Soviet Maskirovko: A Superior Strategy

via Red Stomp

Soviet Maskirovko
by Charles L. Smith

In developing the scenario for a NATO-Soviet conflict used in Red Storm Rising, Tom Clancy placed a great deal of emphasis on Soviet maskirovka.1 Maskirovka is frequently mentioned in passing in many other novels, articles, and monographs dealing with the USSR. But there have been all too few attempts to describe maskirovka as an entity. That is the purpose of this article. Maskirovka is most simply defined as a set of processes designed to mislead, confuse, and interfere with accurate data collection regarding all areas of Soviet plans, objectives, and strengths or weaknesses.

Terminology

In studying the USSR, most Westerners are faced immediately with several problems. A primary example is that of attempting to understand the Soviet/Russian perspective on events. The Russian "mindset" has been influenced by many factors of which Americans are generally unaware or the significance of which have been elusive. For example, the term American imperialistic interventionists as used by the Soviets may be interpreted in the United States as a reference to our involvement's in Cuba, the Philippines, or Vietnam. To the Soviets, it brings to mind the fact that during the Russian civil war, the United States, as well as Britain, France, and Japan, had military forces fighting against Bolshevik forces in Russia. This is one example of the difference in perspectives.

Another major problem is that Russian terms are not always easily translated into English. Maskirovka is an excellent example. In US military terms, maskirovka is often referred to as "camouflage," "concealment," and "deception." Translators frequently use the term camouflage, and the use of this single English term inherently gives the reader a biased perception of what is actually presented in the Russian. For example, research in translated Russian works where the term camouflage has been used creates a view that is different from research where the term concealment has been selected. This is complicated by the Russian word kamufliazh, which translates into English as camouflage. In the Russian context, the term refers to what in the West is classified as disruptive painting (fig. 1),

Another example is the selection of decoys, dummies, or models for the Russian use of false objects. In English there are subtle differences between these terms.

Maskirovka is actually a very broad concept that encompasses many English terms. These include: camouflage, concealment, deception, imitation, disinformation, secrecy, security, feints, diversions, and simulation. While terms overlap to a great extent, a complication is that the Russian term is greater than the sum of these English terms. Thus, those in the West should attempt to grasp the entire concept rather than its components. Maskirovka is not a new concept in the USSR. Its roots can be traced to the Russian Imperial Army. Several Soviet authors trace it back to Dmitry Donskoy's placing a portion of his mounted forces in an adjacent forest at the Battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380. Seeing a smaller force than anticipated, the Tatars attacked, only to be suddenly overpowered by the concealed force.2

This concept, because of the Soviet "mind-set," permeates the entire nation. It is practiced throughout Soviet society and is not just a military term. It is a part of published Soviet data and figures as they relate to the economy, agricultural, or industrial production. An example of this, which pertains to both industry and the military, occurred in the period before World War II and at the onset of Operation Barbarossa. Tile USSR had purchased 100-mm artillery pieces from Germany before the war, and German intelligence estimates of the capabilities of the Red Army were based in part on the use of these guns. Following their invasion in June 1941, the Germans were shocked to encounter much more powerful Soviet 130-mm artillery pieces. The USSR had purchased the German guns and scrapped them while producing their own guns at the same time--a classic instance of maskirovka.

Implementation

Due to its complex nature, the concept of maskirovka is incompletely understood in the West. This article contains three simplified models to illustrate the concept by reflecting its implementation, organizational, and doctrinal-philosophical aspects. Obviously, these are not all-inclusive but rather provide a beginning framework for understanding. The implementation aspects include form, type, environment, and nature of activity (fig. 2).

These factors have been subdivided into additional categories. Within the Soviet military, gaps in the implementation of maskirovka are considered a breach of security and are recognized as a threat to survival.

Forms

The forms of maskirovka, as shown in figure 2, consist of concealment, imitation, simulation, demonstrative actions, and disinformation. These may be employed singly but are most commonly conducted in conjunction with one another.

Concealment. This is one of the primary forms of maskirovka and involves a series of measures to eliminate or reduce possible detection of revealing signs of troops, equipment, plans, or production. Construction or modification of ships under overhead awnings is a form of concealment as is the use of smoke screens on the battlefield. In the Russian context, this form of maskirovka is similar to the English term concealment, plus camouflage. It involves the use of such things as nets, screens, and other devices (fig. 3). The construction of tanks and armored personnel carriers within automobile plants is another means of concealment.
Imitation. Imitation involves the creation of false objects that appear to be real. Use of collapsible and pneumatic mock-ups of military equipment on the battlefield is one kind of imitation. A number of Soviet articles on maskirovka cite the successful uses of these objects during the Great Patriotic War (l94l-45).3 On several occasions during the war, turrets from damaged tanks were placed on wooden frames to imitate actual tanks. This technique has also been demonstrated in Soviet exercises. During one exercise, a damaged bridge was repaired but still appeared damaged while a decoy bridge was erected upstream. The "enemy" made repeated strikes against the decoy while not bothering the repaired structure. Another example of imitation would be the construction of an airfield or factory that is not used.

