MPA Workshop 2010:

New America Foundation
Jihadist Terrorist Prosecutions Since 9/11 Database

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TO: New America Foundation
FROM: Laura Adams, Jason Cherish, Drew Dickinson, Richard Lim, Alyssa Procopio, Joe
            Robertson
SUBJECT: <u>Database of Jihadist Terrorism Prosecutions Since 9/11/2001 Project Details</u>

Memorandum

Summary:

As per your request, our group is pleased to submit to you our database of jihadist terrorism cases since September 11, 2001. We initially obtained our sample set of cases from Schanzer (Duke University), Kurzman (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), and Moosa's (Duke University) recently published "Anti-terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans" study. We quickly realized, however, that this study did not capture many high-profile cases, including Collen R. LaRose (aka "Jihad Jane") and Richard Reid. Thus, we included 16 additional individuals to cover some of these missing cases.

Broadly speaking, we included cases in our study (outside of the Duke-UNC study) based upon whether or not the suspect exhibited a clear intent to do harm to the United States or its interests. Although there have been many cases which have been prosecuted based upon terrorism-supporting financial transactions, given our time constraints, we chose to include those individuals who posed a more direct and immediate threat.

Nevertheless, as there have been approximately 1000 terrorist prosecution cases within the United States between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2009 according to NYU's "2009 Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001 – September 11, 2009," we would like to acknowledge that our time constraints and the initial uncertainty surrounding the time required to code each case precluded us from capturing all of the cases of jihadist terrorism prosecutions in the United States since September 11, 2001.

Methodology:

For the purposes of consistency and transparency, we used a uniform set of databases and websites for researching each case. The databases we used include the following: LexisNexis Academic, Lexis Nexis Legal, and Westlaw. We also used the following websites to collect

legal documents for the terrorist cases: Findlaw, NEFA Foundation, Globalsecurity.org, LawandSecurity.org (report), and defenddemocracy.org (report). Finally, we used Google with basic search terms such as "Najibullah Zazi," "Najibullah Zazi Trial," and "Najibullah Zazi FBI" to collect any remaining information from government and credible news sources, such as the United States Department of Justice.

After finding relevant information, we input the data into the spreadsheet and documented the source for each cell in our references section. We then crosschecked each other's work for accuracy, consistency and completeness. Where "N/A" is listed, the data is not applicable to the case, given a previous response. For example, where an individual was not tried for material support, you will find "N/A" under columns such as "Did Individual Provide Financial Support?" Where "--" is listed, the data could not be found through our methodology. Although you will find many cells with "--", we were pleased with how much data we were able to find for each case through our research.

We have included descriptors of each column in row 2, which are primarily used to indicate what each number represents within that column. For example, where "Gender" is listed in row 1, row 2 indicates that, in the cells below, "0 = Female; 1 = Male." Where cases could not be clearly delineated between the numerical options, our group decided to include further information in comment boxes to provide a more accurate description of the data within that cell. If there is a comment associated with a particular cell, the cell will have a red triangle in the top right corner. Simply clicking on the cell should allow you to access these comments.

Concluding Thoughts:

We hope that this database assists in your analysis of jihadist terrorism cases in the US since September 11, 2001. We have worked diligently to provide the most comprehensive and accessible database possible. We look forward to discussing our findings with you.

Brief Guide to The Dataset

The attached dataset provides information on 152 jihadist terrorism cases in the United States since September 11, 2001. The cases included were based on the dataset of Islamic-American terrorists since September 11, 2001 that was used in another recent major study.[1] Additional cases of terrorism prosecutions were then added within the constraints of the available time period.

While other studies focus on providing individuals' biographic information or details of legal proceedings, this dataset gives a comprehensive overview of each individual's personal background, the details of the alleged plot and/or attack, and the outcome of legal proceedings. Throughout the dataset, 'N/A' indicates the question is not applicable to the specific case, whereas '--' indicates that the information could not be found. Where the numerical answer options could not accurately capture the details of a case, comments have been attached to individual cells, indicated with a red triangle in the corner. Where more than one numerical option was applicable, all were listed. For example, in Column CL "Forms of contact" with a jihadist organization, if an individual had multiple forms of contact, all were listed and separated with semi-colons.

Moving from left to right, **column C, "Status,"** indicates whether an individual is presently detained in the US legal system, killed, missing, or elsewhere (e.g., detained abroad). The details of their status are explained in the dataset, and the status often explains entries in other columns (e.g., if a person is at large, questions about their legal proceedings receive an 'N/A' entry). **Columns H-K** provide details on whether the individual plotted and/or was prosecuted individually or with others. For Column H, **"Associated with Cell,"** the researchers used a broad understanding of 'terrorist cell'—if an individual associated, trained, and/or plotted with other known terrorism suspects, this was understood as a cell. The name of the cell was based on terms used in legal documents or media reports where applicable; for groups with no name, the researchers provided details on the membership in the comments attached to the cell.

