Anton
Shekhovtsov. Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right à la Russe1
(Anton Shekhovtsov, 'Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right à la Russe', Religion Compass, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2009), pp. 697-716.)
Abstract
Russian political
thinker and, by his own words, geopolitician, Aleksandr Dugin,
represents a comparatively new trend in the radical Russian
nationalist thought. In the course of the 1990s, he introduced his
own doctrine that was called Neo-Eurasianism. Despite the supposed
reference to the interwar political movement of Eurasianists,
Dugin's Neo-Eurasian nationalism was rooted in the political and
cultural philosophy of the European New Right. Neo-Eurasianism is
based on a quasi-geopolitical theory that juxtaposes the
'Atlanticist New World Order' (principally the US and the UK)
against the Russia-oriented 'New Eurasian Order'. According to
Dugin, the 'Atlanticist Order' is a homogenizing force that dilutes
national and cultural diversity that is a core value for Eurasia.
Taken for granted, Eurasia is perceived to suffer from a 'severe
ethnic, biological and spiritual' crisis and is to undergo an
'organic cultural-ethnic process' under the leadership of Russia
that will secure the preservation of Eurasian nations and their
cultural traditions. Neo-Eurasianism, sacralized by Dugin and his
followers in the form of a political religion, provides a clear
break from narrow nationalism toward the New Right ethopluralist
model. Many Neo-Eurasian themes find a broad response among Russian
high-ranking politicians, philosophers, scores of university
students, as well as numerous avant-garde artists and musicians.
Already by the end of the 1990s, Neo-Eurasianism took on a
respectable, academic guise and was drawn in to 'scientifically'
support some anti-American and anti-British rhetoric of the Russian
government.
All animals are
equal.
But some animals are
more equal than others.2
Introduction
In August 2008
Russian troops intervened in the armed conflict between Georgia and
the separatist self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia, and
Russian society found itself increasingly affected by the almost
Soviet-like propaganda espoused by the right-wing newsmakers backed
by the state. A quasi-religious mantra, 'Tanks to Tbilisi', was
introduced into the Russian mass media by Aleksandr Dugin, Doctor of
Political Science and a leader of the International Eurasian
Movement, and widely publicised by radio, TV and press. '"Tanks
to Tbilisi!" - this is a voice of our national history'.3
'Those, who do not
second the "Tanks to Tbilisi!", are not Russians. [...]
"Tanks to Tbilisi!" - that's what should be written on
every Russian's forehead' (Figure 1).4
It was Dugin who first referred to the Georgian military's actions
'against' South Ossetians as 'genocide', long before this became the
Russian government's official line of reasoning.5
A month after the tragic events in both South Ossetia and 'core
Georgia',6
a Financial Times article
correctly asserted that 'against the backdrop of conflict in Georgia
and deteriorating relations with the west, Russia's
ultra-nationalist thinkers [were] starting to exert unprecedented
influence'.7
However, reducing Dugin's doctrine, Neo-Eurasianism, to Russian
ultranationalism as advanced by other right-wingers mentioned in the
Financial Times piece,
would be a simplification. As we shall argue in this article,
Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism implies a very specific type of nationalism,
namely the nationalism of the New Right, and can itself be
considered a Russian version of the broad pan-European movement
called the European New Right.
![](/web/20170218133039im_/http://www.mod-langs.ox.ac.uk/russian/nationalism/shekhovtsov-fig1.jpg)
Fig.
1. Dr. Aleksandr Dugin with a Kalashnikov in front of a tank of the
South Ossetian insurgent army. June 2008, South Ossetia.
Ideas Matter
The notion of the
New Right is doubtlessly one of the most ambiguous terms in
contemporary social and political sciences. Predominantly limited to
the Europeanised world, the New Right has at least two major
national or, rather, cross-national manifestations. The first
references to this concept can be found in The
New American Right8
and The
Radical Right,9
1955 and 1963,
respectively. These two edited volumes by contemporary US
sociologists' and historians' essays focused on the conservative
political movement and considered the New Right 'as mainly the
right-wing radicals of McCarthyism and of Midwest neo-populist
Republicanism'.10
The notion soon received a wider interpretation in the US academic
world and was extended so as to cover the Heritage Foundation, a
political think tank founded by the recently deceased Paul Weyrich;
the Moral Majority, a Christian political movement that counted
Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson among its most prominent members;
and also US President Ronald Reagan's social and economic policies.
In fact, it was generally a combination of socially conservative and
economically liberal policies that was ascribed to the US New Right,
and, thus defined, the notion crossed the Atlantic ocean to identify
UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's policies.11
Another major
manifestation of the New Right - the one we will focus on in this
article - is associated with the originally French, though
subsequently cross-national network of think tanks, journals, and
conferences, labeled the 'Nouvelle
Droite' in 1979.12
The entity itself surfaced in 1968 - on the eve of the May uprisings
- with the creation of the principal French New Right think tank
Groupement de recherche
et d'études
pour la civilisation européenne
(GRECE,
Group for Research and Studies on European Civilisation) founded by
journalists, writers, university professors, and other
intellectuals, of whom Alain de Benoist, Pierre Vial, and
Jean-Claude Valla were most prominent. In the course of the 1970s
the Nouvelle
Droite school13
evolved, its relationships with foreign right-wing intellectuals
extended, and by the end of the decade - with the formation of the
German Neue
Rechte (1972),14
Italian Nuova
Destra (1974),15
and Belgian Nieuw
Recht (1979)16
- one could already speak of the European New Right (ENR)17
as a distinctive metapolitical cross-national network. Its
international nature was further enforced in the course of the
1980-1990s when the New Right 'nodes' appeared in the UK (Michael
Walker's journal The
Scorpion and
later the New Right group led by Troy Southgate and Jonothon
Boulter), Spain (José
Javier Esparza's journal Hespérides),
Romania
(Bogdan Radulescu's journal Maiastra),
and
some other European countries.18
Despite
the fact that all of the 'nodes' that make up the broad ENR network
are self-sufficient and have individual doctrines, they share common
ideological origins19
and are characterised by the same set of distinctive features, which
allows the scholars to assign these 'nodes' to a common school of
thought that contrasts with the neoconservative Anglo-American
manifestations of the New Right. The first feature is that the ENR
is inherently opposed to individualism, multiculturalism, and
egalitarianism. According to the ENR thinkers, these liberal
democratic policies are the causes for the alleged contemporary
crisis of the Europeanised world. Instead of them, the ENR longs to
revive and revitalise Europe by implementing the principles of a
hierarchically structured organic community and ethno-pluralism in a
new post-liberal order. The second feature is the ENR's extensive
adoption of the late Italian communist Antonio Gramsci's doctrine on
cultural hegemony.20
This doctrine is based on the concept that a revolution can only be
successful if based on the cultural domination over a given society
by implanting certain ideological messages through newspapers,
conferences, and higher education. The ENR's 'right-wing Gramscism'
- together with the adoption of specific New Left ideas, especially
its sophisticated anti-capitalist rhetoric, as well as regionalist
and ecological stances - has certainly been a novel strategic move
to veil its fascist agenda in post-war Europe.21
Having abandoned both the milieu of immediate revolutionary, but
extremely marginal fascist groups, and the sphere of parliamentary
contestation, to which radical right-wing populist parties adhere,
the ENR preferred to 'focus on the battle for minds',22
thus choosing the way of 'metapolitical fascism'. The fascist nature
of the ENR, however, is disputed by some scholars who argue that the
ENR thinkers have moved beyond fascism and the older revolutionary
right-wing project toward 'a unique post-modern ideological
synthesis'.23
Aleksandr
Dugin's 'Historico-philosophical centre EON
(Aeon)',
established in 1988 and transformed into 'Historico-Religious
Association Arktogeia
(Northern
land)' in 1991, became a Russian 'node' of the broad ENR network.
