A Critical Review of Guevara’s Guerilla Warfare (Part 1)

This is the first part of an old paper of mine which examines Che Guevara's tome Guerrilla Warfare, the full text of which is available in the sidebar. The second part available soon.

“I knew that when the great guiding spirit cleaves humanity into two antagonistic halves, I will be with the people. I see myself being sacrificed to the authentic revolution... I feel my nostrils dilate, savoring the acrid smell of gunpowder and blood, of the enemy’s death; I brace my body, ready for combat, and prepare myself to be a sacred precinct within which the bestial howl of the victorious proletariat can resound with new vigor and new hope.”-Che Guevara, The Motorcycle Diaries

Ernesto “Che” Guevara is a figure who seemingly evokes strong feelings for almost everyone, except most of the people who wear shirts featuring his silhouette on the front. But the people who actually know who he is tend to either hate him, denouncing him as a communist murderer, or love him, hailing him as a freedom fighter and hero of the proletariat. Although Guevara has been accused of taking part in atrocities against civilians, according to Jon Lee Anderson, author of Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life "I have yet to find a single credible source pointing to a case where Che executed "an innocent". Those persons executed by Guevara or on his orders were condemned for the usual crimes punishable by death at times of war or in its aftermath: desertion, treason or crimes such as rape, torture or murder.”
As resistance can take many forms, learning about the different perspectives and methodologies is important for any actor in the realm of social change, no matter which method they choose to subscribe. This post explores Guevara’s most definitive work; Guerrilla Warfare has been widely read by both insurgents and counter-insurgent groups. In the introduction to the most recent edition of the book, Marc Becker claims that the book is antiquated as a source of practical information on guerrilla tactics and is now only valuable as a subject for academic study. But the Zapatista uprising in 1994 and their use of Guevara’s theories, as well as those of other revolutionary theorists like Mao Zedong, proved these ideas were still relevant today.
The first part of the post will examine if the main claims Guevara makes are true. The book is based upon lessons learned during the Cuban revolution, lessons which are the basis of the author’s theses. Additionally, I will investigate whether the book is valuable for solely for academic purposes or militaristic study. I will draw upon the experiences of Latin American revolutionary movements both violent and peaceful for comparative purposes. I will also address some common criticisms of armed resistance, using Guerilla Warfare to defend the theory behind many revolutions. By doing this I hope to demonstrate that those who become as cruel as the regime against which they are rebelling do so based either upon personal choice, or the nature of armed conflict, not because of the ideologies by which they operate .
At the very beginning of the book, Guevara states three tenets of his philosophy on guerilla warfare, based on lessons learned from his experience during the Cuban revolution. They are as follows:

“(1) Popular forces can win a war against the army
(2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
(3) In the underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting”