Simulation. Closely related to imitation but of a more active nature is simulation. This involves creating the distinctive signs and activity near features or objects that concealment is designed to hide. Creation of a dummy antiaircraft site using collapsible mock-ups is imitation; however, equipping the site with devices that emit noise and smoke, together with movement of troops around the facility, is simulation. This latter technique was widely used by the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War.4 One false artillery position that simulated such activity was struck by 117 bombs in one day.

Demonstrative Actions. Demonstrative actions or feints serve to mislead an enemy or opponent regarding plans or military operations. A Soviet offensive may begin with attacks in several locations to divert the enemy's attention to areas away from a main thrust.5 The zones of demonstrative actions may be subjected to excessive aerial and ground reconnaissance prior to an intense artillery barrage. The actual point of the main thrust may not be subjected to the same level of activity until the enemy has begun to respond to the false attacks.

Disinformation. As practiced by the Soviets, disinformation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Examples such as sending false letters and providing untrue information to Western journalists have been widely publicized. One department of the KGB, or Committee of State Security, deals with disinformation of this nature at many levels. Disinformation can take many approaches. When the Germans invaded the USSR in 1941, they were using Soviet-produced maps. These proved to be highly inaccurate, showing factories and towns where there were swamps or showing trails where major roads existed. The drive toward Murmansk was greatly slowed when the Germans realized that a road that they thought their tanks could use did not exist. This forced the vehicles to travel over rough, rocky terrain at much slower speeds.

Disinformation by all military units regarding impending operations has also been widely noted. Prior to the Soviet amphibious assault at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea in September 1943, false orders were published stating that this would be a diversionary landing and that the actual main landing would occur two days later farther to the west. When the actual landing began, the Germans were waiting for the "real" assault.

Types

Another means of approaching the concept of maskirovka is to analyze its various types (figs. 2 and 4).
These have been well documented in Soviet military writings. Here again, these may be divided into several sub categories. Several of the types generally conform to bands of the electromagnetic spectrum and function against military reconnaissance systems such as aerial photography and radar or against target acquisition systems. Other types are designed to counter radio, acoustical, or other attempts to gather information. Specific resources or methods are designed for use in the various types of maskirovka.

The relationship between these, factors was discussed in an article written by two East German officers. The article was later republished in Voyennaya Mysl', the journal of the Soviet General Staff and most prestigious of all Soviet military journals.6 Adding additional significance is the fact that the entry in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia on maskirovka is very similar to the earlier article.7

Optical/Light

Maskirovka can also be divided into a variety of types that cut across the forms previously described. For example, optical/light maskirovka is used to counter reconnaissance systems that involve photography as well as human observation. It may employ a series of nets or screens, either artificial or natural, surrounding the sides and top of a complex or installation. Another form may simply be signs giving false identities to facilities. Also included in this type of maskirovka are the use of camouflage clothing, the utilization of terrain to mask movement of forces, and the use of smoke screens. The primary purpose of screens and nets is to alter the apparent shape of the object as well as its shadow. The Soviet definition of optical maskirovka includes the near or reflected infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Thus, activities include those designed to counter "camouflage-detecting films." Special paints are employed in the manufacture of screens and nets to present realistic imagery.8 Blackouts and night-vision devices serve to ensure light maskirovka. One device is designed to constantly point downward, thereby allowing light to be applied where required without being detected (fig. 5).
Optical and light types of maskirovka may be employed to achieve several forms of maskirovka. The most obvious is the use of nets, screens, and blackouts to conceal items, while mock-ups and dummy lights serve as a form of imitation. In such instances, nets and screens that are badly in need of repair may be placed over mock-ups to indicate poorly executed maskirovka.9 Construction of an apparently real runway complete with dummy aircraft at an airfield is another form of imitation. Movement of empty vehicles using their headlights along secondary roads at night or during the day with the goal of replicating a buildup of forces in an area is the application of lighter optical means to achieve simulation or demonstration.

Thermal. Thermal maskirovka is employed to deny information to enemy reconnaissance and guidance systems that employ sensors in the thermal portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Here also the method of employment varies with the form. There are two primary ways of employing thermal maskirovka to facilitate concealment. Both have the objective of reducing the thermal contrast between the object to be concealed and the background surrounding it. Special air-or water-cooling systems, insulation, and other methods may be used to reduce temperatures or dissipate heat. Thermal screens and special paints may also be employed. On one exercise, a field kitchen was located under tall coniferous trees and excess heat piped underground away from the site to other parts of the forest. This piping and the tall trees effectively dispersed the heat. A second method is to increase the temperature of the overall background. This may be accomplished through the use of heaters. Heaters may also be used to initiate and simulate activity in a different location. At the same time that the field kitchen was being concealed, a fire was placed on an iron plate under a canvas cover away from the kitchen.10 This created a thermal replication of the kitchen. Reconnaissance or other thermal sensors would detect the simulated kitchen but not the actual one, thereby causing an enemy to make an invalid assumption.

