

BEYOND INSURRECTION. ARGENTINA AND NEW INTERNATIONALISM¹

Ana c. Dinerstein

Department of Social and Policy Sciences,
University of Bath
A.C.Dinerstein@bath.ac.uk

INTRODUCTION

Nine months ago Argentina was the scenario of a popular insurrection which forced the resignation of national authorities amidst a deep financial, economic and political crisis. Nine months after the insurrection, accounts of the crisis picture the country subsumed in a political and economic stalemate. In January 2002 an emergency plan put an end to the dollar-peso convertibility and devalued the national currency. Soon after the collapse, negotiations to avoid the default of the external debt resumed and the government was demanded to create a 'realistic macroeconomic framework'² to contain inflation and minimise the fall of industrial output, and to re-establish trust in the financial system.³ To please the IMF, the Parliament annulled the law of economic subversion that ensured the prosecution of those responsible for the *vaciamiento* (flight) of capital, as well as modified the law of bankruptcy to protect enterprises.⁴ Whilst big banks are making profit out of devaluation⁵ and police repression increases, wages are 'collapsing'⁶ with no perspective of recovering in the context of the rise in the dollar-peso exchange rate and the constant increase in the cost of the family food basket.

The IMF exigencies for a deeper economic adjustment will only perpetuate the social agony: the rate of unemployment for December 2002 is estimated at 29% and 5.2 million people fell into poverty only since October 2001, so it is possible to state that more than half of the population of Argentina lives below the so called poverty line. Having their savings trapped still in the banks, the hitherto 'middle class' is struggling to make the ends meet. The perspectives of 'getting better' are almost nil. In most cities of the country and particularly Buenos Aires and the Gran Buenos Aires area, which make-up 40% of the country's population, the search for food in the rubbish bins, informal transactions, barter and crime have multiplied in the last months to a considerable degree.

The political situation is not better. The current electoral competition among different *Peronist* candidates, among whom the populist Rodriguez Saa appears to be leading in the polls, seems unreal as the discredit and hatred of politicians, as well as the lack of alternatives, force us to think that *¡que se vayan todos, que no quede ni uno solo!*⁷ is still alive. Following this general mood, left-wing alliances are demanding the renewal of *all* electoral posts, i.e. not only the President and the Vice-President, but also the Parliament, and even talking of political abstention in the next election of March 2003.⁸ For the opposition, hunger affecting millions has become the most important political issue. With significant

¹ Some sections of this paper are based on material included in two forthcoming articles (Dinerstein 2002 a, b)

² Singh 2002, IMF press briefing and *The Economist* 23.4.02 on line, Global Agenda.

³ See *Statement by the IMF Mission to Argentina* April 17, 2002, at <http://www.imf.org/np/ms/2002/041702.htm>

⁴ On this, see Cafiero M and Llorens J 'El vaciamiento del sistema financiero Argentino en 2001', nakypop@sinectis.com.ar

⁵ See *CASH Página/12* 21.7.02 on line..

⁶ V. De Genaro in *CASH Página/12* 26.3.02

⁷ 'All of them out, not a single one must remain!'

⁸ See Yapur, F 'Pensando al abstención', *Página/12* 26.8.02.

differences among, new political forces like the left-wing *Autodeterminación y Libertad* (AyL) led by MP Luis Zamora and the centre reformist *Argentina por una República de Iguales* (ARI) led by MP Elisa Carrió, trade unions confederations like the *Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* (CTA), new fronts like *Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza* (FRENAPO) and groups like the *Economistas de Izquierda* (Left-Wing Economists, EDI)⁹ are unified behind the demand of the implementation of a ‘distribution shock’. Namely, they advocate the implementation of an urgent plan to reactivate the economy and provide a minimum to the millions who suffer unemployment and poverty,¹⁰ to stop what the economists gathered in the EDI called, ‘the social genocide’.¹¹

From the experience of the last nine months of institutional paralysis and increasing misery, feelings of disappointment based on the idea that the December insurrection was just a desperate scream,¹² i.e. a social ‘catharsis’ which would not solve the deep problems.

The aim of this paper is not to contribute to the general lament on the Argentine collapse but rather to highlight a novel aspect of the Argentine crisis which has been overlooked by most commentators so far: the experience of new forms of politics. It is clear that the December insurrection and the forms of mobilisation which followed it did not mean either the re-emergence of the traditional left or the empowerment of political parties and/or the labour organisations. Moreover, *¡que se vayan todos!* questioned them insofar as their structures, dynamic and strategies move against the non-identity, horizontal, democratic and anti-institutional politics which become apparent in December 2001.¹³

The paper aims to contribute to the debate on the meaning of politics, power and revolution today. The December insurrection was neither a simple ‘effect’ of structural (financial) crisis nor ‘revolution led by the working class’ in traditional terms.¹⁴ I will suggest that the 19-20 was a moment of political subjectivity. That is, a moment of constitutive practice¹⁵ or fusion¹⁶ in which the forms of mediation and regulation of class struggle did not work and labour, whose subjectivity exists in a ‘mode of being denied’¹⁷ became material and physical. After this moment of political subjectivity, the forms of resistance recomposed.

The paper suggests that *¡que se vayan todos!* was not simply the driving force and voice of *civil society*’s claims for social justice, fair income distribution, the end of moral decadence, misery and political corruption. Rather, it embodied a critique of the notion of civil society itself, the latter frequently used to obscure the conflicts and antagonism which underpin capitalist social relations.¹⁸ Whereas the concept of civil society’ -- as highlighted by Tischler—‘produces identification with the state through the notion of separation and independence, the negative concept allows a critique of the state since it overcomes the political abstraction and the violence of homogenisation implicit in the general category of the citizen. It implies a struggle to transform civil society into a subject’.¹⁹

Some of the ways in which this critique is developing in the form of a progressive reconciliation of people with politics, as anti-politics, are explored briefly here insofar as this new attitude towards politics initiated a process of reinventing subjectivity on the bases of solidarity, dignity and a new notion of power as counter-power, revolutionising the politics of resistance in Argentina. Finally, the paper explores certain elements of these new organisational forms and asks whether they can be regarded as conforming to the main

⁹ See www.geocities.com/economistas_de_izquierda/

¹⁰ FRENAPO 2001

¹¹ idem. Ant.

¹² Nunn in Caparrós 2002, p. 218.

¹³ C.f. Altamira, 2001.

¹⁴ Idem. ant.

¹⁵ See Negri, 1991

¹⁶ See the notion of fusion in *Colectivo Situaciones* 2002: 58.

¹⁷ Bonefeld, 1995: 207

¹⁸ For a critique of the concept of civil society see Meschkat K 1999

¹⁹ Tischler 2001, p. 178 (my translation).

features of what has been coined 'new internationalism'²⁰ initiated with the Zapatista uprising in 1994.