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[1] David Shanzer, Charles Kurzman, and Ebrahim Moosa. *Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans.* Duke University- University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 6 January 2010.

Columns L-AX provide biographic information on each individual, including details on their place of residence, family, religious views, education and profession. To be clear, **column AC, "Confirmed mental illness at time of judicial proceedings"** captures whether a person had a mental condition that was confirmed by medical professionals and acknowledged by courts, whereas **column AD "Alleged/claimed mental illness at time of judicial proceedings"** indicates whether the defendant or others made this claim. The categories are not mutually exclusive—confirmed cases were also often claimed cases, but claimed cases were not always confirmed. For **Column AV, "Professional?"** the researchers used the criterion of whether a person's vocation required post-secondary education; however, some subjectivity is unavoidable. Consequently, details on their employment and education are provided in **Column AW.**

The dataset then gives details on the alleged terrorist activity in **Columns AY-DB.** Details on the investigation and initial charges are provided in **Columns BB-BM.** The dataset then provides information on the types of weapons used in the terrorist activity. To clarify, **Column BN "Gun owner"** indicates whether an individual already owned a gun, not specifically for the terrorist plot, whereas **Column BO** captures whether they then purchased arms for the illicit activity. Researchers sought to identify whether terrorists had a history of engaging in conflict before they sought to commit terrorism and then transferred those skills to terrorist activity, by including the questions in **Columns BX-BY, "Participation in armed conflict prior to plot," and "if so, did he/she receive training from militants there?"** Since material support for a terrorist organization is a common charge in terrorist cases, **Columns CA-CF** indicate whether an individual was officially charged with material support, and, if so, what form was specified in the indictment. The researchers sought to remain as close to the actual legal records as possible, but were sometimes limited by lack of access. When providing details on the actual terrorist attack, the researchers distinguished between the *planned* attack and the actual outcome. **Column CW 'Nature of the attack'** describes the intended event—'no attack' means the individual was not planning a specific act (for instance, they may have intended to travel abroad to fight US forces, generally speaking). **Column CX** gives the actual outcome—a thwarted attack, for instance, is indicated as '0-nothing happened.'

Finally, **Columns DC-DS** give information on the individual's legal proceedings. Given that many individuals accept plea bargains, questions about the details of the criminal trial are

often answered with 'N/A.' **Column DJ 'Final Charges'** indicates which of the charges upon indictment (as indicated in Column BC) the individual accepted in a plea agreement, or for which they were found guilty. Lastly, **Column DT 'Other notes'** is where the researchers provided any other relevant details on the individuals personal history, act of terrorism, or legal proceedings, that were not captured in the dataset.

As this is a 'living dataset,' many of the recent cases should be updated as legal proceedings move forward. Furthermore, new cases should be added as new prosecutions arise. Users of this dataset may also choose to expand the dataset to cover more cases, or narrow its contents based around more strictly defined criteria. The researchers also designed a dataset that provides as much detail as possible while still being useful for running data analysis or compiling summary statistics. Depending on its intended use, details within the dataset can be added or omitted.

Initial Analysis of Jihadist Terrorist Prosecutions Database

The database of 152 terrorism cases can be used to provide valuable insights into the demographic breakdown of suspects, the targets of planned attacks, and outcomes of legal proceedings. Our analysis of the findings reveals the following trends within this dataset. The charts for each analysis are included at the bottom of the Excel dataset.

Ethnicity:

As seen in Figure 1, the most represented ethnicity within the dataset is Arab, with 28% of the cases. African-Americans constituted 20% and Somalis were 12%. 11% were South Asian, 9% were Caucasian, and 20% were 'other.' Overall, our data reveals that no single ethnicity constitutes a majority of cases, contrary to popular belief. We should mention, however, that in 20 cases out of 152, the ethnicity is unknown.

Age:

The range of ages at indictment (or age when they were killed in the attack) is 15 to 63. However, as seen in Figure 2, the bulk of individuals were between ages 19 and 35. The mean age is just over 29 years, and the median age is 27. There were four cases for which the age was unknown.

Gender:

As expected, the vast majority of individuals in our dataset are men—only 3 out of 152 cases were of women. This is illustrated in Figure 3.

Countries Visited Prior to Attack:

Figure 4 lists the number of individuals in the dataset who visited certain countries prior to committing the terrorist act for which they were indicted. Overwhelmingly, the most visited countries are Pakistan and Afghanistan. Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt were also visited by a significant number of individuals. It should be noted that many individuals travelled to multiple countries; the dataset lists all countries visited by each individual.