The main problem with these theories is that they are based entirely upon the Cuban revolution, an isolated case unique in its geography, history and sociopolitical conditions. Because of this, one might have to heavily adapt the material to fit their specific situations. If one didn’t, if one read the book too literally or didn’t realize that adaptation was necessary it is quite possible that many people would die unnecessarily. Having said this, it is worth noting that he makes a couple brief to techniques used by insurgents during the Algerian revolution, suggesting some amount of universality. But there are problems with each of the theories and deserve to be examined individually.
The bulk book details how popular forces would fight a war against a professional army. However, Guevara wrote this book before the massive explosion in the development of military technology by the United States in the late twentieth century. Throughout the book, he underestimates the utility of the superior weapon technology that large conventional armies possess. Guevara claims that popular forces are vulnerable to aerial bombardments only during troop movements, a danger which can be avoided by conducting these operations at night . With the advent of thermal imaging and other low-light surveillance technologies, as airplanes can detect the heat signature of humans or motor vehicles, therefore negating the benefit that the cover of darkness provides. Another problem is that, due to the aviation technology of the time he sees the function of aircraft to be conducting tactical attacks. With airplanes this is true, but by the time of the Vietnam War helicopters had changed the face of modern warfare. Guevara describes the importance of preventing the arrival of reinforcements for the enemy , but with the use of helicopters it becomes much difficult for guerillas to do this successfully.
Guevara’s hubris in this area is exemplified with his statement that “planes will be able to drop high-explosives or napalm, both of which constitute inconveniences rather than true dangers .” Che has been proved wrong by the wars of the late twentieth century, which showed that aircraft, both airplanes and helicopters pose a real threat to guerilla armies and not just an “inconvenience.” These are one of the technologies that separate popular armies from professional armies and give the latter a decided tactical advantage over the former.
The risk of military aviation is only one area where the information given is outdated by new developments in military technology. However, he also describes techniques that have historically and are still used today quite successfully, by guerilla forces around the world. The most notable of these is Guevara’s description of the construction and use of what are now referred to by the U.S. military as “improvised explosive devices” (IEDs) useful for creating bombs to be detonated on the side of the road to destroy convoys of truck and tanks . This technique has been used in targeted assassinations of politicians as well as tactical offensive strikes. The current situation in Iraq clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of strategic bombings at disrupting the enemy’s infrastructure, as well as at fighting against well-equipped conventional armies.
Guevara’s statement that a guerrilla army can win a war against a professional army is backed up with descriptions of guerilla tactics. If these tactics were proved to be outdated and/or ineffective, then his first claim would be disproved. Although some of the strategic information is no longer as universally applicable as when it was published, it does not constitute the bulk of information and is greatly outweighed by the amount of still useful information.
Guevara makes the claim that a rebel uprising can create the conditions necessary for revolution. This is the most contested theory in the book, a belief which many claim Guevara clung to overzealously, which eventually led to his capture and prompt execution in Bolivia. While he qualifies this statement by saying that there must be a “necessary minimum ” of favorable conditions, meaning the people must be sufficiently disenfranchised by the futility of participation in the political system , this theory is still deeply problematic for several reasons.
To begin with, it goes completely against Marx’s theory of how the proletariat would rise up against the bourgeoisie, but only when the right socio-economic conditions are present. Nor does Guevara address the possibility that a Gramscian hegemonic control of society would keep people from realizing the extent to which they had been politically marginalized. While theories that critique Marx, Gramsci and other political theorists are certainly welcome and abundant, Guevara provides no evidence to support his claim, other than his experience in the Cuban revolution. And even that may have been falsely interpreted, as the book is written only a year after the revolution and he probably didn’t go into deep academic study about the prewar social and political conditions in the country. Many scholars, including Becker note that Che, when he wrote this book did not have an accurate idea of what really happened during the war that allowed for his campaign to take Havana, notably, especially for a Marxist, the role of the urban poor.Additionally, assuming that this theory is true, how could one possibly know if the peasantry had in reality become disenfranchised to the point of taking up arms? It seems entirely likely that an overly eager ideologue would project their own hopes and dreams upon the situation by seeing everything through a “red-tinted” lens and in doing so start an ill-fated uprising.
Guevara states that, at least in Latin America, the countryside is the optimal place for conducting guerilla warfare. He details the intricacies of the nature of guerrilla warfare, it is abundantly clear why it is best suited for rural areas. Or at the very least, he writes about a type of guerrilla warfare formulated for rural conditions. Furthermore, this theory is supported by many events in the history of Latin America. But as was noted in the previous paragraph, many consider the success of the Castro’s army to be due in part to acts of protest and terrorism undertaken in urban areas, which significantly weakened Batista’s power in Havana. At the point that it was written, this is probably the least refutable argument in the book. But since then, this formula has been adapted to and expanded upon to apply to urban struggles. Numerous Latin American guerrilla movements since the Cuban Revolution have attempted urban-based revolutions with limited results. Perhaps the most successful examples of urban guerilla campaigns conducted against conventional armies are found in the Middle East. The failure of the U.S. Army in Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrates both the feasibility and potential strength of urban insurgency.
Despite the problems outlined above, the question remains, is Guerrilla Warfare still applicable for use by revolutionaries? Or have developments in military technology rendered it so archaic that it is now relegated to mere academic study? While it is clear that there are areas where Guevara's tactics have been rendered obsolete, I believe that the vast majority of the book is still valuable and useful. The book is short, a compilation of three separate essays and is not incredibly in-depth, which the author realizes, and explains, “We offer an outline not a bible.” I would argue that this book should be read in a historical context and with other writings on guerilla warfare. Regardless, a good amount of his writings is backed up by academics, including those who study Latin American guerilla movements. For example, Guevara states that eventually a guerrilla army will function similar to a small government, providing such services as hospitals to both the army and the peasantry. Timothy Wickham-Crowley asserts that insurgent movements gain legitimacy as a “counter state” by fulfilling the government’s end of the social contract to the people, replacing the state as the area’s centralized and recognized authority. The Zapatistas were able to do this quite successfully, becoming the government of multiple indigenous communities by providing them with protection, economic opportunities, and a state of social order. This phenomenon is further seen in the civil society branches of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
Guevara describes many practices that are employed by the Zapatistas as well as other social movements, as well as legitimate nation states. The author’s proposed system of communication to be employed in order to maintain the highest level of security is very similar to the so-called “Zapatista internet,” a network of messengers who hand carry letters through the mountains, providing the most safe means of communication possible. The Zapatistas and Subcomandante Marcos have gained international solidarity though methods of spreading propaganda/information, similar to a preservation tactic discussed by Guevara . This is the kind of technique that is timeless, maintaining its effectiveness despite the ever-present advance of technology.
In conclusion, I would argue that the information contained within the book is relevant to many different types of readers. For scholars of Latin America, the book gives insight into the philosophy and ideas of one of the regions most influential figures, helping them to consider the relationship between the theory and the practice of armed revolution. For aspiring or active revolutionaries, the book provides basic information on how to prepare for and conduct of a guerilla uprising, as well as what to do once that movement has achieved victory and has to set up a post-revolutionary power. But the book should be read along with the writings of both insurgents (those mentioned in the paper and others) and counter-insurgent (U.S. Special Forces, the Rand Corporation, etc.) and should be considered within the historical and contemporary context of Latin America. While Becker is not the only scholar to claim that this book is now valid only for academic study, an in-depth analysis shows that it is still useful despite the amount of material made irrelevant by the rapid advance of military technology. Leaders of counter-insurgency groups, such as government troops or paramilitary units may also find this book useful in understanding the tactics of the groups which they seek to eliminate so that they may do so more efficiently.

