title rights to marine resources are non-commercial in nature. Although marine native title rights remain subordinate to non-Indigenous commercial and recreational fishing rights, they provide Traditional Owners with the right to access sea country and utilize traditional resources for customary and subsistence purposes. Such rights also generally include the ability to access, manage and protect sacred sites located within traditional marine territories. The positive value of recognized native title through litigation, while limited, was summed up by Jon Altman while explaining the impact of the favourable ruling in *Northern Territory of Australia v Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust* in 2008:

> There is no doubt that this is a very positive outcome for those coastal Traditional Owners who have argued for decades that commercial and

recreational fishing in the inter-tidal zone impacts negatively on their social, cultural and economic interests. This decision has fundamentally altered the leverage that these Traditional Owners will be able to exercise in negotiations with either commercial or recreational fishers who want access to Aboriginal-owned waters (Altman Interview, Feb. 27, 2008).

Negotiated settlements and local co-management agreements

Notwithstanding the limitations of the native title system for more sweeping fisheries reform, the recognition of basic marine native title has provided Indigenous Australians with a useful lever with which to negotiate greater access to culturally and economically significant aquatic resources. Negotiation has become a viable option for Indigenous native title holders for several reasons. First, the procedural structure of the native title system itself promotes negotiation over protracted litigation. Determinations of native title are generally quite broad, simply finding that native title either does or does not attach to particular territories or resources. Once determinations are made by the courts, it is then up to the legitimate stakeholders to work out for themselves what those rights entail, with the courts providing a final forum for dispute resolution.

Second, outside the native title system it has become more common for management agencies and other stakeholders to proactively negotiate access and co-management arrangements with Traditional Owners rather than waiting for official determinations by the courts. This is due to both increased pressure from Indigenous groups who have become emboldened by the promise of native title recognition, as well as a general concern by non-Indigenous stakeholders who remain uncertain about the scope of native title law and are hoping to avoid protracted litigation. According to one attorney who specializes in native title law, "No one really expected *Mabo*. And ever since then, I think that native title makes governments a bit nervous, because they aren't quite sure how it's going to go, and what it's going to mean when you put it across the whole country" (Interview, Feb. 14, 2008). So while on paper marine native title rights appear to give very little to Traditional Owners, they have provided opportunities for Indigenous stakeholders to sit at the table where decisions are being made. According to another expert, "because [Australia] is a small country, just being at the table with legitimacy provides an opportunity for good things to happen" (Feb. 13, 2008).

Historically, Indigenous representation within influential agencies, such as State Departments of Primary Industries or the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, has been inconsistent, lacking any real policy making authority. While formal shared governance arrangements remain elusive, there is some evidence that agencies are increasingly willing to include Indigenous stakeholders on advisory boards and to consider their unique interests when making policies that impact native title rights to the sea. Within the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, where management is shared between the Commonwealth's Park Authority and the State of Queensland's Environmental

Protection Agency, Traditional Use of Marine Resources Agreements (TUMRAs) have been utilized to include Aboriginal interests in the operation of the park. Through TUMRAs, Traditional Owners have secured recognition of their rights to hunt marine turtles and dugongs, engage in traditional fishing, and protect culturally significant sites within the park.

It is far less common for multi-stakeholder agreements involving Indigenous marine rights to be initiated at the Federal level in Australia. Perhaps this is due to the inconsistent jurisdictional patchwork governing marine resources and Indigenous affairs nationally. Or perhaps there is a lack of motivation to resolve these matters in a national forum as most of the stakeholders' interests are more localized. It is also likely that the lack of any clear and consistent statement from the Federal government or the courts regarding the nature and scope of Indigenous marine rights has tempered any sense of urgency among industry stakeholders to concede anything to Traditional Owners that would be codified into national policy. In all likelihood, the absence of a national fisheries settlement or even a working framework for cooperation between Indigenous stakeholders, non-Indigenous recreational and commercial fishers, and marine resource managers, is due to a combination of these factors, as well as a strong states' rights movement in Australia that consistently presents obstacles to broad-scale consensus building.

Local management of federally-funded programs

The willingness to enter into negotiated agreements represents a major shift in thinking by non-Indigenous stakeholders and resource managers about the legitimacy of Indigenous Peoples' rights to utilize marine resources and reflects the Australian government's general change in policy toward accommodation and reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples (SinghaRoy 2012). These agreements provide Traditional Owners with a viable mechanism for ensuring that their basic customary rights to access and manage traditional marine resources are protected. That being said, except in the Northern Territory where Indigenous Peoples hold significant bargaining power due to their exclusive control over inter-tidal fisheries, the negotiated rights of Indigenous parties generally remain inferior to the interests of non-Indigenous stakeholders. Another approach that provides Indigenous challengers with a bit more leverage in defining and meeting their own aspirations for sea country is their participation in federally-funded regulatory programs. By developing their own projects, or simply constructing their own agendas within existing management protocols, Indigenous Peoples have more flexibility in meeting their needs as they define them. Maximizing these opportunities often requires Indigenous stakeholders to innovate within bureaucratic funding structures in ways not envisioned by the governmental agencies who are pulling the purse strings.

Various governmental programs have been useful to Aboriginal communities seeking greater recognition of their rights to fish, hunt and manage culturally-sensitive aquatic resources. A notable example is the National Heritage Trust

(NHT), which was established in 1997 to help restore and conserve Australia's environment and natural resources. The NHT, which later became the "Caring for our Country" program, requires "viable community involvement" in natural resource management and has funded thousands of community-driven initiatives. To facilitate Indigenous Australians' country-based management agendas the NHT funded sixteen regional Indigenous Land Management Facilitators and various locally-based Aboriginal Land Management Facilitators whose activities focus on building a structure of representation that meaningfully integrates Indigenous Peoples into decision-making regimes over essential natural resources. Facilitators also work with Traditional Owners to ensure that their own, culturally-relevant management aspirations are included in local programs and that these programs continue to receive funding. These important offices are staffed by young, educated Aboriginal activist-leaders motivated to bolster Indigenous authority on a national level by empowering Indigenous Peoples locally. Through their masterful negotiation of bureaucratic processes and funding sources, these young leaders have become integral to the formulation of creative tactical solutions for Indigenous challengers who seek greater autonomy over their traditional resources.

Sea Ranger and Dugong and Turtle Management Programs, in particular, have become valuable avenues for ensuring that Indigenous marine resources are protected on terms that are culturally meaningful to Traditional Owners. These programs were originally established with the acquiescence and funding of the Australian government for the limited purpose of including Traditional Owners in the regulation of Indigenous dugong and turtle hunting in accordance with Western scientific paradigms of environmental protection. Since their inception, however, Indigenous communities have utilized these programs to meet a host of additional cultural prerogatives, including involving youth and elders in the preservation of traditional knowledge, revitalizing community economies by creating jobs for young Indigenous Australians, educating and training a new generation of Indigenous leaders, and protecting spiritually-significant cultural and natural resources, to name a few (NAILSMA 2004; NAILSMA 2007).

Notwithstanding the intent that these programs adhere to Western scientific paradigms, the lack of immediate oversight by funding agencies provides Indigenous managers with a great deal of latitude to implement best management practices, which often include the incorporation of traditional knowledge into resource management protocols. Through these programs, Indigenous groups are able to direct the management of culturally-significant resources in ways that accommodate the revitalization of local communities and the development of pan-Indigenous networks across Australia. One Indigenous Ranger recognized the link between inter-tribal cooperation, cultural revitalization and political power noting,

> I'd like to see a start for the ranger business, for myself and other young local fellas...go out and see different communities, different areas to see how they work so we can get ideas off them to help us with our goals and our aims for the

future. We got to come together and share ideas as Aboriginal people. If we
come together and share our ideas than we'll be more recognised (NAILSMA
2004:14).

Perhaps the most compelling example of Indigenous innovation within an
existing regulatory framework has been the development of Sea Plans modeled
after Indigenous Protected Area (IPA) designations. IPAs are tracts of
Indigenous lands set aside under Australia's National Reserve System and
managed by Traditional Owners for conservation purposes (Australian
Department of Environment and Water Resources 2007). These innovative
resource management initiatives are philosophically well-suited to Indigenous
self-governance and community revitalization efforts. Through the designation
of IPAs, the Australian government acknowledges and legitimates Indigenous
Peoples' capacity to manage their traditional resources and promotes
Indigenous cultural revitalization as a valid policy objective. Indeed, the IPA
program operates under the assumptions that: 1) Indigenous Peoples, as the
original managers of Australia's fragile ecosystems for tens of thousands of
years, are ideally suited to be contemporary resource managers; and 2) the
integration of Traditional Owners into contemporary resource management
regimes will strengthen systems of traditional Aboriginal knowledge, which in
turn will have significant social and economic benefits (Australia Department of
Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts website 2010).

While the original blueprint for IPAs did not apply to sea country, with federal
support, a few innovative Aboriginal communities have constructed Sea Country
IPAs. The Dhimurru Sea Plan provides a particularly successful example.
Dhimurru is an incorporated Aboriginal organization established in 1992 by
Yolnu land owners in the Northeast Arnhem Land of the Northern Territory.
After registering the Dhimurru IPA over a portion of their lands and successfully
demonstrating the existence of native title to culturally significant islands and
offshore sacred sites, the Yolnu developed and launched a comprehensive Sea
Country Plan in 2006 with funding from the now defunct National Oceans
Office (Dhimurru Land Management Aboriginal Corporation 2006). The Plan
represents an innovative and community-driven initiative that puts Indigenous
marine interests into the hands of Indigenous Peoples. Through the plan, the
Yolnu people outlined their cultural and material interests and obligations to
their traditional sea country, the historical, social and ceremonial sources of
those interests, and ideas for engaging other stakeholders to ensure that the
Yolnu people's needs are met while also respecting the interests of non-
Indigenous resource users and managers:

> We believe Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) may be a way to promote the
> sustainable and equitable management of our sea country, particularly if they
> are a formal mechanism to recognise our rights, responsibilities and
> management efforts in a similar way to the recently declared Indigenous
> Protected Areas. We look forward to discussing with government a model for

> MPAs that is workable for Yolnu people and enhances our position as primary protectors and managers of our marine estates. Such a model should be constructed on a solid scientific basis and our traditional knowledge, skills and understandings. It would need to consider cultural, social and economic factors (Dhimurru Land Management Aboriginal Corporation 2006).

Instead of sitting back and waiting for government and industry representatives to dictate the terms of the Yolnu people's rights, the Yolnu took their clear plan and set of aspirations to the government agencies. For its part, the government recognized the Yolnu's request as consistent with its official stance favouring reconciliation with Indigenous Australians and helped the community identify funding resources and other logistical mechanisms for implementing the plan.

Commercialization of traditional resources

Indigenous Australians participate in the labour force at rates far below that of non-Indigenous citizens (Gray, Hunter and Lohoar 2012). While many Australians bemoan Aboriginal Peoples' reliance on government welfare, few are open to meaningful Indigenous participation in the primary industries if that participation might interfere with the economic pursuits of non-Indigenous Australians (National Native Title Tribunal 2004). For their part, Indigenous Australians are legitimately aggrieved that they have been denied any economic benefit from the commercialization of what were once their exclusive resources (Smyth 2001). They maintain an inherent connection between their cultural and economic interests in traditional resources that cannot be artificially separated (Yu 2007). The Australian High Court's limitation of marine native title rights to non-exclusive, customary and subsistence practices has signaled the futility of native title tribunals as prospective settings for pursuing economic independence. That being said, the entire native title process has emboldened Indigenous challengers to utilize existing native title rights to leverage opportunities and to pursue more innovative pathways to economically develop marine resources.

Most Indigenous communities do not have the infrastructure or capital necessary to pursue commercialization of their sea country and they require governmental assistance through funding, licensing or, better still, policies that prioritize and facilitate Indigenous economic development of traditional resources. To help alleviate the devastation of centuries of economic marginalization, many Indigenous Australians believe that the government should assist them on their journey to economic self-sufficiency as an essential step in the process of reconciliation. According to Peter Yu,

> Despite the substantial Indigenous land holding interests, we are cash and asset poor and with little opportunity to attract investment. Governments, both State and Commonwealth, have been irresponsibly inept at providing a statutory land

regime that links our common law rights with our potential for economic and social development" (Yu 2007:11-12).

While it would be preferable to Indigenous Australians to have the legal recognition of their commercial rights so that they can assert greater autonomy in their pursuit of economic independence, at the very least, they require substantial and consistent funding and support.

To some extent, government funding of Indigenous commercial activities has been forthcoming. Since native title jurisprudence re-awakened concerns about Indigenous Peoples' economic, educational and health disparities, Federal and State agencies have started to develop programs to alleviate inequalities. As a strategy for overcoming economic disadvantage, fishing and aquaculture have been identified as natural industries for Indigenous development that can enable them to make a living from traditional resources, and, most importantly, to remain on country and keep their communities intact. These new programs have spawned a handful of Indigenous-owned fishing and aquaculture businesses across Australia (See e.g. National Native Title Tribunal 2006). A few examples include commercial mud-crabbing in King Sound in Western Australia by the Emama Gnuda Aboriginal corporation, lobster fishing by a Cape York community of Lockhart River in far northern Queensland, and more general commercial trochus shell fishing in Western Australia.

Other Indigenous groups are entering into innovative partnerships with the private fishing sector to cultivate commercial industries within their sea countries. A compelling example is an agreement to construct the world's first sea sponge farm within the Indigenous community on Palm Island. This project represents a unique collaboration between Traditional Owners, a private business group, the Australian Institute of Marine Science, and the State Development and Innovation Centre Townsville. If successful, the project will provide employment and capacity building opportunities for Indigenous Palm Islanders and will be conducted in a way that respects the cultural heritage and values of the Traditional Owners (National Native Title Tribunal 2005b). To Walter Palm Island, one of the senior elders who negotiated the agreement, the opportunities that the project would provide to the Island's youth are the most important reasons to pursue it: "A lot of young people here have talents and this is a way of nurturing them, giving them self esteem and making them feel important" (National Native Title Tribunal 2005b:3).

Civil disobedience

Given the limitations of formal institutional channels for formidable assertions of Indigenous rights to access, manage and utilize their traditional marine resources, it is somewhat surprising that widespread civil disobedience is not more prevalent. While certainly not an alien tactic to Indigenous activists, as the massive protests during the land rights movement of the 1970s-1980s are

testament, acts of civil disobedience over Indigenous aquatic rights have been relatively lacking. There are, however, a few notable exceptions. The first involves the open defiance of State laws prohibiting the poaching of abalone without a license by Indigenous fishers in New South Wales and Tasmania. Despite arrests, significant fines, and court rulings rejecting their native title rights to the shellfish, Traditional Owners vow to continue to exercise their cultural rights to harvest abalone as they have been doing for generations without obtaining State licenses. Joe Carriage, a Traditional Owner who has been prosecuted for poaching abalone in New South Wales, claims that the sea provides the strongest cultural link to Aboriginal Peoples in southern Australia and he fears that, without political action, this link will be lost to future generations. He contends that, "If us older fellas don't take a stand we're going to lose everything [and] we're going to have no culture, we're going to have nothing" (Murphy 2004).

A second example of direct activism comes from far northern Queensland where Indigenous Torres Strait Islanders have made claims to exclusive ownership of their sea country (Scott and Mulrennan 2010). Notwithstanding the Australian High Court's rejection of exclusive native title rights to the sea, Indigenous Islanders have demanded that commercial operators stay away from their traditional fishing grounds. In one case, approximately seventy Islanders staged a peaceful protest against the presence of non-Indigenous commercial operators in the region, although rumours of armed conflict motivated the State of Queensland to send a boatload of police reinforcements to defuse the situation (National Native Title Tribunal 2005a). While many non-Indigenous commercial fishermen "vowed to stand and fight for their rights" against the Indigenous "pirates," others stated that they would rather leave the region than continue to clash with the Torres Strait Islanders (National Native Title Tribunal 2005a).

It is noteworthy that both these instances of protest are local in nature and that they focus on immediate threats to Indigenous Peoples' culturally-derived rights to access, harvest and consume marine resources without undue interference from non-Indigenous actors. These examples, along with the numerous local and regional agreements discussed above, suggest that for Indigenous Australians the customary practices of fishing and harvesting marine resources are inherently local matters. Accordingly, their first choice is to resolve disputes between stakeholders at the scale where such practices occur. The relative absence of pan-Indigenous protest also reflects the broader political and institutional structures in Australia, which hinder pan-Indigenous mobilization by treating Indigenous claims-makers individually and failing to provide any meaningful national forums for adjudicating Indigenous sea country claims.

Indigenous innovation and agency

The findings discussed in the previous section reveal that Indigenous Australian advocates of fishing and aquatic rights use a variety of innovative, adaptive strategies to meet their material and cultural objectives. These findings are pertinent not only for demonstrating the constraining influence of political structures on mobilization tactics, but also for highlighting the agency and innovation of Indigenous actors in deploying strategies of action that allow them to assert themselves upon dominant political processes in culturally and materially meaningful ways. This is the case despite formidable political barriers that remain as a result of the long and destructive history of colonization, the marginalized status of Indigenous Peoples, and the persistence of prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory policies in Australia.

Despite these barriers, Indigenous fishers utilize multi-level approaches to claims-making, which span local, regional and national initiatives. Aboriginal stakeholders continue to assert their native title rights to sea country through litigation and through established bureaucratic channels. But, because the courts, the States and the Commonwealth remain relatively closed to broad-based assertions of Aboriginal marine rights, Indigenous fishers must deploy other innovative strategies to make their claims. A primary strategy involves wielding potential native title rights as leverage in negotiations with local stakeholders. Another involves the strategic manipulation of small-scale government programs in order to more relevantly meet their cultural, political and economic aspirations. These programs, which include Sea Ranger and Indigenous Protected Areas initiatives, were originally established to provide necessary services to Indigenous Peoples and to involve Indigenous communities in co-management of natural resources. However, the operation of such programs is often removed enough from bureaucratic oversight to enable Indigenous Peoples to direct their implementation.

The utilization of a variety of institutional, extra-institutional and innovative strategies for pursuing traditional aquatic rights reflects Indigenous political actors' nuanced understanding of existing political opportunities as well as the benefits and drawbacks of pursuing certain tactics over others. The unique combination of strategies employed in each site is designed to maximize the immediate material objectives of Indigenous stakeholders while ensuring that their long-term cultural and political aspirations are foregrounded. Taken together, Indigenous mobilization strategies demonstrate persistence and "tactical innovation" in the face of daunting political obstacles. According to McAdam (1983), the key challenge facing excluded groups "is to devise some way to overcome the basic powerlessness that has confined them to a position of institutionalized political impotence" (p.340). They initially do this by using non-institutional tactics to force their opponents to deal with them. Once they succeed at this stage, they must either "parlay [their] initial successes into institutionalized power … or continue to experiment with noninstitutional forms of protest" (p.340). In Australia, Aboriginal activists have thus far been unable to achieve widespread institutionalized authority over aquatic resources through

the courts or legislative processes. Rather than succumbing to "widely shared feelings of pessimism and impotence that are likely to prevail (p. 341)" where excluded groups confront a political establishment that is largely opposed to its interests, Indigenous Australians have shifted their strategic focus to more innovative tactics, operating both inside and outside formal institutional settings. The deployment of alternative tactical solutions by Indigenous challengers reflects the significance of human agency in sustaining challenges against the state despite the presence of constraining political structures.

Even though recent legal decisions show little movement on the issue of Aboriginal aquatic rights, there is evidence that the attitudes of non-Indigenous policy-makers regarding the legitimacy of Indigenous Peoples' claims are starting to change. In particular, there has been increasing recognition of the importance of traditional knowledge and the potential for Aboriginal Australians to take on leadership roles in marine management initiatives, especially with regard to the management of threatened dugong and sea turtle species. Australia's former Minister of Environment Protection, Heritage and the Arts, Peter Garrett, echoed this at an awards ceremony honouring leaders of the North Australia Land and Sea Management Alliance when he described Indigenous Peoples as "…the 'front-line' managers of the north Australian coast where dugong and turtle remain abundant" (NAILSMA 2008). My findings also reveal that natural resource managers have been more open to incorporating Indigenous access and management aspirations into aquatic regulatory schemas along the Australian coast.

Given the lack of any legal mandate requiring such accommodation, these changes imply a meaningful shift in thinking about the legitimacy of Indigenous marine title in Australia that is consistent with the arguments that Indigenous activists have been making for years. They also confirm the vulnerability of the Australian government's legitimate authority to regulate Indigenous Peoples and their resources and expose important ideological openings for more focused Indigenous mobilization. More significantly, these transformations, even while modest in scope, demonstrate the influence of Indigenous tactical innovations within bureaucratic arenas formerly monopolized by the state. Finally, the achievement of greater autonomy over highly contested natural resources demonstrates modest but clear movement toward the decolonization of national regulatory regimes in Australia and reveals that Indigenous Peoples are the primary agents of such change. To secure greater recognition of their culturally-derived fishing rights, Indigenous actors in Australia have been able to navigate a relatively closed political system by fashioning workable strategies that maximize their potential for greater autonomy over their marine resources.

Conclusion

In-depth analysis of the Australian case reveals that during episodes of political contention, Indigenous stakeholders are particularly masterful at deploying tactical solutions both inside and outside mainstream political structures. The result is a multi-level approach to political claims-making that simultaneously favours litigation, negotiation, civil disobedience, strategic partnerships and independent approaches, depending on which tactic, or combination of tactics, best achieves their material goals while maximizing their cultural objectives. Given the enduring colonial legacies that continue to dominate the lives of Indigenous Australians and marginalize them from meaningful participation in political processes, one might expect assertions of Indigenous fishing rights to be particularly impotent. While, in many ways political structures still constrain the content and impact of their claims, Indigenous actors are capable of strategically innovating in ways that are, ultimately, effective in bringing about modest legal and institutional changes. While Australian Traditional Owners have yet to achieve widespread structural transformations, by infusing the democratic process with political and cultural demands, they have succeeded in altering the discourses within which the relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the Australian state are constructed. In the wise words of Native American scholar, Vine Deloria, Indigenous Australians, like many Indigenous Peoples around the world, are becoming increasingly adept at "dismantling the master's house" (Morris 2003:9).

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Starting from the Amazon: communication, knowledge and politics of place in the World Social Forum

Hilde C. Stephansen

Abstract

This article explores how communication activists in Belém, Brazil, engaged with the 2009 World Social Forum (WSF) when it arrived in their city and sought to take advantage of the opportunity it offered to strengthen and gain visibility for place-based movements in the Amazon. While the WSF has enabled an unprecedented diversity of movements to exchange knowledges and experiences, and to a certain extent succeeded in "giving voice" to marginalised groups, it also has continued to suffer from its own hierarchies and exclusions. These are evident, inter alia, in the asymmetrical relationship that exists between "local" grassroots groups and "global" cosmopolitan elites. Emphasising the centrality of place to the construction of alternative epistemological imaginaries, the article analyses efforts by communication activists to facilitate autonomous processes of knowledge production among movements in the Amazon. At once place-based and transnational in scope, their communication strategies challenge conventional hierarchies of scale and highlight the importance of grassroots movements appropriating communication technologies for their own purposes. At stake here is not simply the inclusion of "local subalterns" within the "global" WSF, but the construction of communication networks that can support the proliferation of alternative knowledge projects at different scales, within and beyond the WSF.

Introduction

> The Pan-Amazon will be the territory of the 9th edition of the World Social Forum. For six days, Belém, the capital of Pará, Brazil, takes the place of the center of the region to shelter the greatest anti-globalization event of today and brings together activists from more than 150 countries in a permanent process of mobilization, articulation and search for alternatives for another possible world, free of neoliberal politics and all forms of imperialism. [...]

> Much more than a territory to shelter the WSF the Amazon, represented by its peoples, social movements and organizations, will be protagonist in the process and will have an opportunity to spread their struggle around the world, and make continental and global alliances (World Social Forum, 2009).

The decision to hold the 2009 World Social Forum in Belém was motivated by a wish to give voice to the peoples of the Pan-Amazon – a vast territory spanning nine countries[1] – and focus attention on the significance of the region to the world as a whole. Highly symbolic, the choice of the Amazon as a site for the WSF was intended as a way to put ecological issues on the agenda of global civil society and give visibility to the struggles and knowledges of movements in the region. Organisers were eager to ensure that the Amazon and its peoples should not simply form the "local" backdrop to a "global" meeting but play a leading role. This line of reasoning is in keeping with the by now widely accepted sentiment that "place matters" in the social forum process (Conway, 2004; 2008a), and that an important function of the WSF should be to set in motion dynamics and give visibility to movements and issues in the place where it is held.

In this article, I explore how two particular groups of place-based actors – communication activists in Belém who were involved in (1) community radio and (2) participatory video production – engaged with the WSF and sought to take advantage of the unique opportunity it offered to strengthen and gain visibility for movements in the Amazon region. I argue that their communication practices complicate conventional hierarchical understandings of scale and demonstrate the importance of grassroots movements constructing their own communication networks that can facilitate autonomous knowledge production.

I begin by outlining the theoretical framework that underpins my analysis, focusing first the WSF's contradictory position in the present geopolitical conjuncture. Though it has been conceived as an important site for the elaboration of alternative knowledge projects that can challenge dominant modes of thought, the WSF is also criss-crossed by various axes of exclusion. Suggesting that one such axis relates to the role and status of place-based movements and their knowledges, I outline analytical perspectives that highlight the political and epistemic significance of place in a globalised world, and consider the difference that sensitivity to place makes to the way in which we might conceptualise the relationship between communication and knowledge production in transnational movement networks. I then provide a detailed analysis of the practices of placed-based communication activists at the Belém WSF. I demonstrate how they sought not just to act as conduits of information between the "local" and the "global", but to construct communication spaces – both temporary and longer-term – which were at once place-based *and* formed the basis for engagement with wider networks at different scales.

This article is based on ethnographic research carried out in Belém from November 2008 to February 2009. During this time, I worked as a volunteer at the office of the organising committee of the WSF 2009 and participated in the activities of the communication working group, helping to organise a set of

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[1] Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guyana, Guyana, Peru, Surinam, and Venezuela.

"shared communication projects" (Stephansen, 2011; 2012) for independent media. I attended meetings and workshops with communication activists from Belém and elsewhere, and conducted in-depth interviews with them about their practice.

I have carried out this research from a position of political commitment and practical engagement, and conceive of the knowledge that it has produced as a collaborative effort. This does not mean that power hierarchies are irrelevant; my identity as an educated white European clearly places me in a position of privilege vis-à-vis the activists who are the subjects of this article, most of whom were residents of poor urban communities in Belém and of Afro-Brazilian or mixed European/indigenous descent. During my fieldwork I was acutely aware of being perceived by some of these activists as part of a global "WSF elite" that arrived in their city. Such power differentials cannot easily be ameliorated through methodological dictates, however carefully applied. At the same time, while these differences clearly matter, I also do not want to over-emphasise them, as this might contribute to their reification. What I have tried to do – based on an understanding of all knowledge as necessarily socially situated and partial – is to position myself in such a way that I might "see together with" activists in Belém and consider what the WSF looked like from their particular vantage point (cf. Haraway, 1991).

The WSF and "knowledges from below"

Since its inauguration in 2001, the WSF has brought together an impressive diversity of movements, many of which are geographically and politically anchored in the global South, with radically different organisational practices, political imaginaries and worldviews. Much has been made of this diversity and the capacity of the WSF to challenge the *pensamientos únicos* of neoliberal globalisation. A key reference point for such an understanding is Boaventura de Sousa Santos's (2006) notion of the WSF as expressive of an "epistemology of the South": a manifestation of epistemic plurality which forms part of a struggle for "cognitive justice" for knowledges and practices that have been discredited by Western modernity (cf. Santos, 2007; Santos, Nunes & Meneses, 2007). As epistemology of the South, according to Santos, the WSF seeks to replace the "monocultures" of hegemonic globalisation with "ecologies" that allow for a plurality of knowledges and practices to coexist. Thus conceived, it might be situated within the broad historical challenge that anti-colonial movements, along with movements of women, indigenous peoples, and ethnic and sexual minorities (among others) have posed to the hegemony of Eurocentric and masculinist worldviews and their claims to universality and objectivity. Insofar as in brings together and advances the knowledge claims of such movements, the WSF might be conceived as a continuation of this trend.

Though suggestive of an *aspiration*, it is however not at all clear that such a vision of the WSF as a space for multiple "knowledges from below" is empirically accurate, given the very real hierarchies that characterise it in

practice. As Janet Conway (2012: 24) makes clear, "the movements of the WSF are encountering each other on a historically unequal playing field constituted by the coloniality of power".[2] Challenging Santos's somewhat optimistic assessment of the WSF's emancipatory potential, this draws attention to the various axes of exclusion that operate also within the supposedly horizontal "open space" of the Forum.[3]

> Recognizing the character of the contemporary world order as one of global coloniality, and the current period of transition as a crisis of Euro-modernity, problematizes modernity, including its emancipatory traditions. It puts the decolonization of knowledges on the agenda of movements worldwide, especially in navigating North/South, non-indigenous/indigenous, and modern emancipatory/subaltern other divides. The movements of the first halves of the foregoing couplets have been hegemonic relative to their others, historically and currently, in and beyond the social forum. Those others remain far more excluded and subaltern, including in the WSF (Conway, 2012: 24).

One important axis of exclusion within the WSF, which intersects in important respects with the ones mentioned above, relates to the role and status of place-based actors vis-à-vis those that operate on a more self-evidently global scale. As the WSF has travelled around the world, it has become a site for claims by various "local subalterns". From Dalits in India to urban slum-dwellers in Nairobi to indigenous peoples in the Amazon, such groups have come to the WSF to encounter global civil society, make their voices heard, and assert their right to be present in the space of the Forum (Conway, 2004; 2008a). This has not been unproblematic: at several editions of the WSF the exclusion of the local resident population has been the subject of controversy, raising the question of exactly how "local" or "global" any given edition of the WSF should be (Conway, 2008a).

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[2] The term "coloniality of power" is used by Ánibal Quijano (2000) to refer to the persistence of racialised hierarchies of power imposed by European colonialism. More generally, it is associated with the so-called modernity/coloniality research programme, whose members (apart from Quijano) include Walter Mignolo (2000a, 2000b, 2002) and Enrique Dussel (2000, 2002). See Escobar (2004, 2007b) for an overview of this literature and Conway (2012) for an analysis of the WSF from a modernity/coloniality perspective.

[3] Commentators have highlighted a number of ways in which the WSF falls short of its ideals of openness and horizontality. These include the formal exclusion from the WSF of political parties, groups involved in armed struggle, and anyone not opposed to neoliberalism (Biccum, 2005; Conway & Singh, 2009; Ylä-Anttila, 2005); structural barriers to participation such as travel costs and visa restrictions (Andretta & Doerr, 2007; Doerr, 2007; Vinthagen, 2009; Ylä-Anttila, 2005); the WSF's failure to reach out to new actors beyond the "already converted" (Andreotti & Dowling, 2004; Sen, 2004); lack of transparency and existence of informal power structures (Albert, 2008; Pleyers, 2004; 2008); more subtle mechanisms of exclusion arising from cultural norms and conventional notions of political literacy (Doerr, 2007; Wright, 2005); and the persistence of discrimination and even violence against women (Roskos & Willis, 2007).

The debate about the role and status of place-based activisms overlaps in important respects with the question of the subaltern in the WSF (Conway, 2008a). The spaces and decision-making structures of the Forum have been dominated by a highly mobile cosmopolitan elite of scholar-activists – many of whom are members of transnational research and advocacy networks – who have the resources and inclination to travel the world to attend social forums and related meetings (Pleyers, 2008; Worth & Buckley, 2009). Such cosmopolitan intellectuals – who by virtue of their mobility and transnational connections become constituted as "global" actors within the WSF process – have tended also to be the producers of what come to be seen as authoritative knowledges within and about the WSF, while the knowledges of place-based movements (indigenous peoples, rural populations, the urban poor) – who come to be constituted as "local" – tend to be marginalised.

Although this hierarchy of scale cannot straightforwardly be mapped onto other hierarchies constituted by the "coloniality of power", neither is it entirely distinct from them. Though by no means a homogenous group, the cosmopolitan intellectuals who are positioned as "global" are mostly educated within the terms of Western academia, and the knowledges that have been hegemonic – within the WSF as well as in debates about the WSF and global justice more broadly conceived – are those that are rooted in the theoretical and political traditions of Western modernity (Conway, 2012). Such hierarchies of knowledge and scale also overlap with racial hierarchies: white or light-skinned Europeans and Euro-descendants are overrepresented among the intellectual elites that are positioned as "global", while indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants and other racialised groups figure more prominently among those designated as "local".

Consequently, the question of "decolonisation of knowledge" – understood as a project concerned with recognising and decentring the authority of Euro-modernist thought – needs to incorporate the issue of the role and status place-based knowledges, within and beyond the WSF. This is not to say that place-based, grassroots, or subaltern knowledges necessarily or automatically constitute a challenge to Eurocentrism or coloniality,[4] but it is to recognise that politics of place and scale are closely bound up with geopolitical hierarchies of knowledge.

Problematising globality

Beyond the challenge that any particular form of "knowledge from below" may pose to dominant modes of thought, place-based activisms also problematise the claim to globality that is arguably at the heart of the social forum project. As its name suggests, the WSF from the outset has had a global ambition: it is defined in the Charter of Principles as a "world process" and routinely described in such terms by organisers and commentators alike. Debates around the status

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[4] Thanks to Janet Conway for helping me see this point more clearly.

of place-based activisms draw attention not only to the Forum's far from global reach in empirical terms but also the political character of the categories "local" and "global". As Escobar (2008: 30) points out, debates about globalisation have tended to equate the global with "space, capital, and the capacity to transform while the local is associated with place, labor, tradition, and hence with what will inevitably give way to more powerful forces". Within such frameworks, "local" movements are frequently reduced to, at best, misguided struggles to defend traditional ways of life against modernising forces, or, at worst, anti-modern fundamentalisms. Such a conception is also present within the WSF, among those who adopt what Osterweil (2005: 25) refers to as a "universalising globalist" perspective, according to which "effective resistance to neo-liberal capitalist globalization must come in the form of a united global movement that has moved beyond place-based and local struggles".

The place-based character of many contemporary movements challenges this equation of the global with the universal. Though such movements are often concerned with the defence of place against the delocalising effects of global capital, their politics of place cannot be reduced to mere resistance to global forces (Escobar, 2008). Rather, it "can be seen as an emergent form of politics, a novel political imaginary in that it asserts a logic of difference and possibility that builds on the multiplicity of actions at the level of everyday life" (Escobar, 2008: 67). Such a politics of place does not equal insularity: the struggles of many movements involve both the defence of local models of social life and mobilisations involving the construction of coalitions at different scales (Escobar, 2007a; 2008). What is discernible in such practices is an alternative version of globality and what it means to be engaged in global politics. Osterweil conceptualises this emergent politics as "place-based globalism": a political imaginary that "sees true or qualitative globality as comprised of many nodes, places, interconnections and relations that at no point are totally consolidated into a singular global entity" (2005: 26).

In such a perspective, the place-based character of such movements can be conceived in terms of a positive project concerned with the construction of alternative political and epistemological imaginaries; "an expanding politics of diversity and recognition that acknowledges the multiplicity of alternative visions, values and world views, and the presence of existing 'other worlds'" (Conway, 2008b: 223). The practices of such movements involve the production of knowledge that is "embedded in locality and that is responsive and accountable to place-based constituencies – as opposed to the detached expert knowledge of modernity" (Escobar, 2007a: 286). This can be understood as what Santos (2007: 36) refers to as "postmodern knowledge": "knowledge about the conditions of possibility of human action projected into the world from local time-spaces". Such a perspective draws attention to the importance of place (understood both as a particular geographical territory and people's culturally and historically informed experience of, and engagement with, this territory) to the elaboration of alternative knowledge projects – and perhaps even new epistemological frameworks.

Communication and knowledge production

What implications does this have for how we understand the relationship between communication and knowledge production in transnational movement networks such as the WSF? Much writing on the relationship of social movements to new communication technologies has focused on the opportunities that the internet offers movements to bypass dominant media and construct their own communication networks. Since Indymedia first pioneered the use of open publishing in the late 1990s, the emergence of web 2.0 technologies has increased exponentially the possibilities for ordinary citizens as well as movement activists to circulate their own media content.

Manuel Castells refers to this new form of socialised communication as "mass self-communication": "mass" because "it reaches potentially a global audience", "self" because "it is self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many that communicate with many" (2007: 248). Giving social movements the chance to enter the public domain from multiple sources, the emergence of mass self-communication increases their chances of effecting social and political change, as "[t]he greater the autonomy of the communicating subject vis-à-vis the controllers of societal communication nodes, the higher the chances for the introduction of messages challenging dominant values and interests in communication networks" (2009: 413).

In such an account, there is a clear privileging of the global: the ability of movements to create or influence global communication networks is, according to Castells, crucial to their success. Observing that in the network society, networks of power are usually global while resistance is usually local, he contends that "[h]ow to reach the global from the local, through networking with other localities – how to 'grassroot' the space of flows – becomes the key strategic question for the social movements of our age" (2009: 52). Like networks of power, alternative projects must also go through global communication networks to transform consciousness if they wish to effect social change: "it is only by acting on global discourses through the global communication networks that they can affect power relationships in the global networks that structure all societies" (Castells, 2009: 53).

Attention to the epistemic and political significance of place, however, complicates this imperative for movements to "go global", raising questions about how media and communication can contribute to the production of place-based knowledges. Research on alternative and citizens' media shows that communication activists around the world also operate at very local scales (Atton, 2002; Downing, 2001; Rodríguez, 2001; 2011; Rodríguez, Kidd & Stein, 2009). Citizens' media are often driven by a concern to enable members of local communities to express identities, negotiate differences, and enact forms of sociality that strengthen solidarity (Rodríguez, 2001; 2011). Such media can play a vital role in constructing and reinforcing a sense of place and place-based collective imaginaries (Rodríguez, 2009; 2011). In the context of the WSF, this highlights the need to not simply bypass the local in favour of the global but

examine the multiple scales at which activists operate and the complex intersections between them (cf. Sassen, 2006; 2007).

By looking at how communication activists in Belém – whose commitment to place was central to their political practice – engaged with the WSF, this article explores some of the complexities of the relationship between "local" actors and the "global" WSF process. Though they initially understood their relationship to the WSF in fairly conventional hierarchical terms, conceiving of the WSF as "global civil society" arriving in Belém and themselves as "local" actors wanting to "speak to the world", these activists also made innovative use of the WSF to facilitate place-based processes of knowledge production and give impetus to a longer-term project to strengthen movement-based communication networks in the Amazon. Their strategies and practices underline the importance of place-based movements appropriating communication tools for their own purposes, in order to create conditions for the elaboration of knowledges grounded in their own realities and lived experience. For the activists discussed in this article, this is a project that is inextricably bound up with place-*making*: the production of knowledges starting from the Amazon – a vast region that comprises a huge diversity of peoples and cultures – also involves considerable work to define what the Amazon *is*. Their emergent project of place-making – grounded in the production of knowledges *within*, *about* and *for* the Amazon – offers a glimpse of what the construction of alternative epistemological imaginaries founded on a politics of place may look like in practice.[5]

Encountering the WSF

> Since they started hearing talk about the WSF, people had this yearning, this will, the social movements were anxious to participate, to be able to give their cry for freedom. So from then on, everybody created this atmosphere around the WSF, that atmosphere of power, that atmosphere of dynamism, of people being able to scream. So, "are we going to be able to divulge? Are we going to be able to scream? Are we going to be able to realise our desire?" (Community radio activist, interview, December 2008).[6]

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[5] Many accounts of the Belém WSF focus (rightly) on the historic presence in the forum of indigenous peoples, from the Amazon and elsewhere, who advanced alternative cosmo-visions based on concepts of civilisational crisis and *buen vivir* along with a strong attachment to territory. Their particular knowledge projects and practices are central to any broader consideration of "decolonisation of knowledge" and politics of place in the Amazon. This article, however, tells a different (though related) story: that of communication activists from poor urban communities in Belém who sought to articulate their own struggles and realities to those of other actors in the Amazon – including indigenous movements. Indigenous peoples and their knowledge claims are not, in other words, the specific focus of this article, which is – necessarily – a partial account, and should be read as such.

[6] All interview quotes have been translated from Portuguese by the author.

The first group of activists discussed in this article belonged to a network of community radio stations from the metropolitan region of Belém and elsewhere in the Brazilian state of Pará. These were connected through the Forum in Defence of Community Radios (*Fórum em Defesa das Rádios Comunitárias*, or *Fórum de Rádios*, as it commonly was referred to) – a body set up in October 2007 in collaboration with the Pará Society for the Defence of Human Rights (*Sociedade Paraense de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos*) to provide juridical support to community radio activists facing prosecution for unauthorised broadcasting. In addition to fulfilling this legal function, the *Fórum de Rádios* also constituted a reference point for an emerging movement for the democratisation of communication in Pará. In the period leading up to the event, the *Fórum de Rádios* held weekly meetings, in which a diversity of communication activists, including journalists, students, magazine editors, and video producers, participated on various occasions. These meetings functioned alternately as occasions for information exchange about events organised by social movements in the city, political discussions about the communication movement and its aims, and preparations for participation in the WSF.[7]

When I began my fieldwork in Belém in November 2008, two and a half months before the start of the WSF, the atmosphere among activists was one of excitement and anticipation, combined with a slight feeling of uncertainty. There was a clear sense of the historical significance of the WSF coming to Belém, of it representing a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. But for what? What exactly was the World Social Forum? What was going to happen? Among the communication activists I worked with, there was a flurry of activity, with meetings of one sort or another constantly taking place to discuss how to participate in the forum, how best to take advantage of it, and what it would mean for local and regional movements and their struggles. For most, the WSF 2009 was going to be their first social forum and expectations were high.

At this stage, community radio activists conceived of their task vis-à-vis the WSF as twofold. One set of strategies focused on the need to inform local residents about the Forum. There was a widespread sense that the general population of Belém and surrounding areas either lacked information about the WSF or was misinformed about its character and purpose, as the local mainstream media tended to frame the WSF as a tourist event or conference organised by the Workers' Party led state government of Pará. Community radio activists therefore saw it as a key priority to inform their listeners about the character of the WSF and the issues being discussed there, in this way providing

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[7] The majority of regular participants in the *Fórum de Rádios* were residents of poor urban communities within the metropolitan region of Belém, of Afro-Brazilian or mixed (mostly indigenous-European) descent, and in their 30s and 40s (with some younger and older members). Though some participated occasionally in meetings of the communication working group of the local WSF organising committee, most of these community radio activists occupied a relatively peripheral position vis-à-vis the "official" forum organising process, prevented by various factors (such as sporadic internet access, lack of resources, and weak connections to more established sectors of local civil society) from being more fully integrated.

a much-needed counterpoint to the mainstream media. As one member of the *Fórum de Rádios* explained:

> The main objective is this, that all this information reaches this long-suffering population here, so that they can understand this process [...]. Because their minds are so alienated, from other media, from television, that they don't know, they don't know what a World Social Forum is [...]. So our principal objective is this, to bring information about the things that will be happening at the forum to the peripheries (Eduardo, interview, December 2008).[8]

The second set of strategies revolved around using the WSF to make visible local and regional realities and struggles. As the interview extract quoted at the beginning of this section suggests, there was a widespread sense that the WSF provided a unique opportunity for communities and movements in Belém and the Amazon as a whole to "speak to the world". Consequently, community radio activists understood their role as being to give voice to these communities and movements. For one woman, this was a matter of showing the culture and ways of life of the local population:

> [I want to] divulge our culture, our music, to talk about our city, to show, because there are going to be a lot of people from elsewhere participating... show what Belém is like, how it is that the people of Belém live, talk about the sights of Belém, talk about our customs, show our community, how it lives. This is very important (Gabriela, interview, December 2008).

Others, meanwhile, stressed the need to show the realities of the hardship suffered by the local population. This was often placed in the context of what many activists saw as attempts by the local media and government authorities to present an overly positive image of the city to WSF participants. One activist, who belonged to a community radio in Terra Firme, one of the poorest *bairros* in Belém, explained it in these terms:

> I think it won't do to sugar coat things. You have to show the reality of the country, that there is misery, poverty, hunger, prejudice, violence, and this we have to show. And so the Forum, hosted here in Belém, is a good moment to be denouncing the indifference of our appointed authorities (José, interview, December 2008).

Similarly, the WSF was also greeted as an opportunity to highlight the consequences of state-supported exploitation of the Amazon for the region's indigenous peoples:

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[8] Names have been changed to protect anonymity unless otherwise stated.

> We will be able to tell everyone that the indigenous, that the peoples of the Amazon are being massacred by the advance of national capital within the Brazilian territory (Roberto, interview, December 2008).

How might we understand this desire to "speak to the world"? Left at this, it would seem that community radio activists in Belém conceived of their task primarily in terms of acting as conductors for vertical flows of information between the "local" and the "global": on the one hand, to distribute knowledge about the WSF "downwards" to the local population, and, on the other, to disseminate knowledge about local or regional conditions "upwards" to the WSF, conceptualised here as a manifestation of global civil society. But is this all there is to their motivations and practices? The problem with such an analysis is that it makes it difficult to understand the strategies of community radio activists as anything more than a cry for help from disempowered "local" actors. It leads to a conceptualisation of their practices simply in terms of resistance to dominant meanings, and denies them the possibility of positive agency, of being able to construct alternatives. Moreover, a conception of these communication practices simply in terms of transmission from the "local" to the "global" and vice versa relies on a hierarchical conception of scale which privileges the global and fails to account for the variety of scales on which activists operate (cf. Escobar, 2007a; Sassen, 2006; 2007). Though to a certain extent hierarchical conceptions of scale were discernible in community radio activists' understanding of the WSF and their relation to it, especially before they had worked out fully the nature and extent of their participation, their practices went beyond "local" appeals to "global" civil society. In the next section, I discuss how members of the *Fórum de Rádios* made use of the WSF to create a temporary communication space – through an FM radio station that broadcast from the forum site – which enabled them to elaborate place-based knowledges while simultaneously facilitating transnational connections and exchange.

Temporary openings: the *Rádio dos Povos*

> The radio served as an exchange between the people who were there [at the WSF] from other countries with our population here in Belém. Why? Because [...] from the moment they were using our microphones, they were passing on to other people what they were thinking, not just about the WSF, but also about the capital Belém. And the people who were there [listening] ended up sharing what the person was transmitting [...] through the interactivity that the public had with the interviewee (Fernando, co-organiser of the *Rádio dos Povos*, interview, February 2009).

During the 2009 WSF, activists involved in the *Fórum de Rádios* set up an FM radio station – dubbed *Rádio dos Povos* [the Peoples' Radio] – which broadcast

live for the duration of the event. Coordinated by representatives from four local community radios who were responsible for technical infrastructure and management of the programme schedule, the *Rádio dos Povos* was live on air from early morning until late evening every day, and around ten community radios (mainly from Pará but also from elsewhere in Brazil) participated, dividing available air time between them. According to organisers, the radio reached most of the metropolitan region of Belém as well as some neighbouring areas.

At a basic level, the *Rádio dos Povos* functioned to raise awareness of the WSF among the local population. As one of the organisers, a woman from a community radio in a poor neighbourhood on the periphery of Belém, explained:

> Our concern was to be passing information about the forum to people who were not here in Belém following the forum, so that they could have a sense, the listener could have a sense of the programme, of what was happening, of the debates that were taking place at the forum (Brenda, interview, February 2009).

Seeking to bring the WSF to their local communities, community radio activists went to workshops and seminars, listened to speeches and debates to learn about the themes being discussed, and got hold of representatives from various movements who they then brought back to the studio to be interviewed.

As well as acting as the eyes and ears of their listeners, the organisers of the *Rádio dos Povos* also conceived of their role in terms of "giving voice" to WSF participants. What they wanted to achieve through the radio was, in Brenda's words,

> to be able give voice to all the segments present at the forum. Whoever wanted to go there to talk about or debate any subject, that we could put issues on the agenda and debate them, without discriminating against anyone [...], that delegates from whatever country, whatever state, could have access to the means of communication. Because of this we named it *Rádio dos Povos*, because this was what best identified... the identity of the radio was of this amplitude, of this democratic opening, that any segment could arrive there, could have their space and speak, give their interview, give their testimony, pass on their experience (interview, February 2009).

In bringing the voices of the WSF to its listeners, an important function of the *Rádio dos Povos* was to provide a counterpoint to the distorted image of the forum that activists found in the local mainstream media, thereby helping the local population better understand its objectives and significance. However, the radio was not only about one-way dissemination *from* the WSF *to* the listeners. Emphasising the interactive character of their programmes, activists also conceived of the radio as a means for listeners to participate in the forum. As

was everyday practice in their own radios, they opened up telephone lines for listeners to interact with presenters and interviewees in the studio. Describing the target audience of the radio as those who were excluded from the forum because of the R$30 (around €11) entrance fee, one organiser saw the *Rádio dos Povos* as

> the entrance ticket that enabled these people to participate. People who were on the outside, when they had some issue they were interested in, they called and spoke live on air, via telephone, directly on air, on the radio, and debated the issue with us (Fernando, interview, February 2009).

As well as bringing the WSF to the local population, then, the radio also brought the local population, most of who would otherwise have been excluded, to the WSF. By enabling this kind of two-way communication, it provided opportunities not just for information dissemination but for debate about the issues being discussed at the forum. In this way, the radio might be conceived as having provided a link between the "local" and the "global', enabling listeners who could not be physically present to share in the intercultural learning and exchange of experience for which the WSF is celebrated.

However, if we consider in more detail the activities facilitated by the *Rádio dos Povos*, it becomes clear that its function went beyond inclusion. More than just a means to include the "local" population within the "global civil society" gathered at the WSF, the communication space opened up by the radio functioned as a node for transnational connections while being firmly grounded in a commitment to the Amazon as a place. According to organisers, the common denominator for the diverse range of themes debated on the *Rádio dos Povos* was a connection to the Amazon. From urban reform to hydroelectric dam projects, climate change to the struggles of indigenous and Afro-descendent populations, topics were either directly related to the Amazon or discussed with reference to their relevance for, and impact on, people living in the region. As one organiser affirmed, "the criteria that we chose [for what to cover] were like this: verify the most visible themes within the forum that had to do with the Amazon region" (Brenda, interview, February 2009).

This production of knowledge about the Amazon as a region also involved place-*making*. As Brenda explained,

> I think [the radio] contributed to disseminating the significance of the WSF, what it represents for society. What the importance of this movement is, principally here in the Amazon region. Say to the population what it means to be Amazonian. People are in Belém and didn't know that they were from the Amazon region. Belém is inside the Amazon region and we have a responsibility to debate the problems that are inherent in the Amazon region (interview, February 2009).

Raising awareness among Belém's urban population about the problems that the Amazon faces and the struggles of movements in the region – enabling them to "see the reality of the Amazon region, in depth", in Brenda's words – also had as an aim to make this population identify as part of the Amazon. As hinted at in the interview extract quoted above, a sense of belonging to the Amazon – a region that is perhaps most commonly understood as a vast and sparsely populated rainforest – is not necessarily obvious to residents of Belém, a metropolis of around 1.4 million inhabitants (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, 2010). Generating a sense of connection to the Amazon among this urban population, by linking the struggles of poor communities in Belém to those of indigenous peoples, *ribeirinhos* and other rural populations elsewhere in the region, was therefore a key task for the *Rádio dos Povos*. As one community radio activist explained in the run-up to the forum, this was not only about producing media coverage; it was also, crucially, about constructing regional alliances:

> We are going to take advantage of the coverage to engage in dialogue with other movements [...]. It is not just about coverage in itself. We will show the situation, for example, of the indigenous, how they live. But our idea is to support their struggle and for them to support ours. So it's about political dialogue, beyond coverage, beyond saying "let's go to the indigenous camp, [and show that] they live like this, their difficulties are these" but [also asking] "how can we unite our struggles?" (Henrique, interview, December 2008).

The kind of identity construction at play here can be understood as based on the production of discourses that define the Amazon as a place. This place-making might be described, on the one hand, as based on linking the local urban population to the region as a whole; on the other, it was concerned with facilitating a better understanding of the geopolitical location of the Amazon vis-à-vis the world, particularly in relation to its implication in the projects of global capital. Community radio activists' concern to facilitate the production of knowledge *in, about,* and *for* the Amazon – and involve their local listeners in this process – provided the occasion for connections to be made with other actors and their knowledges. WSF participants – from elsewhere in the Amazon and other parts of the world – were brought into the studio in order to bring their experience to bear on issues pertaining to the Amazon, and local activists in turn shared their own experiences. In this way, while grounded in a particular locality and focused on place-based issues, the *Rádio dos Povos* functioned simultaneously as a convergence point for actors from different localities and as a space for translation between different knowledges.

The experience of the *Rádio dos Povos* shows how the WSF provided not simply an opportunity for "local subalterns" to "speak to the world" but an occasion for a collective project of knowledge production involving participants from different places. Although activists were motivated by a concern to better understand a particular place, their participation in the radio also enabled them

to arrive at a better understanding of their place in transnational networks. While they might initially have conceived of themselves as the "local" counterpart to "global" civil society arriving in their city, the experience of the *Rádio dos Povos* facilitated a conceptualisation among community radio activists of themselves and the Amazon as connected to other actors and places through transnational networks.

Having considered the way in which the WSF prompted the opening up, for a delimited period of time, of a place-based communication space for transnational connections in the form of the *Rádio dos Povos*, the following section examines longer-term efforts to strengthen movement-based communication networks in the Amazon region, and the difference that the WSF made to this project.

Longer-term strategies: strengthening communication networks in the Amazon

> [The forum] served for us to show the work of the organisation and strengthen the groups that work with us, that always worked with us, which are young people, social movements, women, university students [...]. For us, the event served to further strengthen this will to continue a process of participatory communication here in the Amazon (Ilma Bittencourt, interview, February 2009).[9]

The second group of activists discussed in this article were connected to CEPEPO, a small NGO based in Belém that worked with communication as a tool for popular education.[10] Inspired by the pedagogy of Paulo Freire, CEPEPO was founded in 1980 to support urban movements in Belém, using photography and film as pedagogical tools to help poor communities reflect on and better understand their realities and struggles. The organisation had since continued working with communities and movements on a range of issues, and described itself as "an NGO that works with and for social movements, to strengthen and document their struggles, using audio-visual tools, giving workshops in this area, producing documentaries and institutional films" (CEPEPO, n.d., my translation). Founded on a vision of the transformative effects of participatory communication, CEPEPO had a long history of working with urban communities in Belém, running projects with the aim of contributing to individual and collective empowerment.

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[9] Ilma Bittencourt (real name) was at the time of my fieldwork the director of CEPEPO.

[10] The organisation's full name was originally Centre for the Study and Practice of Popular Education *(Centro de Estudos e Práticas de Educação Popular)*; this was changed after the WSF 2009 to Centre for Communication and Popular Education *(Centro de Comunicação e Educação Popular)*.

At the time of my fieldwork, the organisation's premises – which provided meeting rooms, film equipment, editing facilities, and a small library – were located in the *barrio* of Guamá. Home to the Federal University of Pará, which hosted the WSF, Guamá is one of most deprived areas of Belém, but also has a diverse cultural and political life, and CEPEPO was strongly embedded in the local community.[11] In addition to this local orientation, the organisation also conceived of its ambit as including the rest of the state of Pará as well as the Amazon region as a whole. Activists involved in the organisation had a strong conception of their city and neighbourhoods as part of the Amazon, and this regional identification seemed more pertinent to their work than a sense of national identity. Much of CEPEPO's work was focused on thematic areas relating to the Amazon, including deforestation, agriculture, and development projects, and the organisation had been involved in various projects with rural communities in the region. Its work could be characterised as having a dual focus: on the one hand, to document and make visible the realities and struggles of people living in Belém and the Amazon, and on the other, through capacity-building, to enable movements and communities to appropriate communication technologies for their own purposes.

Having started as an organisation concerned with the use of communication as a tool for education, CEPEPO increasingly had come to see communication as a theme in its own right, and its own role as being to promote the issue of communication among organisations and social movements, in Belém and in the Amazon as a whole. This was motivated by a strong sense of communication being a major challenge for movements and organisations in the region, partly due to problems of geographical distance and poorly developed communication infrastructures, partly due to a lack of resources and capacity. A key aim for CEPEPO was therefore to strengthen movement-based communication networks in the Amazon, through capacity building, awareness-raising, and developing bonds of solidarity.

The arrival in Belém of the WSF was greeted as an important opportunity to give impetus to this project. This was conceived partly in terms of learning from the experiences of communication activists from elsewhere in Brazil and other countries:

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[11] Very much a low-budget operation, the work of CEPEPO was co-ordinated by one full-time member of staff (a white woman in her late 30s) supported at the time of the WSF by a small core of young volunteers from Guamá and nearby Terra Firme. In their late teens and early twenties, these volunteers (one woman and three men, of Afro-Brazilian and mixed heritage) had come into contact with CEPEPO through participating in the organisation's communication projects for young people, and had aspirations to continue studying or working with communication. Though similarly situated to the *Fórum de Rádios* in terms of its connection to poor urban communities, CEPEPO was somewhat better equipped (in terms of resources, time and cultural capital) to participate in the forum organising process, and the organisation's director, Ilma Bittencourt, was one of the co-ordinators of the Communication Working Group for the WSF 2009. Though they did not work closely together, members of CEPEPO and the *Fórum de Rádios* attended each other's meetings and workshops in the run-up to the forum.

> The forum is going to be this great moment, where there will be other
> organisations which already have managed to work a bit with [communication],
> where we can be seeing, participating in this laboratory, learning, and trying to
> implement this afterwards here in our region, in the Amazon (Ilma Bittencourt,
> interview, December 2008).

In preparation for the forum, CEPEPO hosted what was dubbed the "Shared
Communication Laboratory" (*Laboratório da Comunicação Compartilhada*),
which was in operation for a few weeks prior to the event.[12] The Laboratory
organised a series of workshops bringing together communication activists,
members of various social movements, university students, and local residents.
During these workshops, participants gained practical skills in journalism,
radio, and audio-visual production, began to produce media content relating to
the WSF, and made plans for their coverage of the event itself. As a result,
activists connected to CEPEPO were well prepared for the forum, having learnt
practical skills, established links with various other groups, and – perhaps most
importantly – gained confidence in their abilities as communicators.

As well as offering the possibility to learn new skills and practices, the WSF – a
rare occasion for organisations and movements in the Amazon that normally are
separated by vast distances to come together – was seen as an important
opportunity for CEPEPO to develop relationships with regional actors and
demonstrate the importance of communication to them. In the period leading
up to the WSF, CEPEPO invited representatives from a range of movements to
the Shared Communication Laboratory to discuss how they could collaborate.
This was conceived in terms of putting issues relating to the Amazon on the
agenda:

> What we wanted was to [...] construct this space where we could congregate all
> these organisations that are related to the big themes to do with the Amazon. So
> what we did first was [...] call the social organisations from here in the Amazon,
> which represent the movements, in the widest sense possible, at the level of the
> Amazon. So we called the MST, we called Via Campesina, the women's
> movement, the indigenous movement, the black people's movement, to sit down
> and discuss how we could do this laboratory and incorporate these themes into
> each [communication] project[13] (Ilma Bittencourt, interview, February 2009).

Insofar as it brought together activists from different movements and enabled
them to share their knowledge of issues relating to the Amazon, the Shared
Communication Laboratory can be conceived as an attempt to create a space for

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[12] For a brief discussion of the politics and practice of "shared communication" in the WSF, see
Stephansen (2012).

[13] The independent media coverage of the WSF 2009 was organised in a set of "projects": the TV
Forum for audio-visual coverage, the Radio Forum for independent and community radios, and
Ciranda for text- and image-based journalism.

translation and collective knowledge production which was oriented specifically towards the Amazon. Drawing on its history of working with regional actors and issues, CEPEPO put the Amazon, and its peoples and their struggles, at the centre of its engagement with the WSF. This commitment to the Amazon was also prominent in the way the organisation approached the task of reporting on the WSF:

> We decided here at CEPEPO that we were going to put this on the agenda, the Amazon, themes related to the Amazon, and where there were activities at the forum that had to do with the Amazon, we had to be there, covering, getting interviews, collecting material (Vanessa Silva, interview, February 2009).[14]

The WSF, in brief, was seen as an opportunity to give voice to movements in the Amazon and make their struggles and alternatives visible. Of particular significance to CEPEPO was the discovery of various online platforms for independent media coverage of the WSF, such as www.ciranda.net (for text- and image-based journalism) and www.wsftv.net (for audio-visual content). Previously, CEPEPO activists only had circulated their material by distributing DVDs, mainly within Belém; however, from the experience of the Shared Communication Laboratory, they discovered how to share their content with people in other parts of Brazil and the world.

This sense of being able to connect to the global – the idea that their work could be disseminated via online platforms that in principle are accessible to anyone anywhere in the world – was a great source of motivation and confidence:

> We went to the forum with a much higher self-esteem, in the sense that [we knew] we could produce good quality material and disseminate this material to various places in the world, in Brazil, and in the Amazon (Ilma Bittencourt, interview, February 2009).

However, as hinted at in this extract, acting on or through global communication networks was not necessarily their only – or even primary – concern. Given the difficulties that social movements and organisations in the Amazon have in communicating, circulating media coverage within the region was considered just as, or even more, important:

> First, I think [our audience is] Belém and the Amazon [...]. It's a very big complaint among the social movements that we don't see ourselves; we don't communicate what we are doing, neither to ourselves nor to civil society [...]. I think first here, because sometimes it is much easier to have information about the Amazon there in [your] country, there in São Paulo, but we don't have this

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14 Vanessa Silva (real name) was a volunteer at CEPEPO from Guamá.

information here for society to know (Ilma Bittencourt, interview, February 2009).

Conscious of how movements and communities in the Amazon tend to be excluded from global communication networks and the knowledge that circulates in such networks, CEPEPO sought not simply to enable place-based movements to get a message across to a somehow external "global public". The organisation's work to strengthen communication networks in the Amazon was also, crucially, about creating a space in which these movements could elaborate what that message might be. A key aim, in other words, was to create conditions for production of knowledge *in*, *about*, and *for* the Amazon, starting from the realities of people living in the region.

This project went hand-in-hand with place-making: as in the case of the *Rádio dos Povos*, the production of knowledges starting from the Amazon necessarily also involves work to define what the Amazon *is*. The complaint among movements that "we don't see ourselves" is telling in this respect: strengthening communication networks in the Amazon is not just about rectifying a lack of factual information; it is also about constructing shared understandings of the Amazon as a place and of what it means to be from that place. During an interview in which we discussed the significance of knowledge produced by social movements, Bittencourt offered the following thoughts on the issue of knowledge production in the Amazon:

> Here in the Amazon, it is a struggle which I think is very related to identity [...] in the sense of constructing a knowledge for the communities, for the originary peoples from here, which is ours, constructed through our own relationships here [...]. We perceive that today, the movements, they understand better this process of constructing knowledge from here, from our roots, from our identity – and not from what comes from above [...], which causes problems [in the sense that] you don't manage to develop, you don't construct identity (interview, December 2008).

Recognising the obstacles to identity construction posed by detached "knowledge from above", Bittencourt sensed strongly the need for people in the Amazon to become *subjects* of knowledge and engage in a collective process of identity construction grounded in place. But what exactly was the character of the "Amazon" that CEPEPO wanted to help construct?

What stands out in the accounts of CEPEPO members, as well as those of the community radio activists discussed earlier, is a sense of the Amazon as a place of *difference*, a place that is home to a multiplicity of peoples and movements. When they spoke about the Amazon, they typically did so in terms of the struggles of a diversity of movements and groups in the region: women, young people, poor urban communities, Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples – often with emphasis on the latter two. This particular association of the Amazon

with difference was also discernible in CEPEPO's coverage of the WSF 2009: in the videos that the organisation produced and posted on wsftv.net during the event, the diversity of movements in the region was an important theme in its own right, and indigenous groups as well as Afro-descendants (particularly local youth) featured prominently.

While the notion of difference provided a common thread, what sometimes was less clear in these accounts were the exact boundaries of the Amazon under construction. Though the term "Pan-Amazon" featured occasionally, activists tended to speak of "the Amazon" in general terms, more often than not referring implicitly to the Brazilian Amazon. This mostly Brazilian orientation was also evident in CEPEPO's coverage of the WSF 2009, which was almost exclusively in Portuguese. However, the forum contributed to bringing the trans-boundary character of the Amazon into clearer view, and provided an entry point for CEPEPO into the Pan-Amazon Social Forum (*Fórum Social Pan-Amazônico*, or FSPA) – a process modelled on the WSF which has had as an aim to bring together movements from across the nine countries that share the Pan-Amazon.[15] Having previously only followed this process at a distance, CEPEPO activists decided after the WSF 2009 to join the FSPA communication working group and participate in the organisation of the 2010 FSPA. In July 2009, a planning meeting of the FSPA Council was held in Belém, and CEPEPO's coverage from this event shows a much clearer Pan-Amazon orientation: of seven videos uploaded on wsftv.net during this meeting, three were in Spanish (two of which featured indigenous people from Ecuador and Peru respectively), three featured Afro-descendants talking about racism (one highlighting the importance of unity between Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples in the Pan-Amazon), while two examined the social and environmental impacts of large development projects in the Amazon.

Like the *Rádio dos Povos*, the case of CEPEPO shows that the WSF should not be thought of as simply an occasion for "local" movements to act "on global discourses through the global communication networks", to use Castells' (2009: 35) terms. For activists connected to CEPEPO, the WSF provided the opportunity to strengthen autonomous processes of knowledge production and place-making in the Amazon. Although they welcomed the opportunities that the WSF appeared to open up for disseminating material at a global scale, there was also a strong sense of the need for people in the Amazon to appropriate communication technologies in order to be able to take ownership of the knowledges they produce and share these among themselves. The importance of such a project was summed up by Ilma Bittencourt in the following terms:

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[15] At the time of the WSF in Belém, there had been four previous editions of the FSPA (in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005). The WSF 2009 gave renewed impetus to this process, leading to the organisation of the fifth FSPA in Santarém, Brazil, in 2010 and later the sixth FSPA in Cojiba, Bolivia, in 2012.

The social movements have a lot of information about how another world is possible […] in the form of family agriculture, alternative forms of fishing, of food production, social movements' construction in their communities, how they are constructing more egalitarian relations. So I think this creation of another possible world is in our hands. If we manage to appropriate the tools, and understand communication as a human right, and put this forward through the opportunities that are being given to us today, we will manage to change the world (interview, February 2009).

Conclusion

This article has explored the complex ways in which communication activists in Belém engaged with the WSF 2009 and sought to make use of it for their own purposes. In the case of the *Rádio dos Povos*, community radio activists constructed a temporary communication space that facilitated exchange of knowledge and experience between WSF participants and the local resident population. In the case of CEPEPO's longer-term project of strengthening movement-based communication networks in the Amazon, the WSF provided a unique opportunity to learn from activists from other places, develop links with movements from across the region, and put themes relating to the Amazon on the agenda.

What these examples highlight is the centrality of place – and politics of place – to the practices and imaginaries of communication activists in Belém. Emerging as a central theme is the need for place-based movements to appropriate communication technologies for their own purposes. What comes across clearly both in the case of the *Rádio dos Povos* and CEPEPO is a strong commitment to facilitating autonomous processes of knowledge production that *start from* the Amazon and are grounded in local and regional realities. This commitment to place does not equal insularity; rather, the production of knowledge *in*, *about* and *for* the Amazon becomes a prerequisite and starting point for engaging with wider movement networks at different scales. In the case of the *Rádio dos Povos*, activists' concern to facilitate a deeper understanding of issues pertaining to the Amazon among the local resident population provided the occasion for drawing in activists from elsewhere to share their experiences of similar struggles. In the case of CEPEPO's longer-term project, strengthening movement-based communication networks in the Amazon was conceived as a starting point for the elaboration and proliferation of alternatives grounded in the knowledges and practices of the region's movements.

The politics of place that these activists engaged in challenges conventional hierarchical understandings of scale, demonstrating the complex ways in which different scales of action may overlap, intersect or even be mutually constitutive. The *Rádio dos Povos*, while aimed at the local population of Belém and geared towards the elaboration of knowledges related to the Amazon region, simultaneously – and by virtue of its place-based character – provided a site for transnational connections. For CEPEPO, the ostensibly global WSF process gave

impetus to a project concerned with strengthening regional communication networks that could articulate a diversity of actors and struggles.

In both examples, the production and circulation of place-based knowledges are closely bound up with processes of place-making: the construction of shared understandings of what the Amazon is like as a place and what it means to be from that place. This is far from straightforward, given the vastness, diversity and trans-boundary character of the Amazon combined with the lack of adequate communication networks among movements in the region. Discernible in the discourses of communication activists in Belém is a conception of the Amazon as a place of difference and possibility, as a place that is home not only to a diversity of struggles against domination but to a diversity of *alternatives*. In this respect, their emergent project of place-making offers a glimpse of an alternative epistemological imaginary based on a logic of difference.