Conversion to Islam:

Out of 152 cases, we found concrete information of whether or not 80 individuals had converted to Islam or were raised as Muslim. Of the cases for which we had clear information, 44% had converted to Islam at some point prior to committing a terrorist act, as detailed in Figure 5. While we were unable to determine the religion from which many individuals converted, it is interesting to note that for those for whom their prior religious affiliation is known, they were all of a Christian faith. Anecdotally, we noted that many individuals converted to radical Islam while incarcerated for other crimes they had committed, or due to the influence of a person who was radicalized in prison. For individuals who were raised Muslim, our research revealed that in many cases, individuals experienced some 'turning point' at which they became more radical in their beliefs. We noted that this was often followed by a separation from their family and local Islamic community. These details could not be captured quantitatively; however, we noted them in Column Z, 'Narrative on Religious Practices."

Mental Illness:

Of the 68 cases for which an individual's mental health status was known at the time of conviction, 88% did not have a mental illness confirmed by medical professionals, as seen in Figure 6.

Country of Birth:

Of the 129 individuals for whom country of birth is known, Figure 7.1 indicates the number of people born per country. Of those born outside of the US, Pakistan is the most represented (13), followed by Somalia (10), and Jordan (6). Of the known cases, 51% were born in the US, as seen in Figure7.2.

Citizenship Status:

Figure 8.1 and 8.2 break down the citizenship status of the 128 cases for which this information was available. Over half—52%--are US-born citizens, and 25% were naturalized US citizens. Figure 8.1 breaks down the status of legal residents into 4 categories: legal resident (unknown documentation); student visa; work visa; or refugee. In Figure 8.2, these groups are

amalgamated. 16% were non-US citizen legal residents. Only 7% of the 128 individuals were in the US illegally at the time of indictment or death in the attack

Education:

The dataset provides information on individuals' education level, highest degree earned, and if they were a student at the time of indictment/death. Education level is broken down into: less than high school; some high school; completed high school; some college; completed college; some graduate school; and completed graduate school. The breakdown of the education level for the 76 known cases is illustrated in Figure 9. Of the individuals for whom education is known, 69% had education beyond high school: 34% had some college education; 20% had completed college; 3% had some graduate school; and 12% had completed a graduate degree.

Employment:

For each individual, the dataset provides information on whether they were employed, whether they were a professional, whether they were employed in a field related to their educational background, and details on their education and employment. Of the 95 cases for whom employment status is known, 71% were employed at the time of indictment/death, as seen in Figure 10.

Informants and Undercover Agents:

Of the 152 cases, 56--37%---had an informant involved in the investigation, and 27—18%--had an undercover agent involved. Figure 11 breaks down these figures by year of indictment, from 1999 to 2010. The years with the highest number of cases with informants or undercover agents correspond with the years with the highest number of indictments overall. For example, 2009 had the highest number of cases with informants involved, as well as the highest number of indictments. Thus, it is unclear if the use of informants and undercover agents is increasing or decreasing over time, based on this dataset.

Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons:

The dataset breaks down the type of weapon used, or planned to be used, in the terrorist attack, into numerous types and combinations. Overall, 56 out of 152cases involved no weapons. Of the

cases for which weapons were involved, only one individual planned to use, or did use, a CBRN weapon as seen in Figure 12. This is the case of Jose Padilla, for whom the charge related to the use of CBRN weapons was dropped in 2005. Based on our dataset, CBRN weapons are rarely part of terrorist plots.

Material Support Charges:

Columns CA-CG provide details on whether or not an individual was charged with material support, and if so, what specific form of material support they provided, if known. Of the 147 cases for which this information is conclusively known, 52% were charged with material support, which is illustrated in Figure 13. As indicated in the dataset, however, if an individual was not coded for being charged with material support, they were either charged with another crime or were not indicted (for instance, if they were killed in an attack).

Alleged/Attempted Contact with Jihadist Groups:

Figure 14 indicates the total number of individuals per year of indictment who were known to have allegedly contacted or attempted to contact a jihadist group. Across all of the years, 61% of individuals had alleged or attempted contact with a known jihadist group. For the other 39%, there was no conclusive indication that such contact was attempted. It should be noted, however, that researchers considered an individual to have attempted contact if they contacted an informant or undercover agent who claimed to be a member of an organization.

Domestic vs International Targets:

In Columns CN-CT, the dataset provides details on the target of individuals' planned attack, if the case involved a specific target. Of the 117 cases involving specific targets, 46% involved a domestic target, 47% involved an international target, and 7% involved both a domestic and international target (e.g., if an individual was involved in multiple plots), as seen in Figure 15.

Training for Terrorist Attack:

The dataset provides information on whether or not an individual received training for the terrorist attack, and if so, whether training was received domestically or abroad. Figure 16.1 shows that for the 121 cases for which this information is known, 67% of individuals received

training. Figure 16.2 indicates where training occurred. Of the 67% who received training, 35% trained internationally, 28% trained domestically, and 4% trained both in the US and abroad. Details on an individual's training are included in Column DB.