(The late Graham Smith referred to 'the Eurasianist New Right'.24)
In 1991, Dugin launched his first journal, Milyi
Angel (Sweet
angel) that featured an essay by the Italian New Rightist Claudio
Mutti, interviews with the ENR authors Philippe Baillet and
Jean-Pierre Laurant, as well as articles on and by René
Guénon
and Julius Evola, who are considered important sources of
inspiration for the ENR. In 1992, Dugin launched another journal
Elementy
(Elements),
the title of which directly referred to the ENR publications, namely
French Éléments,25
Italian
Elementi,
and
German Elemente.
Published
between 1992 and 1998, each of the nine issues of Elementy
featured
articles of the thinkers or intellectuals closely associated with
this metapolitical network. Also in 1992, two GRECE's major authors,
Alain de Benoist and Robert Steuckers, visited Moscow on Dugin's
invitation to take part in a panel discussion at the office of the
right-wing Soviet-nostalgic newspaper Den'
(Day),
for which Dugin worked as a journalist. The discussion was also
attended by the Den's
editor-in-chief Aleksandr Prokhanov and the leader of Russian
communists Gennadiy Zyuganov. The early 1990s were the epoch of the
so-called 'red-brown alliance' characterised by a practical
integration of the Russian radical right and radical left. Thus, it
was only natural for the Russian communists (or rather
national-communists) to take heightened interest in the ideas of the
ENR that used to exploit the left-wing critique of capitalism and
bourgeois liberalism. De Benoist was disappointed with his visit to
Moscow as, in his own words, he was 'disturbed by the crude
imperialism and Jacobinism of the vast majority of the so-called
"patriots"', some of whom 'thought about nothing but the
restoration of the old Russian domination over Eastern and even
Central European countries'.26
The
disappointment resulted in the rupture of relations with Dugin, who
nonetheless continued to list GRECE as a 'Eurasian' mission to
France.
![](/web/20170218133039im_/http://www.mod-langs.ox.ac.uk/russian/nationalism/shekhovtsov-fig2.jpg)
Fig. 2. Aleksandr Dugin makes his speech at the TeKoS colloquium 'Welk Europa morgen?' [What Europe tomorrow?].
The red symbol is an official emblem of both GRECE and TeKoS. November 1 1, 2005, Antwerp, Belgium.
In
2005, Dugin was invited to participate at an inaugural meeting of
the British New Right group organised by Troy Southgate, a former
British National Front activist and currently a self-confessed New
Rightist.27
Later
that year, in Antwerp and Brussels, Dugin participated in two
conferences organised by the journal TeKoS,
closely
associated with Synergies
Européennes
(Figure
2). During his 2005 trip to Europe, Dugin met and interviewed
another ENR thinker, Jean Parvulesco and de Benoist, thus apparently
overcoming the 12-year rupture between him and the latter. The
interviews were partially shown in one of the episodes of Dugin's
TV-show Vekhi
(Landmarks),
anchored at the Russian Orthodox channel Spas
(the
title of the Christian Orthodox festivals). The episode was
dedicated to the issue of national identity in Europe, and Dugin
addressed the issue exclusively to the ENR thinkers, presented to
the audience as the 'European intellectual and political elite',
while de Benoist was described as a 'prominent European
intellectual' and a 'leader of the New Right that unites the best
minds of all European states'.28
In September 2008, Aleksandr Dugin - now a Professor in Sociology at
Moscow State University (MSU), a distinguished academic institution
in Russia - established the Centre for Conservative Research (CCR)
at the MSU's Faculty of Sociology. As early as November 2008 de
Benoist, the first guest speaker at the CCR, delivered a lecture to
MSU students and academic staff. Penetrating the educational sectors
is of great importance in the context of the ENR's 'battle for
minds' metapolitical strategy, as the universities, institutes, and
colleges give specific opportunities to the ENR, so they can exert
direct influence upon those who will be forming public opinion and
govern countries in future.
The
doctrine of Neo-Eurasianism29
propagated by Dugin, as well as his 'path from a marginal extremist
to an ideologue of the post-Soviet academic and political elite' -
to cite the title of one of the articles30
- is well researched,31
while the fascist nature of Dugin's ideology is widely discussed.32
This
study, however, focuses on a subject that is rarely subjected to
thorough analysis, namely the phenomenon of the New Right version of
ultranationalism that constitutes - together with the concept of the
socio-political rebirth of the 'cultural-ethnic community'33
- a compound core of Neo-Eurasianism. Methodologically, the study is
based on the approach elaborated by Roger Griffin who defines
generic fascism as follows:
A
revolutionary species of political modernism [...] whose mission is
to combat the allegedly degenerative forces of contemporary history
(decadence) by bringing about an alternative modernity and
temporality (a 'new order' and a 'new era') based on the rebirth, or
palingenesis, of the nation.34
This
approach advances the conceptual framework of a certain 'new
consensus' in fascist studies35
and allows it to transcend the boundaries of the research field by
considering fascism, modernism, and political religions. It is also
important that the approach is applicable both to the interwar and
post-war epochs: As Griffin's concept of generic fascism is
developed on the middle, theoretical, rung of the ladder of the
abstraction,36
it
is possible to go down the ladder to the lowest, empirical, rung to
analyze appropriate time- or country-specific ideological features
of a movement, party or network.