What this article has not done is analyse in depth the specific *content* of the knowledges being produced and circulated through these communication practices. In this respect, the extent to which such practices might contribute to a broader project of decolonisation of knowledge remains an open question. What *can* be said is that the efforts of communication activists to facilitate autonomous processes of knowledge production among movements of Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples and other marginalised groups in the Amazon – a region that for centuries has suffered the effects of colonialism – constitutes a necessary starting point for such a project.

This article began by highlighting the asymmetrical relationship between "global" cosmopolitan elites and "local" grassroots groups within the WSF process. What has become clear is that strengthening the capacity of place-based movements to communicate on their own terms is about much more than inclusion within the "global" space of the WSF: it is about enabling the proliferation of alternative knowledge projects at different scales, within and beyond the social forum process.

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Reflections on Fanon's legacy

David Austin, Aziz Choudry, Radha D'Souza, Sunera Thobani

Many people consider Martinique-born Frantz Fanon to be one of the most important anti-colonial thinkers of the twentieth century. Aziz Choudry, one of the co-editors of this issue of Interface, *initiated a discussion with three colleagues – David Austin, Radha D'Souza, and Sunera Thobani - after many conversations about the legacy of Fanon in the course of collaborations in both academic and activist milieus. These four short pieces discuss the relevance of Fanon's writings for thought and action in struggles today. In doing so, they draw upon the writers' personal, political, activist and academic engagements with Fanon's writings and the questions which he grappled with, in a life cut short by leukemia at the age of 35 in December 1961.*

David Austin

When did you first encounter Fanon, in what context, and how did it impact you?

I first encountered Fanon as a high school student in Toronto. As a youth I spent a lot of time at Third World Bookstore in Toronto. Many of us as young women and men would go there on the weekends or whenever we had free time to buy books, but more importantly to discuss, debate, and exchange ideas on a range of subjects, local and international, and especially on issues related to people of African descent. I must admit that I did not understand everything that I read in Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, but what I did understand really shaped my consciousness. The idea of being Black, but wearing a white mask spoke to me. It explained how we had been shaped by the dominant culture, dominant ideologies, and the deep-seated psychological impact of colonization and racism on the Black psyche. Fanon's writing was a revelation in that sense and provided a language that helped me to understand how race operated, how it is etched in the consciousness – of both the colonized and the colonizer.

Violence

The Wretched of the Earth was another matter. When Fanon spoke about violence in the colonial setting, it resonated with me because it helped to explain the fratricidal violence that I saw around me among Black youth. It explained that oppression and colonization was crucial in terms of understanding the

social, economic, and political circumstances that produced violent phenomenon.

The popular assumption was, and remains, that Blacks are somehow predisposed to violence, almost as if it is embedded in DNA. Fanon's analysis of violence provided a context, a sociological explanation as to why violence occurs; how forms of oppression create pent-up anger and frustration resulting in internalized oppression as the oppressed or colonized feel incapable of challenging colonialism or oppression:

> While the settler or the policeman has the right the livelong day to strike the native, to insult him and to make him crawl to them, you will see the native reaching for his knife at the slightest hostile or aggressive glance cast on him by another native; for the last resort of the native is to defend his personality vis-à-vis his brother.

> By throwing himself with all his force into the vendetta, the native tries to persuade himself that colonialism does not exist, that everything is going on as before, that history continues. Here on the level of communal organizations we clearly discern the well-known behavior patterns of avoidance. It is as if plunging into a fraternal bloodbath allowed them to ignore obstacle, and to put off till later the choice, nevertheless inevitable, which opens up the question of armed resistance to colonialism. Thus collective autodestruction in a very concrete way is one of the ways in which the native's muscular tension is set free. All these patterns of conduct are those of the death reflex when faced with danger, a suicidal behaviour which proves to the settler (whose existence and domination is by them all the more justified) that these men are not reasonable human beings. (Fanon 1967: 54)

His writing about violent phenomenon, fratricide, pent-up anger and the ritualistic dances and rites associated with it in colonial Africa are some of most vivid and imaginative passages in his writing and, for me, spoke to the dancehall culture that emanated from Jamaica and how it was in part shaped by its colonial/post-colonial social and economic context and how dance, as ritual, was a way form of exorcism of the psychological and muscular tension that results from colonial and alienating environments; how we unleash our demons through dance often as enactments of violence and symbolic killings which, in the reggae dancehall and hip hop context, often result in actual acts of fratricide:

> The native's relaxation takes precisely the form of muscular orgy in which the most acute aggressivity and the most impelling violence are canalized, transformed and conjured away. The circle of the dance is a permissive circle: it protects and permits. At certain times on certain days, men and women come together at a given place, and there, under the solemn eye of the tribe, fling themselves into a seemingly unorganized pantomime, which is in reality extremely systematic in which by various means—shakes of the head, bending of the spinal column, throwing of the whole body backwards – may be deciphered as

in an open book the huge effort of a community to exorcise itself, to liberate itself, to explain itself.... There are not limits – for in reality your purpose in coming together is to allow the accumulated libido, the hampered aggressivity, to dissolve as in a volcanic eruption. Symbolic killings, fantastic rites, imaginary mass murders – all must be brought out. The evil humors are undamned, and flow away with a din as of molten lavas. (Fanon 1967: 57)

In this sense, it helped to marry the context of the Global South with my experiences in the Global North. Later I discovered how poet Linton Kwesi Johnson (LKJ) drew on these passages in some of his early poetry as a way of discussing violent phenomena in Britain in the 1970s:

> night number one was in brixton
>
> soprano B sound system
>
> was a beating out a rhythm with a fire
>
> coming doun his reggae-reggae wire
>
> it was a soun shaking doun your spinal column
>
> a bad music tearing up your flesh
>
> and the rebels them start fighting
>
> the yout them jus turn wild
>
> it's war amongst the rebels
>
> madness…madness…war. (Johnson 2002: 6)

But as both Fanon and LKJ point out, this internalized violence often eventually becomes externalized in the form of canalized anti-colonial liberation struggles, an organized movement against colonialism and oppression. This is Fanon's dialectic, a situation in which the conditions become so unbearable that the colonized believe they have no choice but to confront those circumstances through struggle:

> During the struggle for freedom, a marked alienation from these practices is observed. The native's back is to the wall, the knife is at his throat (or, more precisely, the electrode at his genitals): he will have no more call for his fancies. After centuries of unreality, after having wallowed in the most outlandish phantoms, at long last the native, gun in hand, stands face to face with the only forces which contend for his life – the forces of colonialism. (Fanon 1967: 58)

Nationalism

Fanon's writing on nationalism is also important. He unambiguously wrote about the betrayal of nationalist leaders, some of whom, having come to power

by riding the wave of popular nationalist sentiment and struggle, eventually betray the interests of their followers.

> The people who at the beginning of the struggle had adopted the primitive Manicheism of the settler – Blacks and Whites, Arabs and Christians – realize as they go along that it sometimes happens that you get Blacks who are whiter than the Whites…the fact of having a national flag and the hope of an independent nation does not always tempt certain strata of the population to give up their interests or privileges. The people come to understand that natives like themselves do not lose sight of the main chance, but quite on the contrary seem to make use of the war in order to strengthen their material situation and their growing power. Certain natives continue to profiteer and exploit the war, making their gains at the expense of the people, who as usual are prepared to sacrifice everything, and water their native soil with their blood. This discovery is unpleasant, bitter, sickening: and yet everything seemed to be so simple before: the bad people were on one side, and the good on the other. The clear, unreal, idyllic light of the beginning is followed by a semi-darkness that bewilders the senses. (Fanon 1967: 144-5)

But betray is perhaps not the best word as it implies that their interests were always in sync with the majority of the population. In actual fact, it is often the case that, despite the consensus that the colonial power had to go, these leaders quietly harboured aspirations of leadership that would simply mean the replacing the colonial power while maintaining the much of the colonial economic and political structure. In essence, their interests were very much in sync with the former colonial power. This, I would later discover, also applied to community leaders who often represented themselves and their interests at the expense of members of their communities, and often in the service of what Richard Iton refers to as the "prophylactic state." Conjoined with what Iton refers to as the "duppy" or shadowy states in the Global South (2008: 135, 202), we are left via Fanon with a portrait of the interconnectedness of the south to the north that illustrates certain characteristics of colonialism and domination.

Fanon and modernity

One of the merits and challenges in reading Fanon is that he is a modernist. There is a dialectic that threads through his work, the notion that as bad as circumstances can be – or as a result of dire circumstances and when the situation appears to be at its worse – change is possible. Change comes as a result of contradiction out of which a new stage in society or the new society itself comes into being. For Fanon, this means moving beyond the phantoms, rites, rituals, and customs of "pre-modern" society. To me, this is one of weaknesses in Fanon's writing insofar as he privileges a form of progress or development that overshadows or even dismisses the more communal ways of people, the place of the spirit world, and the complexity of African societies:

And the youth of a colonized country, growing up in an atmosphere of shot and fire, may well make a mock of, and does not hesitate to pour scorn upon the zombies of his ancestors, the horses with two heads, the dead who rise again, and the djins who rush into your body while you yawn. The native discovers reality and transforms it into the pattern of this customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom.

Here, in contrasting "reality" with the spirit world, Fanon betrays certain biases which, despite some of the parallels between them, distinguishes Amilcar Cabral from Fanon. Cabral, for example, discussed how horizontal or less hierarchal and more communal societies were more resistant to colonization than those societies that were more vertically structured and therefore assumed to be more complex. In other words, the stratified, vertical societies were more inclined to collaborate with the colonial regime. This is an important consideration that perhaps only a keen observer of African history and culture – as opposed to solely politics – could see.

Teaching Fanon and his legacy

This said, teaching Fanon is always a pleasure as his ideas speak to particular experiences which can ultimately be universalized to a range of experiences. His analysis of violence speaks to any context where oppression, poverty and misery exist, whether it is in Glasgow or Johannesburg. When he writes about nationalist leaders, he is speaking about class aspirations and leaders across the globe in ways that both speak to race and look beyond it. His psycho-social analysis of ritual and dance speak to dancehall and rave subculture and our need for cathartic release, all of which is to be found wherever we find humans. Fanon attempts to speak to the best of our humanity and the challenges of creating the future in the present and envisioning a new society in which to be human is a work in progress, an unfinished movement:

Come, then, comrades; it would be as well to decide at once to change our ways. We must shake off the heavy darkness in which we were plunged, and leave it behind. The new day which is already at hand must find us firm, prudent, and resolute.

We must leave our dreams and abandon our old beliefs and friendships from the time it all began. Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this to Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their streets, in all corners of the globe. For centuries they have stifled almost the whole humanity in the name of a so-called spiritual experience. Look at them today swaying between atomic and spiritual degradation. (Fanon 1967: 311)

Come, then comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate

Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe. (Fanon 1967: 312)

For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man. (Fanon 1967: 316)

About the author

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Aziz Choudry

When did you first encounter Fanon, in what context, and how did it impact you?

I first read *The Wretched of the Earth*, (along with Aimé Césaire's *Discourse on Colonialism*) when I was 17 or 18. I came across it by following some reference to it somewhere, in a public library in South London. Back then, I was struggling for a vocabulary, a language to understand and deal with the racism and racist violence of the early 1980s. From the far-right fascism of the National Front and British Movement, to the endemic police brutalization and harassment of Black and Asian communities, things felt brutal, oppressive and sometimes explosive. It was Thatcher's Britain, and around the time that 'Free Nelson Mandela' and 'Racist Friend' by The Specials were in the charts. The British Army occupation of the North of Ireland, the Cold War, the threat of nuclear annihilation, and the apartheid regime in South Africa ground on. Fanon's trenchant critique of the dehumanization and alienation wrought by racism and colonialism and assertion that "the colonial world is a world cut in two", divided by barracks and police stations seemed as eerily and equally relevant in Brixton, Belfast and Derry, as it later did in explaining divisions within the environment and peace movement in Aotearoa/New Zealand between those – predominantly Pakeha/white activists - unable or unwilling to see the violence inherent in colonization and those –especially Indigenous Peoples and Pacific Island people-who opposed militarization and nuclearization of the Pacific through an understanding of colonialism. My first

reading of Fanon was a pretty personal, private encounter – in hindsight, a study circle or having at least someone to talk about the ideas would have been great. While I have come across much of his other work translated into English since then, it's still *The Wretched of the Earth* that draws me back again and again.

What I remember most was the impact of the passion, poetry, drama and clarity of thought. While I've certainly never seen *Wretched* as some sort of a manifesto, it is difficult not to use the words 'prescient' and 'prophetic' about Fanon. Perhaps it is a false exercise to accurately assess the extent to which Fanon's ideas shaped my analysis first as an organizer, as an activist, and later in life as someone who currently works in the university as a professor in a faculty of education. Yet Fanon has always been there in some form, and in terms of impact, for me, ranks as possibly the most influential thinker. I was not really around academia much until recent years, so my introduction to him was more in the context of my own growing anti-colonial activism and analysis and was not particularly linked to formal education.

Universal and particular

I re-encountered Fanon in the course of activism in Aotearoa/New Zealand, after ending up there in the mid-1980s, and was struck by how his work and ideas had been discussed, debated, and taken up in different contexts. Apart from a year in a university undergraduate program, before 'dropping out', mine were, for the most part, not 'academic' engagements with Fanon. In the context of Indigenous struggles for self-determination in the Pacific, in settler colonial states like Aotearoa/New Zealand and Australia, and perhaps most obviously in regard to France's remaining Pacific colonies – Kanaky (New Caledonia) and "French" Polynesia, Fanon's ideas were present in many conversations around struggles for decolonization and self-determination. In particular I recall conversations in the early 1990s with Kanak independence activist Susanna Ounei, (from French-occupied Kanaky/New Caledonia), about the lessons from Fanon in the context of the Kanak independence struggle and, more broadly, in the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement/network of struggles. Just as the Caribbean and the Pacific islands share some commonalities in their histories of colonialism, there are obvious parallels between French nuclear testing, brutal colonial/military occupation and war in Algeria and French colonialism in the Pacific. I've often thought of how France was conducting its nuclear tests in Algeria at the start of the 1960s, in the last two years of Fanon's life, and the way that testing moved to Mururoa in 1962 (with tests again in the mid-90s). Then there was the Ouvéa massacre of 19 Kanak activists by French security forces in 1988, alongside ongoing militarized occupation of the territory. In the South Pacific, it did not seem to me that one had to look too far or too hard to appreciate Fanon's notion that colonialism is 'violence in its natural state'.

And in so many contexts, it seems that the questions which he highlighted about the perils of bourgeois nationalist leadership replicating colonial rule after the colonizers had allegedly 'left', (and of the potential of 'post-independence' nationalism turning to xenophobia), were in the minds and conversations about leaders and elites who emerged from liberation movements. These were the very same tensions, possibilities, caveats and warnings that Fanon shared on 'the pitfalls of national consciousness.' He offered warnings/analysis that instead of true decolonization, elites involved in national liberation struggles can end up becoming collaborators in replicating the structures of the colonizer, and actors of neocolonialism at a time of formal freedom, betraying any transformative potential of the liberation struggle. The changing of the flag but simply replacing it with neocolonial elites. Unfortunately we have seen that in too many contexts.

Conversations with Maori friends about the decolonization of the mind and relating this to the meaning of decolonization in other context of struggles for self-determination in the Pacific referenced Fanon. His work certainly had an influence on a number of important Indigenous mental health, community and social work initiatives, grappling with the psychological effects of colonization.

Long before the word 'globalization' became so ubiquitous, and before the technology of the Internet, Fanon's ideas had travelled widely in liberation movements --especially those for whom the concept of self-determination had not been jettisoned or supplanted by some other concept like "sustainable development," as Radha has discussed elsewhere. For I think it's sometimes easy to overlook the ways in which, through diasporas and international links between movements and struggles, those ideas and debates of which Fanon was such a major part travelled far and wide. I thought and still think that Fanon spoke to people's lives and struggles not as some abstracted disembodied, objectifying, academic voice, decontextualized from the conditions in which he lived, struggled and wrote.

That was also the context in which I first met Radha and Sunera – through struggles in the 1990s against the free market reforms in Aotearoa/New Zealand and their relations with historical and contemporary forms of colonialism and capitalist globalization, free trade and investment agreements like GATT/WTO (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization, forums like APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), etc. For me, the anti-colonial, anti-racist politics came first. My 'anti-globalization', or 'global justice' organizing was informed by, and framed within that. In turn, alongside questions about whether the "anti-globalization" movement was inherently anticapitalist, a few of us pointed out that it was not inherently anti colonial.

On that note, writing while ill – and ultimately dying from myeloid leukemia in 1960-1961 – Fanon's visionary analysis of imperialism in post-independence Third World nations predicts a scenario where nominally decolonized societies contend with attendant capital flight, and direct colonial rule is replaced by the intensification of foreign investment imperialism which locks newly independent peoples into new forms of exploitation, facilitated by nationalist

elites. I was re-reading the chapter "The pitfalls of national consciousness" (from *Wretched of the Earth*) the other day and thinking about how well it spoke to the last three decades or more of structural adjustment policies, trade and investment liberalization, examples of post-independence leadership which collaborates with former colonial powers, capital and which uses military repression against the masses and thinking, "yes, he got that right!"

Years later, I remember a conversation David and I had on the street outside of Concordia University in Montreal, when we talked about how Fanon had been taken up at the same time in black struggle in Canada, North America, the Caribbean, by Red Power (Indigenous activists) and sections of the white Québecois(e) nationalist left. Talking again recently about his new book, *Fear of a Black Nation*, David made an interesting point about the politics and history of language/translation, about how and when exactly Fanon and Césaire were being seriously taken up in Québecois(e) communities in the original French - before English translations of his work started circulating in oppositional movements, and what that meant in terms of the influence of his thought on respective movements. Alongside that, I think that Sunera's work, more than most in Canada, has consistently invoked and built upon the insights that Fanon has made which connect colonization, racialization and violence in both domestic and global contexts.

Teaching Fanon

A key aspect of Fanon's contribution is his recognition of the intellectual work, the dialectic of learning, in the struggle – with all of its tensions and contradictions. He is clear not to set up some kind of dualistic notion about 'the brain' and 'the brawn' of movements, viewing that both reason and force have great importance in popular mobilization, and are dialectically related. In the context of struggles for liberation, Fanon noted how ordinary people have the potential to take control over their lives, that their consciousness emerges through struggle. Staughton Lynd reminds us that "without exception the most significant contributions to Marxist thought have come from men and women who were not academics, who passed through the university but did not remain there" (2010: 144). In my view, Fanon has to be included in that list.

With a few exceptions, I was surprised and sometimes dismayed at some of the ways that Fanon's work is read in academe. Randall Williams has written perceptively about the "selectivity and wariness with which the revolutionary theorists of decolonization – Césaire, Fanon, Cabral, Rodney, etc. – are received or ignored today" (2010: 105). I have had some pretty surreal conversations with some academics about Fanon in which they seem to have rendered invisible the person, his struggles, his politics and the context in which he wrote. On the one hand, these responses sometimes remind me of a crude, and I think, rather anti-intellectual claim that he somehow glorified or fetishized violence. This is redolent of one time when I had the misfortune to be watching some US TV crime drama where police raid some 'homegrown terrorist"s house and the

camera zooms in on the suspect's bookcase with the *Wretched of the Earth* prominently displayed.   On the other, there are some very strange abstractions of Fanon's work that seem so far removed as to be unrecognizable.

In teaching Fanon, I use Cheikh Djemai's film "Frantz Fanon: une vie, un combat, une oeuvre". In teaching Fanon's writings, life, struggle, and work, what's encouraging is the interest among some students – many, but not exclusively, racialized students—in looking at Fanon's ideas to think through contemporary/recent issues, struggles and dilemmas. Perhaps it's interesting to think about why it is, and with whom one can say, that Fanon's work does and doesn't resonate. I tend to use "Concerning Violence" from *Wretched* regularly in courses on international 'development' and education. It remains hard to move past a reading of the chapter which does not fixate on, and decontextualize, his discussion of violence. A student in one of my classes recently said "he's too black and white". But I've always read it as a powerful critique of the inherent violence in colonialism. On the other hand I recently did a reading course on anti-colonial literature with one of my graduate students, which traversed Césaire, Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Walter Rodney and Steve Biko among others. Reading them together was a fabulous way for both of us to think through their contributions for today.

Fanon's legacy

Lately I've been in many conversations, inside and outside of the university context, about how we – as educators, organizers, activists--can learn from conceptual resources from earlier struggles, rather than reinventing the wheel. There is much to be said for reading Fanon against the contemporary times that we live in. The materiality and intensity of Fanon's writing still leaps off every page. Of course, we cannot and should not overlook the geohistorical aspects of the moment(s) in which he wrote, the time and place, the political and social contexts, how these were shaped by his experiences in Martinique, France, Algeria, Tunisia, and informed by his political commitments and engagements. But obviously his legacy is terribly important-- as evidenced by the fact that there were so many commemorations of his life, work and struggles in so many places in late 2011/early 2012, marking 50 years after his death in December 1961. Sitting with friends and comrades recently in South Africa, affirmed to me how his ideas are clearly relevant for many of those who struggled against apartheid only to find the old regime replaced by governments which, in the name of liberation, seem to have prioritized the interests of capital over the masses. What's exciting is to see a new generation of organizers, and students encountering, rediscovering, or in a sense unearthing, Fanon. Some Fanon reading/study circles wouldn't be a bad thing in both movement and more academic contexts, indeed perhaps encompassing both.

In my mind, I've long bracketed Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* with that powerful poem by Pakistani revolutionary poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz, "Subh-e-Azadi", The Dawn of Freedom. It's not just that they both warn of betrayal by

nationalist elites at the moment of supposed liberation or independence. It's also their profound sense of, and faith in, humanity, alongside their condemnation of the dehumanizing effects of imperialism and colonialism. While perhaps it might be easy to be cynical and dismissive of popular struggles for change, and people's efforts to emancipate themselves from oppression, Fanon was deeply committed to thinking through the difficulties and complexities of the process of decolonization in a way which offered hope. As his former colleague and biographer, Alice Cherki suggests, *The Wretched of the Earth* cannot be dismissed as an outmoded text "if we choose to read [it] as an appeal to the future and what it can hold" (2000: 221).

About the author

Aziz Choudry is a longtime activist who is currently Assistant Professor in the Department of Integrated Studies in Education at McGill University, Canada. He is co-author of *Fight Back: Workplace Justice for Immigrants* (Fernwood, 2009), and co-editor of *Learning from the Ground Up: Global Perspectives on Social Movements and Knowledge Production* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), *Organize! Building from the Local for Global Justice*, (PM Press/Between the Lines, 2012), and *NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects (Zed Books, 2013).* He is on the global spokescouncil, and a regional editor, for *Interface.*

Radha D'Souza

When did you first encounter Fanon, in what context, and how did it impact you?

I first heard about Frantz Fanon as an undergraduate student studying in the University of Bombay. The post-Independence euphoria had ebbed away in India by then. India, one of the first colonies to become independent, the home to Gandhi, was also the first to be disillusioned by it on a national scale. By the mid-sixties the economy had all the trappings of a dependent colony. Poverty and famines were everywhere, the World Bank for all practical purposes wrote the nation's five year plans, and the IMF forced devaluation of the rupee. The Naxalbari uprising, a small peasant revolt in the remote Terai regions on the foothills of the Himalayas, was a spark that fell on the tinderbox of a disillusioned nation. Naxalbari led to widespread state repression. Thousands of young people were 'disappeared' by the state or killed in 'encounters'(extra-judicial killings). Naxalbari added to Indian-English words that are part of the vernacular vocabulary of state violence to this day. Naxalbari was followed by the national railway strike and the national Emergency when the Bill of Rights provisions in the constitution were suspended and the pretence of democracy

ended. To be young was a big security risk, and to be a young man with an attitude an enhanced security risk.

During the Emergency many of us suddenly found ourselves with more time on hand. Without strikes, protests, and demonstrations to organise, a time when even hanging out in cafes came with safety risks, we decided to use our time productively by reading. A university professor who was and still is very supportive of students suggested we read Fanon. I remember clearly our reaction on discovering Fanon for the first time. We felt vindicated, our views about the events around us were validated by someone who was not from our country or context. We were not 'mindless' or 'misguided' as the state and the media portrayed us. We were saying national independence was not supposed to become what it had. State violence was the cause of social violence.

Two and a half decades later I rediscovered Fanon in New Zealand as an academic. Ironically Bombay had been renamed Mumbai, after a campaign spearheaded by the militant Hindu organisation Shiv Sena in 1995 after the demolition of the ancient Babri Masjid mosque in 1992 in Uttar Pradesh. The events leading up to the Babri Masjid were filled with anti-Muslim hysteria and followed by widespread violence against Muslims throughout India. Ironic because the rioters and the victims were both the 'wretched of the earth', drawn from the slums and ghettoes of Bombay, a city marked by what Fanon described as the 'geography of hunger'. Ironic because way back in the sixties Fanon grasped the anatomy of aggression by the oppressed. The colonised man dreams of physical prowess because aggression is 'deposited in his bones'. 'Niggers', Fanon wrote, beat each other up, and there is collective 'auto-destruction'. Poverty and police powers, the two faces of oppression, dehumanises.

The Fanon I rediscovered in New Zealand academia, in Spanish and post-colonial studies, had gone from being a serious champion of the Third World oppressed to becoming a kind of 'cool guy', laundered and pressed by the so-called 'cultural turn' in social theory. Critical theory had transformed Fanon almost beyond recognition. A black man's desire to wear a white mask was no longer about colonisation, oppression and state violence. It became a matter of black "identity", a particular way of engaging racial discrimination that reduced colonialism to a racial question and lead the way smoothly to the politics of multiculturalism. State violence, economic violence, cultural violence, and violence of history, at the forefront of Fanon's critique of colonisation became quiet and invisible, and if mentioned at all, it was only through the lens of identity, as sources for identity formation. Identity was a consequence of violence not the thing itself.

I was astonished to read that Fanon was seen as the 'prophet of violence' by many academics. Surrounded by daily state violence it had never crossed our minds that Fanon could be read in that way. I had learnt that Machiavelli and Hobbes were the prophets of violence. Machiavelli advised the wise prince to use violence judiciously as a technique of statecraft and Hobbes said the power of the body politic rested on the sword. In academia, people around me cited both scholars of Western Enlightenment but rarely if ever associated their thesis

on violence with the modern state which institutionalises and monopolises violence.

In 2011, in the UK by then, I searched to see if there were people who might want to celebrate the life of Fanon in the year of his fiftieth death anniversary. By then, even the cultural and postcolonial theorists had nearly forgotten Fanon in British universities. Neoliberal reform of universities, the successive decimation of trade unions and austerity measures had switched intellectual ethos in academia to TINA mode – there is no alternative but to succumb to restructuring and reforms and put one's head down to survive. These are tough times. Fanon was no longer the 'cool guy' of the eighties and nineties. Fanon was remembered instead in the Afro-Caribbean communities in London, many of whom were still reeling in the aftermath of the Tottenham riots in August 2011 when young black men and women once again demonstrated, very tragically, Fanon's understanding of the anatomy of state violence on the 'wretched of the earth' in the heartland of global finance capital. The British Afro-Caribbean community organised a public event to celebrate Fanon's life. One speaker, a Ghanaian recalled how as a young man and early career journalist he had interviewed Fanon, and reported on his tour of Africa, his visit to Ghana and meetings with Nkrumah in the early days of Ghana's independence. Fanon came to life at the meeting. Women wept as they spoke of police mistreatment of their sons and grandsons. 'Our children are not bad; they are good kids', one of them said. The simplicity of her words moved the audience to tears. I remembered Fanon's quote from his teacher and black poet Césaire in *The Wretched of the Earth*. There is an exchange between a rebel and his mother there that echoed the words of the mother on the stage in London. Fanon belongs to the Afro-Caribbean communities and I am glad he was celebrated by them. It did not matter to me anymore that the multiculturalists in the Universities had forgotten him.

Violence

Fanon was a psychiatrist, a trained medical practitioner. He was also a black man from the French colony of Martinique whose ancestors were slaves. He fought in World War 2 and experienced the most extreme form of state violence: war. Practicing as a psychiatrist in Algeria, he saw from close quarters what colonisation did to the 'human' in human beings. He became interested in the Algerian revolution because of the torture victims who came to him for treatment in the aftermath of the bloody repression of the nationalist movement in France. He moved to Algeria because he saw that as a black man, even a brilliant one, in France in the fifties his practice could not flourish. By then he had experienced French racism firsthand and written *Black Skin, White Masks*. Why do people endure so much suffering and pain for the sake of freedom and national independence? This question led him to interrogate colonialism and imperial domination.

The edifice of modern capitalism was founded on colonialism, the slave trade, the land confiscations, the appropriation of natural wealth and labour. In turn colonialism was a system organised and maintained by naked violence. The violence of colonialism was physical, social, economic, cultural and emotional. Colonial societies were founded by violence and maintained through it. What does a society founded on violence do to its members? On the one hand it could destroy their sense of self so completely that they became benumbed and dehumanised, a pathetic shadow of the human spirit. However, on the other, the human spirit being indestructible invariably found an outlet through spontaneous violence- which could be either individual violence against others equally wretched or collective violence of the poor that came out in outbursts like riots. Either way this violence was intuitive.

The violence of a freedom fighter is qualitatively different in contrast. The freedom fighter begins by saying 'I am not putting up with this 's...' anymore'. The moment s/he resists, the colonial state unleashes extraordinary violence upon him/her. The resistance fighter targets the perpetrator of violence with the hope of ending it forever. Revolutionary violence restores humanity in the abused, tortured individual. The act of resisting returns dignity and sense of self which the oppressor's violence had destroyed. When a person says 'I am not putting up with this 's...' ', s/he ceases to be the animal s/he has been reduced to by the coloniser. The restoration of their humanity is crucial if there is to be freedom at all. The freedom fighter is able to endure extreme trauma because s/he hopes by doing so s/he can keep her/his humanity which s/he has briefly tasted in the act of resistance.

I want to step back from Fanon for a moment in order to locate the wider significance of his contributions on understanding violence of the oppressed in the post World War 2 era. There are three wider points I wish to make.

First, it is important to remember that the critique of Fanon by critical theorists like Hannah Arendt turns on philosophical arguments that reflect post-Holocaust angst among European intellectuals. The philosophical response to European intellectual angst provided the moral justification for seeking reparations from Germany which in turn was used to colonise Palestine and establish the newest colonial-military state of Israel. If violence begets violence - which is true as a philosophical argument - who should bear the responsibility for ending the cycles of violence? The solution for European intellectuals was reparations from Germany (repentance), the use of that money to establish the state of Israel (compensation), and political solution as opposed to armed struggle for a Palestinian homeland and self-determination (non-violence). In this context it is interesting to recall another philosopher of non-violence from the East who took a completely different view on the responsibility for ending cycles of violence. The Buddha in his sermon to Pranjit and Ajatasatru in sixth century BC also argued that violence begets violence. But he concluded that cycles of violence must and can only be ended by the victors. In this school of thought in the European context the onus would fall on the Allies to dismantle the institutions of violence. Predictably the Allies went on to build formidable

military-industrial-commercial - media complexes after winning the World Wars.

Fanon's arguments in contrast were based on clinical observations and conclusions he came to from *healing real* people in a repressed colonised society. The starting point for him was not ethical or political philosophy but a real human being who had come to him to be healed. What should that human being do until the victors dismantle their military-industrial-media complexes? Violence is not about using particular tools – it is not about a knife, or a gun, or a machine gun, which can be picked up or dropped down depending on political 'choices'. Lenin argued that wars mobilise entire societies and that wars reorganise all of society. Before him Engels argued in *Anti-Duhring* that wars were not about weapons alone but the political economy of production, distribution and consumption of weapons. The military-industrial-commercial-media complexes of the post WW2 era reorganised the societies that were victorious in the World Wars, the Allies, as gigantic warfare states by unifying institutions of state and defence establishments, monopoly corporations and institutions of commerce and civil society and institutions of knowledge. When unmanned drone missiles rain bombs on 'mistaken targets' and families of peasants and shopkeepers on the ground become 'collateral damage' what should those people do while they wait for the philosophers of non-violence to convince their warfare states to dissolve themselves?

My second point is about 'agency' and 'subjectivity'. At least since the so-called 'cultural turn' critical theory on the Left has systematically undermined structural analysis in favour of subjectivity and agency. On the Right neoliberalism has elevated individual 'choice' to new levels. Individuals, in the neoliberal conception, are motivated by self-interest and seek to maximise gains by making the right choices. Too bad if their choices are not in sync with market fluctuations. 'There is no such thing as society' as Margaret Thatcher famously said and there will be 'winners and losers'. The conceptualisations of agency in the post-World War 2 era marked by the so-called 'cultural turn' in theory, objectifies agency and transforms subjectivity into an object for philosophical contemplation. It obscures the fact that agency is an attribute of the psyche, the emotional, psychological and moral dimensions of life. Cultural theories integrate the emotional, psychological and moral aspects of life into structures of state and oppression. Foucauldian 'disciplinary power', and the Gramscian 'hegemony' includes agency in the structures of governance and thereby subsume the autonomy of agency in the real life of real people. It forecloses possibilities of transformative structural change. This is the paradox of 'agency' and 'subjectivity' in critical theory. Fanon's question never presented itself to the critical theorists: what should the torture victim mauled by French intelligence service officers, or the peasants systematically dehumanised by the colonial state do? What of their 'agency'?

Fanon's position as a psychiatrist put the question squarely before him, and his practice in Algeria during the revolution and its repression meant the question could not be answered without considering colonialism. The option of

developing a more sophisticated panopticon was not available to him. What makes Fanon a revolutionary thinker is that he did not shy away from answering the question that the context presented him with. Colonisation and state violence dehumanises people. Period. Resistance restores the psychological, emotional and moral dimensions of a dehumanised person by restoring 'agency' to him/her in real life. He was always clear that violence must end but equally clear that it could end only when the architecture for violence was dismantled – colonial appropriation and expropriation must end for state violence to end, and when institutional violence ended, individual violence will become a minor, local and community based problem, as opposed to being a systemic foundation of society as it is at present.

That brings me to the third point about violence which is a far more insidious development since Fanon's times. There are two strands of early Enlightenment and modernisation and their coming together in the post-World War era that is significant. First, the Age of Enlightenment introduced a rupture between the material world and the mental world. This rupture created the body-mind or mind-matter dichotomy that is the hallmark of nearly all schools of Enlightenment thought. However, with the rise of monopoly finance capitalism in the early twentieth century, we find the emergence of psychology as a distinct "science" subject to "scientific methods" of empirical verification and experimentation that could be treated by combinations of medical and social sciences. Psychology is a quintessentially American-led "science" of the twentieth century. Its expansion into "social psychology" and "behavioural" psychology expanded methods of this science of psychology to collective "minds" as opposed to individual responses to situations. Psychology transformed the old 'body-mind' problem in qualitative ways by taking it beyond the realm of ethical philosophy to interventions through clinical and social "treatments".

The engines driving the expansion of the scope and character of psychology were twofold. The Age of Enlightenment produced an extraordinary innovation – the corporation. Conceived initially by merchants as a risk management strategy the corporation was endowed with 'juristic personality' – i.e. it was a 'person' analogous to the natural person. The transformation of corporations from being small risk management societies to monopolies in the early twentieth century created the need for command-communication-control systems within organisations. If monopolies were to be counted as a single a juristic 'person', then they needed to operate with a single 'mind'. Behavioural psychology and social psychology provided the knowledge base for large organisations to functions with a single 'mind'. Fields like 'social psychology', organisational 'behaviour', organisational 'psychology', corporate social 'responsibility' held out the possibility that the juristic person could have a 'mind' similar to the natural person. Behavioural psychology endowed 'juristic persons' with a 'mind'.

Secondly, the rise of new forms of militarism in the early twentieth century, in particular, the invention of airplanes and the emergence of aerial warfare

created the demand for what is called 3C technologies – Command-Communication-Control technologies. 3C technologies in turn involved communication between machines and humans and machines and broke down the most important barrier between men and machines: the psyche. Cybernetics was born during that period, and developments in artificial intelligence, robotics and such brought together a number of social and natural sciences including linguistics, sociology, anthropology and psychology besides biology, chemistry and physics. 3C technologies provided the technological underpinnings for corporate communications and corporations provided the manufacturing facilities for 3C technologies. The juristic person became endowed with a 'psyche'. The natural person became a pale, emaciated and powerless shadow in competition with the juristic person. Postmodernism, cultural and critical theories, as Zygmunt Bauman argues in his book *Legislators and Interpreters* succumbed to the emaciation of the individual. They succumbed to it however by accepting the juristic person as a 'psyche-bearing' person. Fanon never succumbed to this possibility. The juristic person with a psyche was an embodiment of violence, it was colonialism itself, it was the integration of economy, state and civil society in the architecture of societies founded on violence. The psyche was for Fanon an attribute of being human and human beings alone were capable of transformative social action. Healing the social and individual psyche destroyed by the monstrosities of military-industrial-commercial-media complexes was possible not by theorising about subjectivity but by transformative social action. Resistance was therapy and resistance brought social change. This revolutionary insight calls for restoring the unity of the body, the mind and the body politic through transformative action. Fanon was a revolutionary far ahead of his times.

Nationalism

Fanon never saw formal national independence as an end in itself. Equally he saw the Third World elite clearly for who they were and what their success entailed for the 'wretched of the earth'. Fanon never fell into the capitalism-socialism dichotomy of the Cold War. Socialism unleashed the enthusiasm of people whereby they subjected themselves voluntarily to forced labour. Independence forced Third World societies to the same forms of production as under colonialism. Yet socialism and nationalism opened the way for new and creative social reconstruction. The new society he argued cannot emulate the old, or be founded on the value systems of the old society. And, we cannot afford to forget that the grandeur of Europe rests on the wealth appropriated from the rest of the world – Europe was a creation of the Third World, he argued. The Third World cannot reclaim itself by emulating Europe. They must find their own values and methods particular to them, and when doing so, they cannot afford to forget the extraordinary violence that will inevitably befall them. The Third World must choose its own path. Fanon leaves the National Liberation project wide open even after formal independence. In this, Fanon was clearly far

ahead of his times and foresaw the trajectory and limitations of national liberation struggles even when supporting them.

Teaching Fanon

Fanon is outside the bounds of legal education. The day Law Schools include Fanon in their curriculum will signal the beginnings of a world that takes a violence-free world seriously.

About the author

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Sunera Thobani

When did you first encounter Fanon, in what context, and how did it impact you?

I first read Fanon when I went to college as a mature student in the UK to study for an undergraduate degree in the Social Sciences. My family had migrated from Tanzania to England as part of the early 1970s wave of Asian migration in response to the Africanization policies that followed independence from British rule. I grew up in the highly charged racial politics of Tanzania, where Asians had been brought in from India during the late 19th and early 20th century under colonial (German and British) rule to serve as the buffer between the European settlers/colonial administrators and the larger African population. I was thus acutely aware of the violence underpinning this society on an experiential level, but little in my schooling or community life actually acknowledged this reality. My family was working class, but part of a conservative Asian community that had played a key role in furthering the socio-economic policies of the colonial state. And although my family would have had little to lose from the nationalization of property initiated by the postcolonial state after the Arusha Declaration, they decided to migrate to the UK as our community began to leave and rumours abounded about young Asian women and girls being forced into marriage with older African men.

The racism of the 1970s UK – especially in the streets against working class Asian families – was intense, yet we had no language, no tools in my family to even name this, let alone try and confront it in any fashion. There were no community organizations that provided any support, and religious institutions

in the community tended to be very conservative. The grind of daily survival wore my family down, the trauma of migration remained fresh year after year, and the alienation we felt from the larger society left deep scars in all our lives.

After spending some years working, I decided to go to college. This possibility had never been on the horizon for any of the women in my family. When my sister and I went to college, we were breaking new ground. It was there that I read Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, and the book utterly transformed my life. The power of each sentence in the book, the clarity of thought and the controlled fury of Fanon's politics were deeply liberating to read. Suddenly I had a language and a framework in which to understand my own experiences as well as those of my family. The sophistication of *Black Skin, White Masks*' analysis of intra- as well as inter- group racial violence also gave me a way to make sense of the racism of Asians against Africans in the context of the global hierarchy of races instituted by white supremacy. Fanon's explication on the role of violence in the daily reproduction of the racial/colonial order was certainly profoundly unsettling, as was his description of the psychic and spatial ordering of such violence. Yet at the same time, his analysis was deeply reassuring; I had seen and experienced the anger he described erupting in the world around me, anger that until then had seemed inexplicable. Reading Fanon helped me acquire a historical understanding of the colonial order with its global system of racial hierarchy, and of the psychic as well as the material effects of racism and white supremacy.

It is difficult even now to put into words the powerful impact Fanon's ideas had on my thinking. I joined anti-racist organizations while in college, started going on protest marches, and began to understand more fully the meaning of the Brixton and Southall riots as they had erupted in the streets of London. My politicization had begun and there was no turning back after reading Fanon. In many ways, reading Fanon at that point in my life saved me.

Violence

Fanon's famous contention that it is primarily violence that sustains the racial and colonial order highlighted the inextricability of physical conquest and material deprivation from the psycho-sexual aggression that sought to destroy the natives' languages, customs, sexual and gender norms, as well as their historical consciousness, and indeed, their very status as human. The resulting forms of alienation transformed the colonized 'wo/man' into a 'thing' existing in an intense state of politico-cultural and psycho-sexual depersonalization. Only a radical decolonization that replaced a particular 'species' of wo/man with another could enable colonized peoples to reclaim their stolen humanity, argued Fanon in his defence of the Algerian revolution against French occupation. The depth of Fanon's analysis of the forms violence assumes in the organization of the global order remains unparalleled even now.

I was very interested in these ideas on violence when I first read Fanon, and find them even more relevant now in the era of the global War on Terror. Soon after

reading *Wretched of the Earth*, I went to Palestine to work as a volunteer with the Palestinian Women's Union in Gaza. Although this was before the first Intifada, I came to recognize the inevitability of revolutionary violence in the context of the colonial occupation of Palestine by the Zionist state. Israeli troops were to be found on every street corner, checkpoints shaped the experience of everyday life, controlling the mobility of Palestinian friends at every turn. As terrible as the living conditions were in Gaza at that time, the situation is now, of course, much, much worse.

In Palestine, I also came to understand, for the first time in my life, what it meant emotionally and psychically to be connected to a particular land; I also began to understand the lasting impact - through generations - of the violence of dispossession from the land. Coming from a migrant community, I had never really had any experience of this psycho-political phenomenon. But in the time I spent with Palestinian activists, I came to see the deep meaning this relationship to land had in their political vision and in the cultural expressions of their resistance to the violence of the Israeli state. After I migrated to Canada, I saw the same deep rootedness of Indigenous peoples in their relationship to the land, and came to understand that as a member of an immigrant community, my relationship to Canada is of a very different nature. Fanon's ideas thus indelibly shaped my understanding of settler colonialism, and of the urgent necessity for immigrant communities in Canada to build solidarity with Indigenous peoples' struggles for sovereignty. Citizenship has been the mechanism through which immigrant communities have become complicit in the ongoing colonization of First Nations, and any social justice movement that elides the necessity for a fundamental transformation of this institution cannot possibly bring about any meaningful social change.

After the attacks of 9/11, Fanon's analysis of the role of violence in geopolitics and his understanding of the role of revolutionary violence in the anti-colonial politics of the Algerian revolution became relevant once again in my own analysis of the War on Terror. Fanon's ideas had been central to the politics of resistance of third world revolutionary movements, and the relevance of his analysis to the violence instantiated in the 'new' invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 21st century was undeniable.

But as Islamophobia moved to the centre of geopolitics with the invasion of Afghanistan, I was surprised at how quickly left, feminist and anti-war movements capitulated to the demonization of Muslims and Islam that was to become the ideological pillar of this new imperialism. Although many of these activists voiced their opposition to the imperialist policies of the US Administration, they were unable to see past the Western fear-mongering about the dangers of Islam, accepting the US invasion of Afghanistan as the 'lesser' danger. And this included activists who had read and understood Fanon. The 'man' living under occupation is no such entity, Fanon had claimed in his studies of the 19th and 20th century colonial order, finding instead in his psychiatric practice, political activism and personal experience that this order was reliant upon the transformation of the soul of the Black 'man' into the

'artefact' of the white man. The torture and waging of state terror against Muslim populations around the world in the US-led global war was accomplishing the same 'thingification' as the Muslim wo/man was being yet again stripped of their status as 'human', namely, the rights-bearing citizen-subject of modernity. The gains of previously colonized Muslim populations in the postcolonial era, including their access to citizenship rights, were being destroyed in the racial profiling, rendition, targeted assassination and collective punishment being meted out by the nation-state system, yet Islamophobia quickly became as widespread in social justice movements as it was in mainstream society. The Muslim men hunted, tortured and murdered by US forces and their allies were being defined in social justice movements as hyper-misogynist woman-haters, and the Muslim women being killed by US bombs were being defined as in need only of unveiling. Race and religious identity merged in the construction of the believing Muslim as the most potent threat to global security, and Fanon's insightful analysis of the veil in the Algerian women's lives he had studied fell by the wayside. The Islamophobia rife in social justice movements today has been a profoundly disturbing lesson about the state of the politics of resistance in these movements, and convinces me of the importance of engaging with Fanon's ideas on anti-colonial politics once again if we are to understand the ongoing coloniality and raciality that is remaking the contemporary political order.

Teaching Fanon

Fanon has never been included in the required curriculum in any of the Degree programs I have taken, which have been in the UK, US and Canada. I read Fanon outside class on the recommendation of what are today called Sessional Instructors in the neo-liberal corporatized academy, i.e., part time temporary Instructors.

In a recent article for Al Jazeera, Hamid Dabashi has taken on this ongoing marginalization of the work of third world scholars and the privileging of white intellectuals as philosophers and theorists by asking the question 'Can non-Europeans think?' Walter Mignolo (2013) has made an important contribution to this discussion by clarifying that his "...readings of continental philosophy are not in search of guiding lights to deal with issues of non-European histories, but an interest in what are 'they' thinking, what are 'their' concerns and what are 'they' up to." Mignolo then recommends turning to Fanon for those who are interested in understanding Eurocentrism. I am in complete agreement with this recommendation, for Fanon is as indispensable to understanding racial violence, white supremacy, colonialism and imperialism and their material, emotional and psychic effects as he is to understanding the politics of gender and sexuality. Indeed, without the exploration of the role of racial and colonial desire in shaping sexuality, any theorizing of gender relations remains suspect. Given the transformations that have taken place in articulations of the racial, sexual and gender politics of white supremacy in the War on Terror, I see teaching Fanon as absolutely key to the critical race and feminist theory

curriculum. Although some of his writing on these issues is clearly dated, I still consider it impossible to fully grasp the impact of coloniality on questions of sexuality without studying Fanon.

But teaching Fanon is incredibly frustrating, in my experience. I teach in the field of Women's and Gender Studies and have found a deep hostility in this area of scholarship to critical race and anti-colonial studies - indeed to any body of scholarship that questions Eurocentrism. This hostility has increased steadily over the last fifteen years with the rise of poststructural and postmodern feminisms. Every time I have tried to teach Fanon, students who define themselves as feminists will inevitably dismiss him with the simplistic contention that 'he is sexist'. This is the only defence these students have to explain their refusal to engage with critical race theory and anti-colonial politics. And they cling to this defence with all their psychic might, actively contributing to the reproduction of the myth of the hyper-macho Black male.

Similarly, critical race theory, a field where one might expect Fanon's ideas to flourish, remains oblivious – with few exceptions – to the import of his insights. In this field of scholarship too, one finds much antagonism towards Fanon; his work gets dismissed as quaint but belonging to a time long past. By rendering irrelevant Fanon's ideas and thus neutralizing his critique of the violence of raciality, such dismissals further liberalist analyses of race at the cost of radical and transformative perspectives.

Remembering Fanon

Fifty years after his death, Fanon remains much maligned and misinterpreted. The wilful reluctance to engage with his work is evidence of the strength of the established order to quell dissent, an order against which Fanon positioned himself so forcefully. His work continues to provide us with the critical tools to analyze, understand and unmake the contemporary forms of power assumed by this establishment. In Fanon's call for change, we find a deep-seated anger at the dehumanization that is embedded within the global order. We also find the resources for (re)building anti-colonial and anti-racist movements. His optimism for the possibility of radical change is inspiring and life-affirming. As the hold of the neo-liberal paradigm grows deeper within the academy and in society, there is no way forward intellectually or politically in transforming the violence of racism and imperialism except through Fanon.

About the author

Sunera Thobani is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality and Social Justice at the University of British Columbia. Her book, *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada*, was published by the University of Toronto Press (2007), and her current research focuses on Gender, Race, Globalization, Migration and Media Representations of the War on Terror. Sunera is also past president of the National Action

Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), Canada's then largest feminist organization (1993-1996). The first woman of colour to serve in this position, Sunera's tenure was committed to making the politics of anti-racism central to the women's movement.

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A movement stalled: outcomes of women's campaign for equalities and inclusion in the Northern Ireland peace process

Cynthia Cockburn

Abstract

The Good Friday Agreement signed in Belfast in April 1998, and the post-conflict constitution embodied in the ensuing Northern Ireland Act, differed in one important respect from most other peace accords. Thanks to the input of civil society, and particularly of the women's voluntary, trade union and community sectors, the Agreement was not limited to a settlement between the belligerent parties. It envisioned a transformed society, rid of the inequities of a colonial past and reshaped according to principles of inclusion and human rights. The persuasiveness of this agenda lay in its promise to address the poverty, disadvantage and exclusion afflicting the working class of both Catholic and Protestant communities.This article draws on a re-interviewing in 2012 of feminist activists with whom the author engaged in a major project in the 1990s. It evaluates the extent to which the principles and policies for which their movement struggled have been enacted in Northern Ireland governance in the intervening decade and a half.

Introduction

In the period 1996-99 I carried out a project of action-research among feminist activists in the women's community sector in Belfast, Northern Ireland. It resulted in a book, *The Space Between Us* (Cockburn 1998) in which I documented and analysed their movement, framed between studies of similar conflict-crossing women's projects of the period in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Israel-Palestine.[1] In early 2012 I revisited all three countries to recover contact with as many of the original activists as I could find, and ask them to evaluate with me the developments of the intervening decade and a half. [2] I had left them at a moment when peace accords were in the air, or newly achieved. Would ceasefire become peace, and, if it held, would it deliver justice as well as disarmament? Would grassroots aspirations, especially those of women, find expression in a transformed post-war society fit for a new millennium? In this article I draw on in-depth interviews carried out in February 2012 with twelve of the original Belfast feminist activists, and shorter conversations with four others.[3] Drawing also on publications and news analysis, I review their perceptions of the late 1990s, their input to the Good Friday Agreement and their evaluation of conditions and policy-making in Northern Ireland since then, and today, under a devolved, power-sharing government.

In the fifteen years since the Good Friday Peace Agreement was signed, poverty persists in working class areas, but central Belfast has acquired the air of a modern European city[4].

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[4] All photographs by Cynthia Cockburn.

Rebellion in Britain's first colony

The Irish movement for 'home rule' involved decades of parliamentary conflict
and episodes of bitter armed struggle between nationalists, mainly of Catholic
religion and native to the island, and those determined to retain union with
Britain, mainly Protestant and of British descent. It culminated in the Anglo-
Irish Treaty of December 1921, a settlement in which Britain conceded
independence with the status of Crown dominion to an Irish state comprising
twenty-six of the islands thirty-two counties. Protestant resistance led to a
compromise whereby six counties in the north-east of the island, historically a
stronghold of the Scottish and English settlers, remained a province within what
was henceforth termed the 'United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland'. For the ensuing half-century the Ulster Unionist party ruled Northern
Ireland single-handedly in the interest of the Protestant majority, enacting
discriminatory and repressive legislation against the Catholic minority. Simply,
'the disloyal Catholic population were not regarded as part of *the* people by
Ulster Protestants' (O'Leary and McGarry 1993, 109).

It is important to remember that the upsurge of activism in the mid-1960s that
challenged this situation, sparking off the thirty-year period of violence in
Northern Ireland known as the Troubles, was not a renewal of sectarian ethno-
political war, but rather a *civil rights* movement. The initial actors, among
whom were many women, represented themselves as the economically,
politically and socially disadvantaged group they indeed were. It began in
January 1964 with a Campaign for Social Justice, and by 1967 the Northern
Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was leading a full-scale movement
against discrimination in employment, against a biased allocation of housing
and services, and an undemocratic electoral system in which the franchise was
limited to property-owning rate-payers, among whom Catholics were severely
under-represented. This campaign of civil resistance in Northern Ireland echoed
the black civil rights movement of the period in the USA, and was
contemporaneous with the '1968' moment, a surge of student activism and
renewal of the Left in Europe.

The civil rights marches evoked a violent response from Loyalists in the
Protestant community. The extremist Ulster Volunteer Force harassed the
marchers and attacked areas of Catholic housing, resulting in mass
displacement. In 1969 the conflict entered a new phase with the resurgence of
the historic Irish Republican Army, which that year divided into an Official and
a Provisional IRA, the latter an armed force pursuing Republican interests in
Northern Ireland. The same year the British Army intervened, and direct rule
from Westminster was imposed three years later. There followed a further
twenty years of civil war, in which the British authorities, far from playing the
neutral role they claimed, colluded with the Loyalist forces, and further
alienated the nationalist community by supporting the overwhelmingly
Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary and imprisoning large numbers of fighters
and suspects, many of whom were interned without trial.

The appointment in 1989 of the relatively progressive Conservative MP Peter Brooke as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland can be seen in retrospect as a turning point in the conflict. In November 1990 he made a creative move towards an eventual peace agreement by famously asserting that the British Government had 'no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland' and affirming that, should a majority vote for it, Britain would facilitate the unification of Ireland (Hume 1993, 228). Crucially, for the theme of this article, Brooke looked beyond the immediate security situation and remembered that what had brought the civil rights movement onto the street twenty years before had been those two key components of 'rights': the twin issues of equality and inclusion. As John Hume, the Social Democratic and Labour Party leader put it, the marchers had 'asked a very simple question of the unionists: can you give us justice? And can you survive with the answer "yes"?' (Millar 2009, 7). Brooke now stated on behalf of his British masters that equality and social need, justice in short, should penetrate all policy-making. At this time both Britain and Ireland were attentive to the processes of European Union. What Brooke offered Northern Ireland was effectively the British government's response to a European directive on gender equality, broadened to include religion and political affiliation. Two years later, in 1992, Patrick Mayhew, Brooke's successor as Secretary of State, presented a formal equality protocol under the title *Policy Appraisal and Fair Treatment* (PAFT). Technocratic though it sounded, this document had a popular impact, for it used a language of 'equality' and 'fairness' that civil society actors could understand, speak and put to work as an instrument of institutional change.

Women's efforts to shape the peace

Meanwhile peace was becoming thinkable. On 15 December 1993 the Irish and British Governments issued the 'Downing Street Declaration' affirming the principle of consent in determining the future of Northern Ireland. Next summer, following a series of secret talks between John Hume, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sinn Féin's Gerry Adams, the IRA declared a ceasefire, followed in October by the Loyalist commands. Although thereafter progress towards a cessation of the armed struggle was unsteady and interrupted by violence, 1995 saw the joint publication by the British and Irish Governments of a document titled *Frameworks for the Future,* foreshadowing a peace process. Importantly, it picked up on the 'equalities and inclusion' agenda, stressing 'accountability' and making proposals as to how, in John Major's words, 'local people could take more control over the way Northern Ireland is governed, on a fair and equitable basis' (Aughey and Morrow 1996, 217).

While the politicians and combatants were occupied with these manoeuvres, a new society was indeed being imagined and invented by people far from the headline-hitting events. Belfast women had always been the mainstay of the working-class communities in both Catholic and Protestant areas, and in the

1980s they had become active in an emerging community development (CD) movement. Responding to CD's ideology of self-help and empowerment of the disadvantaged, some got together to open women's centres. They were localized, grass roots, street level initiatives, and, given the ethno-political segmentation of Belfast, this inevitably meant clear 'green' / 'orange' distinctions between them. It transpired however that some women, in both the Republican and Loyalist communities, finding common ground as the ones responsible for sustaining everyday life in adverse conditions, were ready for cautious contact and dialogue. Some of the women's centres began, in a quiet, unpublicized way, to take the risk of bringing women into touch across the lines demarcating the segregated communities.

In 1989 a significant development occurred in the relationship between the women's centres. Beginning with a startling act of solidarity between the women's centres in the Protestant Shankill and Catholic Falls Road areas, responding to palpable injustice in Belfast City Council's funding practices, a permanent linking mechanism, the Women's Support Network, came into being (Cockburn 1998, see also Mulholland 1999, McCoy 2000). Although the Women's Support Network (WSN) was, first and foremost, a support organization for the coordinators of the several Belfast women's centres, it drew in other member organizations. Belfast Women's Training Services, and the Women's Resource and Development Agency participated. Another important partner was Women into Politics, a project that furnished neutral ground on which women from the opposed communities could come together safely and talk about 'Politics with a big P', something heretofore the preserve of men. Most importantly, women of the public sector trade union Unison participated in the Women's Support Network. Formed in 1993 as a merger of NUPE, COHSE and NALGO, Unison had a track record, unusual among Northern Ireland trade unions, of actively fostering cooperation between Catholics and Protestants on workplace and economic issues. It also had a high proportion of women members, employees in health and other public services, among whom were energetic feminist activists with a clear idea of what equality should mean.

In 1997, women of the Women's Support Network evaluate some photos I had taken of their activities.

The Network thus enabled cooperation between women of the community sector, the voluntary sector and the trade union movement in voicing women's interests in the future of Northern Ireland and contributing to the moves towards a peace agreement that followed the ceasefires. Getting PAFT's equality and inclusion principles adopted in workplaces, in the delivery of services, in local government and in funding policies, gave the activists a practical focus. Working closely with the Committee on the Administration of Justice, the Equality Coalition, the Human Rights Consortium and other civil society organizations concerned with the equalities and rights agenda, they aimed to make PAFT real, turn it into a tool people could take up and use. The women also challenged the government's Community Relations (CR) Programme, critiquing the insulting kind of CR that meant 'putting Catholics and Protestants together on a trip to Butlins' (McCoy 2000, 9) and stressing the risk-taking, unpaid, day-to-day co-operation that was actually going on in the centres where women of Catholic and Protestant identification were seeking common ground in combatting political neglect, poverty and violence (Women's Support Network et al 2003).

Describing itself as a 'collective feminist voice' of organized working-class women in the city, the Women's Support Network set out to win the attention of the most powerful sources of influence on women's lives and chances: the Northern Ireland structures, and the British and Irish governments. It wasn't easy. Marie Mulholland was WSN's coordinator from its foundation until 1999. She wrote that the Network found the structures and processes of governance to

be 'closed, exclusive and vertical'. They were designed, she felt, to do 'something *to*, not *with*, those whom policy targets' (Mulholland 2001, 172, emphasis added). The European Union however proved more accessible. When the EU sent a Special Task Force from Brussels to engage in consultations on the peace process, the Network and its trade union partners found them receptive to their call for inclusion of the most vulnerable communities in preparing for peace. At this point the alliance of women's organizations gave their initiative the name *Women Working for Change*. Then, as the peace process accelerated, they joined additionally with the National Women's Council of the Republic of Ireland in a project they called *Making Women Seen and Heard* (MWSH), funded by the European Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. During 1997, the MWSH allies reached out to involve in a year-long project no less than 400 other women's organizations, ranging from the Women's Institute to small village groups, some of them from the most marginalized areas in the counties north and south of the Border. Together they launched a major report in early 1998, calling for a rights-based approach to social inclusion and participation in the imminent peace agreement (Making Women Seen and Heard Project 1998).

Meanwhile, in 1996, a non-sectarian women's political party, the Women's Coalition, had formed to represent women's concerns in the political structures. They obtained two seats in the Northern Ireland Forum, the locus of all-party talks leading to the peace agreement, and lobbied with verve and imagination for the equality clauses in the peace agreement (Fearon and McWilliams 2000, Deiana 2007).[5] Recognizing a shared interest in addressing working class poverty, disadvantage and exclusion, smaller parties from both sides, including the loyalist Progressive Unionist Party, the Ulster Democratic Party and Sinn Féin, added to the pressure as the negotiations climaxed. They had the support of Mo Mowlam, Tony Blair's feminist Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at that moment, who shepherded the clauses through. 'It was an exciting time,'

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[5] In founding the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC) Monica McWilliams, Pearl Sagar and their colleagues responded to an abysmal under-representation of women in Northern Ireland's political system (Fearon and McWilliams 2000). This absence had also motivated the creation of the community-based project Women Into Politics, an important element in the Women's Support Network (WSN). However, while the NIWC used 'the language of inclusion without "naming" the disparities between Protestant and Catholic women' (Rooney 2000, 181n), the community-based feminists were by contrast aiming to create a space in which women of the warring communities could practise a forward-moving 'transversal politics', facilitating dialogue in a search for shared values, precisely without foreclosing on conflictual differences. I wrote of them, 'the Network reasoned that, to hold together in the context of big-P elections, a woman's party representing women as women would be obliged to adopt neutrality on issues that were at stake in the constitutional debate. This was different in their view from seeking tactical common ground while maintaining political differences' (Cockburn 1998, 83). On this basis, the WSN made the difficult decision not to formally endorse the NIWC electoral campaign. This was just one of the many debates and divergences in the Northern Ireland women's movement of the period.

Unison's Patricia McKeown remembered when I interviewed her recently. 'We felt we were shaping the new agenda…getting the building blocks of human rights and equality in place so that what would emerge would be a fairer society…And our model was one of participatory democracy, emphasizing the process we wanted to see'.

A peace settlement with a difference

Despite interrupted ceasefires, irresolution on several hotly disputed issues and the virulent opposition of some political actors, a Peace Agreement was eventually signed on Good Friday, 10 April 1998. It addressed the sectarian divide by means of a plan for devolved government in Northern Ireland. It provided for a process involving the early release of prisoners, the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, and the reform of policing and the criminal justice system. To bring an end to armed conflict it could do no less. It did however do more. Thanks to the sustained and imaginative efforts of the women's sector and many other civil society organizations, it contained significant clauses on the twin rights agenda: equalities and inclusion. The principles of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) were soon afterwards given effect in British legislation in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which likewise contained provisions for equalities and human rights. Part VII was titled Human Rights and Equal Opportunities. Its Section 68 provided for a Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. Section 73 provided for an Equality Commission for Northern Ireland. Both sets of commissioners, though appointed by the Secretary of State, were to be fully representative of the NI community. The section of the Act most often quoted subsequently by women activists, however, is Section 75. It establishes 'a statutory duty on public authorities' (defining these comprehensively and closely) to have due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity between persons of different religious beliefs, political opinion, racial group, age, marital status or sexual orientation; between men and women generally; between persons with a disability in persons without; and between persons with caring responsibility for dependents and persons without. These were known as the 'Nine Grounds'.

The GFA, Beatrix Campbell wrote, in her impassioned book *Agreement!,* came to be recognized 'as a dynamic exemplar of reform democracy for the twenty-first century' (Campbell 2008, 57). It located the blame for the conflict not with the people but with the state. The negotiators 'proposed a transcendent duty: to produce more than peace, to begin the millennial work of transforming the sectarian and sexist power relations that structure society' (ibid, 71). She believed that the radical potential of a legal duty for equality lay in the infusion of values in the practice of democratic government, the values of *equality, transparency, accountability and participation* (ibid, 57, emphasis added). And all this had been the work of 'ingenious movements and interests that were not included within the arc of the conflict' (ibid, 71).

Post-conflict : an incomplete peace

The period 1996-98 during which, in my research role, I was working closely with the women of the Women's Support Network and interviewing many of its activists, is thus remembered as a high point for the women's community sector, as it was for feminism in Northern Ireland more generally. The women were fully involved, speaking clearly, being heard and feeling positive. Joanne Vance says, looking back on that period, 'I was certain the women's movement was in a strong position. The women's sector had resources, capacity and know-how, and had gained political experience. I felt we couldn't be overlooked.' Today however, she, like many of the other women I spoke with, is deeply disappointed in the longterm outcome. 'We had felt it was important to have our experience shape the new dispensation. That was our goal. But that never happened.'

What went wrong? For a start, events in the years immediately following the accord seemed more like a continuation of conflict than the dawn of peace[6]. On 2 December 1998 a Devolution Order from Westminster transferred powers to the first post-Agreement Northern Ireland Assembly. The power-sharing arrangement brought the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) into partnership with the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). A twelve-member Executive was established, the ten ministries or departments carefully distributed between the 'sides'. So far so good. But the work of this devolved power-sharing government began in a context of continuing sectarian provocation and violence. The Loyalist July 'marching seasons' in 1998 and 1999 had been as inflammatory as ever. In August 1998 the dissident Real IRA had exploded a 500 lb bomb in Omagh, killing 29 and wounding 200. Punishment beatings in Republican areas were increasing by the hundred, year on year. In 2001 a Loyalist mob violently blockaded a Catholic girls' school in Ardoyne.

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[6] Please refer to a second article arising from this case study of Northern Ireland, 'What became of "frontline feminism"? A retro-perspective on post-conflict Belfast' (forthcoming in *Feminist Review*, 2013) in which I address the problems faced by the women's community sector, and its loss of feminist political momentum, in the fifteen years following the peace agreement.

Despite a community 're-imaging' project, new aggressive murals continue to appear in loyalist neighbourhoods.

Besides, outstanding disagreements remained between the parliamentary parties. As Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's negotiator, puts it in his diary, 'the problem that was to dog us in the years that followed was the constructive ambiguity we had to deploy to get the Good Friday Agreement' (Powell 2009:117). While the Democratic Unionist Party, led by the intransigent Rev. Ian Paisley, had boycotted the peace talks from the start, the more moderate Ulster Unionist Party led by David Trimble had reluctantly signed up to the Agreement on a studiedly vague promise of early decommissioning of IRA weapons. When Sinn Féin failed to satisfy Trimble's conditions by a given date in February 2000, the British government arbitrarily suspended the power-sharing executive and returned Northern Ireland to direct rule. On 5 May 2000 the IRA committed to putting its arms 'completely and verifiably beyond use' and three weeks later the power-sharing institutions were reinstated. However in October 2002 the elected Assembly was again suspended amid claims of a Republican spy-ring in Stormont. Direct rule this time would endure a further five years. In the interval, IRA weapons would be bunkered, but the genuine reform of policing, following the nominal conversion of the Royal Ulster Constabulary into the Police Service of Northern Ireland in 2001, and the

devolution of the judicial system, would remain crucial unresolved issues for Sinn Féin for some years more.

A significant shift was meanwhile occurring in the balance of support among the parties. The original power-sharers, the constitutional nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and the middle-class Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), lost much of their support in elections in 2001, 2003 and 2004. It became clear that any renewed power-sharing government in Stormont would need to be a partnership not between these relative moderates but between the ascendant extremes, the far more radical Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin. Indeed an agreement of this kind between them narrowly failed in 2004. The British and Irish government then sponsored talks at St. Andrews, in Scotland, in the autumn of 2006 which resulted in elections in March 2007. The resulting power-sharing settlement between the DUP and Sinn Féin has lasted to the time of writing, despite the basic contradiction within it: that the two parties aim to use their presence in government for contrary ends, the DUP to consolidate the union with Britain, Sinn Féin to progress to a united Ireland.

It was in early 2012 that I began my project of 'revisiting' the women that had been the subject of my research in the period 1996-98 (Cockburn 1998). In this connection I spent part of February in Belfast, during which time I carried out interviews with twelve of my previous contacts. All had been involved, centrally or peripherally, in the Women's Support Network. All had participated energetically and hopefully in the mobilization for the equalities-and-inclusion agenda described above. While in Belfast I also benefitted from two meetings, one a get-together of seven women of the former Women's Support Network (WSN), the other an open meeting hosted by the Women's Resource and Development Agency (WRDA). Prompting their memory by means of photographs and videos, I asked women to cast back their minds to 1996.[7] My intention was to learn these women's perceptions of developments in the intervening decade and a half. The period had begun with the signing of the peace agreement, fostered by a New Labour government in the UK. As it ended, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition ruled in Westminster, in a moment of economic crisis and downturn affecting Ireland, Britain and the wider world.

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[7] My methodology in this memory work included making, as prompts to recall, posters using my photographs and texts from the earlier period. In spanning place as well as time (since the revisiting involved Bosnia and Israel Palestine as well as Northern Ireland) I made extensive use of language interpretation. I have written about these methodological choices and the contradictions they involve in 'Women Living and Re-living Armed Conflict: Exploring a Methodology for Spanning Time and Place', a chapter in *Gendered Wars, Gendered Memories,* edited by Ayse-Gul Altinay and Andrea Peto, forthcoming 2013.

Women of the former Women's Support Network regather in 2012 to review the outcome of the 'equalities and inclusion' intentions of the peace agreement. On the wall - some of the original photos from the '90s.

What I heard in my interviews was that, throughout these turbulent years, women had continued to experience social problems of many kinds. First, though reduced in number and scale, some acts of war continued. Republican dissidents, refusing the peace accord, continued to carry out attacks on British targets. There were Loyalist attacks on Catholics in a number of flashpoint areas. More common than sectarian combat however, violent feuding has developed between Loyalist paramilitary groups seeking to dominate communities and monopolize the drugs trade. In Republican areas a vigilante group, Republican Action Against Drugs, has been carrying out vicious punishment shootings and exilings of supposed dealers and users. A study carried out by the Women's Resource and Development Agency found violent crime to be felt by women to be more threatening now than during the Troubles (Women's Resource and Development Agency 2008). Violence specifically directed against women and girls – rape, trafficking, abuse in the home – also appears to have been growing rather than diminishing with 'peace' (McMurray 2009).

