







Community Concerns with the Human Rights Implications of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programs in the United States

Council on American-Islamic Relations, Council on American-Islamic Relations- Massachusetts (CAIR-MA), Council on American-Islamic Relations- Minnesota (CAIR-MN), Greater Los Angeles Office of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-LA), Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, Muslim Anti-Racism Collaborative, Muslim Justice League

Submission to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
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Our groups welcome the opportunity to submit these comments to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on our grave concerns regarding countering violent extremism (CVE) programming.¹

The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is the nation's largest Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization, with regional offices nationwide. CAIR's mission is to enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.

¹ This submission is in response to the OHCHR's request for input regarding "best practices and lessons learned on how protecting and promoting human rights contribute to preventing and countering violent extremism" in preparation of a report to be submitted to the 33rd session of the U.N. Human Rights Council pursuant to UNHCR Res. 30/15 ("Human rights and preventing violent extremism").

The Islamic Shura Council of Southern California is a federation of mosques and Muslim organizations serving more than half a million Muslims in southern California.

The Muslim Anti-Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC) is a volunteer-driven education organization building and collecting the tools needed to creatively address and effectively challenge anti-blackness and racism in Muslim communities.

The Muslim Justice League (MJL), is a Boston-based, Muslim-led, locally-driven organization advocating for human and civil rights that are threatened under national security pretexts.

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In the United States, CVE programs are currently being piloted in three cities: Boston, Minneapolis and Los Angeles. A working group in each city has issued framework documents outlining the structure and goals of these programs; ² and the implementation of these programs is underway. Our organizations represent Muslim communities in these cities; we therefore have first-hand information about CVE activities and their impact on targeted communities. Based on our work, we believe that the programs and initiatives within the CVE umbrella bear significant risks to core human rights and fundamental freedoms.

CVE programs focus exclusively on Muslim communities despite the fact that multiple studies have documented a greater threat of violence from other extremist groups, including far-right and anti-government groups.³ The disproportionate focus on Muslims has had severe adverse consequences, including fueling the perception that Muslims are inherently susceptible to violent extremism and therefore require special monitoring. This directly feeds into the vitriolic Islamophobic narrative that has become increasingly pervasive in American public discourse, including the current election campaign.

Moreover, the United States has a long history of Muslim outreach programs being subverted by law enforcement agencies into covert surveillance-gathering operations. Outreach efforts in Minneapolis-St. Paul, San Francisco, Seattle and New York, among others, were found to have

² See Greater Boston Regional Collaborative, A Framework For Prevention And Intervention Strategies: Incorporating Violent Extremism Into Violence Prevention Efforts (2015) [hereinafter Boston CVE Framework], available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/2015/02/18/framework.pdf; Office Of the United States Attorney For Minnesota, Building Community Resilience: Minneapolis-St. Paul Pilot Program (2015)[hereinafter Minneapolis CVE Framework], available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/file/642121/download; Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, The Los Angeles Framework For Countering Violent Extremism (2015) [hereinafter Los Angeles CVE Framework], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Los%20Angeles%20Framework%20for%20CVE-Full%20Report.pdf.

³ Deadly Attacks Since 9/11, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION., (noting that more people have been killed in right-wing attacks than in attacks perpetrated by Muslims), http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html.

covertly been used by law enforcement to record participants' political beliefs, religious affiliations, and personally identifying information.⁴ The mixing of community outreach and spying has engendered a deep mistrust within our communities of government counter-terrorism programs.

The CVE umbrella covers many programs. The two main strands that are being implemented in our communities are: 1) the provision of social services, or the re-labeling of existing social service channels as "CVE" in order to address the economic and social factors that are thought to contribute to violent extremism; and 2) attempts to preemptively identify individuals—particularly young people—deemed "at-risk" of engaging in violent extremism, frequently through the education or mental healthcare system. These measures all carry inherent risks to human rights and basic freedoms.

Branding Muslims as Potential Terrorists Based on Discredited Indicators

CVE programs are premised on the discredited notion that the expression of extreme or "radical" ideas can lead to violence; and that there are observable, predictive "indicators" or "vulnerabilities" that can be used to identify individuals on a "path to radicalization." These "indicators" are frequently explicitly linked to protected religious or political speech or activity; or are vague enough to be generalizable across a wide swathe of the population.