Outcome of Legal Proceedings:

The dataset codes for whether an individual was convicted, acquitted, or pleaded guilty to some or all of the charges for which they were indicted. As seen in Figure 17, 35% of individuals pleaded guilty to some or all charges, 29% were convicted, 15% are still in legal proceedings, and 21% were not applicable (no trial/plea bargain, killed in attack, or at large).

Sentence Length:

Figure 18 graphically represents the sentence length for the 67 individuals who were sentenced and for whom the sentence length is known. In the other cases, individuals may not have been prosecuted (i.e., killed in attack), their sentence length is unknown, or their trials are still ongoing. As seen in Figure 16, most sentence lengths are between 5 and 26 years; 13 individuals received life sentences.

<u>Questions for Further Analysis:</u>

Given the current structure of the database, certain questions cannot be immediately answered. However, the database contains the necessary information to answer the following questions, if analysts re-structure the coding criteria appropriately:

- *How many converts to Islam were converted/radicalized in prison?* The current structure of the database only codes for whether an individual was converted to Islam; however, details of their religious practices, including how/when they were converted, are indicated in Column Z 'Narrative on religious practices,' where applicable. Offhand, we would estimate that 7 individuals out of the 35 for whom it is conclusively known they had converted, had converted in prison. Our references for these individuals include articles from credible news sources that specifically analyze this trend. In the future, a column can be added to code for where a person was converted, to answer this question.
- *Types of Charges:* The dataset only codes for whether an individual was charged with material support; the specific charges are written out in Column BC. In the future, the

dataset can be restructured to code for the various types of charges. With this information, it can be determined how they type of charge has changed over the years, whether certain charges are associated with the use of informants, etc.

- *Intent to fight American troops abroad:* In its present form, the dataset codes for: whether an individual's target was domestic or international; whether it was a military target, and if so, what type; and whether it was a civilian target, and if so, what type. Military targets include both US and non-US forces (e.g., Ethiopian forces in Somalia). However, in Column CT, details on the individual's target are provided, such as whether the target was US troops abroad. Therefore, to determine how many individuals intended to fight US troops abroad, this narrative information can be entered as a numerical value in an additional column.

- *Rate of joining non-Al Qaeda groups:* In its present form, the dataset codes for: whether an individual joined a known jihadist group and/or whether if they attempted to contact a known jihadist group; which group(s) the individual joined or contacted; and what forms of contact were made. In its present form, if an individual contacted multiple groups, the numbers for all groups were listed and separated by semi-colons. Consequently, it is not possible to count how many people contacted or did not contact a certain group, like Al Qaeda. To answer this question, a new code can be inserted for whether or not an individual contacted and/or joined Al Qaeda, if they contacted/joined a known group. Analysts can then determine how the rate of contact and/or membership with Al Qaeda has changed over time.

- *Rate of successful vs non-successful attacks over time:* Presently, in column CX, the dataset codes for whether an attack was successful or not by indicating if: nothing happened; or the various types of damage that resulted. However, '0-nothing happened' indicates if a person's plan was thwarted or failed, or if they never had a clear plan of attack to begin with (i.e., if they intended to fight with jihadist forces abroad). To determine whether the rate of success has changed over time, the data can be re-coded to indicate if an individual never planned an attack, or if their attack was thwarted. The dataset indicates the details of the attack, or if this was not applicable, in column CZ. It should be noted, however, that the years in the dataset are the year of indictment, not the year of the terrorist attack.

Figure 1 - Ethnicity (Of 132 Known)

	Ethnicity		
Code	Ethnicity	Count	As Percent of Ethnicity Known
0	Caucasian	12	9%
1	African-American	26	20%
2	Arab	37	28%
3	Somali	16	12%
4	South Asian	15	11%
5	Other	26	20%
--	Total	132	100%
	Unknown	20	

| Age	Count
10	0
11	0
12	0
13	0
14	0
15	1
16	0
17	2
18	1
19	6
20	3
21	5
22	10
23	7
24	12
25	7
26	11
27	8
28	5
29	5
30	8
31	6
32	5
33	2
34	2
35	3
36	1
37	0
38	1
39	2
40	1
41	0
42	2
43	4
44	1
45	0
46	1
47	0
48	1
49	2
50	1
51	1
52	0
53	0
54	0
55	0
56	0
57	0
58	0
59	0
60	0
61	0
62	0
63	1
64	0
65	0
66	0
67	0
68	0
69	0
70	0
71	0
72	0
73	0
74	0
75	0
Total	128
Mean	29.25675676
Median	27

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Figure 2 - Ages of Individuals at Time of Indictment

Figure 3 - Gender

2%

98%

- Female
- Male

Code	Gender	Count	As % of Total
0	Female	3	2%
1	Male	149	98%
	Total	152	100%

Figure 4 - Countries Visited Prior To Attack/Arrest

Country (vertical axis)

Individuals Visiting Country Prior to Attack/Arrest (horizontal axis)