While cross-communal contact has come to feel less perilous in these years following the peace accords, people continue to be alert and cautious about

where they go, with whom and when. Housing is still markedly segregated, and integration of the school system is moving at snail-pace. Joanna McMinn explained why there is so little movement across the old sectarian lines that box in the local neighbourhoods of North and West Belfast. She said, 'The material conditions have to change first. If there were prosperity, so that people could climb to a better standard of living and have more opportunities, that could contribute to ending the segregation'. But there is no money, public or private, flowing into these poor working class areas. Meanwhile, the recession, unemployment and public sector spending cuts have made things worse.

On the gender front, too, relations continue to be resistant to change. Northern Ireland has continued to be run largely by men. The elections of May 2011 returned 20 women to an Assembly numbering 108, just 18.5%. Statistics of public office show women, despite being half the population, to be less than one-quarter of the power holders (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 2011). The government is failing to implement international and national gender equality law (Hillyard 2006). Women are bearing the brunt of the downturn in the economy (Hinds 2011). Meanwhile, no less in Northern Ireland than elsewhere, marketization, commercialization and commodification are invading every aspect of life, facing young women with highly damaging expectations. Besides, young women's experiences are crucially shaped by young men's enactment of masculinity. The dominant model of manhood in Northern Ireland during the Troubles was a tough and combative one. In spite of efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants, many of whom have served prison sentences, into local economies and community life, militarized masculinity is proving resistant to change (Magennis and Mullen 2011). Meanwhile, male aggression has found new targets in ethnic minorities and homosexuals.

The betrayal of the 'equalities-and-inclusion' ideal

The most profound disappointment expressed to me by the women I interviewed in 2012, however, centered on the promised equalities-and-inclusion agenda. There had of course been profound contradictions within these provisions, interests pulling their interpretation in different directions. Among the questions persisting in many people's minds in the days and months that followed the signing of the GFA and the subsequent passage of the Northern Ireland Act were these.

- How would equality on grounds of sex/gender be interpreted in practice?
- Would sex/gender equality, in being newly framed as one of the 'nine dimensions' of equality, get muffled, subordinated, sidelined?
- Would the equalities themselves translate as intended into the principle informing the new post-conflict system of governance?
- Would the economic dimension of equality, missing from the nine but crucial to the working class of Northern Ireland, be honoured or forgotten?

I will address these questions one by one.

So what became of sex equality?

The women's movement, in Northern Ireland as elsewhere, had imagined a future shaped not only by a reform of the sexual division of labour, an equalizing of opportunities and outcomes, but by a transformation of gender relations themselves, changed men, changed women. Hopes for this long agenda were dashed early on. Instead, the women of Northern Ireland found themselves entering, as Beatrix Campbell put it, 'a new historic settlement, the new era of neo-patriarchy' (Campbell 2008, 83). Even the short agenda, the notion of 'women's equality', was contentious, because the conflict had involved mainly men, and it was to men the policy-makers were looking for a solution. And who were those policy-makers themselves if not (overwhelmingly) men?

An Equal Status Act passed in 1975, dealing with gender equality, and Fair Employment Acts of 1976 and 1989 addressing discrimination on religious or political grounds, had established a firm understanding of the legitimacy of creating a 'level playing field' by positive discrimination in favour of the disadvantaged. But in post-Agreement governance there was amnesia about this. When you look at the small print, you see that Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act actually speaks only of 'equality of opportunity', not 'equality of outcomes', or of 'achievements'. There was nothing in this wording to prevent a back-tracking on positive action for women. And this indeed occurred, with a reduction of equality to 'equity', and a further shift of emphasis to 'equity for men'. Some court cases and settlements began 'redressing' positive discrimination in favour of women by making awards to men. Already in 2006 Margaret Ward was writing, 'there is evidence that a commitment to "gender mainstreaming" is being interpreted as a method by which to marginalise women"' (Ward 2006a). Carmel Roulston, speaking to me of this, termed the approach 'punitive equality'.

Eleanor Jordan, in interview, elaborated on the post-conflict experience of the women's community sector. 'There's been a backlash, so that the equalities agenda is often interpreted as meaning equality for men as much as women'. For instance there had been a push for women's centres to become 'family centres'. There had been a move to divert money for countering domestic violence against women by men into activity addressing domestic violence against male family members and same sex partners (which is, besides, often inflicted by other males). Úna ní Mhearaín concludes that 'There's no understanding of gender politics now'. Equality policy 'has become a weapon used against us'.

Úna ní Mhearaín, former coordinator of the Falls Road Women's Centre.

I learned that the women's centres, despite their activity and purposes, are not allowed to advertise their job openings as for women only, because that would be considered discriminatory. Only Women's Aid are exempt from this ruling. It poses the centres with a quandary. A man might apply for a job at a women's centre, offering some appropriate skills – as a trainer for instance. Were the appointment panel to refuse him, he could bring a discrimination case against them. A number of men had indeed applied for, and been given, positions in women's centres without any discussion as to how this might impact either upon the social relations of the centre or upon the wider women's sector. This

issue had fractured the cohesion among the various centres, while the Women's Support Network and the WRDA had been inhibited from protesting about it by the fear of being challenged on equality grounds.

In 2002 an Ad Hoc Women's Policy Group, with members contributed by twenty-eight organizations, was set up by women activists in an attempt to position women as the subject rather than the mere object of policy debates. It joined the consultation on OFMDFM's cross-departmental '*Gender Matters*' strategy. It made plain its disquiet about this 'gender neutral' approach that was distorting the intentions of the equality legislation (Ad Hoc Women's Policy Group 2006).

The nine equalities – sex/gender lost to view?

We have seen how, in the course of the peace negotiations, the equalities agenda was elaborated to include nine dimensions: difference in relation to (1) religious belief, (2) political opinion, (3) racial group, (4) age, (5) marital status, (6) sexual orientation, (7) sex/gender, (8) disability and (9) responsibility for dependants. In other words, the agenda prefigured a generally egalitarian culture, a 'fair' society. This approach was extraordinarily progressive in Northern Ireland terms because it did not list people in the habitual way by types or identity labels ('Catholics', 'Protestants'). Rather, it identified the kinds of circumstance or situation (being divorced or single, being a carer for an elderly person, for instance) that may give rise to disadvantage. As Beatrix Campbell wrote, 'In a society transfixed by embalmed identities, the diversity of the Nine Grounds creatively unsettled the identity issue' (Campbell 2008, 84).

Some have said however that this broadening of the agenda, which involved the consolidating of separate equality watchdogs into a single Equalities Commission, resulted in reducing the importance ascribed to sex/gender equality, in its de-feminizing, its invisibilizing. Others on the contrary do not believe this was an inevitable outcome of the more encompassing agenda. Marie Mulholland for instance had always believed that 'inequity in Northern Ireland can only be effectively erased when the concept of equality is recalibrated to include all the grounds on which discrimination takes place' (Mulholland 2001, 175). Rather, what had been lacking was a grasp of what was coming to be called 'intersectionality', that is to say an understanding that the chances of any individual are determined by his or her relation to power of not one but several kinds. Gender, race, age - such variables cut across, are articulated within, and are expressive of each other. This perception is of special importance in Northern Ireland where the gender regime, as Eilish Rooney puts it, is *constitutive* of sectarian and social class inequalities and not separable from them (Rooney 2006, 359; 2008). Had this intersectionality been recognized, the effect could have been to strengthen and 'mainstream' sex/gender equality across the board, in principle and practice. This is precisely what *Making Women Seen and Heard* had been proposing. In a conference paper of April

1999 they wrote that mainstreaming means 'that equality be seen as an integral part of all public policy making and implementation, not something that is separated off in a policy or institutional ghetto' (Making Women Seen and Heard Project, 1999).

Edel Quinn, who in the late '90s ran the Women's Advice and Advocacy Services Project.

The administration did not allow this to happen. It is remarkable for instance that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of the year 2000, mandating the inclusion of women in peace negotiations, was not applied in ensuing years in the case of Northern Ireland, even in the renewed peace talks at St.Andrews in 2006 that led to a restored devolved power-sharing government.[8]

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[8] The spurious ground on which Northern Ireland was excluded from the UK's 1325 National Action Plan was that its conflict was deemed not to qualify as an 'armed conflict' within the definition in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols (Women's Resource and Development Agency, 2011) The fieldwork on which this article is based ended in March 2012. In a late editing just prior to going to press I can add that, since then, the all-Ireland feminist group Hanna's House, a project involving the Women's Resource and Development Agency, the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland and the National Women's Council of Ireland, have been energetically engaging women in cross-border activation of UNSC Resolution 1325.

Edel Quinn, in interview, summarized something of the women activists'
experience in these years. There had been 'honest potential' in PAFT, she
believes. Subsequently, *Making Women Seen and Heard* had been an
extraordinary achievement. Four hundred women's organizations mobilized!
The statutory duty was clearly established in law, but a lack of political will, of a
genuine process and commitment of resources had scotched its implementation.

Would the 'equalities' idea be implemented in government policy?

The Good Friday Agreement inevitably gave pre-eminence to issues, such as
disposal of weapons and reform of policing, that had to be resolved for armed
violence to be halted. Nonetheless, the equalities agenda was strongly stated in
the Agreement, where it was clearly understood as a necessary condition for
lasting peace. From the start it was an open question whether that
unprecedented insight would be sustained in the course of implementation. In
passage through the British parliament the Northern Ireland Bill was subject to
subtle changes. Beatrix Campbell's book is notable for tracking this betrayal.
She describes how the 'central theme' was 'lost in translation' between the two
texts. 'The drafters of the British bill had tried to re-instate in it the orthodox
view of the conflict, by giving priority to good community relations as the
condition of the peace and diminishing the status and processes concerned with
the equality duty'. The champions of the equality duty, including Unison's
Regional Secretary Inez McCormack, found themselves engaged in a dense
schedule of meetings with the drafters to try to retain the intention that had,
after all, been endorsed in the popular referenda both North and South of the
border. In a keen defensive struggle they tried to 'protect the primacy of equality
in the Agreement from sly textual manoeuvres'. As the Bill passed through the
second house, the Lords helped by making the good relations duty specifically
subject to the equality duty, thus placing the burden of responsibility for the
problem on the state. As a fortunate result, the ensuing Act was 'neither an elite
stitch-up nor an ethnic carve-up' (Campbell 2008, 71-74).

However, while the duty of Section 76, which deals with religious, Catholic and
Protestant equality, is legally enforceable, the duty of Section 75, dealing with
the other equalities, is not. And furthermore, the way the Office of the First
Minister and Deputy First Minister interpreted Section 75 greatly disappointed

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They have made a formal proposal to Stormont and Dail Eireann to weave the 1325 provisions
retrospectively into the Good Friday Agreement. In July 2012 they made a submission to the
Good Friday Committee on the impact of the conflict on women's lives. In November 2012 at
Croke Park in Dublin they hosted an all-Ireland conference on 'Women Delivering Peace and
Security'. They have called on the London and Dublin administrations to work together on the
implementation of UNSCR 1325 by ensuring complementary sections on Northern Ireland in
their National Action Plans. See
<http://www.communityfoundationni.org/Programmes/Women-and-Peace-Building/Women-
Delivering-Peace-and-Security> and <http://www.hannashouse.ie>.

the women of the community and voluntary sector. Some recall a specially distressing conference in the offices of the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action when a senior civil servant presented government thinking. It seemed that, since the passage of the Act, the politicians no longer needed the support of civil society in the way they had during the conflict. Inez McCormack, looking back, told me recently

> The conflict here leads to a situation in which everything is seen as having to do with sectarian relations. That way the powerful get let off the hook. The problem is defined as only the fault of the two sides. It's a deliberate masking of the problem...There *are* real issues between communities that do indeed have to be addressed. *But* expressing the problem as one of 'good relations' ignores the fact of inequalities and exclusions.

The potential of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 was of course stalled by the re-imposition of direct rule in 2000 and 2002. That had had a particular impact on the implementation of the equalities duties in that the Westminster-controlled Northern Ireland Office deemed 'high level' policy-making to be beyond the reach of the equality duty. Simply, it had never been intended to apply to Britain. Thus, a £16 billion investment programme, 'a once-in-a-generation enterprise' was subject to no equality impact assessment and no social need assessment (Campbell 2008, 92-3).

A three-year plan for Northern Ireland was drafted by the British government during the period of direct rule. Titled *Shared Futures*, it was issued for consultation in 2003 and published by the Executive in March 2005. Unsurprisingly it expressed Westminster's priorities: 'important though it is for government to tackle unfairness and inequalities in people's life chances, a key challenge for government is to build strong cohesive communities'. Equality must not prevail over de-segregation of housing and schools: 'separate but equal is not an option' (Northern Ireland Assembly 2009, 2). As Eilish Rooney put it, this state-managed narrative was representing sectarianism as 'dysfunctional attitudes belonging to "Catholics" and "Protestants", or as a pathological problem that the "two communities" share equally' rather than as structural inequalities with redistributive policy implications (Rooney 2006, 28).Women's organizations, including the Women's Support Network and Women into Politics, pitched into the draft. In their consultation document they deplored 'the absence of interconnection being made between community relations and the promotion of equality and human rights...indication of a severe limiting of the definition of the issue in question'. They recommended that the Equality Commission be designated under Section 75 so that 'good relations is without prejudice to equality' (Women's Support Network et al 2003).

The second major policy programme, *Cohesion, Sharing and Integration*, was issued after the reintroduction in 2007 of a power-sharing Stormont following

the St.Andrews agreement. It was adopted as the government's programme for the period 2008-11. But, as was already clear from the title, 'CSI', as it became known, yet further relegated the equalities principle. Although it paid lip service to equalities and inclusion, the aim of this programme was clearly stated as being: 'to address the divisions within our society and achieve measurable reductions in sectarianism, racism and hate crime' (Northern Ireland Assembly 2009, 4). A swingeing critique of CSI by the WRDA included the following.

> Throughout the conflict and its aftermath, the issues of gender, women and human rights were frequently seen as 'soft issues' that could be addressed after the 'important' or 'hard' security issues have been addressed. The long-term impact of this is that the post-conflict political structures and processes are founded on pre-existing inequalities. This is despite the fact that the Good Friday Agreement expressly recognised 'the right of women to full and equal political participation' and required the government to 'pursue broad policies for... the advancement of women in public life' (Women's Resource and Development Agency 2010).

The Agency pointed out that much of government policy directed at the post-conflict transition had ignored or devalued women's needs and contribution, and the CSI document perpetuated this shortcoming. More precisely, they wrote,

> the draft strategy ignores the requirements of the government's own Gender Equality Strategy and it fails to properly address the requirements of Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. This is partly a result of a skewed approach – an approach that views sharing, cohesion and integration only through the lens of race and community background (ibid).

The anger the activist women were now feeling rings out. The draft document, they wrote, 'betrays its origins in the predominantly male-dominated narratives about the conflict', and sees 'women's needs and contribution as irrelevant'. '[T]he exclusion of women as a sectoral group is a particularly offensive manifestation of a lack of gender awareness on the part of those involved in drafting the documents'. They called on the government to renew its attention to working class women's views by involving 'grassroots workers, volunteers and activists in drafting and reviewing policy' (ibid).

As we have seen, when the women's community sector had pressed the equalities agenda in the 1990s they had not meant sex/gender equality alone. They had espoused an encompassing vision of a 'fair' society, in which the end of the discrimination perpetuating Catholic poverty would give Northern Ireland a hope of enduring peace. Was this conception of equality present in CSI? Disappointingly, that too was lacking. A study carried out for the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust report of 2010 carried a section on 'equality',

referring not to gender equality but specifically equality between the two communities. Even in this respect the authors' judgment of CSI was negative. They noted that 'equality of condition was present as a benchmark in the attempts to strengthen legislation between 1989 and 1998. The norms of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 1998, including "parity of esteem" go considerably beyond "equality of opportunity"'. Yet they found that although 'the equality duty is reiterated more often in the text of *Cohesion* than in *Shared Future*...the actual formulations are no stronger. The emphasis on "equality of opportunity" in *Cohesion* is relatively weak' (Todd and Ruane 2010: 15). In interview, Patricia McKeown summed up for me the meaning of these developments.

> What has happened is that the resources that should have been directed by government to challenging discrimination and promoting equal opportunities were diverted into 'community relations' - the 'shared society' thing. Because it's easier to do! 'Being together' rather than coming together in order to challenge what is fundamentally wrong, the things that are the reason we're divided in the first place.

Would economic equality be a principle of policy making?

Low-wage poverty and joblessness certainly produce a dimension of inequality that cuts across all the nine listed in Section 75, including of course the sex/gender dimension – viz. women's lower earnings and prospects. However, the economic dimension of equality was, from the start, a notable, if logical, omission from the 'nine dimensions'. Robin Wilson points to the inevitability of this. 'Class inequalities cannot be dealt with within an equal opportunities discourse: the formal equality of the wage bargain belies the substantive inequality between capital and labour, as Marx famously dissected it' (Wilson 2007, 156). Economic inequality is foundational in the capitalist system, and ending it requires nothing less than political mobilization of working class interests for fundamental reform or revolution in the relations of property and production. It is not something governments of conservative hue, whether named Tory or New Labour, were ever likely to address through legislation.

On the other hand, there are two ways of looking at economic inequality. The first is to see it, as in the paragraph above, as a matter of class relations - an impoverished working class, an advantaged middle class, a property-owning power-wielding upper class. The other is to look through and beyond the class effect to see an ethno-national dimension – the existence in Northern Ireland of a Catholic population historically disadvantaged by discrimination in labour markets and public policy. Seen this way, economic inequality, expressed in an unfair distribution of job chances, benefits and housing, was primary among the causes of the conflict. Beatrix Campbell wrote, 'the equality and human rights duties promised more than peace, and for the combatants they offered a

dignified stake in a deal - an historically unprecedented way to address the crisis of *class* in Northern Ireland' (my emphasis). Just as it invited Protestant/unionist men to contemplate their class interest with, rather than against, Catholics, 'the deal offered men as men an opportunity for the first time to assert their class interest with, rather than against, women' (Campbell 2008, 105). Would this be addressed by post-Agreement policy makers? The answer would lie in where they would chose to invest, where they would create jobs, in which areas they would modernize the housing stock. Robin Wilson cites official statistics of deprivation to the effect that 'those, predominantly Catholic, working-class neighbourhoods which were most disadvantaged when the Troubles began are still the most disadvantaged today' (NISRA 2005, in Wilson 2007, 157). The women I interviewed in 2012 certainly felt that investment since the peace agreement, and even in recent years, had continued to be seriously tilted in favour of Protestant areas.

Beyond this, however, the circumstances and prospects of working class Catholics, as those of working class Protestants, in the last resort depend less on 'fair' and 'equal' government investment policies than on progressive economic policies by governments that seek to control exploitative, profit-seeking capitalist interests, to modify market forces, to promote social production and to use public resources to provide benefits and services for those who most need them. This is never more the case than in times of recession. In Northern Ireland an estimated 1,600 companies went to the wall in the years 2009-11. Ulster Bank's survey of business managers for January 2012 showed decline continuing month on month. Construction, services, retail and manufacturing sectors all, except retail, recorded a fall in activity, in contrast with restored growth in the rest of the UK. Also in contrast to Britain the services sector, including financial services and restaurants, contracted fastest in terms both of output and employment (Canning 2011a). In July 2012 it was reported that Northern Ireland property prices had fallen by 48% in five years (Canning 2011b).

Yet there is no left-right dimension of politics in Stormont. The relatively stable power-sharing administration installed as a result of the St. Andrews agreement in 2007 involves a carefully-engineered co-operation between two parties, Sinn Féin and the DUP, once held to represent the extremes of Nationalist/Republican and Unionist / Loyalist opinion. The smaller parties that might have offered a socialist option, such as the PUP, have been marginalized. Sinn Féin has a history of left politics. But while in the Republic of Ireland it is able to continue to express this in its platforms and policies, it can scarcely do so in Northern Ireland, where its mandate is to represent one 'side' in the historic conflict. The DUP, for its part, though the majority of its supporters have traditionally been the Protestant working class, is more populist than leftist. Besides, the most left-leaning member of the Assembly is likely to be 'contaminated' by his or her obligatory dealings with the lobbyists and representatives of big business, of corporations, with an interest in Stormont's economic policies. Those who, like the women I interviewed, wish to

move beyond sectarian politics and would cast a vote for progressive socialist economic policies, have nobody to vote for. As Úna ní Mhearaín puts it, with institutionalized power-sharing, the Sinn Féin and DUP Assembly members have necessarily 'settled into their comfortable corners...class has disappeared off the agenda'.

Would the foundational concepts of human rights and inclusion be honoured?

Feminism, in the meaning ascribed to it by the 'frontline feminists' of the women's community sector of the 1990s has always had an outward-leaning, outward-leading, agenda. 'Women' has meant 'equality', 'equality' has meant 'equalities' in the plural, 'equalities' have entailed 'human rights', while rights in turn has inevitably entailed 'inclusion'. So there have been two further questions in women's minds as the years passed. Is the concept of 'rights', which underpinned the settlement, getting embodied in law and the judicial system as promised? And are the powerless, as so many hoped, being included in a participatory process of decision-making?

First, the consolidation of 'rights'... The Good Friday Agreement foresaw the endowment of Northern Ireland with a Bill of Rights, something that had first been raised by the civil rights movement in the late 1960s. The Northern Ireland Act furnished a Human Rights Commission (NIHRC), alongside the Equalities Commission. However what it delivered was not a Bill of Rights, only a Bill of Rights *process* (Harvey 2006). The community sector and the trade unions however continued to exert pressure, and ten years after the Good Friday Agreement, in December 2008, the NIHRC presented advice to the British government on the possible content of such a Bill. In November the following year Westminster published a consultation paper, *A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Next Steps*. The NIHRC however were dissatisfied with its content. Their Chief Commissioner responded, 'Legislation of such importance is deserving of greater consideration and analysis...the Commission does not accept this as a genuine effort to increase human rights protections in Northern Ireland' (NIHRC 2012)). The consultation ended in March 2010. The incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government is even less enthusiastic on this issue than the outgoing Labour government.

Meanwhile, a poll of voters in Northern Ireland carried out in June 2011 showed overwhelming cross-community and political support for a Bill, with more than 83% of self-identifying unionist voters and 86% of nationalists in favour (Clarke 2011). When I interviewed Patricia McKeown, Regional Secretary of Unison in Northern Ireland, in February 2012 she had recently returned from a lobby of Westminster by the Human Rights Consortium, the civil society body that presses the rights issue in Northern Ireland. They had met with little encouragement. The British government were currently working on a possible eventual Bill of Rights for the whole United Kingdom, they had told the

delegation, and 'we'll whack in a bit about Northern Ireland'. Patricia McKeown says, 'These are the themes around which we campaigned for a Yes vote on the Good Friday Agreement...Equality and human rights convinced the people we represented. Now these things are either incomplete or in regression. That is dangerous in a society working its way through a peace process. It's only two decades since the conflict ended'.

Joanne Vance, who led the Women into Politics project, a key initiative of the 1990s.

Second, the question of inclusion and participation of the powerless...The crescendo that swells from 'women' to 'human rights' culminates in the concept of 'inclusion', the participation of the powerless in the processes historically monopolized by the powerful. This final link was already conceptualized in Women into Politics in the mid-nineties. WIP had been about inclusion, about women's right to be involved in the decisions that were shaping their lives. Joanne Vance says now, in hindsight, 'When people on the ground can access, dialogue with and get feedback from their political representatives, when they can hold them to account, that's democracy. That has to be part of the purpose and achievement of getting women into political leadership'. Marie Mulholland later wrote of the aspiration of the Women's Support Network and Women into Politics to 'transform power', to 'develop new frameworks for decision-making

that accommodate those upon whom decisions have the most direct impact'
(Mulholland 1999, 4). 'We must begin by producing the means to allow those
furthest out on the margins of society to become active participants in their own
futures, not just targets for whatever whim strikes those in authority or those
with a violent predisposition' (Mulholland 2001, 176).

*Marie Mulholland, former coordinator of the Women's Support Network, with
Joy Poots, former coordinator of Windsor Women's Centre.*

In the period leading to the Peace Agreement the Women's Coalition had
proposed the creation of a Civic Forum to give civil society a voice in devolved
government. This had indeed been approved by the first Assembly, as a body
with 58 members. It was symptomatic that in 2004 this resource for the
expression of grassroots opinion was suspended and never subsequently
reconstituted. In the struggles that saw direct rule reimposed twice, as Joanne
Vance said to me recently, 'power politics became more important than the
process of peace building'. And Inez McCormack added, 'A peace process has to
be something more than a consensus between the conflicting parties – it has to
address exclusions. We have to get the powerful to change the way decisions are
made. And that is at the heart of the conflict here. An inclusive future has to be
built on changing the patterns of the past otherwise the poor are silenced and

marginalized.' In 1999, only a matter of months after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, in a paper she delivered at the World Bank in Washington, Marie Mulholland had already seen this challenge ahead. 'How do we transform power?' she asked. '...We must develop new frameworks for decision-making that accommodate those upon whom decisions have the most direct impact....What we have now is a fragile cessation of violence; it is not peace'. Peace has to be nurtured and its 'essential proteins are: justice, equality and *inclusivity'* (Mulholland 1999, my italics).

Of course, predictably enough, devolved power-sharing government by Northern Ireland politicians and civil servants turned out to be bare-bones electoral democracy. The people were not invited to make known their needs and voice their ideas except through the vote. In 2001 Inez McCormack and others, stepping straight into this lacuna, launched a project they called *Participation and the Practice of Right* (PPR). Their objective was to support disadvantaged groups in asserting their right to participate in social and economic decisions that affect their lives. What did they mean by 'the practice of right'? Inez explained, 'We took the language and framework of international rights and asked how these could be used to change the relationship between the powerful and the powerless. Rights are not an end in themselves. Rights can set a framework in which power is held accountable by the powerless, owning and using the tools to make needed change'.

The tools PPR employ are action research, policy work, mobilizing, alliance building, campaigning and creative use of the media. With these they began to define and pursue rights in mental health, housing, regeneration of working class communities, children's play. The idea was to challenge not only the outcomes of government policies but the processes in which the decisions leading to those outcomes were made. With a team of hands-on development workers in certain urban areas, for a decade now PPR have been enabling the powerless, consumers of mental health services, tenants on dump estates, to challenge power and shape policy. Inez told me, 'My life experience has shown me that people don't get change unless they're part of making it. That's what our work is about now. This work frames issues in ways that, instead of people being defined as the problem, the focus is on the responsibilty for power to change its behaviour'. Looking back to the community sector of the 1990s, Úna ní Mhearaín says, 'Our organizations in the communities that led the campaigns before, in housing and health for instance, they've all fallen silent. I can't think of such a campaigning group within the community now.' Despite its very different constitution, however, and with nothing like the women's centres coverage on the ground, PPR enables self-expression, collectivity and a challenge to political power in areas of housing and other public services, in the way that the women's community sector once did, and the best trade unions, such as Unison, continue to do today with regard to employer-power in the workplace.

...

On the first day of my visit to Belfast in early 2012 I took a long taxi ride around the city to get a feel for what has changed. There are many new commercial developments, such as the colossal Titanic centre, the Odyssey Arena and the Obel Tower, that give the place the feel of a modern European city. But I was shocked to find the high, wire-clad 'peace walls' the authorities constructed at the height of the conflict along interfaces between Protestant and Catholic areas still stand today. Indeed it is said that one-third of the 99 existing walls have been erected *since* the ceasefires of 1994 (O'Hagan 2012). Declamatory murals remain on walls as 'keep out' warnings.

The so-called 'peace walls', built to keep conflictual republican and loyalist communities apart, have not been removed, and some have been newly built.

Where is cohesion? I asked the women I interviewed: why? Why are Catholics and Protestant communities still kept apart by physical walls, fourteen years after the peace agreement? They were emphatic that this sustained territorial defensiveness has to be put down precisely to the betrayal of the 'equalities and inclusion' agenda, without which the 'sharing and inclusion' agenda was never going to work. The working class of both communities continue to experience

deprivation. The Catholic working class, on top of that, continue to experience discrimination. '[I]n this world of identity politics *recognition* crowds out *redistribution*, the classic egalitarian demand' (Wilson 2007, 153). Inez McCormack said, 'You can't take the peace walls down without addressing the condition of the people living on either side of them. You can't take down the walls that embody the past until people are able to hope for a different future. There are walls of more than one kind!'

I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Inez McCormack, who passed away on 21 January 2013. In doing so, I recall the constancy of her friendship and support, experienced by so many of us, and honour her unmatched life-time contribution to feminism, trade unionism and human rights. Inez lives on in the love, energy, skill and commitment of a multitude of women in Northern Ireland.

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The role of societal attitudes and activists' perceptions on effective judicial access for the LGBT movement in Chile

M. Dawn King

Abstract

The frequent gap between de jure *and* de facto *arrangements within South American judicial systems suggest that an institutional focus is not enough to understand effective access to justice. This article uses a constructivist approach to measure* de facto *judicial access for the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual) social movement in Chile through examining the role of societal attitudes on social movement activists' perceptions of their access to justice. I find that while a lack of judicial receptivity can certainly affect the outcomes of cases, societal attitudes also influence activists' own perceptions about using the judicial system. The fear of societal repercussions limits the amount of judicial cases LGBT individuals bring forth, hence contracting their level of judicial access in practice. A constructivist evaluation of access to justice can enhance the legal opportunity and political opportunity literature, which tend to focus too heavily on* de jure *openings to legal institutions when defining access.*

Introduction

There is an increasing amount of scholarly research examining lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) rights and laws affecting those rights. Many of these legal studies focus specifically on countries where rights have been gained in the Western World over the past twenty years, such as the United States, Canada, and the European Union (for example see edited work by Barclay, Bernstein, and Marshall 2009; Mucciaroni 2008; Engel 2007; Anderson 2005). Still others focus predominantly on countries that have outwardly repressed homosexual rights, such as Namibia and Cameroon (see Currier 2009; Awondo 2010). While many note the importance of the "judicialization of politics" in South America (see Domingo 2004; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006; Taylor 2008), few studies investigate the legal path of LGBT groups in South America, where social movement organizations (SMOs) tend to be in limbo between operating within states that are increasing political opportunities through opening political institutions and cultural norms that often categorize homosexual behavior as immoral. This study takes an in-depth look at judicial access for the LGBT movement in Chile through exploring this tension with a focus on societal attitudes and their impact upon LGBT movements decision to access the judicial system or not.

For decades, it has been noted that the consolidation of democracy is heavily tied to establishment of the rule of law (Dahl 1989, Mather 1990, Peruzzotti 1997, 2002). For Chile, liberal democratic judicial and political reforms occurred throughout the 1990s and 2000s – opening judicial institutions to many previously marginalized actors. At the same time of these institutional openings, however, the LGBT movement battled with conservative notions of sexuality, a variable often overlooked in many judicial access and legal opportunity studies (for notable exceptions see Hilson 2002, and Anderson 2005) . Many judicial access scholars still focus on the impact of institutional variables on judicial access that are external to the social movements or individuals using the system, such as the provision of public defenders, legal aid, legal education, and so on. Yet the frequent gap between *de jure* and *de facto* arrangements within South American judicial systems suggest that an institutional focus is not enough to understand effective access. In a democracy, rights must be gained in practice and not just formally.

This work uses a constructivist approach and evaluates the effect of societal attitudes on the LGBT movement's perception of access to the judicial system. Societal attitudes and activists' perceptions of their judicial access are separate but linked processes. Societal attitudes of homosexuality represent perceptions outside of the social movement being studied, but may indirectly affect how social movement activists view themselves and their available legal opportunities. Activists' individual perceptions of their judicial access are internal to the LGBT social movement and allow me to evaluate the constructivist argument that activists' rights claims can be furthered through formal institutional openings but only if they perceive the institutions as open. Their own perceptions of access can directly affect which avenues they choose to pursue to gain rights and, in turn, can limit or enhance their access to the judicial system regardless of the judicial/political structure within which they operate.

I find that while federal judicial receptivity to homosexual rights claims in Chile was weak between 1990-2010, societal attitudes also influenced LGBT activists' decisions to not use the judicial system. Homophobic societal attitudes can dissuade LGBT activists from using public avenues to gain rights because many potential plaintiffs fear "coming out of the closet" in a hostile environment - hence contracting their level of *de facto* judicial access. Certainly the provision of institutional openings affect social movements' level of judicial access, but this work demonstrates that how activists perceive these institutional openings can explain more about social movement access in practice than simply relying on *de jure* measurements.

While one would expect the political institutions to be effectively more open and accessible to social movements that are more culturally accepted, my research documents this expectation and some of the specific mechanisms that create it. I frame my work within the larger debate concerning the role of culture in collective action theory and argue a constructivist approach to studying social movement strategies expands the explanatory power of the legal opportunity

model because it asks if activists' perceive formal openings to the judicial system as viable venues for rights recognition. Next, I give a brief overview of judicial reforms in Chile that increased *de jure* judicial access to all civil society actors over the past two decades. I then lay out my methodologies and indicators used to measure societal attitudes and activists' perceptions. This is followed by an explanation of the legal-historical context surrounding homosexual rights in Chile. Finally, I present my findings and conclude societal attitudes have an impact on activists' own perceptions of their access to the judicial system. In the case of the LGBT movement in Chile, activist fears of using the judicial system contracts their level of *de facto* judicial access, despite the institutional expansion of judicial access for civil society. Social movements world-wide are increasingly using the judicial system as an effective venue to gain rights recognition. However, for socially marginalized organizations where individual members fear personal consequences due to strong cultural opposition to his/her lifestyle, the judicial system becomes a less effective tactical option. This weakens the effectiveness of Chile's democracy by closing a major venue for rights recognition.

The culture debate and legal opportunity

One debate surrounding the role of culture in social movement theory is whether or not culture can be accounted for in the political process model (studying political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing either in conjunction with or separate from each other) or if the political process model is too "structural" to fully incorporate culture as a variable- creating a culture/structure split. Structuralists often look at social movements' relation to the state through their ability to mobilize support, garner necessary resources, and use available political opportunities to explain movement emergence, while culturalists focus on how groups interpret and perceive these materials (Smith and Febner 2007, 13-15). Further, there is much discussion on how well the political process model achieves its goal of melding both structure and culture through "framing". Jasper (2007, 92) argues that adding framing, an approach that focuses on social movement organizations' conscious decisions to frame grievances, to the political process model was just a "meek attempt" to add cultural variables to a failing theory based almost solely on structures and citizen groups' relationship to the state.

The political process model often explains judicial access as a political opportunity that is dependent on institutional provisions that expand or contract civil society's ability to gain entry to the courts. Over the past decade, however, some judicial and legal scholars abandoned the political opportunity model by arguing legal opportunity should be evaluated in its own right. Legal opportunity is a separate but similar approach that explores why social movement actors chose to use, or not use, *litigation strategies* when attempting to gain rights. Scholars differ slightly on the variables that constitute effective legal opportunities, but they agree that legal opportunity variables include both

structural and contingent factors. The structural variables, like political opportunities more generally, focus on institutional openings to the judicial system. Legal opportunities expand if laws give social movement organizations legal standing, access to formal institutions, and access to increased state legal funding (see Anderson 2005; Hilson 2002; and Wilson and Cordero 2006). Also, elite allies, often times judges, can help expand access to the legal system (see Anderson 2005; Hilson 2002). More contingent variables, such as receptivity of justices (Hilson 2002) and the inclusion of cultural and political frames (Anderson 2005), also affect legal opportunities. Rights groups must frame claims so they fall into categories already established by law, and justices must be receptive to these rights claims.

Recent scholars, focused on LGBT mobilization, who have convincingly added to the cultural debate include those who look at the impact on internal identity politics on movement success or failure (Brown-Saracino and Ghaziani 2009); the use of cultural repertoires, specifically the intentional use of contestation to challenge the status quo while simultaneously building a collective identity (Taylor et al. 2009); and the use of purposive framing to gain access to courts (Vanhala 2009). While these scholars argue that both structure and culture affect LGBT legal opportunities, they still tend to explain cultural variables as something social movement organizations internally "frame" in order to gain rights or create new opportunities. Few focus on the role of external societal attitudes on activists' access to the courts. Anderson (2005, 209-211) acknowledges the influence of societal attitudes on LGBT litigation success when she argues social practices and public opinion can impact justices' decisions, but she discusses societal attitudes affecting the process and outcome of the judicial process and not necessarily access to the system. I expand upon her conclusions by arguing accepted social practices and societal attitudes toward homosexuality not only affect justices' opinions when making decisions but also *activists'* decisions to use the judicial system in the first place, many of whom mention fear of bringing a case to court because it forces plaintiffs to publically "out" themselves in an antagonistic environment.

While the idea of evaluating perceptions when looking at social movement success and emergence is nothing new, some claim it is an anthropological account of studying social movements (Salmon and Assies 2007, 206), it is a very understudied variable in the institutionally-focused political opportunities model and legal access studies more generally. Kurzman (2004, 117) argues for a new path of investigation that diverts from a structural framing to a constructivist framing of studying social movements, where opportunity should be viewed as "what people make of it". Building on this debate, I evaluate perceptions within and surrounding the LGBT movement in Chile and find that LGBT perceptions of limited judicial access, partially due to a fear of outing themselves in a society with negative attitudes toward homosexuality, do in fact limit *de facto* judicial access for the social movement. I am reinterpreting a political opportunity/legal opportunity variable, the level of openness to an

institution, from a cultural perspective in the hope of strengthening its explanatory power for a constituency-specific movement.

De jure judicial access for civil society in Chile

Judicial access is the opening of the judicial system to all citizens to seek legal redress. While measurements of judicial accessibility differ slightly among access scholars, commonly agreed upon measurement are overall judicial spending, increased legal aid to citizens, the provision of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, the increasing use of specialized courts, and public legal education (Londen and Viviano 2001; Di Paula et al. 2006, 3). Chile strengthened all of these variables throughout the 1990s and 2000s in a purposive effort to increase judicial access for all citizens. Spending on the legal system in Chile increased every year from 1997 to 2009 (see CEJA 2008-2009) and the percentage of the total fiscal budget dedicated to the judicial system also increased from .75% in the 1990s to about 1% by the mid-2000s (CEJA 2004-2005). Further, Chile increased its spending on legal assistance programs substantially since the early 1990s (CEJA 2008-2009). Most importantly, Chile created the Public Criminal Defender's Office in 2001 through the Criminal Procedure Reform Act, which provides free legal defense, and implements alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, creating access to justice for citizens who are intimidated by or unable to participate in more formal judicial settings - such as those living in rural areas with little physical access to a court.

While Chile is a unitary system, the judicial reforms of the 1990s and 2000s made strides in attempting to decentralize/localize the judicial system, through advocating ADR and the use of specialized courts. However, in order for citizens to access the judicial system, they have to have some understanding that the system is available for use. Efforts to use mobile legal assistance teams in impoverished areas have made it one of the most successful nations with regards to access reform (Buchanan 2001). This provides greater access to the citizenry by cutting out travel time for the lower income citizens while at the same time easing the tensions associated with traveling to the city for legal advice. Wilson (2004, 34) claims, "these….public and private legal services programs make Chile a hemispheric, if not global leader in access to justice work".

Civil organizations and social movements historically acted as a catalyst for judicial change throughout South America, including Chile, yet many of the institutional reforms mentioned above focus more on criminal defendants than on human rights issues. For social movements, the writ of protection (*recurso de protección*), established in the 1980 Constitution (no. 20 article 19), allows citizens to seek relief from a court of appeals when constitutional rights are violated, thereby providing legal standing for all citizens. However, because of the emphasis on criminal cases, many of the measurements used to assess judicial access in Chile assume a certain amount of homogeneity among those who seek access to the system. Solely concentrating on these institutional

reforms does not give an accurate account of how negative cultural attitudes may affect certain social movements adversely.

Methods

The focus of my case study research and the majority of my fieldwork concentrate on Chilean societal attitudes toward homosexuality and Chilean LGBT activists' perception of their access to the judicial system. I begin by placing the Chilean LGBT movement in historical context through a review of Chilean legislation and laws affecting the LGBT community coupled with an examination of the only three LGBT court cases heard by the Chilean Supreme Court from 1990-2008. I then assess societal attitudes of homosexuality through an evaluation of Chilean public opinion polls over the past 15 years and compare them to public opinion polls in Argentina over the same time period.

Certainly cultural attitudes have some effect on how members in each social movement perceive themselves, but in order to delve deeper into activist perceptions, I employ a separate ethnographic method. I performed in-depth, open-ended interviews with leaders and members of social movement organizations as well as participant observation to complement my analysis of group newsletters/emails/and research conducted concerning each movement's use of the judicial system. In total, I conducted 21 interviews over a three month period from LGBT lawyers, LGBT plaintiffs, organization leaders, and organization members - including multiple interviews from the three largest and most active LGBT organizations in Chile. Interviews were recorded and lasted 45 minutes to two hours each. My interview structure was open-ended, but focused on three components: organizational and personal background, use of the judicial system, and perceptions of access to the judicial system. I transcribed and coded each interview around the categories of: resources, identity, institutional opportunities, framing, and "non-use" of the judicial system. Participant observations included sitting in on organization meetings, a protest march, and organization-sponsored speaker events. Before expanding upon my ethnographic findings on activist perceptions of judicial access, I first turn to a discussion of the legal and historical context within which the LGBT movement operates.

Legal and historical context

While LGBT SMOs did not appear in Chile until after the democratic transition, homosexuals were singled out in legislation well before the 1990s. In 1954, Chile passed a law (11.627) grouping homosexuals as social security threats (Jiménez 2005), which led to the arbitrary detention of sexual minorities until 1994 when the law was abolished. Since then, very little legislation mentions homosexuality specifically. However, for purposes of this study, Article 161 of the Chilean labor code, while not addressing homosexuality specifically, is important for the LGBT movement. Article 161 addresses the right of an

employer to fire employees for the "good of the company", and while a non-discrimination bill recently passed through Congress, no legal protection existed for minority groups against firing during the time of my study. The Movimiento de Integración y Liberación Homosexual (MOVILH), the largest LGBT rights organization in Chile, states the fear of being fired, or not getting promoted due to intolerance, leaves many homosexuals in the closet (Jiménez 2005). This is backed by many studies and international reports claiming workplace security is one of the greatest inequalities for the homosexual community in Chile, and that the majority of LGBT harassment claims likely go unreported, especially to the Work Tribunal, for "fear of social stigma" (Acosta et al 2008, 5; Cardenas and Barrietos 2008).

The one successful policy change for the LGBT movement in Chile occurred in 1998. Social movement organizations successfully lobbied to amend their sodomy law (penal code 365) to legalize sexual practices between consenting male adults over the age of 18.   However, penal code 365 still differentiates between homosexual and heterosexual sex with minors. For homosexuals, consenting age is 18, while for heterosexuals it is 15. According to international organizations, such as Amnesty International, this blatant difference in law between homosexuals and heterosexuals is a violation of human rights (MOVILH 2008a), and homosexuals have been arrested recently for violating the reformed sodomy law. In 2008, a foreign actor visiting Chile had sexual relations with his 17 year old partner and was charged with pedophilia and possession of pornography (EFE 2008). Further, many lesbian interviewees were quick to point out that the change in the sodomy law did absolutely nothing to further their rights.

Regardless of their limited success, most LGBT SMOS still put more faith in the Chilean legislative process than the judicial process. This is evidenced by MOVILH dedicating a substantial amount of resources on lobbying for a non-discrimination bill and civil union legislation beginning in the mid-2000s. After seven years of congressional debate on the comprehensive anti-discrimination law, due to major opposition based on the sexual orientation clause, it was finally realized when the Chilean Senate approved the bill on May 6, 2012 (Ring 2012). While an incredible legislative victory for the LGBT movement, and many other minority groups in Chile, its passage came only when the LGBT movement stepped up their demands after neo-Natzis brutally tortured and killed Daniel Zamundio in a public park, reportedly because he was gay. The passage of the long-awaited anti-discrimination law demonstrates public pressure can influence members of Congress, but also that the process was a long uphill battle that relied on a heinous act before realization.

This focus on the legislative branch for rights recognition is very similar to the strategy of LGBT activists in Argentina when civil unions passed in Buenos Aires in 2002 (and gay marriage legislation nation-wide in 2010). When asked in an interview about the Comunidad Homosexual Argentina's (CHA), venue choice of the legislative branch for rights recognition, the director stated "on one hand the judicial system is very slow... on the other hand, the judicial

system is very politicized…it is very rare that a judge will recognize gay rights".
He went on to state, "we cannot control advances in the judicial system…not
here, not in Argentina…our greatest power is through the legislative branch at
the local level" (Suntheim 2006).   Unlike Argentina, however, Chile's highly
centralized unitary system, and legislative branch purposively designed to
maintain the status quo, makes gaining legislative victories a particularly slow
process for social movements. Chile's unconventional binominal electoral
system, established under the Pinochet regime in the 1980 Constitution,
ensures the two dominant voting blocs receive close to the same amount of
congressional seats even if one bloc receives a strong majority of the votes
(Siavelas 2002, 420-21). This makes it difficult for many SMOs to gain a
majority of legislative support. While the current Chilean president, Sebastián
Piñera announced his support of a civil union bill in Chile (Frandino 2011), the
binominal electoral system over-represents the center-right bloc who publically
came out against Piñera's support.

As will be demonstrated in the following section, Chilean LGBT organizations
steered clear of rights recognition through the courts. Only three LGBT cases
received national attention since democratic transition, and none purposefully
sought rights recognition in a proactive manner, a strategy often employed by
LGBT SMOs in many Western democracies. Further, the LGBT movement's
over reliance on a static legislative branch is a much weaker venue choice than
the more localized legislatures in Argentina – severely limiting their democratic
avenues for rights recognition.

Chilean court cases

The Divine Case

The first gay and lesbian judicial case that gained major national media
attention was the Divine case, which began in 1993. The case refers to a fire at
the gay discothèque, Club Divine, in Valparaiso, Chile. Many witnesses to the
event stated that a group of men started the fire on purpose - sixteen people
died and over thirty were injured. There were many reports that police officers,
and the justice system as a whole, did not take appropriate steps to find
evidence and never bothered to track down the murderers. Social movement
organizations argued the judicial investigation never looked for the cause of the
fire nor for any suspects before closing the case six months after the incident
(MOVILH,2006). Even more offensive to those who were there or who knew
someone killed or injured in the fire, was that the victims were treated like
criminals and intimidated by the "homophobic judge" (Jiménez 2005, 10).

While originating as a criminal case, the Divine Case must be discussed in this
analysis for two important reasons. First, it has become a very powerful
symbolic reminder of institutional homophobia to the LGBT community. Many
popular gay and lesbian themed poems, essays, short stories, and books discuss
the event well over a decade later (Sutherland, 2007; Lemebel 2001). Second,
this case is important because after a large amount of pressure from social

movement organizations, it was re-opened in 2003 based on "improper steps taken" by investigating officials (Jiménez 2005, 67). In 2008, the justices involved with the reopening of the case admitted that it was not handled properly by the first judge. Nevertheless, it is probably too late to find those responsible for the fire (MOVILH 2008b). Not only does MOVILH blame the initial "homophobic" Judge Gandara as the main reason the case was not properly investigated, but the recent judge in charge of the case, Patricia Montegro, claimed to "make sure that the courts have surpassed the homophobia" that was present during the initial investigation (MOVILH 2008b). The move to re-open Divine perhaps shows a changing judicial attitude toward homosexuality, but it also demonstrates that judicial biases, and lack of receptivity, most likely played a role in the investigation and outcome of the case – as many legal opportunity scholars would predict.

The Calvo Case

The second case involves Daniel Calvo, himself a judge in Chile. In 2003, Judge Calvo, then in charge of a major pedophilia investigation, was spotted at a gay sauna. Three days later he was removed from the pedophilia case by the Supreme Court and less than a year later he was suspended for four months. Visiting a gay sauna was enough for his removal from the high profile case, even though Calvo never committed a crime (Jiménez 2005). The Calvo case is symbolic of many similar occurrences in Chile, such as school expulsions or firings from positions for demonstrating homosexual activity. Likewise, the Calvo case is still often cited by international actors as a flagrant abuse of judicial power since the Supreme Court never said why his actions disqualified him from performing his job (Acosta et al., 2008: 11-12).

The Supreme Court maintained his suspension, citing: "the visit of a judge to a gay sauna constituted 'explicit conduct' that seriously jeopardized the 'honor' and 'dignity' necessary to exercise judicial power" (Jiménez quoting Supreme Court Statement 2005). Some claim that this "explicit Court-sanctioned equation of homosexuality to moral aberrance effectively transforms the judicial institution from a potentially powerful enforcer of equal rights into one of its greatest enemies" (Acosta et al 2007, 11-12). Similar to the Divine case, the Calvo case demonstrates that judicial actors' attitudes toward homosexuality affected the outcome: the decision to suspend him was based solely on what they personally deemed to be "dishonorable" conduct.

The Atala Case

The third major homosexual case takes on a much larger role than the other two discussed above. Not only is it the most prominent judicial case involving LGBT rights in Chile, but it was also appealed beyond the Chilean Supreme Court to the international level of justice. This case involves a custody battle for the three daughters of lesbian judge Karen Atala Riffo. Judge Atala, who is herself part of

the judicial system in Chile, challenged the system for a decade, making this case an ongoing fight for homosexual parental rights.

Between 2001 and 2003, Judge Atala lived openly as a lesbian with custody of her three daughters; however, her ex-husband, Jaime Lopez Allendes, filed a suit when Judge Atala started living with her partner (Atala 2007; Vance Center 2006). In May of 2003, a Juvenile Court Judge in Villarica issued a provisional order removing custody of the girls from the home of their mother at the request of their father, even though no hearing had been held and no evidence collected. This ruling was most certainly anti-gay, considering that in Chile custody almost automatically goes to the mother unless she is proved to be a prostitute, drug addict, alcoholic, or mentally unstable (Byrne 2005). In October of 2003, the Court of First Instance of the City of Villarica rejected the lawsuit filed by Mr. López Allendes to gain full custody of their three daughters. After the lower court decision was upheld by the Appellate Court in the city of Temuco, Mr. López Allendes appealed to the Supreme Court of Chile. In May of 2004, the Supreme Court overturned the first two rulings in a 3-2 decision. Atala then brought the case to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights in 2006 (Vance Center 2006). In April 2010, the Commission ruled that Chile violated judge Atala's human right to live free of discrimination (MOVILH 2010).

While very rare, members of the Supreme Court became interested and active in the court case well before it reached the Supreme Court - supporting Mr. López Allendes' appeal from the outset, with the belief that the judges in the initial ruling hadn't considered the right of children to live in a "normal" family (Byrne 2005, A6). Mr. López Allendes, also a lawyer and insider in the judicial system, based his petition to the Supreme Court on the claim that the children had a right to be "furthered and protected" in an atmosphere of normality (Vance Center 2006). Interestingly, unlike the trial court, the Supreme Court did not even consider the children's opinions about their living situation.

Beyond the Court's proactive role, this was also the first instance in which child custody was granted to the father because the mother was a lesbian living with her partner. The Supreme Court decision was based on the beliefs of the justices that children living under the custody of a lesbian were subject to live a life full of ridicule. They argued the girls were in a "situation of risk" whose "pernicious consequences" would "damage their psychological development" (Chilean Supreme Court ruling 2004). The justices chose to ignore expert testimony stating that "the psychological tests on children have proved that living in a household with a lesbian couple does not put the children's development at risk" (Byrne 2005, A6). While the Supreme Court argued Atala's sexual identity did not dictate the ruling, in the same paragraph they stated the sexual identity of the mother could cause her daughters to become confused about sexual roles. The Supreme Court ignored scientific studies clearly showing otherwise and claimed the evidence presented was only " 'an element of the conviction that must form the judges' personal opinion'" (Jiménez quoting Supreme Court Statement 2005, 13).

In all three cases, justices' lack of receptivity toward homosexuality seemed to affect either the process of attaining justice or even the particular outcome/ruling of the case, yet none of cases mentioned above point directly to limited *access* to the system. The fact that the re-opening of the Divine case was the only proactive attempt by an LGBT SMO to use the federal courts for rights issues implies litigation is not sought as a viable strategy for these organizations, but it is also true that the Supreme Court never "denied" access to justice since proactive cases were not brought before the Court. Certainly a lack of judicial receptivity impacts social movement actors' access to the judicial system, as many political and legal opportunity scholars argue, but this work asks if there are other variables that also affect the SMOs' decision to avoid the courts. Many SMOs use litigation as a strategy even when they know the judiciary is unreceptive and the likelihood of winning their case is bleak. Recently, in South America, actors have used the courts as a tool to "delay, disable, discredit [policy], and declare [opposition]" (Taylor 2008, 10; see Dupuis 2002, 9 for examples of movement's use of unreceptive courts). Ultimately, the decision to take a case to court depends on the decisions made by those within the LGBT movement. It is important to identify social attitudes and activists' perceptions as two linked variables that also limit the LGBT movement's access to *de facto* justice.

Societal attitudes

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Fundación IDEAs, a non-profit civil society foundation aimed at ending social discrimination and spreading democratic values, launched multiple studies measuring discrimination against sexual minorities in Chile. The foundation reported that in 1997, 60.2% of the Chilean population thought homosexuality was a "very serious" problem (Fundación Ideas 1997). In 2001, they found that 45.2% of the Chilean population believed that homosexuality should be forbidden since it is "against human nature" (Fundación Ideas 2001), and a survey conducted in 2003 showed that 43% of the Chilean population believed homosexuals should not be school teachers (Fundación Ideas 2003). The most recent survey conducted by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) finds that public opinion in Chile is still divided on the topic. When asked their level of "approval" for homosexuals on a scale of 1 (completely disapprove) to 9 (completely approve), 34% of Chileans marked 1-4 and 30% of Chileans marked 6-9 with a mean score of 5.48. Further, 15 % of Chileans marked "1" while only 4% of Chileans marked "9" (AmericasBarometer, 2010). These results are comparable to acceptance levels in Uruguay and more supportive than results found in Colombia, with a 3.5 mean score.

In addition to the polls above, a couple of comparative studies based solely on the "Attitudes Toward Lesbian and Gay Men Scale" (ATLG), used to measure perceptions toward homosexuals throughout the world, tested the scale's reliability and validity in Chile. One of these studies demonstrated "particularly

strong social intolerance toward gays and lesbians" (Cardenas and Barrientos 2008, 141). In the other comparative study, the authors concluded that Chileans are much more prejudiced toward the LGBT community than the U.S. and that Chileans have much more "traditional" gender role values that have continuously added to negative perceptions concerning sexual minorities (Nierman et al. 2007, 65). While the surveys conducted in this ten year span ask different questions, they seem to back the argument that Chile is a traditionally conservative country with respect to homosexuality.

While similar to other South American attitudes, these findings are in stark contrast to public opinion polls conducted in Argentina. While not fully embraced by the entirety of Argentina, public support of civil unions and homosexuality increased significantly over the past 10 years. In 2002, 69% of Argentine's believed homosexuality to be only sometimes to never justifiable. The same recent LAPOP survey that conducted Chilean public opinion on homosexuality shows a dramatic change in Argentine public opinion since the 2002 survey. The mean score on the 2010 survey was a 7.29 - with more than 70 percent of the population marking a 6-10 on the scale (AmericasBarometer 2010). Certainly there is more public support for the gay and lesbian movement in Argentina now than in Chile.[1]

The evaluation of multiple public opinion surveys throughout the decade does not give an exact "measurement" of acceptance or hostility toward the gay and lesbian movement in Chile, but it does provide a general description of intolerance. The surveys conducted demonstrate opinions are slowly changing concerning sexual minorities, but societal attitudes of homosexuals still tend to be negative, especially when compared to neighboring Argentina. In fact, in late 2010, the Chilean government released a large-scale public service announcement against domestic abuse with the tagline: *Maricón, el que maltrata a una mujer (faggot: one who abuses a woman)*, much to the outrage of international LGBT organizations (Debord 2010). The arguments for causation of these negative attitudes vary and range from the role of the Catholic Church in Chile to perceptions of gender roles that are much more rigid in Spanish and Portuguese-speaking regions of the Americas (Redding 2003, 2; Nierman et al. 2007, 62-65). Further, international studies and shadow reports voice concern over Chile's discrimination based on sexual orientation, specifically with court systems, access to health care, adoption and parenting rights, and access to jobs and public utility services (IGLHRC 2007, 1, 7-9; Acosta et al. 2008, 5-14). These international reports demonstrate that societal attitudes have created an atmosphere where open discrimination is common and fairly accepted. Certainly, there can be severe consequences for "coming out of the closet" by initiating a court case that will be made public.

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[1] The City of Buenos Aires passed civil unions in the early 2000s during an economic and political crisis as a means of gaining political support. Attitudes on homosexuality changed dramatically throughout Argentina in the five years that followed the local decision (Suntheim 2006, see also King 2010, for the Argentine case study).

Activists' perceptions

While this section aims to measure certain perceptions regarding access to the judicial system for LGBT groups in Chile, it should be noted that it would be very misleading to say that there is a singular gay and lesbian voice. Rather, there are multiple perceptions amongst active members in the gay and lesbian SMOs studied. Similarly, there are diverse goals among the SMOs themselves. However, with regard to their opinions on using the judicial system to gain rights, there are many similarities. One of these is that sufficient legal and financial resources are essential. Interviewees also agree that a law specifically protecting sexual minorities would legally justify discrimination claims beyond the use of the more general *recurso de protección*. Neither of these statements is surprising. Clearly, resources are critical "mobilizing structures" in social movement theory and legal standing is a critical institutional access variable in the legal opportunity literature. However, some of the SMOs do have financial and legal resources, especially MOVILH, and the *recurso de protección* provides some standing for all minority groups in Chile. So why are there so few judicial cases involving gay and lesbian SMOs? My research finds that activists perceive seeking judicial redress as a fearsome, and even dangerous, route to gaining rights in Chile due to societal intolerance.

Toly Hernandéz, president of the Movimiento Unificado de Minorias Sexuales (MUMS), and currently the Chilean representative serving on the Board for the Latin American and Caribbean Region of the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), agrees that Chilean society is a little more open to gays and lesbians since 1990. However, she feels that members of the Chilean gay and lesbian community "are very afraid of speaking out about violations of their rights…because there may be problems with their families, their jobs, etc…" (Hernandez 2007). Further, she contends that the fight for rights is still in its infancy in Chile, despite the push from SMOs since the early 1990s. Juan Pablo Sutherland (2007), an author who writes on gay themes and an active member of the Communist movement in the 1980s, similarly claims things have not changed much since the 1980s. He points out, "on one hand there are more public allies now, but on the other hand there is still a lot of fear to identify publicly". Almost all gay and lesbian interviewees mentioned fear as one variable that distances the community from using the judicial system; for some this was a large obstacle and for others it was one of many hindering factors to accessing the judicial system. One interviewee, Rolando Jiménez, stood out, however, due to his optimism on future use of the judicial system.

Jiménez is one of the most vocal gay and lesbian activists in all of Chile. As president of MOVILH, he and his organization have been involved in almost every gay and lesbian legal/judicial battle. He emphasized a positive shift from the old guard to a newer generation of Chileans who now have decision-making power. He explains that the justices and lawyers are much younger and there are more women involved in the judicial system now. Considering his large role in gaining legal rights over the last 15 years, his optimistic view of the Chilean legal environment should not be overlooked. There are signs of a society that is

slowly changing its perception concerning the gay and lesbian population. However, Jiménez's own published report to the first Inter-American Forum on Access to Justice, organized by the United Nation Development Program, states that the Chilean Supreme Court is the "most homophobic institution in the country" (Jiménez 2005, 9). He shows instances of judicial prejudice in all of the court cases evaluated in his research. Further, when speaking about Article 161 of the labor code, he states that there is a "fear of revealing one's sexual orientation because prejudices can affect one's access to future avenues in their profession" (Jiménez 2005, 6).

Jiménez roots the failures of all three court cases, mentioned above, in judicial homophobia, and past individual justices' homophobia has some effect on MOVILH's decision to steer clear of the courts. However, Jiménez also admits that the real danger is revealing one's sexual identity in Chilean society, and that this fear can affect one's decisions to use political structures in place (Jiménez 2007). The perceptions of members within, and represented by, the SMOs have some influence on their decision to not use the judicial system, even though there are structural openings for them. This perception of fear was mentioned many times by those interviewed, including active members of the LGBT community. One LGBT radio DJ and involved activist since the early 2000s, admitted that he may never come out of the closet to his parents or anyone in his small hometown because "it is not worth the hassle". Likewise, Judge Karen Atala explained that her decision to fight the Supreme Court ruling at the international level was based on her resources and knowledge of the judicial system, but that the process "singled her out" and made her personal life very difficult

Conclusion

The optimism of some LGBT activists may be warranted considering the slow, positive change in public opinion toward the LGBT community, the influx of younger justices in the judicial system, and the recent victory in anti-discrimination legislation. That being said, during the time of my investigation there was a fear to bringing cases to the courts. Evidence gathered from interviews demonstrates that fear can lead to a perception of being a "second-class citizen". Many publications produced by the SMOs, and almost all of the leaders interviewed, claim many cases have not been brought to court because victimized individuals are afraid of the consequences of "coming out". While some point to the less than successful outcomes of certain court cases involving gays and lesbians as a reason to use alternative avenues to gain rights, it is the repercussions of bringing a case to court in the first place, regardless of anticipated outcome, that can be the primary problem.

Unlike many other minority groups, gays and lesbians have an option of "staying in the closet". Historically, there have been many minority groups who feared using certain political avenues. What distinguishes the LGBT community from other rights groups is that the fear of bringing a case to court may be

devastating not only publicly but also within their private lives. One seemingly simple decision to fight for one's rights via the judicial system can lead to a loss of job, housing, education, and even one's family just for identifying as a homosexual. Being able to "hide" one's sexual identity is not an advantage for gaining rights, but rather an obstacle for LGBT rights organizations (Corrales and Pecheny, 2010 make a similar argument to explain why so few LGBT individuals join organizations to begin with in Latin America).

Moreover, a perception of limited access creates limited access in practice. Fear of bringing a case to court due to societal repercussions, as opposed to fear of losing a case, can lead to inaction. Most of those who study access to justice measure it by institutional provisions, such as the number of legal means provided for those who feel disenfranchised. This is for good reason, as a legal structure that provides avenues for access is crucial to any social movement who wishes to attain enforceable rights. However, the LGBT case study in Chile demonstrates that for certain rights groups, legal/structural access is not enough to achieve full *de facto* access to the judicial system. The recent passage of the Chilean anti-discrimination bill could become a powerful legal tool for the LGBT movement in the future when making rights claims, but limited judicial access may remain if activists are still afraid of being ostracized by bringing a case to court in the first place. My research suggests that a refocused, constructivist evaluation of access to justice can enhance the legal opportunity and political opportunity literature, which tend to focus too heavily on the amount of *de jure* openings to legal institutions when defining access.

Further, this work demonstrates that the study of identity politics should not solely focus on how activists craft their own perceptions or how they consciously frame their issues within a culturally and politically accepted framework to gain rights, but should also evaluate how societal opinions shape activists' decision-making strategies when venue shopping. Too often, collective action scholars point to the process and outcome of rights claims without focusing on access to the political system. In the Chilean LGBT case study, actors' non-use of the system was not strictly based on an evaluation of their past experiences with an unreceptive judicial system, but, rather, at least partially influenced by public opinion surrounding homosexuality in a traditionally socially conservative country – regardless of expected outcome or concern of a biased process.

Contrary to scholars studying social movements in the Global North, who argue that the judicial system can be a tool for marginalized groups to raise awareness, the LGBT movement in Chile is often afraid to use the courts exactly because it "raises awareness" of their personal sexual preferences. The publicity that many SMOs seek in the Global North via judicial cases work against gay and lesbian activists in Chile, which is why the judicial system is less open for them. Advancing Ashley Currier's (2009) conclusions on the gay and lesbian movement in Namibia, I argue that gay and lesbian social movements' *de facto* access to the judicial system is not only limited in countries where the state openly suppresses homosexuality, but also in states where societal attitudes are non-supportive – even if states are not openly suppressive. While my findings

are geographically and case study limited, LGBT SMOs face similar negative social attitudes in many countries, and must find a space between a hostile judiciary and negative public opinion. In Chile, the LGBT movement chose to pursue rights via the legislative branch, where organizations try to push agendas and individuals can remain anonymous. This reliance on a legislative branch, purposefully structured to maintain the status quo via a binominal electoral system, severely limits the democratic venues available for the movement, and demonstrates Chile's highly centralized system based on elite decision-making creates institutional obstacles to rights recognition.

While the Inter American Commission on Human Rights often rules in favor of plaintiffs in South America, as it did in the Atala case, a mere venue change to the international level of justice does not seem to be the solution to rights recognition. International courts do not have the power to implement their rulings; a judgment against a state may create slow changes at the domestic level due to public embarrassment, but it often does not lead to swift institutional change. This suggests that in Chile, and other regions of the world with similar negative societal attitudes toward homosexuality, the LGBT movement would strategically benefit by focusing first on changing public opinion through media campaigns and educational outreach and then on changing domestic law via the legislative branch. The judicial branch tends to be a conservative institution in many South American countries due to judicial tenure, and judicial decisions are not nearly as affected by shifts in public attitudes as legislative decisions. Even in a country like Chile, where the binominal electoral system creates obstacles for groups seeking rights recognition, the LGBT movement finally gained a legislative victory partially due to a shift toward more public acceptance of homosexuality (as evidenced by the public outrage over the murder of a gay man). This venue choice certainly also worked well for the LGBT movement in Argentina when gaining civil union and, later, marriage rights. Strategically, it makes more sense for LGBT social movements in conservative countries to focus on public engagement and educational outreach. This will not only reduce the stigma of coming out of the closet to potential plaintiffs, but, more importantly, could impact legislative decisions during the law-making process.

Acknowledgements

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Infotainment and encounter in the pacification of Rocinha favela
Paul Sneed

Abstract

This essay draws upon anthropological analysis of dark tourism, concepts of relational philosophy, and auto-ethnography to consider the epistemological and ethical implications of news coverage of the recent pacification of the favela of Rocinha, the largest squatter town in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In November of 2011, police and military occupied Rocinha in a massive joint operation called Peace Shock. This occurred as part of a push to wrest the favelas from the control of the city's criminal factions, a movement many link to Rio's preparation for mega-events like the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. After a major US cable television news network enlisted me (as co-founder of an NGO in Rocinha) to assemble a field crew to document the thoughts and feelings of local residents about the operation–in an effort to eschew the sensationalist stereotypes typical of much news coverage of favelas–I was surprised so little of these everyday perspectives made it to air. Reflection on this episode leads me to contrast "infotainment"-based approaches to learning, which can inadvertently inflict further violence by turning people and their suffering into objects, and "encounter"-based learning, in which people meet in dialogue, mutuality, reciprocity, and community.

> "When atrocity becomes a recreational attraction, visitors are themselves inflicting violence as they search out unique and authentic experiences."
>
> –Erika Robb, "Violence and Recreation: Vacationing in the Realm of Dark Tourism."

> "When a human being turns to another as another, as a particular and specific person to be addressed, and tries to communicate with him (or her) through language or silence, something takes place between them which is not found elsewhere in nature."
>
> –Audrey Hodes, *Encounter with Martin Buber*.[1]

As adults often do when talking to children, I once asked a young boy living in the squatter town of Rocinha, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, what he wanted to be

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[1] This event Hodes writes about is Martin Buber's "encounter," to be explained in more detail below (1972:72). I have added the "or her" in parenthesis to preserve the meaning of the quote in today's language (and the sense Buber himself intended).

when he grew up. His name was Erick, and I had known him since my first visit to Brazil as an undergraduate researcher from the United States six years earlier, in 1990. His aunt Socorro and her family, already dear friends of mine, had been among the first people I had met after moving to Rocinha–a favela of some 120,000 residents located on a steep hillside between two of the most exclusive beachfront neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro–to study the rule of that community by a faction of drug traffickers. Given the difficulties of life in Rocinha and the favela's proximity to the Intercontinental Hotel (and the now defunct National Hotel), perhaps the seven year-old boy's answer should have come as no surprise: when he grew up, Erick wanted to be a tourist.

Several other adults were crowded around the small living room watching the Botafogo soccer club play against Fluminense. They chuckled heartily at Erick's answer, as did I. Certainly the idea of being a career tourist–travelling, meeting new people, learning about history and culture, trying local foods and such, without worrying much about money or having too many responsibilities or rigid schedules–would likely have its appeal for a great many of us. "Ditto!" I told him, laughing. Beneath my amusement, however, it occurred to me that Erick would likely have to make it over some pretty significant hurdles if he were ever to have opportunities at being even a recreational tourist in the way of foreign visitors to his home city. In any case, I figured, he was much better off than another small boy from Rocinha to whom I had posed that same question not long before. This other little boy wanted to be a thief, just like his dad, he had answered. Despite my objections that "thief" was not an occupation, and my request that he think of another career, the five or six year-old told me he was sure that being a thief really was a job and that, since his dad was doing it, it was a good job at that.

