Monday, September 16, 2013 

The slightest of silver linings.

Much (including by yours truly) was written in the aftermath of the coalition losing the vote that would have led, supposedly, to a second vote on whether the UK should join potential military action in Syria.  This understandably focused on why it was that a government with a more than healthy majority by historical standards could manage to lose a motion on foreign policy, something that had the anoraks digging in their books to find the last example of, and what it meant for the main three parties.

Almost three weeks on, and with a deal having been reached between the US and Russia over Syria documenting and then handing over their chemical weapon stocks for destruction, the vote has become even more significant.  In their rush to get on board with what looked to be imminent US military strikes, the deadly duo of Cameron and Hague recalled parliament without so much as having the basics of a case for war.  True, they just about managed to get the joint intelligence committee and attorney general on their side, even if the reports from both were fairly pitiful, but as for why we had to intervene now and whether we could avoid being drawn into a protracted civil war, answers came there none.  Fingers of blame were pointed at Ed Miliband for his supposed preference for party politics over the "national interest", when the real reason the vote was lost was the prime minister's failure to convince his own backbenchers.

Thanks then to the miserable failure of Cameron, Hague and Clegg, you can make a reasonable case that another Middle Eastern adventure was avoided.  Without Cameron immediately granting a vote, apparently confident he would win it, there wouldn't have been the demands on Obama to consult Congress.  Obama, unlike Cameron, realised reasonably quickly that he was unlikely to win a vote, and unprepared to either ignore Congress or suffer the humiliation of such a loss, he and John Kerry sought out a Plan B.  Whether Obama ever truly wanted to get involved militarily in Syria is open to question; he had to be persuaded to act in Libya.  It would though have been an even bigger loss of face to not do something having seen his "red line" breached.  By focusing on chemical weapons rather than the removal of Assad or an increase in help for the rebels, there was always the possibility of a compromise, and that seems to have just about been reached.

As for whether or not Cameron will be thanked by the president is far more difficult to ascertain.  On the surface, it looks like a good deal if all goes as agreed.  Assad loses the weapons that sort of deterred Israel from interfering too heavily in the country, and which also struck a certain amount of fear into the rebels; it doesn't stop the US from increasing aid to the rebels, and there are reports that the long promised weapons have started to arrive; and the US avoids "owning" another sectarian conflict, having successfully engineered one that continues to rage in Iraq.  It could even lead to a break in the impasse over the Iran nuclear programme, if a splash in a certain liberal newspaper is to be believed.

Not everything looks quite so rosy, though.  Should the deal either fall through or Syria attempt to prevaricate, the US has all but boxed itself in to some sort of military action.  All the same problems with an attack on Syria as there were when it looked imminent will still apply.  Moreover, regardless of how it came about, backing down after it looked as though they were only days away from strikes will be seen as weakness at home.  It doesn't matter that the majority of the US public were against intervention, or indeed that the Republicans had just as much of a role as anyone else in making a vote seem unwinnable, we're already seeing the usual suspects whining, having believed they were going to get another notch on their "countries attacked" bedpost.  That it was done with the loathed Russians and while the even more despised Putin lurked in the shadows, having last week dared to suggest the US is anything but an "exceptional" nation, won't have improved their mood.

It feels especially incongruous when the UN inspection team has confirmed definitively that sarin was used in the attack on Ghouta in Damascus on the 21st of August.  Their report doesn't say it in as many words, but the inference is clear that the attack was carried out by the military, rather than the rebels.  This doesn't of course mean that the use of chemical weapons was ordered by Assad himself, or that the attack wasn't a "mistake", with those who prepared it getting the mixture wrong, although obviously the president is ultimately responsible.  It does though bring further into focus just how foolish the mad rush towards intervention was; why could the US, French and UK not wait until the inspectors had carried out their work?  The conflict in Syria has been so coloured with lies and propaganda from both sides that relatively unbiased evidence was crucial.  Like it or not, our own intelligence agencies simply aren't trusted any more, and for good reason.  It's difficult to believe that had any vote on action been delayed until now that a majority still wouldn't have been found, misgivings about another intervention in an Arab country or not.

In truth, it's a fitting sort of end to our entire policy on Syria.  From the very beginning William Hague and the coalition have been either unclear or deliberately misleading in what they've been trying to achieve, recognising the rebels, supplying them with "non-lethal" aid, all while refusing to put pressure on them to attend negotiations which the regime was prepared to enter into.  We say we want a diplomatic solution, yet we make no effort whatsoever to get one.  Instead, we allowed or tacitly supported the arming of the rebels by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, then acted surprised when they went to Salafists and other Islamists.  Now we seem to be hoping the "moderate" rebels will fight the likes of al-Nusra and the ISIS, and are training some to do so.  We cry crocodile tears about children and refugees, while seemingly not doing anything to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people.  The best that can be said is that thanks to the US-Russia agreement, things are unlikely to get any worse for the moment.  They won't however get any better.  Hague and Cameron have however succeeded in making themselves look like idiots, as well as the most unreliable of allies.  The very slightest of silver linings.

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Monday, September 02, 2013 

Syria: the coalition is officially butthurt.

The coalition is exhibiting all the symptoms of what the internet has come to define as "butthurt".  Either unwilling or unable to bring itself to admit that the failure of the Syria vote was all down to them, whether due to the piss poor case they made, the apparent failure to detect massive opposition within their own parties or just plain old fashioned messing up, they've instead decided to pin all the blame on Ed Miliband.  Doncha know, if it hadn't been for the "cynical partisanship" of the Labour leader then Cameron and Hague could now be getting their war on.  According to George Osborne, Red Ed now looks even less like a future prime minister, and Osborne ought to know, considering he's about as likely to follow on from Dave as I'm to be next Pope.

It's fairly pointless looking to opinion polls now, as the results show the public to be as hopelessly confused as usual on who's come out of it well, meaning that they either don't know or don't care, but even before the vote there looked to be a fairly massive majority against any strike on Syria.  Taking this into account, it seems just a little bit silly to be presenting Miliband as the one who put a stop to our taking part in an intervention, as, err, that could just increase his popularity.  The whole partisan argument doesn't even stand up to the slightest scrutiny in any case: the motions were all but identical for goodness sake, just that Labour's asked for more time.  If the coalition had read the situation properly, they could have switched to the Labour motion and still gotten their war.  As it was, both were defeated.

The problem for Cameron and Hague, but Hague especially, is this shows that apart from the keyboard warriors online and the bomb flingers of Fleet Street, his approach to Syria is incredibly unpopular.  If there was widespread opposition to arming the rebels, as there was, why did either think that inconclusive reports of the use of chemical weapons, horrific images from the scene or not, would change people's minds so drastically?  Their policy hasn't made any sense for months, and it's actually got even more ridiculous as time has gone by.  As Simon Jenkins writes, you don't punish a country's government for using chemical weapons by killing more innocent people on the ground, as such an intervention inevitably would.  You either don't get involved at all and push for a diplomatic solution, or you plan an assault that will make a genuine difference.