I. CRISIS, INSURRECTION AND THE MOMENT OF 'FUSION'²¹

The 19-20 initiated a process of negation from which new forms of politics would emerge. The radicality of December lies in that the crisis of capital and the social forms which mediate it as a social relation (precipitated by the collapse of stability as the form of organisation of neo-liberal capitalist anarchy), allowed a moment of *fusion*.²² That is, a moment which was experienced as being in position of one-self with the others. The insurrection facilitated a moment of the dissolution of identity politics which were replaced by anti-politics. The mobilising force of the insurrection was not the identity or the organisation that people join or the type of demands they put forwards, but a universe of needs, ideas, practices, experiences, desires, frustrations, dreams which were postponed and repressed and were now set free by the crisis of capital. The power of December insurrection was in fact negative,²³ a power of saying 'Enough is enough!.' To explain *why* this happened is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper. The crisis has its roots in the last 25 years and stretches through dictatorship, democratisation and particularly the neo-liberal transformation of the 1990s led by Menem. However, for the purpose of the analysis, I would like to look at some of the critical developments of the Menemist period (1989-1999) when a significant transformation of the politics of resistance took place. These changes being usually overlooked when referring to the Argentine crisis.

First it is important to mention the nature and peculiarities of stabilisation programmes and the economic adjustment in this case. As is well known, the Convertibility plan (1991) defeated hyperinflation by means of the devaluation of the national currency and the pegging of the Argentine peso to the US dollar at a rate of 1 to 1. This was indeed considered an economic miracle which would allow the accomplishment of those priorities imposed to the Latin American governments by the Washington Consensus: fiscal discipline, economic stability and growth. The dollar-peso convertibility provided an umbrella under which to produce the great transformation, which consisted of the privatisation of the 93 state-owned enterprises, the deregulation of financial and labour markets, the flexibilisation of labour, the decentralisation of collective bargaining and wages tied to productivity, the reduction of employers' contributions to union welfare funds and social security, the marketisation of health, social security and work accidents insurance, provincial economic adjustment.

However, whilst stabilisation policies were seen as essential for 'the country' and 'everyone' to improve, they were based on the progressive abandonment of democracy and politics as a means of social improvement towards a form of politics which reified capital and the market at expenses of democracy, leading to the legalisation of instability, uncertainty and fear. Not only stabilisation policies were usually carried out quite often through 'emergency legislation' i.e. decrees which replaced the law in order to avoid Parliamentary opposition. Corruption became a means, rather than an anomaly, of achieving the neo-liberal transformation.²⁴ Rather than stability being the means to achieve an end, *it became an end in itself*. The political legitimisation of the Menem administration was highly coercive (as Menem would put it, it was 'me or chaos', and entailed a renunciation to anything outside

²⁰ See De Angelis 2000.

²¹ This section heavily relies on material included in a forthcoming article, Dinerstein 2002a.

²² Colectivo Situaciones 2002

²³ On negative theory and negative power see Holloway 2002a, b; 2001. See discussion about power and counter-power in Colectivo Situaciones 2001a

²⁴ See Casella and Villarruel 2000

stability. The middle classes struggle to be 'in' often took the form of corruption of political elites but also of the co-optation of some sectors of the middle class who could enjoy the benefits offered by the dollar-peso parity within the logic of 'saving yourself if you can'.²⁵ Individualism spread. Stability became the form in which the process of exclusion took place. And yet, it did not annul resistance but rather reshaped it in more politicised, grass-roots, expansive and visible forms which paved the way to the 19-20.

As is well known, one of the main 'new achievement' of the 1990s was mass unemployment. Since the convertibility plan, unemployment went up from six percent in 1991 to 18.5 percent in 1995;²⁶ i.e., unemployment reached 2.4 million people in five years. In the capital and Gran Buenos Aires (where half of the unemployed are concentrated) the rate of unemployment rose to 20.2 percent in May 1995. In July 2000 the rate of unemployment was 15.4 percent and reached 20 percent in August 2000.²⁷ But the main problem was the combination of unemployment and underemployment. In 1996 41.2 percent of the economically active population of Gran Buenos Aires had job problems.²⁸ Poverty and unemployment combined constituted a 'vicious circle' since they are reciprocally related, i.e. under relations of social exclusion it is difficult to be reinserted into the labour market insofar as nutritional, educational, and housing problems create competitive disadvantages for the poor to get into the labour market. Argentina social security and policies developed historically around labour (formal workers), rather than citizenship. In a context of scarcity and austerity, and the deep transformation of labour, social and employment policies became in most cases insufficient, and a matter of corruption, paternalism and confrontation, as well as 'naturalised' inequality.²⁹ Faced with the lack of a universal unemployment benefit, the allocation of employment and social programmes was used by the central government as a form of political compensation or punishment to those governors who were or were not accomplishing the economic adjustment required by the IMF; and by governors to favour political allies before elections or to co-opt unions. After the deconstruction of the institutional role of trade unions who received public funds to run their social policy depended more than ever on the capacity of marginal sectors to mobilise and demand assistance policies.³⁰

Whereas the traditional CGT played a significant role in legitimising the destabilisation of workers' lives and the flexibilisation of labour relations and working conditions, its leaders being successful in making business out of privatisation, the marketisation of pensions and occupational accidents insurance, and the deregulation of the health system, the *Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* (CTA) created in 1992 by state workers among others aimed to recover combativeness against neo-liberal policies and to create a broader opposition movement. The CTA took on board the issue of unemployment and initially organised the unemployed within the Central confederation.³¹

During the first three years of the convertibility plan, the economy achieved high rates of growth sustained by foreign investment. But the plan was vulnerable to the capricious movement of global capital and financial markets. In 1994, it was undermined by an increase in interest rates in the United States, and the reduction of foreign investment. This coincided with the Mexican 'tequila' crisis that affected the stock market and the dollar-peso relation.³² These 'financial' factors were put forward as reasons for the inability of the plan to prevent

²⁵ In Castilian, *sálvese quien pueda*

²⁶ INDEC EPDH May 1995.

²⁷ INDEC.