From
the Right to Difference to Ethno-cultural Ghettos
It
is seemingly difficult to apply the concept of a nation to the ENR,
as the thinkers associated with this network certify (or glorify?)
the irrevocable death of a nation-state. As de Benoist assumes,
'[t]he idea of the nation-state, which reigned in Europe from the
Peace of Westphalia until the first half of the 20th century, is
today reaching its end'.37
However, it is possible to surmount this conceptual contradiction in
this study as Griffin's approach implies an organic conception of
the nation that is not necessarily equated with the nation-state or
its existing boundaries, and which is indebted to modern notion of
the sovereignty of the 'people' as a discrete supra-individual
historical entity and actor.38
By
repudiating the 'modernist' idea of the nation-state, or a political
union of the nation-states (i.e., the European Union), the ENR
thinkers propose a seemingly 'post-modernist' concept of 'a
decentralized federation of organic, ethno-cultural identities that
portray the deep "historical" spirit of cultural
Europe'.39
The concept itself is a result of the ultimately modernist, or
rather alternative
modernist,
re-synthesis of the older notion of organic nationalism that holds
that 'nations and their characters are organisms that can be easily
ascertained by their cultural differentiae' and 'that the members of
nations may, and frequently have, lost their national
self-consciousness along with their independence', while 'the duty
of nationalists is to restore that self-consciousness and
independence to the "reawakened" organic nation'.40
The re-synthesised nature of the ENR's concept of an organic nation
incorporates the New Left's ideas of political regionalism, thus
shifting the emphasis from an
organic
nation to a
federation of
organic nations, or mythologized 'ethnie[s]
as
homogeneous historical or ethnic communities]'.41
Dugin
fully agrees with the ENR concept of organic nations, and defines
the 'etnos'
(Russian
word for the 'ethnie')
as
an 'immediate identity of an individual of the traditional society,
from which he [sic!] draws everything - language, customs,
psychological and cultural attitudes, life programme, and system of
age-related and social identifications'.42
Thus, according to Dugin, the etnosy
are
'principal values and subjects of human history', which 'live in
reconciliation with natural organic cycles, wave-like mutation,
etc.'.43
As
Dugin believes the nature of an ethnic community to be superior to,
and deeper than, that of a state, Neo-Eurasianism refutes the idea
of a modern nation-state, even the Russian one, and promotes the
concept of a 'Eurasian empire' built on the principles of 'Eurasian
federalism'. According to the concept, all the political units of
this 'empire' should be established in accordance with cultural,
historical, and ethnic identifications rather than simple
administrative division.44
In
the 1980s the ENR, especially the Nouvelle
Droite, took
a 'cultural turn' and its thinkers began highlighting the cultural
essence of an ethnie.
The
'turn' allowed them to distance themselves from a biological
conception of ethnicity by using the notion of a culture as a
euphemism for an ethnie.
World
cultures or cultural identities, seen as 'historic', 'rooted',
'authentic', or 'traditional', became the most important and
valuable entities for the ENR. Yet as sovereign peoples may be
deprived of their culture, there is a need to preserve and protect
cultural authenticity by any means. It is significant to note that
the contemporary ENR perceive their own ethnic community, or rather
a European national community and culture, as suffering a decadent
phase that should be surmounted by reviving, reinvigorating, and
restoring the spiritual substance of the community. Therefore, this
way of 'preserving' the cultural authenticity is hardly related to
conservative thinking as the European community should be
rejuvenated to create history rather than be kept as a historical
museum piece.
The
Neo-Eurasianist doctrine does not stress culture and cultural
identity as prominently as the ideological constructs of its French
counterparts. Dugin does speak of cultural authenticity but, in his
view, culture is only one - even if very important - of the
manifestations of an ethnic community, an ethnie.
