The extraordinary pace of expansion in China in the past three decades has led to the popular belief that the country will become the superpower of this century, some even say overtaking the US. I am Chinese myself and rightly proud of the sea of changes in my country, which has almost become unrecognisable since I taught at Beijing University in the early Eighties. I am not yet convinced, however, that China will become the master of the universe in the 21st century.
As China goes from a rural-agricultural society to an urban-industrial one, there are increasing problems of protecting arable land. There are only 900 square metres of arable land per inhabitant, 40 per cent less than the global average. Even more alarming is that these limited resources are constantly diminishing. Wholesale rural areas are being forced by governments — federal, provincial and local — to be turned into cities in the name of progress.
Then there is the air — or rather the air pollution. There is no argument that air quality all over China, particularly in the cities, is appalling. The measurements posted on Twitter by the US Embassy in Beijing last summer registered descriptions such as “crazy bad” and “beyond index”. There is also serious air pollution from metal smelters and a fast-growing battery industry. This gives rise to lead poisoning, one of the most common paediatric health problems, with one-third of China’s children suffering from elevated blood lead levels.
Then there is water. Over-extraction of ground water and falling water tables are huge problems. Water is going to be scarce. The exploitation of dams and other irrigation infrastructure have almost halted the Yellow River’s natural course, threatening to dry up the entire river valley. Even in 1997, the lower Yellow River did not flow 230 days out of the year.
So just looking at the essential conditions of life, China faces enormous problems. Those are aggravated by her vast population of 1.3 billion — and further by her demographics, which have created what someone has called a “perfect storm”.
First, China’s total working age population is set to fall continually in the next 20 years. By 2030, there will be more than four older workers for every three of their younger counterparts. With this smaller, greyer Chinese workforce, the growth rates of the recent past are not going to be sustainable.
Second, China will experience a population explosion of senior citizens in the next 20 years. By 2030, there will be 240 million of them of 65 years old or older. This swelling class of senior citizens will undoubtedly place enormous economic pressures on China that no country of a comparable income level has ever had to face.
Third, because of the one-child policy, which tends to favour boys (with appalling statistics on infanticide of girls), China will have a great imbalance between men and women. Already in 2005 there were 120 boys for every 100 girls. The result is going to be a growing population of unmarried and frustrated young men.
Fourth, the one-child policy has also meant that for this generation there are no more brothers or sisters, no more aunties or uncles, no more nieces and nephews. Given the traditional Chinese family structure of relying heavily upon blood relatives in business, her economic performance is bound to be affected.
But perhaps the most critical question on China’s future rests with its leadership, or the handful of members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Little is known about how these chosen few work together, or even what they think, or how they come to their conclusions. In all the major decisions of state, there is an opacity which has not changed since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. This has necessarily created not only a culture of back-stabbing among those vying for power but, more importantly, a total disconnect between government and people. This dysfunctionality can never be the basis of a great nation.
The plight of the individual in China is fundamental. Far too often we have conferences and seminars and articles about China as a country — on what sort of progress it has achieved, economic growth figures, the rise of a middle class — yet seldom do we focus on the individual.
When I lived in China in the early Eighties I was very conscious of almost a soft reign of terror that prevailed over the capital. It was an acute sense of fear of the authorities. Thirty years later, there seems to be less nervousness — but I still can detect that sense of fear, or at least helplessness. When Chinese people were asked what they thought about the 18th Congress of the Communist Party last year, they said they were not interested because it did not concern them. I think what they really meant was that there was nothing they could do and therefore no reason why they should be interested.
It is precisely that sense of fear that is the greatest hindrance to China emerging as a superpower. There has to be genuine meritocracy in the ruling authority, as well as a real connection between government and people, before China can begin to proclaim to be a great nation — with the release, however gradual, of freedom to the population at large. We desperately need a Chinese nation to be relaxed and happy and living without fear.
I would love to see China to emerge as a superpower in the 21st century. But the fear and unhappiness seems to overwhelm the prospect. It is 100 years ago that China first became a republic with the promise of democracy — bringing to an end 4,000 years of dynastic rule. Maybe China needs another 100 years to secure real freedom before achieving superpower status. After all, 200 years was roughly what it took America to become a superpower from an impoverished beginning.