²⁸ Lozano 1996, p. 4 in Dinerstein 2001b

²⁹ Grassi et.al 1994 in Dinerstein 2001b

³⁰ Barbeito and Lo Vuolo 1995, pp. 120-1 in Dinerstein 2001b

³¹ See Dinerstein 2001a

³² See García and Gómez 1995 quoted in Dinerstein 2001b. The Argentine stock market was also affected by the Brazilian stabilisation policy, the *Plan Real*, that led to the development of the Brazilian domestic market and the reduction of imports from Argentina within the MERCOSUR (INDEC 1999).

increasing unemployment, accelerating outflows of capital and the increasing cost of credit.³³ By 1997, the economic recovery after the 'tequila' crisis was accompanied by an increase in the rates of underemployment and unemployment that were respectively 30 percent and 10 percent higher than in 1994. During the 1990s the state covered for the negative balance produced by the private sector 'which indebted itself to cover the difference and thus accumulate reserves to expand domestic credit'. That is 'the state, following the advice of the IMF, financed the flight of capital abroad' As a result, 'only 30 cents out of every dollar that entered into the country constituted direct investment, and only 10 cents out of the 30 served to increase the productive capacity of the Argentine economy'.³⁴ The state subsidies to capital took place in a context of increasing indebtedness of the state. Whilst during the last dictatorship the external debt grew by 364%, under Menem, it went up by 123%. Whereas by the end of 1975, each Argentinean owed at the moment of being born \$ 320 to international creditors, by 2000 the debt per capita amounted US\$ 3,800.³⁵ Faced with the external debt and the flight of capital profit abroad, stability depended on the increase in the rates of exploitation of labour.³⁶

The significance of the politics of resistance of the 1990s lies in that they made apparent, although in a fragmented manner, that the so-called 'stability' did not mean the real stabilisation and democratisation of society but, rather, that it was a metaphor for a new form of instability which suffocated and subordinated humans to the logic of capital this time not by their physical elimination (like in the 1970s) or political confrontation (like in the 1980s) but, rather, by forcing labour to its 'virtual disappearance'.³⁷ By the 'virtual disappearance' of labour I mean poverty, social exclusion, unemployment and disillusion as a form of capital's command over labour.

The de la Rúa administration (1999-2001) also embraced stability. However, during this period, this form of organising capitalist anarchy was increasingly disarticulated. Whereas during the neo-liberal period struggles were still fragmented responses to the multiple aspects of the neo-liberal transformation, under the la Rúa, the capacity of opposition to reveal the violence of stability unified, amplified and expanded. The tension between persistent social and labour struggles and the pressure from financial institutions produced, in April 2001, a political crisis which broke the coalition, with *Alianza* cabinet members from the FREPASO resigning from their posts. Political instability produced further economic instability. In an atmosphere of general disappointment, political crisis, investors' panic and the 'narrowing of political manoeuvre',³⁸ the return of Cavallo (the creator of stabilisation policies under Menem) to the ministry of Economics under de la Rúa represented not only a 'desperate choice'³⁹ but was a *farce*, as the 1999 vote for the *Alianza* was largely made against Cavallo's neo-liberal policies. Faced with the need to serve the interests of the external debt, and unable to stop a 'haemorrhage of almost \$10,000 million' produced by the flight of capital between April and mid-July,⁴⁰ Cavallo launched a 'zero deficit' plan based on a 30% decrease of state workers' wages and pensions which were above 500 pesos/dollars.

Social protest strengthened.⁴¹ On 24 July 2001, the first National Assembly of Popular, Territorial and Unemployed Workers Organisations in La Matanza, Buenos Aires was held by several organisations⁴² aimed at achieving a national co-ordination of the 50

³³ Gómez et.al 1996 in Dinerstein 2001b

³⁴ Lozano and Hourest quoted by Verbitsky H 'Cabeza Gacha', *Página/12* web, 21.4.02.

³⁵ See evolution of the external debt in <http://www.econolink.com.ar/economyemp/ecempr4.htm>

³⁶ Bonet, 2002

³⁷ Dinerstein 2002 in Dinerstein and Neary eds. 2002 chapter 8

³⁸ *The Economist* 24.3.01, p. 24.

³⁹ Idem. Ant.

⁴⁰ Lewis 2002; Sabanes Plou 2001

⁴¹ Iñigo Carrera, Nicolás y Cotarelo María Celia 2001

⁴² *Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* (CTA), the *Movimiento de los Trabajadores Desocupados* (MTD), *Corriente Combativa Clasista* (CCC) and the *Federación Tierra y Vivienda* (FTV).

existing organisations of the unemployed in the country.⁴³ The roadblocks became a national form of protest. Between 31 July and 17 August three national roadblocks of 24, 48 and 36 hours each organised by the Movement of the Unemployed paralysed the country and achieved public recognition.⁴⁴ Faced with the intensification of workers' protests and the *vaciamiento* of the financial system by big corporations and banks, the payment of \$1.318 million debt was cancelled on 1 August 2001. A mission from the United States visited the country to provide a cure for the Argentine's potentially contagious disease. On 21 August the IMF agreed to give Argentina \$8 billion *if* provincial budgets were reduced.⁴⁵ By September 2001, tax collection fell by 14 percent, economic recession deepened and the so-called 'country risk rating' increased.

That month, an Assembly of the MTD gathered in *La Matanza* to reject the 'zero deficit' bill. The unemployed called for another national roadblock for 6 December, accompanied by a march to Plaza de Mayo to demand the non-payment of the external debt on the basis that it was illegal and immoral, the re-nationalisation of banks and former state-owned companies and to oppose any further economic adjustment.⁴⁶ As on several occasions in the past, capital flew out of the country, provoking financial collapse. As the social and labour struggles strengthened the government was increasingly incapable of controlling them. On 30 November, '\$1.3 billion fled the banks' and 'the central bank's net reserves slumped by \$1.7 billion'.⁴⁷

This 'market coup', anticipated by big investors, justified the introduction of an unprecedented financial measure on 3 December 2001, the so called 'corralito'.⁴⁸ However, far from stopping the flight of capital (which already reached massive proportions *before* the crisis), the 'corralito' once again harmed the working class and the already impoverished middle classes. Namely, people could withdraw 'no more than \$250 per week in cash during a 90-day period of emergency restrictions ... transfers of funds abroad also restricted to \$1,000 per month'.⁴⁹ Payments had now to be made by cheques, credit and debit cards, and money could not be transferred abroad without official approval. In spite of these measures, the government was denied a new loan by the IMF who argued that the government had not achieved 'zero deficit' as promised and forced to accept in Washington the imposition of 15.2 percent cuts in the budget 2002.⁵⁰

In addition to the impact of the lack of cash in the reserves of the central bank, the lack of cash in circulation and the limits on cash withdrawal left those who live on tips, begging, self-employment, those who depend on wage supplements and employment programmes, and particularly the 40 percent of the Argentine workforce whose earnings are outside the banking system and the fiscal structures, not only obviously 'moneyless' but adrift as much in political terms as in terms of survival. This time, those who did not have money at all and those who cannot get their money out of the banking system were in a similar position. The 'corralito' provoked a unified reaction against the government and made the middle sectors to join the struggle of the working class. A general strike against the financial restrictions and the IMF was carried out on 13 December. During the same week, 3 million people had spontaneously voted in favour of the implementation of a universal unemployment benefit of \$380 monthly for all bread-winners, a minimum pension and \$60 monthly child

⁴³ OSAL 5, 2001 : 37.

⁴⁴ OSAL 5, 2001, pp. 60-7.