This
peculiarity of Neo-Eurasianism is rooted in Dugin's adoption of the
Soviet ethnologist and anthropologist Lev Gumilev's theory of
ethnogenesis.45
Since the 1970s, Gumilev's pseudoscientific 'research' on ethnic
communities became increasingly influential in the academic circles
of the Soviet Union. He virtually legitimised the racist discourse
within allegedly internationalist Soviet science. According to
Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis, etnos
is
a biologised organic community - with its life-energy determined by
the forces from outer space - subject to certain irresistible laws
of historical development, as it passes the stages of the rise,
climax, and convolution. Dugin unequivocally perceives his own,
Russian, ethnic community as in the state of decline. He believes
the Russian nation is going through a phase of dilapidation stemming
from its alienation from its mystical essence. In his judgement, the
improvement of the Russian people's severe 'condition in the ethnic,
biological and spiritual sense' means appealing to a Russian
nationalism defined in cultural ethnic terms.46
If
the cultural (and therefore ethnic) identity is seen by the ENR as
the most important and valuable entity, then it is logical to assume
that the ENR's principal enemy is a force perceived as being opposed
to the preservation and rejuvenation of world's unique national
communities. Thus, the radical rejection of multiculturalism (the
liberal project) and internationalism (the socialist/communist
project) are inherent to the ultranationalist core of the ENR's
world-view. The movement's ideologists believe that 'homogenizing'
and 'assimilationist' practices (first of all, miscegenation)
associated with these concepts dilute the differences between
cultures and turn them into one universal culture. Multiculturalism
and internationalism do not remain abstract in the ENR's world-view:
if the relevance of the USSR-promoted internationalism (at least
officially) dramatically decreased after the fall of the Soviet
Empire, multiculturalism is still embodied by the "Great
Melting Pot" of the US. The Anglo-American world in general is
viewed as synonymous with materialist decadence, with a world where
'cultural diversity, human solidarity, and spirituality are
obliterated in the march towards Americanization and the final
victory of the homo
oeconomicus'.47
At
this point Neo-Eurasianist doctrine completely concurs with the
ENR's world-view. Dugin sees today's globalisation as a process, in
which the Western (first of all, Anglo-Saxon, American) cultural
approaches become universal, while different socio-political,
ethnic, religious, and cultural aspects are often violently or
artificially reduced to a single pattern.48
Within the terms of Neo-Eurasianism, the globalisation and
universalism of the Western liberal model led to the decomposition
of ethnic communities into autonomous individuals - the process that
in turn leads to total mixing of races and peoples, as well as a
birth of a new cosmopolitan human. The American multicultural
society is hence understood as a purposeful blurring of
ethno-cultural differences:
The
levelling of economic and political models on a planetary scale
assumes the establishment of a single cultural stereotype. It is
reasonable to suggest that the modelling of this stereotype shall be
done by those forces and poles, which come to be sponsors and
guardians of the whole globalisation process. The American way of
life, clichés
of Americanized ersatz culture transmitted via global media shall
supplant local cultural projects, adjusting the historically
established diversity to one-dimensional preset patterns.49
In
his most important book, Osnovy
geopolitiki [Foundations
of geopolitics], Dugin - 'a sort of mouthpiece and ideologue' of
'the demonization of Western values'50
- has geopolitically grounded Neo-Eurasianist aversion to the US and
the Anglo-Saxon world in general. According to the imperialist
geopolitical theories to which he adheres,51
the planet is roughly divided into three large spaces: the World
Island (principally the US and the UK), Eurasia (predominantly
Central Europe, Russia, and Asia), and the Rimland (the states
between the World Island and Eurasia). According to the
Neo-Eurasianist doctrine, there is a perennial irresolvable
confrontation between the 'Sea power' associated with the US
dominated 'homogenizing New World Order' and the 'Land power' of the
Russia-oriented 'New Eurasian Order' which resists globalisation and
ethno-cultural universalisation. In classic Manichean tradition,
Dugin demonises the US and the whole Atlanticist 'World Island' as a
'reign of Antichrist'.52
The
propagators of both a decentralised federal Europe ('a Europe of a
hundred flags'53)
and the Eurasian empire of ethno-cultural regions assume the Third
World states that allegedly embody the rooted traditional
communities to be their natural allies in a battle against the
'homogenizing New World Order'. According to de Benoist, the
cultural 'diversity is the wealth of the world',54
and the ENR promote the idea of anthropological culturalism in their
'struggle against the hegemony of certain standardising imperialisms
and against the elimination of minority or dominated
civilizations'.55
Here the ENR imitate - in a rather twisted way - the democratic call
for the right of all peoples and cultures to be different. As the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples affirms, 'all
peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations
and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind',
while 'recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to
consider themselves different, and to be respected as such'.56
The ENR turn this right into an imperative, so 'exclusion is given a
place of honour'.57
Now,
'[t]he
right to difference' changed from being a means of defending
oppressed minorities and their 'cultural rights' into an instrument
for legitimating the most extreme appeals for the self-defence of a
'threatened' national (and/or European) identity.58
As
a result, the ENR tend to support cultural-ethnic pluralism of the
world rather than cultural pluralism (multiculturalism) of a given
society or community. The ENR demonstrate pro-Third World
solidarity, but eventually the ENR's respect for other indigenous
cultural and/or national communities is a way of legitimising
European exclusionism and rejection of miscegenation (for a graphic
representation of this thesis see Figure 3).
![](/web/20170218133039im_/http://www.mod-langs.ox.ac.uk/russian/nationalism/shekhovtsov-fig3.jpg)
Fig. 3. PC desktop wallpaper available for download at GRECE's website.61 The image apparently depicts a border
between the federal 'New Europe' and the rest of the world.
This
kind of legitimisation was required to maintain respectability as
the tragic developments of the twentieth century discredited
biological racism and it was 'no longer possible to speak publicly
of perceived difference through the language of the "old
racism"'.59
Therefore, the ENR claim the insurmountable difference not in
biological or ethnic terms but rather in terms of culture, while -
in a politically correct manner - rejecting the idea of the
hierarchy of cultures. However, the main thrust of the ENR is of
European identity, and their ideal is 'a federal Europe' made up of
'homogeneous ethnic-cultural communities'.60
As
the name suggests, Neo-Eurasianism refers to Eurasia rather than
Europe. Dugin advances the idea of 'positive ethnic pluralism', a
project focused on keeping a positive or at least zero sum
demographic balance to prevent the disappearance of Eurasian ethnic
communities. It is precisely the idea of this project that explains
the need for a politically divided Eurasia to give way to a federal
Eurasian empire led spiritually by the Russian Federation. All
political frontiers are expected to be abolished in favor of new
'natural, organic, ethnic borders'. Dugin asserts that these borders
do not imply the political domination of one ethnic community over
another, however, they inherently lead to the appearance of
ethno-cultural ghettos. In the terms of Neo-Eurasianism, this is
called an 'organic cultural-ethnic process' intended to create
individual 'national realities' for the Russians, as well as for
Tatars, Chechens, Armenians, and the rest.62
Although
he claims that Neo-Eurasianist ethnic differentialism excludes
mixophobia and sometimes ethnic mixing is an inevitable and positive
process,63
Dugin stresses that the Russian nation is in need of keeping its
ethnic identity and that there should be special legal regulations
to secure preservation of the Russian nation's ethnic identity
within the supranational Eurasian empire.64
Apparently, these legal regulations are the 'norms of ethno-cultural
hygiene' that Dugin's Neo-Eurasianist order is actively promoting
the introduction of.65
As Spektorowski insightfully remarked with regard to the ENR in
general, though equally relevant to the Neo-Eurasianist doctrine
specifically, the idea behind the New Rightist federalism is 'an
exclusionary national-socialist Europe', 'the proper field for the
emergence of a new type of totalitarianism relying upon a European
version of the "politics of identity"'.66
It
is thus evident that Neo-Eurasianist interpretations of 'the right
of all peoples to be different' is not so much a means of defending
the ethnic-cultural peculiarities of Eurasian peoples, but rather
'an instrument for legitimating the most extreme appeals for the
self-defence' of a Russian ethnic identity perceived to be in
decline. This idea is perhaps best and most laconically articulated
by Dugin himself: 'The will of any people is sacred. The will of
Russian people is sacred a hundredfold'.67
In other words, though all animals are equal, some animals are
indeed more equal than others.