Which is precisely why John Kerry's sermon last Friday was so incongruous.  There he was making this great moral case for how the world couldn't ignore a crime against humanity, when there isn't the slightest evidence that what's actually being proposed would prevent another such use of gas.  If he was personally persuasive, the intelligence released alongside his speech was almost identical to that produced by our own spooks, and raised just as many questions as it answered.  He also gave the game away when he brought Iran and Hezbollah into it, those other actors in Syria who were mentioned while Saudi Arabia and Qatar were ignored.  If Hezbollah did want chemical weapons, they most surely could have got them by now, while the JIC briefing last week said rebel groups did want to get their hands on them.  Personally, I'm far more concerned about what al-Qaida and its friends could do with Sarin or VX than I am Hezbollah, but then al-Qaida only kills anyone it feels like while Hezbollah, err, defends Lebanon against Israel.  Israel, meanwhile, continues to neither confirm or deny it has nuclear weapons, while it most likely has chemical/biological weapons programmes too.

One conclusion to be reached is that rather than wanting to bring the civil war to an end, we actually want it to continue.  Israel, we are told, remains ambivalent, not surprisingly considering the lack of trouble Assad has caused the country, in spite of the continuing occupation of the Golan Heights.  It doesn't like his support for Hezbollah, but he's probably preferable to either the instability of what would come after, or indeed the Islamist regime that would be the most likely outcome.  We ourselves might follow Saudi policy in the region, but we don't particularly want the jihadis to have another potential safe haven, even if it means a dilution of Iranian power.  The conflict might have led to around 2 million people fleeing, but for now they mostly haven't tried to reach our shores, instead going to either Lebanon, Jordan or Turkey.  And as long as they're fighting each other, they're less concerned about targeting the West.

It would certainly explain why we favour only minimally striking Assad for the use of CW, when we went after Iraq not having the first idea how the war there would pan out.  It would also mean that despite all the rhetoric of how something must be done and the use of the most emotional language, we really couldn't care less about the Syrians themselves, something I've felt has been the case from the very beginning.

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Friday, August 30, 2013 

What the Syria vote does and doesn't signify.

Amid all the attempts to try and explain exactly what last night's government defeat on Syria means, there are two fairly fundamental reasons for why they lost, neither of which has much to do with Cameron's standing with his party or Miliband's change of tack 48 hours ago.

First, the government completely failed to make the case for intervention.  The evidence was inconclusive, the legal advice an utter joke, and no one advocating joining the US in striking Syria even began to explain how launching hundreds of cruise missiles at "military" targets was meant to either stop chemical weapons being used again, or improve the humanitarian situation in the country.

Second, the rush to make a decision to meet an arbitrary timetable was a huge mistake.  In the course of a week the government tried to bump the country into another military adventure without explaining why immediate action was so important, or couldn't be delayed until after the UN inspectors had delivered their report.  They wouldn't have apportioned blame, but it would have established beyond any doubt that chemical weapons had been used.  If there was any true echo of Iraq, it was in trying to force matters when waiting slightly longer may well have turned up the cliched "smoking gun".  The arguments a decade ago were so rehearsed that it became more and more difficult to say something new that could change minds; in this instance plenty of people had yet to come to a proper reasoned decision, and so erred on the side of caution.

Only then should we come to how party politics had an impact.  Looking down the list of Tory MPs who voted against the prime minister, there are some who are seasoned veterans of trooping through the no lobby, but fewer than you might imagine.  Cameron and the whips ought to have known from the numbers who were opposed to arming the rebels and were demanding a vote then that there was more than the potential for trouble and they seem to have ignored it, imagining that they would back the prime minister when his authority was on the line.  They also seem to have dismissed the level of press opposition, as well as the few opinion polls conducted that suggested little appetite for another conflict.  Whether you put this down to the Tories being on a high after signs of economic recovery and Labour's troubles during the recess or just ignoring what ought to have staring them in the face, for a party meant to be in tune with public opinion via Lynton Crosby, this is a remarkable failure.

Those on the coalition frontbench really ought to be looking at themselves then before lashing out at everyone else for their supposed perfidy.  It comes to something when it's Jack Straw acting as the voice of (almost) reason, pointing out that this wasn't about the country become isolationist, rather it was the abject failure of the case made by the government.  If it hadn't been in such a mad rush, another week might well have sufficed and the result could have been different. Nor did it help when even before the vote had taken place, words being put in people's mouths or not, Philip Hammond was agreeing that Labour's amendment gave succour to Assad, while others were yet again bringing the "national interest" and "national security" into play.  If the no vote really was as significant as some are making out, I and many others would be delighted. Having blindly followed the US into two disastrous wars of choice, as well as persuaded a hesitant Obama into intervening in Libya, making clear that we will no longer act as backup without exhausting all other options first would be a extremely welcome development.

Nor is this quite the triumph for Ed Miliband that some are trying to portray it as.  As others have detected, this wasn't so much educated, strong leadership as it was a whole lot of luck and Cameron/Clegg snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.  Miliband didn't know what he wanted and his confused speech yesterday said as much; he was playing for time, hoping that doing so would stop a significant number of his own backbenchers from rebelling.  The disaster for Cameron is that if he and his whips had read the situation properly, they could have swallowed their pride and gone with the Labour amendment, which was almost identical to their own motion except it asked for the government to wait until the UN inspectors had given their report.  Cameron and Hague would still have gotten their war.  As it is, Cameron can hardly now go on portraying Miliband as weak when he's suffered such a humiliation himself.

Most important of all though is that last night's vote firmly established that parliament has to be consulted before military action can be taken.  When it came to Libya, MPs voted after the intervention had begun, making it all but unthinkable that they would then ask for the bombers to be brought back.  Barring extreme cases, the royal prerogative has clearly had its day.  Likewise, one of the minor reasons for why last night's vote failed is that with the exception of a few especially egregious Labour MPs, the exact same people who thought Iraq was such a splendid idea were those most vociferous in urging action in SyriaMichael Gove shouldn't be calling others a disgrace, he ought to be reflecting on why it is we are now so resistant to intelligence briefings and the advice of government lawyers.  Not all of the blame can be put on Blair when so many others went along with it; the being misled themselves line simply won't wash.

Finally, the only message this sends to Assad is that Britain won't be joining in an attack.  If the US and France as planned want to make either a pointless gesture to prevent Obama being embarrassed over the breaching of his red line, or alternatively fully intervene on the side of the rebels, then bully for them.  All it signifies is that we won't be rushed into another potentially foolhardy conflict, nothing more.  Those who invoke the image of gassed or burned children as demanding action seem to have no such concerns as to our intervening on the side of rebels who use child soldiers or murder them in cold blood on video, nor are many of them similarly outraged when other states bombard heavily populated areas with no concern for human lifeAs Simon Jenkins writes, not intervening now takes more political courage than doing so, so skewed has the Westminster bubble become.

P.S. It's nice to see that last night has at the very least provided us with a new African euphemism: 


It is understood that Greening and Simmonds were in a room near the Commons chamber, discussing the situation in Rwanda, when the vote was called.

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Thursday, August 29, 2013 

The government's case for war: a collection of words.