This premise is faulty. Despite years of federally-funded efforts, there is no empirical consensus from researchers that there is either a "pathway" to radicalization or conclusive "factors" that predict an individual's propensity to commit terrorism.⁵ Nonetheless, the Boston framework

⁴ See, e.g., Murtaza Hussein, Spies among Us: How Community Outreach Programs to Muslims Blur Lines Between Outreach and Intelligence, INTERCEPT (Jan. 21, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/01/21/spies-among-us-community-outreach-programs-muslims-blur-lines-outreach-intelligence/; MICHAEL PRICE, COMMUNITY OUTREACH OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING? A CLOSER LOOK AT 'COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM' PROGRAMS (2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/community-outreach-or-intelligence-gathering; American Civil Liberties Union, Eye on the FBI: San Francisco (2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_alert_-community_outreach_as_intelligence_gathering_0.pdf.

⁵ See, e.g., Declaration of Marc Sageman in Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Latif v. U.S. Dep't of Justice et al., No. 3:100-cv-00750, 2015 WL 1883890 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2015); Faiza Patel, Rethinking Radicalization, 8-9 (2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf; JAMIE BARTLETT, JONATHAN BIRDWELL & MICHAEL KING, DEMOS, THE EDGE OF VIOLENCE: A RADICAL APPROACH TO EXTREMISM, 19-20 (2010); Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko, Individual and Group Mechanisms of Radicalization in PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREATS: CURRENT MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON ROOT CAUSES, THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTER-RADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT 88 (Laurie Fenstermacher et al., eds., 2010).

seeks to identify "individuals vulnerable to isolation, alienation and becoming disenfranchised," as well as those who express anger or frustration at U.S. foreign policy. The framework for the Minneapolis CVE program identifies five "root causes" of radicalization, ranging from "disaffected youth" to "lack of opportunity." Basing CVE programs on these empirically unsupported "indicators" – which are either vague or relate to political views – means that many Muslims will be identified as suspect even though they have nothing at all to do with terrorism.

Documents from the FBI indicate that the U.S. government is considering expanding CVE to target other communities deemed "at-risk" of extremism. In our view, expanding a flawed program is not the solution. If expanded, CVE programs would continue to suffer from a lack of empirical support, and further stigmatize and marginalize affected groups based on protected speech or activism. Targeting individuals for increased scrutiny or intervention for anything other than suspicion of wrongdoing is impermissible under the U.S. Constitution, and runs counter to American values.

CVE Programs Securitize the Relationship Between Muslim Communities and Social Service Providers

CVE programs in our communities aim to co-opt schools, teachers, mental health care providers, and social workers to identify and report on children and young adults believed to be at risk of violent extremism. In Minneapolis, school staff have been tasked with monitoring Somali

⁶ Boston CVE Framework, *supra* note 2, at 2. Indeed, the very first problem identified in the Framework is framed in precisely this way: "Some young people may be at greater risk of feeling isolated and alienated, making them more vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists." *Id.* at 3.

⁷ "U.S. policy and events around the globe can frustrate, anger and, at time, influence some to think that there is no effective alternative other than to express grievances or solidarity through the use of violence." *Id.* at 3.

⁸ Minneapolis CVE Framework, *supra* note 2, at 3.

⁹ Multiple groups, including environmental and animal advocacy rights groups, and several ethnic and racial minorities have been identified by the FBI as potential threats based on their political affiliations or racial background. *See, e.g.,* Henry Schuster, *Domestic Terror: Who's Most Dangerous?*, CNN (Aug. 24, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/08/24/schuster.column/ (noting that the FBI targeted environmental and animal rights advocacy groups, claiming that the "eco-terrorism, animal-rights movement" had become the number one domestic threat); ACLU, Eye on the FBI: The FBI Is Engaged In Unconstitutional Racial Profiling and Racial "Mapping" (2012), https://www.aclu.org/aclu-eye-fbi-fbi-engaged-unconstitutional-racial-profiling-and-racial-mapping (finding that FBI documents from 2009 show widespread and unconstitutional stereotyping, by attributing a propensity to commit certain types of crimes to entire racial and ethnic communities, including African-Americans in Georgia, Arab Americans in Michigan, Chinese and Russian-Americans in California, and broad swaths of Latino-American communities in multiple states).