Countries Visited Prior to Arrest	Value
Yemen	5
Netherlands	1
Waziristan	1
United Kingdom	5
Ukraine	1
Uganda	1
UAE	5
Turkey	3
Trinidad	1
Philippines	0
South Korea	1
Somalia	16
Saudi Arabia	10
Russia	1
Qatar	2
Pakistan	44
Nigeria	1
Netherlands	1
Malaysia	1
Kuwait	1
Kosovo	4
Jordan	3
Israel	5
Guyana	1
Germany	2
Gaza	2
Egypt	11
Cyprus	1
China	5
Canada	6
Bosnia	2
Bangladesh	2
Bahrain	1
Afghanistan	25

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Figure 5 - Converted to Islam (Of 80 Known Cases)

Code	Converted to Islam	Count	% of Total Known
0	No	45	56%
1	Yes	35	44%
--	Total Known	80	100%

Figure 6 - Confirmed Mental Illness At Time of Conviction (of 68 Known Cases)

12%

88%

- No
- Yes

Confirmed Mental Illness At Time of Conviction	Count	As % of Total
No	60	88%
Yes	8	12%
Total Known	68	100%

Figure 7.1 - Country of Birth (Of 129 Known)		
Code	Country	Count
1	Afghanistan	2
2	Åland Islands	0
3	Albania	0
4	Algeria	1
5	American Samoa	0
6	Andorra	0
7	Angola	0
8	Anguilla	0
9	Antigua and Barbuda	0
10	Argentina	0
11	Armenia	0
12	Aruba	0
13	Australia	0
14	Austria	0
15	Azerbaijan	0
16	Bahamas	0
17	Bahrain	0
18	Bangladesh	1
19	Barbados	0
20	Belarus	0
21	Belgium	0
22	Belize	0
23	Benin	0
24	Bermuda	0
25	Bhutan	0
26	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0
27	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2
28	Botswana	0
29	Brazil	0
30	British Virgin Islands	0
31	Brunei Darussalam	0
32	Bulgaria	0
33	Burkina Faso	0
34	Burundi	0
35	Cambodia	0
36	Cameroon	0
37	Canada	0
38	Cape Verde	0
39	Cayman Islands	0

40	Central African Republic	0
41	Chad	0
42	Channel Islands	0
43	Chile	0
44	China	0
45	China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	0
46	China, Macao Special Administrative Region	0
47	Colombia	0
48	Comoros	0
49	Congo	0
50	Cook Islands	0
51	Costa Rica	0
52	Côte d'Ivoire	0
53	Croatia	0
54	Cuba	0
55	Cyprus	0
56	Czech Republic	0
57	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0
58	Democratic Republic of the Congo	0
59	Denmark	0
60	Djibouti	0
61	Dominica	0
62	Dominican Republic	0
63	Ecuador	0
64	Egypt	2
65	El Salvador	0
66	Equatorial Guinea	0
67	Eritrea	0
68	Estonia	0
69	Ethiopia	0
70	Faeroe Islands	0
71	Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	0
72	Fiji	0
73	Finland	0
74	France	1
75	French Guiana	0
76	French Polynesia	0
77	Gabon	0
78	Gambia	0
79	Georgia	0
80	Germany	0

81	Ghana	0
82	Gibraltar	0
83	Greece	0
84	Greenland	0
85	Grenada	0
86	Guadeloupe	0
87	Guam	0
88	Guatemala	0
89	Guernsey	0
90	Guinea	0
91	Guinea-Bissau	0
92	Guyana	1
93	Haiti	3
94	Holy See	0
95	Honduras	0
96	Hungary	0
97	Iceland	0
98	India	1
99	Indonesia	0
100	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	1
101	Iraq	1
102	Ireland	0
103	Isle of Man	0
104	Israel	0
105	Italy	0
106	Jamaica	1
107	Japan	0
108	Jersey	0
109	Jordan	6
110	Kazakhstan	0
111	Kenya	0
112	Kiribati	0
113	Kuwait	3
114	Kyrgyzstan	0
115	Lao People's Democratic Republic	0
116	Latvia	0
117	Lebanon	2
118	Lesotho	0
119	Liberia	0
120	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0
121	Liechtenstein	0

122	Lithuania	0
123	Luxembourg	0
124	Madagascar	0
125	Malawi	0
126	Malaysia	0
127	Maldives	0
128	Mali	0
129	Malta	0
130	Marshall Islands	0
131	Martinique	0
132	Mauritania	0
133	Mauritius	0
134	Mayotte	0
135	Mexico	0
136	Micronesia (Federated States of)	0
137	Monaco	0
138	Mongolia	0
139	Montenegro	0
140	Montserrat	0
141	Morocco	1
142	Mozambique	0
143	Myanmar	0
144	Namibia	0
145	Nauru	0
146	Nepal	0
147	Netherlands	0
148	Netherlands Antilles	0
149	New Caledonia	0
150	New Zealand	0
151	Nicaragua	0
152	Niger	0
153	Nigeria	1
154	Niue	0
155	Norfolk Island	0
156	Northern Mariana Islands	0
157	Norway	0
158	Occupied Palestinian Territory	0
159	Oman	0
160	Pakistan	13
161	Palau	0
162	Panama	0