⁴⁵ *The Guardian* 25.8.01, archive online.

⁴⁶ Alderete and D'Elía in OSAL 5 2001, p. 41

⁴⁷ *The Economist* 8.12.01, p. 53. During the previous ten months to the implementation of the 'corralito' bank deposits of big investors (and not savers) fell by 29 per cent. (investigation by MPs from ARI quoted in Sevares 2002, p. 6.

⁴⁸ *Corralito* is the Castilian name for playpen. In this case, the money is trapped in the playpen.

⁴⁹ *BBC News* on line 3.12.01.

⁵⁰ *Página/12*, 9.12.01.

benefit for every child, in a referendum organised by the *Frente Nacional Contra la Pobreza* (FRENAPO).⁵¹

On 16 December, the struggle between money and life intensified: looting and demands for food in the supermarkets of Buenos Aires, Mendoza, Concordia, Rosario were reminiscent of the hyperinflationary period of 1989-1991. Mirroring the American government's strategy aimed to resolving the crisis in Afghanistan by sending both food and bombs to a country devastated by fatal contradictions, the central government sent both 20,000 food boxes and hundreds of police officers to those areas of the country where poverty has reached unbelievable proportions and the organisation of the unemployed is strong. Simultaneously, the IMF withdrew its support for Cavallo by stating that the economic strategy was unsustainable, particularly the convertibility plan, and suggested default, devaluation and fiscal adjustment.⁵² The IMF decision made apparent that the 'generosity' demonstrated by it as well as other international institution during 2000 was targeted to only postpone the Argentine crisis. During that year, international bodies lent Argentina 50,000 million dollars. According to Davalos, the reason why the IMF rescued Argentina in 2000 but abandoned her in 2001 lies in the IMF strategy to favour American banks and investors. The financial help of the 2000 allowed them to protect themselves and reposition their investments particularly in welfare and pension funds.⁵³ After that, the IMF had no interest in stopping the 'Argentine contagious disease'. Only European investors, who had invested in the real economy such as REPSOL (Petrol) and *Telefónica de España* (Telecommunications) were affected by the crisis. As a matter of fact, during the previous ten months to the implementation of the 'corralito' bank deposits of big investors (and not savers!) fell by 29%.⁵⁴ After this manoeuvre the IMF gave Argentina an exemplary punishment arguing that she was not implementing the IMF suggestions properly.⁵⁵

The popular insurrection followed. On 19 December 2001, an indefinable force pushed thousands to the streets of Buenos Aires and all cities of the country. Like a call to go out and fight, a massive cacerolazo demanded the resignation of Minister Cavallo. Faced with social mobilisation driven by collective joy and a feeling of liberation and being making history, the government declared the state of siege as a means of controlling social mobilisation.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, rather than provoking fear as expected, the presidential announcement encouraged more people to go on to the streets, and led to a popular insurrection. By contesting the state of siege people regained access to public space, particularly the historical place for politics: the Plaza de Mayo. Following the sound of the pans thousands gathered in la Plaza, and chanting *¡que se vayan todos que no quede ni uno solo!*, a multitude demanded this time the resignation of the president. Police repression was striking. People stayed in the Plaza overnight resisting. The Battle of Buenos Aires lasted more than 10 hours. During the confrontations between demonstrators and the police hundreds were arrested, six people were killed and hundreds injured, making a total of 32 in total within that week.⁵⁷

⁵¹ See FRENAPO 2001.

⁵² Montenegro in *Página/12* 19.12.01; see Denny and Teather in *The Guardian* on line 21.12.01.

⁵³ Davalos P 'Argentina y el FMI', info@alai.ecuanex.net.ec

⁵⁴ see Sevares 2002: 6. See also Cafiero M and Llorens J op cit.

⁵⁵ Stiglitz has argued that this explicit reason hides an implicit one: that Argentina has been punished for emerged as the vivid example of IMF failure (interviewed by M Montenegro, *Página/12* 4.8.02, on line

⁵⁶ The state of siege gave the military the right to repress when more than three people gather in a public space without having to approach them.

⁵⁷ OSAL no 6: 72.

II. THE MOMENT OF RECOMPOSITION (THE REINVENTION OF POLITICS)

¡Que se vayan todos! put forward an irreversible critique of capital as a form of human society (and not only neo-liberalism). The question of *where* is this process going, or whether *que se vayan todos* could serve to the purpose of constructing a political alternative are still in place. But it seems to me that the questions about the ‘usefulness’ and political potential of *¡que se vayan todos!* can *only* be explored from within the movement of participation and recovering of self-determination, dignity and solidarity which is taking place in Argentina. In other words, what really matters is not that *¡que se vayan todos!* does not contain some kind of proposal as how to re-compose the political system and the country’s economy, but whether its powerful meaning can be maintain alive as a radical critique which contributes to the reinvention of ourselves as political subjects. Like *aparición con vida* during the 1980s,⁵⁸ *¡que se vayan todos!* demands for the impossible. By so doing, it generated an empty space for new meanings to be ineludibly invented.⁵⁹

REINVENTING THE AGORA: THE ASAMBLEAS BARRIALES⁶⁰

Among the new forms of political resistance, the *asambleas barriales* (neighbourhood assemblies) stand out for their novelty and qualitative importance in terms of the development of new forms of politics in Argentina.⁶¹

The December insurrection led by the slogan *que se vayan todos!* questioned the state and the whole *system* of political representation.⁶² The mobilising utopia⁶³ of the 1980s ended up in an openly expressed disillusion⁶⁴ as democracy was progressively emptied and became a set of formal rules either overlooked or used to administrate the social misery produced by the neo-liberal adjustment in the 1990s. This, of course, did not happened overnight. During the 1980s, and after 7 years of economic and political horror, the struggle over democracy was intense. But it was of more fundamental significance than its ‘formal’ or ‘participatory’ character as political scientists tend to think. The period of transition to democracy was the political expression of the *other* transition: from economic instability to the legitimisation of the terrorism of money in the form of *stability* in the 1990s. The struggle for and against the legitimisation of the terrorism of money⁶⁵ over the political took the form of hyperinflation. During the 1990s, ‘stability’ emerged as a new paradigm in which inflation was defeated but the issue of democracy was so too. More recently, the ‘crisis of democracy’ become apparent in the last general elections of October 2001 when the *voto bronca* (spoiled ballots) reached 20 percent in the country, 30 percent in Buenos Aires and 40 percent in

⁵⁸ ‘Apparition alive’, main slogan of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.

⁵⁹ Fernández A. M. *et al* (2002) ‘El mar en una botella’, *Página/12* 14.3.02.

⁶⁰ This sub-section on the *asambleas* heavily relies on material included in a forthcoming article, Dinerstein 2002b.