Among all the classic bad reviews of books and films, one I've always been especially partial to is Ian Hislop's pithy dismissal of Edwina Currie's first attempt at a bonkbuster, titled A Parliamentary Affair.  His verdict? "It's not a novel, it's a collection of words."  As Kermode and Mayo would (almost) say, put it on the cover.

In the same sense, Dominic Grieve's reasoning on why an attack on Syria would be legal (PDF) is also a collection of words.  It most certainly isn't the kind of case you'd pay thousands of pounds for were you to ask Suue, Grabbit and Runne to do the same, as not even they would be so brazen as to claim such nonsense was the best they could do.  Grieve's argument is effectively that even if the attack on Ghouta hadn't happened, intervention would still be legal as the level of suffering in Syria is so high, something "generally accepted by the international community as a whole".  As Tom Freeman says, this is gibberish.  This isn't a legal document, it's a political one that also tries to make a moral case, and it fails on that score just as badly.

First off, it's abundantly clear that there are alternatives to the use of force if lives are to be saved.  We could push for the revival of the proposed Geneva talks and an immediate ceasefire.  It should be remembered it isn't the Assad government blocking those talks, it's the rebels.  The talks might fail, but it's most certainly an alternative that would save lives in the short term. Second, all Grieve refers to is the work or lack of it done at the UN, without mentioning how we've recognised the rebels as the de facto representatives of the Syrian people and have been training the Free Syrian Army in Jordan.  Lastly, nor it is clear whatsoever that the proposed use of force will "be strictly limited in time and scope".  The proposed UN resolution calls for all necessary measures to protect civilians, the same wording used by NATO to support regime change in Libya, and as a result has almost no chance whatsoever of being passed, Russia and China having made clear they're not going to fall for the same trick twice.

Thankfully, that's also been picked up by Labour.  Ed Miliband seems to have changed his mind on supporting the coalition mainly due to how he would have inspired a major rebellion in doing so, potentially losing at least one frontbencher, but as Martin Kettle writes, it's that he's done so rather than the reasoning behind it which is important.  When it comes down to it, the real differences between the Labour amendment and the coalition one are relatively slight, and it's more likely than not that Labour will end up supporting a strike.  What the Labour amendment does explicitly state however is that such an intervention must be time-limited, and limited also to responding to the use of chemical weapons, so not precipitating wider action.  If passed, this would hopefully ensure we don't have another Libya-style conflict, although I wouldn't hold my breath, such were the deceptions carried out last time round.

Obviously, if Miliband and Labour had any real backbone, they would oppose intervention outright.  If the party was truly against the arming of the "moderate" rebels, then going beyond that and "sending a message" that the use of chemical weapons is beyond the pale when there is absolutely no indication that doing so would work and could instead spark wider intervention in the future ought to be a no brainer.  When Cameron says this wouldn't be about taking sides, he's talking bilge that should embarrass even him.  We clearly chose our side a long while ago, and it's the side of the Saudis, as it always is.

For as much as the coalition doesn't want to reprise Iraq, the language used by both Clegg and Cameron is almost exactly that of Blair circa 2002-03. If anything, the attack on Miliband for daring to suggest maybe we shouldn't rush to bomb yet another Arab state is fiercer than that made on Jacques Chirac back then.  The lies are also the same, with claims that the whole of Europe supports action when it does not, nor does the Arab League support an attack despite condemning Assad for the Ghouta massacre.

And then we have the joint intelligence committee, once again bending over backwards to help the government on distinctly inconclusive evidence. Their report amounts to err, we've watched the videos on YouTube and Assad must have done it. The Americans by contrast admit that they've lost track of where the chemical weapons are, and so can't be certain that they haven't fallen into rebel hands. It's still almost certain that the attack was the work of the Syrian military, but we don't know who ordered or authorised it, and if we're to believe the JIC, this is the 15th such use. Why then wouldn't the Syrian military just go back to using them in limited quantities again, apparently safe in the knowledge that's permissible? The JIC isn't even certain this is the worst atrocity of the conflict, for pity's sake.

The case presented by the government therefore makes absolutely no sense.  An attack won't target the weapons themselves, not least because we don't know where they are, but because of the potential to kill thousands ourselves through doing so.  It won't be a deterrent, as there's nothing to stop the Syrian military from returning to lower scale use.  The strikes being talked of won't have a major effect on the regime, as it's already survived far worse over the past two and a half years, and so won't improve the humanitarian situation in the country by so much as a fraction.  What it will do is establish once and for all our support for one side in a civil war that is already out of control.  Rather than push for a negotiated settlement, we want to indulge in a worse than pointless gesture, seemingly just to back up a president who made a stupid promise that the use of chemical weapons was a red line.  At least Tony Blair genuinely believed in what he was doing, however horrendously wrong he was; the coalition fits the poodle description far more accurately than he ever did.

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Wednesday, August 28, 2013 

What we needs another war!

Of the many great moments in Peter Jackson's splatter satirising opus Braindead, only one has any real significance in connection with the march to war against Syria, but thankfully it's a damn good one.  Oblivious to the fact that Lionel has just about managed to patch up his quickly zombifying mother to welcome the local head of the women's welfare league, the conversation turns to the lethargy and inaction of young people.  "What we needs another war!", declares the husband, banging the table.

Our politicians and most commentators wouldn't for the most part be so unsubtle.  After all, we are still nominally fighting a war as it stands, although Afghanistan is just about as forgotten as it's ever been.  The same line of thinking is most certainly there, though.  While we thankfully aren't as quick to look towards "military solutions" as our cousins across the Atlantic, where certain congressmen have seen fewer foreign nations they wouldn't bomb than those they would, it's about as far from being the last resort as ever.  If we do involve ourselves in action against Syria, it will be the fourth major conflict we've been involved in since 9/11, or alternatively, if you prefer to go back to 97 and the ascent to power of a certain Tony Blair, the sixth (Sierra Leone, Kosovo).  Whichever timescale you chose, the threat to this country from outside powers during and up to now has remained almost exactly the same, namely miniscule.

The allusion almost everyone is making, understandably, is to Iraq.  Iraq it has to be remembered was not disastrous for either the Americans or ourselves in terms of military defeat; our losses were fewer than those we've suffered in Afghanistan, while public opinion in the US turned against the war more because of the lack of progress rather than the numbers killed and injured, which were low compared to those of Vietnam.  The disaster was meant to be that we failed to plan for what happened after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and that the justification for the war, weapons of mass destruction, had in fact long been destroyed.

Except, as was demonstrated in Libya, we have learned nothing and forgotten nothing.  We hadn't forgotten the mistake of trying to occupy Iraq and govern it, even in the short term, so we didn't.  Instead, we let the various rebel factions get on with it themselves, the result being the stand off between militas that's continuing now.  The lesson that seems most obvious from Iraq, that of not hitching ourselves to the military adventurism of the United States when we don't have to, was seemingly turned on its head by Cameron and friends being more belligerent against Gaddafi than Obama was.  With Syria, despite again our representatives having seemed more gung-ho over the past two years than the Obama adminstration, we now once again seem to be determined to act as both lawyer and bombing understudy of Team America (you may add your own fuck yeahs).