Conclusion
In
this article, Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism is analyzed through
the perspective of the ultranationalism manifested by the European
New Right, a broad metapolitical network of think-tanks, journals,
colloquiums, and various cultural projects. As a well-known
newsmaker and popular political commentator, Dugin has a significant
influence upon public opinion in Russia and is pushing it in a
right-wing direction. However, the question of whether Dugin's ideas
have a direct influence on the Russian authorities remains
unanswered. We are inclined to agree with Shlapentokh's observation
that
[i]t
would be naïve
to assume that Putin or any member of his inner circle begins his
day by reading Dugin's most recent publication the way Soviet
officials of the past began their day by reading Pravda.68
Beyond
any doubt, there are reasons to think otherwise. In 1999, Dugin was
appointed a special advisor to the contemporary Duma speaker
Gennadiy Seleznev who publicly suggested that Dugin's geopolitical
doctrine be made a part of Russians school curriculum.69
From 1999 to 2003, Dugin was a leading figure in the Centre of
Geopolitical Expertise - the expert consultation board of national
security established under Seleznev. Most recently, the political
commentator Ivan Demidov, who once stated that it were high time to
implement Dugin's ideas70
was appointed a Director of the Ideological Directorate of the
Political Department of Edinaya
Rossiya's (United
Russia, the virtually monopolistic political party led by Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin) Central Executive Committee.71
This notwithstanding, there is no evidence that the Kremlin follows
the Neo-Eurasianist doctrine. However, to immediately influence the
Russian authorities per
se is
hardly its chief aim. Since the ENR's strategy is 'a long-term
project to win hearts and minds',72
Neo-Eurasianists stress - wholly in agreement with the 'right-wing
Gramscism' - the importance of developing radical right-wing culture
within Russian society, particularly, through higher education. As
Capoccia argued, 'democracy can be [...] "defended" by
strategies with long-term goals, such as those aiming at promoting a
democratic culture through education, or democratic propaganda',
most importantly 'in the present context of the "protection and
promotion" of democracy in newly democratizing states'.73
Apparently, the Russian New Right led by Aleksandr Dugin, Professor
of Sociology at Moscow State University, is perfectly aware of the
fact that fascism can be 'defended' the same way.
Short
Biography
Anton
Shekhovtsov finished Sevastopol National Technical University
(Sevastopol, Ukraine) in 2000 and acquired a Specialist degree in
English language and literature study. Currently he is a third-year
PhD student in Political Science at Sevastopol National Technical
University. In his thesis he analyzes new radical right-wing parties
in Europe. His academic interests include but are not limited to new
radical right-wing parties in Europe, the European New Right,
varieties of interwar European fascism, (re)sacralization of
politics. He has authored papers in these areas for Totalitarian
Movements and Political Religions, Politologychnyy visnyk, and
Naukovyi
visnyk 'Gileya'. He
is also a co-author of a Russian-language book Radical
Russian Nationalism (Moscow
2009) that deals with the contemporary Russian radical right-wing
parties, organisations, and groupuscules.
Notes
1
This article is based on a paper presented at the interdisciplinary
postgraduate conference 'The Russian National Idea', held on June
6-7, 2008, in St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, Oxford,
UK. My thanks go to the conference conveners Victoria Donovan and
Robert Harris. I am also grateful to Tudor Georgescu who was very
kind to do proof-reading. Any mistakes, however, are solely my own.
2
George Orwell, Animal
Farm (New
York: Knopf, 1993), 88.
3
Aleksandr Dugin, 'The End of Compromises - Tanks to Tbilisi!',
Evrazia.org,
August
10, 2008 (http://evrazia.org/article.php?id=571#english).
4
'Tretya mirovaya nachalas'. Aleksandr Dugin prizyvaet srazhat'sya',
Russia.ru,
August
9, 2008 (http://www.russia.ru/video/dugin3mir/).
5
See (or listen) 'Osoboe mnenie s Aleksandrom Duginym', Echo
of Moscow, August
08, 2008 (http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/532383-echo/).
6
The 'core Georgia' term became widespread in August 2008 and meant
Georgia without South Ossetia and a second separatist province of
Abkhazia.
7
Charles Clover, 'Invasion's ideologues: Ultra-nationalists Join the
Russian Mainstream', Financial
Times, September
8, 2008
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4e3712f4-7dc6-11dd-bdbd-000077b07658.html).
Besides Dugin, the article focuses on other Russian right-wingers
like Dmitriy Rogozin, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and Aleksandr
Prokhanov.
8
Daniel Bell (ed.), The
New American Right (New
York: Criterion Books, 1955). Daniel Bell (ed.), The
Radical Right. The New American Right, Expanded and Updated (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday, 1963).
10
Peter Viereck, 'The Philosophical "New Conservatism" -
1962', in Daniel Bell (ed.), The
Radical Right, 155.
11
On the American and British neoconservative New Right see Sara
Diamond, Roads
to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United
States (New
York: Guilford Press, 1995), especially Part II: 'The Rise of the
New Right, 1965-1979',
109-202;
Chip Berlet, Matthew Nemiroff Lyons, 'From Old Right to New Right:
Godless Communism, Civil Rights, and Secular Humanism', in Chip
Berlet, Matthew Nemiroff Lyons, Right-Wing
Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort (New
York: Guilford Press, 2000), 199-227;
Jonathan Martin Kolkey, The
New Right, 1960-1968: With Epilogue, 1969-1980 (Lanham,
New York and London: University Press of America, 1983); Norman P.
Barry, The
New Right (London
and New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Desmond S. King, The
New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship (Basingstoke:
Macmillan Education, 1987); Mark Hayes, The
New Right in Britain: An Introduction to Theory and Practice (London
and Boulder: Pluto Press, 1994).
