

of the abolition of the... which was held at... This association... joining committee... and good will... were delivered in... Foreign and... and important, was... resolution: it wishes in these... a hindrance to... an extension of the... it calls for the... to bring it to a...

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Peter concluded... especially a re... mably per... his mallet and... in a few minutes... the fearful sound... and, lighting his... the cause whence... and was about... recollection of his... with his knee... The hammer of... to great, and, he... re to do than ex... and, more than... than ever cause... his? It appalled. Fear... rous hair. He had... Sabath, and he... adventure the... upon him, and he... mon.

over, Peter now... Peter had forsaken... every comfort that... during the night... no purpose. In... in happening to see... it where Peter's... was being done... on the part of... Peter, that has... mysterious 'hies',... in his English... of candle, which... bearing, imported... his discovery and... a good people of...

ION. REED. [188 Pages, price... Washington, etc.] RIGHTS DISCUS- OF AMERICAN... U. S. Holden... Glasgow, Scot... in this country... adoption of the Constitution of Massachusetts to the ratification of the Federal Constitution, was, to all intents and purposes, the same with the law of England. It had been settled in *Sommerett's case* (7) in 1772, that the common law of England will not extend to the colonies, and that slavery on English soil. This was an unbinding principle. We have seen its application, when enlarged to the British Colonial possessions, in the case of the American slaves forced into Bermuda, and there discharged on *Adams' case*. (8) A similar doctrine was held.

It was held in *Constance's case* (9) in consequence of this decision (in *Sommerett's case*) says Mr. Christian, 'if a ship laden with slaves was obliged to put on an English harbor, all the slaves on board might and ought to be set at liberty.' (10) In *Porbe vs. Carobane* (11) a similar doctrine was held.

Now I ask the court to look at the language of our Declaration of Rights, and say whether *Sommerett's* (1) General Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts Bay, 1780, p. 212. (2) *Windsor vs. Halliday* 4 Mass. Rep. 127. (3) *Barre Dowd*, 34 Fed. 2d Mass. Ab. 313. (4) The master had no control over the religion of the slave. (5) *Dunn vs. 303.* (6) 2 Mass. Ab. 313. (7) 10 Howell State Trials, 66. (8) 10 Howell State Trials, 79. (9) 81 Com. 425 in No. Ed. 1793. (10) 2 B. & C. 445.

boarding house, and Providence, persons of color. GARDNER.

# THE LIBERATOR.

VOL. VI. OUR COUNTRY IS THE WORLD—OUR COUNTRYMEN ARE ALL BRETHREN. NO. 41. BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS. [SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1838.]

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Advertisements making one square, or a space of equal area and breadth, will be inserted three times for one dollar.

## SLAVERY.

### THE SLAVE CASE—MR. LORING'S ARGUMENT.

(Continued from our paper of Sept. 31.)

Slavery then is contrary to good morals—a violation of the law of nature, and of the revealed will of God. It therefore falls within the first exception to the exercise of national competency.

2. But it is also within the second exception. It contravenes our policy. If the slave system of Louisiana is to be introduced here, in the most limited extent, it will be an entire novelty among us. Massachusetts has known nothing like it. Slavery was established here nearly sixty years since, and resembled little more than in name, the bad bondage of the South. In the Massachusetts Colony, as early as 1641, it is ordered by the Court and the authority thereof, that there shall never be any bond-slavery, villenage, or captivity among us, unless it be (such) lawful captives taken in war, as willingly sell themselves, or are sold to us; and such shall have the liberties and Christian usage, which the laws of God, established in Israel concerning such persons, doth morally require. (1) This law was not a dead letter. Chief Justice Parsons says, (2) 'If the master was guilty of a cruel or unreasonable chastisement of his slave, he was liable to be punished for a breach of the peace, and if he allowed the slave was allowed the demand of a price, against a violent and barbarous master. Under these regulations, the treatment of slaves was in general mild and humane, and they suffered hardships not greater than hired servants.'