Going to the United Nations at this point, despite both the US and ourselves having argued repeatedly over the past few days that we don't need a security council resolution for bombing Syria to be lawful, just reminds fatefully of both Iraq and Libya.  The likes of Jack Straw and Blair himself continue to maintain that any chance of a second resolution explicitly authorising action against Iraq back in 2003 was scuppered by Jacques Chirac saying he would veto one in any circumstances; in fact he said he would veto one at that precise time.  It was enough for Blair to argue that the UN route had run its course.  Now we again have the UN itself asking for more time for inspectors to do their work, while we've taken a resolution to the council this time knowing for a fact that the Russians will veto it.  And also again, we have those claiming that the inevitable stalemate will condemn the UN to the status of its predecessor.

To suggest that this is once more a mess of our making, having so thoroughly abused UNSC 1973, seems to be to make yourself even more unpopular.  That resolution, despite calling for negotiations between the two sides and upholding an arms embargo, authorised all necessary means to protect civilians, just as the proposed resolution today does the same.  Our politicians are asking us to trust them this is going to be just a one-off response to the "moral obscenity" of large scale use of chemical weapons, while at the same time preparing the ground for exactly the same sort of campaign as was waged in Libya.  To call it duplicitous doesn't even begin to do it justice.

Most remarkable of all is that whereas you expect those who were in favour of the Iraq war to support this latest foreign excursion, and to also make the exact same arguments now as they did then, those who ought to know better are joining them.  Alan Johnson writes an especially pompous open letter to Owen Jones in which he concludes that a one-off strike aimed at certain targets would re-establish deterrence and make Assad think before using chemical weapons again.  Well, perhaps it might; alternatively, if we're being honest about it truly being a one-off, then why wouldn't he use them again once the heat is off?  Are we then going to do this all over again?  Are we certain an attack will have a deterrent effect when the sites likely to be hit have been so widely disseminated, and when Russia is more than happy to replace any destroyed weapon systems?  Is it of no consequence that countless wars have metastasised after what were meant to be limited interventions?  And still no one seems to want to explain why this particular crime against humanity is so much worse than all the others that have been committed in Syria by both sides.

The one key difference this time is that unlike in the cases of both Iraq and Libya, neither the public nor the press are fully on side.  Ed Miliband is currently tying himself up in knots over whether to support the government, apparently determined to live up to the accusation of being weak rather than just oppose the whole wretched process, but seems likely to end up urging his party to vote in favour of tomorrow's motion.  Marx's now cliched aphorism was that history repeats, first as tragedy, then as farce.  In his day, governments didn't have to listen to their people.  In the modern age, it seems to be the people who learn while politicians and their cliques refuse to take lessons from anyone or anything.

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Tuesday, August 27, 2013 

Achieving nothing but doing something.

History tells us that dictators do stupid things.  Hitler, ignoring what happened to Napoleon's army, started his campaign against the Soviet Union too late in the year to possibly complete the capture of Moscow, let alone territory beyond the capital.  Stalin, meanwhile, refused to accept the innumerable warnings from his spies within Germany that an invasion was coming, or indeed the evidence of the massing of forces, such was his lack of preparedness for an early breaking of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.  More recently, Saddam Hussein imagined that the support from the US for his regime during the war against Iran would continue even if he annexed Kuwait, a view it has to be said was encouraged by the US ambassador at the time.  It was nonetheless a huge miscalculation, although Hussein couldn't possibly have imagined he would become the bogeyman of the next decade as a result.

The key question today is, was Bashar al-Assad really so idiotic as to launch a poison gas attack on a suburb of Damascus just as UN chemical weapons inspectors had arrived in the capital?  It certainly seems so, but something just feels wrong.  No one has yet adequately explained why Syrian forces only seem to target civilians with chemical weapons, rather than the actual rebels they're fighting against.  Juan Cole's reasoning behind the attack seems the most realistic: that the army thought it was a risk worth taking and which could then be blamed on the rebels themselves afterwards.  


One thing that doesn't seem to be up for discussion is whether the very top of the Syrian government authorised the attack, or whether the army within Damascus is relatively autonomous.  If this wasn't an Assad endorsed decision, and despite everything I still think that's the second likeliest explanation behind the army acting of its own accord, then the other possibility worth considering is whether the army has been infiltrated by rebels looking to frame the regime.  Outlandish yes, but it seems more plausible than rebels having captured some chemical munitions then attempting to do the same.  The rebels have about the same amount of respect for human life as the government does, after all: remember the attacks on government buildings then blamed by the rebels on the regime attacking itself, until it turned out it was them after all, or indeed the disastrous siege of Aleppo, still continuing.

Unless either the US or ourselves have bona fide evidence from on the ground, it still can't definitively be said that this was the work of government forces.  The evidence undoubtedly points that way, but we can't be certain.  Nonetheless, if this was the work of the rebels aimed at crossing Obama's fabled "red line" and triggering full scale intervention, they seem at the moment likely to be let down again.  


As from the beginning of the conflict, we want to be seen to be doing something, but that something seems designed not to change anything.  First we said we wanted negotiations between the two sides at the same time as we acquiesced in the arming of Islamists by Qatar and Saudi Arabia; then we said we wanted negotiations but only after we'd armed the "moderates" to the point at which Assad was forced to the table.  As for now, we still supposedly want talks at Geneva to take place, but we can't allow the use of chemical weapons without responding militarily.  Except, rather than attempt to destroy the stockpiles of chemical weapons, it seems it will just be purely conventional military targets struck by cruise missiles if we do indeed take action.  Naturally, this will be perfectly legal under international law, despite not having UN backing.

What then will such strikes achieve?  There isn't a suggestion they will substantially change the situation on the ground, seeing as two years of brutal civil war have resulted only in stalemate.  If it's meant as a warning to the regime not to use such weapons again, do we truly believe only a limited intervention will do so?  If it doesn't, will our response ratchet up further?  Do we have any intelligence on how Iran and Hezbollah will respond?  Both they and the Syrians themselves have allowed Israeli incursions to go unanswered, but will they maintain the same posture this time?  Are we certain of the targets, and the debilitating affect attacking them will have on the regime?  Are we sure this won't further affect civilians, stuck between three belligerent sides that apparently care little for them?

Moreover, what does it say about our wider interests and policy in the region?  Why is it a "moral obscenity" and a "crime against humanity" when hundreds or thousands are killed using one specific weapon, but only a cause for concern when hundreds or thousands are killed using more conventional ones?  What is so uniquely terrible about the use of chemical weapons in this instance, and not been uniquely terrible when they have been used both by the US and our other allies in the past?  Have we forgotten that we were supporting Saddam when he gassed the Kurds?  Why do the deaths of these civilians rank more highly than those of the tens of thousands who have died in the civil war in Syria so far?  Do we really believe that striking back in this instance will discourage other governments in the future from using such weapons?  Or is this really all about the fact that Obama put himself in a hole last year when he declared that their use would result in intervention?

That really does seem to be the overriding reason, and the whole face-off is reminiscent of the farce in December 1998 when Iraq was bombed for supposedly not co-operating with the UN weapon inspectors.  The other echo is of 2003, when we demanded that the inspectors be allowed in only to then shift the goalposts once the request was allowed, something that happened again this weekend.

