Here is an entertaining spin-off from a long but pretty unproductive argument I have been having with ‘Jack’ and ‘Paul P’ about Hitler’s attitude towards Britain. The whole thing is to be found in the discussion thread of the posting ‘”Visceral” Hatred, Ukrainian Culture and the Hitler Threat’ published last Thursday.
My view is that we were never a central concern of Hitler, as is shown by his actual behaviour, and tend to exaggerate our part in the war. My opponents seek to rebut this by producing various documents and quotations showing that at various times Hitler contemplated creating a big Navy to challenge the RN. No doubt he was urged to do so. No Navy worth the name doesn’t lobby for more ships. He may even have considered it at various moments. But not only did he never actually build such a fleet. He declined to make use of the large chunk of the French Navy which fell into his hands in 1940 - several battleships and heavy cruisers, plus many destroyers and other vessels, which would have been formidable in battle. He didn’t because he wasn’t interested. Russia, and particularly Ukraine and the Caucasus, were his aim. That’s why he invaded the USSR, and not Britain, in 1941.
This, by the way, led to Mr ‘P’ making certain insinuations about me for which he has now apologised and withdrawn – the exchange can be found in full on the thread.
It has also, rather more interestingly, produced this counter-factual suggestion from ‘Jack’ as to the progress of events after a compromise peace and renewed non-aggression pact between Poland and Germany, such as might well have happened had Britain and France not dishonestly guaranteed Poland’s independence (in the full knowledge that they could and would do nothing to protect Poland if attaced) in April 1939.
I have interleaved my responses to the suggestions by ‘Jack’ in his comment, marking those responses *** .
‘Jack: ‘With her eastern border secured (no fear of a two front war), Hitler could launch his war of revenge against France in 1941-2’
***I would like to know more about this ‘war of revenge’. When was it planned first? In any case, there is the strong possibility that, in the absence of war in 1940, Belgium would have reconsidered her neutrality and permitted the extension of the Maginot line into her territory, so making Hitler’s 1940 invasion plans impracticable. France knew perfectly well that this fault existed in her diplomacy and defences. So did Belgium. Alternatively France, lacking such an alliance, would have fortified her frontier with Belgium. The Maginot line was in fact a formidable obstacle, and its major fault was that it was so seriously incomplete. Hitler might well have used the time to build his own Western defences, which in 1940 were not serious but could have become so.
Then there is the problem of how Hitler would have justified an unprovoked attack on neutral France. We now know (read Lynne Olson’s interesting book ‘Those Angry Days’ for details) that it was the arrival of German troops in Paris which finally awoke the USA out of its neutralist torpor in 1940, and began to shift opinion towards armed neutrality if not eventual war. Such an attack would also have been viewed with some alarm in Moscow. Hitler would have thought carefully before doing any such thing. His interest in Alsace and Lorraine was never very great. They were annexed after conquest, but they were a symbolic conquest. Would he have taken major risks for Alsace and Lorraine alone? My view is that he invaded France because he did not want to have an active enemy on his Western frontier while he was attacking Russia. All his policies were guided by the over-riding Eastward priority.
He continues ‘ to definitively remove Britain from economic and political involvement on the continent’.
***This is simply odd. He would have attacked France, if he did so, to eliminate France. It is extraordinary vanity to imagine that he would have done so to ‘definitively remove Britain from political involvement on the continent’.
If Britain had had any sense, she would have kept at arm’s length from such involvement anyway, as her interests were not affected.
‘ and could proceed with Plan Z to guarantee superiority over the Royal Navy that had the Far East and Mediterranean (Japan and Italy) to consider as well.’
***‘Jack’ has this ‘Plan Z’ on the brain, I’m afraid. You might as well take seriously the US Navy’s plan for a war with the British in the 1930s. The files of every major state are full of unfulfilled plans. What matters is which of them came to pass. Look, if Hitler had wanted a war with the British Empire, he’d have built a huge navy instead of a huge army. He didn’t , because he didn’t want such a war. That wasn’t because he was nice (he wasn’t) or liked cream teas (though he may have done).It was because his policy was the regular east-facing policy of all German governments since about 1900.
He wanted a war with the USSR.
Jack : ‘Hitler would have time to integrate the European economy into Germany's on Germany's own timescale.
***No doubt. But like most people he is simply not using his imagination to the full about how momentous the Polish guarantee was. If we had not given the Polish guarantee and had then not gone to war in 1939, there would have been no Norway campaign, no invasion of the Low Countries, no Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Hitler would not have had the crucial access to raw materials granted to him by that Pact, and so would have been far more vulnerable to a naval blockade if he had initiated a war with France or Britain.
He would not have had control over anything West of the Rhine. He would not have invaded Norway or Denmark , or the Baltic states. So the ‘European economy’ would have been limited to the ‘Greater Germany’ created by the end of 1938, slightly extended by the Polish concessions discussed earlier. My own guess is that he would have sought to ease these problems by putting irresistible pressure on Romania (for its oil).