These many years later, I have spent a total of some four years living in Rocinha as a researcher of everyday life and popular culture in the favela and as a teacher/co-founder of a non-profit educational and outreach center there. Remembering back on that conversation today, it strikes me that Erick's interest in being a career tourist was not really so far removed from my own interest in being an academic or a community activist. Indeed, it occurs to me that the desire Erick felt to be a *turista* was at heart similar to the attraction felt by many people engaged in more "serious" pursuits to learn about and connect with other people and places through things like journalism, ethnographic research, activism, service learning, volunteering, mission trips, filmmaking, photography, study abroad, or any number of other scholarly and artistic practices. Almost inevitably, there are psychological and emotional factors involved in such pursuits that can make them entertaining as well as educational. Even though I never would have copped to it at the time, there was no small dose of "tourist" in me–just as there is a little "tourist" in most of us as we engage in such activities.[2]

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[2] Erick Andrade Gonçalves, now 23 years old, is one of the friends who has most profoundly impacted my work as a community educator and researcher in Rocinha. Now a young father,

Dark tourism, infotainment, and encounter

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with or exploitive about being a tourist; it's more a question of what kind of tourism we practice and the way we practice it. Erika Robb, a cultural anthropologist who spent a year as a "voluntourist" working with two non-profit organizations in Rocinha while she conducted fieldwork on favela tourism, makes this point in her studies of "dark tourism."[3] According to Robb, dark tourism is tourism in places of violence–whether past (as in the case of Nazi concentration camps like Auschwitz) or present (as in the case of poor neighborhoods facing problems of social exclusion and violence, like Rocinha). She argues that while dark tourism offers tremendous resources for potentially transformational educational experiences that can contribute to greater social and global justice, in blurring the lines between civic responsibility and entertainment it can just as easily turn ugly, trivializing human suffering and turning it into a commodity (2009:51).

Although Robb does not suggest names for labeling the poles of what she considers destructive and constructive dark tourism in the article, we can extrapolate such a division from the thrust of her arguments. The destructive side does little to eradicate violence and can even inadvertently work to the opposite effect and generate more violence, as Robb points out in the first epigraph of this essay (54). Because of the way such negative sorts of dark tourism join together "information" with "entertainment," they are readily comparable to the journalistic neologism "infotainment." This infotainment-style dark tourism is not primarily about transformational education or about stopping objectifying people as exotic "things" and as "others." Indeed, because of the somewhat superficial experiences it entails, it is likely in some ways to reinforce caricatures and stereotypes about other people that–at the societal level–may end up serving to justify further oppressive control, greater discrimination, or even bodily aggression against them, as Robb points out.

More constructive practices of dark tourism, on the other hand, promote a transformational type of educational experience in which the "tourist" turns towards "another as another," in the sense of the second epigraph of this essay, as a "particular and specific person to be addressed." Such a turning about and openness entails the mutuality and reciprocal dialogue of what Austrian-Israeli existential theologian Martin Buber called *Begegnung*, which means "meeting" or "encounter" (Buber 2010). Forms of this sort of encounter-style dark tourism allow for "learning" in a broader, more transformation sense than "information," as part of an immersion into a moment and place of community or communion.

Erick has traveled somewhat extensively around the city and state of Rio de Janeiro and even throughout Brazil, mostly as a semi-professional street ball and soccer player and a member of the Sonho de Um a Noite de Verão ballroom dance troupe.

[3] Voluntourism"–in which travellers blend social justice and environmental activism with more conventional, entertainment-driven forms of tourism–has become increasingly popular in Latin America over the past two decades or so (see Fogarty 2009).

Buber's relational philosophy revolves around what he describes as the twofold attitudes of human beings toward the world around them. We embrace one side of this, which he denotes as "I and it," when we engage other people and the world as "others," "objects," "phenomena," or "things." We embrace the other side, which he calls "I and Thou," when we turn towards the other people and the world around us as "another," in encounters of mutuality and exchange. The first entails an organizational posture concerning the connections between objects and the second a relational one concerning relations between persons. For Buber, every "I and Thou" relationship opens up a window giving a miniature glimpse of the ultimate *Thou* of God, even encounters with animals, trees, or a mere "heap of stones" (Hodes 1972:42).

One of the aspects of his thought that makes Buber's notion of encounter so readily applicable to questions of dark tourism is the emphasis he places on dialogue. He understands dialogue not so much in the sense of the dialectical reasoning process of the Socratic method but more in the sense of the immersion in community and communion it made possible among participants (Hodes 1972:72). He argues that "genuine dialogue"–as opposed to "technical dialogue" or "monologue" posing as dialogue–involves a "turning towards the other" that brings "encounter," or *Begegnung*, or into existence as a real, inter-subjective space of the "in between" (Buber 2010: 102-103).[4]

At the core of Buber's understanding of dialogue is a fundamental distinction very much in step with the tensions Robb observes between destructive forms of dark tourism and constructive ones. For Buber, dialogue is not so much a question of "content," in the sense of something that could be acquired as experience, information, argument, or consciousness-raising, as it is one of "presence," in the sense of people coming together in the present moment of the here and now–in openness to one another and the world around them. At the heart of his formulation is an emphatic rejection of the rationalistic epistemology so prevalent in Western thought (especially since the Enlightenment) in favor of a more mystical and holistic understanding of knowledge. As part and parcel of his assertion that, "All real living is meeting," Buber argues that the power, knowledge, and life we find in encounters is not the result of agency–or through seeking and acquiring things like information, experience, adventure, or entertainment–but rather through what he terms as "grace," as a thing freely given that we accept and receive (11). With this in mind, Buber writes,

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[4] In some ways, Buber's vision of dialogue is similar to that espoused by Paulo Freire in *Pedagogia do Oprimido*, Freire's seminal manifesto of popular education, especially for the emphasis Freire places on the role of community, love, faith, and humility in dialogue (Freire:92-94). On the other hand, whereas Freire links dialogue to conceptual and analytical processes like the "reflection" and "convincing" necessary for revolutionary consciousness-raising (Freire:58-64), Buber's notion of dialogue is less goal-oriented and more existential, as explained below.

> The relation to the Thou is direct. No system of ideas, no foreknowledge, and no fancy intervene between I and Thou… No aim, no lust, and no anticipation intervene between I and Thou. Desire itself is transformed as it plunges out of its dream into the appearance. Every means is an obstacle. Only when every means has collapsed does the meeting come about" (11-12).

His emphasis on receiving and presence over the seeking and mastery of content loosens up the apparent rigidity of Buber's dualism. Encounter is never perfect but is a question of degree, just as it is not permanent but only a momentary reprieve from objectification and "false" encounter. This means that even when people engage in dark tourism–or any other potential encounter–in ways that are mostly superficial there exists the possibility that they will come around and meet those around them more as persons and less as objects.[5]

My aim in this essay is to make connections between these two modes of dark tourism and other pursuits that can be seen as having "dark" dimensions in similar ways. Just as dark tourism is fraught with ethical and epistemological tensions that can be characterized in terms of the differences between infotainment and encounter, so too can things like "dark journalism," "dark ethnography," "dark research," "dark social activism," "dark artistic expression," and "dark education" more generally. In a sense, any of these endeavors can become a form of "dark infotainment" through which an individual objectifies people as "others" and "things," inadvertently reinforcing the very violence they are intended to combat. By the same token, however, such endeavors can become "dark encounters," in the sense of Buber's Begegnung, through which a person turns towards another in community.

To consider such tensions here, I will frame my comments as something of an auto-ethnographic reflection on my own trajectory as a bit of an accidental "dark" tourist–in my involvement with journalism, ethnography, and community activism undertaken to address issues of violence and social exclusion–whether in directly living and working in Rocinha or through indirect participation in such activities through other educational and civic avenues. As an example of the tensions I have personally wrestled with between infotainment and encounter in the exploration of violence, I will discuss my involvement in a journalistic project to cover the recent pacification of the favela of Rocinha late last year in a massive joint police and military occupation of the favela called *Operação Choque de Paz*, or "Operation Peace Shock."

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[5] In an online reflection, musicologist and founder of MusicUnitesUs Judith Eissenberg explores the difficulties experienced by non-initiates in entering in "encounters" (in Buber's sense of "I and "Thou") at a performance of Brazilian *candomblé* music held at Brandeis University. She arrives at a position that, like Buber's, understands the encounter as a question of degrees rather than an absolute. She writes, "How do we go about this when our very ways of processing, transmitting, taking in knowledge seems to be so different, one 'of the hand,' the other of the mind? Clearly, for this dialogue to take place, the I and the Thou must each be willing to learn a little of the other's way" (Eissenberg).

The pacification of Rocinha

Near four thirty in the morning on November 13th, 2011, eighteen armored assault vehicles rolled up the streets of Rocinha–the largest and perhaps best known of Rio's favelas; with them two armored helicopters patrolled the skies. Accompanied by the city's highly controversial urban tactical unit, the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE), and a total of some 3,000 police and military personnel, these vehicles were part of the Operação Choque de Paz, initiated to claim governmental control of the Rocinha after decades of the rule of drug gangs in the community (Araújo 2011).

After government sources announced the tentative schedule for the operation earlier that month, Rocinha kingpin Nem (whose legal name is Antônio Francisco Bonfim Lopes) fled the favela and was arrested in the middle-class enclave of Lagoa in the trunk of his lawyer's car. His lawyer's attempts to pay off the arresting officers, who were members of the BOPE, were unsuccessful (Leite and Mendes 2011). Nem had been at the head of the Rocinha gang since 2005 and was considered one the principal leaders of one of Rio's most powerful criminal factions, the Amigos dos Amigos (ADA), or "Friends of the Friends" (Aquino 2011b). Rocinha, widely considered the crown jewel in the Rio drug trade, due to its location amidst some of Rio's richest beachfront neighborhoods, was the 19th of the city's over 900 favelas to be "pacified" since the program was initiated in 2008–as the city prepares to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics (Romo 2011). Unlike operations in many of the other pacified favelas, the local drug gang did not resist; not a shot was fired and no one was injured.

Operation Peace Shock was the opening phase of the implementation in Rocinha of an ambitious new mode of community policing initiated in 2008 in the favela of Dona Marta, located nearby in the middle-class neighborhood of Botafogo ("Operação" 2011). Until recently, the policing of favelas consisted mostly in an unending series of military-style invasions carried out to arrest or kill criminals and apprehend drugs, weapons, and other property–not infrequently resulting in casualties among innocent residents (Soares, Batista, and Pimentel 2006). When these short-term operations were over, the police would leave the favela, allowing the drug traffickers to regroup or for new ones to take over (Arias 2006; Penglasse 2008). Just as commonly, the policing of favelas was left to extralegal and even illegal means, either through the drug traffickers themselves or paramilitary groups who often assumed patronage of their local populations (Zaluar and Siqueira Coneição 2007).

While the initial phase of the new model of policing may look similar to the in-and-out approach of former days, the difference is in maintaining a permanent police presence in the favelas at local police stations known as *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPPs), or "Pacifying Police Units." These new installations are promoted as constituting a radical departure from the old system through a two-prong approach. First, law enforcement is carried out by scores of community beat cops, many of whom are women, selected largely from

the ranks of new recruits presumably not yet implicated in the tangles of police corruption and brutality considered endemic among Rio's police. Second, the UPPs are community centers offering a comprehensive range of government sponsored social services (Aquino 2011b).

From my current residence here in the United States, I followed these events as best I could before, during, and after Operation Peace Shock, through both news accounts and contact with friends in Rocinha and around Rio alike. Like many people living in the favela with whom I spoke, I was fearful that the operation would bring casualties, especially if the members of the favela's powerful gang were to resist, as had gangs in other pacified favelas, or if the police and military exhibited the brutality of former days. Even if there were no gun battles, I was afraid there might be abuses and humiliating acts practiced against my friends and neighbors from around the favela, young and old–people who had been my students and teachers and who had offered Rocinha to me as my home throughout the years I lived there. Would the name Operation Peace Shock prove to be just a euphemism for an oppressive action that would deal out more dehumanizing violence against the poor residents of Rocinha? Or did it represent some more genuine commitment on the part of mainstream Brazilian society to extend social inclusion to the poor? In the long term, I was concerned pacification would bring about gentrification. Moreover, even if a UPP were successfully installed and the outside formal society was to gain control of the favela, how would this effect the sense of community its residents have built up from within?

After Rocinha's initial pacification, the operation suffered some major setbacks and the inauguration of its UPP, the 28th in the city, was pushed back until September 2012–almost a year after Operação Choque de Paz. In the early months of the pacification police reported uncovering new stores of firearms and illegal drugs in the community and a resurgence of gang-related shootouts left at least thirteen people dead, including a police officer from the BOPE ("Policial do Batalhão de Choque É Morto após Troca de Tiros na Rocinha" 2012). Also, on March 26th, one of the Rocinha's political leaders was gunned down in the street in broad daylight. Vanderlan Barros de Oliveira, known as *Feijão*, or "Beans," president of one of Rocinha's three neighbors associations (Associação de Moradores e Amigos do Bairro de Barcelos, or AMAB), had been suspected of money laundering ties with the favela's ousted gang leader, Nem ("Presidente de Associação de Moradores da Rocinha É Morto" 2012). International SOS Medical Alerts and Travel Security reported that favela tours were suspended and warned against visiting Rocinha (International 2012). Then just days before the UPP was officially inaugurated, another police officer who was working with the UPP was shot to death (Carvalho 2012).

Despite such difficulties, the majority of favela residents in both pacified and non-pacified areas continue to hold a generally favorable view of the UPPs, with some polls rating them at 92% and 77% approval respectively (Vasconcellos 2010). José Mariano Beltrame, the Secretary of Security for the State of Rio de Janeiro and principal architect of the program, has enjoyed popularity across

class lines (Aquino 2011b). Still, activists and advocacy groups from Rocinha and around Rio are critical of the UPPs on several fronts. Marcelo Freixo, a state representative from the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) and one of the best-known critics of the program, has claimed that the UPPs are a cosmetic cure designed more to protect the city's image during the upcoming FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016 (Freixo n.d.). Another well-known public figure opposed to the UPPs is MC Leonardo (Leonardo Pereira Mota), who points to the negative impact of pacification is having on the sense of community in the favelas and on popular cultural practices there, such as Rocinha's once vibrant *baile funk* music scene. Himself a pioneer Rio's electronic of *baile* funk music, a Rocinha native, and co-founder of the highly politicized Associação de Profissionais e Amigos do Funk (APAFUNK), MC Leonardo has denounced pacification, saying, "I haven't seen anything as shameful as the UPPs since the military government in Brazil. Peace is a feeling, you cannot impose it on people" (McCoughlin 2012).

Others, too, have voiced concerns over the specific methods of the UPPs' implementation. According to the website of the non-profit community health group Mundo Real, the success of the UPPs will be impossible until a culture of accountability can be installed in the Rio police forces (Mundo Real 2012). In an editorial in the New York Times published as part of a discussion of the challenges presented Rio's upcoming Olympic Games, Brazilian urban planner and activist Theresa Williamson (director of the Comunidades Catalisadoras non-profit organization) warned against the threat that pacification could lead to gentrification if it focuses too much on security and not enough on integration policies (Williamson 2012b), which she lists in a more complete version of her argument published by the online community news service *Rio On Watch*,

> **Integration policies include** education, job training and access, health care, sanitation, public spaces, housing materials, formalization of businesses, payment for services, and definitive land title, all of which are required to integrate these communities into the formal city—and they should be implemented in that approximate order so as to allow time for improvements in income which will allow residents to pay for services and remain where they are (Williamson 2012a).

With twenty or so more favelas scheduled to receive UPPs in the near future, the pacification program will continue at the center of debates about citizenship and social violence in Rio de Janeiro and throughout Brazil for a long time to come.

Backstory

Brazil and Rio specifically have gained much notoriety over the past thirty years or so as places of police and gang violence. More recently, this image has been reinforced by the international success of films like *City of God* (Meirelles and Lund, 2002), *Bus 174* (Padilha, 2002), *Carandiru* (Babenco, 2003), and *Elite Squad* (Padilha, 2007). Rocinha's position in the wealthy Zona Sul and its history of intense gang violence have become somewhat emblematic of the lamentably wide gap between the haves and have-nots in the country. So it was no surprise that Operação Choque de Paz generated a blitz of media coverage around the world.[6]

The day after the police occupied Rocinha, I received a call at my university in the United States from a friend named Jake at a major American cable television news network, TVN, or Television News.[7] We had met two or so years earlier when he produced a piece about projects to build community in Rocinha that had featured our small educational and outreach center, along with a judo school and a hang gliding program. Even though Jake didn't speak Portuguese and had spent little time in Brazil–and had never visited Rocinha–he had always impressed me greatly with his ability to eschew sensationalist tones and to instead represent everyday people like the residents of Rocinha in an intimate, down-to-earth style. Jake was troubled by what he saw as somewhat trivializing and exploitive character of the media coverage he had seen about the Rocinha and Operation Peace Shock from other new sources. In his view, coverage had almost invariably focused more on the armored helicopters, tanks, and black-ops police troopers–along with the firepower of Rocinha's notorious drug gang–than on what ordinary residents thought and felt.

When he sent me the link for *City of God, Guns and Gangs*, a documentary about the UPP program and previous favela pacifications, I understood what he meant. Despite being thoroughly documented and very successful in communicating the challenges of the UPP program from a sociological point of view, the coverage is presented in an adventurous tone that constantly pushes the dangerousness and underlying violence of the theme to the forefront. In the film, which was the fourth episode of season five of the *Vanguard* series on Current TV, Portuguese journalist Mariana van Zeller can be seen wearing a combat helmet as she accompanies the police on an operation; she also interviews drug addicts and gang members, dedicating relatively little space to "civilian" community leaders or everyday favela residents. Although the video is in English, van Zeller speaks to local people in her Continental Portuguese

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[6] A quick survey of the Internet on the days leading up to and following the Rocinha pacification operation turns up an abundance of news sources, such as the following in English, Spanish, and French (see "Con un Megaoperativo Recuperan la Favela Más Grande de Río de Janeiro" 2011, "La Police Prend Contrôle de la Plus Grande Favela du Brésil" 2011, Romo 2011, Scruggs 2011).

[7] I use many pseudonyms throughout this essay in order to protect the anonymity of the friends and contacts involved in the episode recounted here, especially anyone identifiable with the news story and the non-profit educational and outreach center.

throughout, never positioning herself for English speaking audiences as a foreigner in Brazil or as a person from a different social class from favela residents. Her lack of "coming clean" works to deemphasize her distance from the subject and to cast her as an insider and legitimate "guide."

Even the description of the *Vanguard* series on their website bills the series in terms that smack of dark tourism,

> *Vanguard* is a no-limits documentary series whose award-winning journalists put themselves in extraordinary situations to immerse viewers in global issues that have a large social significance. Unlike sound-bite driven reporting, the show's correspondents, Adam Yamaguchi, Christof Putzel, and Mariana van Zeller, serve as trusted guides who take viewers on in-depth real life adventures in pursuit of some of the world's most important stories (Current TV 2012).

In emphasizing that the reporters place themselves in harm's way in "extraordinary situations," while taking viewers on "real life adventures," Vanguard runs the risk of getting away from the hard journalism it touts and falling into infotainment. In limiting itself to "guns" and "gangs," and evoking the ultra-violent feature film *City of God*–itself often criticized for commercializing the violence of Rio's favelas in sensationalist tones–the title of the episode itself moves things even further in this direction.[8]

In the wake of such entertaining media coverage of Operation Peace Shock, Jake wanted to put together a television news segment for the daily news show he worked on, *Details*. It would present the story of Rocinha's pacification in an up close and personal tone more conducive to the viewer engaging the residents of Rio's favelas in a spirit of "encounter" over "infotainment." Jake's idea was to focus less on police and gangs and more on what everyday people of in community were thinking and feeling.

He asked me if I would be interested in helping get someone to film interviews around the favela, reminding me that with TV news things would need to move very quickly. Excited at the proposition of helping make the voices of everyday people a bigger part of the story–and at the opportunity to work with such a prestigious television network and hopefully help get word out about our non-profit center–I gladly came on board. Over the next several hours, I used Skype, email, and the telephone to contact and coordinate a small group of volunteers in and around our non-profit educational and outreach center–including both Rocinha residents and outside researchers/community activists–and enlist their help in setting up a series of interviews throughout the favela.

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[8] Film critics Marta Peixoto (2007) and Ivana Bentes (2003) have argued that *City of God* and many other recent films about poor people and favelas in Brazil have been limited in their ability to raise awareness about social exclusion by their entertaining qualities.

Community interviews

My main contact for filming the interviews was Chema Vidal, an old friend I met in Rio in 1998 when he first went to Brazil from Barcelona seeking employment as a cameraman. That year, Chema moved to Rocinha as my roommate in Rocinha. Over the next several months he spent hours upon hours in Rocinha helping me get our little educational and outreach center off the ground with Cleonice Gonçalves, Lucinda Santos, and Patrícia Cliliano, the organization's other co-founders. Now, 13 years later, on the heels of Rocinha's momentous pacification, Chema was a Ph.D. student in Luso-Hispanic Literary and Visual Studies at an Ivy League school. He happened to be back in Rio across town conducting research for this thesis and was more than happy to help with the TVN news segments. Another friend who agreed to help Chema was Patrick Perez, an American PhD. student in Sociology at the City University of New York (CUNY) who had been living in Rocinha for many years as he worked towards his degree. Patrick was co-founder and director of another small NGO in the favela that worked with healthcare. He offered to accompany Chema in getting around Rocinha to film the interviews and to introduce him to local social activists and community leaders to get their take on things.

Chema and Patrick's first stop in Rocinha was the small private day school where our non-profit currently conducts its programs, owned by co-founder Patrícia, whom I had contacted to schedule an interview. The school, called Escola Cebolinha, after "Little Onion," a cartoon character from the Mônica comics, is located just off the Largo do Boiadeiro, a small plaza at the foot of Rocinha that is one of the busiest areas of the favela. It occupies the first two floors of a house, with another two floors of residential space above it. Its four classrooms, kitchen, storage room, and single bathroom are kept very tidy; the classrooms are brightly painted and have various cartoon characters on the walls, along with large green blackboards and the sorts of children's artwork on clothespins and whatnot typical of many daycare/child development centers anywhere. At the time of pacification, the Escola Cebolinha was doing better than ever, with over 100 students, ranging from two to six years old, as well as several teachers and assistants.

Chema and Patrick recorded interviews with Patrícia, her niece, Thaís, and one of her teaching assistants, Rosie. Patrícia's brother-in-law, Jackson, who is a volunteer at our NGO, also came over to meet with Chema and Patrick. Like almost all the people the two interviewed, these folks were solidly optimistic about the Rocinha pacification. Unfortunately, after experiencing some difficulties with his camcorder equipment and the low lighting in the school, the only segment Chema could upload to the TVN site was a brief statement made by Patrícia.

Patrícia Cliliano, who is in her early forties, was born and raised in Rocinha after her parents moved there from the northeastern state of Ceará in the sixties. As a young woman, she graduated from high school with a certification in teaching. After involvement in a series of government run schools and NGOs,

she joined her childhood best friend, Cleonice Gonçalves, in the mid-90s as a partner in the Escola Cebolinha. In 1998, as a means of starting up our NGO, Patrícia and Cleonice suggested we hold our activities at their school in the evenings and on weekends when it was not in use. Eventually, Patrícia assumed sole control of the Escola Cebolinha, after Cleonice had kids and decided to sell her share and also to leave the NGO.

Three years ago, Patrícia graduated from the UNITINS (Fundação Universidade do Tocantins), after completing the requirements for an online/distance learning degree in Education, with hopes of continuing her studies at the Master's level. Besides being a former director of our NGO in Rocinha and its current Field Coordinator in the favela, Patrícia (who is single) is also very involved her Pentecostal church, the Igreja Missionária Evangélica Maranata, located in Copacabana. She is deeply committed to her teaching and community activism and is an effective boss at her school. Even so, she is somewhat shy publicly and not too keen on things like media appearances–as is somewhat evident in her (42 second) spot with Chema,

> We're at the Escola Cebolinha. Today, as a matter of fact, there are few children because of the pacification, right? And the mothers are still afraid to send their kids to school. We are waiting for things to calm down so the children can return to school safely. (pause) What do I think of the pacification? I think the pacification is very important at this time here in our community because as far as I'm concerned it's going to help a lot. There will be improvements in water supply, electricity, sewage, sanitation. It's really going to help our community a lot. Anything else?[9]

Despite her enthusiasm for the pacification, sadly it has brought about some difficult circumstances for Patrícia–at least in the short-term. In the months since Operation Peace Shock, the Escola Cebolinha has lost most of its students to new government-run schools that have been started up as part of the program's social angle, currently having less than 30. Patrícia has been forced to let go of all but one of her teachers and is currently keeping the school running on a shoestring with no take home pay of her own. Even so, she remains optimistic that in the long run her situation will improve and that the new situation will prove beneficial to Rocinha residents (Patrícia Cliliano, pers. comm.)

Chema and Patrick's next stop after leaving the Escola Cebolinha was the PizzaHot restaurant, one of the busiest in Rocinha, where they spoke with local businessman Gabriel Soares de Almeida, known around the favela as Gabriel da PizzaHot. The restaurant is located on the corner of the busiest intersections in the whole favela, open along its entire front side in the way of sidewalk cafés. In

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[9] This and all other translations appearing in this article are my own.

the early days of our NGO, Gabriel had opened up his office to us for the use of our non-profit organization in a back room of the restaurant, where we were able to set up a desk with a computer and telephone. When Chema and Patrick stopped by that day, Gabriel–who is married with two kids and in his late forties–was only too glad to see them and to have a chance to share his thoughts and feelings about Operation Peace Shock.

In the segment, which is roughly four minutes long, Gabriel can be seen leaning against the front counter that separates the main dining area from the kitchen. But with no external mike, the camera can't pick up his voice very well over the din of the traffic and his initial exchange with Chema is too muddled to make out (in fact, such difficulties ultimately made it impossible to use in the TVN video). It clears up a bit as Gabriel straightens his posture and introduces himself as a business owner who was the first to bring residential food delivery to Rocinha. Born in the Northeast, he says, he's lived in Rocinha since he was a small child. Throughout these four odd decades, the government has been essentially absent from Rocinha, he says, especially in terms of things like healthcare and law enforcement. Pacification, he suggests, represents a fundamental act of social inclusion in which the government has annexed a territory that had been left to operate separately and under its own rules all these many years.[10] Gabriel sees this gesture of social inclusion as an extension of the new, wealthier Brazil of the Lula era, which has a stronger middle-class and a new societal standard no longer compatible with the rule of criminal factions. After so long living on a sort of "island," he says, the residents of Rocinha are extremely hopeful about the new UPP and the improvements in social relationships it represents. Gabriel closes out the segment with a smile and a warm thank you to the viewers for their attention.

Towards the end of the day, Chema filmed a spot with someone much less enthusiastic about the pacification than the other folks interviewed. He and Patrick decided to stop by the house of Jurandir da Silva, or "Pai" Jurandir, as he is often known ("Father" Jurandir), an Afro-Brazilian man in his mid-fifties who came to Rio from Salvador, Bahia when he was four. Jurandir is a priest of *candomblé* whose house doubles as a *terreiro*, or place where sessions of the Afro-Brazilian animist religion are practiced. He serves Xangô, the *orixá* spirit of thunder and justice who possesses him spiritually in the elaborate sessions of percussion, song, and dance put on by Jurandir and the other faithful.

Jurandir is a kindhearted, generous person, with a rich, deep voice for singing his favorite samba songs; a voice a bit like fellow Bahian and timeless *sambista* Dorival Caymmi. Besides singing, in his younger days Jurnadir loved to dance and playfully wander the streets of the city during Carnival dressed in what he called his *bundão*, or "big butt." That was how he described his outfit: a black wig and a short, flower-covered cotton dress with a pillow tucked under the seat.

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[10] These were the "rules" of the drug traffickers, who since the 80s have extended the culture and code of conduct of the city's prison gangs into its favelas (see Penglase 2008).

Jurandir is also an excellent cook of Brazilian food, especially Bahian food and the food of the Cariocas, as Rio natives are called. In fact, he was so good in the kitchen that he worked for years as the cook for his close friend, the famous samba singer Elza Soares.

Back in the late 90s and early 2000s when Chema and I lived down the alley from his house, Jurandir lived with his best friend, the much younger Roberto. A shoe salesman born and raised in Rocinha, Roberto was brought up by his mother in *umbanda*, a syncretic faith blending African religions with Catholicism, and the Spiritism of Allan Kardec. In the days he lived with Jurandir, Roberto became an *ogan* of candomblé (a priest who does not fall into trance or receive spirits during the sessions) who played percussion in Jurandir's sessions.

Chema and I both knew them both well; we had spent a great deal of time with Jurandir in his home, which was small but bustling with social activity. The two liked making coffee for us and offering us plates of Jurandir's delicious cooking. Often, as either Chema or I came back home in the middle of the night, we would stop off at their window in the alley leading to our house, where Roberto or Jurandir would chat with us from their living room couch, frequently luring us in to watch TV for hours while they smoked and made coffee. They also used to hold cookouts in the cramped alleyway outside their front door. Every few months, Roberto helped Jurandir put on elaborate sessions of candomblé, to which we were always invited and made to feel welcome, despite the fact that we were not initiates.

The two friends had a dog named Fly–a skinny, female half sheepdog who was quick and communicative (although she rarely resorted to barking). During the candomblé sessions, I remember her peering out from her place under a plastic lawn chair by Roberto's feet as he played his percussion, excited by the crowd of drummers, dancers, *ekede* attendants, and people of all ages from around the community who were jammed into the small house. I can still see Fly raising her head from her front paws and wagging her tail as Jurandir passes by, twirling to the beat of the drums in the thick of a session, adorned in the white robes and headgear of Xangô, his aluminum two-headed ceremonial axe in hand, his eyes nearly closed. To me, Fly embodied the spirit of the magical, in-between space that comes to be in candomblé gatherings in which an everyday home is transformed into a temple and where the mundane and the domestic co-exist with spiritual ecstasy and release. For Fly, one moment or the other always seemed to be more about the gathering and the people she loved than anything else.

As for Jurandir, his affinity with Xangô is perhaps no coincidence, since even when he is not "possessed" by the orixá, associated with thunder and justice, the man himself embodies a stormy spirit of righteousness. He is a "tell it like it is"-type person who's not afraid to speak his mind. He's also very sensitive to the hidden motives of those around him and quite cynical of the police and government in particular. People who knew him back in the day say that in his youth Jurandir was brawler, or *brigão*; I've heard stories about him getting into

more than a few physical altercations back then, even with a PM, or officer of the Military Police. Nowadays, legally blind and older, he is more of a homebody. His somewhat poor health notwithstanding, a great many people from Rocinha and other parts of the city still visit him each week, seeking spiritual guidance and support.

On the evening of the interview, Jurandir heated up plates of food for his visitors and offered them bottled beer, coffee, or water. Sitting in a little white, plastic chair in his living room, glass plate and fork in hand, he spoke candidly for the camera about his reluctance regarding the pacification.

In the opening of the clip Chema sent, Patrick is talking to Jurandir about the ways room rentals had gone up in the previously pacified favelas of Santa Marta (in Botafogo) and Cantagalo (in Ipanema) from R$200 a month to R$800. People had been forced out and another social class had moved in, Patrick says, to which Jurandir responds,

> But that's what I'm saying… Their desire, their ambition, is this land here, this piece of land. Do you think they're satisfied that, besides everything, besides the fact that this is a favela, that it gives poor people a place to live, it also takes away some of their revenue? Look, the property taxes around here are some of the city's highest, the property taxes down in São Conrado, but because of Rocinha they have to reduce them. Everyone knows that. They have to reduce them. So, what happens? Here we are applauding the service of the State, of the police, right? And our country. For law and order. But this law and order is going to cost us a great deal down the line. I'm 60, I'll be 60 soon. Maybe tomorrow I won't be around to tell the story or to see what happens, you know? But that's usually how things go.

> I have nothing to say against the drug traffickers, against this or that… You know why? I've never been held up, they've never killed anyone from my family, I've never been involved in any way, never smoked drugs, never did lines or anything, so I don't have any reason to complain or to say if it was good or bad. I've always been a stand up person, always fought hard and worked to live, to survive, see? I never relied on any of that, not the police, not the drug dealers, or anybody else, you know? I've always followed my path with my head held high with no problem. I don't rely on them.

> Right now, I see a lot of things. I see a lot of things. See, I pray to God the police come in here differently than the way they came into to other communities. At least the way people say they came in–I never saw anything personally so I can't really accuse them for sure. But I pray to God the police don't come in here doing what they've done in other favelas, stealing things from poor people, taking their personal belongings.

> I've been shaken down by the police before. I have. But since people asked me afterwards… people asked me to let it alone, I dropped the matter, you know? I went to meet a guy in São Conrado. I bought an entertainment center stand, and the guy bringing it didn't know his way around Rocinha. So I went to São Conrado to wait for him, there in São Conrado's little plaza. He came over from Tijuca. As we were coming into Rocinha a Policeman stopped him, so he… we all

got out of the car, me, him, and the driver. So the PM stopped him, he came over and all, and he ended up asking for money. The guy didn't have any money and he came over to ask me if I had any. I said, "I refuse to give this cop money!" He said, "No, no, no! Give me some and later the boss will set things straight." And I ended up giving R$20 to a… to a policeman. I mean, the policeman, who's supposed to uphold the law… my guy was totally clean: there was nothing wrong with the car, he had all his documents, he had everything, and the policeman shook the guy down. (Man passes in the alleyway outside Almir's window, "Hey, Almir!" Almir answers, "Hi!") You know what I mean?

So, that's what I'm talking about. Let's pray to God that all this works out and that it's good for poor people, because you know it's going to be good for the rich people either way, right?

Chema and Patrick lingered a while longer at Jurandir's house as they finished up their food and drink. When they finally thanked him for his hospitality and help with the piece and headed out, night had fallen.

Production and airing

By the end of the next day, Chema had uploaded several videos to Jake's TVN site for editing. Jake put the interviews of Patrícia, Gabriel, and Jurandir on YouTube so I could transcribe and translate them for the read overs. He told us his team at TVN wanted to do two segments: the first, which was to be about the pacification, would include footage from the interviews with the residents; the second would be about the other side of Rocinha, in the wealth of culture and community to be found there, and would include footage from an interview with me. Any further material that could not be worked into these two segments could be posted on TVN.com as a podcast, he said. Jake's team wanted Bela Boyd–the anchor of *Details* who had been very supportive of the project from the start–to personally interview me. Since she needed to leave the studio on travel, however, it would push back our airdate. This was actually a good thing, Jake remarked, since it gave us a bit more time to work on this than was originally planned.

At that point, I was generally confident that our experiment in community collaboration was going to yield some results considerably more humanizing than the original stories that broke in the media at the time of Operation Peace Shock and the adventurous *City of God, Guns, and Gangs* documentary mentioned above. Even so, I had second thoughts about personally appearing in one of the segments. It seemed to me that it would be better just to focus on the folks we had interviewed, who were not only eyewitnesses but also permanent residents of Rocinha. Though Jake didn't disagree, he pointed out that it would be helpful, too, to have an English speaker involved and someone representative of the scene of social activists and researchers; such a person would serve as a sort of mediator connecting wider audiences to the life in the favela.

Jake's team at TVN was trying to contact another American academic and activist or two who lived in Rio but who were out of town. I thought that made better sense than interviewing me, but when he told me their names I changed my mind. I told him that I had the deepest amount of respect for all of them as activists, but that none had ever lived in any of Rio's favelas, much less Rocinha. Why didn't he use the bit Chema filmed with Patrick Perez, I suggested (although I had never had a chance to view it), or set up a one on one interview with Patrick over Skype, since his presence in the piece would fit in with TVN's desire to include an English-speaking activist without moving things too far away from the actual community. The team would consider such an option, Jake replied, but it was more likely I would be chosen if his other American contacts living in Rio fell through. Eventually, I agreed to the interview with Bela Boyd for *Details*, which she conducted with me via Skype. I was nervous, but she put me at ease. We talked for nearly 20 minutes about the rich culture and community of Rocinha and she asked smart questions about religious groups and burgeoning scene of non-profit organizations. The following evening Jake called me, exited for me to see the finished segments, which had aired on that day's show and which he had sent as links via email.

Interview Segment

The first link he sent me was to the segment about community and culture in Rocinha, which was basically an interview with me with some additional live action images of children and other residents of Rocinha going about their lives. Considering how nervous I was at the time of taping, Jake had done a good job as an editor to keep me from sounding too tongue-tied. From my conversations with Jake, I had a notion of just how significant it was for TVN to pull off a piece that focused less on gangs and guns and more on community and culture, and that promoted education (one of the banners that flashes across the bottom of the screen suggests that viewers interested in supporting educational projects there visit the website for our NGO). His show's anchor, Bela Boyd, likewise deserved much credit for pushing for the piece, as well, as did the field reporter who worked on it, Fresca Durham, and indeed Jake's whole team.

Still, upon viewing the piece, I noticed that much of what I am shown saying for the three minutes and 38 seconds of the edited version of the interview is about the gang. The sound bites were focused less on relationships and people and more on "things" like the physical structure of the favela, its size and population density, the weapons members of the drug gang had carried around the streets, and the prison code rule of law they had kept in the community during the many years of their rule there. This didn't leave much room for mention of the other residents or their intelligence, creativity, spirituality, and wisdom–or the sense of community that pervaded the favela. It occurred to me that I must not have been emphatic enough about the love and humanity of the people of Rocinha. In fact, I felt a bit foolish for having mentioned the drug traffickers at all. Additionally, there were no credits included that would give people an idea of

the responsiveness of our field team and the receptivity of people in Rocinha to help put the piece together, attitudes that for me were testimony of the sort of community spirit we were trying to portray in the piece.

Pacification Segment

The pacification segment, which aired first on TVN, is much shorter (one minute and 49 seconds). Considering the short length of the segment, Jake and his team actually packed in a large amount of information about Rio's pacification program and Operation Peace Shock in Rocinha. Despite the abundance of images of police and military personnel and their assault vehicles, the segment does a better job than the bulk of media coverage by including sound bites from local residents–first Jurandir, then Patrícia. The entertainment factor is toned down as well. Instead of wearing a combat helmet and joining police on an operation, Fresca Durham, the reporter to which the piece was credited, dons a motorcycle helmet and takes a motorcycle taxi ride around Rocinha to take in the mood of the favela.

Even so, the narrative and B reel focus on relatively stereotypical images of favelas like the heaps of trash strewn about the favela and the tangles of electrical wires running overhead. At one point, Fresca Durham describes Rocinha as a place of "poverty living in dark alleys." In fact, since neither my friends in Rocinha nor I had been informed that TVN had an official reporter on location working on the same story, I was tremendously surprised to see Fresca in the piece at all. As it turned out, she was the network's new correspondent in Rio who had scooped the story and filmed it on her own. In any case, it seemed odd to me to have my friends spring into action in this way only to find their work inserted into the story of another person they'd never even heard of, especially since once again no credits were attached to the piece.[11]

The inclusion of sound bites from Jurandir and Patrícia, although quite short, certainly helped shift the emphasis to everyday people. Jurandir, who comes first, is merely quoted saying, "I pray to God the police don't come in here doing what they've done in other favelas, stealing things from poor people, taking their personal belongings." The scene cuts to Patrícia, who says, "I think the pacification is very important at this time here in our community because as far as I'm concerned it's going to help a lot. There will be improvements in water supply, electricity, sewage, sanitation." Besides their brevity, the effectiveness of these shots is further limited by their inclusion as anonymous excerpts with no contextual information. Jake later explained to me that Jurandir and Patrícia had been added to the piece as shots of what is called MIS, or "man in the street."

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[11] Jake later wrote a detailed blurb for the *Details* website listing each person's role and thanking them for helping set up or participate in the interviews. At his and most other networks, it is not standard operating procedure to give credit to producers, cameramen, and the like as part of the actual story.

While I could see that including flash perspectives such as these could have its value, leaving the people closest to the story unnamed seemed to contradict the very goal that had inspired the story in the first place of giving greater voice to Rocinha residents. This omission was particularly unfortunate to me in light of the fact that my own name and title as a foreign university professor was so prominently displayed in the other piece and that I was given so much airtime. So when I finished viewing both segments, I wondered how effective we had been in offering a less infotainment-based perspective than productions like *City of God, Guns, and Gangs* and the others that had inspired our own journalistic project. In other words, I was not sure how much more "human" it had been or how much more of an "encounter" it had made possible.

In some ways, my dissatisfactions with the segments were the result of having had such a positive experience in my earlier collaboration with Jake in his video from the year before, the one about community building in Rocinha at the judo school, at the hang gliding program, and at our non-profit educational and outreach center. But that piece never aired on TV but was instead posted directly as a podcast on the network's webpage, allowing it to be much longer and softer, more like a documentary-style piece than a TV news article. Whereas the new segments together totaled only roughly five minutes, the earlier video had been nearly a half hour. Also, the earlier piece had no explicit narrator but was done using only "natural sound," allowing the people featured in it to speak much more for themselves. As we worked to make the pacification piece, I don't think I realized just how different it would be to produce the sort of rapid-fire segments typical of commercial television new programs like *Details*.

Dark Encounters

Looking back on the segments over one year after the pacification of Rocinha, it occurs to me that in attempting to blur the lines between commercial news and community-based reporting our journalistic experiment had embodied the tensions between destructive and constructive forms of dark tourism pointed to by Erika Robb. In her work, she describes spectacles of violence as a triangular performance between "victim," "perpetrator," and "witness," arguing that in destructive forms of dark tourism this "witness" becomes something more akin to a "voyeur" (2009:53) and points out that, "… combining commercialization with witnessing often results in the creation of spectacular, fantastic displays–displays unlikely to do justice to the pain of others" (54). It is in this sense that she warns of the potential violence that can result from overly sensationalistic and entertaining inroads into dark tourism.[12]

Though he does not directly engage tourism or entertainment, Martin Buber's notion of encounter offers a unique complement to Robb's formulation. When

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[12] Robb borrows this triangle of spectacles of violence from David Riches' formulations in *The Anthropology of Violence*, published in 1986.

we are able to meet the people around us in situations of violence in the relational spirit of Buber's encounters we blur the division separating perpetrators, victims, and witnesses. As we turn towards a victim as "another" we connect with the pain and suffering of that person in a personal way, rather than merely being titillated by it. In so doing, we gain greater awareness that violence against anyone is violence against us all (including the perpetrators of violence themselves). More than empathy towards others, pity, or mere tolerance, however, such connection entails an even deeper and fuller sense of unity and equality between persons, in community and love. In a similar way, in turning toward the perpetrators of violence as "another," we experience the violence in our own attitudes and actions–including the potential for destructive consequences of our "dark encounters"–and perceive more clearly the ways these can sustain violence socially.

My dissatisfaction with the final TVN segments that aired stemmed from the limitations we faced in helping viewers turn towards the Rocinha residents portrayed less as exotic "others" and more as fully fleshed out human beings–as "another" and as persons. After they aired, I resolved to edit together a new independent segment that would embody encounter over infotainment to a fuller extent. I went to the media productions studio of my university in the United States, where a colleague and one of my students helped me recycle some of the uncut material filmed along the way and splice it together with additional footage shot by other students, colleagues, and Rocinha residents.

When this new 12-minute segment was ready, I posted it on our NGO's website and sent out the link to two or three other community organizations in Brazil. No doubt, it was much less readily visible and accessible than the TVN pieces. Almost certainly, this longer, independent version was not entirely successful in eschewing the shortcomings of the official news pieces, either, though at least it gave me a chance to highlight Jurandir's testimony nearly in its entirety and to more properly credit him by giving his name, as well as those of many others involved. It also enabled me to show Jurandir in the context of his leadership role in worship at a candomblé session.[13]

Looking back now, it occurs to me that just as our news segments embodied the tensions underlying dark tourism, so too does writing the present essay. In a very real sense it too is an act of dark tourism that is reaching for the encounter–for communion with another as another and not as an exotic object– however imperfectly. Indeed, long before I ever worked with TVN to put together the video news stories on Rocinha's pacification, my own experience as a foreign researcher/social activist and neighbor there had encapsulated many of the tensions between the potential superficiality and sensationalism of

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[13] The film, available online, is titled *Pacificação da Favela: Encontro com Pai Almir* (*Favela Pacification: Encounter with Father Almir*, 2012). The highest quality version is at: https://vimeo.com/50384580. I see it as something of a spin-off from two longer videos I produced called *Rocinha: Em Casa no Morrão* (*Rocinha: At Home on the Big Hill*, 2007) and *Atalhos e Encontros* (*Pathways and Encounters*, 2012), which are also available online.

information and entertainment, on the one hand, and the possibility of a more profoundly communal connection in encounter.

From the beginning, many of the motivations that led me to move to Rocinha in the first place as an independent researcher and exchange student in Rio in the early 90's were the same as those that attract the radical tourists and adventure volunteers of today (and as those of many potential viewers of more sensationalistic news videos and other films about favelas). If I am honest, the attraction I felt to life in the favela in those early days stemmed in part from my desire to see myself as someone who cared about people and social justice, as some sort of hardcore person with firsthand experience of violence who knew which way the wind blew, as they say, and as someone connected to causes bigger than myself. I suspect, too, that in some ways it was born out of my own frustrations with daily life in the United States, which only all too often seemed to me somewhat fragmented and plastic; it was as my experiences in Brazil would give me a psychological boost capable of lifting me out the sense of lifelessness and alienation that threatened to get a grip on me.

In another sense, my initial relationship with Rocinha was like that of a person with a romantic crush; I didn't really know Brazil, Rio, or Rocinha all that well yet, in of themselves, but I was fascinated and giddy with excitement at the *idea* I had of them. Just as is often the case with crushes, however, my fascination with Rocinha and the people I met there was at least as much about me as it was about them. Just think of the difference between the feeling of being "in love" with someone (which even a stalker can feel) and actually "loving" someone we truly know and are with, through the good and the bad.

To be fair to my younger self, I was also motivated by a genuine connection I felt with the many extraordinary and caring people I was meeting in and around Rocinha. I was glad to spend time with these people, who were constant reminders that some of the most important types of knowledge and power are not found inside the classroom or in books. Despite these flashes of real connection, though, my being in Rocinha wasn't nearly as selfless or altruistic as I thought and my solidarity did not run nearly so deep. To this day my own craving for "real life adventures" in "extraordinary situations" and my desire immerse myself along the front lines of globally significant realities–like the focus of Current TV discussed above– sometimes rears its head, somewhat hindering my ability to fully move beyond seeing others as objects and to begin meeting them in genuine community.

But if someone who is "crushing" has a chance to actually be in a relationship with the person he or she desires, of course, it can be possible to move beyond feeling "in love" and *knowing about* the person to truly *knowing* that person in real emotional intimacy. Over time many of my friends and neighbors in Rocinha freely opened their hearts and lives to me, by turning toward me as a person and accepting me, and by allowing me to treat them likewise. The fact that my circumstances in the favela were not limited to either research or social activism helped place me in a position to receive this love and fellowship: during my years in Rocinha I also attended a local 12 Step recovery group, went to

church, played capoeira, and worked out at a local gym, among other things. Working at the NGO and teaching were good places to start, but it was really in sharing daily life with my friends in these other spaces of encounters–in which I was generally not a teacher but instead a learner, or at least someone on equal footing with those around me–that I found myself being led beyond the boundaries of "content" and "experiences" into the "presence" of deeper community.

Ultimately, there is little difference between encounters in places of violence and encounters anywhere else. We do not have to be on a favela tour or visiting a Holocaust museum to turn away from people as exotic "others" or experience them as objects; this can happen in our relationships with friends, co-workers, teachers, and students, between parents and their children, in our most intimate sex and love relationships, and even in our spiritual lives. When this happens and we treat the people around as "things" for whatever reason, some small degree of violence creeps in that turns our relationships similarly "violent." If we allow ourselves, however, we can turn toward the world in community. This we can do as we walk alone in the woods, contemplate a work of art, read a scholarly essay, or watch a sports event on TV; we can also enter into encounter with others persons at a school or pizza place, or at a church or house of candomblé in a favela–in dialogue, reciprocity, mutuality, and community.

Acknowledgement

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Going local: Calls for local democracy and environmental governance at Jumbo Pass and the Tobeatic Wilderness Area

Mark C. J. Stoddart and Howard Ramos

Abstract

Social movement and world society literatures argue that activism is increasingly becoming transnational, if not global. However, recent literature on environmental governance and local citizenship argue otherwise. Instead, these literatures find that the 'local' is valorized. We examine the ways in which Canadian environmental movements make use of 'the local' as they mobilize against the Jumbo Glacier Resort development in British Columbia, and Off-Highway Vehicle Use in the Tobeatic Wilderness, Nova Scotia. Using data from interviews with core environmental activists, environmental organization websites, and content analysis of media coverage, we explore why activists seek local governance and use local tactics. These cases show that the appeal of the local is rooted in the scale of the environmental problem, perceived exclusion from environmental governance, and the potential for successful mobilization in the local context.

Introduction

Over the last few decades, notions of globalization, world society, and transnational relations have increasingly dominated the pages of sociology journals. These concepts have also driven the bulk of new research on social movements and contentious politics (della Porta 2005; della Porta et al. 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith and Wiest 2012). A recent search of the keyword combination 'social movement' and 'local,' versus 'social movement' and 'transnational' on SocIndex, a leading sociological search engine, showed that well over two times the number of articles retrieved mention social movement and transnational over social movement and local (see Appendix 1). Yet, when the same keywords were run on a Google search, the world's leading English language search engine, we find the opposite. In fact, we find that over five times the number of hits for local over transnational while also mentioning social movement. If the term global is used instead, the difference is much less stark but the term local still has more hits. Those familiar with the concerns of the Global Justice Movement (GJM) or of environmental movements would likely not be surprised by the popularity of the 'local' given that activists of both movements tend to valorize the concept and use it to promote alternatives to neoliberal forms of globalization (Adkin 2009; Park 2012). Their emphasis is often on consensus building as well as deliberative and participatory forms of local governance and democracy situated against policies imposed by national and international institutions that disregard the experiences and needs of

everyday people. Overall, these differences illustrate a disconnection between sociologists and the public at large, an observation echoed by Burawoy (2004).

The difference in focus is well documented by McAdam et al. (2005), who examined 1,000 Chicago-area protest events between 1970 and 2000, and found that social movement theory creates a distorted lens of everyday activism, which tends to be local in nature. Similarly, Andrews and Caren (2010) analyzed environmental organizations and environmental news coverage in North Carolina and found that localism works as a key criterion of social movement newsworthiness. They conclude that issues of concern and movement-media dynamics differ considerably between the national and local scales. They encourage researchers to move beyond analysing only prominent national organizations and media outlets to also consider the more numerous, and less exceptional, organizations and media that cater to municipal and state polities.

It is thus important for social movement scholars not to lose sight of local and small scale movements and to analyze why activists appeal to the local rather than national, transnational, or global scales. When movements 'go local' they operate in micro-political contexts, contest immediate municipally based grievances, and target municipal, regional, and provincial (or state) political actors. Our analysis engages these issues by looking at two local Canadian environmental conflicts over the proposed Jumbo Glacier Resort development in British Columbia and Off-Highway Vehicle (OHV) use in the Tobeatic Wilderness in Nova Scotia. We focus on comparing these two cases because they provide instructive examples of environmental movements that have successfully worked within local and provincial social milieu, rather than focused their attention on national or global political and public spheres. Our intention is not to measure the efficacy of their strategies and decisions to scale down rather than scale up, but rather to explore how going local operates in everyday activism and to illustrate why activists chose this route. Using data from news coverage, environmental organization websites, and interviews with core activists we show that the scale of an environmental problem, perceived exclusion from environmental governance, and the ability to achieve outcomes at the local level all contribute to whether or not activists 'go local.'

Going global or going local?

Since at least the 1990s, sociologists have theorized notions of globalization and transnational relations, and have used these concepts to understand changes in almost all social spheres (Steger 2003; Waters 1995). Some have argued that globalization and transnational relations have changed the scale of cultural identities (e.g. Castells 2004; Featherstone 1990; Melucci 1996), others argued they have engendered the rise of international political institutions and new forms of governance (e.g. della Porta 2005; Meyer 2000; Montpetit 2003), and yet others show that they have shifted the frames of social problems to global injustices (della Porta et al. 2006; Thorn 2007). In his recent plenary address, ISA president Michael Burawoy (2012) argued that contemporary social

movements work to bridge local and global concerns and political scales. The environment has been no exception, and it too has been characterized as a transnational problem (Macnaughten and Urry 1998; Spaargaren et al. 2006) as seen with concerns over global warming or biodiversity loss.

Scholars of contentious action and social movements have followed suit, devoting countless articles and books to transnational issues and actions. With the rise and expansion of neoliberalism during the 1980s, and its intensification after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, many social justice grievances shifted from individual nation-states to transnational regions of the globe. This is demonstrated by mobilization against international economic forums and policies, such as protest against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Smith 2007), the North American Free Trade Agreement (Ayres 1998), and institutions like the G7-G8-G20, European Union, or the World Economic Forum (Pianta and Marchetti 2007). The shifting scale of grievances can also be seen in a number of other movements, including Indigenous struggles (Khasnabish 2008) or the human rights and environmental movements (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Increasingly, a range of grievances and movements are united under the Global Justice Movement (GJM) banner, which is seen as an umbrella movement of movements (della Porta 2007).

Activists, NGOs, and interest groups have increasingly re-packaged their issues as transnational (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005). Tilly and Tarrow (2007) call this scale shift and argue that it is a process whereby social movement action moves outwards from local sites of action. Although they recognize it can occur by scaling down, which is a fragmentation of large-scale mobilization, much more attention is offered to scaling upward and this is in line with recent attention to the rise of transactional activist networks. Scaling up or going transnational allows activists to tap into a wider range of resources and political opportunities. The rise of new communications technology and increased travel produces transnational, if not global, ties. Some argue that this has increased the currency of information, sparking an age of 'information politics' (Castells 2000, 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998), where naming and shaming, observing, and producing counter-hegemonic positions are core tactics.

Information politics are largely sustained through international networks and are linked to international organizations, such as those associated with the UN. They also create a transnational civil society and lead to the diffusion of information, grievances, and tactics (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Tarrow 2005). Much of this literature does not view globalization or transnational activism as replacing local or national contentious action, but views it as a new set of opportunities for movements to amplify their grievances to a wider audience. Domestic actors gain the ability to circumvent local authorities by shifting scales. Keck and Sikkink (1998) call this a 'boomerang effect,' where nation-states face pressure from international authorities and other states because activists tap into transnational networks and opportunities. Bob (2005),

however, shows that not all movements are equally successful at producing this scale shift. Smith (2007, p. 314) also cautions that many transnational activists are concerned with the 'democratic deficit' of international institutions. This leads some to conclude that the turn to international authorities has led many activists to valorize national and local sites of action in response (Park, 2012). This is especially the case with issues of governance and citizenship participation.

At the same time that transnational and global pressures have challenged nation-states as citizenship regimes, nation-states have also faced internal challenges. Many have noted the increasing importance of 'sub-politics,' which includes ongoing political participation through social movements and interest groups as vehicles for social change, rather than engaging representative democracy through party politics (Beck 1992; Castells 2004). Benjamin Barber (1995) cautions that globalization challenges democratic governance and exacerbates nationalism and ethnic conflict. He recognizes that transnational capitalism does not require democratic governance, an observation echoed by GJM activists who call for 'globalization from below' and demand new participatory forms of governance (della Porta et al. 2006). Likewise, in addition to ecological protection, many environmentalists are interested in fostering new forms of citizenship that are 'participatory, expansive, solidaristic, and ecological' (Adkin 2009, p. 4). Some even contend that the environmental movement may pose the biggest threat to global capitalism (Sklair 2002, 275). As environmentalists pursue ecological wellbeing they increasingly demand more local democracy that includes meaningful deliberation, the voices of everyday people, and consensus.

Some argue that non-state actors are gaining increasing access to – and power within -- processes of environmental governance, particularly in the spheres of public lands and protected areas management (Bardati 2009; Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Mascarenhas and Scarce 2004; Parkins and Davidson 2008). Analyses of 'policy networks' shows that environmental policy-making is not limited to national governments and involves an increasingly wide range of actors, including all levels of government, industry representatives, social movements, scientific experts, and ordinary citizens (Compston 2009; Montpetit 2003). There are new opportunities for social movements in governance processes and new opportunities for participatory democracy. At the same time, several researchers observe that social movement engagement in environmental governance processes is bound by the need to adhere to the market-based logic of neoliberalism (Adkin 2009; Gareau 2012; Goldman 2007). However, few have fully engaged questions of why activists pursue local opportunities.

A number of academic literatures engage issues of local democracy and governance. These issues, however, are often missed by social movement scholars. Research on local democracy is largely found in urban planning, geography, and political science. Much of this literature attempts to clarify notions of democracy, participation, and governance (e.g. Bucek and Smith

2000; Haus and Sweeting 2006; Melo and Baiocchi 2006). A key focus is on deliberative processes that involve participation by local citizens. Much of the literature focuses on cities as sites of local democracy and governance (e.g. Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Boudreau 2003; Isin 2000; Purcell 2006). There is next to no literature on smaller locales, like neighborhoods or rural areas. Another common observation is the increasing role of social movements, NGOs, and public interest groups, which Bucek and Smith (2000) call the 'third sector,' in the facilitation of participatory democracy.

The appeal to the local, however, is not without its critics. Purcell (2006) warns against the 'local trap,' which is more open and participatory than at larger scales but less influential (also see Parkins and Davidson 2008). Park (2012) similarly notes that the valorization of the local comes at the cost of cosmopolitanism and openness. Others warn that it is important not to overstate the powers of either locales or the federal and transnational scales. In many countries, power and governance operates at the meso level, that of provinces or sub-states, a political sphere neglected by many activists and social movement scholars (Boudreau 2003). As a result, for our purposes we treat the local polity and democracy as including micro and meso politics of municipalities and regions or provinces as well as the processes at these levels that incorporate the voices of people living in them.

In the remainder of the paper we thus ask: Why do environmental activists 'go local'? We answer this question by looking at looking at two Canadian environmental conflicts, one over a proposed ski resort development in British Columbia and the other over Off-Highway Vehicle use in the Tobeatic Wilderness in Nova Scotia. Although both cases are regional, receiving little national or international attention, they provide important insights on why activists demand local participation in democracy and governance.

Methodology

We engage the question of why movements 'go local' with a mixed-methods approach that combines textual analysis of news media coverage and environmental activist web sites with semi-structured interviews with core members of local environmental organizations.

The textual analysis of news coverage includes articles published in major Canadian national and provincial newspapers. We look at two national newspapers, the *Globe and Mail,* which is viewed as centrist in political orientation and the *National Post,* viewed as more conservative. Both papers have a wide circulation with average daily print circulations of 315,272 and 156,646 respectively. In addition, we examine two regional papers, the *Vancouver Sun* and Halifax *Chronicle-Herald,* with average daily circulation rates of 175,572 and 107,353 respectively (Canadian Newspaper Association 2009).

The Factiva database was used to sample 132 articles from the four newspapers. Keywords were selected in order to return the broadest range of articles

possible. A keyword search of the terms 'Jumbo Pass,' 'Jumbo Glacier,' and 'Jumbo Resort' produced a sample of 25 articles about Jumbo Pass (16 from the *Globe and Mail* and nine from the *National Post)*, published between 1983 and 2009 (23 of these were published between 2003 and 2009). A similar keyword search for the term 'Tobeatic' produced a sample of only nine articles (eight from the *Globe and Mail* and one from the *National Post*), published between 1992 and 2005. Factiva was also used to produce a sample of ten articles on Jumbo Pass from the *Vancouver Sun*, published between 2002 and 2005, as well as 88 articles on the Tobeatic from the Halifax *Chronicle-Herald*, published between 1999 and 2009. Every article was checked to confirm it dealt with land use in the Jumbo Pass and Tobeatic regions and all relevant texts were analyzed.

An internet ethnography was also carried out, focusing on twelve websites produced by environmental organizations cited in news coverage of the conflicts. This approach involves treating the internet as a research field and creating detailed notes based on observation of the websites. (A list of organizations examined can be obtained by correspondence with the authors.) A semi-structured protocol was used to guide note-taking on the websites, with a concentration on movement claims, key words, and imagery used on home pages and throughout the websites. Notes also focused on protest tactics, whether the websites reflected news media discourse, and the use of web-links. Website observation and note-taking was carried out by a graduate student research assistant between November 2009 and February 2010.

Newspaper articles and website notes were imported into NVivo software and were manually coded and analyzed. Representatives from each of the environmental organizations cited in the textual analysis were contacted and asked to participate in interviewing.

Interviews were carried out with five Jumbo Pass and three Tobeatic activists. All interview participants were 'core' activists who dedicated a significant amount of time, effort and emotional investment to these organizations. Interviews with core activists were semi-structured and questions were formulated on the analysis of news articles and websites. Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and were carried out between March and May 2010.

Participants describe different routes to becoming involved in the Jumbo Pass and Tobeatic conflicts. The most common narrative was personal recreational experiences in Jumbo Pass or the Tobeatic Wilderness that were central to deciding to become involved in campaigns to protect them. The core activists who participated in interviews largely had a "preservationist" orientation to environmentalism, with a broad emphasis on the value of wildlife and wilderness protection, and appreciation for environmental science (Brulle 2009). At the same time, they were also "democratic pragmatists" that value of citizen engagement, public consultation, and dialogical forms of policy-making (Dryzek 1997). There was little evidence that core activists interviewed held other key environmental standpoints, such as deep ecology, environmental justice, ecofeminism, or ecological modernization.

We next turn to an analysis of news media, website, and interview data to explore why activists 'go local.' Overall, we find that environmental activists demand local democracy and governance when the scale of the environmental problem is immediate and not readily translatable outside a specific context, when they perceive a failure of participatory democracy and governance, and when successes can be found in local and regional institutions.

Results

The scale of the environmental problem

Both cases are Canadian environmental conflicts where environmental organizations and activists have appealed to local decision making, governance, and democracy. The Jumbo Glacier Resort conflict centers on the proposed construction of a ski resort in south-eastern British Columbia. The area where the resort would be built is public land that is not part of any protected area, though it is in close proximity to the protected Purcell Wilderness Conservancy. Conflict over the development has been ongoing for over 20 years. The dispute involves resort developers, the provincial government, environmental organizations, activists, and local residents. A major point of conflict is the resort's potential impact on local wildlife, particularly grizzly bear populations. Other environmental concerns relate to impacts the development will have on glaciers and glacier-fed creeks and rivers as well as the environmental impacts road construction will have on the region's eco-system.

For example, a 2004 *National Post* article summarizes contention over the resort as follows:

> Environmental groups like the Jumbo Creek Conservation Society complain the development would disturb a wilderness area and disrupt the local grizzly bear population. There is a lot of support for those ideas among local residents. Many communities are also concerned they would end up footing the bill for improvements to roads and other infrastructure that would be necessary if the resort goes ahead (Greenwood 2004, FP5).

Environmental organization websites also focus on grizzly bear impacts as the key ecological risk posed by the development, arguing that grizzly bear research in the area is flawed, and that mitigation plans for grizzly displacement are inadequate (Jumbo Creek Conservation Society 2009; Valhalla Wilderness Society 2009; Wildsight 2009). The websites also argue that new resort development makes little sense as climate change is shrinking glaciers in the area, and that the resort will contribute to water pollution in downstream creeks and rivers (Jumbo Creek Conservation Society 2009). Similarly, a core activist sums up their organization's concerns with the ski resort as follows: 'We're very concerned about loss of wildlife habitat, we are very concerned about any damage that might occur to the watersheds up there. ... We also claim that this

is nothing more than a land grab to get cheap crown land at tax payers' expense for real estate development' (Jumbo 02).

None of these environmental concerns translate to global threats, not to mention ones that resonate nationally. While environmental websites link the development to climate change, this is done with reference to the local impacts of climate change, rather than defining the resort as a contributor to this global issue. As a result, the scale of the environmental grievances that environmental organizations and activists are engaging is regional and local. Much of activists' efforts are based on getting the provincial government to amend its position with respect to the resort. Until March 2012, environmentalists were successful in stalling the development, but then the provincial government granted approval for the resort. Appeals to local politics and process have been key elements of the Jumbo Resort conflict, which we expand upon in the next section.

Environmentalists' concerns over the Tobeatic Wilderness are different. Rather than being conflict ridden, they are more focused on processes of environmental management. The Tobeatic has long been a popular destination for canoeing, hunting and fishing, with professional outfitters operating as tourist guides. It also contains rare remnants of old growth forests. The main target of environmental mobilization has been Off-Highway Vehicle (OHV) use because it damages vegetation and contributes to pollution. Noise pollution from OHV's may also disrupt local wildlife, including endangered species like mainland Nova Scotia moose and Blanding's turtles. After several years of environmental activism and public consultation, the Tobeatic Wilderness was designated as a protected area in 2006, with the introduction of a provincial "wilderness management plan."

A 2006 op-ed piece written by members of the Ecology Action Centre was published in the Halifax *Chronicle-Herald* shortly before the provincial government released the final management plan for the Tobeatic. The op-ed summarizes the issue as follows:

> Later this month, the government will have the opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to nature conservation when it releases the long-awaited management plan for the Tobeatic, the largest wilderness area in the Maritimes. A strict prohibition on OHV use, consistent with the recommendations of the OHV Task Force and the Tobeatic Advisory Group, needs to be front and center … To do anything less would be to go backwards … (Plourde and de Gooyer 2006, A7).

Environmentalist-produced web content also focuses on the ecological harms of OHV use, including soil and vegetation damage, and air and water pollution (Sierra Club of Canada 2010; Tobeatic Wilderness Committee 2010). A core activist describes the reasons why OHV use should be excluded within the Tobeatic as follows:

> I think that when you go on an ATV [All-Terrain Vehicle], first of all, you've got an engine running and you can't hear the beauty, the interaction of the birds, and the wind in the trees and the leaves and everything. And secondly, it scares all the wildlife away. And then they damage all the trails that they're on if they cross them when they're muddy. So I would just prefer to have the ATVers stay on the roads (Tobeatic 01).

While environmental websites value canoeing and other forms of non-motorized recreation, they generally call for the exclusion of motorized recreation and permanent structures in the wilderness area (Tobeatic Protection Alliance 2010; Tobeatic Wilderness Committee 2010).

These environmental grievances center on the Tobeatic region and are not transnational threats. Like the Jumbo Resort conflict, much of the focus of environmental activists is on regional and local politics. The Tobeatic was protected through a Protected Areas Management Plan in 2006, and much attention was on how activists could participate in its governance. In both cases environmental organizations and activists have paired environmental concerns with demands for local participation in environmental governance. The scale of the environmental grievances is local and in both cases appealing to local political opportunities has come with rewards. In the next section, we expand on demands for democracy and local governance.

Demands for democracy and local governance

Local decision making and public consultation are highly valued in both cases, but in different ways. In the Jumbo Resort conflict activists are concerned that the development will be imposed on their community without consultation and despite broad opposition. In the Tobeatic case local decision making is prized because of the political opportunities that public consultation processes introduced to environmental governance in the region.

The importance of local decision making in the Jumbo Resort conflict can be seen in a 2005 *Globe and Mail* article, which noted that:

> The proposed development at Jumbo Glacier has already stirred considerable controversy in the Kootenays, where thousands of people have signed petitions, calling it an unwanted commercial intrusion into a wilderness area. But despite those protests, the project got a major push forward… (Hume 2005, S1).

Websites run by local environmental organizations reflect the same concern. For example, the Jumbo Creek Conservation Society and Wildsight routinely link the environmental problem with calls to 'keep the Jumbo decision local,' which is viewed as more democratic than provincial decision making that is responsible for approval of the development (Jumbo Creek Conservation Society 2009; Wildsight 2009).

Like the news coverage and websites, activists also herald the importance of local decision making. One participant asserts that opposition to the resort is not limited to a small group of dedicated environmentalists, but is grounded in widespread local concern that people in the region are being ignored. As one activist reported:

> We are talking about thousands and thousands of people writing tens of thousands of letters over two decades saying we don't want this because, and there are thousands of different reasons. So that's the local level opposition (Jumbo 03).

Another felt that local decision making about the development was as a 'matter of paramount importance':

> There have been many polls and surveys and the responses have come in every time between the mid-sixties and the nineties of those who were in opposition to it. So there's been a long term and a very general opposition to the whole project … (Jumbo 01).

Activists in the Jumbo case view local decision making as something that has been denied, which they perceive as an affront to democracy. The lack of participation in governance is seen as a wrong that must be overcome and motivates much of their activism.

The importance of local decision making is also emphasized in the Tobeatic case. A *Chronicle Herald* article, for instance, describes the Tobeatic Advisory Group as follows:

> In the fall of 2002, the Environment Department, responsible for wilderness protection policy, said the Tobeatic advisory group would collect ideas, concerns and solutions from the public as a first step toward creating a strategy for the wilderness area (Medel 2004, A5).