Throughout New England, it is believed that Slavery was very far from being of the absolute, rigid kind. The master was as liable to be sued by the slave, in an action for beating or wounding, or for moderate chastisement, as he would be, if he had thus treated an apprentice. A slave was capable of holding property, in character of devise or legate. If the master should take away such property, his slave would be entitled to an action against him, by his prochein ami, and the difference between the master and his apprentice is a servant for time, and the slave is a servant for life. (3)

If the slavery of Massachusetts differed only in its duration from apprenticeship, it follows, that the subject of it could not have been rigid, without his consent, out of the Commonwealth. (4) The respondent claims should be done with the subject of the present suit. Negro slavery in this state was no milder than the ancient English villenage (5)—and even the villenage could not be carried out of England (6).

The Declaration of Independence, though not having the force of law, must be considered as the expression of our fundamental policy. It was our first and only solemn act, as a nation, with respect to the opinions of mankind; a manifesto in which we set forth to the world the self-evident principles, which were to form the basis of our rising institutions.

Our Declaration of Rights, and the judicial decisions founded on it, are indicative of the same policy. The course taken by Massachusetts on the Missouri question, points in the same direction. To stop the expressive language of the resolutions on slavery, adopted at a recent meeting of citizens in Concord Hall, 'Our laws do not authorize its principles; resolve against it—our citizens will not tolerate its existence among us.'

3. Slavery falls within the third exception to the rule of national competency. It violates our public law. The law of this Commonwealth, on slavery, from the adoption of the Constitution of Massachusetts to the ratification of the Federal Constitution, was, to all intents and purposes, the same with the law of England. It had been settled in *Sommerett's case* (7) in 1772, that the common law of England will not extend to the colonies, and that slavery on English soil. This was an unbinding principle. We have seen its application, when enlarged to the British Colonial possessions, in the case of the American slaves forced into Bermuda, and there discharged on *Adams' case*. (8) A similar doctrine was held.

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But this ground was rejected by the north, and no where more decisively than in Massachusetts. More recently, it has been asserted, that the recognition of slavery in the national compact renders it unlawful for individuals, in the free states, to defend its evils or to remedy them. Those loose suggestions argue a very superficial acquaintance with the constitution. I will not urge again, the general considerations by which I have shown that the terms of the constitution are the measure of the surrender made by the parties to it, of their peculiar principles or rights. It is sufficient to say, that an amendment to the constitution inserted with jealous care, provides that 'The powers not delegated to the U. States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.'

To apply this rule to the case before us. Independently of the case of fugitive slaves, no power is delegated to the United States, by the constitution, in the same consideration that would be due to Spain, or any other friendly power.

The second section of the fourth article of the constitution of the United States, which enacts that 'no person held to labor or service, in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of such service or labor, be claimed by the owner in any state to which he may flee, or to any other friendly power.'

(1) 1 Wash. C. C. R. 501. (2) 4 Wash. C. C. R. 298. (3) 10 Howell State Trials, 167. (4) *Mar. Rep. 465.* (5) 'Many scriptures are opinion and feeling—Rory, 3 Com. on Cons. 177.

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which is escaped from his master into free. He shall dwell with there, where it liketh him best. (1) But, he shall not be sold out of the country. (2) Still, were this the case of a fugitive slave, where, as I conceive, the laws of God and the laws of man conflict, I should not stand before a legal tribunal, and urge the court to disregard or annul the human law. I say, therefore, that when, as in the present case, we get beyond the sphere of the human enactment, the court are free to look to the will of God (the perfect law of liberty): in this sense, and to this extent, 'Christianity is part of the common law.'—But my learned brother is not satisfied with having the human law paramount, within its own limits. He claims that whatever the sphere of the human enactment, the court are free to look to the will of God (the perfect law of liberty): in this sense, and to this extent, 'Christianity is part of the common law.'—But my learned brother is not satisfied with having the human law paramount, within its own limits. He claims that whatever the sphere of the human enactment, the court are free to look to the will of God (the perfect law of liberty): in this sense, and to this extent, 'Christianity is part of the common law.'