‘Jack ‘ : ‘Britain would not have been able to rely on the USA for assistance if FDR had not been re-elected in November 1940 when Chamberlain died in office.’
***As it happens (and again Lynne Olson is very good on this) FDR was never the secret enthusiast for Britain portrayed in so much sentimental literature, but a tricky and devious politician who gave the impression of action while not actually taking any. His 1940 opponent, Wendell Willkie, might well have beaten Roosevelt had there been no war, and there is reason to believe (see Olson) that Willkie might well have been *more* interventionist than Roosevelt. Again, a reading of Olson on this period is a sharp corrective to sentimental ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ ideas of how the USA viewed Britain at that time. Public opinion wavered between mistrust of or indifference to us, to active dislike. Congress wanted us stripped bare before it would give us any aid at all, and Congress got what it wanted.
‘Jack’ asks : ‘Would Churchill have become Prime Minister or would a more "realistic" appeaser consider that Germany should be left alone to expand eastwards and retain her new euro zollverein in order to retain "independence" and most of the Empire?’
*** More interesting still. Without a war in 1939, there would have had to have been an election by November 1940. One wonders what the Labour Party (which was opposed to rearmament until March 1939) would have actually said about defence and foreign policy in that election. The old ‘Guilty Men’ myth of Left-wing courage and resolution versus Tory cringing appeasement would not, I think, have been sustainable if that election had taken place. It was never true, but a 1940 election would have drawn attention to its untruth in a pretty big way. It is very unlikely that Churchill would have become Prime Minister. But then again, Churchill’s great contribution to our national story was to refuse, quite rightly, to make peace after Dunkirk. Such a peace would have been worse than any other possibles alternative.
k;
If there had never been any such defeat, his role would have been less important. And the Dunkirk defeat is, once again, a direct and traceable consequence of the Polish guarantee. By the way, please don’t forget that Churchill ‘appeased’ Stalin like anything , very ‘realistically’, as his defenders rightly point out, and was shockingly bullied by Stalin, especially over Poland, before, during and after Yalta. And that Roosevelt was no help in many of these conflicts.
As for this new ‘euro zollverein’ this just shows ( for the second time) that 'Jack' simply hasn’t realised that, without the Polish guarantee, there wouldn’t have been any such thing in 1940. No guarantee, no war in September, no Norway campaign, no invasion in May. Do think.
‘Jack’: ‘The invasion of the Soviet Union would have been initiated at the most favourable moment for Germany. The USSR would not have received vital Lend-Lease from America.’
***The first bit of this is certainly true. But by what route would Hitler have attacked? Would Stalin have refused to believe he was planning an attack? Would his armies and air forces have been wholly unready for it when it came? The fact that Stalin took the Pact seriously, and the fact that Hitler was already on the banks of the River Bug in September 1940, directly on the frontier of the USSR, greatly aided the German campaign. Without the partition of Poland, he would have had to compel Hungary, Romania and the rump of Slovakia (and possibly Poland too) to give him passage. This could not have been done without attracting attention. He would also have had to leave a substantial force in the West, in case neutral France (which, not having been defeated in May 1940 would still have appeared to him as a major military threat) decided to declare war and take advantage of his commitment in the East.
All Hitler’s military adventures were huge gambles on quick victory, just as 1914 had been. As soon as it became a long war, he was almost certainly done for. Germany’s problem (until it obtained the eastern land empire that it wanted) was that it was capable of huge spurts of dynamic energy, but in sustained warfare it would eventually be outmatched by the industrial power of its enemies.
I wouldn’t be a bit surprised if Britain and the USA, if neutral in 1941 had given some sort of aid to the USSR against Hitler Roosevelt’s administration, for certain, was crammed with Communist agents and fellow-travellers. As for us, it’s possible. We’d been allies in 1914. We’d already contemplated a new alliance in the famous failed Moscow talks of summer 1939, to which we had despatched Admiral the Hon. Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, amongst others.
‘Jack’ again: ‘Japanese expansion in the Far East would still have been southwards to take advantage of the occupation of France and the Netherlands.
***Once again, *what* occupation of France and the Netherlands???? (third time of asking)Without the Polish guarantee and the Molotov pact, there is no reason to suppose this would have happened. That is the whole point. This sort of thing proves that ‘Jack’ isn’t really thinking about this at all.
‘Jack’ : ‘There would have been a localised Pacific War because of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines that would have been concluded with a victory for the USA. The British Empire would have been terminally weakened.’
***I really cannot comment on this. But I cannot see how any other outcome in the Far East could have been much worse for the British Empire than the one that followed from the Polish Guarantee, namely the catastrophic loss of Singapore. This event ended that Empire forever. And if France had not been defeated in 1940, the Japanese advance into Malaya through French Indo-China would have been a very different thing.