Whereas the provincial government was seen as denying local participation and decision making in the Jumbo case, it was viewed as a generator of political opportunities in the Tobeatic case. The provincial government not only initiated the advisory group, but also a series of public consultation sessions to engage the public in dialogue about the future of the region ('Deadline Extended for Consultation' 2004; 'N.S. Invites Comments on Tobeatic Plan' 2002).

When conflict with government emerges in the Tobeatic case, it is not because it fails to incorporate citizens, but instead because of delays in process. For instance, letters to the editor in the Halifax *Chronicle-Herald* repeatedly express concerns with the provincial government 'dragging its feet' on finalizing

and implementing the management plan that was formulated through the Tobeatic Advisory Group and public input processes (Dodaro 2006; Hutt 2006; Smith 2006).

Environmental organization websites reflect the same concerns. The provincial government is accused of stretching out the timeline to create a management plan, making decisions behind closed doors, and failing to make information open to the public (Sierra Club of Canada 2010; Tobeatic Protection Alliance 2010; Tobeatic Wilderness Committee 2010). Again, the concern is not about outright exclusion, but instead on more meaningful and timely participation. Whereas environmental organizations in the Jumbo case are positioned against the British Columbian provincial government in their demands for local decision making, in the Tobeatic case organizations are positioned with the provincial government.

As one activist describes the Tobeatic governance process, 'The whole process was meant to include a broad spectrum, geographically [of the five counties bordering the Tobeatic] as well as ideologically, and I think that was important' (Tobeatic 01). Despite publicly expressing misgivings about government delays in the media and on organization websites, in interviews activists appreciate the ways in which public consultation and local participation were integrated into environmental governance for the Tobeatic. Much of activists' talk centers on the Tobeatic Advisory Group, which is valued because it brought together a diversity of perspectives in a face-to-face setting at a local level. The long time-line of the process and animosity with OHV users are discussed, but the TAG process is viewed in a positive light despite these shortcomings. It was a process initiated and facilitated by government, and it provided space for local stakeholders to shape the ecology of the region. As one core activist describes the TAG:

> It was very lengthy … it was a long process and anything that is a process that's worthwhile is probably lengthy. And very important in terms of saying that there was a collaboration. Even if there were people who went away and said we didn't get what we wanted or were angry about this, even though maybe people felt that they weren't well represented they still were represented (Tobeatic 01).

While environmentalists generally emphasize the importance of local democracy, some speak of the Tobeatic as a place whose protection is in the interests of the 'greater good of all Nova Scotians' (Jackson 2006, A1). There was some frustration for activists from outside the local area who were excluded, but who understood the Tobeatic as a place of 'provincial significance.' As one core activist noted, 'It should not just be local input, the management plan … [The] consultation was only with local groups, so our organization, which has over a thousand members and is province wide, was not allowed to participate in that planning process and we felt we had a legitimate interest and should have been there' (Tobeatic 03). Ironically, the Tobeatic case was local to the point that it excluded activists from other parts of the province,

not to mention national or transnational organizations. Even so, as we will see in the next section, both movements had relative success because of their appeals to local democracy.

Success and power in participating in local democracy?

Local social movement conflict encompasses several dimensions, including being initiated and led by locally- or regionally-based movement organizations, adopting local frames for articulating complaints and demands, and targeting local political institutions (e.g. Municipalities, Regional Districts and Counties). In writing about Jumbo Glacier Resort, reliance on 'the local' is understood by *National Post* columnist George Koch as a mechanism for environmentalists to assert influence over regional governments to a degree that would not be possible with the provincial government. His articles warn that developers are at risk from 'expropriation by local government buckling to activists and ideological bureaucrats' (Koch 2006, FP21), and describe environmentalists who are 'bullying local politicians into sabotaging Jumbo' and who are 'pressuring the regional district to impose death-by-zoning' (Koch 2007, FP19). However, framing localism as a tool for environmentalists to wield a disproportionate amount of power over land use is less typical than framing localism as a more democratic alternative to higher-level political decision-making.

In the Jumbo conflict, the main political opportunity to participate in environmental governance has been through public input processes related to the project's provincial Environmental Assessment. Otherwise, environmental organizations have generally been marginalized from decision making over the resort. As a result, just as resort developers appear as environmentalist opponents, so is the provincial government interpreted as an opponent by environmentalists. Environmental organization websites repeatedly claim that the provincial government has ignored the interests of communities surrounding the resort development, providing data from opinion polls and plebiscites that demonstrate local opposition to the resort (Jumbo Creek Conservation Society 2009; Valhalla Wilderness Society 2009; Wildsight 2009). The province is also accused of making decisions about the resort without public visibility or accountability. Throughout the conflict, environmental organization websites encourage viewers to contact provincial politicians about their opposition to the resort, but have simultaneously encouraged viewers to write letters to members of the local Regional District of East Kootenay as a parallel and complimentary political strategy (Jumbo Creek Conservation Society 2009; Wildsight 2009).

 A core activist describes his group's interactions with the provincial government as follows:

> With this government in particular we really have very limited access to any of the ministers. It's just very much a pro-development, many people characterize it as

an anti-environment government. I'm pretty sure it's not anti-environment, they're just so pro-development that a lot of the other concerns that we have just get swept under the table and lost in their quest to minimize red tape and fast track approval processes (Jumbo 04).

The provincial government appears closed to activists; however, the local Regional District of East Kootenay (RDEK) presents a political field open to activist engagement. When asked about interaction with provincial and local government, one participant responded, 'Well we do have a good relationship with some of the people, directors, on RDEK. A very good relationship with them' (Jumbo 02). Activists also describe the importance of the shifting political opportunity structure. In the Jumbo case, the main turning point was the transition from New Democratic Party (NDP) to Liberal provincial governments in the early 2000s. Both governments supported the resort, but activists felt that they had greater access and more open communication under the NDP. A participant describes the shift as follows:

> You know, governments changing and so on, changes the response you get and the interest you get. Back in '95 or '96 up to 2000, goodness gracious people in the environmental assessment office were very objective, they mailed us copies of anything that was of interest, we phoned up every week or two to people in the office and they would chat and tell us things, and then somehow after 2002 that kind of contact totally ceased. All groups opposed to the Jumbo Resort were shut out. If you wanted to know something you had to do a freedom of information thing … so it appeared to be a deliberate attempt by some bureaucrats, at least, if not some government members to limit our impact on the decision making process (Jumbo 01).

Since the Liberals took power provincially, activists emphasize connections with opposition Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), who wield less influence than members of the governing party. As another participant noted, 'The MLA who's in opposition, Norm MacDonald, for the area that Jumbo's in, we're in very regular touch with him. … We get phone calls, we update him when we can and feed him questions that we'd like to have answers to that maybe he can get from questions in the question period' (Jumbo 04).

In the Jumbo case power was gleaned through activists' use of local institutions, as well as laments of failed democracy and lack of participation at the provincial level. This contributed to the stalling of the Jumbo Resort development, but the closure of these opportunities, more recently, appears to have led to failure for the movement as the resort was approved in March 2012. Similar trends in the appeal to local and provincial institutions can be seen in the Tobeatic case. However, in the Tobeatic the provincial government did not shut out local environmental organizations, but instead facilitated local participation. This was done particularly through the formation of the Tobeatic Advisory Group,

which brought together stakeholders from local communities, environmental
and recreational organizations, industry and others.

A brief 2002 *Chronicle Herald* article describes opportunities for input into the
environmental governance of the Tobeatic as follows:

> The Environment Department is asking the public to help prepare a management
> plan for the Tobeatic Wilderness Area. The department and the Tobeatic advisory
> group will collect ideas, interests and concerns during four weeks of consultation
> this fall, the first step in the development of a strategy for the wilderness area
> ('N.S. invites comments on Tobeatic plan' 2002, A3).

Two years later, opportunities for public input into the process continued as the
Tobeatic Advisory Group prolonged its work of formulating policy
recommendations. For example, a 2004 notice from the *Chronicle Herald*
advises that government has extended of the deadline for public input because
Environment Minister Kerry Morash 'said there has been a lot of public interest
in the plan and some concerned people needed extra time to complete their
comments' ('Deadline extended for consultation' 2004, B4).

The participatory nature of environmental governance in the Tobeatic is highly
valued by environmentalists. This is illustrated by a front page article, published
shortly before the government released a final management plan, which quotes
a member of the Ecology Action Centre as follows: 'This is the largest wilderness
area in the Maritimes. If native wildlife is going to persist over time, then it
needs to be something that has a plan to do that - and this is a very good plan,
and it was arrived at in a very democratic way' (Raymond Plourde quoted in
Jackson 2006, A1). Environmentalist-produced web content related to the
Tobeatic does not rely on discourses of local decision making or local democracy
to the extent seen in the Jumbo Pass case. However, these websites also
promote citizen participation through letter writing to provincial politicians
(Tobeatic Protection Alliance 2010; Tobeatic Wilderness Committee 2010).

By contrast with the Jumbo case, activist engagement in environmental
governance was facilitated by the provincial government in the Tobeatic case.
For example, one participant was directly invited by government to sit as a
representative on the Tobeatic Advisory Group (TAG), which made suggestions
based on dialogue and public feedback. He describes his experience as follows:

> The government people who are going to have to implement it [the management
> plan], were active participants, they were facilitators. The groups were often
> mediated by a facilitator, which was a bit of a nuisance sometimes when I wanted
> to yell and scream but anyway, it's healthy to yell and scream once and a while. ...
> I think we got a lot, every group, pro or con, got a lot more out of listening to real
> people debate. And it was a consensus model too, which was a pain in the ass. I
> don't know if that's the best way, well that's the way it was (Tobeatic 02).

Compas (2012) suggests that environmental organizations are effective at leveraging power at the local level when government perceives them as a source of valuable resources, such as expertise and information. This dynamic seems to play out in the Tobeatic case, where environmentalists enjoyed greater access and power within environmental governance processes.

Core activists also describe a changing political opportunity structure in the Tobeatic case. One activist describes a 'two phase' governance process for the Tobeatic as follows:

> When I look at the Tobeatic there's almost two phases, the first being to get it designated, and the second is the management plan. And the first one with the designation was really fighting with the bureaucracy at department of natural resources and the logging companies. ... Because even though it was the government policy to move ahead, at a high level, there were bureaucrats trying to undermine that and screw it up along the whole way and that was trying to ... get around the old guard foresters who just didn't understand why you would want to set anything aside, just the ideology of it' (Tobeatic 03).

Here the focus is not on transitions of the party in power, but on initial resistance of the civil service to attempts to open up policy-making. This resistance was overcome by the government when it established the Tobeatic Advisory Group and public hearings as mechanisms of environmental governance.

Engagement in environmental governance assumes the ability to effect change (Mascarenhas and Scarce 2004). By that standard, environmentalists have never been fully engaged in environmental governance at Jumbo Pass. The Jumbo issue is largely driven by regional, rural organizations, with limited connections to provincial organizations that may be better linked to provincial networks of political power. While the Tobeatic is also largely driven by local, rural organizations, their claims receive much greater 'amplification of voice' from larger provincial organizations based in Halifax (Reed and Gill 1997). A Halifax-based core activist describes this separation of roles as follows:

> We were not as involved, the local groups did their thing and our role was to be an echo for what they said when we met with Ministers. We would say, 'respect the local process ... and if that's what they [local environmental organizations] say, this is what they're asking for and we think that's reasonable and we think you should listen to them (Tobeatic 03).

The success of local organizations participating in the provincial environmental governance process of the region meant there was little incentive for local environmentalists to escalate their concerns and shift the scale of action upward and beyond the region. Rather, power and successes were found in engaging local and provincial institutions.

Conclusion

Despite the disproportionate amount of attention that social movement scholars have placed on transnational activism, the Jumbo Resort and Tobeatic cases remind researchers that many environmental and social justice causes are fought on much smaller scales. These cases offer insight into why movements 'go local' instead of attempting an upwards scale shift by appealing to broader national and transnational networks. Specifically, the cases remind researchers that the scale of many social conflicts is local in nature. Such conflicts, as McAdam et al. (2005) suggest, are far more common than dramatic national campaigns, but receive far less attention by social movement scholars. This is despite the common framing of social movements at local scales by non-academics.

For many social movements, targeting action at the local level makes sense. Going local is not necessarily a failure of social movements to scale up their grievances and campaigns, and does not necessarily reflect failed attempts to connect local and global movements. Remaining local is also distinct from the process of 'downward scale shift,' wherein "widely coordinated contentious action fragments" (McAdam et al. 2001 331-332). Our analysis suggests at least three reasons why movement organizations and activists 'go local,' including the scale of the grievance, perceived exclusion from governance and decision-making, and political opportunities that offer the potential for successful mobilization in the local context.

In both the Jumbo and Tobeatic cases, the environmental grievances were highly local in nature. In the Jumbo case, the proposed resort development would affect local wildlife and involved local tourism and the economy. The environmental problems caused by the development do not easily translate transnationally and do not readily appeal to universal moral dilemmas. The same can be said for the Tobeatic case, which centered on the governance of a remote environment in a marginal region of Canada. In both cases environmental organizations and activists would face significant cultural work to translate their grievances to a wider context creating a cost that might be unwarranted given the scale of the grievances and success in engaging municipal and provincial polities.

Instead, environmental grievances were linked to demands around participation in decision making and governance processes of particular environments. Such demands are common among many movements, even at the transnational scale, as documented by della Porta et al. (2006) with the GJM. Interestingly, such demands are framed as appeals to 'local democracy.' However, there is little evidence (at least in the Jumbo and Tobeatic cases) that activists fully appreciate the variants of governance structures democracies present. Attention is paid on deliberation and participation. Largely absent, however, are discussions of institutions and procedures that influence local democracies. Instead, at the core of activists' demands are desires for increased participation and power for local citizens to influence the decisions that will affect their lives. The framing of grievances in this manner, as seen especially in the Tobeatic

case, not only contributes to preventing a scale shift to the national or transnational level, but may also exclude activists, organizations, and bystanders outside of the local context. Yet, the relative successes of the movement has meant that such exclusion has not come at the cost of obtaining the movement's goals.

Last, the desirability of 'going local' can be seen in the success of movements that do so. As Boudreau (2003) rightly highlighted, many forget that much governance in federally organized nation-states comes at the state or provincial levels. In both cases, provincial governments play a large role in how organizations and activists engage environmental problems. In the Jumbo case appeals to failed local consultation and participation led to a stalling of the resort development for two decades. In the Tobeatic case, appeals to increased local participation shut out environmental organizations from outside the region. In both cases movements gained disproportionate power because of their appeals to micro (municipal) and meso (provincial) level institutions rather than escalating their grievances to national and international arenas. Largely, as with many grievances, these issues can be resolved in more immediate political contexts. As classic work by Morris (1981) or more recent work by Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggests, grievances only need to escalate, shift up, when blockage is met in smaller-scale political arenas. During our time frame of analysis neither movement faced such blockage and that is largely correlated to their successes and local activism. However, with provincial government approval of Jumbo Glacier Resort granted in March 2012, it remains to be seen whether social movements involved in this conflict will continue to 'go local' or will face pressure to scale up their opposition from the local to the national or even transnational arenas.

While our findings are based on a comparison of two specific cases, they point to a more theoretically generalizable contribution to social movement scholarship. Focusing on movements that 'go local' leads to different stories about movement framing, interaction with governments and opponents, and movement outcomes than narratives based primarily on studies of national and international social movements. For many social movement issues, the local scale should not be ignored in favour of analysing how movements work to attract national or international media and political attention. It is time for movement scholars to pay more attention to everyday and local activism. Overall, we believe the Jumbo Resort and Tobeatic cases show that small-scale, local, and regional movements can offer important insights to social movement scholars. They help illustrate at three of the mechanisms that drive movements downward in their political challenges and remind scholars to not forget about the everyday activism that shapes contemporary societies.

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Appendix 1

Search of Keywords on Social Movement, Geographic Scale and Democracy		
Search engine	Keyword search	Count
SocIndex	'social movement*' AND local	1,174
	'social movement*' AND local AND democracy	82
	'social movement*' AND global	1,242
	'social movement*' AND global AND democracy	146
	'social movement*' AND globalization	892
	'social movement*' AND globalization AND democracy	93
	'social movement*' AND transnational	2,748
	'social movement*' AND transnational AND democracy	238
Google	'social movement' local	5,220,000
	'social movement' local democracy	151,000
	'social movement' global	4,180,000
	'social movement' global democracy	1,980,000
	'social movement' globalization	2,060,000
	'social movement' globalization democracy	1,410,000
	'social movement' transnational	984,000
	'social movement' transnational democracy	642,000
Google Scholar	'social movement' local	104,000
	'social movement' local democracy	56,800
	'social movement' global	68,100
	'social movement' global democracy	37,600
	'social movement' globalization	30,400
	'social movement' globalization democracy	23,300
	'social movement' transnational	24,500
	'social movement' transnational democracy	18,600

Note: SocIndex search is based on Boolean searches and the database ranges from earliest to present. Google Scholar uses a 'Google Scholar' search and was 'anytime' with respect to period. Searches were conducted on 10/01/2012. Google search included 'everything' and 'the web' and was conducted on 10/03/2012.

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Writing in a movement: a roundtable on radical publishing and autonomous infrastructures

Anna Feigenbaum and Stevphen Shukaitis with Camille Barbagallo, Jaya Klara Brekke, Morgan Buck, Jamie Heckert, Malav Kanuga, Paul Rekret and Joshua Stephens

Introduction (Anna)

In October of 2011 I hosted a roundtable discussion on radical publishing with editors from Pluto, Zed Books and New Left Review. The conversation, featured in Interface 3/2, engaged issues around the labour of radical publishing, raising questions about how we write and research as activist academics. Shortly after the roundtable appeared, I received a Facebook post from Stevphen, a friend and colleague, applauding the roundtable but questioning where the autonomous press fit in with this rendering of radical publishing? Nearly a year later this inquiry moved from virtual critique to living room debate. In June 2012 Stevphen, Jamie and I organised a follow up roundtable with folks working with Autonomedia, PM Press, AK Press, The Paper, Occupied London *and the Institute for Anarchist Studies.*

Participants

Jamie – I'm on editorial boards for some movement journals and I'm publishing a book with Minor Compositions at the moment. So I'm kind of a contributor more than a producer in the world of radical publishing.

Malav – I'm based in Brooklyn, NY. I'm Coordinator and Series Editor of a publishing and programming house called Common Notions. We've partnered with PM Press for our first few publications, and also work closely with a number of other left publishers, distributors, and programming efforts such as AK Press, Autonomedia, and artist cooperative Justseeds, as well as Bluestockings Bookstore and 16 Beaver.

Anna – I'm a Lecturer in Media and Politics. As a media producer I've done little bits and pieces, some zines. I research social movement history so I interact a lot with things that are produced autonomously by small presses.

Stevphen – I work with Autonomedia. For the past three years I've been editing a book series called Minor Compositions. I also work at the University of Essex.

Camille – I'm Camille, I recently started working for PM Press in London. Before that, I, along with other people in the room, helped start *The Paper*, which was in response to the student uprisings and revolts starting in 2010

Coming out of that experience, we bought a risograph, which is really exciting, so we've now seized the means of printing.

Jaya – I'm part of a collective called *Occupied London*. We started doing some journals back in 2007. We did 4 prints of journals on theory and action, urban theory and action, so a kind of specific focus on the city, from mainly an anarchist perspective. In 2008 our focus kind of shifted and we started a blog instead, and that became the main focus for our project for a few years, and that's probably what we're known for because that was one of the few sources of information of what was going on in Greece available in English. And last year we published a book with AK Press called *Revolt and Crisis in Greece*.

Paul – I'm Paul, I was involved with *The Paper*, besides that I'm also involved in the production of experimental documentaries, and increasingly audio recordings and internet radio.

Morgan – I'm also based in Brooklyn. I've interned with two Left publishers, both in New York. I'm currently a member of Common Notions, as well as Antumbra Design, a design collective which works with a number of publishers and other organizations in New York and across the US.

Joshua – I'm based in New York. I work with the Institute for Anarchist Studies, I've a number of primary roles in that. One is that I've been doing some editorial consulting on our book series with AK Press. I'm currently playing managing editor-slash-whip cracker on an anthology the Israeli group, Anarchists Against the Wall, and I also edited the majority of the Lexicon pamphlet series that we did. In addition to that, I play curator to the workshop or teaching tracks that we do at various conferences, when we're invited, which feels a lot like editing sometimes.

Writing in a Movement

Anna – First we'd like to start by asking you about movements and how you see your projects as being situated in relation to movements – just listening to your introductions, and the overlaps between, it sounds like some projects are sparked by movements, other serve as a documentary or reflective space for movements. What do you think about these relationships?

Camille – I think that the experience that comes out of, like the rupture with the student movement, was around actually a rejection of the idea that all of knowledge production could happen online. When we were on the streets on a fortnightly or monthly basis, and particularly, the police strategy of kettling people, so people being contained for like, 8 to 10 hours, there felt like a crying need for pieces of paper again, because it was really boring being in the kettle. Movement analysis was happening in quite a snippy, bitchy, online bloggy culture where there was an anonymity, you didn't have to take responsibility, you didn't have to stand in front of someone and say, "This is what I actually think, and this is what I think we should be doing." *The Paper* came out of the

desire to have a material object. It only really made sense if there was somewhere to hand it out – it wasn't something that we wanted to have in bookstores or newsagents, we wanted to hand it out at demos or at rallies or in occupations. At the time we were able to print 3,000, and we were able to literally just rock up to a demo, distribute 1500, and then go around to the 6 occupations that were happening around London, and then an edition would just disappear really quickly. For a while we were producing them on a monthly basis. We had a collective of 10-20 people producing it. That collective changed over six months while it was being produced. We got into a bit of trouble, really quickly, which was good for a printing project, nearly got charges brought against us for the first edition. Which we didn't really think was possible, stupidly.

Anna – For what?

Camille – We reprinted an article from the student movement in Australia, which had been banned in the mid 1990's, called the 'Art of Shoplifting', which explains (in a political way) how and why to shoplift. We had erroneously thought that it had been through the courts in Australia, and the student editors has eventually gotten off, so obviously the cops here wouldn't be interested in getting into that sort of thing. It did end up in the High Court in Australia so it probably should have given us some kind of indication that people took it seriously. So they did that – they took it seriously.

Paul – So *The Paper* was a kind of boom and bust thing in the sense that there was a medium and there was an audience, and there was a willingness to produce this thing, and as the student movement was basically incarcerated, was the victim of oppressive apparatus, the medium disappeared, we found ourselves lost with who our medium was. In a sense, we tried, for that medium to be the Occupy movement, with little success. And we tried in various ways to engage that movement, and we can discuss the failures there. But also, in some sense the levels of engagement with people, because we didn't have a clear sense of responsibilities, it changed issue to issue, people's commitment changed issue to issue, relatively successful in some sense, but it seemed that when that movement started to deteriorate, levels of commitment changed, where people's commitment changed. In a sense we were quite tied to a particular movement, and as we tried to transcend that … it paled out a bit.

Camille – And big arguments happened around editorial content, like proper big… which was good. It was a really rare opportunity of collective writing, like 5 or 6 people writing a text together, which a lot of us talk about doing and then I don't actually see that happening a lot of the time.

Paul – It was a life changing process for me, the first time I did it. I think I did 2-3 editorials, 6 issues. We would have a meeting which would be a planning meeting over the big issues, we would discuss what was going on at the time, really just open ended discussions without any real agenda, and on the back of that we would decide issue themes. And then on the back of that, we would discuss what was going in, we'd discuss pitches people had made, and on the

back of those meetings, 2-3 people would be tasked with writing the editorial, which would reflect not the opinions of those people, but the discussions that happened in those meetings. There wasn't always a consensus, in fact, rarely was there a consensus. One consensus was anti-capitalist, revolutionary support for the student movement, broadly as you can conceive of having it, and then on the back of that, it would be generally one person writing an editorial, and then handing it to 2 or 3 people who would then massively do hatchet jobs, and debates and discussions between those people, and then editorial would be presented to those people to do more hatchet jobs. The great kind of transformative thing for me was trying not to think of one's own position, but a relatively broad position on the left, on these things you'd been discussing, then justly representing those positions in 300, 400, 500 words.

Camille – We were attempting to make the mechanisms of production of the paper visible, so we would make the arguments we had in the collective visible in the editorial. For example, one was during the Wisconsin struggle, there was a banner that said 'screw us and we multiply', and we decided to use a really pixelated image of the town hall and the banner, and we put it in hot pink, 'screw us and we multiply', and we were handing that out at the major trade union demo that happened. And then there was a debate about what relation that had to radical feminism, and about rape, and so in the end, we wrote about that debate in the editorial. It wasn't about making those things disappear or have a collective front. It was about "we're trying to have a collective newspaper, we're not a party, and we don't have a line." But not in a self-obsessed kind of way, people are not interested in that.

Anna – Jaya, your project also uses a collective writing process, do you want to talk us through it?

Jaya – I was actually wanting to talk more about the relation with the movement, what we think we experience with the blog that we're running. It's this interesting situation that the fact that we're in London, made it much easier to have in depth reporting on what was going on in Greece, simply because we were outside the different factions.

Stevphen – What about the Institute for Anarchist Studies? It seems to me IAS is not connected to one particular movement, but bridges many of them. Would that be a fair impression?

Joshua – I think the function of the IAS has shifted in recent years, particularly as before the book series emerged, its role in knowledge production in anarchist circles was a bit more obscure, I think. There was a constellation of people who either came to the conference or came to things in New York, but the book series really kind of, really exploded the boundaries, particularly as the first book was a Cindy Milstein book which in my opinion is the best introduction to the anarchist tradition written in probably a century, and there hasn't been anything like that and a lot of people took that up. And the subsequent books that we've done, did the same thing in a really accessible way for a young audience, but also took up themes that weren't really being addressed and that

there was an appetite for. So now there really is a relationship with a movement, and the Lexicon series was a response to the Occupy movement. We were literally sitting around in a meeting as tweets went live that people were being tear-gassed in Union Square, and pepper sprayed. And we thought, "there's a lot of confusion, there's some really weird placards down in Zuccotti, there's some stuff about JFK conspiracies even. It seems like these kids are righteously angry and frustrated, but have very little in the way of political or historical reference, so what could we do to try and contribute something there?" Some of us had already been down there a good deal and we heard kids throwing around terms, in a way that was really elastic and amorphous, and we saw that all the time, potentially creating a lot of confusion for process. So Josh McPhee came up with the idea of creating these sort of encyclopaedia entries for young people, or less politically mature people who were new to the movement; terms that it would be useful for them to have a sort of clear and consistent command of. And that's exploded. That's been huge.

Anna – And is the book series free?

Joshua – No the book series is not free. The book series is done through AK Press. It's a small book series so it's not as expensive as a regular book. The Lexicon series is free, we ran a Kickstarter in advance to finance that. People were really enthusiastic, and when we printed them, it was like, anytime we took them to an occupation, or to a protest, they were gone in minutes.

Morgan – They're like little books, and they've got really cute covers...

Jaya – so there's one little booklet for each word?

Joshua – We took five terms: power, anarchism, gender, white supremacy and colonialism. We tapped people to write them who we felt had some degree of expertise in each particular area of discourse. And I think, with regards to anarchism, power and gender, we felt those were terms that we're already using a lot and sometimes misusing, so we wanted to create some clarification. And I think with regards to white supremacy and colonialism, those were terms we wanted people to have an awareness and a command of. We wanted to put them out there, and kind of contrive a momentum or lend them weight that would get young people interested and talking about them. Now, we're talking about what the next five will be. Josh MacPhee was brilliant about coming up with it; like, it will be visually brilliant, it will be colourful, like cluster bombs. And this will be for younger people, and people who are new to movement, and this has been extraordinary.

Authorship and movements

Stevphen – So we've heard a lot about people from the periodical and the book end of things in relation to movements. Is this also relevant in terms of relationships with authors and how writing comes together, projects?

Jaya – That's a really good starting point to talk about the Occupy movement. At least 4-5 books have been printed specifically about Occupy from various publishers.

Joshua – Which I think raises the point about different temporality and writing composition with regard to this type of writing, and also a sense of relationship to the movement. **Are you writing from within the movement, or from without so you can intervene? Are you writing collectively? Are you writing anonymously? Are you writing for fame, and fortune and glory?** And there's been a whole mixture. In New York City there was a whole incubator for this sort of thing through Occupy. There's been the Lexicon series. There have been many others that were not necessarily geared towards propaganda, just really reflecting or steering. There are a lot of untamed elements when you go down to Zuccotti Park and see the sort of visual landscape, and the politics and aesthetics of it aren't always easy to digest.

Anna – I feel like, a couple of different types of books were happening. One was the *n+1* collection of pieces called Occupy! Some of them had already been published, some that had been written specifically, some that had been co-authored, pieces in first person from diaries, logs of text messages sent about the Brooklyn Bridge, and this was my experience about this.

Malav – Anna, yes, I thought it was cool for what it was, and sort of timely, with chronological narration. So what the book was trying to do was not all necessarily analytical. Because how do we produce a book length analysis about a movement that is only several months old? That is the kind of thing you do in a blog or an article. Books are meant to be produced in hindsight, after the fact, looking back. And actually the books that came out of the Occupy movement quickly really challenged that idea. What the n+1 book was trying to do was not necessary meant to be analytical, the intention behind it was to speak to people that weren't necessarily a part of Occupy but that were sympathetic or were interested, or were from different cities, or weren't really at Zuccotti but would like to have known more about the day to day experience.

Joshua – One of the key things for me when I started to see the books coming up was that I felt like a lot of the books that were coming out of the Occupy movement were often targeting people outside the movement as a sort of explanatory mechanism. I actually think that was appropriate. For instance, my mom is a retired DOD employee who lives overseas and is still largely connected to people in the US military abroad, many of whom are deeply indebted and disgruntled, and all of a sudden, they're incredibly curious about this movement. When I was at my mom's in Spain two months ago, she had a brunch for people to basically ask me about the movement, and I think that

these mechanisms are quite a bit more necessary now than they were two years ago. We need to have these tools to communicate with people who aren't there, but not just activists who aren't there, also people with really disparate sorts of positions, who are either sympathetic, or curious. Because I think there is a curiosity, a more widespread curiosity. People like my mom, who didn't give a fuck about what we were doing two years ago, now they're incredibly curious. I think that is really profound. That orientation of those books, being explanatory and ethnographic, that sort of thing was actually... it was correct.

Paul – Is what we're talking about inherent tensions and contradictions of a kind of pedantic, vanguardism, and at the opposite end of the spectrum, a pure transparency of the movement, or are we rather talking about tactics, revolutionary tactics, in terms of what the purpose of these texts are? I bring it up because this was a constant tension in *The Paper*, who are we writing for, what's the purpose.

Malav – Like OR books, they're not movement publishers, they don't operate in the same way, there aren't the same things at stake for them. Same as a couple of other publishers. The Verso book sold tens of thousands of copies and managed to come out on the 3-month anniversary, the occupation had already ended, and they sold within a week or something. It was insane. I think there's something about that too.

Morgan – The actual movement publishers, they haven't intervened, and that's been a conscious thing because they're not necessarily embedded in the movement.

Jamie – Like the movement publishers still have the shutters open, as it were?

Joshua – That could be it, or like, the stakes are different.

Morgan – Yes, I think that's it.

Camille – Yes, you don't want to put out a shit Occupy book!

Morgan – Exactly, I only know the more motivational back-story to OR, it's like "we have our existing audience who isn't necessarily in the movement, and we're going to be the translator of this movement to the outside audience." Whereas PM or AK are embedded in the movement and their readers actually are the movement, so they have a much different stake.

Joshua – So AK, they're actually organising in groups, doing talks, workshops, writing short pieces, getting pamphlets, doing all the organising work. That's important everyday work. And it's important that these are collected, edited collections as opposed to a single author saying, "I'm going to tell you how I invented the term 99%, and so on."

Camille – I think what's interesting for me is that we had four books come out about the student movement in the UK. Occupy didn't really work here, it occurred but didn't actually generate the same energy as the US, it was not a movement in the same sense. I think it was a spectacle in every sense of the word. And the student movement, we similarly had an explosion, short and

sharp. **Before the paint was even dry on the graffiti, someone had brought out an edited collection on the student movement**.

Anna – Again, that question of temporality, what happens when you do something really, really quickly?

Camille - No, actually I think it's about opportunism. For sure I think things can be brought out really quickly. I think you produce a different work when you're producing it fast and rough; when you're producing texts with ideas that you think should be circulating because you're intervening into certain debates, I think that can be an article or an essay or a book, like, people can move mountains – you can copy edit shit in an incredibly short period of time.

Morgan – I think it's really interesting, having this conversation circling back on the question: **What is the role of book publishing at this moment, and why is it that most of the books that have been published have been for an external audience?** Is it because there is no way for traditional book publishing to intervene in this sense? Or is it that there are other ways like the Lexicon series that are autonomously produced materials, is that the vehicle? Or is it just that… I don't know. That movement publishers are just waiting for the right moment?

Joshua – Or the right proposal, like maybe no one's offered them a great contribution to the discussion.

Morgan – I think it's interesting, the mechanisms of publishing. It literally takes one year to publish a legitimate book. It's really difficult to crash through a high quality book. So it doesn't necessarily lend itself to timely interventions, like for example OR Books, their model is built on the ability to have print on demand.

Malav – They do all the development and then they sell the rights of the full-developed book to Haymarket or whoever.

Morgan – So their model is cutting out the distributor. It was meant to save money but it doesn't really, because contrary to what many believe, a lot of the cost isn't in the production, but the distribution side of things, there's a lot of overhead in the front end. So it's basically – write books very quickly and then push them through on a print on demand format, and then once books have been produced in that way, selling the rights to a more traditional publisher. It's interesting also, to think about their sort of model, which is partly to save money, but partly also to be able to intervene in political moments in a way that's more adaptable than traditional publishing where you have to announce a book in advance and have this cumbersome distribution model. But even then, it's still, it doesn't necessarily lend itself to relevant interventions.

Anna – That's also because it's a business. They're also trying to make money.

Morgan – Colin Robinson and John Oakes who run the company are both long time Left publishing veterans, and this is a new project for them, and for them it's very much in that world, and it's very much a business for them.

Anna – But the model's interesting.

Joshua – These are publishers that are businesses, they're trying to deal with that autonomy from the boss by earning a wage for themselves. I just think it requires a vastly different outlook to these discussions, you know, the book has to sell.

Anna – For AK and PM too?

Joshua – AK and PM on a different scale.

Malav – From like, let's say co-production, as more knowledge structure in publishing vs. a representation to the outside, that's a sort of model of production models, there's actually a much different understanding of what's being done altogether.

Camille – Yeah, like I, even though I work for a publisher and I really like books, and they're one of my favourite commodities in the whole wide world, I feel like, I'm not entirely sure about the book as a form - or in every instance. That's actually a reason I helped start a newspaper. I actually think there's different forms of publishing at the moment that lend themselves to different movements. I suppose with two hats on, I think there's a role for the newspaper in a different way.

Anna – Well, yes, I suppose that's what my question was in a way. Maybe books are only one way to be communicating?

Camille – In this question around Occupy or the student movement, I think there's a definite role around books. But in terms of this question around writing in movements, I would like to see hundreds of newspapers being produced again on a daily basis.

Paul – But even there, to come back to this question of the inherent contradiction within movements. We ran up against limits, for instance, because our meetings, they weren't invite only. I mean our editorial board, it was whoever showed up to a meeting, and so we started having meetings around the occupation at St Paul's. And we'd try to poster the event, advertise as much as possible, and there was some kind of desire for inherent explosion of the whole thing. But there were problems with holding public meetings at Occupy LSX. They attracted people with low degrees of commitment or interest to the project itself. And people that came from the Occupy Times group were not necessary inherently anti-capitalist and were much more interested in replicating journalistic practices of the mainstream media with a slightly different message, though one that was not inherently anti-capitalist.

Camille – But I think that's more to say, it's easier to say 'we want to do co-production.', It's much fucking harder to think about what that means, because you set up a slight distance because you're with a group of people who want to compile a set of representations and that stuff... but I also think that's also got a lot to do with, here in Europe, people talk a lot about workers' inquires, and I see very little outcome from the vast amount of inquiries that are undertaken, and I see people tying themselves up in knots very, very quickly. So it seems like

everyone is inspired by the 70s Italian model, there's been some good books written about it, so everyone's like 'oh, wow, yeah we should do an inquiry!' then lots of people start inquiries, then I never hear anything about it.

Stevphen – There's a passage in *Fire and Flames*, the new PM book, where [Geronimo] talks about how we suffer from the Italian illusion, where we're all like 'we'll do what the Italians did'…

Paul – So there was this dream of transparency, which dissolved really quickly.

Camille – I never had a dream of transparency!

Morgan – It's funny, even producing that OR book, just the question of co-production in the book-publishing world, was to me very confusing. It was very ambiguous, like it's produced by this amorphous, named but individual nameless collective, but also at the end of the day, it's just a book by a publisher. But the rights will be sold, because it's also like, non-profiting, money's going to OWS, but what does that even mean? Six months later… it's just, it was a really weird experience. I guess I just wasn't in touch with the folks that produced it, afterwards, the body of people that were contributing to it.

Joshua – I'm increasingly coming to the understanding that we need a diversity of tools for these interventions. Have you seen that YouTube clip about consensus? That was beautiful, it was one of the most powerful sort of illustrations of anarchist politics I've ever seen and it never said the word. But I feel like we haven't caught up with how that movement has shifted, in terms of being able to talk about what those new forms convey and what the value of that is, and what the content of them is. And short of communicating the content, those things are invisible right now, because we haven't really figured out how to make them visible, or how to document them.

Anna – To me that brings up a newspaper again. I feel that something that gets lost in a blog, in an online newspaper context, is that idea of a newspaper creating an imagined community. Like in the 80s, just before the internet, movement newspaper editors would still go to each other's community assemblies, they would write a little paragraph about what was happening. But today there is also a question of can a newspaper have the same salience in a digital world?

Camille – I think that, really, they can have more impact, in some kind of weird way, because it's a real piece of paper, shoved into people's hands.

Autonomous infrastructures

Malav– Can we just take a step back and flag this entire project under the word infrastructure? Because we didn't really talk about how we push these different publishing projects around, so like distributions, keeping that, none of them have any ownership over. The thing that cuts through them all is the same corporate distributor that gets the stuff out. Printers or whatever. All these different publishing projects have different distribution methods, but whenever we're talking about a book, we're talking about largely distribution methods that we don't have any control about.

Jaya – As a publisher you don't really have necessarily a direct relationship with bookshops. Individuals can create relationships with individuals at bookstores, if you so choose and you have the capabilities. But as a publisher who is radical, you don't necessarily have a connection with radical bookstores or booksellers, so in a lot of ways, you are completely dependent on the distributor, on the individuals who are going to the bookshops, selling your books.

Stevphen – The thing that I found doing that in the UK, it was one thing coming around to these stores and getting them to take books, it was another thing having to call them 17 times and getting them to pay for anything. And the amount of labour that it took...

Anna – I think that's exactly the thing, there's so much labour that goes into creating and maintaining the relationships, even just the mechanical following up. It's really, really difficult.

Malav – I didn't mean for us necessarily to return back to this nuanced conversation about publishing, rather I was thinking about the different ways in which we employ technologies. We have different tactics or tools to do this, and they all come with tensions and challenges, and distribution models, and levels of transparency or whatever...

Anna – Can we also go back to the idea of a **radical media ecology** for a moment. I wonder if maybe you can write the way that works for you, maybe you can take these different positions at different times. Maybe now we are seeing possibilities for cultivating an ecological perspective towards the ways that we engage different audiences. Maybe one project doesn't have to do all those things in one instance, it can make a decision to do one and make a tactical decision to do another. I think the Lexicon project is a good example of this.

Joshua – I think that's actually precisely what has been so profound out of this movement, because coming out of this post-Seattle alter-globalisation stuff, myself and my peers who were organising that were like, if we didn't show up to a meeting, there was shit that didn't get done, there were real stakes to that, right? And in this movement, there's such a massive ecology to it, one person's participation doesn't make that much difference to it. There is the joke I've been making, things are so dynamic and vibrant that if I decide to stay home and watch Boardwalk Empire, the world's not going to end. But the flipside of that is

just what you said, like we can make tactical decisions, like this is the form of writing or the audience that I'm most adept at performing in or speaking to, and that's ok. I can make a tactical decision to devote my energy to that, and there are other people who can do other things. I think that's actually an asset and a real blessing to this movement.

Camille – I don't feel that way at all. Actually.

Anna – How do you feel?

Camille – I feel like we're in a moment of decomposition, I feel like all the gains we made in 18 months are being eroded, faster than we made them. We didn't win the demand about not increasing the fees, but like, I personally wasn't there just because I care about fees. ..I think that with the winter riots, the students created a certain terrain and in a complex way helped create some of the possibilities for the summer riots. So **winning for me was about the contagion that was going on.** And also, by being on the streets, with high school kids, who were picking up shit fast, burning stuff, and throwing stuff at the cops and having a real sense that actually things were shifting, and actually it was possible, what we could do.

Anna – And then it was shut down!

Camille – And the last demo we were on there was total policing, and there were 8,000 riot cops. And I was like, no one's going to do anything, we're all going to march with our one allocated riot cop.

Joshua – There was a buddy system?

Camille – There was! It was so fucked up.

Paul – There was definitely a sense of collective struggle, on the part of students, and it didn't feel like it was a massive leap for that to link into all the trade union struggles, and say, 'we're going on…' but they didn't.

Camille – You could feel the moment, it was like a membrane, coming closer and closer. And also everyone watching in the establishment had every understanding that if that membrane had been broken, we would have been in a completely in a different historical situation.

Paul – Which is precisely the conversation that is happening in Quebec.

Jaya – From a European perspective, the one thing that I find really difficult to deal with, given what's happening all across Europe right now, is the fact that the struggles are so nationalised, and the fact that there hasn't managed to be some coherent online or offline publishing going on, bridging all the different things,. People are aware of each other, but the focus is so specific in each moment, and so localised.

Camille – The return of the State.

Jaya – In a way, it is.

Camille – They thought it had gone away, but it came back…

Joshua – I honestly wonder, to some extent, how much is that linguistic? I was speaking to some Palestinian anarchists, there actually are Palestinian anarchists, they are very few and they are very young, and I was asking them, what was the sort of things that brought them to this political orientation? Was it books, were there websites? So they start rattling off, 'there were these Egyptian anarchists, and these Syrian anarchists, and these Bahraini anarchists...' who are these people? Now, I am friends with these people on Facebook and Twitter, and I'm seeing the stuff that they post, and I think the linguistic consistency across these different struggles, the fact that it's all in Arabic, it generates less of a nationalisation, so I wonder how much of that sort of, fractured dimension in Europe is because of that?

Malav – We've got people from America and Canada, and Australia. There's an Anglophone thing happening.

Jaya – I agree that it's a challenge we need to meet right now, there's a practical thing we need to solve in some way or another. But it's not the reason for why nothing is there, because during the late 90s, early 2000s that was not a problem, there was organising going on all the time. And collectives sprang out exactly to serve that purpose.

Camille – I've presented at conferences before where there is a makeshift transmitter and everyone has a small radio for translations, there's a team of translators working.

Jaya – Yeah, so it's completely possible.

Camille – But it's not in written form. And that's the difference.

Jaya – People are meeting each other, and that's the difference. But one thing I can't help think is that things were easier because the struggles were less sensitive to people's material conditions in their home countries. We were looking at a set of ideals, global capital...

Camille – It was summits.

Jaya – Exactly. And now, it's like people's workplaces, their education, their families, their health, that makes it really difficult to organise on a European-wide level.

Camille – But it is about national struggles.

Jaya – That's the problem. It is and it shouldn't be, it really shouldn't be.

Camille – But that's the critique of the summit protests, that we never succeeded in translating into to a material struggle, or able to engage it. So in someway this is the answer to our failure around the summit stuff, that people are embedded and located in places that they actually can affect change, however limited...

Malav – What about the disparity of material conditions. I mean, I'm not European, so I could be off the mark about this, but it makes perfect sense to me because part of the European crisis is the disparity of material conditions that

was flattened in the creation of the Eurozone, and how many countries had to take on massive amounts of debt in order to be part of that?

Jaya – Well it makes sense, but it's also exactly the danger. In Europe we are facing a real kind of situation of the rise of fascism and that's real. And part of the struggle against that is to move beyond the fact that it's Germany's fault or it's Greece's fault, or we were tricked by the people in France. That's really important.

The role of publishing

Anna – Do you think there's a role that publishing can play?

Jaya – Definitely. I really think that's an important thing for publishing at this point, to do something at this level. In our collective we've been thinking about newspapers, but on that level.

Camille – We had a page in *The Paper* called 'translations,' where we would take the editorial and translate it into another languages, and we would take stuff from other places and translate it into English. But also think about the political questions around translation, I think there's a lot around that stuff.

Jaya – That's again the difference between having a physical meeting with each other.

Camille – With a physical meeting, I don't have any problem, I know how to do it. With internet debates and large amounts of text, I don't know how to do it.

Joshua – One infrastructural question for me is the cultivation and mentorship of writers. I'm thinking particularly of one of the grants that the IAS funded recently; a group of Latino activists who were radicalised in the immigrant movement that galvanized around May Day in 2006. Back then, these people were teenagers, and now they're writing a piece about the Latino encounter with the Occupy movement. I think it's important to think about the process of mentoring and cultivating writers, as an infrastructural question, because it's not enough to communicate to an audience. There's value to carrying an audience *through* something; reading material ought to be an experience, not just a conveyance. Cultivating the capacity for that is an infrastructural question, like how we mentor and cultivate writers and transmit skill and things like that. And maybe we're uncomfortable talking about it, like it reinscribes dynamics of authority, but it seems like something we really ought to make explicit.

Camille – Because it makes the mechanisms of co-production visible, as opposed to notions of talent, merit, genius, 'Oh, she's just got a way with words! That's just so innate!'

Paul – There's some of us who've been trained to write in institutions, and who find it very easy to move into these other spaces and be already good at writing, in certain ways, either non-institutional or mixed mechanisms for nurturing writing. Does something like that exist?

Joshua – The IAS does that. Anytime we give someone a grant, one of us takes responsibility for accompanying that writer through that process and editing their work.

Paul – I think, especially if we're going to have things like newspapers and we're going to have people writing for those, and producing for those, or producing blogs, the editorial component is a part of the editorial process. There needs to be a degree of consciousness about that process, as a deliberate revolutionary strategy, that we're cultivating people who have access to skill and all that.

Camille – Like politicising house guides, and style guides. In terms of saying we write in a certain way, and these are the reasons we write this way. These rules are not mythical, we know what they are, and if we write them down, then they are public and they are there in terms of debate. We use these words, we don't use these words, and why do we it in that way.

Jaya – Our collective recently talked about that's what we need to do. So it's happening slowly.

Paul – We also tried to do that, breakdown the division of labour with some of the student movements we were involved with, and do collaborative writing projects, especially in terms of young undergraduate students who lacked confidence for writing for a relatively broad audience. We did that with degrees of success, because of levels of commitment varied, but mostly because these things were so fluid, and it took time to organise these things, and by the time we'd organise and go to an occupation, the occupation had been busted, and we had to start from scratch.

Camille – And also the occupations we were interested in were the working class occupations, which were completely different to the ones I was involved in.

Paul – I remember comrades being at occupations at universities, where students would get a call, they want a press release, 'what the fuck's a press release?' And there's a role for us there, a pedagogical role. And the other side was breaking down the division of labour, in terms of production, and that was where the dream of a risograph came from, in part anyway, breaking down the division of labour between who writes and who doesn't write in the movement, but also who produces the actual material product that we have.

Camille – London's such a weird place, there's actually heaps of risographs, but no one would ever tell you about them, because you've got to be on this island for ages before anyone tells you shit, in that weird kind of way.

Anna – To me that brings up again the importance of material objects, of technologies and how we build infrastructures around them. And also the question of money, which is the word we're always skirting around, when we talk about what it means when we do these projects. **I'd love to hear about what you guys kind of think about these projects to acquire and share means of production and how things like getting a risograph can alleviate some of the problems of labour and costs.**

Morgan – It's interesting in New York, thinking about the risograph – a feminist collective in Brooklyn acquired a bookbinder a couple of years ago. It was by and large a personally funded operation, and it was really exciting, getting this bookbinder, owning the means of book production, it was phenomenal. It ended up though, no a failure because its not over yet, but as far as its life in New York was concerned it was a surprisingly challenging project to maintain. In the end we just couldn't generate projects for it, we couldn't generate energy for whatever was needed to make it useful social equipment. So ultimately, it seemed to just fizzle. And this extraordinary equipment that had so much potential for supporting the movement or supporting feminists, or producing really awesome radical material just sat dormant, costing money in rent, for about a year and a half.

Jaya – And printing is always an issue here in London. It's incredible; it's like every time there's a question mark.

Camille – I've been thinking about infrastructure for the last two years, in terms of what is lacking in London. We both lack it politically, in terms of organisation to build, and in terms of bits of machinery and equipment. And the other major infrastructure that we don't have is a space. Like, squats don't last very long anymore there's no bleeding between institutional space and movement space. Many other places have a whole variety of spaces, which London doesn't.

Anna – We don't even have social centres with kitchens, which drives me crazy.

Paul – And you end up eating hummus and pita every week.

Morgan – I don't know what it's like in New York, I feel like there is space, but you sort of have to carve it out for yourself and pay rent.

Joshua – One of the interesting things that has come out of the Occupy movement in New York is that working groups that were formed around these sorts of functions, over time, began converting to workers' co-operatives. I can't say for sure as I've been out of the country for three months, where those are at, but there is a dimension of them monetizing that service on the market, and using the margins from that to help materially support movement. So they're producing a livelihood for people, which is a propaganda win, beyond something merely oppositional. It's actually producing livelihood, which is something the state has failed to do. That's a win. But additionally, it puts highly-skilled people working in often apolitical professional spheres in the service of aspirations with no real capital; a worker cooperative can foster the relationship key to or even finance a really outstanding web-developer providing services to a movement project that would normally be out of reach, for instance.

Malav – It shows inside a movement what it is it that moves people. They'll draw on something and offer something to it in their way. So you get your professionals, who are like, 'oh my god, my skills are useful for something other than making money!' And that is what publishing is about, about moving people.

Camille – I think the question round infrastructure is a really interesting one, it's bound with materiality, it's sitting around and talking about the kind of things we need to make something possible.

Jaya – With that, I feel there's an immense cynicism in London, especially in the squatting movement, where there's a shitload of people and there's a shitload of tools, there's no way in hell… they'll be like, 'no, no, no they've been through this too many times before, their shit disappearing…' there's all that history of cynicism.

Camille – But that bleeds into everything.

Paul – That poses another infrastructural question, what are the mechanisms of accountability that we can enact, that we can intervene on that particular problem, that we can allow us or enable us to cut through that cynicism?

Malav – but there's a way that accountability gets interpreted as domination, it's totally pragmatic but…

Joshua – That's a major problem in New York, like the GAs were live-tweeted, and all you had to do was sit and watch twitter, and you could read about someone getting head butted or punched, and then the person who was responsible, you would see getting quoted in the live tweets from the next GA. And it was like, on what planet is it acceptable for me to be seeing their name here after they decked somebody?? And people just really didn't have the confidence or the tools to get that, and again there's a cultivation and a mentorship that needs to be brought in, and say, it's ok to tell someone who head butts someone that they're not allowed in the next meeting. And I think there was a real hopelessness there, and an infrastructural failure on our part too…

Malav – I don't know if it was that stark…there was a lot of procedural work done.

Anna – A lot of it goes back to that thing, that shit we really don't want to talk about, that we find really uncomfortable, and we're like, "Is there a Lexicon series of the shit we don't want to talk about?" There are best practices but you have to poach them from all over, and I wonder what it would look like to have a publishing project on that…

Joshua – Cindy Milstein and I talked about how there are all these Occupy books that basically function to explain the movement to people who are on the outside in some way or another. And pondered what it might offer, instead, to draw on the voices of people who have areas of expertise or skills in some way, like what would it look like to create a textual toolbox for younger activists who have a lot of energy, and are resilient and haven't had their souls crushed. What would it mean to have tools for these people, analytic tools, tactical tools, in a textual form? So when everyone was saying, "Oh consensus process, it's so convoluted, mundane and banal…" somebody would respond, "5 years ago Mark Lance did this piece for the journal 'Social Anarchism' called Fetishizng Process, that really dove into this before that was really this widespread discussion."

Paul – I was going to ask, what is the role that publishing poses to that challenge of balancing outreach and building political arguments and tactics inside a movement? I'm not saying its going to be answered but I think that's the challenge, and I think it's every bit as much a question of form as it is a question of content.

Anna – And then again, I think, how do you have a dual strategy? We've talked alot about newspapers. Could you have one that was for the movement and one that was not? What are other possibilities for being multi-perspective and being multi-local?

Joshua – I think that's the great thing about New York, is that you see the same people distribute them simultaneously; like you have the *Occupy Wall Street Journal* and then you have *Tidal*. They are two very different forms. The Occupy Wall Street Journal is a more popular sort of mechanism, and Tidal is a more analytical, theoretical tool, and I'm not clear on the analytics of who's reading what...

Stevphen – I found it really interesting in a way, people keep drawing lines, the lines aren't explicit but there are lines, and then we get back to what's the audience, and as soon as you start defining something as propagandist as opposed to intra intelligentsia...

Paul – You can write in different kinds of ways...

Stevphen – I think the key component of it is that you're just speaking in different voices.

Malav – People do want different things, you can't put them in boxes. Acknowledging them and that people do read different things...

Camille – Yeah, I have a problem with the term accessibility, I have a knee-jerk reaction to it. There's some kind of general assumption that working class people are dumb. Which intersects with the critique that comes up consistently that we write too academically. There's also this idea that people have to understand everything that they read right away, but in many ways i think its ok to get a dictionary and look it up, the world is difficult and for some ideas and thinking you are required to do some work.' In that **there is no way I can deliver some McDonalds version, that you just get it, eat it, and shit it out.**

Morgan – That sounds like what the Lexicon series was about, like this is complicated, unabashedly this is a very complex topics, and that is why there are all these other tools, that in a much more straightforward way build up to...

Camille – There's this tension that, like there a certain terms like 'reproductive labour' that I refuse to let go of, because I use it in a specific way that actually means something. I'm also happy to spend a paragraph or two explaining what I mean by 'reproductive labour' so you don't have to go to your Marxist dictionary to work out what I mean, but nonetheless, you have to be willing and generous enough to go through the process of reading, because then **it's not just about a process of writing, but a training to read.**

Joshua – And that cultivation of reading discipline is of value. I'm always having to make the same argument with people: You have to be willing to learn things you don't know. If I hadn't, I never would have gotten through the first Bad Religion album I had, because there were scientific terms in half of their songs, and I had to go look them up in order to engage with that, and it was really compelling and I developed a discipline around that. That's of value.

Final thoughts - On the value of books

Jaya – I think the question I raised earlier is the one I'm still walking away with, which is what is and what will be the role of book publishing vs. all of these other forms, is there a way for publishing to be… in this movement, as opposed to other movements? What will be the role of the book publishing in creating useful interventions for the outside and also for us in the movement?

Camille – Despite all the amazing articles, blog posts, podcasts, despite all of those, the most important thing to me is books. There's a crisis in traditional publishing that I think is really productive for us to engage with, and there is a proliferation of infrastructure and tools coming out of the movement. And somehow, our publishers have not really harnessed the contradictions and the tensions between those two things. We're not really using a whole variety of different ways of engaging people, and dissemination. And the fact that we're still bound to this old distribution model – we need to be leapfrogging over these old problems, and confronting ourselves with new problems.

Jaya – I think that's exactly it, because the question isn't are books relevant, but how do we make them relevant?

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Framing the movement, framing the protests: mass media coverage of the anti-globalisation movement

Tomás Mac Sheoin[1]

Abstract

This essay examines media framing of the anti-globalisation movement (AGM) and AGM summit protests. The majority of the data this essay examines supports a view that insurgent social movements are still framed primarily within a deviant and violent frame, marginalizing and trivializing the movement and its adherents. The emphasis remains on spectacle, drama, confrontation, violence and deviance with classic media tactics of marginalisation, the reappearance of the folk devil and the threatening outsider (whether in the form of foreign agitators, anarchists, Korean farmers or German terrorists) and the use of racialised and sexualised frames to 'other' protesters. This emphasis was combined with a dismissive attitude to the movement's deliberation and policy fora such as the World Social Forum (WSF). Some studies report national differences in AGM framing, while traditional explanatory factors –such as the political inclination of the media, organisational factors, nearness of location- continue to be of importance.

Introduction: media and movements

> But this started when they herded us like cattle in a fence
> Protesters getting' restless without an exit
> They threatened to arrest us, we pushed back and then
> A hail of rubber bullets hit teens and old men...
> They tried to blame it on the anarchists, garbage
> I was there, I'll tell you right now pigs started it
> But they distort it in the news
> Talkin' about stompin' down Niketown wearing their shoes
>
> - Blue Scholars, Fifty thousand deep, *Bayani*, Rawkus Records, 2007

The treatment and presentation of social movements in the mainstream corporate media is important to social movements for a variety of reasons. Some

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analysts present this in terms of agenda building, with social movements attempting to place issues on the social and political agenda through protest activity: 'media portrayals of new social movements (NSMs) are critical to their success with their target groups. Ultimately the goal is to change policy. The argument is that by setting the agenda or by setting the way in which a story is framed one eventually gets desired social change. There is increasing evidence that shows how successful agenda-setting not only influences public opinion but also elite opinion, as well as elites' perception of public opinion. This triple effect is the ultimate objective of anyone seeking media coverage' (Miljan and Lee 2003: 6). Regarding globalisation and the anti-globalisation movement (AGM) 'the way in which the WTO meetings, the officials involved, and the conflicts, both without and within the walls of the conference, are presented through the media will determine the public opinion formed on critical global issues' (Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 81). This public opinion is what others term 'common sense', the accepted version, the hegemonic description of reality.

Media treatment is also important due to its effects on public mobilization: a comparison of German protest against INF [intermediate nuclear range forces] missiles, the Gulf war and the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) involvement in Bosnia concluded 'media framing of issues can matter tremendously for social movements' capacity to mobilize, and perhaps particularly for instrumental movements that focus primarily on policy issues rather than on sub-cultural identity or subcultures' (Cooper 2002: 74). Finally media demonization and criminalization of movements can have an effect on movement activities and their policing: media frames are not only important for winning theoretical battles and reinforcing hegemonic versions of the social contract, they are also relevant to the battles on and for the streets. If movements are framed as deviant and criminal, it follows that repression is understandable, if not required. Newspapers stoke outrage, anticipate protester violence and cheerily support police violence. The media creation of an expectation of violence through anticipatory coverage that frames forthcoming protests as violent operates to chill dissent and protest, while pre-emptively legitimising police violence, surveillance and repression.

From the above it's clear that the interaction between media and social movements is of major importance to understanding movement strategies, successes and failures. The AGM is an excellent subject for this, as its transnational nature facilitates the examination of media and movements at least transnationally, if not globally. This essay is an attempt to bring together in one place and review material in the English language on the treatment of the anti-globalisation movement (AGM) by the corporate mass media: it uses primarily academic sources, supplemented by material from activists and media fairness organisations. The definition of the AGM (or alterglobalisation or global justice movement) has been the subject of much controversy. For the purposes of this essay the AGM is the transnational social movement which grew in response to economic globalisation, originating in opposition to World Bank

and IMF (International Monetary Fund) policies of structural adjustment in peripheral countries and whose main manifestations have been mass mobilisations at the summits of international financial institutions (IFIs) and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and participation in a variety of global, regional and national social fora. While the AGM has overlapped with, and in the US for a period morphed into an anti-war movement, for reasons of space I will exclude consideration of the media treatment of anti-war activism. (Cushion 2004, 2007; Dardis 2006; Klein, Byerly and McEachern 2009). Similarly I will not deal with the development and use by the AGM of its own alternative media, aside from occasional comments which I may be unable to resist. Furthermore I will deal only with English-language contributions. Regrettably my lack of foreign language skills means I am unable to report on such work as Rucht and Teune (2008) and Rucht and Teune (n.d.) on the G-8 protests in the German media, Tartaglia and Greganti (2002) on the Italian media's treatment of Genoa, Yla-Anttila (2006) on the SMASH ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) demonstrations in the Finnish media, Salerno (2005) on Geneva 2003 or Yegres (2008). Furthermore, recent manifestations of the movement in the Occupy and indignados movement will not be considered, nor will the recent eruption of anti-austerity protests in Europe, again for reasons of space. My concern will be with the traditional forms of corporate mass media – newspapers and television: recent allegedly more democratic social media such as Twitter and Facebook will not be considered. Finally, I need to be clear what this essay does not do. While I have attempted to bring together as much of the literature as I could, this is not a literature survey: many of the papers under consideration, particularly those which have appeared in journals, make interventions in and contributions to a variety of theoretical debates and discussions. To deal adequately with that side of the literature would require a monograph: this essay will concentrate on attempting to bring together the empirical evidence presented in the literature, which will then be available for a wide variety of analyses.

Academic studies of media and protest

Academic attention to mass media is of reasonably recent vintage, with initial work appearing in the 1970s, while the subject received a major boost through the development of media and communications studies. A broad range of academic fields and disciplines have also shown interest in the subject, as shown by the journals in which some of the material this paper attempts to bring together appeared: as well as the expected media, communications, cultural studies and social movement journals, there are articles in anthropology, area studies, criminology, economics, geography, international relations, political science and sociology journals.   A variety of approaches is obvious with explanatory or causal factors advanced varying from the macro scale, using systemic concepts such as hegemony (Gramsci), the public sphere (Habermas) and the spectacle (Debord), to the micro, citing journalistic routines, "news

values" and location among other factors. Early studies tended to the macro and were concerned with how mass media functioned to support and maintain capitalist social relations, as well as the media's disciplinary functions, while later work tended towards the micro scale, with detailed and often technical analysis of media practices and functioning, analysis moved from concern over ownership to concern with the operations of the media. Thus critique moved from political to technical concerns, though these technical concerns could still be embedded in a critical international political economy.[2] These strongly empirical micro approaches find explanations at the organisational level, emphasising the importance of journalistic routines, speedy production of copy, rapid turnover of news and short attention cycles. Other explanations can also be found at the newsroom level, including which reporters are assigned to protest stories: security correspondents, who often act as a conduit for police positions, are likely to provide different perspectives to those provided by reporters whose beat is politics or social issues. Other approaches look at sources used in media reports, finding official sources such as state and city officials, police officers and the like are favoured over civil society actors.

A trail-blazing analysis of the anti-Vietnam War demonstration in London on 27 October 1968 was produced by Halloran et al (1970). This work by researchers from the Centre for Mass Communication Research at the Leicester University found media reports did not involve 'various interpretations focusing on different aspects of the same event, but with basically the same interpretation which focused on the same limited aspect –the issue of violence' (Halloran et al 1970:301). Thus reporters had approached the demonstration with a pre-determined opinion of what the event was going to be and then searched for material that fulfilled this expectation, which material was then reported. Further early English work grew from the sociology of deviance then being developed by Cohen and others (Cohen and Young 1973), with an emphasis on media treatment of social problems and subculture and the creation of media panics and folk devils, a concept easily applied to protesters, while it also intersected with critical criminology (Glasgow University Media Group 1976, 1980). This was followed by an emphasis on the political economy of the media, associated with an international political economy looking at corporate monopolization of the mass media (Schiller 1981) and the imbalance between core and peripheral country control of the media (Mattelart 1979). [3]

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[2] As Rechitsky (2005) notes 'much of this new scholarship is coming predominantly from critical media studies perspectives' while older studies 'were grounded in sociological theory'. There may be a parallel here with what has been described as the disappearance of capitalism as an explanatory factor in social movement studies (Goodwin n.d.).

[3] This was concerned not just with national but also global media imbalances and was associated with a political project calling for a New International Information Order, of a similar nature to calls then prevalent for a NIEO (new international economic order) which, just like the NIEO also in demand at the time, failed to appear.

Among questions raised here were if the media is owned by conglomerates, with economic interests outside the media, how does the wider interests of the media owners impact on their reporting and editorial bias? [4] The next move forward was the development in the USA by Herman and Chomsky of the Propaganda Model which argues dissenting voices and news are excluded by the use of five filters –media ownership, advertising, reliance on official sources, flak (pressure on media from governments and corporations) and anti-communism. However despite its broad applicability, the Propaganda Model has faced strong criticism (Robertson 2010) and is not popular with media academics. [5]

A seminal text appeared in 1980 with Gitlin's examination of media treatment of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the anti-Vietnam war movement. Gitlin's empirical examination showed the media's framing of the movement and its effects on the movement and the SDS.

Gitlin's analysis of media treatment of the SDS identified the following framing devices:

> The early framing devices involved:
>
> -*trivilization* (making light of movement language, dress, age, style and goals);
>
> -*polarization* (emphasising *counter*demonstrations, and balancing the antiwar movement against ultra-Right and neo-Nazi groups as equivalent "extremists")
>
> -*emphasis on internal dissension*;
>
> -*marginalization* (showing demonstrators to be deviant or unrepresentative);
>
> -*disparagement by numbers* (under-counting);
>
> -*disparagement of the movement's effectiveness*. (Gitlin 1980:28-29, emphases in original).

These frames were joined later, following the adoption by parts of the movement of more militant tactics, by a further set of frames:

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[4] One example is provided by the contentious NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 1993 debates in *The Washington Post*, which was 'overwhelmingly supportive of the free trade act, with 63 feet worth of pro-NAFTA editorials and columns, compared to only 11 feet of anti-NAFTA commentary' while 71% of expert sources in news coverage was pro-NAFTA, with 17% opposed. The paper failed to 'disclose to its readers that its owners stood to make hundreds of millions in forgiven licensing fees from a rider attached to the treaty' (Ackerman 2003, quoted in James 2002:17)

[5] 'In a sample of 3053 journal articles from 1988 to 2007, only 79 articles (2.6%) made any mention of the Propaganda Model, while in a survey of 48 media, communication and cultural studies textbooks widely used in higher education, only 11 (22.9%) considered the Propaganda Model and only four did so in any depth.' (Robertson 2010). Despite this Robertson argues that the Propaganda Model remains widely applicable in a range of international contexts and is 'an essential component in the media researcher's toolbox' (Robertson 2010).

-reliance on statements by government officials and other authorities;

-emphasis on the presence of Communists

-emphasis on the carrying of "Viet Cong" flags;

-emphasis on violence in demonstrations;

-delegitimizing use of quotation marks around terms like "peace march";

-considerable attention to right-wing opposition to the movement, especially from the administration and other politicians.' (Gitlin 1980: 29, emphases in original)

What's interesting about Gitlin's work is that it is not solely concerned with the interactions between the movement and the media. Instead of such a narrow focus, their interaction is always considered within the evolving dynamic of not only the movement's history but also of the national political situation. Thus while media and movement interactions are minutely scrutinised, that scrutiny always operates within a larger political context. This wider view may be contrasted with the narrower view of more recent (professional, technical) literature, which often ignores this wider context of the media/movement interaction it studies.

Gitlin's work was seminal in the formation of the 'protest paradigm' concept, which Di Cicco (2010:136) summarises as follows:

> "Protest paradigm" news coverage contains consistent patterns, beginning with criticism of protesters and protest groups –such as an emphasis on protesters' unusual appearances and demonstration strategies and highlighting the presence of any so-called "extremists" present among them. Such coverage creates an image of demonstrators as fringe radicals. The protest paradigm also disparages specific protests by suggesting disunity among participants and using quotation marks for non-speech items (e.g. "animal rights") to express journalistic scepticism. Another element of the protest paradigm is an emphasis on dramatic events and images such as violent conflict between protesters and police and other counter-normative actions. Further, public opinion is often invoked in coverage to marginalize protesters and protest goals. Finally, protest paradigm coverage tends to favor the perspectives of authorities over those of protesters, sometimes excluding protesters' voices entirely.

Recent work by Boyle, McLeod and Armstrong (2012) on the protest paradigm in 13 newspapers from North America, East Asia and the Middle East shows the protest paradigm also operates internationally:

> This finding reinforces the central tenet of the protest paradigm and shows that the application of this concept is not limited to a given region. That is, protesters across the world are more likely to receive critical treatment if they pose a threat to the status quo – particularly if their tactics are more extreme (Boyle, McLeod and Armstrong 2012: 13-14).

This paradigm has been supplemented recently by a 'nuisance paradigm'. An analysis of 40 years of protest coverage in five US papers – *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Seattle Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle* and *LA Times* – found increasing coverage of protest as nuisance, with liberal protests more likely than conservative protests to be characterised as a nuisance. (Di Cicco 2010). Emphasising annoyances, inconveniences and interruptions caused by protest to daily life, 'nuisance paradigm coverage dismisses the *method* of protests by suggesting that protests cause more trouble than they are worth. Thus, while the protest paradigm typically disparages *specific* protests or participants, the nuisance paradigm promotes a more negative view of protests in general through an emphasis on perceived bothersome effects that, to some extent, inhere in protest as a tactic. (Di Cicco 2010:136, emphasis in original).