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Best, J. said, 'Slavery is a local law, and therefore if a man wishes to preserve his slaves, let him attach them to him by a relation, or make him the baron of his prison, or rivet well their chains, for the instant they get beyond the limits, where slavery is recognized by the local law, they have broken their chains, they have escaped from his prison, and are free. The plaintiff does not find his slaves upon any violation of the English law, but he relies upon the colony of nations. I am of opinion, however, that he cannot maintain any action in this country, by the colony of nations. Although the English law has recognized slavery, it has done so within certain limits only.—Whatever service he (the slave) owed by the local law, is got rid of, the moment he got out of the local law.'

In the case of Knight v. Wedderburn, (1) tried in Scotland, before the Court of Session, Jan. 15, 1778, it was argued for Mr. Wedderburn, in support of his claim to the services of Knight, a Jamaica slave, whom he had brought with him to Scotland, that Knight was still a slave. A 'nave of property,' said the court, will be maintained in every country, where the subject of it may come. The Status of persons settled in whatever they go. The law of the colonies is not to be considered unjust, in authorizing this condition of slavery. The statute which encourage the African trade, alone that the Legislature do not look on it as that light.'

The Court were of opinion, that the dominion assumed over this negro, under the law of Jamaica, being unjust, could not be supported in this country, at any extent.

We have seen in the case of Forbes v. Cochran, that the British courts will not respect the claims of Spanish slave-masters, when their slaves get out of Spanish territory. And yet Great Britain has recognized, in a great number of treaties and other public acts, the right of Spain to hold slaves. In the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, she expressly stipulated that 8000 slaves should be annually supplied to the Spaniards. But not to rely on this, very recent conventions recognize the right of Spain to prosecute the slave trade, south of the line. Yet Great Britain flings her representation against it, and her laws denouncing the slave trade a crying anomaly. It does not mean to deny, that the policy of foreign governments and of our own, does in my own private judgment, involve inconsistency.

'Earth is sick, And Heaven is weary of the hollow words, Which kings and statesmen utter, when they talk of justice.'

The prohibition of the foreign slave trade by our own government, at the same time that we willfully representation against it, while they remain under its legal contemplation, it is obvious, is not sufficient for our present purpose. The States of Europe have seen the evils of slavery too clearly, to allow it a foothold at home, while mistakes view of colonial policy have caused them to view with each other in representation against it, while they remain under its legal contemplation, it is obvious, is not sufficient for our present purpose. The States of Europe have seen the evils of slavery too clearly, to allow it a foothold at home, while mistakes view of colonial policy have caused them to view with each other in representation against it, while they remain under its legal contemplation, it is obvious, is not sufficient for our present purpose.

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THE FOSIL ELEPHANT.

The earth is not the only world.
We were a race of mighty things?
The world was all our own.

MISCELLANEOUS

APPEAL TO CHRISTIAN WOMEN AT THE SOUTH.
We give below an extract from Miss A. B. Grimké's noble and truly eloquent appeal to the Christian women of the South...

MISCELLANEOUS

ing to do with just as much as I have suffered many things this day in a dream because of it?
It was a woman; the wife of Phileas. Although I know that for every man who has delivered Christ, yet I consented to surrender the Son of God into the hands of a brutal soldier...

MISCELLANEOUS

Watchman, who by his services already rendered to the cause of the oppressed, claims to the confidence of the religious public, not to be destroyed by the persecutions directed against him.

MISCELLANEOUS

From the New York Evening Post.
A STORY AND THE APPLICATION.
Some time since, a watchman going his rounds between him and eleven o'clock in the evening...

THE FOSIL ELEPHANT.

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