163	Papua New Guinea	0
164	Paraguay	0
165	Peru	0
166	Philippines	0
167	Pitcairn	0
168	Poland	0
169	Portugal	0
170	Puerto Rico	0
171	Qatar	0
172	Republic of Korea	1
173	Republic of Moldova	0
174	Réunion	0
175	Romania	0
176	Russian Federation	0
177	Rwanda	0
178	Saint-Barthélemy	0
179	Saint Helena	0
180	Saint Kitts and Nevis	0
181	Saint Lucia	0
182	Saint-Martin (French part)	0
183	Saint Pierre and Miquelon	0
184	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0
185	Samoa	0
186	San Marino	0
187	Sao Tome and Principe	0
188	Saudi Arabia	2
189	Senegal	0
190	Serbia	0
191	Seychelles	0
192	Sierra Leone	1
193	Singapore	0
194	Slovakia	0
195	Slovenia	0
196	Solomon Islands	0
197	Somalia	10
198	South Africa	0
199	Spain	0
200	Sri Lanka	0
201	Sudan	0
202	Suriname	0
203	Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands	0

204	Swaziland	0
205	Sweden	0
206	Switzerland	0
207	Syrian Arab Republic	0
208	Tajikistan	0
209	Thailand	0
210	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0
211	Timor-Leste	0
212	Togo	0
213	Tokelau	0
214	Tonga	0
215	Trinidad and Tobago	1
216	Tunisia	0
217	Turkey	1
218	Turkmenistan	0
219	Turks and Caicos Islands	0
220	Tuvalu	0
221	Uganda	0
222	Ukraine	0
223	United Arab Emirates	0
224	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
225	United Republic of Tanzania	0
226	United States of America	66
227	United States Virgin Islands	0
228	Uruguay	0
229	Uzbekistan	0
230	Vanuatu	0
231	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0
232	Viet Nam	0
233	Wallis and Futuna Islands	0
234	Western Sahara	0
235	Yemen	3
236	Zambia	0
237	Zimbabwe	0
	Total	129

Figure 7.2 - % Born in the U.S. (Of 129 Known Cases)


% Born in U.S.	51%
% Born outside the U.S.	49%

Figure 8.1 - Citizenship Status at Time of Indictment/Death (Of 128 Known)

Code	Citizenship Status	Count	% of Total Known
0	U.S. Born Citizen	67	52%
1	Naturalized Citizen	32	25%
2	Legal Resident (Unkown I	16	13%
2.25	Student Visa	1	1%
2.5	Work Visa	1	1%
2.75	Refugee Status	2	2%
3	Illegal Resident	9	7%
	Total	128	100%

Figure 8.2 - Citizenship Status with Legal Status As One Category (Of 128 Known)

Legend:
- U.S. Born Citizen
- Naturalized Citizen
- Legal Resident (Unkown Documentation, Student Visa, Work Visa, or Refugee Status)
- Illegal Resident

Citizenship Status	Count	% of Total Known
U.S. Born Citizen	67	52%
Naturalized Citizen	32	25%
Legal Resident (Unkown D	20	16%
Illegal Resident	9	7%
Total	128	100%

Figure 9 - Education Level (Of 76 Known)

Education	Count	As % of Total Known
Less than High School	6	8%
Some High School	6	8%
Completed High School	12	16%
Some College	26	34%
Completed College	15	20%
Some Graduate School	2	3%
Completed Graduate School	9	12%
Total	76	100%
Less Than High School or Some High School	12	16%
Completed High School	12	16%
Some College or Higher	52	68%
Total	76	100%

Figure 10 - Employed (Of 95 Known)

29%

71%

- ■ No
- ■ Yes

Employed	Count	
No	28	29%
Yes	67	71%
Total	95	100%

Figure 11 - Use of Informants or Undercover Agents Per Year

- Cases with Informant Involved
- Cases with Undercover Agent Involved
- Total Number of Indictments (Cases) During The Year

	Total Number of Indictments (Cases) During The Year	Cases with Informant Involved	As % of Total	Cases with Undercover Agent Involved	As % of Total
1999	1	0	0%	0	0%
2000	0	0	0%	0	0%
2001	2	1	50%	0	0%
2002	18	2	11%	0	0%
2003	24	5	21%	3	13%
2004	8	3	38%	2	25%
2005	12	4	33%	3	25%
2006	17	12	71%	8	47%
2007	15	9	60%	7	47%
2008	8	1	13%	1	13%
2009	43	17	40%	3	7%
2010	4	2	50%	0	0%
Total	152	56	37%	27	18%
Average	4.666666667	56			