My Bugout List: Three Guns Without Which I Would Never Run to the Hills

It is often asked which three guns one should carry if it is time to take up arms, bug out to the woods, etc. It is the subject of many, many gun-nerd flame wars on AR15.com and other gun forums. I encourage my readers to post their own lists and thoughts on mine in the comments section. I'm no expert but if I were in Vermont and I had to start a small resistance cell in the wooded wilderness and were to potentially face armed human adversaries I would take:

Primary- Any AK in 5.56x45mm or .223 remington, preferably a tricked out Krebb Kustom but any hand-build or Saiga conversion would do nicely. I'd go with the Kalashnikov platform because it is better suited for guerrilla warfare because of it's extreme durability and low maintenance requirements. But rather than going with a Soviet cartridge such as 7.62x39mm or 5.45mm, I go with the NATO chambering because of resupply issues; 5.56x45mm would be much easier to find in supply raids on both civilian and military targets. Additionally the caliber is small enough to hunt game as big as deer but as small as a prairie dog or raccoon.

Secondary- I wouldn't be caught dead in the wood of VT without a 12 gauge shotgun, pump action for increased reliability and ammo compatibility, such as a Mossberg 590. The versatility of the platform makes the gun useful for close-quarters combat as well as in rural firefights. Additionally having a duck/foul gun that could also be loaded with slugs to take down deer-sized animals and larger. Ammo is common, easily reloaded and many components can be improvised from powder to load.

Pistol-If I had my druthers I would be packing a tactical revolver chambered in .357 magnum such as a Smith and Wesson R8. Again the pistol would serve both in a combat role and a hunting role, although you'd have to be a pretty damn good shot or be lucky enough to have a dear walk within 50 yards.

If combat was not an issue I would take a .308 bolt action, a .22 magnum/20 gauge over/under and keep the .357 in case a bear charged me.