children to identify "identity issues and disaffection—root causes of radicalization";¹⁰ the Boston plan envisions teacher-created "lists of students to determine which students appear not to be connected."¹¹ The FBI, which is also working in our communities, recently launched a website to encourage school children to identify extremists in their midst.¹²

We find it unconscionable that school teachers are being asked to view their students as potential terrorists and report them. As is evident from the experience of Prevent in the U.K., this model will inevitably result in the casting of unwarranted suspicion on our children and open the door to a hostile educational environment for Muslim children.¹³

CVE programs include programs that support social services provision within Muslim communities, from increased funding for mental health care to afterschool activities and mentoring for Muslim youth. The Minneapolis program, for instance, recently introduced a

¹⁰ C-SPAN, *Minneapolis Public School CVE Program*, March 9, 2015 available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4530677/minneapolis-public-school-cve-program

¹¹ Boston CVE Framework, *supra* note 2, at 6. Greater Boston Regional Collaborative, A Framework For Prevention And Intervention Strategies: Incorporating Violent Extremism Into Violence Prevention EFFORTS 6 (2015), *available at* https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/2015/02/18/framework.pdf.

¹² Michelle Boorstein, *Muslim Activists Alarmed by the FBI's New Game-Like Counterterrorism Program for Kids*, Wash. Post (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/11/02/muslims-and-arab-groups-concerned-about-fbi-counter-extremism-program-aimed-at-schools/; Laurie Goodstein, *F.B.I. Tool to Identify Extremists is Criticized*, N.Y. Times (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/us/fbi-tool-to-identify-extremists-is-criticized.html? = 0.

¹³ In the UK, teachers now have a statutory duty to spot signs of "non-violent extremism" and report accordingly to authorities. This has resulted in children as young as 3 being referred for anti-radicalization interventions. See Homa Khaleeli, 'You Worry They Could Take Your Kids': Is the Prevent Strategy Demonizing Muslim Schoolchildren? GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/23/prevent-counter-terrorism-strategyschools-demonising-muslim-children. Surveys of British elementary school children have been undertaken in order to determine whether young children are vulnerable to extremism. Students identified as potentially radical through their answers have been referred to authorities through the Channel intervention-based program. These measures have been heavily criticized by local Muslim communities. See, e.g., Ben Ferguson, Is Your Child a Terrorist? UK Primary School Children Asked to Complete Radicalization Survey, VICE NEWS (May 29, 2015), https:// news.vice.com/article/is-your-child-a-terrorist-uk-primary-school-children-asked-to-complete-radicalization-survey (describes a questionnaire handed out at a primary school with a large population of Muslim students on whether they agreed or disagreed with statements such as "It is my duty to defend my community from others that threaten it"); Alex Bushill, 'Radicalisation Risk' Pupils in Waltham Forest Named, B.B.C. NEWS (Nov. 30, 2015), http:// www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-34942431 (elementary school pupils were asked to complete a survey that was described by authorities as "a range of tools designed to ensure early intervention for any children who are felt to be vulnerable to radicalisation." Seven primary school children were reported to the government as vulnerable to radicalization (and their names mistakenly released)).

mentoring program and job training for Somali youth as part of the pilot program.¹⁴ While providing social services often brings much-needed resources to these communities, framing this delivery from a counterterrorism framework, rather than as a basic function of good governance, reinforces the corrosive, misleading notion that Muslim communities are uniquely prone to terrorism. As a result, even programs that would normally be welcomed have been divisive and counter-productive, and have been rejected by large segments of our communities.¹⁵