Figure 12 - Weapons Involved in Plot

Legend:
- N/A - No Weapons Involved
- CBRN Weapons
- Non-CBRN Weapons

Code	Type of Weapons Involved in Plot	Count
0	N/A - No Weapons Involved	56
1	CBRN	0
2	CBRN	0
3	CBRN	1
4	CBRN	0
5	Non-CBRN	10
6	Non-CBRN	36
7	Non-CBRN	5
8	Non-CBRN	6
9	Non-CBRN	3
10	Non-CBRN	2

Weapons	Count
N/A - No Weapons Involved	56
CBRN Weapons	1
Non-CBRN Weapons	62

**Figure 13 - Charged with Providing Material Support (Of 139 Known)**

Charged with Providing Material Support (Of 13	Count	As % of Total Known
No	70	48%
Yes	77	52%
Total	147	100%

Figure 14 - Alleged Contact/Attempt to Contact Known Jihadist Groups Per Year of Indictment

Year of Indictments with Known Jihadist Group	Total Cases	As % of Total
1999	1	100%
2000	0	0%
2001	2	100%
2002	14	78%
2003	16	67%
2004	5	63%
2005	10	83%
2006	4	24%
2007	3	20%
2008	8	100%
2009	27	63%
2010	3	75%
Total	93	61%

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Figure 15 - Alleged Target Involed In Plots

| Alleged Target of Individual's Plot	Count	As % of Total
Domestic	54	46%
International	55	47%
Domestic and International	8	7%
Total	117	100%

Figure 16.1 - Received Training For Terrorist Attacks (YES/NO) (Of 121 Known)

Received Training For Terrorist Attacks			As % of Total
No		40	33%
Domestic		34	28%
International		42	35%
Domestic and International		5	4%
Total Known		121	100%

Received Training For Terrorist Attacks	Count		As % of Total
No		40	33%
Yes		81	67%
Total Known		121	100%

Figure 16.2 - Received Training for Terrorist Attacks (Of 121 Known)

Received Training For Terrorist Attacks			As % of Total
No		40	33%
Domestic		34	28%
International		42	35%
Domestic and International		5	4%
Total Known		121	100%

Received Training For Terrorist Attacks	Count		As % of Total
No		40	33%
Yes		81	67%
Total Known		121	100%

Figure 17 - Outcome of Case

Acquitted/Convicted/Plea Bargain/Ongoing Trial	Count	As % of Total
Acquitted/Not Guilty	0	0%
Convicted	44	29%
Plea Bargain	53	35%
Ongoing/Pending	23	15%
N/A or No Trial	32	21%
Total	152	100%

Figure 18 - Sentence Length (Of 67 Known, Applicable, and Whose Trials Are Completed) -- 100 Indicates Life in Prison

Frequency Data for Figure 18 -

Sentence Length	Count
0	0
1	1
2	1
3	1
4	0
5	2
6	1
7	3
8	4
9	0
10	8
11	2
12	1
13	3
14	0
15	7
16	1
17	1
18	2
19	0
20	4
21	0
22	2
23	0
24	1
25	1
26	0
27	0
28	0
29	0
30	3
31	0
32	0
33	2
34	0
35	1
36	0
37	0
38	0

39	0
40	0
41	0
42	0
43	0
44	0
45	0
46	0
47	1
48	0
49	0
50	0
51	0
52	0
53	0
54	0
55	0
56	0
57	0
58	0
59	0
60	0
61	0
62	0
63	0
64	0
65	1
66	0
67	0
68	0
69	0
70	0
71	0
72	0
73	0
74	0
75	0
76	0
77	0
78	0
79	0

80	0
81	0
82	0
83	0
84	0
85	0
86	0
87	0
88	0
89	0
90	0
91	0
92	0
93	0
94	0
95	0
96	0
97	0
98	0
99	0
100	13
101	0
Total Number of Sentences	67

Country Code Numbers

1. Afghanistan
2. Åland Islands
3. Albania
4. Algeria
5. American Samoa
6. Andorra
7. Angola
8. Anguilla
9. Antigua and Barbuda
10. Argentina
11. Armenia
12. Aruba
13. Australia
14. Austria
15. Azerbaijan
16. Bahamas
17. Bahrain
18. Bangladesh
19. Barbados
20. Belarus
21. Belgium
22. Belize
23. Benin
24. Bermuda
25. Bhutan
26. Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
27. Bosnia and Herzegovina
28. Botswana
29. Brazil
30. British Virgin Islands
31. Brunei Darussalam
32. Bulgaria
33. Burnika Faso
34. Burundi
35. Cambodia
36. Cameroon
37. Canada
38. Cape Verde
39. Cayman Islands
40. Central African Republic
41. Chad