12
Le
Figaro Magazine founder
and GRECE member Louis Pauwels referred to the 'nouvelle droite' in
his France
Soir article
on March 29, 1979, so as to contrast this trend to the 'bourgeois,
conservative, and reactionary right'. See Tamir Bar-On, Where
Have All the Fascists Gone? (Hampshire
and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 84-85.
13
On the French Nouvelle
Droite see
Roger Griffin, 'Between Metapolitics and Apoliteia:
The
Nouvelle Droite's Strategy for Conserving the Fascist Vision in the
"Interregnum"', Modern
& Contemporary France 8/1
(2000): 35-53;
idem, 'Plus
ça
change! The
Fascist Pedigree of the Nouvelle
Droite', in
Edward J. Arnold (ed.), The
Development of the Radical Right in France: From Boulanger to Le Pen
(Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2000), 217-252;
Pierre-André
Taguieff, Sur
la Nouvelle Droite: jalons d'une analyse critique (Paris:
Descartes & Cie, 1994); idem, 'The New Cultural Racism in
France', Telos
83
(1990): 109-122;
idem, 'From Race to Culture: The New Right's View of European
Identity', Telos
98-99
(1993-4): 99-125;
Anne-Marie Duranton-Crabol, Visages
de la Nouvelle droite: Le GRECE et son histoire (Paris:
Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1988).
14
This year Siegfried Pöhlmann,
a Deputy Chairman of Nationaldemokratische
Partei Deutschlands (NPD,
National Democratic Party of Germany), founded the Aktion
Neue Rechte (Action
New Right) after his failure to become a leader of NPD. See Rainer
Benthin, Die
Neue Rechte in Deutschland und ihr Einfluß
auf den politischen Diskurs der Gegenwart (Frankfurt
am Main: Lang, 1996), 28. There's regrettably little research on the
Neue
Rechte available
in English. The first point of reference is Roger Woods, Germany's
New Right as Culture and Politics (Basingstoke
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). In German see, first and
foremost, Armin Pfahl-Traughber, Konservative
Revolution und Neue Rechte: Rechtsextremistische Intellektuelle
gegen den demokratischen Vefassungsstaat (Opladen:
Leske + Budrich, 1998); Benthin, Die
Neue Rechte in Deutschland; Wolfgang
Gessenharter, Kippt
die Republik? Die Neue Rechte und ihre Unterstützung
durch Politik und Medien (Munchen:
Knaur, 1994). See also the web-site of Junge
Freiheit (Young
freedom), an important newspaper of the Neue
Rechte (http://www.junge-freiheit.de),
and its archive (http://www.jf-archiv.de).
15
Bar-On, Where
Have All the Fascists Gone?, 145.
On the Italian Nuova
Destra see
Franco Ferraresi, Threats
to Democracy: The Radical Right in Italy after the War (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger Griffin, 'The Blend of
Literary and Historical Fantasy in the Italian New Right',
Literature
and History 11/1
(1985): 101-124; Marco Revelli, 'La nuova destra', in Franco
Ferraresi (ed.), La
destra radicale: una ricerca (Milano:
Feltrinelli, 1984), 119-
187; Piermario Bologna, Michele Calandri and Emma Mana (eds), Nuova
destra e cultura reazionaria negli anni ottanta (Cuneo:
Istituto storico della Resistenza in Cuneo e provincia, 1983).
16
By 1993 the Belgian Nieuw
Recht was
mostly associated with TeKoS
(from
Dutch Teksten,
Kommentaren en Studies), a
journal founded in 1979 by Luc Pauwels and published by Delta
Stichting (see http://delta-stichting.blogspot.com). Another major
Belgian 'node' was enabled in 1993, when Robert Steuckers left GRECE
and founded his think tank Synergies
Européennes
(European
Synergies).
17
The pan-European phenomenon remains heavily under-researched. Before
2007, there were only two monographs on the ENR available in
English, see Tomislav Sunic, Against
Democracy and Equality: The European New Right (New
York: Peter Lang, 1990) and Michael O'Meara, New
Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe
(Bloomington:
1stBooks, 2004), but, ironically, both books were written by ENR
adherents. For an unbiased, comprehensive study of the phenomenon
see Bar-On, Where
Have All the Fascists Gone? See
also Roger Griffin, 'Interregnum or Endgame? The Radical Right in
the "Post-fascist" Era', Journal
of Political Ideologies 5/2
(2000): 163-178; Alberto Spektorowski, 'The New Right:
Ethno-regionalism, Ethno-pluralism and the Emergence of a
Neo-fascist "Third Way"', Journal
of Political Ideologies 8/1
(2003): 111-130.
18
Concerned readers can check the links section at the GRECE's
web-site (http://www.grece-fr.net/ liens/_liens.php) to evaluate the
broadness of the ENR network.
19
On the ideological origins of the ENR see Matthew Feldman, 'Between
Geist
and
Zeitgeist:
Martin
Heidegger as Ideologue of "Metapolitical Fascism"',
Totalitarian
Movements and Political Religions 6/2
(2005): 175-198; Thomas Sheehan, 'Myth and Violence: The Fascism of
Julius Evola and Alain de Benoist', Social
Research 48/1
(1981): 45-73; Richard Drake, 'Julius Evola and the Ideological
Origins of the Radical Right in Contemporary Italy', in Peter Merkl
(ed.), Political
Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1986), 61-89; Pfahl-Traughber,
Konservative
Revolution und Neue Rechte.
20
On Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony see Walter L.
Adamson, Hegemony
and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural
Theory (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980); Kate A.F. Crehan, Gramsci,
Culture, and Anthropology (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2002).
21
On the fascist nature of the ENR see Griffin, 'Between Metapolitics
and Apoliteia'; idem, 'Plus ça
change!'; Richard Wolin, The
Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism: From
Nietzsche to Postmodernism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 256-277; James G. Shields, The
Extreme Right in France: From Pétain
to Le Pen (London
and New York: Routledge, 2007), 143-157; Martin A. Lee, The
Beast Reawakens: Fascism's Resurgence from Hitler's Spymasters to
Today's Neo-Nazi Groups and Right-Wing Extremists (London
and New York: Routledge, 1997), 210-216.
22
Roger Griffin, 'Introduction', in Cyprian Blamires and Paul Jackson
(eds), World
Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia (Santa
Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 23.
23
Bar-On, Where
Have All the Fascists Gone?, 134.