Radar. Radar maskirovka employs several techniques to counter all forms of radar. Figure 6 shows two primary techniques for countering radar. One is to analyze topographic maps and relief models to determine areas of "radar shadow" or dead space where known ground-based radars cannot scan. Another technique to deceive ground-based radars is to place an object behind a net containing metallic or other radar-reflecting strips. The first technique involves the elimination or reduction of any radar return, while the second bombards the sensor with radar energy. Another means of accomplishing the first method is through the use of special coatings and may be considered in the design of weapon systems. In a 1973 article, one Soviet naval author in discussing maskirovka of ships pointed out that right angles on ships create bright returns on radar scopes or imagery.11 The Typhoon-class submarine, which appeared in 1983, has very few right angles on the superstructure, a form of stealth technology.
Radar reflectors are a passive means of jamming radar systems. These may be corner, pyramid, spherical, or dipole reflectors that are designed to reflect radar energy back to the sending radars. When suspended in pairs along a road or scattered in an area, corner reflectors create a bright return on a radar scope that masks any activity along the road or within the area (fig. 7).12 The sensor will indicate that something is present but will give no indication of its nature. This makes it difficult to accurately detect movement along the road or activity in the area, thus adding an element of confusion and possibly concealing any activities. Corner reflectors may be issued or produced in the field from wood and metallic foil. During the mid-1970s, each Soviet motor rifle battalion was provided 30 Corner reflectors.
Radar reflectors may also be used for imitation and simulation. Corner reflectors placed inside or beside dummy tanks will imitate the radar image of a tank.13 Radar reflectors may be placed on motorcycles that travel up and down roads to simulate heavy traffic. An article in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia by Maj Gen A. I. Palii, of the Engineer Troops, contains a discussion and sketches showing the use of radar reflectors to alter the landscape as it appears on radar (fig. 8).14
Reflectors can be used to create false bridges as well as to make coves appear to be solid ground. One Soviet book points out the success of similar reflectors used by the Germans to deceive 100 American and British aircraft who dropped their bombs on a lake in Berlin.15

Sound. Complete silence is obviously a major means of sound maskirovka. Troops, equipment, and other facilities should operate as quietly as possible in combat to avoid detection. The reverse of this is employed for imitation simulation and demonstrative actions as well as for disinformation. During the preparations for the L'vov-Sandomierz offensive in 1944, Col Leonid Brezhnev, as political officer for the 18th Army, was responsible for creating the sounds of two tank armies on the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. This was an area where there were very few troops. Using loudspeakers, the Soviets were able to convince the Germans that a major thrust was to come from this location. At least one German division was deployed from the region of the real Soviet attack to defend the left wing of the front from an anticipated attack by the false tank armies.16

Radio/Radar. Radios are both a blessing and a curse. They allow speedy communications but often reveal locations of facilities otherwise concealed. Analysis of the pattern of radio use may, for example, help identify command posts. One means of reducing this problem is to disperse radio antennas away from command posts, thereby focusing an enemy's attention on another area. Radios also serve as a means of simulation, demonstration, and disinformation. Apparent inadvertent transmissions may actually be designed to spread false information. A simulation such as the one Secretary Brezhnev was involved with required false radio transmissions to replicate the Soviet tank armies. In other instances, large Soviet tank units were relocated while their command and other radios remained in the old positions and continued broadcasting.

Environment and Activity

Maskirovka may be conducted in any environment to deny information to sensors. Sound maskirovka on board a submerged submarine is designed to counteract acoustical sensors within the aquatic environment. Regardless of the environment, the form and type of maskirovka may be either active or passive. While most aspects of maskirovka involve some form of activity, others (such as silence) require none. The best example of active and passive actions is in an area of radar. The use of special radar-reflecting or absorbing netting and possibly radar reflectors tied down in an area is considered passive. Moving reflectors up and down a road is considered active, as is jamming an enemy's radar systems using false transmissions or dispersing radar-reflecting chaff. In the Soviet military, these active methods are part of normal maskirovka, while in the West they are considered radio electronic warfare.

Organization

Maskirovka has many organizational factors. The second of the three simplistic models shows the organizational factors (fig. 9). These factors include the level of implementation, mobility, and the branch of the armed forces involved.
Level

Maskirovka is employed at all levels of military activity. At the tactical level, it often involves more concealment and imitation than simulation and disinformation. Here the primary objective is to make the location of small units difficult to determine. Operational as well as strategic maskirovka are based on successful tactical efforts. At these higher levels, larger units and greater areas are involved with greater emphasis on simulation, demonstrative actions, and disinformation.

Mobility

The mobile or fixed nature of an object has a great bearing on the implementation aspects of maskirovka. In this regard, items such as tanks or field artillery frequently assume both modes. Thus, while in a fixed mode, a tank may be masked by netting. While it is in motion, such netting is uncalled for and other means of concealment are required.

Branch of Armed Forces

The aspects already described, as well as the doctrinal inputs detailed below, apply to all branches or services of the Soviet armed forces. Aspects that apply to small units in the Ground Forces apply also to naval troops, KGB border guards, troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and to troops of the other forces and services. Maskirovka at the operational level would involve close coordination between the five branches and Rear Services of the Minister of Defense's forces, as well as with the KGB's border guards and MVD troops. This is especially true at the front and theater of military operations (TVD) levels during wartime when these may be under one commander.

