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MI6 stood by bogus intelligence
British intelligence agencies accepted false information even after a source told them of a supposed chemical weapon that was remarkably similar to one from the 1996 movie The Rock, my colleague Ewen MacAskill has learned from the report.
The incident is just one of a series of blunders described by the Chilcot report committed by Britain’s overseas spy agency, the Secret Intelligence Service in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In the incident, the report describes a source providing details about spherical glass containers allegedly filled with chemical weapons at an establishment in Iraq.
MI6 at the time defended the authenticity of the source and the material, according to the Chilcot report. “However, it drew attention to the fact that the source’s description of the device and its spherical glass contents was remarkably similar to the fictional chemical weapon portrayed in the film The Rock,” the report says.
In the 1996 movie, Nicolas Cage, playing an FBI chemical warfare specialist, joins Sean Connery, playing a former British spy, to prevent chemical weapons being launched against San Francisco.
The similarity between the movie and the source’s alleged device had been noted when the MI6 report was first circulated on 11 and 23 September 2002, well before the Iraq invasion in March 2003.
But this and other bogus claims were not formally withdrawn by MI6 until 29 July 2003, four months after the invasion, Chilcot reports.
In a devastating finding, Chilcot said: “SIS did not inform No 10 or others that the source who had provided the reporting issued on 11 and 23 September 2002 about production of chemical and biological agent had been lying to SIS.”
False allegations that Saddam could attack UK targets within “45 minutes” were not withdrawn until 28 September 2004. Bogus information by a source known as Curve Ball that also fed into the case for war was not withdrawn until the following day, 29 September 2004.
The faulty intelligence from MI6 was compounded by Tony Blair who hardened up the information when he wrote the foreword to the so-called “dodgy dossier” in September 2002. Chilcot concluded that Blair presented the assessments of the spy agencies to parliament with a “certainty” not justified by available intelligence.
Chilcot blames the intelligence community not just for passing on bogus information in the first place but failing to correct the prime minister when he toughened up the so-called intelligence.
The intelligence agencies had a serious blind spot. “At no stage was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined by either JIC (the Joint Intelligence Committee, the umbrella organisation representing all the intelligence agencies) or the policy community.”
In the foreword to the dossier presented to the public in September 2002 preparing the case for war, Blair said he believed the intelligence had “established beyond doubt” that Saddam had continued to produce WMDs.
But the Chilcot report concludes: “The assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.”
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9 Chilcot findings rejected by Tony Blair
Tony Blair’s lengthy speech about the Chilcot report, and his subsequent Q&A with journalists, was remarkable. Blair has expressed sorrow and regret about what happened before, but today, particularly in his opening remarks, he sounded more emotional and contrite than ever.
The intelligence statements made at the time of going to war turned out to be wrong.
The aftermath turned out more hostile, protracted and bloody than we ever imagined.
The coalition planned for one set of ground facts and encountered another.
A nation whose people we wanted to see free and secure from the evil of Saddam became instead victim of sectarian terrorism.
For all of this I express more sorrow, regret and apology and in greater measure than you can know or may believe.
But the raw emotion (genuine, I believe, although no doubt many will assume it wasn’t) could not conceal the fact that Blair’s performance was a statement of defiance.
Earlier this year Tony Blair said in an interview that at some point “the political class as a whole has got to get up and stand up for itself”. That’s what he was doing this afternoon. His main complaint about Sir John Chilcot was that Chilcot did not recognise what it was like to have to take decisions. Blair repeatedly criticised Chilcot for refusing to consider what might have happened if Britain has chosen not to support the invasion of Iraq, suggesting that there was a thick streak of naivety or otherworldliness running through the report.
But Blair also rejected many of Chilcot’s specific conclusions. I’ve counted at least nine points where Blair said Chilcot was wrong. Here they are:
- Blair said he did not accept Chilcot’s claim that the war was “not a last resort”. There was no rush to war, Blair said.
The inquiry finds that as at 18 March war was not the ‘last resort’. But given the impasse at the UN and the insistence of the USA – for reasons I completely understood and with hundreds of thousands of troops in theatre which could not be kept in situ indefinitely – it was the last moment of decision for us, as the report accepts.
- He rejected Chilcot’s claim that Britain and America undermined the authority of the UN by going to war without a second resolution. Blair said:
The inquiry finds that going to war without a majority of the UNSC in agreement ‘undermined the authority of the UN.’
The reality is that we – Britain – had continually tried to act with the authority of the UN. I successfully convinced the Americans to go back to the UN in November 2002 to secure resolution 1441.
- Blair said he did not accept Chilcot’s assessment that it would have been acceptable to refuse to support America.
Whilst they accept that it was my prerogative as PM to decide to be with the USA in military action, the inquiry questions whether this was really necessary.
9/11 was an event like no other in US history. I considered it an attack on all the free world. I believed that Britain – as America’s strongest ally – should be with them in tackling this new and unprecedented security challenge. I believed it important that America was not alone but part of a wider coalition. In the end, a majority even of the European Union nations supported action in Iraq.
- Blair said he did not accept Chilcot’s claim that the risk of an insurgency should have been predicted.
The inquiry finds that there were some warnings about sectarian fighting and bloodletting. I accept that but would point out that nowhere were these highlighted as the main risk and in any event what we faced was not the anticipated internal bloodletting but an all-out insurgency stimulated by external arms and money.
- Blair said Chilcot was wrong to blame the armed forces, the intelligence services and civil servants, because they were following Blair’s instructions.
I do not think it is fair or accurate to criticise the armed forces, intelligence services, or civil service. It was my decision they were acting upon. The armed forces in particular did an extraordinary job throughout our engagement in Iraq in the incredibly difficult mission we gave them.
Some of the Chilcot criticisms are of the armed forces are set out here.
- Blair said he did not accept Chilcot’s claim that the war was a failure. (See 12.09pm.) Blair said the first part of the campaign was a “brilliant military success”.
- He said he did not accept Chilcot’s claim that it was “humiliating” for British soldiers to have to do a deal with a militia group in southern Iraq.
- Blair rejected Chilcot’s claim that it was a mistake to be conducting “two enduring campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan” at the same time.
- Blair accused Chilcot of underestimating the damage done to French and German relations with America by their stance on Iraq.
That’s all from me and Peter for today.
We are handing over to Alan Yuhas.
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George Bush says world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power
Corbyn apologises for war on behalf of Labour to Iraqis, to soldiers' families and to Britons
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Lord Butler says Blair exaggerated the reliability of the intelligence, but did not lie
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Goldsmith says Chilcot backs his finding that war was legal
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