For this scholarly position, besides Bar-On's research, see
Taguieff, Sur
la Nouvelle Droite; Duranton-Crabol,
Visages
de la Nouvelle droite.
24
Graham Smith, 'The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and
the New Eurasianism', Transactions
of the Institute of British Geographers 24/4
(1999): 483.
25
The full title of the French journal is Éléments
pour la civilisation européenne
(Elements
for European civilisation), while the full title of the Russian
journal is Elementy -
evraziyskoe obozrenie (Elements
- Eurasian review).
26
'Three Interviews with Alan de Benoist', Telos
98-99
(1993-1994): 209-210.
27
On Troy Southgate see Graham D. Macklin, 'Co-opting the Counter
Culture: Troy Southgate and the National Revolutionary Faction',
Patterns
of Prejudice 39/3
(2005): 301-326. Southgate is also an editor of the New Right
journal Synthesis:
Journal du Cercle de la Rose Noire (Journal
of the circle of the black rose) (www.rosenoire.org) and a prolific
musician, whose possibilities of propaganda thus surmount the
materialist realm of books, journal articles and discussions.
28
Aleksandr Dugin, 'Puteshestvie po intellektual'noy Evrope - poiski
otvetov na zhiznennye voprosy', Evrazia.org,
November
22, 2005 (http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=
News&file=print&sid=2760). Concerned readers can also watch
the episode (http:// large.evrazia.org/Veni_17.wmv). The description
itself and de Benoist's appearance at the Christian Orthodox
TV-channel were all the more surprising since he used to vehemently
attack 'Judeo-Christianity' and demand it to give way to
pre-Christian European pagan beliefs.
29
Despite the name, Neo-Eurasianism has a limited relation to
Eurasianism, the interwar Russian émigré
movement. On the historical brand of Eurasianism see Vladimir
Makarov, 'Pax Rossica: The History of the Eurasianist Movement and
the Fate of the Eurasianists', Russian
Studies in Philosophy 47/1
(2008): 40-63; Slawomir Mazurek, 'Russian Eurasianism -
Historiosophy and Ideology', Studies
in East European Thought 54/1-2
(2002): 105-123; Dmitry Shlapentokh, 'Eurasianism - Past and
Present', Communist
and Post-Communist Studies 30/2
(1997): 129-151.
30
Andreas Umland, 'Formirovanie fashistskogo "neoevraziiskogo"
intellektual'nogo dvizheniya v Rossii: Put' Aleksandra Dugina ot
marginal'nogo ekstremista do ideologa postsovetskoi akademicheskoi i
politicheskoi elity, 1989-2001 gg.', Ab
Imperio 3
(2003): 289-204.
31
Andreas Umland, Post-Soviet
'Uncivil Society' and the Rise of Aleksandr Dugin: A Case Study of
the Extraparliamentary Radical Right in Contemporary Russia.
Unpublished
dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Social and Political
Sciences of the University of Cambridge for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, 2007; idem., 'Der "Neoeurasismus" des
Aleksandr Dugin. Zur Rolle des integralen Traditionalismus und der
Orthodoxie fur die russische "Neue Rechte"', in M. Jäger
and J. Link (eds), Macht -
Religion -
Politik. Zur Renaissance religiöser
Praktiken und Men-talitäten
(Edition
DISS., Vol. 11) (Munster: Unrast, 2006), 141-157; idem,
'Kulturhegemoniale Strategien der russischen extremen Rechten',
Österreichische
Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenschaft 33/
4 (2004): 437-454; idem, 'Formirovanie fashistskogo
"neoevraziiskogo" intellektual'nogo dvizheniya v Rossii';
Marlene Laruelle, Aleksandr
Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? Kennan
Institute Occasional Paper, no. 294 (2006); Dmitry Shlapentokh,
'Dugin Eurasianism: A Window on the Minds of the Russian Elite or an
Intellectual Ploy?', Studies
in East European Thought 59/3
(2007): 215-236; Alexander Höllwerth,
Das
sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr Dugin. Eine Diskursanalyse
zum postsowjetischen russischen Rechtsextremismus (Soviet
and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Vol. 59) (Stuttgart: ibidem,
2007).
32
Anton Shekhovtsov, 'The Palingenetic Thrust of Russian
Neo-Eurasianism: Ideas of Rebirth in Aleksandr Dugin's Worldview',
Totalitarian
Movements and Political Religions 9/4
(2008): 491-506; Andreas Umland, 'Dugin kein Faschist? Eine
Erwiderung an Professor A. James Gregor', 'Secondary Debate on
Aleksandr Dugin', in Roger Griffin, Werner Loh and Andreas Umland
(eds), Fascism
Past and Present, West and East. An International Debate on Concepts
and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right (Soviet
and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Vol. 35) (Stuttgart/Hannover:
ibidem, 2006), 459-499; Stephen Shenfield, 'Dugin, Limonov, and the
National-Bolshevik Party', in Stephen Shenfield, Russian
Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements (Armonk:
M.E. Sharp, 2001), 190-219; Markus Mathyl, 'The National-Bolshevik
Party and Arctogaia: Two Neo-Fascist Groupuscules in the Post-Soviet
Political Space', Patterns
of Prejudice 36/3
(2002): 62-76; Alan Ingram, 'Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and
Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia', Political
Geography 20/8
(2001): 1029-1051.
33
The issue of the rebirth, or palingenesis, of the 'cultural-ethnic
community' in relation to Dugin's ideology is extensively dealt with
in Shekhovtsov, 'The Palingenetic Thrust of Russian
Neo-Eurasianism'.
34
Roger Griffin, Modernism
and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler
(Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 181.
35
See Roger Griffin (ed.), International
Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus (London:
Arnold, 1998).
36
On the ladder of abstraction see Giovanni Sartori, 'Concept
Misinformation in Comparative Politics', American
Political Science Review 64/4
(1970): 1033-1053.
37
Alain de Benoist, 'What is Sovereignty?', Telos
116
(1999): 115 (http://www.alaindebenoist.com/
pdf/what_is_sovereignty.pdf).
38
Roger Griffin, 'Grey Cats, Blue Cows, and Wide Awake Groundhogs:
Notes towards the Development of a "Deliberative Ethos"',
in Roger Griffin et al. (eds), Fascism
Past and Present, 428.