⁶¹ According to a survey one in three inhabitants of the city of Buenos Aires and Gran Buenos Aires has participated in a *cacerolazo* or *asamblea barrial* (H Jaime y Asociados, cited by Kollmann in *Página/12* on line, 10.3.02. In March 2002, there were 272 *asambleas* in the country; 112 in the city of Buenos Aires, 105 in the province of Buenos Aires 37 in Santa Fe, 11 in Cordoba and the rest in other provinces (*Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayoría* quoted by Feijóo and Salas Oroño 2002 p.25-26; see also Guerrero 2002.

⁶² Botana, N ‘La democracia en zona de riesgo’ *La Nación* on Line, Opinion, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>, 28.2.02. Also González Toro, A ‘Por quién doblan las cacerolas’ *Clarín, Zona*, <http://www.clarin.com.ar>, 27.1.02

Página/12, 27.01.02

⁶³ Sonderéguer 1985, p. 27 in Dinerstein 2001b

⁶⁴ See Tedesco 1999

⁶⁵ See Marazzi 1996

Rosario⁶⁶ as the De la Rúa administration, including the Parliament, was increasingly delegitimised.

The December insurrection was a unique case in which a democratic government was overthrown by a popular insurrection. Following this, the *asambleas* emerged as a continuation of the insurrection and the spontaneous *cacerolazos* which engulfed the country for the last months. Against the opinion of those who consider the exercise of direct democracy as anarchism which threatens the political system,⁶⁷ the *asambleístas* advocate direct democracy and established the defence of self-determination' of the neighbours, human rights activists and workers' assemblies and the *Piqueteros* organisations as one of their guiding principles.

The *asambleas* re-appropriated the public space as a forum for deliberation, debate and discussion: the *asambleas* re-appropriated 'la palabra'⁶⁸ and initiated an open process of autonomous social reflection which implies a critique of the state, capital and the law.⁶⁹ The *asambleas* gather people from the same neighbourhood to discuss, reflect, connect, listen to the others and recover a sense of community, lost by neo-liberal individualism. They constructed a bridge between private lives and the public space.⁷⁰ Neighbours meet once a week in every neighbourhood. Initially, the *asambleas* were directly concerned with general aspects of the crisis, and rejected the IMF intervention in national affairs, discussed the non-payment of the external debt, demanding welfare provision, job creation and the overhaul of the political system. Progressively, the *asambleas* consolidated as a new form of territorial political commitment and participation which condense and expand multiple diverse experiences, knowledge and social practices in each neighbourhood.⁷¹

The *asamblea* became a 'site of conjunction' that is a time-space site within which the articulation of ideas, debates, feelings and solidarity action with workers, the movement of the unemployed,⁷² students, pensioners, takes place. The *asambleístas* support the occupation of factories,⁷³ work together with the local hospital, school, barter club, homeless and squatters,⁷⁴ students. They participate in different workshops and discussions and plan direct action (*cacerolazos* and *escraches*⁷⁵) against financial institutions, the media, corrupt politicians).⁷⁶ Each one organised their own journal, web page, cultural activities.⁷⁷ The *asambleas* also developed at a city and national level. The first meeting of the representatives of the *Asambleas Barriales* of Buenos Aires, or *asamblea* interbarrial took place on 13 January. The co-ordination subsequently developed at the national level.⁷⁸

⁶⁶ Rodríguez in Gambina *et al* 2002, p. 23

⁶⁷ See Grondona, M 2002 'En Lugar de las instituciones, la "acción directa" *La Nación* 27.3.02, on line. Also *La Nación* editorials on February 17 and 14 2002

⁶⁸ 'Language'. Caparrós in Caparrós 2002, p. 199

⁶⁹ Heyn in Caparros 2002, p. 213

⁷⁰ Eduardo, Meeting with Asambleístas...op cit

⁷¹ M. Bellucci interview by M Moreno in *Página/12*, 29.4.02.

⁷² See developments of the Asamblea of Liniers in López N. 2002

⁷³ For instance, the *asamblea* of San Cristóbal supports and works together with the workers of the factory Bruckman who occupied the factory in December 2001 to save their jobs faced with the bankruptcy and abandonment of the factory by its owners.

⁷⁴ This is the case of the *Asamblea Vecinal Plaza Rodríguez Peña*. See bulletins no 1 and 2 Buenos Aires, April and May respectively.

⁷⁵ The *escrache* is a form of protest created by the human rights organisation *Hijos* in the 1990s, so named for the action of pointing at people with the intention of making public their infamous actions of the past. While H.I.J.O.S used the *escraches* against the accomplices of the dictatorship, it is used since December 2001 also to denounced corrupted politicians and banks.

⁷⁶ As an example see Minutes of the *Asamblea Interbarrial*, 16.6.02, *Parque Centenario*, Buenos Aires. See <http://www.caceroleando.8m.com>

⁷⁷ e.g. *La Trama*, a two-day cultural activity organised by the *asamblea* of Palermo Viejo 25-26 May 2002.

⁷⁸ The First National Inter-Neighbourhood Assembly (17.3.02) brought together 150 *asambleas* from across the country in the *Parque Centenario* neighbourhood of Buenos Aires. Apart from the neighbourhoods of the capital city, participants to the general assembly came from several towns in Santa Fe, Jujuy, Tucumán, Córdoba, Santa Cruz, Entre Ríos, Salta, Chubut, Buenos Aires and Gran Buenos Aires (*Minutes*, 17.3.02, Buenos Aires).

The *asambleas* practice an absolute horizontal form of participation where delegation is reduced to a minimum. And it is within this permanent deliberative state that they reject the hierarchical and corporatist logic of political parties and labour organisations. Whereas the traditional political parties are going through an extremely serious crisis as the main form of political representation, both the radical left and the organised labour movement are being forced to rethink their views on insurrection and their strategies towards the new genuine and new organisational forms and forms of resistance, such as the *asambleas* or the *escraches*.⁷⁹ The discussion of power, the state and 'what to do next' is always an issue at the neighbours' encounters.⁸⁰ But rather than the *asambleas* constitute a new form of political organisation, they constitute so far a forum for the discussion of the political system, the form of democracy and participation. Rather than disputing constituted power the *asambleas* are a constituting power against it.⁸¹

The *asambleas* reunite different social classes (transversality) and gives space for diversity.⁸² This is owed to the identity *neighbour* which is in fact a negative identity: 'citizens prefer to be called 'vecinos' for they reject –sometimes to exasperating forms- the old forms of naming actors and political relations'.⁸³ It helps the recovering and consolidation of social networks in that specific territory as well as links with other neighbourhoods: 'Vecino' is an identification which serves to the purpose of the recovering of the power of determination and solidarity. This 'classless' feature of 'vecino' helps the development of political creative action.

