The more I think about the issue, the more it seems that there's just a fundamental directionality of hierarchal systems such as the military. It's not possible to move away from the centralized analysis model to a decentralized model because that would lead to a landslide of decentralization, and the whole structure would break down. The "blogging intel ecosystem" works best when it's done exactly the way the "enemy" conducts business (US cathedral v. "enemy's" bazar): it's unclassified, anyone can participate, and often your very funding and operational capability depend on not only your participation but your success in that ecosystem. If analysts were paid only by the number of hits and links their intelink blogs received (e.g. their google ranking, for lack of a better term), then suddenly you'd have an amazingly well populated and up-to-date system (side note: the current system is so bad that most intelipedia pages are still largely the same as when they were cut and pasted from wikipedia in the first place!). For example, if the US military stopped paying people, and instead paid for operational success in some kind of market-system, and if the US military abandoned all rank/hierarchal structure and let people organize in whatever way worked best to get their piece of the pie (payment for operational success), then there would be real value in open and decentralized reporting and analysis being conducted by the very people who are also using that information to operate. Of course, anything structured like that would never have gotten itself into the royal mess we're now in...
More to the point, minus the mumbo-jumbo, and my conclusion is that this entire set of solutions that I'm hinting at is fundamentally unavailable to the military because of its structure. For the concept to work as a solution, the military would need to abandon its structure to such an extent that it would no longer be in need of the solution. And this structure is also the source of the original problem.
In all honesty, do you think that this problem will ever get better? Which is more likely to happen: 1) "they" add another 300,000 hours of predator video first to your analytical load without considering the consequences to your processing/exploitation/dissemination system, or 2) "they" conduct a top-down re-evaluation (complete with the budgetary authority to make real changes) of how their system functions and begin to collect data with the efficiency of the overall process in mind. What you're grappling with is a symptom of a structural problem that will only continue to get worse, not better, until the structure is addressed. While I have no doubt that you'll be able to improve the system to some degree, that will work in a way like Jeavons' paradox, and make the overall situation worse: by improving system capacity by some amount, the immediate need to address the underlying structural problem will recede and you'll get 500,000 hours more predator video, not 300,000 hours, because now you can handle it. Which, of course, will only get you back into the same jam you're currently in, but with more invested in a flawed structure and less elasticity of that structure to respond to future demands because you've picked the low-hanging fruit improvements already...
Begs the question: to what extent is this unique to Nation-State military structure, or, as suggested by Tainter and others, is it impossible to voluntarily contract the scale and scope of hierarchy, leaving collapse as the only possibility?
On a semi-Diagonal Economy-related note, does this support the argument that we must focus on building diagonal structures rather than adapting existing, hierarchal institutions, or is that overreaching?