Whether of a macro or micro orientation, most academic studies show mainstream media report on social movements in a biased fashion. Movements can be ignored or not reported on or, when they can't be safely ignored and have to be reported on, disparaged as marginal, dismissed as ignorant and denounced as criminal. Two types of bias –selection bias –*what* gets reported- and description bias –*how* it gets reported- have been identified. (Smith et al 2001: 1400).[6] The existence of selection bias has been shown by those concerned over methodological issues in the study of social movement protest who problematise the use of newspaper data to create protest event databases (Herkenrath and Knoll 2011, Ortiz et al 2005), with Bagguley (2010:617) noting in relation to gender bias 'many of the discussions of selection bias remain resolutely ungendered'.[7]

To begin with selection bias, one basic method of looking at media treatment of the AGM is to examine the amount of coverage the movement has received. Here an example is provided by Make Poverty History (MPH)'s analysis of the media impact of its campaign in terms of 'hits'. This simplistic attitude towards coverage is not confined to reformists: regarding the anti-Atlantica protests in Halifax, Canada in July 2007, organiser Pierre Blaire of the Anti-Capitalist Coalition said 'We're pretty excited about what happened. We think it was a huge success, especially judging from the international media coverage it got'

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[6] A typical example of selection bias in the US media is provided by the example of the the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) Ministerial meeting in 2003 in Quito, Ecuador and the accompanying demonstrations. Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR) observed 'according to a search of the Nexis database, no major national broadcast television or cable news program in the US did a single story focussed on the protests or the Quito ministerial. Nor did National Public Radio national news programs, or the three major news weeklies *Time*, *Newsweek* and *US News and World Report*. *USA Today*, the country's largest circulation newspaper, ignored the story as well' (Coen 2003). This was not due to negligence on the part of reporters: *New York Times* and *Miami Times* reporters did extensive interviews with protest leaders but these did not appear in print.

[7] These problems of selection and description bias are important, not only for media studies, but also for the wide range of social movement studies that have utilised newspaper data. (Earl et al 2004).

(Emanuel 2007). This quantitative analysis, emphasising the number of hits/amount of coverage needs to be balanced by examination of the quality, bias and framing of coverage. (see Gorringe and Rosie's methodological critique of MPH cited in the Gleneagles 2005 G8 section below).

Thus the analysis of selection bias needs to be supplemented by the analysis of description bias. The main concept in relation to description bias is framing: researchers examine how the media frame a subject –what's included and excluded, emphasised and ignored, as well as the tone of coverage, and whether coverage is 'thematic' (looks at issues) or 'episodic' (concentrates on events). As already noted, in general the media frame social movements as marginal and criminal. Classic studies of media treatment of protest, such as those of Murdock (1973) and Gitlin (1980), show, in the first case, how a predominantly peaceful demonstration was transformed through use of a 'riot frame' into a violent demonstration and, in the second, how media marginalise and trivialize a social movement through selective framing. Much recent work on the media treatment of social movements has concentrated on the analysis of framing, with both qualitative and quantitative methods used by scholars investigating the issue.

Recent work has also shown that selection bias operates transnationally, as do aspects of description bias such as gender bias. As part of empirical research examining the use of international data sets (gleaned from English-language newspapers) Herkenrath and Knoll (2011) examined reporting in these sources of protests in three Latin American countries –Argentina, Mexico and Paraguay. They found 'a mere 5.3 percent of the protest events in Argentina, Mexico and Paraguay recorded in the OSAL archive[8] for the period January to December 2006 obtained coverage in the roughly 2500 English-language newspapers archived by Lexis-Nexis.' (Herkenrath and Knoll 2011:171) They also found significant national differences, with 14.3% of protests in Mexico, 2.7% of protests in Argentina and only 0.8% of protests in Paraguay receiving coverage, concluding '[o]ne of the most important factors affecting the likelihood of international coverage is the location of the protest.' (Herkenrath and Knoll 2011:176)

A similar study of gender issues in English-language newspaper coverage of protest (for the period August 27, 2007 to August 27, 2009 in 13 newspapers) found 'men appeared more frequently than women as subjects of stories, as sources in stories, and in bylines' and 'gender portrayals in protest coverage differ based on the region of the world where the newspaper is located as well as the tactics of the protest group' (Armstrong Boyle and MacLeod 2012:10)

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[8] OSAL (Observatio Social de America Latina) appears to be a superb database of protests in Latin America maintained by the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLASCO) , beginning in June 2000 with number 1 (http://biblioteac.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/osal/osal1/) and the most recent appearing to be number 29 in May 2011 (http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/osal/osal29/osal29/pdf)

leading these analysts to suggest 'the consistent finding that gender disparities occur in both US and international settings suggests that the journalistic patterns and norms that underlie gender disparities cut across cultures and geographic regions' (Armstrong Boyle and MacLeod 2012).

Other work has shown national differences in how media treat protest. A comparison of Canadian and US television networks' treatment of protest found 'Canadian news did treat protest more seriously than US news did... protesters on CBC were more likely to be quoted and for longer segments of time.' (Wittebols 1996:358). In comparison, 'with the exception of stories on protests in Eastern Europe during the break-up of the Soviet bloc, US networks emphasized conflict and violence rather than the issues in protest' (Wittebols 1996:358).

This finding intersects with findings that location is a determining factor in media coverage of protest activity: we should expect to find obvious differences in the level and angle of coverage depending on the geographical location of the protest and the ideological orientation of the newspaper. Thus a paper is more liable to report on a protest in its own country or one that borders on it than one that occurs in another continent. Here we can see a dichotomy between the coverage of the AGM and summit protests as both a global and a local issue. When a summit comes to ground in a particular city in a particular country (with the attendant manifestation locally of an AGM) a global issue becomes a local event which obtains in the local media the coverage of a local event (Seaton n.d). Similarly local concerns can dominate protest against summit meetings, as when anti-US base protests were a major feature of protests at the G8 2001 meeting in Osaka, Japan.

In the following essay we will see vivid examples of the framing of the AGM as a deviant, violent social movement. We shall see the formation of this frame in coverage of summit protests, first at Seattle, followed by the gradual application of the frame to further summits. We shall also see an example of selection bias in the way that social fora have generally hardly been reported on, which also involves an example of description bias, with the media routinely ignoring the boring alternative summits for the more exciting street reporting. But before turning to this literature, we should briefly note the three actors who have strategies to influence the media presentation of summits and summit protests –the summit organisers and organisations, the police and the AGM.

Media facilitation by summit organisers

Official organisers of summits attempt to capture media attention through time-honoured methods of facilitating journalists. Press attendees at official media centres will be fed, watered, provided with free access to information technology and internet and, on some occasions, a variety of bribes. Stad (2007) notes the latter in relation to the 1997 European Union (EU) Amsterdam Summit: 'When the 1997 Summit had ended, we witnessed journalists all over the city logging

wheeled suitcases –part of the press package –stuffed with presents from the EU (bottles of wine, computers…).' However, once embedded, journalists can have difficulty extracting themselves from the clutches of the organisers: 'the media village is set up in such a way that once the journalists are inside they do not want (or dare) to leave again to places where they could meet normal people or even encounter activists' (Stad 2007). According to this author in Europe this tactic reached its climax at Amsterdam in 1997 'when the media village was set up in such a way that once entered it was almost impossible to leave'. (ibid). In further examples 'at Gleneagles 2005 G8…[i]nside the summit security zone, media centres provide workspaces with internet connections, edit suites, radio booths, and space for private conferences given by authorities and summit officials. Including catering provided for journalists, the British government spent £3,852,000 on media facilities and £1,454,000 on transportation for journalists' (Starr, Fernandez and Scholl 2011: 54-55) while for the Heligendamm summit the German government spent 15 million Euro to construct a press centre. (Starr, Fernandez and Scholl 2011: 55).

Police treatment of media

An influence on media treatment of protest not often alluded to in the literature is the police, in particular police treatment of media workers. Recent examples of police management and treatment of media include embedding journalists with the police forces in Miami during the FTAA protests in 2003, restriction and expulsion of journalists from scenes of protest, surveillance of journalists in England and attacks on media workers at various protests. We need to see specific media strategies being followed by the police in an attempt to influence media framing. As Greer and MacLaughlin (2010:1044) note 'Police forces now have well resourced communications officers to ensure that 'brand' image and message are accurately and/or positively represented to key stakeholder audiences', while Starr, Fernandez and Scholl (2011:54) note 'media strategies are an increasingly important dimension of the social control of dissent'. In the case of the London G20 protests, the police 'released a barrage of press statements before the protests which served to pre-emptively quell criticism of their actions on the day' (Younis 2009).

One particular police practice has been the adoption of the practice of embedding reporters with police, a practice previously adopted by American troops in Iraq. (Pfau et al 2004, 2005) This became particularly obvious in the case of the Miami model, where embedding of reporters was one aspect of the model.[9] The effects of embedding are obvious: 'by occupying police space, the

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[9] An even more extreme example of embedding is given by Greer and McLaughlin (2010:1060) who report how, in the case of the media treatment of the protests at G20 (Group of 20) London 2009, 'the police perspective… was further reinforced when, on 3 April, journalists were allowed to join follow-up police raids on squats used by alleged 'ring leaders' of the groups accused of orchestrating the violence [at the protests]'.

embedded journalists experienced the protest from the subject position of the police' (Mihal n.d.: 18). Similarly in relation to photographers 'since visual images from embedded protesters (*sic*) are framed from the police's line of sight, it would be expected that most images of protesters would be produced from the police's subject position' (Mihal n.d.: 19) While the resulting coverage was sympathetic to the police, some embedded journalists admitted it was lacking in depth and diversity, due to their inability to move between police and protesters. (Pacenti 2004). Embedding journalists ensures the situation is seen from the point of view of the force in which the reported is embedded: which side of the police line reporters and photographers are on can have a major impact on reportage. Thus one of the few stories in the mainstream coverage of Seattle that conveyed the reality of police brutality was provided by the coverage of his own arrest by Keri Murakami of *The Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (2/12/99, quoted in Ackerman 2000): 'Three Seattle police officers slammed me to the pavement, handcuffed me and threw me into the van. I was charged with failing to disperse even though I showed them reporter's credentials and repeatedly said I was just covering a story'.

One obvious reason for police interference with journalists is the desire to prevent police behaviour being recorded. In relation to Heiligendamm, the Committee for Fundamental Rights and Democracy reported

> On Thursday, media representatives who were present on the field next to the West Gate were asked to leave the area. The police announced they had one last chance to leave through police cordons, otherwise they would endanger themselves and the police's work. Such a blatant threat- which borders on coercion- towards journalists who want to carry out their job of reporting highlights how openly and (*sic*) the police attempted to prevent any public scrutiny of their actions. (Steven 2007).

Sometimes police also attack accompanying mainstream media when attacking protesters, either by chance or to prevent recording and reporting of police violence. In Melbourne at the S11 WEF (World Economic Forum) protests in September 2000, Barrett (2000:15-16) reports:

> Police had waited for darkness before launching the evening baton-charge. When TV camera crews turned on their lights for filming, a police officer is heard on one crew's soundtrack ordering them to "turn those lights off". The police targeted people who were holding cameras. SBS-TV's script reported "Police attacked indiscriminately. TV crews appear to have been targeted. SBS cameraman Luke Roche was attacked [by police] from behind [by batons]. Roche's footage showed the police advancing on him, then threatening him, before assaulting him, as his camera fell to the ground, still filming. Channel Seven News reported "Several officers turned on a Seven News camera crew". And a Reuters cameraman from Sydney, Simon Mossman, was bashed by the police.

Similar reports of police attacks on media come from Genoa (O'Carroll 2001, Niwot 2011:69) and Gothenburg (Vigil 2003:28).

Police surveillance of the AGM can also extend to surveillance of journalists covering the movement as well. In May 2008 the NUJ (National Union of Journalists) wrote to the British Home Secretary protesting against surveillance of journalists and photographers by police, specifically the Forward Intelligence Team (FIT) of the London Metropolitan Police (LMP), calling for an end to intimidation and harassment of journalists and photographers doing their jobs.[10] A statement by Bob Broadhurst, in charge of public order policing at the LMP, said 'Metropolitan Police FIT officers do not target legitimate photographers. FIT officers are deployed in an intelligence and evidence gathering capacity at public order events. This may include interaction with photographers who, on production of a valid form of accreditation, will be able to continue with their work'. (Incisive Media 2008) The implications of this statement are worth noting. First we see the blatant distance between the police statement and the truth: the NUJ letter cited a recent demonstration at which journalists were catalogued by FIT officers, while also referring to Freedom of Information requests which confirmed the inclusion of journalists on the FIT database. The other implication lies in the existence of illegitimate photographers, who presumably will be targeted by the police, as will illegitimate journalists. This leads from the police perspective to the division of the media into 'our media' and 'their media'. This seems to imply the creation of new offences: felonious photography and felonious journalism. Joking aside, we need to note the generally antagonistic attitude of police to alternative, independent and non-corporate media, exposed at the extreme in raids on Indymedia premises. A useful example of this is provided by a complaint filed with the Seattle Police Department by two students from the Art Institute of Seattle: 'they claim (and had video evidence to back up their complaint) that a police officers (*sic*) came up to their car, knocked on the window, and once the window was open sprayed both women with pepper-spray apparently then telling the women "Tape that, bitch".' (Dickson 2002:14).

Movement strategies

Here we may note the increasingly visual and spectacular nature of AGM protests: 'the recent anti-global capitalism protests are characterised by their increasingly theatrical nature, oriented not only to their political opponents but more importantly to the media and the public gaze' (Craig 2002:48). Indeed even traditional leftists have begun to embrace innovative demonstrating

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[10] Similarly, following the 2009 G20 protests in London, the NUJ 'received multiple complaints about alleged police assaults on reporters, the use of cordons and refusals to release journalists from areas in which demonstrators were being contained. Police officers also used public order and counter-terror legislation to stop reporters taking photographs' (Greer and MacLaughlin 2010:1055)

techniques in AGM protests. 'At Genoa for example many traditional leftists, including reformists associated with ATTAC [Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens] and Trotskyists with the SWP [Socialist Workers Party], planned a theatrical action on the southern edge of the red zone, where activists would playfully send thousands of paper planes across the fence' (Juris 2005: 418). It is possible therefore to view the contest at international summits as being between two spectacles: the spectacle of the powerful enshrined in the summit (with added celebrity when the likes of Bill Gates and Bono attend) compared, confronted and contrasted with the spectacle of the streets. One major area for this struggle is in the media: thus Shumate, Bryant and Monge (2005) can write about media coverage of Seattle as comprising 'narrative netwar' in the 'global mediascape'.

Meade (2008) argues that you have to analyse the framing of the summit along with the framing of the anti-summit movement, presenting the European Union (EU) Accession Summit in Dublin in 2004 as involving 'a contest over the meaning, relevance and justice of the European project'. We can see from Meade's account two different results from the media coverage: while protest was delegitimised and policing placed beyond question, on the ideological level the summit was framed in common sense terms as good, beneficial and immune from criticism. She examines in particular the coverage in *The Irish Independent* which 'uncritically defended the European project, presented protest as little more than a security problem, demeaned anarchist and foreign protesters and reduced culture to the lowly status of money-spinner' (Meade 2008: 333). Ideologically coverage in *The Irish Independent* 'effectively framed the EU in non-political terms. Indeed its coverage focused on the two most superficial aspects of the accession process, the merry-making planned for Dublin and provincial towns and the high-scale security operation. Reports consistently evoked terms such as 'party', 'fiestas', 'celebrations' and 'festivities' to define the authoritative character of the 'Day of the Welcomes'. (Meade 2008: 337). Thus this was not a political gathering of the elite solemnising and solidifying a political project, but a party and a celebration that the spoilsport protesters were opposed to. [11]

While much of the literature portrays the media construction of the AGM as something done to the movement, in certain ways the movement has also been involved in this construction, sometimes wittingly, sometimes unwittingly. Thus obviously NGO campaigns like Make Poverty History (MPH) and Jubilee 2000 will develop their own media strategies, but parts of the more nebulous anti-summit movement also organise to influence media images. This can be seen in the creation of increasingly complex props such as puppets, effigies, etc. and the adoption of highly visual styles of dress: in the case of the white overalls of Ya

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[11] For the media coverage of the protests themselves, Browne (2004:140) characterises it as 'the distortion of what was actually a Garda [Irish police force] riot-control operation without a riot into a dangerous outbreak of anarchist violence' and the 'virtual erasure' of the protesters and their reasons for protesting.

Basta and the Black Block, a highly uniform visual style is adopted, while in the pink and silver blocs, enthusiasts of tactical frivolity, highly individualistic costumes provide ready-made photo opportunities. Other examples would include the Radical Cheerleaders and the Clowns' Army. Wall (2003) is a useful comparative account of the differing communication and media strategies followed by both NGOs and the radical wing of the AGM in Seattle.

However, certain sections of the AGM, principally the more miltant, have genuine reason to avoid the attention of the mainstream media. As well as ideological objections to the part media play in capitalist society and their control by major corporations, protesters have pragmatic reasons for limiting media contact, especially photographic and visual: 'German police use media images to make a comprehensive database of activists' faces to aid in the prosecution of more militant activists' (Stad 2007). Thus one section of the movement may take a principled stance against any cooperation with the corporate media. But here movement ambiguity towards corporate and mainstream media must be noted. Schwartz (2002) provides a useful account of relations between activists opposing an animal genetics meeting in Minneapolis in 2000 and the media covering their opposition. The activists' suspicion of the media preventing them from receiving some of the coverage they desired: 'the barriers erected by the International Society of Animal Genetics Welcoming Committee (ISAGWC) contributed to the one-dimensional representation produced by the press and hampered the potential for enlightened discourse many organizers said they hope to provoke' (Schwartz 2002: 34) The contradictions in movement attitudes to the media came when ISAGWC-affiliated activists called a press conference to denounce police search and seizure of computers and records at a house used by some of the protesters: 'Rather than view the press as it had the day before –as complicit in the social ills the group opposed- residents of the house suddenly chose to use the press as a vehicle to address one of these problems –police brutality' (Schwartz 2002: 34).

Others have seen fit to engage the media in an attempt to influence the media's portrayal of the movement. Organisers of some anti-summit protests have reported on their efforts to interact with and influence media coverage (Stad 2007 and Media G8 International Press Group 2007 on Heligendamm; CounterSpin Collective 2005 on Gleneagles). A useful description of the practical difficulties involved is provided by Stad 2007 from which we extract one illustrative anecdote:

> With a few hours sleep and a heroic attempt to shower under ice water at 8AM, you have to answer questions with uncombed hair, in between three preparatory meetings for actions whilst your phone continually rings because your Media Bus has just been confiscated by police with the accusation that it is coordinating 'militant actions'. The agreement to stay in contact the day after fails to take shape because we are all arrested during a blockade and spend the rest of the Thursday in Guantanamo-like cages whilst all telephones and personal belongings have been confiscated.

Some cases of success have been reported. Kutz-Flamenbaum, Staggenberg and Duncan (2012) report that, in the case of Pittsburgh G8 protests, protesters 'were surprisingly successful in influencing the way in which they were presented in the local print media.'

A further example of movement use of and response to the media space provided by the hype in the run-up to a summit protest is provided by the case of the EU Accession Summit in Dublin in 2004. While the Irish media produced the routine anticipatory coverage in a violence frame the Dublin organisers did not take this frame lying down and actively attempted to insert their own perspective into the space the media hype had created, most effectively on the national television show *The Late Late Show* (23/4/04) when a female spokesperson 'managed to trounce verbally (and with her patently unthreatening appearance) two mainstream commentators who were playing up the dangers of violence on May Day' (Browne 2004: 138).

The essay proceeds as follows. The next section looks at the general trends in media presentation and framing of the AGM.[12] The following section recounts media framing of anti-summit protests from Seattle in 1999 to London in 2009, including a glance at the visual presentation of some summit protests. This is followed by two shorter sections looking at the media treatment of social fora and the AGM in the periphery. The essay finishes by presenting some tentative conclusions on the media presentation of the AGM, the debate over violence and the contributions and limitations of the literature on which this essay has drawn.

Covering the anti-globalisation movement

Much of the literature looks at representation, construction or framing of and discourses about the AGM and its activists in the media, with a large number of case studies of particular anti-summit and other demonstrations. There is a general emphasis on the marginalisation of protesters through framing them as ignorant, violent, young, etc., with specific examples of protesters being framed as 'Other' –as foreign or animal, through racialisation and their presentation as folk devils. Studies can be national (eg Canadian television coverage) and transnational: comparisons are made between different media (television and newspapers), as well as between different countries. Many studies report on pre-summit coverage, accompanied by felon-setting and preparation for violence. This specific aspect needs to be seen in the wider context of the policing and repression of the AGM. (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009).

One problem with the available studies is their limited geographic spread. Even though the AGM, and AGM protests, have drawn academic attention specifically

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[12] Those interested in the gory details are directed to the Appendix, where that data is provided.

due to its and their transnational character, the majority of academic studies deal with the media treatment of AGM protest within a national context, whether by looking at protests in one country or through looking at media in one country. Many are confined to one country or even one newspaper. Most of the media studied are within core western countries (national studies are of Belgium, Canada and the USA while *The New York Times* gets serious attention, for example), and media studied often tend to be published in world cities. Studies such as Beyeler and Hubutsch (2003) and Ekcrantz (2004), which reach across the divide between core and peripheral countries, are rare. There is little available on non-core country media treatment of the AGM and AGM demonstrations.

The media frame developed at Seattle was reproduced for later summit protests in the US and was also globalised. Coverage of summit protests in the US media after Seattle involved constant references back to Seattle, as the first such protest in the US and therefore the debut of the summit frame. For example, coverage of A16 in Washington DC consistently referred back to Seattle: 'The extensive police preparation was a perpetual theme in pre-protest articles, which repeatedly noted the similarities with the WTO (World Trade Organisation) protests in Seattle' (Boykoff 2006: 212), while for reports of the protests themselves 'more than half of all newspaper accounts (53%) of the A16 protests compared happenings in DC to the violence in Seattle, while more than a third (37%) of television segments did the same' (Boykoff 2006:213). Rausch et al (2007), in their study of the *New York Times* from 1999 to 2004, also document continued references to Seattle in half of all stories on AGM protest. (Rausch et al 2007: 140): thus the coverage was consistently framed in reference to Seattle 'used as a symbolic reference connoting the threat of civic disorder' (Rausch et al 2007: 141). For US television network coverage of summit protests Rechitsky (2005:) reports 'The same clip of protesters kicking down a Starbucks window showed up during the introductory segment of nearly half of all reports covering the events in Seattle, Washington D.C., New York and Miami.'

This reference to previous events is not confined to the US media nor is Seattle the only reference point. Berenson found more than a third of articles on summit protests used an explicit memory-based frame for their reporting: this memory-based frame involved 'negative references to previous protest activities activating cognitive schemas built during the coverage of previous events, maintaining them and associating them with the portrayal of the new event.' (Berenson 2009: 6-7) Thus the original frame is reactivated for each new protest. The continuation of a frame across/along a series of protests is helped by the use of these memory-based frames/strategies. Lee (2008), for example, reporting from Hong Kong, presents an image of local media replicating an already existing international frame to which local reporting is expected to conform.

What is interesting is that, even with this limited set of studies, the media treatment of the AGM is not monolithic, despite the globalisation of the media.

In the English-speaking core countries (Australia, Canada, England and the USA) Berenson (2009) isolates a startling difference in coverage of summit protests between major US newspapers and papers in other English-speaking nations (see Table 1 for details). Negative coverage of the protests never dropped below 50% in the US, while it reached a height of 88%. For England, Canada and Australia, only once did negative coverage exceed 25%.

	New York Times	*Washington Post*	*Times / Sunday Times*	*Guardian*	*Toronto Star*	*Sydney Morning Herald*
Seattle	55.55	54.5	20	22.22	40	7.14
Washington April 2000	58.3	62.64	10	13.33	12.5	16.6
Prague Sept 2000	69.24	88	9	20	12.5	16
Genoa July 2001	50	66.68	13.33	8.33	10	25
Canada June 2002	75	62.5	16.66	20	8.33	n.a.

Table 1: Percentage of negative coverage across newspapers. Based on Berenson (2009: 9-10).

Another survey which extended its reach to England language papers in South East Asia (Malaysia and Singapore) found the AGM portrayed as having four main characteristics: 'youthful and middle-class, violence-prone, divided and lacking coherent positions' (Adler and Mittelman 2004: 192).

The most extensive account of differences is found by possibly the only truly transnational study which examines media treatment of the WEF and anti-WEF protest for 1995 and 2000-2003 in six newspapers from Bolivia, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and the USA found differences in reporting on the AGM are related to contextual factors such as the ideological position (i.e. left or right) of the newspaper and the national context (i.e. whether a core or peripheral country) in which the paper is published. Some indication of the differences between the national media in their treatment of the AGM can be seen in the proportion of media attention devoted to 'violence' on the one hand and to counter-summits and social fora on the other.

Year	NZZ (SW)	FAZ (GER)	LAM (FR)	NYT (USA)	ED (BOL)	CP (SP)
	V/SF	V/SF	V/SF	V/SF	V/SF	V/SF
2000	25.8/0.0	20.0/0.0	5.0/15.0	16.0/0.0	20.0/0.0	18.8/6.3
2001	27.7/1.5	35.3/0.0	--/--	100.0/0.0	11.1/33.3	0.0/0.0
2002	22.0/24.4	18.5/18.5	--/--	38.3/6.7	28.6/38.1	0.0/50.0
2003	40.8/7.0	223.5/11.8	8.6/22.9	--/--	--/--	--/46.2

Table 2: Percentage of media attention to 'violence' (V) and Social Fora (SF) ('—' =Data not coded). Extracted from Tables 3b and 3b, Beyeler and Hubscher (2003:10).

NZZ = *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*; FAZ = *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*; LAM = *Le Monde*; NYT = *New York Times*; ED = *El Diario*; CP = *Cape Times*.

In a later publication from the same research project, with extended results from the inclusion of WTO protest and the addition of the *Times of India* to the papers reviewed, Beyeler and Kriesi (2005) found AGM protests received extensive media coverage, with the proviso that 'the Seattle protests marked both the beginning and –in most countries the peak- of newspaper attention towards the movement.' (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005:102).

For media in the USA, Berenson's finding of a negative attitude to AGM protests is reinforced by two studies of editorial comment. James (2002), reporting on editorial page coverage for one month around the Seattle and Quebec City summits, found support for free trade positions and marginalisation of anti-free trade positions increased between the Seattle 1999 and Quebec 2001 protests, the first statistically significant. For the attitude to protesters, at Seattle 57% was negative, 26% neutral and 17% positive; for Quebec this changed to 75%

negative, 15% neutral and 10% positive. (James 2002:9). It is hard not to agree with James that this indicates a consolidation of elite opinion: 'while print media attention to trade issues *expanded* significantly immediately before, during and after Seattle, the spectrum of actual debate *narrowed* within the forum of newspaper editorial opinion before, during and after Quebec' (James 2002: 19), which reinforces the point that quantity of coverage needs to be balanced by consideration of the quality of the coverage.. For the April 2001 Quebec City protests against the FTAA, the US newspapers maintained a pro-FTAA line in their editorials. For the month of April a search of Nexis found 34 editorials supporting the FTAA, none opposing it and one which was ambivalent. (Coen 2001).

Rausch et al (2007) look at framing of the AGM in *The New York Times* from October 1999 to September 2004, allowing them to look at changes in movement framing over time. Their examination of the amount of coverage the AGM received shows nearly half of the coverage they analysed appeared in the period October 1999 to September 2000: what can be seen is a major decrease in coverage following Seattle, including a drop in the number of photographs of the movement's activities published. Of particular interest here is that every year the number of photographs exceeded the number of written stories, implying that the visual nature of AGM protest activities ensured photographic coverage while news editors also felt their requirement to document AGM activities could be satisfied through photographic rather than written means. What may be occurring is a routinization of coverage of anti-summit protests, with a drop in novelty value following the Seattle protests. They also note what they call a tabloidization of protest through the increasing interest in style and cultural aspects of the movement over substantive issues, increased use of photographs and increased involvement of celebrity coverage. (Rausch et al 2007: 142).

Bennett et al (2004) looked at treatment of the WEF, protests against it and the WSF in *The New York Times* around the time of the WEF meetings in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Coverage of the WEF far exceeded that of the WSF (see below, social fora section). They report an increase in the coverage of protester issues relating to the WEF from 23% of articles in 2001 to 34% in 2002 and 50% in 2003. However, while 40% of activist issues were sourced to protesters, 53% were sourced to WEF officials (Bennett et al 2004: 447,448). Thus, by referring to issues protesters had placed on the agenda, in a clever recuperative public relations campaign the WEF succeeded in rebranding itself (at least in *The New York Times*) as an organisation concerned with real-life solutions to urgent problems compared with protesters who were framed as anarchists. This was accomplished by the use of the spectre of violence: 'Protest/violence themes infused 92% of the stories before the meeting, 68% during the meeting, and returned as the most dominant theme (75% of the articles) after the meeting.' (Bennett et al 2004:448).

Rechitsky (2005)'s qualitative content analysis of the treatment of six AGM protests from 1999 to 2002 on four US television channels found five different discourses –law and order, economy, public sphere, outside agitation and recognition –and 'no significant differences in discourse across major television news networks'. Discourses of law and order emphasised policing and dichotomised peaceful and violent demonstration tactics: 'marches and rallies were framed as legitimate, while direct action –non-violent or more militant- was framed as illegitimate "violence" ' (Rechitsky 2005). Discourses of the economy emphasised the economic costs of property damage and the restriction of general economic activity –in a word, shopping- while the protesters' agenda was characterised as against local and national economic interests which were identified as 'export-oriented economic growth'. Discourses of the public sphere involved portraying protester identity in a trivializing manner as another generation of hippies, dividing protesters into hooligans and cheerleaders, denying their political legitimacy and replacing the previous generation's communist bogeyman with the latest version, the 'anarchist', framed as the 'criminal element' in the AGM. Discourses of outside agitation 'portrayed protesters as invaders who have come to cause disruption in the lives of the locals', identifying local commuters as victims of the protesters. Discourses of recognition granted some legitimacy to protest issues, involving reports on the adverse effects of corporate globalisation and including interviews with experts and with rank and file reporters. Rechitsky (2005) concludes that 'there is a positive relationship between disruptive and contentious tactics –civil disobedience, direct action and symbolic property destruction- and the quantity and even quality of coverage on major television networks'. He attributes the decrease in coverage over time to the absence of spectacle and 'violence'.

Gunby's retrospective analysis of coverage of the AGM on five US television channels shows an early spike in coverage, which then significantly decreases over the period of the study (see Graph 1, Gunby 2011:15) and also reports changes in movement framing over time: 'While the violence frame, amalgam of grievances, and to some extent the disruption fame are all still prevalent, the ignorance and freak frame have almost disappeared entirely from TV news reporting on the global justice movement' (Gunby 2011:22). She notes for the period 2005 to 2010 the violence frame was most prevalent (Gunby 2011:16) Around a fifth of reports (21.05%) referred to past protest events as comparators and predictors: 'This was one way that the violence frame was introduced into a lot of stories where peaceful protests were happening. The reporter would say that the current protests were very calm compared to past events, or that past events indicated that the peace would not last for long.' (Gunby 2011:21).

For comparison, Canadian television coverage of summit protests was found not to marginalise the protesters, with protester statements given more substantive coverage than those of world leaders attending the summits, while the emphasis given to protester violence was small. Their expectations going into the study were that due to television's visual nature coverage would

concentrate on spectacle, drama and confrontation, summits with the greatest violence would gain most coverage and the actions of protesters would receive attention at the expense of the protesters' substantive political message. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 8). The amount of coverage of violence was surprisingly small: 'The use of tear gas and pepper spray, albeit the image that probably comes most readily to mind with regards to activist/police interactions, actually received only 6 percent of CBC and 15 percent of CTV attention to activists' (Miljan and Lee 2003: 14). In the context of the general coverage of the protests, less than 1% of CBC's and 3% of CTV's coverage of the meetings concentrated on violence. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 14). Duggan (2011), examining treatment of the G8/G20 protests in Ontario in 2010 in Canada's foremost national paper of record, the *Globe and Mail* found 43.5% of articles marginalized protesters, primarily through an emphasis on violence, property destruction and civic disruption, 20.9% of articles trivialized protesters, with negative portrayals of movement diversity seven times more common than positive ones, while 14.5% of articles featured frames that dissented from official or authoritative accounts by looking at police brutality and civil rights violations.

The only non-English language media studies available relate to Belgium. Van den Bulk and Bedoyan's study of Belgian television and newspapers in relation to WTO Doha (Nov 2001) and the EU Laeken Summit (December 2001) found most coverage to be around Laeken (due to physical proximity) rather than Doha (partly due to lack of contestation due to security measures). Generally '40 to 50% of all movement news shows or mentions violence, sometimes real violence, sometimes the lack or possibility of violence. The latter clearly implies that the movement and violence are framed as going hand in hand: the absence of violence is seen as strange and riots are to be expected' (Van den Bulk and Bedoyan 2004:10). A study of mainstream Belgian media reporting on trade and globalisation issues from 1999 to 2002 found little coverage of issues outside coverage of the Seattle, Genoa, Doha and Johannesburg summits. Analysis of the content of this media coverage –categorised as information on the summit itself, background information on globalisation, and coverage of riots and demonstrations- found stark differences by type of media. The quality newspaper has a fairly equally balanced distribution across the three categories, with 40% on the summit, 31% on background information and 30% on the riots and demonstrations. However, the popular press pays hardly any attention to the background information (7%), has 21% coverage of the summit, and focuses the vast majority of its coverage on riots and demonstrations. Remarkably, the news on the self-proclaimed quality television station is quite similar to the popular press in its disproportionate coverage of riots and demonstrations (63%). (Swinnen and Francken 2006: 648) These analysts calculated a 'riot index' and demonstrated 'a significant positive relationship between the riot index and media coverage' (ibid), a relationship which was especially strong in the popular media, where 86% of coverage of the Genoa summit covered 'riot-related issues', which summit also received two-thirds of all coverage of summits in the popular media, which also reported nothing on violence-free

Doha. Again, they observe this concern with violence 'does not only seem to hold for the tabloids, but for all the media: all media pay most attention to the Genoa summit and least to the Doha summit' (ibid).

The violence frame

We may note to begin with some peculiarities of media concern with violence. First the media shows an immense preference for protester violence over any other kind: police violence is of little interest. Indeed in some cases where the only evidence available and shown (in highly monitored and photographed protests) is of police violence, media still describe the situation as involving protester violence (see coverage of S11 2000 in Australia below). There is also consistent exaggeration of the amount of violence with small violent incidents presented as typical or defining media images of protests. Even when the police admit that they were responsible for the violence, as in the case of May Day 2007 in Los Angeles, the media can still cling to the riot script. (Santa Ana 2009). In general police methods remain unquestioned, when they are not being encouraged. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) notes that, while the three US networks reported on the killing of Carlo Giuliani by police at Genoa, 'none raised questions about the use of live ammunition for crowd control' (FAIR 2001). Finally we should note the variations in the meaning of the term violence: while police violence is generally expressed through assaults on protesters, protester violence does not require a person as victim: they can be violent towards a shop or bank window or towards other inanimate objects such as cars or statues of Winston Churchill.

In Belgian media coverage of the EU Laeken summit protests in December 2001 'almost half of the news about the movement contained references to violence, be it in writing about violence, expected violence or the absence of violence, or in pictures showing intimidating protesters, their effective violence and the consequences thereof' (Bedoyan, Van Aeist and Walgrove 2003: 14) Similarly, Jiminez, reporting on Spanish coverage of the AGM, noted 'the AGM media coverage has been bound to the issue of violence' (Jiminez 2003: 15) while in relation to Gothenburg (Sweden) 'The frame of violence is already present in the beginning of the week, way before the 'actual' violence, which indicates that the media have decided how they will represent the events before they 'actually' occur' (Hultman 2003: 8). The media's treatment of violence often involves exaggeration and hyperbole, partly as a result of the media's unquestioning acceptance of official police stories. Thus for the rioting at Rostock before the Heiligdendamm G8 protests in 2007, media ran police-sourced stories of thousands injured, including 433 police officers, with 18 officers from Berlin alone reported to be in hospital with serious injuries. Magically, two days later, according to the right-wing weekly *Focus* 'no-one was in hospital anymore. This kind of rectification however never makes the front page.' (Anon n.d.). US television coverage of the Seattle and Washington D.C. protests emphasised violence with 'nearly 70% of television segments focused on the ostensibly

violent protests' (Boykoff 2006: 225). This was most visible in relation to
Seattle, where 63% of news stories featuring the violence frame, 'more than half
of all newspaper accounts and almost three quarters of every television segment
focusing on violent protestors' (Boykoff 2006: 211). Even when violence did not
occur, the frame remained in place 'as journalists remarked on the lack of
destruction, the absence of violence or the potential for violence' (Boykoff 2006:
211). If the majority of studies on media framing of the AGM emphasis the
dominance of the violence frame, we should note a dissenting opinion in a study
of *The New York Times* from 1999 to 2004: 'Although attractive to news values,
democratic-globalization protests with high levels of arrests, injuries and
property damage –such as Quebec City and Genoa- did not seem to enjoy high
visibility in our analysis. In fact some violent protests received lower media
attention and more sympathetic framing, while some events with relatively
prominent coverage and favourable frames featured little violence' (Rausch et al
2007: 142).

Anticipating violence

The media has not only reported AGM protests within a frame that delegitimises
the protests and vilifies the protesters, but has also been instrumental in
building an expectation of violence at AGM protests, thereby justifying and
legitimising police actions in limiting and repressing protest. Whether actively
participating in a strategy of tension, or simply playing to its own worst
instincts, the media has hyped the possibility of violence and thus contributed to
state attempts to criminalise the AGM. Anderson (2004) reports a 'sad but
familiar pattern' in relation to six different AGM protests between 2000 and
2003 in the US which showed 'the same pattern of police exaggeration,
governmental fear mongering and media gullibility':

> Police officials, aided by a hype-hungry mainstream media, exaggerate the possible
> dangers posed by consistently non-violent protesters. Using the climate of fear created by
> this hype to justify their actions, the police consistently engage in extra-constitutional and
> illegal behaviour, such as mass pre-emptive arrests, the [*sic*] interference with media
> outlets, and brutal protest behaviour. Inevitably the mainstream press realizes the hype
> once the protests are safely over and sheepishly admits its mistakes. (Anderson 2004)

The point has been made more succinctly by another analyst: 'the media did not
just report on the space of terror in Genoa, they helped produce it'. (Juris
quoted in Gorringe and Rosie 2005: 4). Even the police occasionally have
considered pre-summit coverage to be excessive: in Miami, the Miami Police
Department (MPD) considered the anticipation of violence in the media
coverage prior to the FTAA to be excessive: 'The level of alarm in these stories
increased as the FTAA Summit approached and it reached a point of near

hysteria in the weeks and days prior (*sic*)' (MPD 2004). Similar anticipatory coverage is detailed in the case studies below.

For the WEF protests in New York in 2002 a Nexis search of pre-protest coverage found much of the coverage was dominated by 'unsubstantiated commentaries that portray activists as thugs', with a minority comparing protest with terrorism. These articles also referred back to the overwhelmingly peaceful protests in Seattle, Washington DC, Los Angeles and Philadelphia as 'window-smashing, flame-tossing spectacles' (*New York Daily News* 24/1/02), 'violent mayhem' (*New York Post* 20/1/02), 'radical protesters rampage[ing] through the streets...clashing with police' (*Daily News* 18/1/02), 'wild protest melees' (*New York Times* 25/1/02) and 'violent' (*Newsday* 18/1/02) (All quoted in FAIR 2002).

Other frames

While predominant the violent frame is not the only frame to which the AGM was fitted: while the possible frame of the justified protester does not seem to be particularly popular, though it does occasionally appear, most of the other frames tend to marginalise the protesters. Boykoff's analysis of US media coverage of Seattle and Washington, DC. (Boykoff 2006: 209) identified five predominant frames in that coverage –the violence frame, the disruption frame, the freak frame, the ignorance frame and the amalgam of grievances frame (frames which are not mutually exclusive) concluding that 'the Violence Frame is the most dominant of the five, as it appears in 59% of all mass-media accounts. In other words, the Global Justice Movement was portrayed as violent in nearly three of every five segments' (Boykoff 2006: 224), compared with 39% for the Freak Frame, 26% for the Amalgam of Grievances frame and 19% for the Ignorance Frame.

I have already detailed the violence frame. The disruption frame (similar to Di Cicco's (2012) identification of the 'nuisance paradigm') combined a focus on protesters' intention to disrupt the summits with the disruption to residents' everyday lives and to business as usual caused by the protests. This frame turns local residents into victims of the protesters . (Boykoff 2006: 214,215). The freak frame concentrates on what divides some protesters from the mainstream of society –not just their opinions and values, but their age, dress and appearance. Here 'the more radical elements of the global justice movement –in terms of both outward appearance and ideology- are transformed into a synecdoche for the entire movement' (Boykoff 2006: 216). The ignorance frame described activists as uninformed or ignorant: the tactic here is to interview suitably ignorant protesters who are then 'held up, if tacitly, as representative of the movement' (Boykoff 2006: 220) As well as being ignorant, however, activists are also protesting for too many causes, leading to the amalgam of grievances frame: 'negative portrayals of movement diversity were seven times more common than positive representations' (Boykoff 2006: 221).

Generally the frame operates to marginalise the demonstrators. One tactic is trivialization, a particularly fine example of which is provided by Wall's analysis of wire service reporting of the dismantling of a MacDonalds restaurant in France by the Conféderation Paysanne which shows how this episode in the AGM's history was reduced from a global to a national and even local story (Wall 2005: 110), while the authors of the action were reduced to a single person, who was then portrayed as 'likeable yet comical' (Wall 2005: 106). The wire services presented the action as an individual action by Jose Bove, rather than a collective action. By emphasising Bove's facial hair and comparing him to a cartoon character like Asterix, Bove was cast as a crazy French folk hero on a Quixotic quest to preserve the purity of French produce. The background of the story –its position as part of a struggle over trade- was lost, with the WTO – against whose activities the Confederation Paysanne was protesting- remaining invisible in the coverage. Thus 'the coverage fails to provide any sort of thematic frame that would convey the bigger picture' (Wall 2005:109).

A further tactic involves invoking the 'threatening other' or constructing the demonstrators as 'folk devils'. For an example of invoking the threatening other, in advance of the March 2002 EU Summit in Barcelona conservative People's Party spokespeople attempted to pre-emptively link protesters with Basque street fighters (Juris 2008: 87). Coverage of the AGM has also included animalisation and racialization of the protesters, both in the US (Lawless 2001) and Gothenburg, Sweden (Hultman 2003), with the addition, in the latter case, of a metaphor of sexual violence. We turn now to look at the construction of AGM activists as a new folk devil.

Constructing the folk devil

Another method of delegitimising the AGM is through the construction of anti-capitalist activists as a new form of folk devil. In the sociology of deviance a folk devil is a class or group of people who have been constructed through media coverage and expert commentary as the personification of evil, a group with no redeeming characteristics. Media production of the folk devil proceeds through exaggeration (including distortion of events reported to increase numbers, violence and destruction involved), prediction (that similar events involving the folk devil will become more violent and destructive) and symbolisation (which sees a word (such as anarchist) become symbolic of status (deviance); objects (such as black clothes and masks/bandanas) symbolise the word. In the process the objects become symbols of the status (and the emotions of fear and hate that accompany the status). When fear within general society of the folk devil has been created, it is expected by the public that the powers that be will take strong action against the folk devil. Donson shows the folk devil being constructed in relation to the May Day protests in London. 'The ease with which activists are now publicly connected with extreme violence and criminality can be seen in relation to the ritual protest actions of May Day in London. ...in the context of anti-capitalist activists we have the creation of suspicion and fear in the mind of

the public, and the expectation on the part of the police that activists are anarchist thugs. The obvious conclusion to be drawn by the authorities and the media, and therefore to be passed on to the public is that there will almost certainly be trouble.' (Donson et al 2002:11)

In the run-up to the 2001 protests the media, fed by police 'intelligence' and briefings, created through anticipatory coverage 'a context whereby peaceful protesters were discouraged from attending, and public opinion was prepared for the nature of police tactics on May Day itself' (Atkinson 2001:147). While *The London Evening Standard* warned 'Anarchists to loot Oxford Street', *The Sunday Telegraph* reported Special Branch fears that the WOMBLES (White Overalls Movement Building Libertarian Effective Struggles) were 'drilling...about 500 rioters in preparation for attacks on the police during the protests' (quoted in Atkinson 2001:145-146). In a prime example of felon-setting 'Photographs of suspected ringleaders were circulated to the press during April 2001, despite none having been [32] identified as offenders. Rather they were described in newspaper reports as people 'suspected' by police of 'intending' to cause violence' (Donson et al 2004:17). Exaggeration was the tune of the day: 'Newspaper accounts intoned that anarchists were thousands strong, would carry samurai swords, had links with the Real IRA (Irish Republican Army), had been to training camps in USA, and were 'battle hard' from Seattle' (ibid). As Wahl-Jorgensen (2003:135) notes this coverage involved 'metaphors of war, invasion, and terrorism'.

Donson et al's (2004:20) analysis of Prague shows not only 'how the construction of antiglobalisation activists as folk devils is transmitted across national boundaries' but also movement attempts to respond to this. While the Czech press, police and police authorities happily adopted the international frame with the usual anticipatory coverage stressing violence and the threat of foreign protesters, strong security measures and political support for repressive action, the actual protests in Prague, with the division of protesters into different coloured columns, and Ya Basta using the traditional white/good, black/bad trope to their advantage by dressing all in white in contrast to black-coloured riot police, showed the difference between the traditional conception of folk devils and AGM members, who reflexively responded in an attempt to undermine their marginalization and construction as mindless thugs.

Framing the summit protests: from Seattle to London

Starting in Seattle: WTO November 1999

The most studied anti-summit protest understandably was that at Seattle. Given that this was the first anti-summit demonstration that received sustained and intense media attention globally it was where the media frame or template for coverage of future demos was first laid down; it also occurred in the USA. The vast majority of available studies concentrate on the framing of Seattle in the US media. I begin with a comparison between traditional and activist media, continue with a speedy review of a variety of studies of Seattle framing in the US media, move on to a detailed analysis of Seattle framing in The Australian newspaper, before concluding by looking at three studies which make substantial contributions to the study of framing at Seattle as well as to wider debates on media treatment of protest.

I begin by looking at a research programme comparing coverage by local, US national and international press coverage of Seattle-related protests with that of activist internet sources. Choosing *The Seattle Times* as the local, *The New York Times* for the US national and LexisNexis and Global Newsbank as international sources, the researchers obtained 232 articles from the *Seattle Times*, 49 from the *New York Times*, 29 from Global Newsbank and 629 from LexisNexis. (No number was given for the activist sites, but 20 websites were examined). Of the final 54-page chronology of local, national and international protests compiled by Almeida and Lichbach, 83% were reported in activist sites, 33% in LexisNexis, 28.4% in *The Seattle Times*, 17.3% in Global Newsbank and 10.5% in *The New York Times*. For coverage of protests in cities outside Seattle in the USA and in other nations, activist sources described protests in 27 US cities and 55 cities outside the USA; LexisNexis 7 US cities and 21 other cities; *The Seattle Times* 3 US cities and 3 cities outside the USA; *The New York Times* 2 US cities and two outside the USA; Global Newsbank no other US cities and two cities outside the USA. (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 262). For identification of protest groups and NGOs involved in anti-WTO protests, for protests in Seattle, LexisNexis identified the greatest number, followed by *The Seattle Times* (74 social movement organisations [SMOs]), *The New York Times* (43), activist sources (40) and Global Newsbank (25). For outside Seattle, activist web sources identified 77 SMOs, LexisNexis 14, The *New York Times* 5, Global Newsbank 2 and *The Seattle Times* none. (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 260-262).

Almeida and Lichbach's findings are unequivocal: ' internet sources report the most transnational protest events at local, national and international levels...[they] also reported more SMOs participating in contention nationally and internationally than conventional media sources. However for SMOs protesting locally in Seattle LexisNexis reported the greatest number followed by *The Seattle Times*.' (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 262-263).

This study is useful in reminding us that Seattle was one of a set of transnational protests against the WTO: as Almeida and Lichbach warn 'If analysts focus solely on the core city of the protests, they obviously miss much of the "transnationalness" that distinguishes this ascendant form of collective action' (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 252). Yet this is precisely what occurs in the mass media with successive summits: attention is mainly focussed on the protests in the summit city itself, while the accompanying transnational protests are neglected or ignored. The one case where this is not so is reporting on May Day which often takes the form of a comparative compilation of protests in different cities, when it is actually reported on at all. Thus Almeida and Lichbach note Prague was accompanied by 82 protests in other cities, while protests in at least 50 cities outside Canada accompanied the April 2001 Quebec City anti-FTAA protests (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 252).

Solomon found coverage of Seattle by *The New York Times* and *The LA Times* disparaged protesters as marginal figures (according to *New York Times* editorial Dec 1, 1999, p.A23, they were 'a Noah's Ark of flat-earth advocates') who failed to understand free trade and its benefits, trivializing and misrepresenting their concerns, while violence ('defined solely as social unrest and damage to private property, not as environmental damage and human suffering' [Solomon 2000]) was emphasised. Solomon compared *The New York Times* and *The LA Times* coverage (22 reports and editorials) with coverage in the British *Guardian* and *Observer* (67 reports and editorials) noting the US papers estimated protester numbers at 30,000 while the *Guardian/Observer* said 100,000, with the British papers noting the international nature of the protests (both in terms of international protesters in Seattle and simultaneous protests around the globe), an aspect the US papers ignored.

Undrakhbuyan's analysis of US metropolitan newspapers' coverage of Seattle found reports emphasised violence, with portrayals of protesters as violent increasing from 14.3% of all articles mentioning protesters two weeks before the protest to 39% during the protest and 48.1% two weeks after the protest (Undrakhbuyan 2009:16). He also found that 'a significant change took place in the frames of major city newspapers...as a result of the protest' with the media agenda shifting from the WTO's official agenda to that of the protesters, at both the level of articles and paragraphs. For the latter he notes: 'The number of paragraphs devoted to the agendas of the WTO declined by almost half, whereas the number of paragraphs devoted to the agendas of the protesters doubled and remained at the high level even two weeks after the protest' (Undrakhbuyan 2009:17), with this change being statistically significant. Undrakhbuyan concludes that his findings 'confirm the theoretical stance that claims that the more the protest is portrayed as deviant the more the message of the protest is heard' (Undrakhbuyan 2009: 21).

Goeddertz and Kraidy report three frames from their analysis of *The Washington Post*'s coverage. One frame represented free trade as the engine of democracy, equating US corporate interests with democratic representations of

the US, while another divided the First and Third Worlds, representing the WTO as an opportunity for Third World countries to embrace political and financial freedom. The third frame represents protesters as misguided, at least partly due to the paper's failure to adequately explain the reasons for the demonstration: 'The coverage left the average reader without adequate explanation of the reasons behind the demonstrations, leading to the conclusion that the demonstrations were nothing more than an unnecessary disturbance to important global affairs.' (Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 83). The *Post* did this by a simple stratagem, silencing the demonstrators: 'we could not find, in our research of all *The Washington Post* articles on the 'Battle of Seattle', any interviews of the demonstrators, nor were their concerns made clear in any detailed positive fashion' (Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 89). This silencing of protesters was confirmed by the impressionistic study by Ackermann (2000) which found protesters were mischaracterised as anti-trade and seldom quoted, while media treatment of police and protester violence lacked balance and neutrality.

Houston (2004: 15,27) finds violence to be the focus of most texts on Seattle he analysed. He identifies the following frames regarding Seattle: the confused protester; protesters hurting those they claim to help; a few bad seeds (the violent protesters) and the no-win police (too liberal or too repressive in their response to protest, either way the poor dears get criticised). The ignorant protester frame also shades into the confused protester frame (as found in Seattle coverage by Houston 2004: 18-19), which is often seen as the result of the diversity of causes united in AGM protests, thus allowing reader to dismiss the protester. Houston (2004: 13-14) also finds a disproportionate reliance on official and police sources in his discourse analysis of newspaper texts relating to Seattle.

This finding of disproportionate reliance on official sources was placed in a historical context by Nambiar, who in a comparison of media coverage of Seattle with the march on the Pentagon found journalists at Seattle cited official and authoritative sources more than did journalists covering the anti-Vietnam war demonstration Nambiar (2004: 61). This represents 'a growing and almost reflexive dependence on "the official" as the dominant and primary sources' (Jha 2007: 49). Thus 'increasing the media's reliance on sources such as the police, fire officials, owners of damaged property, and other such official sources once again points to a pattern of protest coverage with templates of delegitimisation built into reporters' coverage decisions'. (Jha 2007: 50).

	Supportive of protesters	**Supportive of protesters' targets**	**Neutral**
Seattle	42	57	103
Pentagon	65	58	109

Table 3: Story valences, Seattle and March on the Pentagon. Derived from Jha (2007: 46).

We now turn to look at the one study of framing of Seattle in a non-US medium. McFarlane and Hay (2003) look at the way 'protester voices were delegitimized, marginalized and demonized' through the 'protest paradigm' *The Australian* newspaper used to report on the Seattle protests over a two-week period. *The Australian*, owned by Rupert Murdoch, is the only national Australian paper and has an elite readership. Using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods of content analysis they examined all items (except letters to the editor) that mentioned Seattle over a two-week period (Nov 26 to Dec 10) around the WTO summit, a total of 27 items. They identify five marginalizing frames used by *The Australian*: the first, that of protest as carnival performance –emphasising the circus and carnival atmosphere- 'obliterated or rendered less visible the protests' undeniable political content' (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 219); the second frame, the freak show, emphasised that protesters were marginal to mainstream society by describing protesters' appearance (clothes, piercings, etc.): 'Approx 33% of the space given to protesters in The Australian was dedicated to descriptions of their appearance, identity, personal attributes and even their diets' (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 219), while for WTO supporters no such detail was provided: 'Attention was focussed clearly on their opinions and statements, not on their dress-sense, hairstyles or diet' (ibid); the next frame, 'the battle of Seattle', utilized the violent crime and property crime frames to situate the protests within an 'anarchy and violence' structure which 'portrayed protesters as being involved in violent conflict with police rather than engaged in intellectual debate with the WTO' (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 222); another frame linked the protesters both to the 1960s (civil rights, anti-Vietnam war) protests and the grunge generation, presenting Seattle as 'the latest incarnation of a protest ideology' (quoted in McFarlane and Hay 2003: 223); the final frame, the 'idiots at large' frame, depicted protesters as ignorant and stupid, with little understanding of what they were protesting against while they also succumbed

to 'conspiracy theories, leftist mythology, urban legends and childish fantasies' (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 224). McFarlane and Hay's five frames have similarities with the five frames Boykoff (2006) discerned in coverage of Seattle and Washington DC A16 in the USA media.

McFarlane and Hay make two other useful observations on *The Australian*'s coverage: first, the weight of opinion in *The Australian* was pro-WTO: of the twelve opinion pieces printed during the period only one was supportive of the protesters and critical of the WTO. Similarly sources quoted in the stories were 'overwhelmingly protest-critical/WTO-supportive' (McFarlane and Hay 2003:225), with protest-critical quotes receiving 139 lines compared with 78 lines for protester-supportive quotes. Finally more space was dedicated to descriptions of violence and conflicts with the police (form of protest events) than to protester views (content/context of events) (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 227).

Our final three studies make substantial contributions to arguments over the media framing of Seattle. Shumate, Bryant and Monge present Seattle as a case study of competing frames, both in the national and international media, DeLuca and Peeples argue that, rather than distracting attention from the protesters' case, the violence in Seattle was the means by which increasing attention was paid in the media to the protest and Rojecki argues that the media, instead of marginalising protesters, became increasingly sympathetic to them over the period of the coverage.

Shumate, Bryant and Monge (2005) look at the coverage of Seattle in the context of attempts by two competing organisations –the Direct Action Network (DAN) and the WTO- to tell their stories or have their frame accepted in what they term 'narrative netwar'. They outline four frames –three for DAN and one for the WTO- showing 'how multiple stories can compete with one another on the global mediacape' (Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 82). They note that 'three competing DAN identity narratives emerged in the media, while the WTO identity narrative remained unchallenged' (ibid), attributing this to DAN's lack of identified spokespeople or leadership, leading to journalists creating identity narratives for DAN based on their own observations (and no doubt sympathies). The WTO frame is characterised by Shumate, Bryant and Monge as 'a vision of the WTO as a beneficient global body that struggles to support the same people and ideals held by the protesters' (Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 81) with elements of 'a martyred international governing body' (ibid).

For DAN the first story framed it as a 1960s throwback, with emphasis on performance, costume and party, thus resembling the Carnival/Spectacle frame. This frame was most obvious in coverage of the early protest (with *The Seattle Times* noting 'a crowd that could have been mistaken for that of a Grateful Dead concert and an atmosphere more Mardi Gras than mayhem')(quoted in Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 78) but also continued through and after the violent frame. They summarise the effects of this frame: 'Whether nostalgic or indulgent, the stories of the Seattle protesters reliving the 1960s painted the

protests as at best naive… Their protests were merely child's play or a party'
(Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 78).

The second story, DAN as non-violent heroes with a legitimate cause, most
closely resembled the story DAN's own press package promoted. This story had
two elements –first, the largely peaceful protesters and second, police violence.
(As they note 'without police force reported throughout Seattle, this story would
not have been possible' Shumate, Bryant and Monge (2005: 79)). Noting this
was an international story – reported in *The New Straits Times* (Malaysia), *The
Business Times* (Singapore), *The New Zealand Herald* and *Il Sole* (Italy)- they
conclude –with significant exceptions like *the Australian* (Murdoch-owned) and
The South China Morning Post 'the vast majority of English-language
international newspapers reported the story of the peaceful protesters with
legitimate issues being abused by an oppressive US police force' (Shumate,
Bryant and Monge 2005: 80).

The third story is one we will return to again and again throughout this essay,
with DAN framed as violent and irresponsible rioters engaged in the 'Battle of
Seattle'. Major sources for this story were of course police, with the (soon to
become usual) anticipatory coverage in *The Guardian* quoting a City of London
Police source claiming 'the violence was pre-planned' and Seattle PD Assistant
Chief stating in the December 7 *Seattle Times* 'These were not peaceful
protesters…They were rioters trying to take over the city of Seattle' (quoted in
Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 81). This frame emerges as 'one of the
dominant identity narratives' (Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 80) and was
widely reproduced.

DeLuca and Peeples's research emphasises the influence of protester violence
on media coverage: crassly put, more violence means more coverage, less
violence means less coverage and no violence means no coverage. For US
television networks (CNN, ABC, NBS, NBC) the Sunday and Monday night of
Seattle received 10.40 and 13.10 minutes of airtime; on Tuesday, the first day of
the protests and the 'violence', saw coverage increase to 17 minutes and the
story moved to the first or second position on all networks; on Wednesday
coverage increased to 28.30 minutes while the story led on all networks; on
Thursday the WTO remained the top story on three of four networks and
received 16.40 minutes airtime. This coverage of the violence included the
voices of the demonstrators both in the opening story, where quotes from
demonstrators were interleaved with images of the violence and in the
background stories where reasons for the protesters' actions were covered. They
compare this with coverage of the WB/IMF Washington DC protests, where 'the
coverage pattern was almost the reverse of that in Seattle': on Saturday and
Sunday before the meeting opening, the protests were the lead on six of seven
news broadcasts, receiving 10 and 13.20 minutes coverage respectively;
coverage peaked on Monday with 17.30 minutes but the story led on no
network; on Tuesday, though protests continued, there was no coverage; they
comment 'Apparently, without violence or the threat of violence, the protests

were not even worthy of coverage'. The message is confirmed by the experience with Doha, where there were few protests and no violence: 'Consequently, there was absolutely no TV evening news coverage by the four major networks' (DeLuca and Peeples 2002:140). They drive the point home: 'When dramatic violence did not occur in DC, coverage disappeared. In Quatar, where violence was ruled out *a priori* by the choice of venue, television coverage was nonexistent. Clearly, then, the symbolic violence and police violence did not detract from more substantive coverage of the protesters' issues. On the contrary, without such violence or its threat, TV news coverage quickly evaporated.' (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 141).

They find a similar pattern in coverage by US newspapers (*The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The LA Times* and *USA Today*), where the image of violence was central: 'As was true for television, images played a dominant role in the print media coverage of the WTO protests. Headline stories were accompanied by quarter-page images (some as large as ten and a half inches across) of police and protesters facing off in teargas-fogged streets' (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 141) Of 65 images of the WTO and its accompanying protests printed in these papers from November 28 to December 2, 41 were of 'uncivil disobedience', 8 were of peaceful protest, and 10 related to WTO and elite proceedings. The violence led to the front-page appearance of the protests, just as newspapers' interest had begun to sag:

> For the first time, on December 1st all four newspapers ran front-page images of the convention, each opting to display pictures of the violent interaction between police and protesters. Fifteen of the images that accompanied the eighteen articles covering the WTO were of acts of uncivil disobedience or of the violent police response. Two images were of the anarchists and their actions. Two images were of the convention proceedings. Although violence was a focus of the photographs and the lead stories, the papers reported critically claims of the WTO and the predominantly peaceful character of the protests was emphasized. This trend continued on December 2nd, with the four newspapers running a noteworthy *sixteen* images of uncivil disobedience. (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 141-142).

The protests increased overall coverage (see Table 10) leading to the conclusion 'Far from stealing the limelight from the legitimate protesters, the compelling images of violence and disruption increased the news hole and drew more attention to the issues' (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 142). The coverage of the violence-less protests at Washington (see Table 4) showed no comparable major spike in coverage, while Doha received less coverage overall (13 documents) than did December 2 in Seattle. (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 141-143)

	Nov 28	**Nov 29**	**Nov 30**	**Dec 1**	**Dec 2**	**Total**
Seattle	2	4	4	7	14	31
	April 15	**April 16**	**April 17**	**April 18**	**April 19**	**Total**
Washington	3	6	6	6	3	24

Table 4: New York Times *coverage. DeLuca and Peeples (2002).*

Quite a different picture of the presentation of the protesters in the popular press and broadcast news in the US is provided by Rojecki, which 'followed a trend of evolving understanding of and increasing sympathy to movement positions' (Rojecki 2002: 159). Rojecki agrees that the protesters were originally framed as frivolous through emphasis on their costumes and actions, while their opinions were trivialised; however

> 'What was noteworthy in *USA Today*'s coverage was not its initial reflexive *ad hominem* attack on the protesters themselves –their ignorance, disorganisation and violence- but its gradual engagement with movement issues and eventual retreat from blanket characterization of movement participants. Over the course of a week, representatives of movement organizations were invited to make reasoned arguments on behalf of their causes, and reporters and officials distinguished the peaceful majority from a small group of window-smashing "anarchists". Increasingly sympathetic coverage permitted the protesters to develop a coherent political critique' (Rojecki 2002:161)

Furthermore the broadcast news carefully distinguished between the mainstream of the movement and the violent minority, while also reporting the protests had become violent '*because of police overreaction*' (Rojecki 2002: 161, emphasis in original). In its coverage of the day when the Mayor declared a state of civil emergency

> Instead of blaming demonstrators, broadcast media highlighted examples of "out of control" police. Accompanying video footage showed police officers chasing demonstrators into neighbourhoods beyond the Convention Center, and, in one scene

repeated in several network newscasts, a protester being kicked in the groin and then fired on at point blank range with rubber bullets. The movement was not to blame for the city having lost its pride; rather, broadcast coverage pointed to police overreaction and the implied intransigence of the WTO, described as "undemocratic", "cloaked in secrecy", and "pandering to business interests" (Rojecki 2002: 162)

Rojecki's analysis of op-ed contributions to the USA's three most influential papers –*The New York Times*, *The LA Times* and *The Washington Post*- is also surprising: these 'reveal anything but a monolithic approach to economic globalization or to its antagonists...Even more remarkable is the continued breadth and depth of the critiques, the majority of which are in sympathy with the protesters' (Rojecki 2002: 166). Of 16 contributions to *The LA Times* 'none were antagonistic...and only four...could even be characterized as ambivalent' (Rojecki 2002: 163). With the noted exception of Thomas Friedman, *New York Times* commentators were 'as sympathetic to the movement as those in the *LA Times*' (Rojecki 2002:165), while some of the material in *The Washington Post* was positive (Rojecki 2002: 164). Rojecki thus presents the media as having played a positive role in presenting the concerns of those protesting against the WTO; indeed he believes 'the mass media may play a constructive role in building democratically responsive institutions' (Rojecki 2002: 167).

S11 Australia WEF September 2000

To begin with it's useful to note Passonen's 1995 research which found the Australian media's construction of protests to be inevitably violent, with editorial texts setting up a dichotomy between 'we' (the police) and 'them' (the protesters), with frequent use of 'battle' and 'assault' metaphors, and the construction of the 'thin blue line' as a dividing line between 'us' and 'them', protecting 'us' from 'them', often written off on the base of appearance and dress as 'weird' or non-serious. (Maynard 1996)

Protesters against the 2000 WEF meeting were denounced with nationalist discourse as unAustralian (Luckman and Redden 2001; Flesichmann 2003): 'S11 was not an Australian protest. It was a nasty, foreign idea unimaginatively imported from Davos, Seattle and elsewhere, out to ruin Australia's chance to take its "rightful place" in the global economy with the help of its nice friends in the WEF' (Luckman and Redden 2001: 27) As Craig (2002:42) notes 'the WEF protesters not only received negative media coverage, but were often demonised'.[13] Lacey and Grenfell (2000) trace two main themes in the coverage, one focussed on violence, the other on the diversity (read as incoherence) of the protesters. For an example of the latter, the variety of protesters at S11 was

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[13] Fleischmann (2003:2) notes a foreign hand's involvement in this demonisation but unfortunately doesn't identify the culprit: 'Aided by an American corporate think-tank, mainstream media in Australia started to create an image of the planned S11 protests as definitely violent and a disgrace for the nation in the eyes of the world'.

emphasised by Australian paper *The Age* (12/9/00, p.6 quoted in Craig 2002:41) which noted protesters comprised 'Friends of the Earth, ferals, socialists, feminists, freaks, schoolkids, clowns, anti-nuke and anti-logging types, thespians, angry young men and women from interstate, even opponents of the regime in Burma and China's repression of the Falun Gong sect.' This is what Boykoff refers to as the Amalgam of Grievances frame.[14]

For the violence frame Barrett (2000) provides a superb day-by-day comparison of TV images and newspaper and television reporting. This reports the expected anticipatory coverage of the protests: 'the Melbourne media built up the expectation of violence…the protest was labelled as 'violent' long before it took place' (Barrett 2000: 3) By September 9th *The Herald Sun* was raising the threat from protesters to possibly include 'arson and chemical attacks' (Barrett 2000: 4) while a commentator for *The Sydney Morning Herald* speculated on August 28 whether protesters 'may choose to spray the police with their own urine, as their comrades did in Seattle last November' (Barrett 2000: 14). Barrett reports *The Herald Sun* as most vituperative and most divorced from reality in its depiction of protesters and the protest. On September 15th, for example, it described protesters' 'disgusting and violent tactics, including attacking cars, spraying urine on officers, spitting or hurling rocks, marbles, ball bearings, metal nuts and glass' (quoted in Barrett 2000: 20), with the following day a report of the opinion that 'the ratbag army of red militants, fiery ferals and clueless snipers asked for any war they may have received at the hands of a dedicated police contingent this week' (quoted in Barrett 2000: 21).

As Barrett points out continuous verbal denouncements and descriptions of protester violence were undermined by the inconvenient fact that all available television coverage depicted police rather than protester violence: 'After analysing all the stories and TV footage of September 11-13, I find that the media's *written* claims about assaults committed by citizens were, in fact, not supported by (and were, in some cases, contradicted by) the TV coverage. I am not saying that *no* member of the public committed any violence around the Crown Casino during the three days…My point is that, during the three days, the television coverage showed footage of punches and beatings being committed by police and none being committed by civilians.' (Barrett 2000:22). Thus, even when evidence contradicts the violence frame, the media can still continue to use the frame.

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[14] A useful selection of material from the Australian media –print and television- can be found at http://journalism.uts.edu.au/subjects/oj2/oj2_s2000/s11/pages/intro.html accessed 14/7/04.