42. Channel Islands
43. Chile
44. China
45. China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
46. China, Macao Special Administrative Region
47. Colombia
48. Comoros
49. Congo
50. Cook Islands
51. Costa Rica
52. Côte d'Ivoire
53. Croatia
54. Cuba
55. Cyprus
56. Czech Republic
57. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
58. Democratic Republic of the Congo
59. Denmark
60. Djibouti
61. Dominica
62. Dominican Republic
63. Ecuador
64. Egypt
65. El Salvador
66. Equatorial Guinea
67. Eritrea
68. Estonia
69. Ethiopia
70. Faeroe Islands
71. Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
72. Fiji
73. Finland
74. France
75. French Guinea
76. French Polynesia
77. Gabon
78. Gambia
79. Georgia
80. Germany
81. Ghana
82. Gibraltar
83. Greece
84. Greenland
85. Grenada
86. Guadeloupe
87. Guam

88. Guatemala
89. Guernsey
90. Guinea
91. Guinea-Bissau
92. Guyana
93. Haiti
94. Holy See
95. Honduras
96. Hungary
97. Iceland
98. India
99. Indonesia
100. Iran (Islamic Republic of)
101. Iraq
102. Ireland
103. Isle of Man
104. Israel
105. Italy
106. Jamaica
107. Japan
108. Jersey
109. Jordan
110. Kazakhstan
111. Kenya
112. Kiribati
113. Kuwait
114. Kyrgyzstan
115. Lao People's Democratic Republic
116. Latvia
117. Lebanon
118. Lesotho
119. Liberia
120. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
121. Liechtenstein
122. Lithuania
123. Luxembourg
124. Madagascar
125. Malawi
126. Malaysia
127. Maldives
128. Mali
129. Malta
130. Marshall Islands
131. Martinique
132. Mauritania
133. Mauritius

134. Mayotte
135. Mexico
136. Micronesia (Federated States of)
137. Monaco
138. Mongolia
139. Montenegro
140. Montserrat
141. Morocco
142. Mozambique
143. Myanmar
144. Namibia
145. Nauru
146. Nepal
147. Netherlands
148. Netherlands Antilles
149. New Caledonia
150. New Zealand
151. Nicaragua
152. Niger
153. Nigeria
154. Niue
155. Norfolk Island
156. Northern Mariana Islands
157. Norway
158. Occupied Palestinian Territory
159. Oman
160. Pakistan
161. Palau
162. Panama
163. Papua New Guinea
164. Paraguay
165. Peru
166. Philippines
167. Pitcairn
168. Poland
169. Portugal
170. Puerto Rico
171. Qatar
172. Republic of Korea
173. Republic of Moldova
174. Réunion
175. Romania
176. Russian Federation
177. Rwanda
178. Saint-Barthélemy
179. Saint Helena

180. Saint Kitts and Nevis
181. Saint Lucia
182. Saint-Martin (French part)
183. Saint Pierre and Miquelon
184. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
185. Samoa
186. San Marino
187. Sao Tome and Principe
188. Saudi Arabia
189. Senegal
190. Serbia
191. Seychelles
192. Sierra Leone
193. Singapore
194. Slovakia
195. Slovenia
196. Solomon Islands
197. Somalia
198. South Africa
199. Spain
200. Sri Lanka
201. Sudan
202. Suriname
203. Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands
204. Swaziland
205. Sweden
206. Switzerland
207. Syrian Arab Republic
208. Tajikistan
209. Thailand
210. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
211. Timor-Leste
212. Togo
213. Tokelau
214. Tonga
215. Trinidad and Tobago
216. Tunisia
217. Turkey
218. Turkmenistan
219. Turks and Caicos Islands
220. Tuvalu
221. Uganda
222. Ukraine
223. United Arab Emirates
224. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
225. United Republic of Tanzania

226. United States of America
227. United States Virgin Islands
228. Uruguay
229. Uzbekistan
230. Vanuatu
231. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
232. Viet Nam
233. Wallis and Futuna Islands
234. Western Sahara
235. Yemen
236. Zambia
237. Zimbabwe

Appendix B:

Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

January 19, 2010

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
2. Abu Sayyaf Group
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
4. Al-Shabaab
5. Ansar al-Islam
6. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
7. Asbat al-Ansar
8. Aum Shinrikyo
9. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
10. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
11. Continuity Irish Republican Army
12. Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
13. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
14. Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
15. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
16. Hizballah (Party of God)
17. Islamic Jihad Group
18. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
19. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
20. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)
21. Kahane Chai (Kach)
22. Kata'ib Hizballah
23. Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)
24. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
25. Lashkar i Jhangvi
26. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
27. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
28. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
29. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
30. National Liberation Army (ELN)
31. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
32. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
33. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)
34. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
35. Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)

36.   al-Qa'ida
37.   al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
38.   al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GSPC)
39.   Real IRA
40.   Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
41.   Revolutionary Organization 17 November
42.   Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
43.   Revolutionary Struggle
44.   Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
45.   United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
46.   Other