The democratic dynamic of the *asambleas* is *situationist*. The *asamblea* is indeed a space-moment site here and now and whose continuation does not depend on formal rules but on the commitment of the *asambleistas*. Political intervention is dynamic and it presupposes direct control of collective action. The *asambleistas* discuss what to do and how and what action should be taken in the near future⁸⁴ but also do what have been decided to: the *asamblea* 'is a body who thinks by doing'.⁸⁵ This Spinozian notion of democracy is founded 'on what Deleuze calls "the art of organising encounters" and which 'poses a rigorously corporeal and passionate logic of assemblage oriented towards collective joy'.⁸⁶ This practice of generating encounters is not ideological or strategically chosen but emerged as a form of survival within the crisis,⁸⁷ in that necessity became politics and politics became a need. Being in the streets with the others became, after the December insurrection a tool to fight uncertainty and individualism.

DIGNITY, SOLIDARITY AND COUNTER-POWER: THE PIQUETERO MOVEMENT

Like the *asambleas barriales* some sectors of the movement of the unemployed are developing territorial commitments towards the construction of a counter-power based on solidarity, democracy and dignity.

The novelty of the 1990s with regards to the politics of resistance, was the emergence of the *roadblocks* as a new form of struggle. The 'roadblocks' organised by the unemployed,

⁷⁹ On the tension between *asambleas* and the orthodox left see Le Fur 2002.

⁸⁰ There is a weekly discussion group of the *asamblea de Parque Rivadavia* which every Saturday meet and discusses *Where are the asambleas going?*. See the discussion on power and the state in Feijóo and Oroño 2002, p. 28.

⁸¹ Feinman 2002, p. 577

⁸² Fernández A *et al* 2002, op.cit.

⁸³ Feijóo and Oroño 2002, p. 30

⁸⁴ L Perez Esquivel 2002: 66.

⁸⁵ Mattini 2002: 54.

⁸⁶ Hardt, 1995, p. 31.

⁸⁷ Krymkiewicz 2002, p. 4.

public sector workers and local communities demanding employment programmes, job creation and investment, and participating in the decision-making processes regarding these matters, became the most *visible* form of protest under Menem. The roadblocks opened a space for direct democracy and the exercise of new forms of solidarity of entire communities, and facilitated the autonomous organisation of the unemployed. During 1993 and 1994 many spontaneous displays of workers' resistance against the *lack of money*, in the north and south of the country were already calling into question the effectiveness of the 'stability'.⁸⁸ During 1996-1997 they reached massive proportions leading to truly 'popular upheavals' like Cutral-Có and Plaza Huinca, in which popular assemblies and direct democracy among demonstrators encouraging community solidarity emerged. The *roadblocks* led to the emergence of a new identity (*Piqueteros*) and new organisations like the *Comisiones de Piqueteros*, with negotiating capacity regarding the allocation and management of employment programmes, and community concerns. In the following years, the roadblocks expanded until they reached a nation-wide proportion in August 2001.

When the inhabitants of the local community (the unemployed, women and men, casual and state workers, self-employed, children, local trade unions and organisations of the unemployed), severely affected by unemployment and poverty produced by enterprise restructuring or the privatisation of the main source of employment, the marketisation of life and governmental corruption and indifference, blocked the main motorway by means of barricades, pickets and a bonfire made of burning tyres, they effectively stroke against capital. Initially, the roadblock presented a direct and physical barrier that served three purposes: to prevent the circulation of the normal trading in goods and services, to make people's demands visible and to create a point of encounter. But in act the *roadblocks* mobilised existing contradictions within the national and provincial administrations, capitalist financial institutions. Throughout the 1990s, the demonstrators at the roadblocks demanded for the increase of employment programme allowances, payment of overdue wages for state workers, and government assistance in establishing and developing employment and industrial projects in the area. They also demanded the guarantee that they would not be legally persecuted, as had been the case in the past, for their participation in the *roadblock*, which, according to the criminal code is considered a crime. The government usually responded by both sending hundreds of military policemen to the area and by trying to negotiate with demonstrators. Coercion did not change the demonstrators' minds. In general, the young unemployed, who called themselves the *Piqueteros* or *Fogoneros*, rejected institutionalisation and subordination and take a leading role in the organisation of resistance. Resistance turned the motorway into a battlefield.

During the 1990s, the political power of the *roadblock* did not lie in the ability to obtain more employment programmes or even more jobs and capital investments for the impoverished areas of the country. By conjuring capital, the *roadblock* highlighted how the more 'abstract' contradictions underpinning the production and reproduction of capitalist society as a totality, could articulate in a dramatic form of subjectivity. The *roadblocks* pointed at the violence of *stability* and aimed to *stabilise* the uncertainty entailed in the violence of stability by imposing physicality on the abstraction of global capital. The roadblocks evolve from the very heart of stability to *fight for recognition against the virtual disappearance* of labour entailed in unemployment, poverty and disillusion produced by the self-expansion of capital.⁸⁹

During the period 1999-2001 the movement of the unemployed strengthened. The 'nationalisation' of the roadblock hitherto provincial or local, in July and August 2001 marked a qualitative shift in the politics of resistance. Since then, the Movement of the Unemployed suffered reorganised. At the moment, there are three main groupings: the FTV

⁸⁸ By the lack of money I mean i.e. overdue wages, suspensions and dismissals in the private sector, wage reductions, payment of debts to employees with bonuses, adjustment and redundancies, as well as cuts in welfare expenditure, labour flexibilisation policies, and corruption.

⁸⁹ Dinerstein 2001a

within the union *Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* (CTA), the *Bloque Nacional Piquetero* (close to left-wing political parties) and the *Coordinadora de Piqueteros Aníbal Verón*. The latter gathers eleven independent organisations of the Movement of the Unemployed (MTD) in the south of Great Buenos Aires. The different groups gathering in the *Coordinadora Aníbal Verón* were born in different moments. Rather than ‘branches of a central organisation’ as they have been mistakenly understood⁹⁰ their guiding criterion is territoriality. These sector of the *Piquetero* Movement deserves special attention in terms of the development of new forms of politics.