Gothenburg, Sweden EU June 2001

The major frame or metaphor for reports on the Gothenburg protests in Sweden was war (Hultman 2003: 6). 'During the summit there was a constant mentioning of a "feeling of war", "the battle of Gothenburg", "besieged city", "guerrilla warfare" or "regular street combats" , while the accompanying photographs were 'charged with visual references to war aesthetics like people hunching down in the streets or frightened faces taking protection in a smoky environment' (Fridolfsson 2005: 17). By the end of the week's coverage the metaphor changes to one of rape, with Gothenburg presented as a raped and violated city:

> Many headlines talk about rape and being raped at the end of the week that I have studied. GP[15] writes for example "*Raped Gothenburg*'" and GT construct the headline "*They succeeded in raping the town.*" As well as in the headlines as in the article this metaphor is constructed. When DN describes how the police worked on Saturday it is presented as a consequent of a rape. "*Lines of containers were placed at strategic places in centre. The police did all it could to prevent a new rape.*" The rape is described by the media as a fact, and as a 'objective' description of the events. GT writes in a headline "*They raped Gothenburg. With masked faces and fist with stones they succeeded in raping Gothenburg*". The newspapers present the reader with a clear active subject and an object for its actions. The description of Gothenburg as a raped object, and thereby feminised object, that was invaded by rapists is also constructed and represented with words as "*outrage, ravaged* and *eliminated*" (Hultman 2003:6, emphasis in original).[16]

If the city had been raped, it is obvious that the rapists are the demonstrators, who are no longer political activists but barbarous and animals, the other, who is also consistently described as black, with the demonstrators 'reduced to their clothes and its imaginary symbolic of blackness. Blackness is thereby used in the newspaper representation as connecting the demonstrators to an already constructed imaginary of sexuality and anarchy' (Hultman 2003:7). The demonstrators then are animals, rapists and blacks. Hultman summarises his study of over 800 texts and pictures from six of the leading Swedish newspapers as 'an example of how included people, white, Swedish and political, might become racialised as a specific other... [which] has the function of reformulating a political struggle for global equity into an animalised biologism' (Hedkvist 2004: 2,3) Another analysis of three days of visual coverage in the Gothenburg press reports a 'dramatic overrepresentation of photos of violence. Twelve of a

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[15] GP, DN and GT are acronyms for newspapers whose full names Hultman does not give. From Vigil (2003:14) they can be identified as *Expressen*, Gothenburg (GT), *Dagens Nyheter* (DN) and *Göteborgsposten* (GP).

[16] The image of the wounded city was also reported for Seattle , which was left with 'wounds that city leaders say will not heal soon' (*Washington Post* 5 December 1999, A02, quoted in Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 83)

total of 144 newspaper photographs portray peaceful demonstrators' (Vigil 2003:23).

In this situation the police became Gothenburg's defenders against foreign rapists. Thus in a study of *Goteborgs-Posten* between June 11 and 18 Patrik Haggqvist notes strong sympathy for police officers, no doubt connected with his observation that the police were persistently used as the main source for the newspaper articles. (Hedkvist 2004: 23). In keeping with the pro-police coverage of Gothenburg in the Swedish press, the use of live ammunition against protesters does not appear to have been controversial for the local press, despite no demonstrator being shot in Sweden since 1931: 'the shootings of three demonstrators were portrayed as acts of self-defence, and criticism of the police actions that arguably triggered the riots was extremely muted' (Mueller 2004: 143).

Finally Mueller reports decided differences between reporting in Swedish and British papers regarding the protests: while Swedish media was overwhelmingly negative, if not vicious, 'British newspapers from left (*Guardian*) to right (*Daily Telegraph*) tended to sympathise with, or at least understand, them as signs of growing resistance within 'the people' of Europe to an ever-more centralised EU-project' (Mueller 2004:144 citing Enbom 2003).

Genoa, Italy G8 July 2001

Juris sees the media framing of Genoa as passing through three phases similar to those identified by Anderson (2004) in the US. In the first phase –the run-up to the protest- reporting helped spread fear and tension about the protest. For the second phase, immediately after the protest, the newspapers were full of images and accounts of violence and war. The third phase saw the media frame change to a critical view of the behaviour of the Italian police as undeniable accounts and images of police misbehaviour and abuse became available. For the second phase, the coverage of the events of July 20th were embodied in two images: the death of Carlo Giuliani and 'the appearance of a ravaged, war-torn city' (Juris 2005:424): 'the Italian and international press coverage on 21 July was filled with images of burning cars, masked protesters dressed in black hurling stones at Italian police, armoured *carabinieri* firing tear gas and brandishing shields, and the occasional shot of a bludgeoned protester receiving first-aid.' (Juris 2005:425).

For the Italian coverage, a useful taste is provided by a second-page article from *Il Secolo XIX* worth quoting at length:

> Black sweatshirts and pants, black ski masks, and red handkerchiefs wrapped around them. Molotov cocktails, sticks, stones and crowbars. The classic image of the violent squatters, which the Genoa Social Forum has spent months working against, descended on the city of the G8, reducing it to a battlefield of car skeletons, burning barricades, and devastated stores. The Black Bloc had a free hand in Genoa for four hours...It unleashed

the most disastrous urban guerrilla warfare ever seen around a summit' (quoted in Juris 2005: 425).

We should note here as well as the ascription of the violence solely to the anarchists, the 'vocabulary creep' involved in the application of the term 'urban guerrilla warfare' to the protesters' violence.

Juris reports the Spanish newspapers were less sensational in their reporting, while also attending to police violence. By July 23rd the frame was already beginning to shift, especially in the international press, with the Spanish paper *El Pais*, for example, describing the police raid on the Genoa Social Forum media centre in terms that draw on experiences with the Latin American dictatorships: 'in the middle of a generalized panic, journalists and members of the organization were obliged to lay down on the floor, face down with their hands in the air, in a scene reminiscent of "those experienced in Latin America during the 70s", as the President of the Genoa Social Forum later pointed out.' (quoted in Juris 2005: 426), while the same paper also recounted the experiences of a Spanish activist 'tortured in a police van' (Juris 2005: 426). Here the foreign papers were able to report on a local connection by drawing on the experiences of their nationals at the hands of a foreign (Italian) police force. [17]

An exception to the press trend on Genoa is given by Atton who characterises coverage by the English liberal paper *The Guardian* as sympathetic to, and in part reliant on, the voices of the demonstrators, with for example a story of 27 July 2001 'using its interview with the two activists to fill almost half the feature' (Atton 2002:501). While recognising that this inclusion of activist voices is still limited by professional journalism's 'routinised insistence that 'ordinary people' … may only speak on matters of which they know' (Atton 2002:502) Atton nevertheless praises the reporting of *The Guardian* on Genoa:

> throughout his reports from Genoa [*Guardian* reporter John] Vidal constantly explores the complex picture of the G8 protests: the brutality of police raids; the violence of some black block anarchists and evidence for their role as agents provocateurs; the debates between violence against property and violence against the person; the 'parallel summit' organised by demonstrators and taking place at the same time as the street violence (Atton 2002: 501).

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[17] Similar local interest was noted by Luckman and Redden in the case of Australian television reportage on S26 in Prague, which framed Prague in terms of S11 in Melbourne, including coverage of an Australian protester from Melbourne at the Prague protests. (Luckman and Redden 2001: 30).

Hong Kong WTO 2005

Early coverage (October 2004 to September 2005) tended to concentrate on security and protest policing (including concentration on 'worst case scenarios'), at least partly due to the assignment of security correspondents to the story. In this period, there was a strongly pro-establishment bias: police preparations were rarely challenged and anti-WTO sources seldom mentioned, much less quoted. L. Leung (2009: 255-256) confirms pre-conference coverage as anticipating violence and concentrating on police strategies and tactics to maintain order: 'the reports confirmed a binary characterization of protesters versus government/police which also served to imprint the dualities of law/lawless, good/evil, orderly/unruly, security/danger' (Leung, L. 2009: 256).

Lee's paper traces the coverage of the WTO protests in one elite newspaper, *Ming Pao*: while early coverage maintained pro-establishment and pro-police bias, expansion of reporting (through assigning two reporters to the story in May 2005) led to expansion of coverage, including coverage of protesters' position. There was a major concentration of media interest on Korean farmers, at least partly 'because they were identified as likely to engage in "violent protests". They therefore fit into the pre-conference framing of the anti-WTO protests' (Lee 2008: 65). For the Hong Kong press, the Korean farmers functioned as the foreign threatening other.

When protests began 'some Hong Kong media continued to sensationalise the coverage' -one extreme example being 'a TV reporter wearing a helmet to do on-site, live coverage when no physical or dangerous conflict was occurring' (Lee 2008:66). *Ming Pao*'s presentation of the protests framed them as 'carefully scripted dramas' with some positive coverage of the Korean farmers and a relaxation of the 'law and order' frame to accept minor police/protester scuffles and pushing and shoving, allowing the protests to be seen as largely peaceful. (Partly this was due to the stationing of reporters both inside the conference centre (three reporters) and with the protesters (two reporters)). Another important factor was a change in tactics by the Korean farmers who, at a midnight emergency meeting 'noticing the negative news coverage in Hong Kong they received on that first day, they spontaneously changed their tactics.' (Leung, L.Y.M. 2009: 60). The adoption of the 'three steps, one bow' tactic was so powerful that it changed 'the tone overnight from 'Korean protesters as violent' to 'Korean protesters as hapless victims' (Leung, L.Y.M. 2009: 58). The protesters also mobilised the cultural resources of highly popular Korean media exports: 'On the second day of the conference, a fresh array of female farmer protesters took the lead, when they incorporated into their protest strategies the theme-song of the Korean television blockbuster *Daejanggeum*' (Leung, L.Y.M. 2009: 57). However Lee cautions that, while the law and order frame was loosened, it remained in place, with anarchists substituting for the Koreans as the 'irrational other' and an expectation of heightened violence on December 17th, the eve of the last day. Then the coverage changed to the 'riot script' when the protesters went beyond what was locally acceptable as protest behaviour.

Here Lee makes the important point that 'the protests were only somewhat more violent than the protests in the first few days', shown by an injury count of only 70, 10 being police and only 3 being hospitalised for observation, 'not a single case of serious injury, and no property damage' (Lee 2008: 68-69). Lee's study shows how in particular conditions newspaper reporting can extend beyond the 'riot script' in reporting transnational summit protests and 'news can become much more open to alternative voices normally marginalised in daily news' (Lee 2008: 71).

Leung also confirms local media focussed on protests over conference proceedings, with less than 20% of coverage in *Ming Pao* devoted to the conference proceedings and 23 articles in *Apple Daily* on the protests, while less than 10 were devoted to the conference itself. (Leung, L. 2009: 256-257). The exaggerated reporting of violence was not unconnected with the sensationalist orientation of the Hong Kong media in a highly-competitive market: as one reporter told her 'we can't really defy editors' orders: we were literally told to focus on the violent clashes between the police and the protesters' (Leung, L. 2009: 260).

Leung presents a more cynical interpretation of violence at Hong Kong as a co-production of state, protesters and media, which emphases the performance and spectacular nature of the protests: 'For the government, the staged violence (and the quelling of it) served as proof of government competence and determination, as well as police strength. For the anti-establishment protesters, violence became a tool to attract concern for their plight. For the mainstream media, it became a money-making opportunity.' (Leung, L. 2009: 266). Leung characterises Hong Kong media coverage of WTO 2005 as involving 'sensationalized reporting, the almost excessive focus on the 'violent' protest instead of the conference as well as the focus on the Korean farmers as the only 'culprit' ' (Leung, L. 2009: 263) which she contrasts with the British *Guardian* coverage where the protests 'were a minor issue compared with the contents of the conference' (Leung 2009:261).

Gleneagles, Scotland G8 July 2005

Opposition to the G8 (Group of 8) meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland in July 2005 involved a variety of different groups and protests. On the reformist side of the AGM Make Poverty History (MPH) united a wide variety of English NGOs, charities and church groups, while the radical wing organised under the aegis of the Dissent network. MPH operated a major campaign for the year before the summit, including the sale of white armbands and photo opportunities such as a visit by 600 female clergy to the Downing Street residence of the British Prime Minister, culminating in a 'human wristband' encircling Edinburgh the week-end before the summit. Loosely associated with MPH was Live8, a musical event organised by Bob Geldof.

Gorringe and Rosie begin their consideration of media coverage of the anti-G8 campaign by looking at MPH's own evaluation of their media 'success'. This report, analysing a sample of 1200 press, magazine and online items, acclaimed this sample as generating 'over 1 billion opportunities to see with an advertising value equivalence of £136.5m' (MPH 2006 quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 5) while at least one of MPH's three demands –trade justice, debt cancellation and 'more and better aid'- was mentioned in 50% of these cases. Rosie and Gorringe used the same methodology to draw a different picture of the media coverage of the G8 campaign in the six months before the summit. Their results found that, in terms of 'media hits', key words such as violence/violent (504 uses), riot (314 uses) anarchist/anarchy (301 uses) exceeded trade justice (269 uses), drop the debt (298 uses) and 'more and better aid' (270 uses), while celebrity Bob Geldof received almost as many mentions (1473) as MPH itself (1516). (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 44).

Rosie and Gorringe thus suggest that MPH's celebration of the number of media hits is not a satisfactory method for the analysis of the media success of the G8 campaign: 'it is not enough, however, simply to show that certain terms were used...it is imperative to see just *how* these terms were used' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a:44), emphasising the *quality* of the coverage as well as its *quantity*. They then proceed to show how media coverage leading up to the summit framed the protests in negative terms, emphasising spectacular possibilities of violence, while marginalising, if not altogether ignoring, the reasons behind the protests: 'violence and disorder were, from the outset, central themes in the press imagination' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 43).

Analysis of media coverage in the six months prior to the Gleneagles G8 summit found 'anticipations of violence and disorder were central themes in the press imagination (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 8), while the proposed protests were situated largely within media accounts of Genoa 2001, rather than other previous summits (Kananaskis, Canada, Okinawa Japan, Sea Island, USA) where protests were non-violent. Even regarding Genoa itself, they note how media accounts involved a 'simplistic portrayal of the Genoa protests as violent –even though most protestors were peaceful and that much of the violence involved police authorities' (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 4). Reportage focussed on the anarchist and direct action fractions, describing what were open and publicised preparatory events and meetings in conspiratorial tones as 'secret meetings', while also presenting these preparatory activities in militaristic terms. A quote from *The Times* gives a taste of the coverage:

> A remote farm in the Lanarkshire countryside was transformed...into a city of well-laid out army tents and marquees resembling a military encampment. The military aspect was no accident. This was a "war summit" where about 300 anarchists –some dressed in urban guerrilla garb in freezing temperatures- had gathered to draw up plans to paralyse Scotland during the G8. (quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 13).

In pursuit of this theme journalists 'infiltrated' 'secret' meetings, attended 'training camps' and quoted anonymous 'leaders' as to their plans for 'total disruption' of the summit, while their reports were accompanied by violent images from the clashes at Genoa. The news they brought back with them was frightening indeed. *The Scottish Sun* (24/6/05, p. 4 quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2009a:45) warned:

> Scotland could become a battleground as protesters finalise their plans to wreck the G8 summit. Previous summits have ended in bloody –and deadly- clashes with police. Anti-capitalist websites give a shocking insight into their plans, which include flaming barricades and the storming of banks.

This treatment was not limited to the tabloids. A brave reporter for *The Sunday Times* 'spent six months posing as an anarchist to discover a sinister plan to unleash chaos on Scotland during the G8 summit.' (*The Sunday Times* 29/5/05, pp.1.4, quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 46).

This mode of reporting conjured up the 'folk devil' of the secretive, violent anarchist to create a 'moral panic' regarding the planned protests, even the mild-mannered reformist plans of MPH, with the fear that crazed anarchists would succeed in hijacking the protests, 'threatening to *infect* legitimate protest, turning 'law-abiding citizens' into criminal deviants' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 48). Thus, despite the attempt by some newspapers to separate 'legitimate' and 'extremist' protests and 'good' from 'bad' protesters, the protests as a whole were framed in violent terms. This emphasis on violent means of protest (how) drowned out the reasons for protest (why): 'more articles contained references to riots, violence and/or anarchists than to Make Poverty History's key aims' (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 9). This violent frame was extended even to the highly respectable MPH: 'the constant invoking of 'Genoa' and 'chaos' also characterized coverage of 'mainstream' organisations including MPH' (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 14). Given that it would be difficult even for the British tabloids to present MPH's plans in this light, much coverage was devoted to the possibility that militants would hijack MPH's activities to create disorder. Finally we should note that this violence-obsessed coverage was most pronounced in the local Scottish media: 'Premonitions of impending violence were most pronounced in Edinburgh's Scotsman Group titles (*The Scotsman*, *The Evening News*, and *Scotland on Sunday*) –to the point that they constituted a virulent, if localised moral panic.' (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 15). By June the local media were 'questioning the motives (and sanity) of even the most respectable protestors' (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 15).

The MPH march passed off peacefully and without arrests. But MPH's 'media-friendly 'spectacle', the symbolic ringing of Edinburgh's city centre by hundreds of thousands of white-clad demonstrators' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 50) did not provide the main frame or focus for reports of that Saturday in Edinburgh, with competing accounts of the Live8 concert and 'clashes', 'battles' and

'anarchists storm riot police barricades' dominating media reporting. The latter violent frame was built on an extremely thin empirical foundation: 'at one point, 60 anti-capitalist protesters were said to have acted "aggressively" and confronted the police in the city centre but there were no arrests' (*The Sunday Express* 3/7/05, quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 50). Still, why let the facts get in the way of a good story?[18]

London G20 2009

The media treatment of protest at the G20 in London in 2009 is exceptional in that the accepted frame of protester violence changed to one of 'police violence' following the death of a London man, Ian Tomlinson: as one set of authors comment 'what a difference a death makes' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b). In the latest of their series of excellent papers on the policing of summit protests in England and Scotland, these authors used LexisNexis to search for articles within 149 newspapers in Britain between January and April 2009. This research found the normal pattern of anticipatory coverage framing the expected protests in terms of the dangerous anarchist folk devil, with a useful example from the liberal, left-leaning *Observer* reporting 'growing fears for the safety of people going to work' along with entertaining tactical suggestions including 'speculation that protesters will drive a tank to the Excel conference centre on London's Docklands, where the G20 are meeting' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b), including only as an afterthought mention of the major rally planned by the Trades Union Congress and NGOs. As the authors note: 'it may seem surprising that the Observer declare *Government of the Dead* as a "leading protest group" whilst largely ignoring *Put People First* (a broad coalition of trade unions, faith groups, NGOs and charities) but 'anarchists' make better copy than trade unionists' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b). The point is further emphasised by their analysis of coverage in the *Sunday Times* of the entirely peaceful *Put People First* march of 35,000: 'the march received almost no coverage: a short (300 word) piece' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009). They concluded press coverage 'highlighted themes of conspiratorial, secretive and dangerous protesters and a concomitant para-militarization of the policing. Lost in the coverage were 'legitimate' and 'peaceful' protest organisations, their motivation and policies' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b).

These authors note a shift in the tone of coverage in some papers from anticipated protester violence to police tactics, partly due to reporters'

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[18] This was echoed in the coverage of the radical protesters' attempt to march on the summit site at Gleneagles the following Wednesday. Here again an incident where 'a small group of protesters...left the march and entered a field next to the security fencing' leading to 'a minor breach in a fence' (McKiggan n.d.) was blown up into the 'Battle of Gleneagles', even in supposedly responsible and sympathetic newspapers like *The Guardian*. Needless to say whatever political causes motivated these protesters were not reported on.

experience within the police 'kettles' and protesters' complaints, but mainly due to Ian Tomlinson's death: what is particularly interesting is that 'the shift in tone occurred when Tomlinson's death was still seen as accidental' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b).Their work can be seen to have established their contention that 'culpability for police tactics and their consequences lie, at least in part, with the self-same media who so convincingly damned them *after* the event' (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b).

Greer and McLaughlin (2010) look at the same subject based on news reports from 1 March 2009 to 25 April 2009, accessed both in hard copy and through LexisNexis, supplemented by television and Youtube coverage, as well as analysis of the official reports subsequently produced. They agree with Rosie and Gorringe that 'early press coverage reflected and reinforced an explicit inferential structure built around the default news frame of 'protester violence' that prioritised the police perspective on the events of the G20' (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1049) and demonstrate this in convincing detail. They then note the change in focus from protester violence to police violence, which they attribute to citizen journalism. Here they note 'the sheer density and variety of recording devices being used by professional and citizen journalists, private businesses, demonstrators, the police and passers-by' (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1050). The decisive moment in the shift in frames came on April 7 when the '*Guardian* website broadcast mobile phone footage that appeared to provide clear evidence of police violence against Tomlinson minutes before he collapsed' (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1050-1051) recorded by an American fund manager passing by. As these authors note, citizen journalism did more than simply undermine the news frame of protester violence: 'it also resulted in numerous official inquiries... and raised wider questions about public order policing and the news media in the twenty-first century' (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1053). These authors give a resounding summation of the success of citizen journalism in this case: 'Were it not for the incendiary 'visual evidence' handed to the news media by citizen journalists, the 'story' of Ian Tomlinson may never have taken off, the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] may well have succeeded in denying or defusing allegations of police violence and the policing of G20 may have ended up in MPS 'Greatest Hits' portfolio of how to police public order events in the capital. Because of citizen journalism, the operational integrity and institutional authority of MPS were first of all questioned and then successfully challenged' (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1054).

As well as more general cultural explanations for the transition from protester to police violence, these authors note two contributing factors: press dissatisfaction with police treatment of reporters working at protests meant that the press, on the basis of their personal experience, were 'receptive to information that challenged the MPS version of events' (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1055) while in recent scandals that undermined 'the MPS position in the news media 'hierarchy of credibility' the 'official truth' disseminated by MPS statements had been found to be incorrect and/or misleading' (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1056). Later work by the same authors reports how 'what

began as an *event-oriented* news frame of 'police violence' –the activities of an unidentified rogue officer- evolved into an inferential structure that highlighted problems of a *systemic* nature –how the MPS police public protest' (Greer and McLaughlin 2012:288) with 'the inferential structure of 'police violence' … co-joined in this time period by the additional frame of an 'institutional culture' of 'cover-up and impunity' in cases of police misconduct' (Greer and McLaughlin 2012:282).

Framing the movement in images

I have already noted the important role photographs have come to play in the media presentation of the AGM. Higgins (2003), Vigil (2003) on Gothenburg and Perlmutter and Wagner (2004) are the only work I found which undertake detailed analysis of photographs published on the subject of anti-summit protests.[19] DeLuca and Peeples (2002: 141-142) found that images were central to the reporting of Seattle in the US newspapers, Rausch et al (2007) document that from 1999 to 2004 in *The New York Times* photographic coverage exceeded news story coverage, while for the social fora, Ekrantz (2004) notes the importance of photographs in representations of the WSF, as does Das Gupta (2004) in terms of Indian papers' coverage of WSF Mumbai.

A striking example of description bias is shown by the photographic treatment of the killing of Carlo Giuliani by police during the Genoa G8 protest in July 2001. As Perlmutter and Wagner (2004) note, the photographic icon chosen

> is the fourth in a series of 11 images taken in sequence by Dylan Martinez before, during and after Giuliani's shooting. Rather than feature the scene where Giuliani lies contorted on the ground in a pool of his blood or even an image where the police jeep has backed over his body, the mainstream press selected the suggestive image of Giuliani lifting the fire extinguisher and the police officer pointing the gun out of the back of the vehicle…the content of this image…was selected by mainstream media to assert a simple narrative of protester violence, not police violence. (Perlmutter and Wagner 2004: 102)

Nor was this the only choice made in photographic constructions of Genoa: as an example of selection bias, available photographic evidence of collusion between police and 'Black Bloc' activists was ignored by the mass media. The violence in Genoa was dismissed by many protesters as the work of agents provocateurs. These claims were supported when 'Italian newspapers printed a photograph that showed people dressed as Black Bloc protesters, their faces covered, standing at the gates of a local *carabinieri* barracks. The men in the photo clutched what appeared to be metal rods as a smiling uniformed officer

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[19] While Vigil (2003) is exceptional in the amount of visual material it reprints from the press, the orientation of the analysis of that material is tangential to this essay and so will not be engaged with here.

stood nearby. Other pictures showed presumed Black Bloc members engaging in what appeared to be a friendly chatter with police before starting a riot' (Philipps and Trofimov 2001: 10).[20] Needless to say, these photographs did not grace the pages of the international media. Finally,

> More revealingly, as a cue to a process of purposive framing at work, many mainstream media sources discontinued their coverage of the G8 by the Monday following Giuliani's death. It was almost as if once the metonym of 'anarchist violence provokes police response' had been shown and written up, the work of these press agencies was complete. (Perlmutter and Wagner 2004: 103)

Thus they conclude that the image 'served less to show what happened than to direct public gaze and interpretations to framed meanings that, in this instance, marginalised a strike against authority by establishing 'protester violence' as the news lead. (Perlmutter and Wagner 2004: 91)

Higgins collected newspaper material from nine English newspapers from July 16 to July 24 2000, yielding 65 texts and 49 visuals, mainly photographs, but also cartoons. Of these visuals, nine dealt with the protests, four portraying a human chain protest at Kadena air base, two portraying marches and one portraying Jubilee 2000's protests. Higgins gives a detailed analysis of two photographs, one of the human chain (reproduced in the *Daily Telegraph*, *Financial Times* and the *Times*) and another of a student protest (reproduced in the *Daily Telegraph*), as well as the textual context (the headlines, articles and captions accompanying the photographs) noting that, while the human chain photograph presents a confrontational or oppositional action interaction between the protesters and the fence surrounding the US airbase, the demonstration is obviously peaceful and non-violent. Higgins notes that the headline ('Protesters hijack G8 summit') and caption used in the *Daily Telegraph* differs from those in the other newspapers, invoking a script of violence. The second *Daily Telegraph* photograph caption refers to helmeted and masked Japanese students: 'The words helmeted and masked once again invoke images of violence and terrorism. They reiterate the hijack image from the previous day' with the result that 'The promise of violence rather than peace is the message we are left with', leading her to conclude 'These two photos combine to produce a reportage of expected violence as an introduction to the G8 summit in this paper' (Higgins 2003:8).

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[20] A similar example of police infiltrators dressing as Black Bloc in Gothenburg was reported in a small article in the independent social democratic newspaper *Aftonbladet* (Vigil 2003:28) but the issue of police infiltration and agents provocateurs was ignored in the wholesale coverage of Black Bloc violence by the Swedish press.

Ignoring the Social Fora

Before examining the media treatment of the social fora we should note complaints (mainly by the NGO wing of the AGM) that social fora, alternative summits and similar events organised to coincide with major mainstream summits are routinely ignored by the media in favour of coverage of (preferably violent) anti-summit protests. The following complaint is reasonably typical: 'Organisers of the G8 Alternative Summit have been very frustrated with the German press' focus on the images of disturbances on the margins of Saturday's largely peaceful rally and its lack of coverage of the issues relating to global justice that are being discussed in the week-long affair that is timed with the G8 meeting in Heiligendamm' (Focus on the Global South 2007). When the choice comes down to the movement in its meetings and the movement in the streets, the media go with the streets. Given this, we should not be surprised if the media did not prove enthusiastic in their coverage of the social fora. Set up as an opposition to the WEF in Davos, the World Social Forum (WSF) initially presented a simple oppositional or comparative frame to the media, a frame that the media used immediately. However the media framed both fora differently, with the WEF being portrayed as sober and businesslike, while the WSF was carnivalistic, utopian and out of control, and thus impractical, often with the use of religious metaphors presenting the WSF as a site of pilgrimage. (Ekecrantz 2004:126).

The treatment of social fora in the media can be examined in terms of the amount of coverage and the comparative coverage of WEF versus WSF – selection bias- and also in terms of the content of coverage –description bias. For selection bias, when we turn to mainstream media coverage of the various Social Fora we are struck by how conspicuous it is in its absence. Thus, in the regularly-produced reports on the WSF by the Swiss group the Centre for Applied Studies in Negotiation (CASIN) noting the limitations of mainstream media coverage becomes an annual ritual. For WSF Mumbai 'The fourth WSF went largely unnoticed by most of the international mass media.' (Simonson 2004:47). For 2005 'there was widespread criticism among WSF participants this year that, of the little mainstream news coverage of the WSF, the majority of it centred on the Brazilian President'. (Simonson 2005:32). For the Nairobi WSF 'mainstream media coverage…was fairly limited.' (Simonson 2007:23). However we should note important national differences. Beyeler and Hubscher (2003: 10) report a comparatively high attention to AGM counter-summits, especially the WSF, in *Le Monde* and the Bolivian *El Diario* compared with other European and US newspapers. Contextual factors can explain this: *Le Monde* is a leftist paper and French activists were strongly involved in the preparation for and development of the WSF, while Brazil is nearer to Bolivia than any of the other countries whose papers Beyeler and Hubscher studied: thus the WSF represented a local or regional news issue to *El Diario*.

This can be compared with the situation in the USA. Solomon (2001) noted the first WSF went almost unnoticed in the US media, with a search of the Nexis

database finding, despite wire services like AP producing coverage, one article in *The Washington Post*, no mention in *The LA Times* or *USA Today* and one paragraph in the self-described US 'paper of record' *The New York Times* on the detention of Jose Bove after he joined an attack on a Monsanto farm growing soyabeans. Bennet et al (2004) compare coverage of the WEF and WSF in *The New York Times* between 2001 and 2003. The following table speaks for itself as to the importance *The New York Times* attributed to the WSF:

Year	WEF	WSF
2001	12	0
2002	58	5
2003	18	3

Table 5: New York Times *number of articles on WEF and WSF, 2001 - 2003. Based on Bennett et al (2004:442).*

The large number of articles on the WEF in 2002 is due to the WEF being held in New York: as a 'local story' the Forum received increased coverage.

Medeiros (2005) similarly compared treatment of the WSF and the WEF in elite newspapers in England and the US in 2005. (See Table 6).

	Financial Times	*Guardian*	*New York Times*	*Wall Street Journal*
WSF	1	2	2	-
WEF	13	4	6	3

Table 6: Number of articles on WEF and WSF, 2005. Medeiros (2005).

The American national media's disdain for social fora is not confined to foreign fora. The first US Social Forum in 2007 'drew some 12,000 activists and not a single major newspaper or television reporter outside its host city of Atlanta' (Hollar 2010). A similar blackout affected the second US Social Forum in Detroit in 2010 (attended by 15,000 to 20,000), which Hollar compares with the Tea Party Convention (attended by 600): 'Across ten major national outlets in the two weeks surrounding each event, the Tea Party got 177 mentions to the Social Forum's three' (Hollar 2010).

Ekecrantz (2004) compares press coverage of the WSF in four countries –Brazil, China, Russia and Sweden. Ekecrantz cites Maia and Castro (2004) as discerning three major discourses (or frames) in the wide and very mixed coverage in the Brazilian media: in one the 'carnival' or 'spectacle' aspect of the WSF was emphasised, especially in images and visual material; another framed the WSF as 'utopian' (to be read as 'unrealistic') and emphasised 'useless verbosity'; the third recognised and analysed the forum as an expression of left politics. In Russia there was very little coverage of the WSF except for some neutral material in business weeklies and some local internet sites. A systematic search for coverage of the 2002 WSF found only reports from news agencies and some translations from foreign media. For China, Ekecrantz reports on a recent trip to Beijing and Shanghai where he interviewed news editors, journalists and staff and students of university communication departments:

> The WSF was largely unknown. In fact not one researcher or student answered that she or he had heard about it and a few journalists only vaguely, if at all (although all of them were heavy web users). The sampling is of course highly unrepresentative, but it indicates that the WSF is not simply an issue in China. (Ekecrantz 2004:130)

In Sweden Ekecrantz reports that despite relatively broad coverage, which has increased over the years, the WSF has been reported as utopian and unrealistic, with less attention paid to the sober meetings and workshops that are the political content of the WSF: 'the dominant discourse on the WSF is strikingly similar to that of the Carnivalistic and Utopian frame in the Brazilian press. The photographic material strongly underlines this perspective on the WSF.' (Ekecrantz 2004: 127). In conclusion Ekecrantz notes similarities across his four chosen countries: 'their national media do not endorse the basic ideas at the WSF, either by being silent about them or by patronizing them, sometimes comparing them with the more sober expression of the WEFs' (Ekecrantz 2004:132).

For WSF Mumbai Taghioff (2005) identifies five strands to its treatment in English-language newspapers in India. The first, emphasising the size and colourful nature of the Forum, treats it as a spectacle. The second related the Forum to debates on globalisation with critics –mainly in the business and conservative press- deriding it as utopian and irrational, and supporters –mainly in the liberal press- producing a varied debate giving 'a sense of contradictory discussions within the elite groups of the Indian polity' (Taghioff 2005: 6). The third theme was provided by a rape case at the Forum, while the fourth consisted of profiles of star attendees like Joseph Stiglitz and Arundhati Roy. The final theme was one of local interest, with reports on Indian activists and the organisation of a more traditional left rally, Mumbai Resistance. Taghioff stresses those articles which treat of the Forum as unrealistic, irrational and unproductive, with comparisons being drawn between the WSF and a religious event, the attendees thus becoming 'true believers' who are, by definition, irrational. (Taghioff 2005).

This study is complemented by research in regional and local language newspapers. CDL (Communication for Development and Learning) compiled news coverage in Karnataka state over the five days of the Forum, covering four English-language nationals circulating in the state and four local language papers published in Bangalore. When of the latter four only one was found to cover the WSF, coverage in an English-language newspaper circulating in Karnataka was added to the study. For the nationals *The Hindu*'s coverage was the highest, with 21 items: it also published Arundhati Roy's plenary speech in the main paper. The local English language paper was next with 18 items (2 on the front page), while the only local language paper that covered the WSF ran 11 items, 6 on the front page. Much of the coverage was visually lavish, in keeping with Taghioff's identification of the spectacle frame. The most important evidence provided by the study was the non-coverage in non-English language media, which of course have wider and deeper reach –especially among the poorer elements- than English-language media. (Das Gupta 2004).

For the European Social Forum (ESF), Rucht and Teune examined coverage in paired elite conservative and liberal papers in four host countries (Italy, France,

Britain and Greece) and two other countries (Germany and Spain). The pattern shows coverage starts at a reasonable level (190 articles) for Florence (2002), rises to 222 for Paris (2003), before dropping precipitously for London (2004) (58) and Athens (2006) (61). For the first ESF, there were (disappointed) expectations that the violence from Genoa would spill over to Florence, with several press correspondents interviewed mentioning 'the pressure exerted by their directors or editorial staff to report negatively on the event' (Rucht and Teune 2007: 15). Thus the papers attempted to frame the Florence ESF as a sequel to Genoa and showed no interest (during press conferences, etc.) in any issue other than demonstrations and possible violence. The second ESF in Paris received greater coverage than any other ESF, partly through coverage in the French left-wing press and distribution of coverage on the AFP wire service, while the right-wing papers paid much attention to the presence of Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan, subject of half the 54 articles published in *Le Figaro* in relation to the Paris ESF (Rucht and Teune 2007: 16). Excepting coverage in *The Guardian* (official media partner of ESF London) Rucht and Teune (2007: 16) found little coverage of ESF London, a finding confirmed by CASIN (Lee 2004: 12). For the Athens ESF, the accompanying demonstration finally fulfilled the media's desire to use its violence frame: 'the violence attracted most space in the media coverage for the entire ESF. In Germany, the majority of newspapers reduced their coverage to this particular incident, while the forum as such was of secondary importance only' (Rucht and Teune 2007: 17). The conclusions of these researchers are as follows: 'three trends are obvious: proximity is the key explanatory factor for the amount of press coverage; the media interest in the event decreases over time; and liberal and conservative media differ widely in their coverage.' (Rucht and Teune 2007: 17). Later work (Teune 2009) reiterated these conclusions.

The movement in the periphery

Mirroring the paucity of literature reported on policing of the AGM in peripheral countries (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009) regrettably there are no full-length articles on media treatment of the AGM in peripheral countries. What we can do here is simply cite such sources as can be found. In preparation for the APEC summit in November 2004 in Santiago, Chile, the usual media demonization campaign began in September 2004. According to Alvaro Ranis of ATTAC Chile, who was organizing the Chilean Social Forum parallel to the APEC Summit, 'the most powerful media outlets' were waging a campaign to 'demonize, ahead of time, the demonstrations to be held by citizens who express Chilean civil society's dissent regarding neo-liberal globalisation policies.' Alarmist press reports included alleged preparations for 'terrorist' acts against the summit as well as traditional reports on meetings of the coordinating committee in a 'dimly lit' trade union office, where the committee meets to plot violent action. According to conservative daily *El Mercurio* (2 October 2004) the APEC security operation could be threatened by the committee, which

linked 'around 30 ultra-left and anarchist groups' and 'black-clad punks'. (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009:229). This example can be supplemented by analyses of two peripheral social movements that are part of the AGM.

Hammond reports five different frames for the organisation of the rural landless, the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra), in the Brazilian media: the MST as a militant revolutionary organisation, as 'solution to a national problem' (that of idle land, unemployed rural workers and rural to urban migration), as pathetic creatures who symbolise an archaic rural Brazil out of tune with contemporary Brazilian reality, as guerrilla capitalists and as 'a law-breaker and provoker of violence', the 'demonization' frame. 'Of the five, the demonization frame appears most frequently, probably accounting for more newspaper reports than the other four combined. It is also, evidently, the most clearly hostile to the movement.' (Hammond 2004: 80). The predominance of negative frames is confirmed by an analysis of four major Brazilian dailies between April and August 1999 which leads Maisa Mendoca to conclude:

> A large part of these articles characterise the landless as aggressive, potential guerrilla fighters, obsessed with the seizure of power or violent. On the other hand, the police are presented as defenders of order, although statistics of violence in the countryside demonstrate the opposite (Mendoca 2000 quoted in Hammond 2004: 84).

This negative frame is shown by the use of the explicitly condemnatory term 'land invasions' for land occupations by the MST, while Hammond also cites the work of Berger as showing the importance of violence in the framing of the MST. 'It is violence, or the possibility of violence, that dominates coverage of the movement, Berger claims, especially if the occupiers can be described as "armed" –which, as Berger shows, usually means that they have armed themselves with shovels and sickles, adopting a "defensive-provocative" stance (Hammond 2004: 73).

Hammond tempers this negative view by noting the coverage is 'in reality, more complex' (Hammond 2004: 84) as shown by the existence of the other four competing, if minor, frames. He also makes the useful point that framing of a social movement involves framing both the movement itself and the issue that the movement raises. On the latter, MST 'can reasonably claim that it has won the battle to frame its main issues, the land question, in the Brazilian media. The media (even, sometimes, the provincial press owned by local elites) generally portray agrarian reform as a necessity and the struggle for it as just' (Hammond 2004: 75). Finally it is notable that the occasions where it moves outside the land question that the MST gets most negative framing. These include its involvement in indigenous protests and the World Social Forum.

A similar concern over violence can be seen in some press framing of Thailand's Assembly of the Poor (AOP). Founded in Bangkok in 1995, the AOP received favourable media treatment for its initial marathon demonstrations in 1996 and

1997 but after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 coverage in some papers became unfavourable as 'editors feared that protest would create a negative image of Thailand and scare away foreign investment' (Chalermsripinyorat 2004:545). AOP protests at Pak Mun dam in 2000 led to increased coverage when the possibility of conflict and violence piqued media interest: in the words of the general news editor of Thai tabloid newspaper *Thairath* 'We sent a reporter to monitor the situation there when the prospect of violence was looming. We waited until the situation returned to normalcy and when there was no more sign of violence, we [then] asked the reporter to come back.' (quoted in Chalermsripinyorat 2004: 550). As protests continued without conflict media interest waned: in reponse the AOP staged protests with strong visual impacts to maintain media interest and in recognition of media covering the protest more with photographs than with news reports. Finally it should be noted that media concern over and dislike for violence also applied to violence involved in state repression. When the AOP invaded the premises of Government House in Bangkok in July 2000 'Despite public debates about whether or not the protesters were justified in trespassing into the government compound, the media actually devoted more attention to the state's heavy-handed response to the action. The widespread condemnation turned the tables on the government as the press began to take a more sympathetic stance towards the AOP.' (Chalermsripinyorat 2004:557).

Some (tentative) conclusions

While Cottle (2008: 855) is correct in claiming 'much has changed since earlier studies documented how the mainstream news media invariably reports protests and demonstrations through a dominant law and (dis)order frame, labelling protesters as deviant and de-legitimising their aims and politics by emphasizing drama, spectacle and violence', in some ways little has changed. The majority of the data this essay has examined supports a view that insurgent social movements are still framed primarily within a deviant and violent frame, marginalizing and trivializing the movement and its adherents. The emphasis remains on spectacle, drama, confrontation, violence and deviance. We have seen classic media tactics of marginalisation, the reappearance of the folk devil and the threatening outsider (whether in the form of foreign agitators, anarchists, Korean farmers or German terrorists) and the use of racialised and sexualised frames to 'other' protesters. We have come across little evidence of the 'possibility for a … more complex range of media responses to protests and demonstrations than in the past' (Cottle 2008: 857), though we should note the more optimistic conclusions of Lee (2008) on Hong Kong and Rojecki (2002) on Seattle.

What we have also seen is, once the violence frame had made its debut in Seattle, a reproduction of that frame over the following years as it was applied to the succeeding summit sieges and reproduced internationally –at least in the English-language press- with the creation of a series of media events that local

media expect to shoe-horn into the available frame. A particular media treatment of the AGM was reproduced internationally with the emphasis on protest and riot over deliberation and forum and an emphasis on violent over peaceful protest, and on spectacle. Similar tactics were seem worldwide – othering, marginalization, etc., as was anticipatory coverage. We appear to have here the global spread and adoption for local use of a frame made in Seattle.

This broad conclusion needs qualifying. Having accepted that the most popular frame is one which continues to marginalise movements through emphasis on their deviant and violent nature, we must note the minority of data and analyses that dissent from this position. Rojecki's (2002) analysis claims media moved beyond this frame over the period it covered Seattle. On the issue of the dominance of violence in the frame, data from Canada (Miljan and Lee 2003), the USA (Rausch et al 2007 and Boykoff 2006) and Bolivia and France (Beyeler and Hubscher 2003) contradicted the emphasis on violence as the most popular frame. Similarly, while much coverage was negative, a reasonable amount of positive coverage was also found. Even in US, there was positive coverage of some constituent parts of the AGM, for example, the student sweatshop campaign. (Opel n.d.).

Despite many commonalities in the media treatment of the AGM, there has been international variation also: the coverage in the US was much more negative than that in Canada, for example. We have seen decided national differences in media treatment of the AGM. Thus once again when globalisation is in question national contexts, forces and ideologies are decisive. Furthermore traditional explanatory factors (such as whether a newspaper is of the left or of the right, liberal or conservative) and journalistic routines and organisational factors (such as to which correspondents a story is entrusted and what sources – governmental, security forces- are called on) continue to be of basic importance in explaining media behaviour. As no doubt does the question of ownership. It is not my purpose here to do so, but it appears possible to make an initial characterisation of some of the globe's major English-language newspapers/media from the different ways they reported, framed and constructed the activities of the AGM. A useful analysis might perhaps lie in the field of media ownership, such as comparisons among media owned by News Corporation and others.

This essay confirms Mac Sheoin and Yeates (2009)'s conclusion in relation to policing of AGM protests, that national, regional and local issues and conditions are important factors which have not been washed away by the tidal wave of globalisation. Thus, a variety of traditional explanatory factors –such as the political orientation of the newspaper and the national political context on one side or newsroom organisation and procedures (such as whether the story is assigned to security correspondents) on the other- are of prime importance to how the media treat antiglobalisation protesters. We also see issues such as the geographical nearness of protest are of importance in coverage decisions, while

we can also see that summits are –and are reported as- local as well as global events.

The violence debate

There has been much debate in the literature as to whether the 'symbolic' 'performative' violence at the protests has been advantageous or disadvantageous for the AGM. Juris' position is straightforward: the militants' embrace of symbolic/performative violence as a means of expressing both subcultural identities and rejection of capitalism was used by the state and the media to legitimise police repression and portray the protesters as violent hooligans, while dismissing the politics behind the symbolic violence: 'Performative violence thus provides an important tool for resource-poor actors in their struggle for visibility, but only at the substantial cost of reinforcing the media frames and repressive strategies promoted by police and government authorities' (Juris 2005: 428). Thus while violence ensnares and ensures media attention and widespread dissemination of coverage of protests, it is also used to dismiss and demonise the protesters.

While some research suggests protests without arrests and violence have a higher chance of receiving 'thematic' ('message'-related) as opposed to 'episodic' ('event'-related) coverage (Mueller 2004: 143 citing Smith et al 2001: 1412) there is also the chance that these protests will not be reported at all, especially in the international press. Mueller (2004: 143) notes relating to Gothenburg 'the riots were covered in detail by the international press –something that did not occur after the much-larger anti-EU protests in Brussels and Barcelona.' Again, from the point of view of the militants who wish to convey the message that there is resistance to the status quo 'a picture of a black-hooded rioter throwing stones at riot police is likely to communicate that there is militant dissent, no matter how the media spin it.' (Mueller 2004: 144). Mueller's note that the violence frame satisfactorily propagates the message of the radical wing that resistance is possible returns us to the realisation that we are dealing with an alliance (often unhappy) of widely diverging forces in the AGM, a point further emphasised by evidence on the divergent forms and means of communication undertaken by different forces in the movement.

A major criticism made of media coverage by some elements in the AGM was that attention was focussed on the streets rather than reporting on the (allegedly more positive) proceedings at the movement's alternative or counter-summits organised in parallel with the IFI summits and at which positive policy solutions were put forward. (In this they echoed complaints by IFI apparatchiks that the street stole coverage from the offical summits also). This dismissive attitude on the part of the media was to continue with the arrival of the WSF and other social fora.

Contributions and limitations of the literature surveyed

The literature reviewed in this essay represents some steps forward in the study of media and protest. First the literature on summit protests has added a new dimension to framing of protests by drawing attention to the importance of anticipatory coverage of protests. Thus methodologically it is no longer enough to look at the framing of protests during and immediately after the protests: for an accurate picture, preliminary and anticipatory coverage must also be included. The analysis of anticipatory coverage emphasises the importance of media to social movements, not simply in relation to obtaining coverage for social movement claims and issues (i.e. agenda-building) but also in terms of its impact of the practical activity of protest itself. The coverage proves again the implications of the folk devil model, as anticipatory coverage was used to justify increased repression, chilling dissent and reducing the available space for protest.

Another useful contribution suggests protest needs to be analysed in a dialectical relationship with the summit or event being protested. Meade (2008) argues successfully for analysis of the presentation by the media of the summit as part of a process in which summit and protesters are framed together and in opposition to each other. Thus ideally a study should look both at the framing of the protest and the framing of the summit and the organisation involved. Shumate, Bryant and Monge's (2005) analysis of DAN and the WTO at Seattle is another useful example of the benefits of this perspective.

This also suggests it is insufficient to confine oneself to the analysis of the media: it is necessary also to attend to the position of the police and the varied security forces and forces of repression, as their protest management plans and strategies include media strategies which are highly influential in framing protests.

Related to this, and a definite move forward in scholarship in this area, is the increasing attention that is being paid to movement strategies in relation to media, both in relation to corporate mass media (including the new social media) and to the development of their own alternative media. The appearance of such academic analyses (Mattoni 2012, McCurdy 2010, Rucht 2004, Teune 2006, Wall 2003) as well as analyses by movement participants (CounterSpin Collective 2005, Media G8 International Press Group 2007, Stad 2007) is a welcome development, though one I have not engaged with, for reasons of space. Related to this is also Donson's pointing out the difference between the AGM and the traditional folk devil, due to the reflexive nature of the AGM. Thus the movement can change its activities to undermine some media framing. Here we may cite with Donson et al (2004) changes in movement activity in Prague, as well as the Tute Bianchi's reversal of the traditional black/white dichotomy, while analyses of Korean protesters' changed tactics in Hong Kong are also relevant, as well as their mobilisation of themes and motifs from the Korean popular culture that was washing over Asia at the time of the protests.

This change, and other changes in what Cottle calls the media ecology, implies future study of this issue must broaden from traditional media studies of newspaper and television coverage. It's noticeable that the vast majority of the studies brought together in this review concentrated on newpaper coverage; only a minority look at television coverage, which is generally accepted to be the major means of popular access to news. Furthermore in the newspaper analyses, the vast majority of newspapers chosen were elite newspapers, rather than tabloid, popular newspapers. There is also a need to broaden analyses from words to images. The small number of analyses dedicated to pictorial representation are a welcome addition to the literature and a step in the right direction.

One of the major lacunae in the literature is information on media coming from peripheral countries. Finally we might note how little the coverage and its analyses has grappled with the transnational nature of AGM protest. Despite the heavy emphasis in the literature on the novelty of this transnational aspect of the AGM, neither the media nor academic analyses have extensively engaged with this aspect of the movement. This is an important contribution to the existing debate over the limitations of media sources for the study of social movements and protests. What has been disappointing has been the lack of suitably global analyses of a global phenomenon. The prevalence of methodological nationalism shown in the proliferation of national studies leads one to appreciate even more those few internationally or globally comparative studies that exist. By bringing together evidence from the various national and international studies I hope I have made a useful contribution to this necessary global analysis.

Appendix: Reporting the anti-globalisation movement

Much of the literature looks at representation, construction or framing of and discourses about the AGM and its activists in the media, with a large number of case studies of particular anti-summit and other demonstrations. There is a general emphasis on the marginalisation of protesters through framing them as ignorant, violent, young, etc., with specific examples of protesters being framed as 'Other' –as foreign or animal, through racialisation and their presentation as folk devils. Studies can be national (eg Canadian television coverage) and transnational: comparisons are made between different media (television and newspapers), as well as between different countries. Many studies report on pre-summit coverage, accompanied by felon-setting and preparation for violence. This specific aspect needs to be seen in the wider context of the policing and repression of the AGM. (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009).

One problem with the available studies is their limited geographic spread. Even though the AGM, and AGM protests, have drawn academic attention specifically due to its and their transnational character, the majority of academic studies deal with the media treatment of AGM protest within a national context, whether by looking at protests in one country or through looking at media in one country. Many are confined to one country or even one newspaper. Most of the media studied are within core western countries (*The New York Times* gets serious attention, for example), and media studied often tend to be published in world cities. Studies such as Beyeler and Hubscher (2003) and Ekcrantz (2004), which reach across the divide between core and peripheral countries, are rare. There is little available on non-core country media treatment of the AGM and AGM demonstrations. This echoes the lack of studies of the policing of the AGM in peripheral countries (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009). Such work as exists concentrates on single movements such as the MST in Brazil (Hammond 2004) or the Assembly of the Poor in Thailand (Chalermsripinyorat 2004).

The media frame developed at Seattle was reproduced for later summit protests in the US and was also globalised. Coverage of summit protests in the US media after Seattle involved constant references back to Seattle, as the first such protest in the US and therefore the debut of the summit frame. For example, coverage of A16 in Washington DC consistently referred back to Seattle: 'The extensive police preparation was a perpetual theme in pre-protest articles, which repeatedly noted the similarities with the WTO protests in Seattle' (Boykoff 2006: 212), while for reports of the protests themselves 'more than half of all newspaper accounts (53%) of the A16 protests compared happenings in DC to the violence in Seattle, while more than a third (37%) of television segments did the same' (Boykoff 2006:213). Rausch et al (2007), in their study of the *New York Times* from October 1999 to September 2004, also document continued references to Seattle in half of all stories on AGM protest, except in the period October 2002 to September 2003, when movement activities mainly involved anti-war protests with little parallel to Seattle. (Rausch et al 2007:

140). Thus the coverage was consistently framed in reference to Seattle 'used as a symbolic reference connoting the threat of civic disorder' (Rausch et al 2007: 141). For US television networks coverage of summit protests Rechitsky (2005) reports 'The same clip of protesters kicking down a Starbucks window showed up during the introductory segment of nearly half of all reports covering the events in Seattle, Washington D.C., New York and Miami.'

This reference to previous events is not confined to the US media nor is Seattle the only reference point. Berenson's study of six different newspapers found more than a third of articles on summit protests used an explicit memory-based frame for their reporting: this memory-based frame involved 'negative references to previous protest activities activating cognitive schemas built during the coverage of previous events, maintaining them and associating them with the portrayal of the new event.' (Berenson 2009: 6-7) Thus the original frame is reactivated for each new protest. The continuation of a frame across/along a series of protests is helped by the use of memory-based frames/strategies. Lee (2008), for example, reporting from Hong Kong, presents an image of local media replicating an already existing international frame to which local reporting is expected to conform.

There are a variety of possible ways to approach this literature. One method might be to examine the findings of the literature on a national basis, attempting to lay out a history of media presentation of the AGM in the US, Canada and elsewhere, comparing and contrasting national experiences. Another might involve looking at the treatment of the AGM by the type of medium (television, quality paper, tabloid paper). I will look first at longtitudinal surveys of media treatment of the AGM before examining the framing of the AGM's two major manifestations, summit protests and social fora.

International coverage

Certain differences have been reported between coverage of the AGM in the media of the English-speaking core countries: Berenson (2009), (who studied coverage from April 2000 to June 2002 for five AGM protests, for 3 months – one month before and two months after the protests), isolates a startling difference in coverage of summit protests between major US newspapers and papers in other English-speaking nations (see Table 1 above for details). Negative coverage of the protests never dropped below 50% in the US, while it reached a height of 88%. For England, Canada and Australia, only once did negative coverage exceed 25% in coverage in *The Toronto Star* of Seattle when 40% of coverage was negative. Houston (2004:23-24) using *The Guardian* as his English newspaper, also found differences between US and British papers in reporting on Seattle.

Another series of differences have been reported in possibly the only truly transnational study, Beyeler and Hubscher look at media treatment of the WEF

and anti-WEF protest for 1995 and 2000-2003 in six newspapers from Switzerland, France, Germany, USA, Spain and Bolivia for four weeks around the WEF in a paper which provides preliminary results from a research project. They note no articles on protest against the WEF before 1998 but following Seattle report increased attention to both the WEF and anti-WEF protest.

This important extension of the (geographical) range of analysis outside core countries (and extension linguistically outside Anglophone media) is undertaken in a paper which looks at media coverage of anti-WEF protests from 1994 to 2003 in *Neue Zürcher* (NZZ -Swiss newspaper) and for 1995 and 2000 to 2003 in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ -Germany) *The New York Times* (US), *El Diario* (Bolivia), *Le Monde* (France) and *The Cape Times* (South Africa). They demonstrate differences in reporting on the AGM are related to contextual factors such as the ideological position (ie left or right) of the newspaper and the national context (ie whether a core or peripheral country) in which the paper is published:

> Newspapers from developing countries and left-wing newspapers in the advanced industrial world tend to be more attentive to discussion forums of the global social justice movement, they put more emphasis on the issue-specific message, and they tend to present the movement in a more positive way. In the country where the targeted event is held, newspapers overall give more attention to the movement, they tend however to emphasize the procedural aspects, i.e. the security measures, legal aspects and the (possible) use of violence (Beyeler and Hubscher 2003:13)

	NZZ	FAZ	Monde	NYT	Diario	Cape T
2000	13	16	9	7	2	10
2001	32	17	-	3	9	9
2002	15	29	-	49	7	10
2003	39	15	8	-	-	12

Table 7: Coverage of anti-WEF protest in 6 newspapers, number of articles. Extracted from Beyeler and Hubscher 2003:9, Table 2. '-' = data not coded.

Some indication of the differences between the national media in their treatment of the AGM can be seen in the proportion of media attention devoted to 'violence' on the one hand and to counter-summits and social fora on the other.

Year	NZZ	FAZ	LAM	NYT	ED	CP
	V/SF	*V/SF*	*V/SF*	*V/SF*	*V/SF*	*V/SF*
2000	25.8/0.0	20.0/0.0	5.0/15.0	16.0/0.0	20.0/0.0	18.8/6.3
2001	27.7/1.5	35.3/0.0	--/--	100.0/0.0	11.1/33.3	0.0/0.0
2002	22.0/24.4	18.5/18.5	--/--	38.3/6.7	28.6/38.1	0.0/50.0
2003	40.8/7.0	223.5/11.8	8.6/22.9	--/--	--/--	--/46.2

Table 8: Percentage of media attention to 'violence' (V) and social fora (SF). ('—' =Data not coded) - Source: extracted from Tables 3b and 3b (Beyeler and Hubscher 2003:10).

Le Monde, *El Diario* and the *Cape Times* are the papers which pay most attention to movement counter-summits, in particular the WSF. The French paper's attention can be explained by the fact that the WSF was in part a French initiative; that of *El Diario* can be attributed to the proximity of the WSF in Brazil. The *New York Times*, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* pay the highest attention to the issue of 'violence': for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* the proximity effect is the obvious explanation; for the *New York Times* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* the explanation must lie in their ideological orientation. These authors also report a more critical attitude to the AGM in more liberal western media.

In a later publication from the same research project, with extended results from the inclusion of WTO protest and the addition of the *Times of India* to the papers reviewed, Beyeler and Kriesi (2005) found AGM protests received extensive media coverage, with the proviso (?) that 'the Seattle protests marked both the beginning and –in most countries- the peak of newspaper attention towards the movement.' (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005 102) Exceptions were the Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (due to the proximity effect of the protests taking place in Davos in Switzerland) and *El Diario* (due to the proximity of the WSF in Brazil). The US paper 'exhibited what might be called a "big-country perspective" in that it was apparently disinterested in events not taking place on "its territory" '(Beyeler and Kriesi 2005:102) ; another phrase for this might be American isolationism.

In their evaluation of the AGM by both journalists and other quoted sources they found *Le Monde* more supportive of the movement than other country papers. On the issue of violence 'the NZZ and NYT, both newspapers published in countries directly confronted with protests, not only paid more attention to security issues and violence in their reporting, but their journalists were also quite critical of the movement actors and, on the average, reported more critically about the movement's issues' (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005: 104). For the peripheral country papers 'there are some indications that they took a more positive attitude... there was no clear pattern for the *Times of India*, while the *Cape Times* and *El Diario* in particular seemed to take a more positive attitude (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005: 105). For their general conclusion '[w]hile direct support for the global social-justice movement primarily comes from industrialized countries, newspapers published in these countries tend to give priority to critical evaluations. Only in France do we find supportive governments and publics as well as a very supportive stance of the newspaper we analyzed. Newspapers published in the South were more supportive of the movement, while their elite frequently evaluated it negatively' (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005:106).

Another survey which looks at the image of the AGM in Asia, Europe and North America (derived from a Lexis search –from October/November 2000 to October/November 2002 looking at *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, *The Economist*, *The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, *The New Straits Times* (Malaysia) and *The Straits Times* [Singapore]) found it portrayed as having four main characteristics: 'youthful and middle-class, violence-prone, divided and lacking coherent positions' (Adler and Mittelman 2004: 192).[21]

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[21] Adler and Mittelman's research compares this media representation with the results of a survey of protesters in Washington DC on 19-22 April 2002. For their conclusions see Adler and Mittelman 2004: 207-208.

National coverage –the USA

An early examination of 200 stories by major US news outlets (broadcasting and print) on Prague (September 2000), Quebec (April 2001), Gothenburg (June 2001) and Genoa (July 2001) protests concludes the main problem with the coverage is not the emphasis on protest violence but the lack of context provided in the coverage (Guiffo 2001). Hall and Bettig (2003), citing mainly US papers and news agencies, argued the media treatment of protest from Seattle to the WEF 2002 protests presented protesters as a motley crew disturbing the peace, emphasised the spectre of violence and treated police as highly trained professionals, while focusing on property damage.

Rausch et al (2007) look at framing of the AGM in *The New York Times* from October 1999 to September 2004, allowing them to look at changes in movement framing over time. Their examination of the amount of coverage the AGM received shows nearly half of the coverage they analysed appeared in the period October 1999 to September 2000, with some 101 stories (or 48% of a total of 210 stories) appearing in that time frame, dropping to 38 stories (18%) in 2000/2001, rising again to 52 stories (25%) in 2001/2002, dropping precipitiously to 7 stories (3%) in 2002/2003 and rising slightly to 12 stories (6%) in 2003/2004. Attributing the one case of a rise in story numbers to a local factor (the WEF protests in New York in 2002), what can be seen is a major decrease in coverage following Seattle. Of relevance is a similar drop in the number of photographs of the movement's activities published (from 106 in 1999/2000 to 69 in 2000/2001, 64 in 2001/2002, 17 in 2002/2003 and 19 in 2003/2004). Of particular interest here is that every year the number of photographs exceeded the number of written stories, implying that the visual nature of AGM protest activities ensured photographic coverage while news editors also felt their requirement to document AGM activities could be satisfied through photographic rather than written means.

They note a significant increase in the use of non-official sources over the period, with 56% of sources in 1999/2000 being unofficial, dropping to 55% (2000/2001) and 53% (2001/2002) which they attribute to the 9/11 factor, before increasing again to 63% (2002/2003) and 64% (2003/2004). While the increase in unofficial sources is significant, so is the overall high level of unofficial sources, which never drops below 50%. They also note an important shift away from establishment sources like the AFL-CIO and the Sierra Club to less-established protest figures and also to sympathetic celebrities. Particularly interesting is their finding of a rise in the use of both delegitimising and legitimising terms over the period studied with delegitimising terms increasing 41% while legitimising terms more than trebled. (Rausch et al 2007: 138), while also noting variations attributable to September 11. Particularly useful is their point that use of these terms in not mutually exclusive: 'Journalists could use an increasing number of terms to describe movement supporters and goals while also writing more about violence and deviance at protests' (Rausch et al 2007: 138). This allows a nuanced version of framing practices, as does their emphasis

on changes and variations in frames over the period studied. However the brute reality of their data also shows, after a major explosion of coverage at Seattle, a drop in coverage of the movement over the period. We may note their observation that 'the striking and prolonged drop in stories about the movement a year after Seattle suggests either that protests declined in frequency or that journalists perceived these events as offering lower news value over time' (Rausch et al 2007: 141). Given that they have not undertaken research to discover whether protests declined in frequency (an unfortunate omission) and noting their attribution of editorial decisions to journalists, what may be occurring is a routinization of coverage of anti-summit protests, with a drop in novelty value following the Seattle protests. They also note what they call a tabloidization of protest through the increasing interest in style and cultural aspects of the movement over substantive issues, increased use of photographs and increased involvement of celebrity coverage. (Rausch et al 2007: 142).

Bennett et al (2004) looked at treatment of the WEF, protests against it and the WSF in *The New York Times* around the time of the WEF meetings in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Coverage of the WEF far exceeded that of the WSF (see below, social fora section). They report an increase in the coverage of protester issues relating to the WEF from 23% of articles in 2001 to 34% in 2002 and 50% in 2003. However, while 40% of activist issues were sourced to protesters, 53% were sourced to WEF officials (Bennett et al 2004: 447,448). Thus, by referring to issues protesters had placed on the agenda, in a clever recuperative public relations campaign the WEF succeeded in rebranding itself (at least in *The New York Times*) as an organisation concerned with real-life solutions to urgent problems compared with protesters who were framed as anarchists. This was accomplished by the use of the spectre of violence: 'Protest/violence themes infused 92% of the stories before the meeting, 68% during the meeting, and returned as the most dominant theme (75% of the articles) after the meeting.' (Bennett et al 2004:448).

James (2002), reporting on editorial page coverage of free trade and the AGM in 35 major US newspapers for one month around the Seattle and Quebec City summits, found that support for free trade positions and marginalisation of anti-free trade positions increased between the Seattle 1999 and Quebec 2001 protests, the first statistically significant. For op-ed coverage of Seattle giving a position on free trade 58% was positive, 36% neutral and 6% negative (all by guest op-ed writers); for Quebec, 82% was positive, 16% was neutral and 2% was negative (again by guest op-ed writers). For the attitude to protesters, at Seattle 57% was negative, 26% neutral and 17% positive; for Quebec this changed to 75% negative, 15% neutral and 10% positive (again no positive item was written by newspaper staff: in both cases positive material was from guest op-ed writers) (James 2002:9). It is hard not to agree with James that this indicates a consolidation of elite opinion: 'while print media attention to trade issues *expanded* significantly immediately before, during and after Seattle, the spectrum of actual debate *narrowed* within the forum of newspaper editorial

opinion before, during and after Quebec' (James 2002: 19), which reinforces the point that quantity of coverage needs to be balanced by consideration of the quality of the coverage.

For the April 2001 Quebec City protests against the FTAA, the US newspapers maintained a pro-FTAA line in their editorials. For the month of April a search of Nexis found 34 editorials supporting the FTAA, none opposing it and one which was ambivalent. Several editorials worried about the integration of minimum labour and environmental standards in the FTAA 'but none of the 34 suggested that the agreement would not be fundamentally beneficial for the people of the Americas' (Coen 2001). The papers' op-ed pages were less convinced of this: 'the same Nexis search found 25 opinion pieces essentially in favour of the FTAA vs nine opposing it, with four others with a more mixed analysis' (Coen 2001).

Rechitsky (2005) provides a qualitative content analysis of the treatment of the AGM from 1999 to 2002 on four US television channels –CBS, CNN, ABC and NBC- by looking at coverage from three days before to three days after selected summit protests – Seattle, IMF/World Bank (Washington, D.C. 2000) WEF (New York 2002) and Miami (2003). He found five different discourses –law and order, economy, public sphere, outside agitation and recognition –and 'no significant differences in discourse across major television news networks'. Discourses of law and order emphasised policing and dichotomised peaceful and violent demonstration tactics: 'marches and rallies were framed as legitimate, while direct action –non-violent or more militant- was framed as illegitimate "violence"' (Rechitsky 2005: X). Discourses of the economy emphasised the economic costs of property damage and the restriction of general economic activity –in a word, shopping- while the protesters' agenda was characterised as against local and national economic interests which were identified as 'export-oriented economic growth'. Discourses of the public sphere involved portraying protester identity in a trivializing manner as another generation of hippies, dividing protesters into hooligans and cheerleaders, denying their political legitimacy and replacing the previous generation's communist bogeyman with the latest version, the 'anarchist', framed as the 'criminal element' in the AGM. Discourses of outside agitation 'portrayed protesters as invaders who have come to cause disruption in the lives of the locals', identifying local commuters as victims of the protesters. Discourses of recognition granted some legitimacy to protest issues, involving reports on the adverse effects of corporate globalisation and including interviews with experts and with rank and file reporters. Rechitsky concludes that 'there is a positive relationship between disruptive and contentious tactics –civil disobedience, direct action and symbolic property destruction- and the quantity and even quality of coverage on major television networks'. He attributes the decrease in coverage over time –Seattle had 24 stories, Washington D.C. 13, New York 7 and Miami 4- to the absence of spectacle and 'violence'.

Kate Gunby is undertaking a retrospective analysis of coverage of the AGM on five US television channels which shows an early spike in coverage, which has significantly decreased over the period of the study (see Graph 1, Gunby 2011:15). She identified 349 television segments, with CNN leading the pack with 210 stories, followed by ABC with 54, Fox with 28, CBS with 25, NBC with 18 and PBS with 14. (Gunby 2011:15). Possibly CNN's nature as an international network explains its higher coverage than that of those news channels confined to the US. Gunby reports changes in television framing of the movement over time: 'While the violence frame, amalgam of grievances, and to some extent the disruption fame are all still prevalent, the ignorance and freak frame have almost disappeared entirely from TV news reporting on the global justice movement' (Gunby 2011:22). She notes for the period 2005 to 2010 the violence frame was most prevalent (Gunby 2011:16) while also noting 'the police were never reported as the initiators of violence. Instead 42.11% of the reports explained how the police were responding to the protesters' (Gunby 2011:21). Around a fifth of reports (21.05%) referred to past protest events as comparators and predictors: 'This was one way that the violence frame was introduced into a lot of stories where peaceful protests were happening. The reporter would say that the current protests were very calm compared to past events, or that past events indicated that the peace would not last for long.' (Gunby 2011:21).

Finally we should note a study of framing of a constituent element of the US AGM, the student anti-sweatshop movement. An examination of coverage of this movement in *The New York Times*, *The L.A. Times* and *The Washington Post* from 1995 to 2002 involved positive framing of the protesters and their case. Opel identified two major frames relating to the protesters who were, in the first frame, identified as smart, informed students concerned over a labour issue but, in the second frame, were dissimilar to the student protesters of the 1960s. As Opel (n.d.: 8) notes 'these frames intersected throughout the coverage, creating a positive depiction of the student activists and noting a historic break with the activism of the 1960s'.

National coverage - Canada

Canadian TV coverage of three summit protests –APEC (1997) G8 (Knanaskis) and Summit of the Americas (Quebec City)- was found not to marginalise the protesters, with protester statements given more substantive coverage than those of world leaders attending the summits, while the emphasis given to protester violence was small. Their expectations going into the study were that due to TV's visual nature coverage would concentrate on spectacle, drama and confrontation, summits with the greatest violence would gain most coverage and the actions of protesters would receive attention at the expense of the protesters' substantive political message. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 8). The actual coverage was as follows

	APEC	Summit of the Americas	G8
CBC	13	9	17
CTV	8	6	19

Table 9: Coverage of summits, Canadian TV broadcast news, by number of stories . Compiled from Miljan and Lee (2003:10).

For source statements (excluding journalists) in these stories, on one channel citizen groups provided the most statements, while on the other the federal government held that position: on both channels citizen groups provided more source statements than foreign governments attending the international meeting:

	Fed gov	Citizen group	Foreign gov	Streeter
CBC	25.4%	28.2%	9.5%	8.5%
CTV	33.5%	29.5%	15.9%	1.7%

Table 10: Sources for television coverage, various summits. Extracted from Table 1 in Miljan and Lee (2003: 11).

Nor did the actual content of the coverage conform to the expectation that movement messages would be marginalised in the mass media, as shown by the following table:

	Politicians/WTO agenda	**Activist messages**	**Activist activities**	**Police activity**
CBC	51.2	21.9	14.8	12
CTV	45.8	17.7	20.9	15

Table 10: Contents of Canadian television coverage by subject (percentage). Based on Miljan and Lee (2003: 13).

