The Japanese rightly pride themselves on their sense of order, predictability and loyalty. They are also known for particularly nuanced public statements.
But all of a sudden they are having to accept their closest ally is determined to upend all of that predictability in the two areas most important to them – security and trade. And to do so in a rash and dangerous way while Donald Trump focuses on playing out his own emotive attacks on domestic critics and the media.
Along with the rest of the world and much of the American population, the Abe government is struggling to adjust to the radical change in rhetoric and direction coming out of the Trump administration. Yet nowhere is the contrast in style more obvious and more pointed than in cautious Japan – especially given the country's long-term strategic relationship and reliance on the US alliance for security and for agreed international rules of trade and commerce.
Suddenly, all of that is now under imminent threat. The typical Japanese mode is to demonstrate patience rather than any immediate reaction. But that's not the reason behind the quick refusal of the Japanese to agree with Australia in promptly promoting a Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement minus the US. Japan just doesn't think this would be worth it given the deal was as much a guarantee of greater US engagement in the region as an economic advance. Nor does Shinze Abe want to kill off the achievements of the TPP and the (illusory) prospect of a change of heart from the US at a later date.
Instead, Abe will be waiting for his own meeting with Trump next month to clarify the position while still officially appealing for American support for the TPP. He will wait some time – months if not longer – before committing Japan to a new path on trade. That might include some form of a bilateral deal, albeit as an inferior alternative.
It will also inevitably include more urgent attention on trade negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Partnership that includes China, while attempting to use the framework of the TPP as the standard. That's even though any prospect of agreement between the parties remains an even more protracted proposition.
But while all that is deeply unsettling for the Abe government, its national interest is more directly threatened by the interplay of the Trump administration and the various security threats in the region. The fear in Japan about the nuclear intentions of North Korea is very striking. There's concern that Kim Jong-Un will use the instability in the South Korean government and the change of US leadership to focus even more on his nuclear testing program in a way that will bring on some type of crisis. The planned deployment of an advanced US missile defence system in South Korea is also strongly opposed by China.
But it's how to respond to China's activities in the East China and South China Sea that's a continuing drama in the Year of the Rooster.
The new US Defence Secretary, James Mattis, is due to visit Japan next week to discuss China and North Korea - and, no doubt, Trump's view that US allies should contribute more to their own defence. This early sign of US commitment will help reassure the Japanese government. But there's a lot to be reassured about.
The Abe government had already overcome the extreme sensitivity in Japan to any form of military activity by liberalising the rules under which Japan could participate in collective "self defence" and increasing the spending on defence, albeit from a base the Americans will consider is still way too low.
Earlier alarm over Japan's Senkaku Islands - also claimed by China as the Diaoyu Islands - has eased a little, at least temporarily, despite regular and increasing Chinese appearances in Japan's declared territorial waters. That's in part due to the patrolling Japanese coast guard and Japanese self defence forces but also because of the backing of the US and a clear US statement the Senkakus were covered under its security treaty with Japan.
But Japan, like its neighbours, has remained outraged by China's steady militarisation and reclamation of islands in the region over the last several years.
The common view in Japan was the Obama administration was too willing to ignore this provocation for too long. Although the US eventually started paying more attention and increasing its naval presence, including conducting freedom of navigation exercises over the last couple of years, it came too late to stop China's massive building, especially in the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
The new concern is that China may try to extend its reclamation activities to the Scarborough Shoal near the Philippines to complete a neat triangle of maritime control. As yet, there's no sign of this while China assesses the new Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte as well as the possible Trump reaction. But Japan is on red alert.
That means most in the Japanese government would welcome an even stronger US presence in the South China Sea, including more freedom of navigation exercises, as a clearer message to China that enough's enough. They would also welcome Australia joining in although Japan is not urging this – especially as it doesn't conduct such exercises itself. But Japan does want ever more open naval collaboration between the US, Australian and itself, including more joint maritime exercises, as a combined show of international engagement and counter to China.
But what it fears most is any form of incident that might escalate on either side. For Japan, as for the US, brash unpredictability is its alarming new norm.
Jennifer Hewett is in Japan as a guest of the Japanese government.