CVE Infringes Freedoms of Speech, Association, Religion and Belief

The "risk factors" or "vulnerabilities" that are identified by government agencies as markers of pre-terrorism frequently involve certain religious behaviors and political views. ¹⁶ Asking families, teachers, religious leaders and other who come into contact with Muslim youth to report them if they exhibit these "risk factors" creates an atmosphere of mistrust and guarded speech. It reduces space for political discussions and engagement within our communities, and the

More recently in a 2014 speech by a senior White House official, "ideological differences" and "sudden personality changes" were identified as potential warning signs of violent extremism. Lisa Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at Harvard Kennedy School Forum: Countering Violent Extremism and the Power of Community (Apr. 15, 2014) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/16/remarks-assistantpresident-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-lisa-. The Boston CVE framework identifies frustration and anger with U.S. foreign policy as one of the "problems" that may fuel violent extremism. Boston CVE Framework, *supra* note 2, at 3.

¹⁴ Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Minnesota, Twin Cities Somali Community Leaders, Government Officials and Private Partners Present Plan to Build Community Resilience (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/twin-cities-somali-community-leaders-government-officials-and-private-partners-present.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Press Release, Council on American-Islamic Relations- Minnesota et al., Minnesota Muslims Concerned About New 'Stigmatizing, Divisive and Ineffective' CVE Pilot Program (May 1, 2015) http://files.ctctedn.com/bd15115b001/d068ad69-9ad8-46a0-bdcd-b9d57454ed20.pdf; Press Release, Muslim Students Association West, Muslim Students Associations Across CA Against Federal Government's Countering Violent Extremism Programs (Feb. 21, 2015), <a href="http://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aad278&id=25a5c44b43&e="https://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eaae2442c8d20aa

¹⁶ Reports by the FBI and NYPD identified activities such as wearing religious attire and growing a beard as "risk factors" for radicalization. Though these reports have been debunked by several empirical studies, their conclusions continue to influence policy in the CVE space. *See* COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS: FROM CONVERSION TO JIHAD (2006), *available at* http://cryptome.org/fbi-jihad.pdf; MITCHELL SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT (2007) *available at* http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/ public information/NYPD Report-Radicalization in the West.pdf;

opportunity to challenge and contest violence as a means for achieving political change will disappear.

In our view, and that of many in the communities that we represent, CVE is simply another form of surveillance – carried out by friends, families, schools, and other public institutions. The fact that CVE programs are led by U.S. Attorneys' Offices, which are traditionally charged with prosecuting terrorism-related cases; and that federal, local and state law enforcement officials have been closely involved in the development of these initiatives,¹⁷ indicates that at least some part of such programs relies on gathering information about our communities and transmitting such information to law enforcement. The chilling impact of surveillance has already been well-documented among Muslim communities in several cities.¹⁸ From our work in impacted communities, it is clear that Muslims—particularly those from lower socio-economic backgrounds—have often refrained from participating in public discussions of political and religious issues for fear of drawing unwarranted law enforcement scrutiny. CVE merely fosters this climate of fear, distrust and self-censorship by expanding the sources of "soft surveillance" to religious leaders, doctors, teachers, social workers, and friends.

Additionally, the formal deployment of CVE programs in our cities has led to a side-lining of individuals and groups who are concerned about the impact of these initiatives and informal efforts to silence these voices. For instance, in 2014, during a closed-door meeting with community groups in Boston, a representative of the United States Attorney's Office castigated Muslim community members for organizing a public discussion about their concerns regarding CVE without inviting the USAO to use the discussion as a platform to promote CVE.¹⁹

CVE Programs Lack Transparency

Although CVE programs are meant to involve the public, there is little in the way of transparency about these programs. Several governments as well as the United Nations have affirmed their commitment to ensuring that CVE programs will respect basic human rights and civil liberties. However, such assurances mean little when information about the safeguards built into such programs is so scant. Many of the undersigned organizations have repeatedly requested

¹⁷ Boston CVE Framework, *supra* note 2, at 16 (listing several representatives from federal, state and local law enforcement as part of the Greater Boston Regional Collaborative that developed the Boston CVE framework).

¹⁸ See generally MUSLIM AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES COALITION ET AL, MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN MUSLIMS (2013) http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf.