Doctrine

All Soviet military operations are based on a carefully defined and structured hierarchy of military thought (fig. 10). These include military doctrine, science, and art, as well as numerous contributing factors.
Political strategy, technical capabilities, and many other factors have an impact on Soviet military doctrine, science, and art. An analysis of these factors is beyond the scope of this article; however, in the realm of maskirovka they all have led to the formulation of several principles.

Principles

Regardless of the type, form, environment, nature, and organizational aspects, maskirovka is governed by four major principles. These principles are not described in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, but they are discussed by military personnel both in books and articles. in spite of changes in technology, these principles remain valid, and the Soviets believe they must be practiced for maskirovka to be successful. Several principles have sub elements that some Soviet military authors may regard as separate guidelines. They also have a certain amount of overlap. The four principles described below appear to be the most pertinent and consistent in Soviet military writings. These are activity, plausibility, variety, and continuity.

Activity. The principle of activity or aggressiveness stresses that all maskirovka must be persistent to give the enemy a false idea. The objective is to cause the enemy to make incorrect estimates of a situation.17 Once a form or type of maskirovka has been implemented, it may become necessary to change it. For example, after an airfield has been attacked and has once again become operational after repairs, maskirovka efforts might be made to make it appear still out of commission and abandoned.

Plausibility. All efforts at maskirovka must be plausible. This is an especially important principle. Regardless of the type or form of maskirovka involved, the enemy must believe what he sees is real when in fact it is not.18 At the tactical level, slit trenches must not be cut across natural contours but should blend with the terrain. Maskirovka that does not blend into the background will, in effect, pinpoint the location of the object. Placing a dark-colored net over a tank in an area of sand and light brush is obviously less plausible than using a matted sand-colored net. False targets should be located in sites where their presence would be expected; that is, a radar site would not normally be located in a deep depression.

Variety. Repetitious patterns of maskirovka must be avoided and variety employed. This is the principle of variety. Some German sources indicate that Soviet efforts at maskirovka during the Second World War were predictable. As German forces moved into new positions, they scanned the areas held by the Red Army in an attempt to locate specific positions such as command posts, They would suspect certain locations as the site of these positions based upon their past experiences. In many instances, such suspicions were confirmed. Several authors have pointed out that the Soviets tend to follow the "approved" solution to many matters, including locations for units and command functions. Soviet attempts at disinformation also were said to follow a pattern that, once recognized, revealed the maskirovka effort.

Continuity. The final principle is that of continuity both in peace as well as in war. It is difficult to successfully employ maskirovka on a new factory or installation after all construction has been completed. Maskirovka must be part of all plans and must be continued throughout an operation. An extremely significant example of a violation of this principle occurred in 1962 and led to the Cuban missile crisis. Maskirovka efforts were employed from the beginning of the operation to conceal deployment of missiles to Cuba. However, no efforts at concealment were made during the construction of launch sites. US reconnaissance assets were able to detect these sites based upon their pattern.

Research and Writings

Maskirovka has been the subject of many articles in Soviet military periodicals and books. Several of these are accounts of research either within the USSR or from foreign sources. Obviously, because of the nature of the topic, many specifics are not presented in their analyses. Soviet articles "based on foreign sources" often serve as a means of discussing or presenting techniques and technologies that the Soviet military believes would add to its maskirovka efforts. Because of this, articles and descriptions of this type should be carefully scrutinized. While the implications have not been ascertained, a 1969 Soviet book described in detail several means of reducing radar returns. Items analyzed included West German ceramic plates that disperse radar energy, a West German three-layer absorbing material, and a corrugated-surface material designed in Britain that also absorbed radar energy.19

The same purpose is served by articles that cite examples of "good" or "bad" maskirovka from the Great Patriotic War. To a large extent, these reviews of military history provide insights into current views and ongoing debates. Soviet maskirovka has also been studied in the West to a limited extent. One problem has been that of scale. Research and articles have included in depth studies of smaller components such as smoke screens without analyzing how these mesh into the entire concept, other approaches have been to discuss several main components without examples of implementation. Although these have added greatly to the understanding of maskirovka, additional studies and analysis are needed.

Conclusions

This article began by citing examples of maskirovka in the novel Red Storm Rising. The author of that book presents numerous examples of military maskirovka, including me use of noise decoys by submarines, dispersal of radio antennas and transmitters around command posts, and stealth aircraft. The article then focused on the Soviet armed forces and used three simplified models as a means of addressing the topic. As indicated in the article, maskirovka is a complex and well-structured Russian concept that is also well funded and carefully planned.

In spite of the numerous military examples included, the book Red Storm Rising uses maskirovka primarily to describe activities in the political arena. Some of the aspects described in the book differ from those employed by the military, but other factors are essentially the same. Disinformation rather than concealment may become the primary form, but the four principles still are of utmost significance.

Because of this, maskirovka must be understood in its broadest context by all who deal with the USSR.