What's angered me most from the beginning over our stance on Syria and continues to do so now is the fundamental lack of honesty.  We pretend to care about the country's civilians, but clearly we don't.  If we did, we wouldn't be contemplating air strikes or giving even more weapons to the rebels, we'd be demanding that both sides attend peace talks, as there simply isn't a military solution, or rather there is, but not one that doesn't involve the almost total destruction of the country's infrastructure and thousands more deaths.  The war became a sectarian conflict precisely because of the intervention of the Saudis and Qataris funnelling money to the jihadists who fomented one in Iraq, autocracies we remain on such good terms with.  Rather than try and stop this from continuing, our response was to train and fund "moderates", not just to fight Assad but to also potentially fight the jihadis once Assad fell.  Instead, they're fighting now.  We're now dressing the apparent coming military action up not as any sort of intervention, however limited, but as a response to the use of chemical weapons.  It won't achieve anything, but we can't admit we don't want to take the risk of another full scale war in the Middle East, plus it'll make us look like big, strong men of action, and we'll get to use some of our shiny weapons, justifying their cost.  We must do something, but it can't be too little or too much.  Not doing anything simply isn't an option.

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Thursday, August 22, 2013 

Syria: a hell we can't solve.

It's a measure of just how difficult it's become to trust anything coming out of Syria that yesterday's horrific images, apparently showing the mass poisoning of civilians, have been treated with a relative amount of scepticism by the media.  Unlike previous videos meant to depict the aftermath of chemical weapon attacks that some suspect may have been faked, there really isn't any doubt about this latest atrocity: regardless of exactly which chemical was used, with some experts dubious as to whether it was sarin, the symptoms shown this time would be all but impossible to fake on such a scale, at least without a major budget and practice.

The question does remain though as to what was used, and who deployed it.  It could be sarin that has degraded, or some other form of organophosphate that has been weaponised.  The other quandary is how it was deployed: Brown Moses has videos showing what seem to be Syrian-manufactured munitions, the same as those found in proximity to previous alleged chemical weapon attack sites.  This in itself doesn't really help us as to who fired them: while the rebels have relied on jerry-rigged and amateur weapons systems, we don't know whether the regime had systems capable of delivering chemical weapons at the outset of the rebellion, and so they may well have had to improvise themselves.

Most perplexing is why the government would have chosen to carry out the heaviest attack of the war just as the UN weapons inspectors have been allowed in, and indeed, are apparently only 6 miles away from ground zero.  It could be that this is Assad emphasising his position of strength, convinced that he now has the upper hand in the conflict and so prepared to show the complete impotence of the international community.  Conversely, it could be the rogue commander issue again, or that in this instance the chemical hadn't degraded as much was expected, or that more was used than was authorised.  If, on the other hand, this was an attempt by the rebels to frame the regime, did they make the same mistakes as the Syrian military may have done, not expecting there would be so many apparent casualties?

On the balance of probabilities you'd have to say that the simplest explanation, that this was a chemical attack by the government, authorised at the highest levels or not, is also the best one.  If this truly wasn't the actions of the regime, then there shouldn't be a problem with allowing the UN inspectors to visit the site, especially as they would quickly be able to conclude whether this was a sarin attack or the use of some other sort of chemical.

Sadly, such has been the bloodshed in Syria that even though this marks an escalation in the type of weapons deployed, it doesn't really change anything on the ground.  This is still a proxy war that we have refused to stay out of, lecturing and continuously turning up the rhetoric while not being prepared to push without conditions for a peace settlement.  Instead, we've backed rebels that have committed atrocities of their own, unconcerned at the possibility the weapons we supply to the "moderates" will almost certainly end up in the hands of those who execute children and priests in cold blood (extremely graphic).  The language used by politicians against Assad over the past day has also been in stark contrast to that deployed against the military in Egypt, where similar numbers have been slaughtered the past month.  We've gone past the point at which we could have done something, had we wanted to; now all we can do is mouth platitudes and empty threats as two depraved, desperate sides battle against each other, with the innocent trapped in the middle.

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Monday, June 24, 2013 

So it goes.

You don't really need me to tell you that there's a hilarious irony at work in the merry dance Edward Snowden is leading both the US authorities and journalists in. Thanks to his leaks we know that both the NSA and our own GCHQ believe that they have mastered the internet, working close to hand in glove with the world's major internet firms, even able to tap into the fibre optic cables that link the UK with the rest of the world. Can they manage to keep track of just one man though, despite his arriving in Moscow on a plane? The answer is a big fat nope.

What does seem to be the case is that his plan to catch a flight to Cuba today was an elaborate ruse, one that seems to have worked perfectly. While the hacks and no doubt others were all waiting for him to board the Aeroflot plane, it seems likely he was already slipping away. Who knows where he is, but it wouldn't surprise if, despite his apparent request for asylum in Ecuador, he now turned up in Iceland, the original safe haven he had in mind.

Almost needless to say, Snowden's escape, through authoritarian nations no less, has been enraging the right people. The Hong Kong authorities claim the warrant they were sent for Snowden's arrest was bodged, something denied by the Americans, while Russia is now essentially being threatened lest it dares allow him to leave. Considering the act recently passed in Congress that targets Russian officials alleged to have abused human rights, something deemed not necessary when dealing with far more oppressive nations, it wouldn't exactly be a surprise if they also decide to turn a blind eye to Snowden's departure, seven Russian fugitives returned by the US in recent years or not.

And we should be clear about this: while Snowden is not a soldier and so if repatriated couldn't be treated in the same way as Bradley Manning has under the court martial system, you can guarantee he wouldn't have a much better time of it. The United States hasn't been able to point to a single intelligence source who has suffered as a result of Manning's leaks, despite Wikileaks posting the raw files up for anyone to download. The best they could manage is the utterly ludicrous "aiding the enemy" charge, as though Osama bin Laden discovering what US ambassadors really thought about their hosts in some way helped al-Qaida.

Snowden, by contrast, has only passed on files that have exposed how personal information is increasingly being sucked up by the intelligence agencies, with either no oversight whatsoever or the most minimal conceivable.  Even if GCHQ was exaggerating in the documents Snowden leaked to Graun on Project Tempora, and the fact that they've also had a source in MI5 comment suggesting that it's fairly accurate what they can do, then it seems they've already got access to all the metadata they could ever need.  If they can also access the content of messages for three days, then they've already got powers which go beyond what the security services have been asking for in the Data Communications Act.  The idea that foreign intelligences agencies didn't already know about this, and have their own systems either in development or already in use is laughable.  Only if they didn't is it possible that Snowden's leaks have damaged national security either here or in the US.

Not that our leading politicians have commented.  While the Graun's latest story on Friday gained slightly more media attention than their previous expose of GCHQ's spying on the G20, for the most part the silence has continued.  Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee Malcolm Rifkind said that he expected GCHQ would provide a written report in response "within a day or so", and that it again seems will be that.  We might at some point in the future get a truncated, redacted report from the ISC which reassures that everything was in fact in order and we don't have anything to be worried about.  So it goes.

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Thursday, June 20, 2013 

The "treachery" of the Graun and the silence of the rest of the media.