¹⁹ Email from community member dated Apr. 11, 2016 (on file with the Brennan Center).

that government agencies provide information on privacy, human rights and civil liberties protections in CVE programming.²⁰ There has been no response to these efforts.²¹ Governments must reinforce their commitment to protecting human rights in the CVE context by providing substantive information on human rights safeguards, rather than mere assurances that such safeguards exist. Given the contentious history of intelligence gathering through community outreach programs in the United States, such transparency is critical to ensuring that programs that ostensibly aim to empower communities do not become intelligence-gathering exercises that impinge on the rights of our communities to speak and pray.

Many of the programs carried out under the CVE umbrella carry serious risks to basic human rights and freedoms. The premise of such programs fosters discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, labeling them as inherently suspicious and in need of special monitoring, and accordingly impact the right to freedom of religion. Criminalizing speech and other non-violent behavior as "extremist" runs the risk of infringing rights to freedom of expression, thought, conscience, assembly, and association. Measures that involve educational institutions impinge on the right to education and academic freedom. Moreover, the lack of transparency about these programs has raised concerns in our communities that CVE will essentially function as a front for surveillance and intelligence-gathering. Though we have focused on the impact of CVE within the United States in this submission, we are deeply concerned that similar practices and policies will be invoked and used by other states following this example to target human rights advocates, civil rights groups, and media representatives in the name of countering violent extremism.

²⁰ See, e.g., Letter from Brennan Center for Justice et al. to Rep. Michael McCaul, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., et al. (July 10, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/071415%20Final%20CVE%20Bill%20Coalition%20Letter.pdf; Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et al., to Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Deputy Nat'l Sec Adviser (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141218 cve_coalition_letter_2.pdf.

²¹ CVE programs are currently the subject of at least two lawsuits from civil rights organizations over the government's withholding of information regarding these programs' implementation and efficacy. *See* ACLU v. Department of Homeland Security: FOIA Lawsuit Seeking Records on "Countering Violent Extremism" Programs, American Civil Liberties Union (Feb. 9, 2016) https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-department-homeland-security-foia-lawsuit-seeking-records-countering-violent-extremism; Brennan Center for Justice, *Brennan Center Files Suit to Make "Countering Violent Extremism" Records Public*, Jan. 26, 2016 https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/brennan-center-files-suit-make-countering-violent-extremism-records-public.

It is noteworthy that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon placed such importance on respecting human rights when implementing programs and measures to counter violent extremism.²² To give content to this imperative, we respectfully suggest that OHCHR recommend that States implementing CVE programs take the following steps:

- Ensure that simply holding or expressing beliefs labelled "extremist" as opposed to committing a criminal act is not made punishable and does not subject the belief holder to measures which interfere with freedoms of conscience, speech, worship, association or other fundamental human rights.
- Ensure that any programs intended to discourage political violence (including those run by non-governmental organizations receiving government funding) operate according to transparent, publicly available guidelines and incorporate clear, specific and publicly-available safeguards for human rights and civil liberties. All programs should also be regularly monitored and evaluated, both to assess their efficacy, and also to evaluate their impact on human rights. Such reviews should allow for meaningful participation and input by civil society actors, and these reviews should be made publicly available.
- Heed the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, in particular, that "[t]he broad-brush 'securitization' of human rights, international development, humanitarian assistance, education, community integration, gender or any other agenda by the State or the international community must be avoided," and that states "must respect, protect and promote the human rights of all individuals, of all ages, genders, ethnic or religious affiliation without discrimination, without framing this obligation as part of any broader agenda, including the prevention and countering of violent extremism." Programs to provide resources and social services to underserved communities therefore should be directed entirely by government agencies tasked with overseeing education or health, without reporting to, or collaboration with law enforcement or intelligence agencies and without connection to objectives of countering or preventing "extremism" or political violence.

²² Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/65, ¶ 33 (Feb. 22, 2016), advanced unedited version available at https://goo.gl/xPx0wi.

 $^{^{23}}$ Id. at ¶ 56(d).

We are grateful for the opportunity to present our concerns about CVE to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and urge you to carefully consider the issues raised here in preparing your report on the subject.