Notes

1. Tom Clancy, Red Storm Rising (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1986).

2. F. Myshak, "Modern Camouflage," Tekhnika-Molodeghi, March 1968, 1-3.

3. C. Smith and J. Zebrowskii, Evolution of Soviet Doctrine on Maskirovka of Fixed Installations, Technical Report EL-858 (Vicksburg, Miss.: US Army Corps of Engineers, 1985).

4. Yu. Dorofeyev and V. Shamshurov, Engineering Measures Against Modern Weapons (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974).

5. V. A. Yefinov and S. G. Chermoshentsev, "Maskirovka," in Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], vol. 5 (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978), 175-77.

6. Kh. Adam and R. Gebel', "Military Camouflage," Voyennaya Mysl'[Military Thought], November 1971, 79-86.

7. Yefinov and Chermoshentsev.

8. V. Shchedrov, "Camouflaging Troops during Regrouping and Maneuvers," Voyennaya Mysl' [Military Thought], June 1966, 61-69.

9. Dorofeyev and Shamshurov.

10. V. Aleshinskiy, "Protection of the Unit Rear," Tekhnika i Vooruzlieniye [Technology and Armament], 1955.

11. M. Kuklin, "Camouflaging Ships," Tekhnika i Vooruzheniye [Technology and Armament], May 1973, 26-34.

12. Dorofeyev and Shamshurov.

13. S. I. Kondratenko and A. I. Molodtsov, Camouflage Training for Troops (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1969).

14. A. Palii, "Radiolokatsionnaia Maskirovka," in Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], vol. 7 (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1958), 5-6.

15. Yu. G. Stepanov, Protivo-Radiolokation' Naya Maskirovka (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968).

16. N. Kobrin, "Operational Deception: Examples from WWII," Soviet Military Review, April 1981.

17. A. A. Beketov, A. P. Belokon', and S. G. Chermashentsev, Maskirovka Deystviy Prodrazdeleniy Sukhoputnykh Voysk [Ground Troop Concealment] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976).

18. V. A. Matsuienko, Operational Field Camouflage (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1975).

19. Stepanov.

Creating the Conditions for Revolution in the Here and Now

One of the helpful criticisms that I have received from like-minded individuals in regards to this blog is that while it is all well and good to read up on guerrilla tactics and weapons systems, etc. what we (the revolutionary left) really need to concentrate on now is building the conditions that will make a revolution possible. I wholeheartedly agree with this; even if I were so inclined to attempt to form a revolutionary army, Vermont is not ready, nor is the United States, and nor is the world and all my efforts would be in vain. That and at this point I can count the potential recruits for such an endeavor on one hand. So how can we build the revolution in the here and now while also training for potential armed conflicts?

First and foremost one should network with other comrades and supporters of the revolution. One should become involved with already existing progressive social movements, unions and political organizations, even if they are not as radical as one would hope. Chances are you will learn useful organizing skills and discover potential comrades in arms that you otherwise would not have met. Many successful revolutionary organization were formed as splinter groups or with frustrated former members of less radical, established organizations or social movement. Regardless of whether one chooses this route, there is power in numbers and the more people ACTIVELY involved in social movements the more powerful they become. In addition to regular activities, one should attempt to push these organizations and movements more towards the left.

One tactic that deserves discussion is the "stiffening of protests," a favorite of urban guerrilla groups. Basically members of insurgent groups go to protests of sympathetic social movements and act as agitators, encouraging the group to clash with the police. By inviting acts of repressive violence upon the group and responding in kind, the guerrilla creates even more discontent and distrust of the government among the populace. Now this can be problematic as the guerrillas are basically co-opting a peaceful demonstration and bring harm upon their unsuspecting comrades. However, in this day and age the police often don't need to be provoked into making mass arrests and/or firing tear gas and pepper spray into the crowd. I find it shocking that, for example in Mexico protesters wield machetes and Molotov cocktails and fight back against "riot" police while in the U.S. activists just stand there and take it while they are tasered and gassed.

In addition to educating yourself, you must educate others. The forces of capitalist imperialism control the media, the education system, thus people's perceptions of the world and subsequently their actions. To counter act this, one must undertake the considerable effort of educating others, particularly fellow workers. Although obviously not a panacea, supporting and working for non-corporate media such as Democracy Now!, NPR and indie media efforts goes a long way towards confronting this hegemony. The Revolution Script is my humble attempt to do just that. Popular education projects and the dissemination of counter-hegemonic propaganda should also be a part of your efforts.

As your nascent clandestine network becomes established and more influential, it should start developing its support and intelligence networks. In his book "Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual," Scott Wimberly talks about the preparation, planning and organization phase of an insurgency:

During this phase, the insurgency forces and general population must be prepared for resistance. Preparing the population is primarily psychological. Sometimes the enemy does this for the insurgency due to their policies and actions. Sometimes propaganda and other measures are necessary.

Because of the strength of the enemy, security is of prime concern during this phase. The resistance should try to remain secret at this time so it can infiltrate governmental agencies, organize and establish intelligence networks, align and train various factions, and choose initial targets.