The amount of coverage of violence was surprisingly small: 'The use of tear gas and pepper spray, albeit the image that probably comes most readily to mind with regards to activist/police interactions, actually received only 6 percent of CBC and 15 percent of CTV attention to activists' (Miljan and Lee 2003: 14) In the context of the general coverage of the protests, less than 1% of CBC's and 3% of CTV's coverage of the meetings concentrated on violence. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 14) Finally, they note that, for CBC at least, the Quebec Summit of the Americas –the summit with the most clashes between police and activists- received the least coverage. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 19) Their general conclusion on violence and summit coverage reiterates that their expectation of increased media attention to violence did not appear in the data:

> The least violent event, the G-8 summit had the most media attention. Moreover activists' messages were presented slightly more often than description of tactics. For the other two meetings, the least violent event received the least attention. The APEC meeting where the extent of clashes with police involved arrests and pepper spray had more attention than the Summit of the Americas meeting where there were far more arrests and tear gas blanketed sections of the city. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 19)

Hamel (n.d.) contrasts coverage of the Summit of the Americas through two newspapers, *The Montreal Gazette* and *The National Post*.

Newspaper	Number of articles	Protesters	Politics	Economics	Security measures
Montreal Gazette	289	30.4%	21.8%	18%	14%
National Post	135	39.3%	20.7%	14.1%	14%

Table 11: Number of articles, subject of coverage, Canadian papers. Source: Hamel (n.d.: 19, 21).

Duggan (2011) examined treatment of the G8/G20 protests in Ontario in 2010 in Canada's foremost national paper of record, the *Globe and Mail*: coverage involved 62 articles published between 24 June 2010 and 1 July 2010. He found 32% of the articles had as primary source official or authoritative sources such as police, government officials or businesspeople; 43.5% of articles marginalized protesters, primarily through an emphasis on violence, property destruction and civic disruption, 20.9% of articles trivialized protesters, with negative portrayals of movement diversity seven times more common than positive ones, while 14.5% of articles featured frames that dissented from official or authoritative accounts by looking at police brutality and civil rights violations, including an article by the paper's design editor on his own and his children's experience of police tactics. On the outside agitator theme, it's worth noting the reports that many of those arrested spoke French: as Duggan (2011:34) notes this can be read as 'from elsewhere'.

National coverage - Belgium

Van den Bulk and Bedoyan's study of the depiction of the AGM in Belgian television and newspapers in relation to WTO Doha (Nov 2001) and the EU Laeken Summit (December 2001) found most coverage to be around Laeken (due to physical proximity) than Doha (partly due to lack of contestation due to security measures). Generally '40 to 50% of all movement news shows or mentions violence, sometimes real violence, sometimes the lack or possibility of violence. The latter clearly implies that the movement and violence are framed as going hand in hand: the absence of violence is seen as strange and riots are to be expected' (Van den Bulk and Bedoyan 2004:10)

A study of mainstream Belgian media (one quality paper, one popular paper and the main television news on a quality television station) reporting on trade and globalisation issues from 1999 to 2002 found little coverage of issues outside coverage of the Seattle (US, 1999), Genoa (Italy, 2001), Doha (Qatar, 2001) and Johannesburg (South Africa, 2002) summits. Analysis of the content of this media coverage collected from two weeks before until six weeks after the start of the summit –categorised as information on the summit itself, background information on globalisation etc., and coverage of riots and demonstrations- found stark differences by type of media.

> The quality newspaper has a fairly equally balanced distribution across the three categories, with 40% on the summit, 31% on background information and 30% on the riots and demonstrations. However, the popular press pays hardly any attention to the background information (7%), has 21% coverage of the summit, and focuses the vast majority of its coverage on riots and demonstrations. Remarkably, the news on the self-proclaimed quality TV station is quite similar to the popular press in its disproportionate coverage of riots and demonstrations (63%). (Swinnen and Francken 2006: 648)

These analysts calculated a 'riot index' and demonstrated 'a significant positive relationship between the riot index and media coverage' (ibid), a relationship which was especially strong in the popular media, where 86% of coverage of the Genoa summit covered 'riot-related issues', which summit also received two-thirds of all coverage of summits in the popular media, which also reported nothing on violence-free Doha. Again, they observe this concern with violence 'does not only seem to hold for the tabloids, but for all the media: all media pay most attention to the Genoa summit and least to the Doha summit' (ibid).

Framing the summit protests

The violence frame

We may note to begin with some peculiarities of media concern with violence. First the media shows an immense preference for protester violence over any other kind. For example, the violence involved in and underlying free trade agreements is never mentioned (for one example of this, in relation to the Halifax 2007 Atlantica protests, see Martinez 2007). Similarly police violence is of little interest. Indeed in some cases where the only evidence available and shown (in highly monitored and photographed protests) is of police violence, media still describe the situation as involving protester violence (see coverage of S11 2000 in Australia below). Media concentrate on protester violence, even when they acknowledge that only a minority of protesters are violent (as noted by Houston (2004: 22) in the case of Seattle). There is also consistent exaggeration of the amount of violence with small violent incidents presented as typical or defining media images of protests. The media, especially television, can take one particular incident, which may be totally exceptional in terms of

the protest, and, by presenting only that incident, frame the protest through that incident. An example here we could cite is the repetition of a two-minute clip of police water cannon in use at the EU Day of the Welcomes in Dublin/Accession Summit in 2004, thus presenting the protest through an exceptional incident.

When media do attend to police violence it is generally seen as a reaction to protester violence, even if the former precedes the latter. In Seattle police violence, including use of tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets against non-violent protesters was explained as a response to the trashing of shops by anarchists, despite *The Seattle Times* noting the first use of pepper spray and rubber bullets as taking place at 10AM on November 30th, nearly two hours before any window was broken (de Mause 2000). A similar inversion of reality through a failure to attend to chronology can be found in media accounts of the G20 demonstrations in London on April 1, 2009, where the press 'narrative… precisely reverses the events of the day' (Younis 2009). Thus *The Guardian*'s live blog confirms a kettle at the Bank of England at 11.57, half an hour before any mention of 'clashes', with window-smashing first reported at 1.30, yet accounts in *The Times*, *The Guardian* and on BBC report the clashes and protester violence and then report on police control and containment measures, placing the cart squarely before the horse. Here again the demonstrators were presented as violent and confrontational while 'eyewitness accounts of both days state that virtually all of the violence came from police' (Younis 2009). Even when the police admit that they were responsible for the violence, as in the case of May Day 2007 in LA, the media can still cling to the riot script. (Santa Ana 2009). Finally we should note the variations in the meaning of the term violence: while police violence is generally expressed through assaults on protesters, protester violence does not require a person as victim: they can be violent towards a shop or bank window or towards other inanimate objects such as cars or statues of Winston Churchill.

In general police methods remain unquestioned, when they are not being encouraged. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) notes that, while the three US networks reported on the killing of Carlo Giuliani by police at Genoa, 'none raised questions about the use of live ammunition for crowd control' (FAIR 2001). Indeed the coverage of Genoa was at times so indulgent to police behaviour that the BBC 9 o'clock news even excused an attack on their own camera operator: 'As the day went on the police response was increasingly harsh, in their frustration they also turned on a BBC cameraman' (quoted in O'Carroll 2001).

Violently framing the protests

In coverage by Belgian TV and newspapers of the EU Laeken summit protests in December 2001 'almost half of the news about the movement contained references to violence, be it in writing about violence, expected violence or the absence of violence, or in pictures showing intimidating protesters, their

effective violence and the consequences thereof' (Bedoyan, Van Aeist and Walgrove 2003: 14) Similarly, Jiminez, reporting on Spanish coverage of the AGM, noted 'the AGM media coverage has been bound to the issue of violence' (Jiminez 2003: 15) while in relation to Gothenburg (Sweden) 'The frame of violence is already present in the beginning of the week, way before the 'actual' violence, which indicates that the media have decided how they will represent the events before they 'actually' occur' (Hultman 2003: 8).

The media's treatment of violence often involves exaggeration and hyperbole. Partly the problem is the media is reporting in the middle of chaotic and complex situations of public disorder in which it is difficult to cross-check and confirm stories and sources; partly it is a question of the media's unquestioning acceptance of official police stories. Thus for the rioting at Rostock before the Heiligdendamm G8 protests in 2007, media ran police-sourced stories of thousands injured, including 433 police officers, with 18 officers from Berlin alone reported to be in hospital with serious injuries. Magically, two days later, according to the right-wing weekly *Focus* 'no-one was in hospital anymore. This kind of rectification however never makes the front page.' (Anon n.d.) A similar example can be given of the allegation that Walden Bello incited Rostock demonstrators to riot, based on mistranslation of his speech by German news agency DPA. In English Bello said 'We must bring the war into the discussion because without peace there can be no justice'; he was reported as saying 'We have to bring war to this demonstration', thus allegedly inciting those attending to riot, a calumny repeated 'in hundreds of newspapers throughout Germany and Europe [that] contributed to the perception that violence had been deliberately fanned by the organisers of the largely peaceful but spirited rally.' (Focus on the Global South 2007)

The media's emphasis on violence can mean violence becomes the whole story and other aspects of the protests remain un- or under-reported. This is a major complaint made by the NGO wing of the AGM, which denounces media attention to violence at the expense of 'thematic' coverage of the reasons for the protests. For an example of violence taking over the story, Nambier (2004: 49) quotes a political correspondent on a Seattle daily:

> All our energy was taken covering the protest...there was little discussion of what they were protesting about...we missed a story...there was a huge labour march of 50,000 people...barely got a mention in our paper because we were so busy focusing on what was happening downtown with people breaking windows, throwing things.

TV coverage of the Seattle and Washington D.C. protests emphasised violence with 'nearly 70% of television segments focused on the ostensibly violent protests' (Boykoff 2006: 225). This was most visible in relation to Seattle, where 63% of news stories featuring the violence frame, 'more than half of all newspaper accounts and almost three quarters of every television segment focusing on violent protestors' (Boykoff 2006: 211). Even when violence did not

occur, the frame remained in place 'as journalists remarked on the lack of destruction, the absence of violence or the potential for violence' (Boykoff 2006: 211). Boykoff also notes the frequent application of war vocabulary to the protestors, as in the *Washington Post* story with the lead 'A guerrilla army of anti-trade protestors took control of downtown Seattle today' (cited in Boykoff 2006: 212). This framing 'advances the impression that violence dominates the protest terrain when, in fact, it is the exception rather than the rule' (Boykoff 2006: 213). [22]

If the majority of studies on media framing of the AGM emphasis the dominance of the violence frame, we should note a dissenting opinion on the dominance of the violence frame in AGM coverage in a study of *The New York Times* from 1999 to 2004: 'Although attractive to news values, democratic-globalization protests with high levels of arrests, injuries and property damage – such as Quebec City and Genoa- did not seem to enjoy high visibility in our analysis. In fact some violent protests received lower media attention and more sympathetic framing, while some events with relatively prominent coverage and favourable frames featured little violence' (Rausch et al 2007: 142). Boykoff responds to DeLuca and Peeples' claim that symbolic violence resulted in substantive coverage of protest issues by checking all stories utilising the violence frame to see if they contain five sentences that explained the reasons for the protests. The results were meagre: 14% of newspaper articles and 7.3% of television reports using the violence frame in Seattle devoted five or more sentences to issues; for Washington DC this reduced further to 6.3% of newspaper articles and 4.9% of television reports. His conclusion: 'this study did not come up with convincing empirical evidence to support the claim that violence in the streets –if "symbolic violence" or vandalism- was a step on the road to deeper, broader coverage of the issues and ideas that galvanise the global justice movement.' (Boykoff 2006: 226)

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[22] We can note here a peculiar similarity between mainstream and alternative media. In the words of Schwartz (2002: 36) in relation to the International Society of Animal genetics conference (Minneapolis, July 2000) 'Both corporate and independent media represented the Counter Conference using images of the same violent confrontation'. We may mention here also feminist critiques of predominantly male and violent representations of anti-summit protests: an example is the problem of representation of women and gender in Indymedia texts and posts, with a recent analysis reporting 'much of the IMC's mediated text still generated through the perpetuation of patriarchal and ethnocentric images' (Brooten, 2004: 2) Similarly in response to observations that mass media concentration on spectacle and violence at protests distracts from coverage of protest issues, Poell and Borra (2011:15) note 'precisely the same observation can be made about the activist social media protest accounts'. They were analysing social media use at the Toronto G20 protests, concluding 'it is clear that violence, arrests and the overwhelming police presence, as well as the anger about this, completely dominated the #g20report account on all three social media platforms. Eventually these issues became the protesters' main focus, overshadowing the original reasons for the G20 protests' (Poell and Borra 2011:14)

Here again it's worth referring to Beyeler and Hubschler's wide-ranging study which also reports variations in newspapers' obsession with the violence frame, with *The New York Times* showing the highest concern (35.4% of all mentions of the movement), the right-wing European papers *Neue Zurich Zeitschrift* (30.8%) and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (28%) following closely behind, while Bolivian paper *El Diario*'s concern is also high (22.5%). Comparatively *The Cape Times* (10.5%) and *Le Monde* (7.3%) pay little attention to the question of violence. (Beyeler and Hubschler 2003:10) while the study of Canadian television reportage cited about also denied the central place of violence in the frame. (Miljan and Lee 2003).

Anticipating violence

The media has not only reported AGM protests within a frame that delegitimises the protests and vilifies the protesters, but has also been instrumental in building an expectation of violence at AGM protests, thereby justifying and legitimising police actions in limiting and repressing protest. Whether actively participating in a strategy of tension, or simply playing to its own worst interests, the media has hyped the possibility of violence and thus contributed to state attempts to criminalise the AGM. Anderson (2004) reports a 'sad but familiar pattern' in relation to six different AGM protests between 2000 and 2003 in the US [23] which showed 'the same pattern of police exaggeration, governmental fear mongering and media gullibility': drawing from mainstream media reports he documents the climate of fear created before the protests, media descriptions of arrests during the protests and (often revised) media accounts of the same arrests after the protests were over and cases which came to court were dismissed while the media belatedly realised the damage done to civil liberties. Anderson summarises the process as follows

> Police officials, aided by a hype-hungry mainstream media, exaggerate the possible dangers posed by consistently non-violent protesters. Using the climate of fear created by this hype to justify their actions, the police consistently engage in extra-constitutional and illegal behaviour, such as mass pre-emptive arrests, the [*sic*] interference with media outlets, and brutal protest behaviour. Inevitably the mainstream press realizes the hype once the protests are safely over and sheepishly admits its mistakes. (Anderson 2004)

The point has been made more succinctly by another analyst: 'the media did not just report on the space of terror in Genoa, they helped produce it'. (Juris quoted in Gorringe and Rosie 2007: 4) Even the police occasionally have considered pre-summit coverage to be excessive: in Miami, the Miami Police Department considered the anticipation of violence in the media coverage prior

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[23] WB/IMF April 2000; RNC July 2000; WEF February 2002; Anti-war protests February 2003; World Agricultural Forum May 2003 and FTAA November 2003.

to the FTAA to be excessive: 'The level of alarm in these stories increased as the FTAA Summit approached and it reached a point of near hysteria in the weeks and days prior (*sic*)' (MPD 2004). Similar anticipatory coverage is detailed in the case studies below.

For the WEF protests in New York in 2002 a Nexis search of pre-protest coverage (1 December 2001 to 28 January 2002) 'found that most articles in the *New York Daily News*, *New York Post*, *New York Times* and *Newsday* mentioning the WEF have focussed on police preparations for the protests. As a result, the political debate over the WEF has been obscured, as have concerns about police brutality and civil liberties' (FAIR 2002). Much of the coverage was dominated by 'unsubstantiated commentaries that portray activists as thugs', with a minority comparing protest with terrorism. These articles also referred back to the overwhelmingly peaceful protests in Seattle, Washington DC, Los Angeles and Philadelphia as 'window-smashing, flame-tossing spectacles' (*New York Daily News* 24/1/02), 'violent mayhem' (*New York Post* 20/1/02), 'radical protesters rampage[ing] through the streets...clashing with police' (*Daily News* 18/1/02), 'wild protest melees' (*New York Times* 25/1/02) and 'violent' (*Newsday* 18/1/02) (All quoted in FAIR 2002). Some of the anticipatory coverage is little short of felonsetting. A cover story of *The New York Daily News* a few days before the Republican Party's National Convention in New York in August 2004 reported Jaggi Singh, a Canadian anti-free trade activist, to be a dangerous anarchist who had received firearms training from a member of the Black Panther Party (a completely bogus fact), while a competing paper *The New York Post* 'published a photo of Jaggi shooting off a handgun. A friend of his who saw the picture notes 'it is some brown guy with high cheekbones and a Harry Potter haircut, but it's not Jaggi" (Sarracini 2005), the photo just as bogus then as the claims of firearms training.

Other frames

While predominant the violent frame is not the only frame to which the AGM was fitted: while the possible frame of the justified protester does not seem to be particularly popular, (though it does occasionally appear) most of the other frames tend to marginalise the protesters. Covering the period 28 November to 7 December 1999 for Seattle and 11-20 April 2000 for Washington DC, Boykoff investigated coverage in six newspapers, *The New York Times*, *The LA Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *USA Today* and *The Boston Globe*, and five television networks –ABC,CBS, NBC, CNN, FOX- examining 111 newspaper articles and 110 television segments for Seattle and 69 newspaper articles and 68 television segments for Washington, DC. (Boykoff 2006: 209) Analysis of framing practices in this material identified five predominant frames in that coverage –the violence frame, the disruption frame, the freak frame, the ignorance frame and the amalgam of grievances frame (frames which are not

mutually exclusive) concluding that 'the Violence Frame is the most dominant of the five, as it appears in 59% of all mass-media accounts. In other words, the Global Justice Movement was portrayed as violent in nearly three of every five segments' (Boykoff 2006: 224), compared with 39% for the Freak Frame, 26% for the Amalgam of Grievances frame and 19% for the Ignorance Frame.

	Seattle	Washington DC
Violence frame	62.9	53.3
Disruption frame	38.0	60.6
Freak frame	36.2	42.3
Ignorance frame	19.0	19.0
Amalgam of grievances frame	23.5	29.9

Table 12: Five frames in Seattle and A16 reporting, as percent of total articles. From Boykoff (2006: 212,215,217,219,221).

We have already detailed the violence frame. The disruption frame (similar to Di Cicco's (2012) identification of the 'nuisance paradigm') combined a focus on protesters' intention to disrupt the summits with the disruption to residents' everyday lives and to business as usual caused by the protests. This frame turns local residents into victims of the protesters: for Seattle 17% of all news accounts framed residents in this way, while for Washington DC 31% did. (Boykoff 2006: 214,215). The freak frame concentrates on what divides some protesters from the mainstream of society –not just their opinions and values, but their age, dress and appearance, often deriding them as young and immature. Here 'the more radical elements of the global justice movement –in terms of both outward appearance and ideology- are transformed into a synecdoche for the entire movement' (Boykoff 2006: 216). The ignorance frame described activists as uninformed or ignorant: the tactic here is to interview suitably ignorant protesters who are then 'held up, if tacitly, as representative of the movement' (Boykoff 2006: 220) As well as being ignorant, however, activists are also protesting for too many causes, leading to the amalgam of grievances frame, found in roughly a quarter of all accounts. This is, in some ways, an accurate representation of a movement which is a coalition of varied and various groups and movements. While this movement diversity is held to be a virtue by movement activists and some analysts, for the media while 47.3% of articles saw this diversity in a neutral light and 6.5% saw this as positive, 46.2% saw it as a negative trait in the movement. Thus 'negative portrayals of movement diversity

were seven times more common than positive representations' (Boykoff 2006: 221).

There is sometimes a very crude division of demonstrators into good and bad. Juris (2008:85-86) reports on Spanish press division of protesters at Prague into 'good' (NGO) and 'bad' (radical) protesters, also reported in relation to Gleneagles (McKiggan n.d.). The media reports provide a strange version of the AGM which describes it as both diverse and uniform at the same time. The media also simplifies the movement. Thus while the diversity of the movement is sometimes stressed (in an incoherence frame) on other occasions the demonstrators are characterised en mass, mainly as anarchists. Thus demonstrators carrying Maoist flags and other Marxist signs become anarchists, as do traditional communists, while the characterisation of black block as uniformly anarchist ignores the presence, for example, of radical nationalists such as Basques and Kurds. Militants at Prague were described by Spanish paper *El Pais* (29 Sept, p.70 quoted in Juris 2008: 86) as 'rioters with coloured hair and gas masks, radicals for the sake of being radical, with no more ideological foundation than trashing windows and luxury cars, and punks with pierced penises urinating all over the streets'

Generally the frame operates to marginalise the demonstrators. One tactic is trivialization. A particularly fine example of trivialization is provided by Wall's analysis of AP and AFP reporting of the dismantling of a MacDonalds restaurant in France by the Confederation Paysanne which shows how this episode in the AGM's history was reduced from a global to a national and even local story (Wall 2005: 110), while the authors of the action were reduced to a single person, who was then portrayed as 'likeable yet comical' (Wall 2005: 106). The wire services presented the act6ion as an individual action by Jose Bove, rather than a collective action by the Confederation Paysanne, a farmers' union with a 'high-profile role in the global justice movement' (Wall 2005: 106). By emphasising Bove's facial hair and comparing him to a cartoon character like Asterix, Bove was cast as a crazy French folk hero on a Quixotic quest to preserve the purity of French produce. The background of the story –its position as part of a struggle over trade- was lost, with the WTO –against whose activities the Confederation Paysanne was protesting- remaining invisible in the coverage. Thus 'the coverage fails to provide any sort of thematic frame that would convey the bigger picture' (Wall 2005:109). Particularly interesting is Wall's finding that the coverage of the two news agencies is remarkably similar, with none of the expected national differences between an American and a French wire service. (Wall 2005: 112)

A further tactic involves invoking the 'threatening other' or constructing the demonstrators as 'folk devils'. For an example of invoking the threatening other in advance of the March 2002 EU Summit in Barcelona conservative People's Party (PP) attempted to pre-emptively link protesters with Basque street fighters, with *El Pais* (March 10th) reporting 'Aznar (PP president) warns demonstrators of the risk of joining Batasuna' and *El Mundo* (14 March, p.3)

headlining 'More than a thousand Basque radicals will go to Barcelona' (quoted in Juris 2008: 87) Coverage of the AGM has also included animalisation and racialization of the protesters, both in the US (Lawless 2001) and Gothenburg, Sweden (Hultman 2003), with the addition, in the latter case, of a metaphor of sexual violence. We turn now to look at the construction of AGM activists as a new folk devil.

Constructing the folk devil

One method of delegitimising the AGM is through the construction of anti-capitalist activists as a new form of folk devil. In the sociology of deviance a folk devil is a class or group of people who have become constructed through media coverage and expert commentary as the personification of evil, a group with no redeeming characteristics. The state and the media co-produce the folk devil:

> News stories are often led by the press releases issued by government and the police as the establishment engages in its own efforts to control the debate particularly where the folk devil is a person or group who is a challenge to the established order of society. They will report on events and behaviour, habitually in a way that initiates, reinforces and embeds the public's suspicion and fear. (Donson et al 2002: 5)

Media production of the folk devil proceeds through exaggeration (including distortion of events reported to increase numbers, violence and destruction involved), prediction (that similar events involving the folk devil will become more violent and destructive) and symbolisation (which sees a word (such as anarchist) become symbolic of status (deviance); objects (such as black clothes and masks/bandanas) symbolise the word. In the process the objects become symbols of the status (and the emotions of fear and hate that accompany the status). When fear within general society of the folk devil has been created, it is expected by the public that the powers that be will take strong action against the folk devil. This allows those who exploit the folk devil by censuring it and taking action against it to make gains –

> more resources and greater powers for the police, the press sells papers, politicians reinforce their authority and can be seen to be strong in the face of attacks upon society which can improve electablility. However, gains can be seen in ideological and symbolic terms –reinforcement of the credibility and support for the police, silencing of diverse voices which offer difficult challenges to the status quo and resulting reinforcement of the established order of things. (Donson et al 2004: 5)

Donson shows the folk devil being constructed in relation to the May Day protests in London.

> The ease with which activists are now publicly connected with extreme violence and criminality can be seen in relation to the ritual protest actions of May Day in London. ...in the context of anti-capitalist activists we have the creation of suspicion and fear in the mind of the public, and the expectation on the part of the police that activists are anarchist thugs. The obvious conclusion to be drawn by the authorities and the media, and therefore to be passed on to the public is that there will almost certainly be trouble. (Donson et al 2002:11)

Donson and her co-workers look first at the guerrilla gardening May Day 2000 protest in Parliament Square in London: explicitly organised by activists to be non-violent it passed off peacefully until riot police blocked all exits from the square, until at one exit the police line was miraculously broken and police allowed demonstrators to move to a street with an empty and unguarded McDonalds, when, according to an eyewitness 'for a full quarter of an hour those who wished to had a free hand to smash up the restaurant. It was only when surrounding shops were started on that the police miraculously reappeared and swiftly and easily corralled everyone in that section of Whitehall into the secured pen of Trafalgar Square' (quoted in Donson et al 2004:15). Thus, by sleight of hand and police tactics, a peaceful day's protest was transformed into a riot.

Building on the image of May Day 2000, in the run-up to the 2001 protests the media, fed by police 'intelligence' and briefings, created through anticipatory coverage'a context whereby peaceful protesters were discouraged from attending, and public opinion was prepared for the nature of police tactics on May Day itself' (Atkinson 2001:147). While *The London Evening Standard* warned 'Anarchists to loot Oxford Street', *The Sunday Telegraph* reported Special Branch fears that the WOMBLES were 'drilling...about 500 rioters in preparation for attacks on the police during the protests' (quoted in Atkinson 2001:145-146). In a prime example of felon-setting 'Photographs of suspected ringleaders were circulated to the press during April 2001, despite none having been identified as offenders. Rather they were described in newspaper reports as people 'suspected' by police of 'intending' to cause violence' (Donson et al 2004:17). Exaggeration was the tune of the day: 'Newspaper accounts intoned that anarchists were thousands strong, would carry samurai swords, had links with the Real IRA, had been to training camps in USA, and were 'battle hard' from Seattle' (ibid). As Wahl-Jorgensen (2003:135) notes this coverage involved 'metaphors of war, invasion, and terrorism'. [24]

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[24] Wahl-Jorgensen's analysis of British press material (reporting, editorials, letters) between January 1 2001 and January 1 2002 on the subject of May Day 2001 found four frames dominating the coverage: the 'law and order' frame comprised 59% of the material, depoliticising the protests and constructing them as spurious and a threat to public safety; 'discourses of the economy' comprised 9% of the coverage, mainly appearing after the protests and framing the protests as a form of costly economic disruption; 'discourse of the spectacle', covering 7% of the material, invited readers to laugh at the protesters who were portrayed as irrational and amusing, though a portion of this coverage also laughed at the authorities; the

Donson et al's (2004:20) analysis of Prague shows 'how the construction of anti-globalisation activists as folk devils is transmitted across national boundaries'. While the Czech press, police and police authorities happily adopted the international frame with the usual anticipatory coverage stressing violence and the threat of foreign protesters, strong security measures and political support for repressive action, the actual protests in Prague –with the division of protesters into different coloured columns, and Ya Basta using the traditional white/good, black/bad trope to their advantage by dressing all in white in contrast to black-coloured riot police, showed the difference between the traditional conception of folk devils and AGM members, who reflexively responded in an attempt to undermine their marginalization and construction as mindless thugs. Similarly, while Czech media presented Prague in the usual 'battleground' terms, as one dissident (under the former Communist regime) noted in an interview with Donson et al (2004:23) 'at the end it was 26 shop windows broken. The next morning all major dailies used the word war in their, uh headlines on the front page so hell for Czech's 26 shop windows equals war'. Donson points to changes in this example from the traditional view of the folk devil, the main difference being that the AGM folk devil is not accompanied by a moral panic, as this would require expert commentary discussing the folk devil's deviance: as one of the main aims of making the AGM into a folk devil is to

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final frame, 'discourses of recognition', involved 18% of the coverage and involved substantive recognition of the reasons for the protest and often involved sympathy for the protester: this final discourse only rarely appeared in the hard news reporting (when it did, it involved quoting the protesters) but appeared in the editorial, opinion and letters pages, generally seen as less authoritative than straight news reports. Wahl-Jorgensen concludes the media coverage 'took place in a context that provided an incitement to silence about globalisation ... by speaking of the protests in terms of their damaging effects on law and order and on the economy, and by making a spectacle out of the protesters' incompetence' (Wahl-Jorgensen 2003:144); however she also notes the success of the protests in interrupting the silence about globalisation through the more sympathetic material the papers also published.

Rucht (2005) presents an interesting sidelight on the British papers' coverage of Mayday 2000 in a comparison with German media attention to Mayday 2002 in Berlin. For London 'the papers clearly devoted their main attention to the violence, and especially the desecration of the national monuments –an aspect of the protests emphasized by three out of five major tabloids. The extent of press coverage was stunning... The tone of the reports is demonstrated by the labels used for the protesters ...terms such as "ragbag mob", "ramping anarchists", "thugs", "mindless yobs", "unreconstructed Stalinists" and "riot crusties" (Rucht 2005: 170) shows the British tabloids in full cry in pursuit of the folk devil. In comparison the German press response to Berlin 202 was relatively modest, with a dichotomy in treatment possibly attributable to the proximity effect: 'The Berlin papers devoted more attention to the violence and related aspects such as police strategy, whereas nationwide papers concentrated more on the (peaceful) trade union demonstrations' (Rucht 2005: 172). Rucht attributes the differences in coverage to the consistent rioting on Mayday in Berlin annually since 1987, as a result of which 'the German public was not exactly shocked. In a perverse sense, the violence in Berlin was perceived as "business as usual"' (Rucht 2005: 178). The British public and their papers were less accustomed to such violence and the 'desecration' of national monuments was the cause and occasion for the tabloid pack's rabid denunciation of the anarchist folk devil.

silence its activists, commentary is not welcome as it would suggest the AGM has politics, while constructing the AGM as a folk devil makes the AGM simply violent and thuggish and thus without any politics worth commenting on.

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Reviewed by Ana Margarida Esteves

Te Punga Somerville, Alice. (2012). *Once Were Pacific: Māori connections to Oceania*. University of Minnesota Press. 296 pp. Paperback.

Reviewed by Ella Henry

Zibechi, Raúl. Translated by Ramor Ryan. (2012). *Territories in resistance: A cartography of Latin American social movements.* **Oakland: AK Press. 364 pp. Paperback ($19.95, £14.00)**

Reviewed by **Colleen Hackett**

In his book, *Territories in resistance: A cartography of Latin American social movements*, Raúl Zibechi undertakes the massive task of synthesizing the forms, achievements, potentialities, and challenges of the multitude of popular resistance movements throughout Latin America over the past four decades. His case studies are based on popular resistance movements throughout the southern cone and other parts of Latin America, such as the piqueteros of Argentina, the indigenous Mapuche of Chile, the landless workers' movement of southern Brazil, the Zapatistas of Mexico, the reclaimed territories of El Alto, Bolivia, the community schooling projects of Bogota, Colombia, the citizens' movement of Ecuador, and the women-led self-managed kitchens in Lima.

Zibechi argues that neoliberal economic models, such as free trade agreements and other privatization programs, have resulted in the re-colonization and displacement of historically excluded groups such as indigenous groups, Afro-Latinas, and those living in extreme poverty. This populace often physically and socially occupies the "subterranean level of society" (p. 55), geographically living on the periphery of urban centres and socially stripped of access to citizenship. With this in mind, Zibechi then provides a rich theoretical basis for understanding the resilient capacities, as well as the susceptibility for dissolution, among several communities in the face of the many destructive forces of neoliberal capitalism in Latin America. He situates the depth of historical oppression and struggle of each group under investigation, but he often spends more time on the ways in which these groups "are opening up their own spaces in a process of struggle in which they develop as subjects; spaces that they create, design, and control" (Zibechi 2012: 67).

Central to Zibechi's analysis is the notion of the 'territorialization of movement.' Zibechi defines territory as "the space in which to build a new social organization collectively, where subjects take shape and materially and symbolically appropriate their space" (p. 19). These spaces are shaped by the need to collectively survive from the predatory consequences of capitalism, and as such communities premise their social relations on mutual aid, cooperation, and horizontal decision-making. Dense networks of social reciprocity help to constitute, and are in turn constituted by, a community's fulfilment of local emancipatory needs, whether they be popular education, health care, or the production of food and other necessities.

Zibechi further points out that those groups who have such strong internal affiliation and who have fulfilled their own material needs are less susceptible, although not necessarily invincible to, interference such as state repression, economic crises, or political cooptation. Just one example Zibechi uses for this

(and there are many other cases in point) are the recuperated factories in Argentina. One of the worker-reclaimed and horizontally organized companies that, under privatized rule had massive closures throughout the 1990s, sought to enhance community solidarity. The workers at El Aguante Cooperative in Buenos Aires not only provided the affordable bread to the residents of their shared community, but they also organized and participated in neighbourhood assemblies, festivals, May Day ceremonies, and public dialogues. The cooperative was able to resist eviction with help from neighbourhood residents who camped with the workers for forty-five days. As Zibechi states, "this exceptional case reveals how a social struggle can redraw territories and establish linkages where indifference was once the norm" (p. 96). The new boundaries drawn by the mutually cooperative partnership between factory workers and the community exclude capital's power to organize social relations, alienate workers from their labour and from the consumers of their product.

I believe that one of Zibechi's greatest contributions in *Territories in Resistance* is the detail in which he pays to the construction of non-capitalist social relations within popular resistance movements. These alternative spaces are 'ways of life,' or counter-hegemonic worldviews, that are espoused by many 'societies in movement' as a crucial component to the maintenance of political autonomy and the resistance to neoliberal forms of repression and governance. According to Zibechi, these subaltern perspectives are often partial, incomplete, or fragmented, as there are no recipes or templates for spontaneous and emancipatory alternatives. It is this 'other-world' view that Zibechi finds favourable to the homogenizing force of the state that, to the behest of those people living on the margins, collapses all differences based on ethnicity, gender, or class into a generalized, superficial category that eludes meaningful societal transformations. Instead, the cosmovision among indigenous cultures and those popular groups that prioritizes non-capitalist relations also "strives to make intercultural learning an art of understanding and translation, allowing us to fertilize our thoughts with different agendas, arising from different cosmovisions that are not intended to be all embracing, but rather local experiences that are just as important as those considered 'central'" (p. 57). The honour given equally to all ways of thought, worldviews, and lifestyles are part of the decolonization project that, in conjunction with other aspects of movement building, should eliminate the propensity for domination.

Another aspect of the symbolic defense used by the more successful resistance efforts in Latin America, as identified by Zibechi, is the fostering of a cultural identity and collective self-awareness that is nurtured by the relationship between political subjects and their territory. Zibechi states that the territorialization of resistance helps to crystallize liberatory identities and discourses by starting with the places occupied by marginalized groups who "refuse – explicitly and consciously – to accept the role of subordinates or 'excluded' that the system has reserved for them" (p. 87). Many indigenous 'societies in movement' are recovering traditional knowledges, especially in health care, as a way to decolonize information from the state and private industry, and to become more self-determined and autonomous. Movements

are also creating spaces for open dialogue among themselves and as a way of 'performing' revolution. It is this non-capitalist space that is thought to facilitate the challenge to oppressive forces, both internal and external to the movement.

Yet the specific discussion of how oppressive practices may be replicated within societies in movement is surprisingly absent in Zibechi's book. For instance, Zibechi sporadically mentions the changing role of women and the new gender relations found in the territorial organizations of Latin America, yet his evidence for such change is quite sparse. He does reference the Zapatistas' admission of the sluggish pace to improvements in gender equity (p. 139), yet does not afford any explanation to this, and instead glosses over this point to emphasize the slowness that may be inherent to the process of 'reinventing tradition.' Surely, relations rooted in centuries of patriarchy will take much effort to overturn, and generally speaking women within the Zapatista movement do occupy higher statuses. The Revolutionary Women's Law passed in 1993 by the Zapatistas establishes concrete declarations of the equal standing that women should hold. Yet we cannot omit the gaps "between rhetoric and reality", and, as Subcomandante Marcos recognized in a 2004 communiqué: "Even though Zapatista women have had a fundamental role in the resistance, respect for their rights is still, in some cases, just a declaration on paper" (Klein 2008).

Zibechi concludes his book on the dangers faced by popular resistance movements in Latin America. His heedful warnings of the destructive capabilities of the 'new forms of domination' can benefit all types of activists from other movements around the world, which I find to be of particular value. Zibechi contends that extreme forms of political repression are outmoded and, because of their overtly violent nature, may actually encourage revolt by strong communities that act in self-defense. Instead, the threat emerges "under progressive governments, [*because*] current movements become weaker, more fragmented, and more isolated than ever" (p. 293). The reason is that leftist governmental regimes subtly operate their power in order to regulate social marginality and increase public loyalty through creating the illusion of participatory politics while simultaneously preserving the interests of the state. Zibechi aptly calls this the 'art of governing the movements.' Sometimes social movements are co-opted by the state's encouragement of activists and movement 'leaders' to take governmental positions, which, as Zibechi illustrates, almost always results in the adoption of state interests (which also can translate to favouring capital), over the interests of the people. Zibechi concludes on the point that state co-optation destroys the intensive networks of mutual aid and social reciprocity that non-capitalist movements were originally founded on, while leaving these very movements susceptible to the state's agenda.

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Dwyer, Peter and Leo Zeilig. (2012). *African struggles today: Social movements since independence.* **Haymarket Books. 260 pp. Paperback.**

Reviewed by **Jonny Keyworth**

In light of the uprisings across North Africa which have been sewn into the 'Arab Spring' discourse, Dwyer and Zeilig's aim to strengthen and embolden activists and their movements in sub Saharan Africa by giving them their place in the political analysis of sub Saharan Africa, is particularly poignant, as activism from south of the Sahara is often overlooked from radical perspectives. Indeed, Dwyer and Zeilig see themselves carrying on the tradition of studying history from 'the view from below,' spearheaded by eminent Marxist historian E.P. Thompson who sought to shed light on "the blind alleys, the lost causes and the losers themselves" (pg. 4).

By arguing that there has been great neglect of African social movements in analyses of African society, the authors present their analysis as a midpoint between the two dominant viewpoints of: seeing social movements as authentic and 'of the people,' and merely being the puppets of their Western funders. The 'great neglect' that African social movements had experienced in relation to analyses of modern African society is the drive of the authors -- they hope to "place social movements at the center of the analysis of postcolonial African political change" and underline their capacity to unite the "coalitions of the discontented" (pg. 2).

The authors adopt a historical materialist approach in a relatively Orthodox Marxist style, as they seek to restore the agency of social movements and activists and draw an overview of the dialectics of political change in modern Africa, so they thus reject orthodox studies of social movements that conceptualise politics as governance and social movements as the embodiment of the Gramscian civil society, with the masses merely passive victims. We can thus see the last 50 years of African history as part of a process of: An Epoch of Uprisings - Cracks in the Monolith - Frustrated Transitions. This allows us to understand a sometimes messy and disjointed history and social movements' place within these historical stages.

The central disjuncture for African social movements that the authors pinpoint is the difficulty of the transition from movements as anti-colonial coalitions, to movements within the framework of the State. It is this movement that has presented opportunity yet challenge, and is one that movements are still struggling with today. Dwyer and Zeilig use the examples of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, and South Africa to highlight this point. Indeed the authors aptly term this phenomenon as 'Frustrated Transitions' -- the fervour surrounding independence has failed to be turned into progressive political change, with the three chosen countries as good examples of this

'frustration.' The DRC's move from Lumumba's populism to the patrimonialism of the Mobutu era to the ongoing conflict in the Kivus today; ZANU-PF's descent from party of liberation to party of oppression and authoritarianism, and the ANC's gradual move towards neo-liberalism, each offer testament to this argument.

The authors rightly ask -- democratic transition to what? It is here that they draw conclusions about the nature of the African state which has been left with limited capacity to either crush social movements outright due to hostile global economic conditions for African states, or have the ability to listen and respond to their demands, again because of economic restrictions but also because of political reasons. Dwyer and Zeilig note that whilst it has been a process of profound disappointment, they refrain from nihilism that often populates radical Africanists, that is, 'the tragedy of Africa' narrative. The authors conclude that this process has opened up the space for social movements to pursue their demands and due to globalisation's stripping of the state's sovereign decision-making power, social movements can now look across borders for allies to present alternatives to capitalist globalisation. Yet the key issues that African social movements are struggling around have not been adequately articulated by African social movements; and according to Dwyer and Zeilig, this is due to the fractured nature of globalisation.

Thus the central question of the book is a crucial one -- which way forward for African anti-capitalism? The authors are concerned with the concept of 'transition' due to their historical materialist approach, and hence the aforementioned question is tackled in the form of a response to where activists are in the current transition in their section on 'an epoch of uprisings' which takes us from 1945 and the rush to independence, up until 1998 and the period dubbed as the 'democratic transition' period. Dwyer and Zeilig skillfully trace social movements' rise and fall throughout the end of the 20th century, demarcating the key strands of radical politics in Africa since 1945---the labour movement, religious movements, the womens' movement, the peasantry and students/intellectuals. However the book does not focus specifically on any strand of the African anti-capitalism in the attempt to paint a broad overview of the current political situation. This perhaps would have been useful as it would have drawn greater attention to what the issues and ideologies that African social movements are struggling over.

It is from here that Dwyer and Zeilig draw their critique of civil society organisations and the social forums in Lusaka 2003, Harare 2005 and Nairobi 2007, and also the first World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil 2001. The main issues for social movements in the current historical stage are outlined as unity, organisation and globalization. Yet the authors' overriding critique is a contradictory one, in that they note the significance of what Hardt and Negri have called "a new democratic cosmopolitanism, a new anti-capitalist transnationalism, a new intellectual nomadism, a great movement of the multitude" (pg. 210), and the move away from hierarchical forms of organisation that dominated the global Left in the 20th century.

Dwyer and Zeilig follow this by claiming that anti-hierarchical forms of organisation are problematic, and lead to 'informal elites' -- a brush they also use to tar the women's movement. Dwyer and Zeilig conclude that the anti-capitalist movement in Africa has failed in developing meaningful alternatives to "actually existing" globalisation (pg. 234), and note the declining significance of the social forums in recent years. African social movements have been unable to build unity due to the divergent of perspectives of how globalisation affects the region.

The authors discuss The World Social Forum in Nairobi in 2007 as a useful example that underlines the issues for the global Left in the 21st century. The Forum highlights both points for optimism but also points for disappointment. It was perhaps the largest continent-wide non-governmental event in sub-Saharan Africa and was organised and facilitated by movements themselves. Yet the Forum was in many ways a 'talk shop,' with little desire to discuss a common agenda and most of the sessions revolved around the event itself. The professionalisation of movements, from the influence of NGOs and development discourse, narrows movements into sectoral single issues machines (often to satisfy funders) rather than political vehicles for disgruntlements and radical ideas. It is here that it might have been worthwhile for the authors to discuss either Abahlali baseMjondolo from South Africa or Bunge la Mwananchi from Kenya, as possible different organisational structures. The authors are quick to question the post-Seattle social movement activists and their brand of anti-globalisation and related organisational structures, and indeed the 'horizontalist' trend has not borne much political fruit. But Dwyer and Zeilig offer of the models of Latin America and China as possible alternatives to this situation is problematic.

The book indeed allows us to 'navigate through the mess, clear up confusion, and expose contradiction', and by articulating sub Saharan African movement's 'constrained agency'. Dwyer and Zeilig's book is a significant step forward in the discourse of radical politics in sub Saharan Africa, and should be applauded for its intention to break stereotypes, and also ignorance, of African struggles. What the authors offer us is a solidly Marxist approach to Social Movements in Africa which seeks to explain the transitions in African society, that have led to current political situation of social movements, and offer us insights to the nature of African anticapitalism, and the fractured process of the transition to independence, the difficulty surrounding unity and a lack of a cohesive organising agenda around issues relating to neo-liberal globalisation. Do the authors offer a path forward for activists organising and struggling in Africa today? Perhaps not, but the succinct history and narrative that they have drawn is a useful tool for activists across the continent, to learn from previous struggles and understand the struggles of today in their wider historical context. There is a debate to be had as to whether the authors 'revolutionary socialist' analysis is a relevant model to African activists today, but at least Dwyer and Zeilig have begun that debate.

About the review author

Jonny Keyworth is a graduate of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, where he studied a Masters in African Politics, with his dissertation researching Trade Unions and the challenge of informalism in Tanzania. Currently working in employment support in Edinburgh where he is a member of the Unite union, whilst working in an advisory role for a Tanzanian rural development charity based in Edinburgh. His email is jon.key AT googlemail.com.

Bush, D. Roderick. (2009). *The End of White Supremacy: Black Internationalism and the Problem of the Color Line.* Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Paperback.

Reviewed by **Hleziphi Naomie Nyanungo**

In The *End of White World Supremacy*, Roderick Bush critically discusses the various social movements that sought to bring about racial equality in the United States. With detailed examples, Bush demonstrates how the 1960s social movements in the United States of America were part of a global social movement that challenged white supremacy the world over. For instance, Bush locates the "the New Negro, civil rights, and Black Power phases of the Black freedom struggle in a larger tradition with sites in the United States, the Caribbean, and Africa and among the social and national movements of the Three Continents" (p. 12).

Bush argues that racist oppression and humiliation did not only affect Africans in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also people of African descent who were in the Americas and Europe. In the Americas, blacks were enslaved, while in Africa blacks were colonized. It is within this intellectual framework that Bush argues that the Black Freedom struggle is part of an international struggle for freedom. According to Bush, in their struggle for freedom blacks utilize the ideology of Black Nationalism as the vehicle for resistance. He defines the ideology of Black Nationalism as a "reaction of formerly disparate groups of African descent to a sense of mutual oppression and humiliation" (p. 16). The struggle for Black freedom, that is to say freedom from racial oppression, was organized around this common experience, and not a common cultural heritage, loyalty, or tradition. Black Nationalism was therefore an international struggle in that black peoples were considered to be one nation fighting different manifestations of racial oppression across the world.

In great detail, Bush lays out the rich historical background of the Black Nationalist movement in the United States and beyond. He draws on the works of scholars and activists such as W.E. B Du Bois, Booker T. Washington, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Jr., Marcus Garvey, and C.L.R James to contextualize his thesis. The author specifically looks at various movements that were a part of the civil rights movement. These include the student movement, the civil rights movement, and the womanist (or black feminist) movement. The point made is that the movements were not isolated but connected to broader social movements against equality and prejudice along the lines of race, class, and gender.

Bush uses the Student Organization for Black Unity (SOBU) formed at North Carolina A&T State University as a case study of Black Nationalism that is internationalist in essence. SOBU, later renamed to Youth Organizational for Black Unity (YOBU), is described as a Pan-African student organization that

was "national in form and internationalist in scope" (p. 44). According to Bush, the work of this organization and others like it reveals their recognition of the international nature of the black struggle as they supported anti-apartheid movements in South Africa and nation-building movements in other countries of Africa while at the same time challenging the racist system in the USA.

Bush also explores the inherent dilemma of social movements where on one hand social justice issues are interlinked and yet it is not possible to address them all simultaneously. He points out that the movement to abolish slavery did not only challenge racial configurations of American society, but also challenged the constructions of labour and treatment of workers. Although not explicitly and certainly to a lesser extent, the movement to abolish slavery also challenged patriarchal notions embedded in society. The same is true for the civil rights movement and black student movements. Perhaps the lesson here is that no cause is isolated from other causes. Thus, when a social movement focuses on one cause and ignores or neglects related issues, it is likely to weaken the movement or perpetuate the oppression of a certain groups.

A question that arises from this debate is: How do activists make the decision about which cause to prioritize? The book reveals that there is no easy or clear cut answer to this but it is an important consideration in social movements as there are significant implications to deciding what issues to make priority. One of those implications is that the choice determines who becomes ally or enemy to the movement. Allies and enemies is a recurring theme in the book. Allies and enemies from both within and beyond the specific movements in the African-American struggle for equality are brought to light in the book. Bush explains the forming and breaking of alliances within the movements. One example of such is what appears to be a rather contentious relationship between two key figures in the African-American struggle for freedom, Booker T. Washington and W.E.B Dubois. Bush describes Washington as an accommodationist whose approach to addressing racial oppression was in direct contrast to the more radical Dubois. For readers who are familiar with these names but do not have a good grasp of their positions and approaches to the race issue, *The End of White World Supremacy* provides a rich descriptive and balanced explanation of these and other prominent well known (as well as lesser known) figures in the African-American struggle.

Although activists and scholars of colour in particular will find this book useful, the book offers critical insight for radical activists who are interested in building social movements that are based on anti-racist values. The most important lesson that I took out of the book is the importance of cultivating solidarity among social movements. While not a new idea, this notion invites social activists to explore new possibilities for bridging connections and strengthening social movements all over the world.

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Rahier, Jean Muteba. (2012). *Black social movements in Latin America: from monocultural mestizaje to multiculturalism.* **Palgrave Macmillan. 250 pp. Hardcover.**

Reviewed by **Mandisi Majavu**

'Black social movements in Latin America' is a collection of essays that explore the situation of Afrodescendants' political activism in Latin America. According to Jean Rahier, the editor of this volume, for years, the official history of many Latin American countries did not acknowledge the presence of Afrodescendants in Latin America. Rahier explains that in the early 1980s, Afrodescendant organizations developed in accordance with the specificity of their national political climate and demanded full recognition of Afrodescendants as citizens. And, between the 1980s and the late 2000s, these organizations went through a similar political trajectory--from ideological monocultural mestizaje and "invisibility" to multiculturalism and state co-optation.

Monocultural mestizaje refers to the historical fact that national identities of many Latin American countries were, for many years, imagined as a mestizo identity. As far as Rahier is concerned, the introduction of multiculturalism in the 1990s did not disrupt the hegemonic ideological mestizaje. Catherine Walsh argues in chapter one that the multicultural reforms that were introduced by some Latin American governments in the 1990s were not initially designed to meet the demands of Afrodescendant organizations. Rather the multicultural constitutional reforms "had as their conception and base indigenous recognition; African descendants, if mentioned at all" were an afterthought.

The theme that runs through the different chapters of the book is the exploration of strategies that Latin American states deploy to co-opt social movements. The notion of co-optation of leaders of black social movements refers to the fact that the late 2000s and early 2010s saw Afrodescendants participate at the higher echelons of state institutions in many Latin American countries. According to Rahier, the inclusion of leaders of black social movements in the apparatus of the state has complicated political struggles, while, at the same time, it has allowed for some improvement in the landscape of race relations in Latin America. Catherine Walsh argues that the inclusion of Afrodescendants in the apparatus of the progressive states of Latin America has benefited Afrodescendants. In these states the concerns of African descendant peoples are not only made visible, but racism and discrimination are named.

Additionally, progressive states in Latin America have gone as far as to adopt new constitutions that acknowledge Afrodescendants' existence. Carlos Benedito Rodrigues da Silva questions the idea of co-optation of social movements. In chapter ten, he writes that "if we hold to the notion of co-optation… we miss the opportunity to expand dialogue and increase the risk of self-entrapment in a straightjacket, reviving the difficulties faced by the

organizations that preceded us" (p. 195). Da Silva is of the view that as much as maintaining autonomy is important for black social movements, it is equally important not to lose sight of the need for a qualified dialogue with the state. He further points out that in Brazil the dialogue between the Brazilian government and black activists has facilitated the inclusion of racial issues in government agendas and drew attention to the processes of black exclusion in the sociopolitical life of the country.

In some countries like Honduras, however, co-optation of leaders of social movements has had negative effects. For instance, instead of passing constitutional reforms that recognize black rights, the Lobo government created the Secretariat of Indigenous and Afro-Honduran Peoples. The rationale behind the creation of the Secretariat is to legitimize a government that came to power through the coup, explains Mark Anderson. According to Anderson, Afrodescendant activists have critiqued the lack of consultation in the process of creating the Secretariat. Moreover, activists involved in the Assembly of Indigenous and Black peoples criticise the Lobo government for furthering "'the invasion of indigenous and Black territories' via the concessions of rivers to create private hydroelectric dams in the Mosquita and in Lenca territories; mineral exploitation; militarization of territories; tourist projects; and model cities" (Anderson 2012: 68).

Another theme that runs through the different chapters of the book is the exploration of how neoliberal projects and the politics of multiculturalism served as the backdrop to the development of Afrodescendant organizations. For instance, Carlos Agudelo points out that financial institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) were instrumental in the development of politics of recognition in Latin America. The IDB in particular was the first financial institution that gave attention to the situation of Latin American Afro-descendants, writes Walsh. According to Fontaine, the IDB and the World Bank have at one time or another designed and implemented programmes targeting the conditions of Afro-descendants. De La Torre and Sanchez writes that in Ecuador, the World Bank went as far as to create policies for ethno-development based on the idea of fomenting social capital among indigenous people and Afro-Ecuadorians.

The involvement of financial institutions in the development of multicultural policies in Latin America compels Catherine Walsh to ask whether the political gains made by Afrodescendants organizations "portend to radically transform the structures of domination and power that have intertwined the interests of capitalism and the rhetoric of citizenship and democracy with the use of the idea of race?" (p. 16). At this juncture it is important to remember that Audre Lorde once wrote that "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house." In many ways the essays in this volume grapple with Audre Lorde's insight by investigating the politics of the Afrodescendant organizations and by trying to make sense of the political gains made by Afrodescendant organizations in different Latin American states. It is for this reason that social movements will find this book useful.

About the review author

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Scholl, Christian. (2012). Two Sides of a Barricade: (Dis)order and summit protest in Europe. SUNY Press: New York. Paperback $29.95.

Reviewed *by* **Ana Margarida Esteves**

Two Sides of a Barricade has the wake-up call effect of a cold shower after a night of peaceful slumber. This is the kind of book that should be read by any academic who claims to use her or his scholarly authority for "emancipatory" purposes. It is a brilliant expose of how corporate globalization promotes, in the words of Vandana Shiva (2011), a merger between the corporations and the state and the emergence of a hybrid political form -- the corporate state. Such hybridization leads liberal representative democracy to turn itself against the freedoms it is supposed to protect when corporate interests are at stake.

Naturally, as Scholl points out, such context makes it necessary and urgent to incorporate social control studies in the analysis of liberal democratic regimes. Based on his insider position in European protest movements, Scholl makes an institutional ethnography of the biopolitical dimension of summit protest management in Europe. He basis his analysis on participant observation, as well as interviews and documents from which one can reconstruct the history of repression and surveillance of summit protest since the 2000 mobilizations against the meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Prague to those of 2007 against the Heiligendamm summit.

Scholl presents protesters as "brokers" between groups oppressed by global capitalism and the elites that meet and negotiate their interests at summits. The focus of Scholl's analysis is the barricade, presented as a moment of confrontation between manifestations of the hegemonic forces of global capitalism and its counter-hegemonic opposition, materialized in the bodies of police and military forces on the one hand, and those of protesters on the other. Such confrontation lays bare the political nature of social control in summits, and more generally the structurally violent nature of the liberal democratic state in the context of global capitalism. Scholl's standpoint indicates that the purpose of the social control of protests in summits is not to protect people, property, or civil rights, as it is usually claimed by authorities, but to make sure that summits happen and global elites coordinate their interests without disruption, despite the protests on the streets. However, the political nature of such form of social control is supported and reinforced by a proceduralist approach to politics that is "anti-political," in the sense that it uses the logic of bureaucratic administration to silence counter-hegemonic dissent and render it invisible in the public sphere. Such totalizing logic reduces the antagonistic character of social relations to a mere procedural matter to be managed according to supposedly "objective" technical criteria by expert administrators. It also renders invisible the actual lack of "objectivity" of those criteria, which reveals itself in the way in which the conflict mediating function of the liberal

democratic state tends to be biased towards the defense of dominant economic interests.

Through the study of the interaction between authorities and protesters in such context, Scholl develops an analytical framework focusing on four contested sites of struggle that structure those interactions: the use of bodies, of space, of communication, and of legal means. Such framework is used to analyze how four tactics used by street protesters to contest global hegemonic power relations asserts a "disobedient body" versus the "hegemonic docile body", a product of disciplinary control. Such tactics are the "White Overalls," "Pink & Silver," the "Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army," and black blocks. Situating these tactics in the street in the context for disciplinary tactics, Scholl shows how the interaction between summit protesters and authorities, between 2000 and 2007, resulted in an escalation in methods of social control to a level that one normally tends to associate with the "Years of Lead" in 1970's Europe. Such methods include the preemptive arrest of scholars for the simple fact of befriending protest organizers. They also include forms of infiltration and surveillance that have the effect of promoting the internalization of social control, to the extent of eroding or creating barriers to the emergence of a collective memory of struggle, therefore leading to a depoliticization of conflict and the framing of moments of struggle as separate, isolated disruptive events. That happens through the enforcement of a level of self-censorship among protestors that limits the sharing of information among protesters and the co-creation of narratives that counter the "official" accounts of the status quo. Still, the escalation and increasing transnational coordination of social control by authorities is responded with increased transnational coordination among protest groups, which in its turn promotes tactical innovation. Scholl does not make a normative assessment of this process, focusing instead on how it is socially coordinated by trans-local power relations that exceed the moment of street interactions. Instead of explaining control in terms of preexisting categories, the author explores how the doing of dissent interacts with the controlling of dissent.

Scholl's book also raises bold questions about the disciplinary effects of the institutional dynamics of academia on social movement research. For instance, Scholl's standpoint and frame of analysis invites the reader to ask uncomfortable, but necessary questions about the extent to which the methods used for social movement research mimic the proceduralism of the corporate state by constructing a "truth" that depoliticizes conflict and contributes to sustain and reproduce its ruling regime. To what extent does the methodological individualism that characterizes much of social movement research, explicit in its focus on the identity and agency of protesters, end up creating knowledge that contributes to the reinforcement of the status quo? The invitation to ask uncomfortable questions is implicit in the critique that Scholl makes to the use of police data as the main source of information in certain prominent transnational social movement research projects. It is also implicit in the author's deconstruction of the concept of "social movement," with the argument that it tends to obscure the contentious nature of anti-systemic collective action.

Besides, Scholl's criticism of the state-centric nature of social movement research, shows how this field of social enquiry tends to become complicit with the "anti-political" practices of ruling of the corporate state. On top of that, there is the criticism of the very notion of "objective" social scientific knowledge, which according to Scholl bureaucratizes social analysis and reduces methodological questions to administrative problems. The author contrasts such form of knowledge with the "locally organized, reflexive knowledge of individuals in the everyday world," which is supposed to be the basis of a "sociology of the people" (p. 15).

Scholl's methodological criticism implies that it is necessary and urgent for social movement scholars with aspirations of socially engaged scholarship to question not only the methodology they use, but also the institutional and disciplinary foundations of their work and identities. Under what circumstances does social movement scholarship become an instrument of social control and, despite the good intentions of its scholars, part of the practices of ruling that supports the status quo contested by the movements they study? To what extent does the "publish or perish" mentality, the politics of employability and tenure, and the geographical mobility associated with employment precariousness promote self-censorship and prevent the establishment of the social ties that are necessary for the elaboration of effectively engaged and politically empowering scholarship? On top of that, how does the socialization of scholars turn them into "docile bodies," impacting their capacity to think outside the box and develop strategies aimed at circumventing such institutional limitations? Because, in the words of the author, the biggest lesson one can take from *Two Sides of a Barricade* is that social control "works." And so does strategic innovation and inventiveness, which become possible only when the internalization of social control hasn't reached a level that neutralizes the capacity to imagine alternative futures to those engendered by the status quo. That happens within social movements, as well as among the (generally) well-meaning scholars that study them.

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About the review author

Ana Margarida Esteves is a scholar-activist and educator, born in Portugal in 1975. She has lived, worked and studied in several locations in Portugal, Great Britain, Belgium and Brazil and travelled extensively across Europe, Africa, North an South America. She teaches and does research on Solidarity Economy, popular education, community-based finance, participatory action research, alternative food systems, local development, direct and participatory democratic decision-making, and how to promote a dialogue between mainstream western science and "indigenous" knowledges, with the purpose of deepening our understanding of the world. She is the author of several articles and edited book chapters on these topics. She is also a co-founder and member of the international spokescouncil of *Interface: A journal for and about social movements*. Ana Margarida is currently working on a book manuscript entitled "Insurgent Economics: Democratic innovation and the promotion of a cooperation-based economy by the Brazilian Solidarity Economy movement". She can be contacted at anamargarida.esteves AT gmail.com

Te Punga Somerville, Alice. (2012). *Once Were Pacific: Māori Connections to Oceania*. **University of Minnesota Press. 296 pp. Paperback.**

Reviewed by **Ella Henry**

Alice Te Punga Somerville has written a scintillating text that explores the relationship between Māori and our Pacific forebears, using as the narrative metaphor for her analysis the painting by Tupaia of the first encounter between James Cook and tangata whenua at Uawa in 1769. That painting features inside 'Once Were Pacific: Māori Connections to Oceania,' in which a Māori male is holding a koura (crayfish) for trade, whilst Cook holds out a piece of *tapa* cloth, previously acquired in Tahiti. Cook was surprised by the 'extraordinary fondness' Māori displayed towards the *tapa*, ignoring the European trinkets also being offered. This acknowledgement of the value of *tapa* forms the basis of Somerville's argument that, despite the hundreds of years of separation, Māori still maintained a bond with the cultural remnants of their Pacific heritage.

This work from literature studies draws on a wide range of literature, including creative texts such as poetry, fiction, music, art, journalistic writing, visual texts, scholarly, and historical work, to interrogate Māori connections with the Pacific, "rather than in establishing (or proving) whether or why these connections might exist" (xxvi).   In the ensuing chapters, Somerville explores Māori and Pacific relationships and how these relationships have been articulated throughout long periods of time and across a variety of sites. She locates this work within the project of decolonisation not by erasing colonisation, but by re-membering it.

In Part I, entitled *'Tapa: Aotearoa in the Pacific Region,'* Somerville focuses on the 'realm of *tapa*,' "exploring the ways in which Aotearoa is articulated as part of the broader Pacific region on the basis of cultural and geographic proximity" (p.3). Chapter I, 'Māori People in Pacific Spaces' concludes that, "it is through the lived, negotiated, ongoing, and specific interactions between Māori and the Pacific that articulations of connection, or otherwise, have any meaning and, indeed, any possibility of change" (p.35). Drawing on the work of Pacific-Based Māori Writers' Wineera, Patuawa-Nathan, and Sullivan in Chapter 2, she identifies the dichotomy of Māori *departing from* an originary home, Aotearoa, whilst *returning to* an originary home in the Pacific, referring to double-directional mobility between departure and return, which extends the Māori literary canon, whist challenging thinking about the pivotal relationship between Māori, the Pacific and Indigeneity. Somerville prefaces Chapter 3, 'Aotearoa-Based Māori Writers,' with the question: if one does not stop being Māori when living in the Pacific, does one stop being Pacific when living in Aotearoa? She refers to a Hinemoa Baker poem about the migratory pattern of eels, beginning their lives in tropical sea water, migrating to the rivers of Aotearoa, and returning to the tropics once more to breed, and states, "the

migratory cycle of the eel suggestively shadows the process by which these Aotearoa-based Māori writers articulate their connection with the Pacific – the question of which end of the trip is 'home' and which is 'away' depends on the place from which you're looking" (p.80). Ultimately, for Somerville, the 'realm of *tapa*' produced throughout the Pacific from the *aute* (paper mulberry) plant, brought from the Pacific and lovingly nurtured in the inhospitable Aotearoa climate, until its ultimate extinction, exemplifies the notion that *tapa* could and should be reproduced in Aotearoa, so as to remind us of our connections to the Pacific and the context of our Pacific origins.

Part II, *'Koura: The Pacific in Aotearoa'* opens with the trenchant notion that, perhaps, "Māori people aren't Pacific people in the same way that non-Māori Pacific people are Pacific people" (p.92). In the 'realm of the *koura,'* Māori have a specific role, as *tangata whenua*, literally translated as 'people of the land.' However, Somerville also refers to the hospitality dimension of the term '*tangata whenua,'* whereby Māori are the 'hosts' in Aotearoa, and all others are '*manuhiri*' or guests. Thus, Part II explores in more depth the relationship between *tangata whenua* and *manuhiri*, Pacific people who are indigenous to Aotearoa and Pacific people who are guests, new New Zealanders, Māori and Pasifika, and the ongoing migration of Pasifika people, not because they have been invited by tangata whenua, but because of their relationship with the nation-state of New Zealand. She explores Pasifika communities as guests, then citizens of New Zealand, (rather than Aotearoa), who are either compelled by -- or at least complicit with -- the attitudes to the position of *tangata whenua* that serves the needs of that settler nation-state. She notes that Māori and Pasifika communities have at least two avenues by which the connections between the two groups can be both articulated and practiced: one is the legacy of connections articulated in Part I of the book including cultural, linguistic and whakapapa links which pre-exist the arrival of Europeans; the other is "the shared experience and often physical proximity of Māori and Pasifika communities, which often come about as a result of both communities suffering at the hand of the racist colonial settler nation-state" (p.96).

Chapter 4 focuses on 'Māori-Pasifika Collaborations,' from the inclusion of Pasifika soldiers in the 28th Battalion during WWII, to the labour migrations from the 1950s to the 1970s, through Pasifika enrolments in Māori boarding schools, to living, working, and playing sports alongside each other, and the more recent emergence of *Kōhanga Reo*, language nests in Pasifika communities. These collaborations have built on both the genealogical connections (whakapapa) and the demographic ones, disenfranchised communities living in close proximity, so they could address their shared social predicaments and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. These collaborations have produced activist and creative work, both expressing and embodying connections through relationships and shared artistic visions. Chapter 5, 'It's like that with us Maoris: Māori write connections,' opens with a lament that there are few treatments of Māori-Pasifika connections in the body of published Māori writing in English, and reviews texts by Apirana Taylor, Patricia Grace and Briar Grace-Smith, whose works are "particularly significant because they

take for granted that the relationship between Māori and Pasifika people is a part of the Aotearoa they represent" (p.136). However, more Pasifika writers refer to their relationships with Māori, therefore, Chapter 6, 'Manuhiri, Fānau: Pasifika write connections,' explores this body of work, whilst acknowledging that Pasifika communities are caught on the horns of a dilemma, on the one hand they are as citizens and residents of New Zealand, the settler nation, but they are also guests in Aotearoa, *manuhiri* on Pacific islands which are populated by their kinfolk. Finally, Chapter 7, 'When Romeo met Tusi,' looks at the 'disconnections' and the problems that have arisen among Māori and Pasifika metropolitan communities, which at the most acute are reflected in sabotage, prejudice, and social and sexual prohibitions and even violent confrontation. Somerville concludes that, "as long as Māori and Pasifika communities insist that their primary relationship is with the New Zealand nation-state, relationships between these communities will struggle to function beyond the narrow parameters that the state provides... In the light of these mutual failures to render each other visible, it is difficult to reconcile the rapturous response to the arrival of *tapa* (with Cook) and the moments of present-day prejudice and suspicion" (p.175). In her summary of the 'realm of the koura,' Somerville acknowledges that, "treating disconnection between Māori and Pasifika communities is tricky because analysis risks lapsing into a discussion of Natives Behaving Badly, in which a moral position is asserted along with instructions for ideal interactions and reproaches for those failing to measure up. It falls on the critical scholar to be aligned with and contribute to the struggle for justice by carefully historicising and contextualising present predicaments, paying attention wherever possible to the role of power in the production of narratives and countering dominant configurations of power by ensuring that disempowered and marginalised voices have an opportunity to speak as well" (p.184).

Somerville, in her conclusion, draws together the strands of the narrative, and critically reflects on her own role, as an Anglophone Māori researcher within a university environment. She notes that the story of Cook's first trade with Māori, after which he was astonished that Māori might value the Tahitian *tapa* cloth more than any of the European trinkets he provided, provides an 'allegorical form' for the relationship between Māori and the Pacific, and the academic context of the university, and that one of the most exciting things the academy might offer to Māori, in terms of literary analysis is the opportunity for Māori to connect with the Pacific through that analysis.

As a Māori scholar, embedded in the Māori Faculty at AUT, which is housed beside the Pacific Advancement division, I am continually reminded that we share both aspirations and cultural characteristics, but apart from a small group of close friends of Pasifika descent, this book chides me to acknowledge that I do not, and have not forged ties, built bridges, and explored a wider range of relationships with my Pacific relatives. Further, this book not only argues persuasively why these relationships are important and useful, but how they are a fundamental component of my identity and how enriching those relationships

are an integral aspect of the decolonisation project. Mauri ora Alice, for a book that stimulated, informed and excited me in equal measure!

About the review author

Ella Henry has a PhD in Māori entrepreneurship in screen production (2012). She has taught in the field of Māori development at the University of Auckland, UNITEC Institute of Technology and for the last five years at Auckland University of Technology. In 2012, she was the Chair of Ngā Aho Whakaari, the association of Māori in screen production. In 2013, she was appointed to the Auckland Arts Regional Trust (ART). She has also been actively involved in Māori screen production, as a producer, writer, actor and television presenter, and an activist, advocate and researcher for the Māori business development. She can be contacted at ella.henry AT aut.ac.nz