On Monday, the Graun ran an extraordinary story.  Detailing how GCHQ had spied on delegates at two G20 summits in London in 2009, it made clear how even those regarded as allies had had their emails intercepted, with agents having gone to the extent of setting up internet cafes so as to make the process easier.  Justified on the grounds of defending "economic well-being", a clause included in the Intelligence Services Act 1994, it was really something far more mundane: an attempt to gain any sort of advantage in the negotiations.

Considering how much the right-wing press love Gordon Brown, you might have thought that the Graun's revelations would have had a significant impact.  But no.  With the exception of a couple of follow-ups, it seems most of the rest of the media wasn't interested.  Nor were they taken with the Graun's live Q&A session with their source for all the stories on the NSA, Prism and GCHQ, Edward Snowden.  With the exception of an attack piece in the Mail by Stephen Glover, where the man who was one of the founders of the Independent now writes up what Paul Dacre tells him to, nor has there been any real criticism of the paper for what Glover calls "treachery".  Roy Greenslade wonders why.

The most obvious answer, it seems, is that the D-Notice committee issued a polite note to editors after the first tranche of stories were given wide coverage.  While, as always, there had not yet been any contravention of the committee's guidelines, the "intelligence services are concerned that further developments of this same theme may begin to jeopardize both national security and possibly UK personnel".  How this could be the case when all the revelations have done is alerted the average citizen to just how far surveillance of the internet and phone calls has gone, with little in the way of oversight, and how GCHQ and the NSA work together is unclear.  If ever there was an example of the warning off of editors from publishing anything else, quite clearly this it.

All the same, as Dominic Ponsford writes, this doesn't explain why the media didn't bother to follow up the Graun's stories.  Once the Graun had breached the order, which is voluntary, the information was in the public domain and so there was no reason for the rest of the media to continue to abide by the order, as indeed happened once the news of Prince Harry's deployment to Afghanistan became public.  It also can't be that the Graun is now viewed as beyond the pale, else the original reports on the NSA wouldn't have been covered in the detail that they were.

It's more, as we've seen, that the security services are the one part of the state that tends to get a free pass from both right and left.  Where the left tends to have a blind side when it comes to the NHS and the right often seems to think the police can do no wrong (although even that's changed in recent times with the likes of the Mail deciding the police have become just another part of the PC (groan) state), both seem to be overwhelmed by how "keeping us safe" trumps civil liberties and basic accountability every time.  William Hague in the Commons didn't even attempt to seriously engage with the questions about how GCHQ worked with the NSA on Prism, he just said everything was hunky dory, and that was enough for both politicians and the press.  It is, as Greenslade writes, remarkable that the press that makes so much of its independence from the state and raises hell at the threat of regulation finds so little to worry about when it comes to the darkest reaches of government.

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Monday, June 17, 2013 

Guns for everyone.

Oscar Wilde supposedly said that you'd have to have a heart of stone not to laugh at the death of Little Nell in The Old Curiosity Shop.  Reading Hopi Sen's post on Syria, I feel exactly the same emotion (and yes, it is slightly unfair to pick just on Hopi).  He writes of our "grotesque failure" in the country and how he wishes we "felt more shame for what we have not done for the people of Syria".  Has it really not became blindingly obvious that our politicians care absolutely nothing for the poor bastards caught in the middle of the "Free" Syrian Army, the jihadists, Hezbollah and the Assad regime's forces?  Can even those normally dialled in to the very heart of politics not see that the situation in Syria has developed precisely because of our involvement, rather than because we have failed?  And are we really now going to rehash the exact same arguments we had 10 years ago?

Let's start at the very beginning.  In the spirit of the Arab spring, large numbers started protesting against Assad.  Their demand at the outset was not for the fall of the regime, but for reform.  Assad responded with bullets.  The protests continued, the demand changed to the fall of the regime.  The bullets kept coming.  Slowly but surely the revolution morphed from a peaceful one which was inclusive to one where some protesters began taking up arms.  These arms were mainly obtained from Iraq and neighbouring countries, but they also came from Libya, and then and most crucially, from Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  While the Assad regime has for the most part rejected sectarianism in its public statements, it's undoubtedly the case that Sunnis were and have become specifically targeted.  In part in response to this, and in part because they saw the fall of Assad as a way of delivering a set back to both Iran and Hezbollah, the funding and supply of weapons from Qatar and Saudi Arabia increased.

Ourselves, the French and the Americans have been covertly supporting this gun running for some time now.  Increasingly though we've become alarmed that something truly astonishing was happening: the money and weapons from the gas kleptocracy and the oil kleptocracy respectively were going to Sunni Islamists, some of them even directly aligned with the Islamic State of Iraq (aka al-Qaida's franchise in the country) rather than the more secular rebels.  That the Saudi Wahhabis would fund other Wahhabis was clearly something that couldn't have been predicted.  In response, while still helping with the smuggling of weapons into Syria via Turkey, special forces have been training some of these "more secular" rebels in Jordan.

Seeing that the bloodcurdling rhetoric against Alawites and the Shia in Syria was reaching new heights, and also recognising that if the Saudis and Qataris wanted to play at proxy warfare then they could too, Hezbollah went from covertly helping Assad's army to openly intervening on his side, on the pretext that the fall of Assad would have dire consequences for Lebanon.  While the situation already seemed to be turning somewhat in the favour of Assad, as the attack on the capital Damascus by the rebels failed, the help from Hezbollah helped shift the balance on the crucial road to the city of Qusayr, with the rebels retreating.  Morale up, it looks certain that the Syrian army and Hezbollah will next attempt to take back the city of Aleppo.

It's this, rather than any nonsense about chemical weapons which explains why it is the Americans have now decided that they must also overtly intervene.  As Mark Urban explained on Newsnight on Friday, and as Marc Lynch also writes, the potential for a Hezbollah-Iran victory in Syria is just too much to bear.  It doesn't matter if all it does is re-establish the status quo ante of two years ago, before the uprising; ourselves, the Americans and the Saudis had all banked that Assad was as good as gone.  Ever since we screwed up by overthrowing a Sunni dictator in Iraq and installing a Shia elective dictatorship, we've been looking to desperately redress the balance.  It didn't matter exactly what sort of government eventually emerged in Syria, even if it was of a far from moderate Islamist variety, so long as it was no longer an ally of Iran.

The fact is, if we really cared about the horror of the war in Syria and the war crimes being committed either by the regime or the rebels, we would have found a way to intervene by now.  We found a way to get rid of Saddam, we found a way to get rid of Gaddafi, we found a way to get rid of the Islamists in Mali who had taken root there as a direct result of our getting rid of Gaddafi, and so on.  We haven't up till now because the situation, however much our politicians criticised Russia, China or the UN, or Assad himself, suited them.  Bleed the regime dry without putting boots on the ground or getting our expensive missiles dirty; let the autocrats we supply with shiny deadly toys do the work instead.

Who then knows if the regime has been using chemical weapons.  It's more than possible that one or more of the generals in charge of the Syrian army have become so deranged that they've taken matters into their own hands and authorised the use of sarin in limited quantities, which would explain the reports we've seen that otherwise seem difficult to understand militarily.  Whether it's been authorised at the highest ranks of the government is far more difficult to ascertain.  Either way, it was always absurd to place a red line on the use of chemical weapons unless they were being used widely and to horrifying effect.  Even if 150 people have died of exposure to sarin, it's a figure that pales close to inconsideration when the UN says that over 90,000 have now died.