If a foreign power is to provide any type of aid to resistance, or if the resistance is trying to obtain such assistance, this planning/organization phase is critical. The potential sponsor will be concerned about the potential for political embarrassment, compromise, and the chance of success. If the sponsor does not recognize such things as good planning, training, and organization, it will likely not give assistance.

There are many other ways of creating revolutionary conditions. I hope comrades will contribute their ideas in the comments section.

The Art of War and Iraq

The Art of War is a classic and everybody's read it (except Bush aparently), etc. etc. That much we know. I thought it would be fun to look at the Iraq War and predict who is going to win based on verse 17 of chapter 3 of the Giles translation, which I do realize is outdated, but the Griffin translation is not available free online and neither is Cleary's.
"Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

(1) Before the war many people predicted disastrous results that warned of getting stuck in a quagmire of fighting a counter-insurgency. BushCo. insisted that victory would be complete and that the Iraqi people would welcome us as liberators not rebuff us as occupiers.

(2)The U.S. military is currently over extended due to its involvement in the global "war on terror." Despite not having enough troops, equipment, strategy, advisors etc. for fighting the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and supporting military operations in Pakistan, Columbia, the Philippines, North Africa, BushCo. still claims that we could beat down North Korea and Iran should the need arise.

(3) The troops want to protect their country and fight for democracy, but they also want to have shorter tours of duty and fewer of them. BushCo. and high-ranking members of the armed forces want to keep the troops in combat more and for longer periods of time. They also want to continue the kind of imperialist foreign policy that got us into the mess we are in now.

(4) The Army was not prepared to fight the wars that we are involved in now. They did not have the right training nor the proper doctrine to do the job that they were sent to do. They are scrambling to catch up and develop a new method of fighting a new kind of war. The Iraqi insurgency was ready to do for the moment that they heard "yellow cake uranium". They knew that we were coming and that the war would become a cause célèbre for would-be Islamic/Arab militants and guerrillas in the region. The insurgency is also ready to fight "the great Satan"(and maybe even Lord Satan).

(5) Even if you think that we had/have the military to win these wars, you cannot deny interference from the civilian leadership of the army. These wars are very political and are directed, in large part by politicians, not military men. When Bush delays planned military operations because he needs to get reelected or when troop levels are temporarily increased in an attempt to silence critics and/or gain political support for the GOP, the U.S. effort in Iraq suffers.

It seems to me that, according to The Art of War, the U.S. will not achieve victory in Iraq. I would love to hear others' opinions on the matter.

Best Time Article Ever: So You Wanna Be a Hizballah Fighter?

Normally I wouldn't repost anything from Time or other products of the corporate culture industry, but I found this article which details the inner workings of one of the world's most successful "alternative civility"-based organization making it worthy of The Revolution Script. I find Hizbollah interesting(as an object of study) because it, like the Black Panthers, Young Lords and other influential social movements essentially has two branches. It's civil society branch functions as a counter-state, as described below fulfilling the traditional roles of government in which the Lebanese government has failed. It's "uncivil" society branch trains an army of resistance fighters and conducts operations against Israel using tactics which are now popular with Palestinian guerrillas. The legitimacy gained through the actions of the first branch allows the second branch to not only exist but operate succefully.

So You Wanna Be a Hizballah Fighter?

Hizballah's state-within-the-Lebanese-state -- its hospitals, schools, banking system and even its consumer goods stores -- is a closed society that's off-limits to outsiders. But no part of the structure is more closed and more secret than the military wing, access to which is extremely limited for an American journalist such as myself. But my assistant, Rami Aysha, grew up in Haret Hrek, the mostly Shia Muslim suburb of Beirut that is Hizballah's main stronghold in Lebanon, and at my request, he spoke to a few Hizballah fighters in his neighborhood, some of them former school chums, about the process by which they became members of the formidable anti-Israeli militia.
The two phases in the development of a Hizballah fighter are like Boy Scouts and Boot Camp. During the first phase, Hizballah recruiters keep an eye out for young Shia Muslim students in both Hizballah-run schools and the national school system. They look for energetic kids, violent kids, and smart kids, from the age of seven into the late teens, and begin taking them on field trips and workshops where they are given a through ideological indoctrination, and then as they get older, a brief introduction to the AK-47 assault rifle.
Two important themes stick out: from the beginning, the training stresses the path to martyrdom, which is achieved through honesty, prayer, and combat. And from the start, Hizballah organizes its child recruits into the basic cellular structure of the organization. Each is assigned to a cell of about five kids, with each cell having its own kid commander, and their own missions: usually games and exercises like treasure hunts. This stage ideological training can last for years, or it can be done in as little as 9 months, depending on the zeal of the recruits and how much free time they have from school.
Hizballah trainers constantly separate the wheat from the chaff. Those who pass all the ideological training tests, move on to learn the basics of warfare: weapons training and outdoor maneuvers for a total of at least 9 months, much of it in the Bekaa valley. All along the way, the trainers are on the lookout for those with special abilities. The lazy ones -- with the ability to sit for hours on end without getting bored -- are chosen as lookouts to watch Israeli troop movements; the brave ones are chosen for attacks, the smart ones are chosen for intelligence and security; and the smart and unpredictable ones -- the guys who don't look or act or behave at all like fighters -- get chosen for what is called reverse security, or counterintelligence.
When they graduate from military training, the new fighters are broken up and sent off to join cells out in the field or overseas alongside veterans. Of all the fighters, about one in ten is chose to be a commander, and goes to Iran for a few months of special training. The number of Hizballah fighters is a secret, but in a recent speech, the group's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, hinted that there are tens of thousands of them.