39
Spektorowski, 'The New Right': 123.
40
Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism
and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and
Nationalism (London
and New York: Routledge, 1998), 146.
41
Griffin, 'Plus ça
change', 243. Italics in original.
42
Aleksandr Dugin, 'Evolyutsiya sotsialnykh identichnostey pri
perekhode k paradigme postmoderna', Evrazia.org,
October
06, 2004
(http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=arti-cle&sid=1979).
43
'Programma OPOD "Evraziya"', Evrazia.org,
April
21, 2001
(http://www.evrazia.org/mod-ules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=40).
44
'Programma OPOD "Evraziya"'.
45
On Lev Gumilev's theories see Victor Shnirel'man, The
Myth of the Khazars and Intellectual Antisemitism in Russia,
1970s-1990s
(Jerusalem:
Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism,
2002); idem., 'Lev Gumilev: or "passionarnogo napryzheniya"
do "nesovmestimosti kul'tur"', Etnograficheskoe
obozrenie 3
(2006): 8-21; Victor Yasmann, 'Red Religion: An Ideology of
Neo-Messianic Russian Fundamentalism', Demokratizatsiya
1/2
(1993): 20-38
(http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/Dem%20Archives/DEM%2001-02%20yasmann.pdf);
Galya Krasteva, 'The Criticism towards the West and the Future of
Russia-Eurasia', The
Eurasian Politician 4
(2003) (http://users.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/2003/galya.htm).
46
Aleksandr Dugin, Osnovy
geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoe buduschee Rossii. Myslit'
Prostranstvom (Moscow:
Arktogeya-tsentr, 2000), 259, 255.
47
Bar-On, Where
Have All the Fascists Gone?, 109.
48
Aleksandr Dugin, 'Evraziyskaya ideya v kachestvennom prostranstve',
Evrazia.org,
http://
evrazia.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1904.
49
Aleksandr Dugin, 'Evraziyskiy put' kak natsonal'naya ideya'
(http://www.evrazia.org/
modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=849).
50
Leonid Luks, ' "Weimar Russia?" Notes on a Controversial
Concept', Russian
Social Science Review 49/6
(2008): 34.
51
On imperialist geopolitics see Gearóid
Ó
Tuathail, 'Imperialist Geopolitics', in Gearóid
Ó
Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (eds), The
Geopolitics Reader (London:
Routledge, 1998), 15-43.
52
Aleksandr Dugin's speech at the Imperial March in Moscow on May 01,
2007 (http:// www.baznica.info/pagesid-3956.html). See Jean-Adolphe
Fouéré,
L'Europe
aux cent drapeaux. Essai pour servir a la construction de l'Europe
(Paris:
Presses d'Europe, 1968). A title of the book by the Breton
nationalist and ideologue of European federalism Jean-Adolphe Fouéré
became one of the major slogans of the ENR.
54
Alain de Benoist, Vu
de droite: Anthologie critique des idées
contemporaines. 5ième
éd.
(Paris: Copernic, 1979), 25.
55
Etienne Balibar, 'Is There a "New Racism"?', in Etienne
Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race,
Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London
and New York: Verso, 1991), 21-22.
56
United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (New
York: United Nations, 2008), 1-2
(http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf).
57
Taguieff, 'From Race to Culture': 124.
58
Ibid.
59
Ralph D. Grillo, 'Cultural Essentialism and Cultural Anxiety',
Anthropological
Theory 3/2
(2003): 163.
60
Griffin, 'Plus ça
change', 222.
61'Fonds
d'écran,
illustrations', Nouvelle
Droite -
GRECE (http://www.grece-fr.net/galerie/
_galerie.php#fonds).
62
Dugin, Osnovy
geopolitiki, 258.
63
'Programma OPOD "Evraziya"'.
64
Dugin, Osnovy
geopolitiki, 251.
65
Aleksandr Dugin, 'Prishel konets Evropy', APN
Kazakhstan, November
14, 2005, http:// www.apn.kz/publications/article53.htm. An
interesting parallel can be drawn between the Neo-Eurasianist
concept of a federation and the project of British
National-Anarchists (a 'school' within the British New Right led by
Troy Southgate), the self-confessed 'racial separatists': '[W]e wish
to see a positive downward trend whereby all bureaucratic concepts
such as the UN, NATO, the EU, the World Bank, and even nation-states
like England and Germany are eradicated and consequently replaced by
autonomous village-communities'. While these communities may be
established along the lines of common traditional culture, ethnicity
or religion, the British National Anarchists long for the
communities to avoid 'racial miscegenation' that 'endangers mankind
in the same way that hunting and pollution threaten both the
environment and the animal kingdom'. See 'What is National
Anarchism?', Folk
& Faith (http://
www.folkandfaith.com/articles/anarchy.shtml).
66
Spektorowski, 'The New Right': 127.
67
Aleksandr Dugin, 'Organicheskaya demokratiya', in Aleksandr Dugin,
Konservativnaya
revolyutsiya (Moscow:
Arktogeya, 1994) (http://arctogaia.com/public/konsrev/demo.htm).
68
Shlapentokh, 'Dugin Eurasianism': 221. See also Matthew Schmidt, 'Is
Putin Pursuing a Policy of Eurasianism?', Demokratizatsiya
13/1
(2005): 87-100.
69
Ivan Kurilla, 'Geopolitika i kommunizm', Russkiy
zhurnal. Obrazovanie, February
23, 1999 (http://old.russ.ru/journal/edu/99-02-23/kuril.htm).
70
'Ivan Demidov: Russkomu narodu neobkhodimo postavit' sebe tsel'',
Evrazia.org,
November
04, 2007 (http://evrazia.org/article.php?id=164).
71
See Andreas Umland, 'Moscow's New Chief Ideologist: Ivan Demidov',
Global
Politician, March
25, 2008 (http://www.globalpolitician.com/24333-russia).
72
Bar-On, Where
Have All the Fascists Gone?, 7.
73
Giovanni Capoccia, 'Defence of Democracy against the Extreme Right
in Inter-war Europe: A Past Still Present?', in Roger Eatwell and
Cas Mudde (eds), Western
Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge (London
and New York: Routledge, 2004), 104.