That figure is interesting in itself.  Those who like me recall how the Lancet's excess death studies in Iraq were criticised might be surprised to learn that the UN's estimate is based on some extremely unreliable or otherwise biased sources.  Indeed, if we're to take the figures at face value, then they suggest that 25,000 Syrian government troops have been killed since the uprising began, and another 17,000 militia.  That these figures are being used by politicians to suggest that Assad has killed 90,000 of his own people when that simply isn't the case is a classic example of the softening up process that is now in operation to justify the ratcheting up of our support to the "good" rebels.

As for those concerns about just how moderate, secular and committed to democracy our chosen rebels are, well, we'd rather not talk about how the man we've taken to bosom, Salim Idris, was a general in the Syrian army for decades and only discovered he wanted a free society last year.  Our understandable wish to compartmentalise the rebels simply doesn't work on the ground; they work together regardless of their different allegiances or how they see the future of the country.  Nor are they going to refuse to help those battalions that run out of ammunition or have their weapons captured by the regime, so any weapons we do supply will almost certainly end up in the hands of the extremists, as has already happened with previous shipments.

Our policy on Syria has never made sense precisely because it has been so dishonest.  We backed the Saudis, as we always do, somehow forgetting that wherever Saudi money goes Wahhabism goes along with it.  We claim that our supplying of weapons now is to meant to somehow reorder the balance of power and force Assad to the negotiation table when it will do nothing of the sort.  As the Graun argued, we've just rewarded the rebels for refusing to attend the now apparently indefinitely postponed Geneva peace conference, rather than saying attend and if nothing comes of it then we'll do something about it.  Our ultimate unstated aim is to damage Iran at the exact moment that the people in that country overwhelmingly voted for a moderate as president, in the kind of elections that though neither free or fair have never so much as occurred in either Saudi Arabia or Qatar, nor ever will should the ruling families have their way.  And now, now, we have those who always argue for intervention without having the first idea of what that means in practice, of the cost, of the planning, of the need for an exit plan, or following Iraq any kind of long-term plan whatsoever, saying that something must be done.  Forgive me if I say that I think we've done quite e-fucking-nough already.

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Monday, June 10, 2013 

Through the prism.

Whenever the security services are criticised, we always get the same boilerplate response.  They do amazing work keeping us safe; they have to get it right every time while our enemies only have to be lucky once; we can't possibly be told of everything they're doing to protect us so they often prevent attacks we never even hear about it; and so on.  To which the obvious answer is: well, no shit.  The point surely is that with great power comes great responsibility.  As with the police or any other state service, they have to be held to account, even if everything can't be disclosed for very good reasons.

For all the claims from politicians that our intelligence agencies are some of the most open in the world, they simply don't have regulators worthy of the name.  The Intelligence and Security Committee has yet to prove it is up to the task, even with its boosted powers, such were the lies it was told about our involvement in rendition, and indeed the whitewash which the committee itself applied.  Nor are the commissioners any better, while the previous reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile, was practically a creature of the security servicesHis replacement David Anderson does at least seem slightly more worthy of the description independent.  It also doesn't inspire confidence that the latest chairman of the ISC, Malcolm Rifkind, also chairs LEK, which provides consultancy to arms manufacturers.

When William Hague then says the law abiding have nothing to fear from GCHQ potentially having access to almost every piece of information an individual has shared with the majority of the internet giants via the US National Security Agency's Prism programme, you ought to know that the opposite is the case.  The old trope about those who have nothing to hide having nothing to be concerned about is so hoary that it shouldn't really need to be answered, but it ought to be even more ridiculous in a sad age of "revenge porn" and when so many share their most intimate secrets online.  Almost every single person has something in their past that they wouldn't want to become common knowledge, or which they would only ever share with their closest friends and family.  I most certainly have.

Whether or not it is the case that GHCQ have been using Prism as a way of getting around our more stringent laws on data interception isn't clear.  Certainly, that there were 197 such requests last year makes apparent that it's useful for something, although whether or not they gained access to information they otherwise hadn't been able to get hold of with the authorisation of a secretary of state or court order we can't know.  The inference from Hague in the Commons today was that these requests are also authorised either by him or another minister, hence why he and Cameron have both said that everything GCHQ does takes place under a legal framework.

He did at least recognise there might well need to be a change in the law, taking the point from David Blunkett of all people that while ministerial approval might still be required, it is not legally required.  This rather misses the point that we shouldn't be using what another intelligence service is accessing without oversight when it goes beyond what our own laws currently stipulate is permissible.  The proposed communications bill, which the joint committee said went too far, only proposes that the information that a message or action has been sent (metadata) be kept by ISPs, not the actual content itself.  Prism, by contrast, sucks in everything, and it seems with a certain amount of connivance from the likes of Facebook and Google, despite their claims to the contrary.

You don't have to be Alex Jones to be worried that while this data collection might currently be used to (in the main) protect us, it wouldn't take much for it to be used for mass surveillance, and indeed probably already is in any number of authoritarian states.  It should also concern us that contrary to the assurances from politicians, the tide is in fact towards ensuring the security services are further beyond proper scrutiny.  The justice and security bill that ensures there won't be a repeat of the "seven paragraphs" case has become law, the Gibson inquiry's report (what there is of it) is still yet to be published, while the Chilcot inquiry also seems to be stuck in limbo.  The communications data bill will eventually get passed in some form or another, precisely because the securocrats have too much influence and power for it not to be.  Just as we have an independent commission to monitor the police, so we should have a genuinely independent one for the intelligence agencies.  What we'll continue to have instead is the stonewalling and obfuscation that Hague in the main delivered to parliament today, along with the usual toadying from the majority on all sides.

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Tuesday, May 28, 2013 

Syria: where do you even begin?

For those taken with the question set for 13-year-olds seeking a scholarship to Eton, asking them to write a speech for a future prime minister justifying the shooting of unarmed rioters, here's another hypothetical situation:

For over two years, a foreign nation has been beset by a crisis. The emergency began when protests, inspired by regional upheaval, called for political reform. The authoritarian government responded by ordering the army to shoot the demonstrators. What then had began as a peaceful uprising morphed into an armed uprising, with those who had originally called for incremental change becoming increasingly marginalised and religious extremists taking their place. Adding to the problems is the religious background of the regime, which despite being secular, is predominately made up of those who belong to a minority sect. The conflict has now reached such a peak that it threatens the stability of the entire region, with a neighbouring country experiencing an upturn in intercommunal violence, a militia from another state intervening on the side of the regime and two other authoritarian states openly funding and supplying the rebels. What do you do to try and put an end to the conflict?

If your answer is anything other than make a concerted push for negotiations between the two sides moderated by a neutral third party, then you probably would have fit right in at Windsor. William Hague of course didn't attend the school of the choice for the children of the ruling class, he merely works alongside those who did. Thankfully, he did manage to pick up a degree in PPE from Oxford, and only someone blessed with those credentials could have come up with such a utter dog's breakfast as his policy on the above extremely thinly disguised non-hypothetical situation, aka Syria. It takes real courage and effort to come up with an approach that simply makes no sense whatsoever, and that's something you simply don't get from attending lesser establishments.