The *Coordinadora de Piqueteros Aníbal Verón* (CPAV) stands out for the intense autonomous social, cultural and political work that its activists develop in the poor neighbourhoods of the south of Great Buenos Aires. They are not the only sector of the Movement of the Unemployed which does so, but it is important to look at how they develop their community work. The CPAV does not have leaders and is guided by principles of direct democracy and horizontal organisation based on solidarity and dignity.⁹¹ They do accept and manage the employment programmes from the government but, unlike the FTV within the *Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* (CTA), the *Coordinadora Aníbal Verón* rejects the institutionalisation of the movement of the unemployed. Unlike the *Bloque Piquetero Nacional*, identified with left-wing political parties, the *Coordinadora Aníbal Verón* rejects political identification and declares itself independent from all political parties, including those on the left.⁹² Most importantly, those working within the *Coordinadora Aníbal Verón* argue that they ‘don’t believe in “taking power”’. Their struggle ‘is not about how to reach power in a system impregnated by values which don’t have any response to society.’ They argue that they work in order to ‘change the system’. ‘We believe that the starting point for that is the construction of something new from below, among us. We are concerned with recovering what is human, with creating collective solidarity relations among our mates.’⁹³ As they explain, the MTD is not just about unemployment or employment programmes but a ‘proposal, a project which although takes unemployment as its central issue, has broader objectives related to the recovering of dignity’⁹⁴ It is interesting to see how they think of their struggle: ‘we don’t want inclusion. I don’t want to be exploited again. I don’t struggle to be exploited...one thing that we know certainly is what we don’t want. The surprise lies in that we are trying to discover where we want to go as we walk and this is something is not finished, we reflect about this daily.’⁹⁵

To these *Piqueteros*, the MTD ‘is a source of counter-power’ in which the identity of the unemployed stops being a lack⁹⁶ to allow a process of self-determination.’⁹⁷ They argue that ‘many still think in a classical way. That is, “if we take power from above then we can change things”. And we think: from below, without thinking of taking power, we struggle. We are below and we don’t want to go anywhere. We are always going to be rebels’⁹⁸

On 26 June 2002, two young unemployed men who participated in a roadblock at the Avellaneda bridge, south of Great Buenos Aires, were brutally assassinated by the police far from the roadblock. Maximiliano Costeki (25) and Darío Santillán (21) were both unemployed and activists of the *Coordinadora de Piqueteros Aníbal Verón*. Their murders constituted the most important political event in Argentina since the popular insurrection of December 2001 occurred. That day at the roadblock, the unemployed demanded as usual an increase in the amount and number of subsidies to the unemployed, a family subsistence

⁹⁰ See Oviedo’s *Una historia del Movimiento Piquetero* quoted in MTD 2002.

⁹¹ See *El rostro de la Dignidad. Memoria del MTD Solano*, Documentary by *Argentina Arde*, Cine Independiente, September 2002 and *Colectivo Situaciones* 2001b

⁹² Viales L ‘Los proyectos políticos piqueteros’ *Página/12* 23.6.02, p.16-17

⁹³ Andrés Fernández, MTD Solano cited by Viales L. ‘Los proyectos políticos piqueteros’ *Página/12* 23.6.02, p.17.

⁹⁴ Interviews with *Piqueteros* in *Colectivo Situaciones* 2001b.

⁹⁵ *Idem ant.*

⁹⁶ In Castilian ‘carencia’.

⁹⁷ MTD 2002

⁹⁸ Interview with *Piqueteros* by *Colectivo Situaciones* 2001b.

allowance, rejected the privatisation of health services, the end of the repression to the unemployed, and investment in education, among others. But the brutal police repression to the roadblocks, characterised by the Duhalde administration itself as a 'hunt' (!), and which left also 90 people injured and many more imprisoned,⁹⁹ was indicative of the political recognition of the significance of the struggle of these sector of the Movement of the Unemployed.

The murders initiated a much needed debate within the CTA among those who wanted to support the struggle of the *Coordinadora Aníbal Verón*, basically human rights activists, and the leaders of the FTV and CCC, which organise the unemployed in *La Matanza* who don't want to risk either their good institutional relations or the power of management of an important amount of employment programmes. But the events of June also provoke a unique cross-class social and political solidarity with the *Coordinadora Aníbal Verón* emerged immediately and quickly grew and expanded after the murders. A general strike and three massive mobilisations gathering *Piqueteros*, *asambleas barriales*, left-wing political parties, trade unions, human right social movements and other progressive organisations marched to the Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires, on June 28, July 3 and 9. The slogan chanted by the demonstrators, 'I can see it... I can see it... tonight... *all of us are Piqueteros!*',¹⁰⁰ adequately captured the need to fight fragmentation to confront capital.¹⁰¹

III. ARGENTINA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM: INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION:

Although unique in its form, the Argentine popular insurrection must be interpreted in a global context. The Zapatistas movement opened a new world for the politics of resistance and revolution. They appropriated the use of language, social reflection, democracy and solidarity towards the recovering (or reinvention) of human dignity. Resisted not only by the right but also by the 'left', their revolt of dignity¹⁰² paved the way for the constitution of a 'new internationalism'.¹⁰³ Unlike the old internationalism, 'the new internationalism implies that the national and international distinctions loose sharpness' and the relation between the labour movement and the other movements is one of 'building alliances and bridges'.¹⁰⁴

In this 'new internationalism', as argued by De Angelis, positive elements like dignity, hope and life prevail, and thus the fight against capital becomes 'a residual': '*it is capital which deploys forces against people's constitution of humanity*'. The old revolutionary practice started from the condition of exploitation, poverty and misery and indicated the answer: revolution. Here, revolution was conceived *as realising* the hopes of the masses understood in terms of the party plans. Internationalism (and the party) was instrumental to this answer, this idea of *realisation*. The Zapatista's practice starts from the same poverty, exploitation and misery, and from the fact that despite this poverty, oppression exploitation, etc. people are dignified human subjects, able to hope and self-govern themselves and ask: what to do in order to deal with our needs?'¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Journalists and other activists who were at the Avellaneda railway station at the moment of the massacre captured the entire brutal episode: the police shot Maximiliano and left him to die on the floor of the railway station. Darío found him dying and, without even knowing him, stayed beside him while others went to get help. But the chief of the police of the province of Buenos Aires himself dragged Darío out of the station and a plain cloth police officer shot him in the back

¹⁰⁰ *Ya lo veo, ya lo veo, esta noche somos todos Piqueteros!*

¹⁰¹ Bellucci and Dinerstein 2002.

¹⁰² Holloway in Holloway and Pelaez (eds.)1998; Bonefeld 2001, De Angelis 2000.

¹⁰³ De Angelis 2000.

¹⁰⁴ See table in De Angelis 2000: 11

¹⁰⁵ De Angelis 2000: 31 author's own emphasis

This 'concrete internationalism is diametrically opposed to the old abstract ideological internationalism'¹⁰⁶ also in that it brought about a new conception of power. As Holloway argues, 'the core of the newness of Zapatismo is the project of changing the world without taking power...Zapatismo moves us decisively beyond the state illusion...The state illusion understands revolution as the winning of state power and the transformation of society through the state.'¹⁰⁷

There are some elements of the Argentine insurrection and the organisational forms presented in this paper which can be regarded as contributing to this 'new internationalism'. In Argentina, the current crisis of capital particularly in its money form, did not diminish resistance, but transformed it into a more politicised, noisy, physical and grass-roots forms which, like the roadblocks, searched for visibility against the 'virtual disappearance of labour'. Like the Zapatistas *Ya Basta!*¹⁰⁸ *¡que se vayan todos!* was the apex of a long term struggle which made apparent the increasing unsustainability of the project of capital (and not only its neo-liberal form) daily affecting more and more people. This unsustainability constitutes the subversive aspect of globalisation insofar as the negation of capital as a form of society allows the reinvention of politics in various forms which share a common aspect: to have relocated the significance of human life to the center of the discussion about the economy, the state, the political regime, the law. They seem to express the idea that 'there can be nothing more essential in society than humans. If essence is conceived as something else other than humans, then society transforms into a humanless world'.¹⁰⁹