Though men make up the majority of Hizballah's frontline fighters, there are plenty of female fighters as well, mostly reservists. And even if don't carry weapons themselves, women are the ticking time bomb of Hizballah. They vote, and (especially if they are married to another member of the Resistance thanks to a Hizballah mating service) they'll give birth to the next generation of fighters.
--Andrew Lee Butters with reporting by Rami Aysha/Beirut

Mao's Innovations in Popular Warfare

From Gérard Chaliand's Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan:

"The campaign in China was based on a remarkable innovation. Until the Second World War, the military doctrine of both right and left treated guerrilla operations as purely secondary. The main concerns were, quite rightly, aviation and mechanical forces. Although they contain nothing new in terms of technique , Mao Tse-tung's writings, which deal with revolutionary war rather than guerrilla operations per se, constitute a major breakthrough. It is quite meaningless to isolate the strictly military element in his writing, as certain authors have been tempted to do, for what matters is the close link between the political and the military that characterizes Mao's thinking. The point is that guerrilla warfare is a military tactic aimed at harassing an adversary, whereas revolutionary war is a military means whereby to overthrow a political regime. (authors emphasis)

What was Mao saying that was new? Not unlike his predecessors, he considered guerrilla warfare more than a mere backup for the regular army, although Mao did not in fact write about guerrilla war. What he was concerned with was revolutionary war, in which regular army units employ the tactics of irregulars, partisan units fight in parellel to the regular forces (with their actions sometimes considered most important), and classical full frontal assaults are launched only when the situation demands them. Mao's real innovation lay elsewhere in the field of politics. His political insight was special, for he was a specific and unforeseen avatar of Leninism."

Urban Guerrilla Tactics: Armed Propaganda

From the votes that I have gotten so far on the survey (if you haven't already voted, please do so) it seems that people are yearning from more information on tactics and strategy. So here you go:

In any type of insurgency, part of the strategic goals should be to delegitimize the state in the eyes of the people. This makes their job that much harder and your much so much easier. This will go a long way to demoralizing the armed forces, making enemy soldiers prone to surrender or desertion. One tactic that can be employed in urban insurgencies to this end is sometimes referred to as "armed propaganda." Basically this entails any armed action that demonstrates the government's weakness and lack of control and the relative power and amount of control of the guerrilla group.
The best example of this that I can think of would be the occupation of the city of Pando by the Tupamaros of Uruguay in 1969. Multiple commando units entered the city in a funeral procession, with their arms hidden in the hearse as to avoid detection. They went into action at a preordained time and occupied the city hall, phone exchange (as to prevent anyone from calling for help), the police station, and the fire station. They only fired one shot, injuring a cop who then gave up. They occupied the town for ten minutes, issuing propaganda etc. and then extracted back to Montevideo. Many were captured outside the city and beaten by cops. However, the action was still wildly successful, rallying popular support for the Tupamaros and embarrassing the dictatorship in the eyes of the people who were supposed to fear it. This tactic was so effective that it was emulated by an Argentine urban guerrilla group the following year. It all goes back to the idea that the urban guerrilla can never hope to achieve a purely military victory, rather they must use acts of violence and militancy to achieve a political victory. I will most likely post on the occupation of Pando again, as it is an interesting case study and the Tupamaros an important and influential historical insurgency. I think that I actually have a complete account of the occupation that I'll have to dig out.

More lessons from the FLQ

In previous posts I have posted snippets of my thesis, I wrote this today and thought it would make a good inspirational story. Here is another preview of "Frozen in Terror: The FLQ and the Fight against Global Capitalism":

"L'Armée de Liberation du Québec" (ALQ or Quebec Liberation Army), orchestrated nine hold-ups and robberies over a period of eight months in 1963 and 1964, obtaining forty thousand dollars in cash as well as fifty-five thousand dollars worth of electronics and military equipment before being arrested. What is noteworthy is that a group of mostly untrained nineteen to twenty-three year-olds could orchestrate such actions against military targets. At the very least these robberies demonstrated to the people of Québec how vulnerable the military and financial institution of the province were. Seen in this perspective, the second series of FLQ actions were successful, despite the fact that they ended in numerous arrests and repossession of all captured munitions by the Canadian authorities. Just one example of their raids exemplifies this perfectly:

"Carried out with clock-like precision, the raid began at half-past seven in the morning of January 30 (1964) and was over by nine o'clock. An ALQ commando unit overpowered the night watchman and tied him up, along with eight other civilian and military employees of the Department of National Defence. (As in all reserve army barracks, there were no troops quartered there.) A truck was backed into the drill hall on Avenue des Pins and loaded up; 59 Belgian FN 7.62 semi-automatic rifles (the type used by NATO troops); four Bren light machine guns and 34 Sten submachine guns with firing pins; four 60-millimetre field mortars; three bazooka-type rocket launchers; hand grenades; five Browning automatic pistols; 13,000 rounds of .22 calibre ammunition; 2,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition; and 2,300 rounds of .303 ammunition. Add to this: 15 two-way radio sets, two portable field telephones, storm lanterns, electric wire… Official estimates put the total value at about $22,000." (Quote From Louis Fornier's "FLQ The Anatomy of an Underground Movement)

This capture alone would have been enough to start an insurgency, had there been enough FLQ members to use the guns. Today it seems absurd that such a large cache of munitions would be left virtually unguarded anywhere in North America. But at that point in time nobody expected such levels of political violence in Canada; the same reason why dynamite was so easy to such large quantities from construction sites. It must have been an alarming revelation to both the Canadian state and the people of Canada to realize how easily "extremists" could rob the army of so many dangerous weapons. For example, modified mortars are a very common explosive currently used by the Iraqi Insurgency for Improvised Explosive Devises (IED) that are killing so many people in Iraq.

Communiqué and PR for the Guerrilla

Communiqués are an integral weapon in the arsenal of any insurgency, a weapon to be used in their political struggle to win over public opinion. Without some form of communication to the populace, only the government and bourgeoisie’s versions of the story is widely known. The contestation of public support is of paramount importance for the guerrilla, in particular the urban guerrilla, Guillén argues, who because of the “terrorist” nature of their actions “can never win popular support unless they can explain their actions as something more than random criminal assaults or lunatic gestures. ” He also criticized the Tupamaros for being overly reliant on tactics, arguing that strategic and political victories much more integral to a successful guerrilla campaign. Often the publication of communiqués by mainstream media outlets is the only way that guerrillas can make their voices heard. In cases of particularly authoritarian regimes, even this may not be possible as Moss describes was the case in Uruguay during this same time: “In the face of official censorship, the Tupamaros have tried to construct ‘counter-media,’ including a private radio transmitter and the use of electronics experts to break into normal broadcasts with special messages… (taking) over public meeting-places like cinemas and workers’ canteens to deliver impromptu harangues.”

Online Resources for the Guerrilla/Intellectual

If you already haven't checked out Marxists.org, do so immediately. They have a large selection of guerrilla manuals and other Marxists text. They have a non-pdf copy of The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla by Carlos Marighella. I have already posted a link for the manual in PDF, but I fear that the link in now broken. An incredibly in depth and thoughtful analysis of Marighella and his minimanual can be found on Surkh Samachar, a promising young blog. Marighella along with Abraham Guillen literally wrote "the books" on urban guerrilla warfare and heavily influence guerrilla movements throughout South America and the world. Guillen is unfortunately not very well known. His tome "Problems in Revolutionary Strategy" is not even sold by Amazon and suspiciously has disappeared from my local library. Nor does he appear on Marxists.org. I was able to find a special collection of his writings housed at the University of Florida.
To find some or all of these I recommend Be Heard, an online left leaning book store.

Lessons from the FLQ

A while ago a reader suggested that I incorporate analysis of historical guerrilla movements in order to contextualize the subjects discussed in my blog post. I agree with this but for me its more important to learn from the mistakes of guerrillas in the past so as not to repeat them. I have gone so far as to incorporate the study of guerrilla and other leftist social movements into my program of study at college. One group that I have devoted considerable attention to is the Front de libération du Québec, the FLQ. Their tactics was consisted of bombing to infrastructure such as railroads and radio transmitters, bombings of symbolic targets in and around Montréal, and the kidnapping of politicians. Many of their arms were stolen from army barracks, police stations, rifle clubs etc. They stole thousands for sticks of dynamite from construction sites within Montréal, where a subway system was currently being built. Their downfall was facilitate by their execution of one of their hostages, Pierre Laporte when the Canadian Government refused to meet their absurd ransom demands. The killing turned public opinion against them making defeat certain. The great urban guerrilla theorist Abraham Guillen said that the group would have been more strategically wise to have made more reasonable demands, so that the government would look bad if they didn't secure the release of the hostages.

Ideology

For those looking to learn more about Marxism and what various Marxists say/said the site Marxists.org is an invaluable resource. They have "The Art of War" in case you don't like the version provided in my previous post. It is not my favorite translation but it doesn't make that much of a difference. They also host the Mao book, "On Guerrilla Warfare" which I posted earlier. I have also found Guevara's canon Guerrilla Warfare as a pdf. This book kicks ass, but read it in its historical context because, like Marx, Che just got some stuff wrong.
I might possibly have another interview before the one that I previously mentioned that I want to do. Peter Young, convicted "terrorist" and former member of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is speaking at Hampshire College on April 24th at 8:30pm in the Main Lecture Hall of Franklin Paterson Hall. I will try to obtain an interview with him, and post it here. It is another step towards professionalizing this blog.