Never let it be said then that we don't at times get our own way in the EU. Despite the objections of 25 of the 27 member states, as we were backed only by France, Hague succeeded in getting the arms embargo on Syria lifted, or it will at least be allowed to lapse come the end of the July. Yet If we're to believe Hague this doesn't necessarily mean that we'll be arming any rebels any time soon. No, the intention behind our move was designed to put more pressure on Assad, who clearly has far more to fear from "moderate" forces than he has from the likes of the al-Nusra front or the myriad bands of Islamists, both of whom are far more heavily armed thanks to the largesse of our erstwhile allies Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The only problem with this argument is that, err, it's been subtly changed over the last week. Previously, threatening to arm the rebels was designed to bring the regime to the negotiating table. When the regime then did agree to a meeting with the rebels in Geneva with hardly any prompting, something the rebels have not yet signed up to, we had to make the change. I don't think anyone noticed.

It would somewhat help if Hague was to outline exactly who these "moderates" are that so desperately need our weapons. We don't know whether they're moderate Islamists, believers in liberal democracy, moderate leftists, just that they aren't extremists. The suggestion seems to be that we're thinking of someone like Salim Idris, the commander of the Free Syrian Army. Considering that the FSA is neither free nor an army in the usual sense of the term, more a loose network of local militias, all of which will have different priorities and outlooks, this doesn't really inspire confidence that any supplied weapons wouldn't soon be in the hands of "extremists" also. Nor does Idris himself instantly strike as a model, err, "moderate": as well as warning today that the FSA would "take all measures to hunt Hezbollah, even in hell", he's also called for Lebanon itself to bombed.

Then there's another teensy problem. Exactly what in the way of weaponry is Hague proposing we supply? He presumably doesn't mean simple small arms, as Syria is awash with rifles and ammunition, despite the rebels having been complaining bitterly for months that there wasn't enough to go round. No, what they want and have been crying out for is heavy weaponry, manpads, anti-tank guns and the like. The very idea of this understandably alarms Israel, having twice already attacked convoys allegedly taking long-range missiles to Hezbollah. It should also alarm us: are we seriously thinking of sending weapons that can down planes into the middle of a civil war and hoping for the best? We've just spent the past week reacting in exactly the way extremists want to the murder of a single person. Should such weapons get in the hands of al-Qaida affiliates, it really would be something to worry about.

On almost every level I can think of, Hague's determination to at least get in a position where we can supply weaponry utterly baffles me. Previously when it looked as though the Ba'athist regime was slowly but surely on its way to extinction I cynically wondered if it was a ploy to get weapons into the hands of "moderates" so they would then be in a stronger position for a battle with the extremists for overall control of the country. With Assad now looking in a stronger position thanks to the continuing backing of Russia and the open intervention of Hezbollah, that seems less likely. It doesn't seem to be meant to ingratiate ourselves with either Qatar or Saudi Arabia, both of whom have no qualms about their weapons going to the extremists rather than the "moderates". It also isn't about weakening Iran, as the above kleptocracies had hoped, as Assad again seems unlikely to fall any time soon. It also can't be an attempt to show we aren't at war with Islam itself through supplying weapons to "good" Muslims to fight "bad" ones, as the only word it seems possible for Hague and friends to use to describe "our" rebels is moderates. Nor is it about protecting the civilians in the country who haven't fled, who we seem to have completely forgotten in all of this. The only thing that even slightly explains how we've ended up here is our continued riding on the coat-tails of US foreign policy; indeed, our role in this instance seems to be to make the running for open arming of "our" rebels as part of the process of persuading the American people it's a swell idea. Either that, or the Tories have become even more crazed in their neo-conservative yearnings than we'd imagined.

After all, you might have thought it would've dawned on the government by now that the invocation of the "responsibility to protect" in Libya was a disaster of a magnitude only slightly less than that of Iraq. Our determination to assist in the overthrow of Gaddafi not only emboldened Russia (and to a lesser extent China) to block any recurrence of the abuse of the UN process, it made abundantly clear to the remaining tyrants in the region that their only chance of remaining in power was through crushing any and all opposition. It also didn't help that we looked the other way as Bahrain destroyed the opposition movement there with the help of troops from such paragons of democracy as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While the instability in Libya has spread to surrounding countries, the conflict has for the most part been non-sectarian. In Syria, the opposite has become the case. What may have began as an attempt to weaken Iran on the part of the Saudis and Qataris by funding Sunni rebels has metastasised into a full blown civil conflict which is having a devastating impact on both Iraq and Lebanon.

Despite all of this, or rather in spite of it, we still propose to send more weapons into a region which is overflowing with them and where hundreds of people are being killed every day, whether in car bombings in Iraq or in Aleppo, Homs, or Qusayr in Syria. Somehow, this gesture is meant both to persuade Assad to take negotiations seriously whilst also enabling our pet moderate rebels to "protect" civilians. Somehow, we've ended up on the same side as the jihadists we've spent the past 12 years fighting a "war" against, and yet we're claiming to be acting on the side of moderates and in the pursuit of freedom. Somehow, we've ended up pushing for the same policy as John McCain, who seems to want to be this decade's Charlie Wilson and who has at one point or another advocated bombing almost every single Middle Eastern state. Somehow, and most incredible of all, our representatives have learned absolutely nothing.

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Tuesday, March 19, 2013 

10 years on, and all's a well...

There was a strong reaction at the Foreign Office today to reports of the use of chemical weapons in the north of Syria.

"Obviously, reports are still highly conflicted at the moment and both sides have blamed each other", said foreign secretary William Hague at a hastily convened press conference.  "Nonetheless, this latest development doesn't change our stance.  If it was indeed the rebels that used chemical weapons, presumably seized from the Assad regime's poorly secured stockpile, then what we need to do now is ensure that more such weapons get into the hands of moderates rather than extremists.  The opposition's weaker position doesn't create the right atmosphere for political negotiations."

"If, on the other hand, it was the regime that used a chemical warhead, then our position is still the same.  We need to ensure that the moderate rebels also get such warheads in order to be able to protect civilians from the regime's onslaught.  The EU arms embargo must be lifted."

When it was pointed out to Hague that apart from his position being contradictory, there was no guarantee the moderates wouldn't sell the weapons they were given by the UK and France straight to the extremists at the first opportunity, his demeanour suddenly changed.

"Look, isn't it obvious what we're doing here?  We all know full well that the regime is going to fall eventually, and what our training of moderates in Jordan is aimed at is ensuring they're strong enough to be able to fight the likes of the al-Nusra Front in the power vacuum that follows.  We couldn't really give a stuff about the Syrian people; all we care about now is that we don't have another branch of al-Qaida operating without constraints in a Middle Eastern countryWe really have learned the lessons of Iraq, which is that it's far better for Arabs to kill Arabs than for Arabs to kill Western soldiers."

Our foreign policy is still completely and utterly insane.

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