Through their practice of direct democracy, the search for autonomy and political recovering and recomposition of social networks of solidarity, the encounters which were born in the hot evenings of every neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires, as well as the work of the MTD (the two examples explored in this paper) maintain alive the critique of civil society (and thus of the state and capital) initiated in December 2001 in Argentina. They opened pluralist spaces within which a new political subjectivity based on solidarity, dignity and counter-power can be constructed. Whether or not these organisational forms will remain or contribute to the construction of a broader movement is still unknown. There are some movements in this direction. The rhizomatic power of the insurrection was made apparent on 22nd of August 2002 when the Argentine Social Forum gathered more than 600 organisations in Buenos Aires to discuss the meaning of crisis and insurrection, and the Argentine contribution to the global anti-capitalist struggles.

REFERENCES

Altamira, J 2001 *El Argentinazo*, Rumbos, Buenos Aires

Bellucci M and Dinerstein A 'Seamos todos Kosteki y Santillán', <http://listas.ecuanex.net.ec/listas/listinfo/alai-amlatina>, 30.6.02

Bonefeld, W 2001 'Social Form, Critique and Human Dignity' *Zeitschrift für krritische Theorie* 13/2001: 97-112.

¹⁰⁶ Taylor 2002: 105

¹⁰⁷ 2002b. See these thesis in Holloway 2002a.

¹⁰⁸ See Vargas and Cañas 2002

¹⁰⁹ Bonefeld 2001: 107

Bonefeld W 1995b "Capital as Subject and the Existence of Labour" in Bonefeld W *et al* (1995), eds., *Open Marxism*, Vol. III, Pluto Press, London: 182-212

Bonet, Alberto 2002 Argentina 2001: 'Crisis, insurrección y la caída de la convertibilidad, mimeo, Buenos Aires

Caparrós M with several authors (2002) *Qué País. Informe urgente sobre la Argentina que viene*, Buenos Aires: Planeta.

Casella B and Villarruel D 2000 *La Mano en la late. Diccionario de la corrupción argentina*, Buenos Aires: Grijalbo.

Colectivo Situaciones 2002 19 y 20 *Apuntes para el nuevo protagonismo social*, Ediciones de mano en mano, Buenos Aires.

Colectivo Situaciones 2001a *Contrapoder. Una Introducción*, Ediciones de Mano en Mano, Buenos Aires.

Colectivo Situaciones 2001b *MTD Solano*, no 4, Ediciones Mano en Mano, Buenos Aires

De Angelis M 2000 'Globalization, New Internationalism and the Zapatistas' *Capital & Class* 70, CSE, London: 9-35

Dinerstein A and Neary M 2002 eds. *The Labour Debate: An Investigation into the Theory and Reality of Capitalist Work*, Ashgate, Aldershot-Burlington

Dinerstein A C 2002b 'Insurrection and the Asambleas Barriales in Argentina' *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Blackwell, forthcoming January 2003.

Dinerstein A C 2002a The Battle of Buenos Aires. Crisis, Insurrection and the Reinvention of Politics in Argentina' *Historical Materialism* 10.4, Brill, pp. 279-312, forthcoming

Dinerstein A C 2001b *The Violence of Stability. An Investigation of the Subjectivity of Labour in Argentina*, PhD thesis, University of Warwick. Unpublished.

Dinerstein A C 2001a 'Roadblocks in Argentina', *Capital & Class* no 74, London, CSE: 117

Dinerstein A C 1999 'The violence of Stability: Argentina in the 1990s' in Neary M ed. 1998 *Global Humanisation: Studies in the Manufacture of Labour*, Mansell, London - New York: 47-76.

Feijóo C and Salas Oroño L 2002 'Las asambleas y el movimiento social' in Several Authors op. cit: 22-30.

FRENAPO 2001 'Transformar la crisis en una oportunidad' FRENAPO, Buenos Aires.

Gambina J *et al* 2002 'Rebeliones y Puebladas. Diciembre de 2001 y Enero de (2002). Viejos y Nuevos Desposeídos en Argentina' *Cuadernos de la FISyP* no 7 (serie 2), Buenos Aires.

Guerrero, M 2002 'Emergencia y Desafíos de las *asambleas* barriales' *Herramienta* 19, Buenos Aires, Antídoto: 47-58.

Hardt, M 1995 'Spinoza's democracy: The Passions of Social Assemblages' in Callari, A *et al* eds. *Marxism in the Postmodern Age. Confronting the New World Order*, The Guilford Press, London-NY: 24-32.

Holloway 2002b 'Zapatismo and Social Sciences, *Capital & Class* 79, CSE, London, forthcoming.

Holloway J 2002a *Change the World without Taking Power. The Meaning of Revolution Today*, London: Pluto.

Holloway J 2001 Doce tesis sobre el anti-poder' in Colectivo Situaciones (ed.) *Contrapoder...* op.cit. : 73-81

Holloway, J. and E. Peláez 1998 *Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in Mexico*, Pluto, London.

Iñigo Carrera, Nicolás y Cotarelo María Celia 2001 'La protesta en Argentina (enero-abril de 2001)' *OSAL* 4, CLACSO, Buenos Aires.

Krymkiewicz, M 2002 'Nuevas prácticas y nuevas relaciones', *Campo Grupal* 35, Buenos Aires.

Lewis C (2002) 'Political Economy of Policy Making: constraints on Duhalde', paper to the Argentina Round Table, Centre for Latin American Studies, Cambridge, February 2 (<http://www.latin-american.cam.ac.uk>)

Le Fur A 2002 'El asambleísta: un nuevo sujeto político?' in Several Authors op. cit. pp. 34-43.

López N 2002 'Asamblea Popular del Barrio de Liniers. Nuevos Lazos Sociales. Entrevista' *Herramientas* 19, Buenos Aires: Antídoto: 115-124.

Marazzi C 1996 "Money in the World Crisis: The New Basis of Capitalist Power" en Bonefeld W. and Holloway J. (eds.) op. cit. : 69-91.

Mattini L 2002 'La hora de las comunas' in Several Authors 2002 op.cit. 44-55

Meschkat K 1999 'Una crítica a la ideología de la "sociedad civil"' in Hengstenberg P *et al* (eds.) *Sociedad Civil en America Latina: representación de intereses y gobernabilidad*, Nueva Sociedad, Caracas.

MTD Solano 2002 'El MTD y la construcción del poder popular' *Herramienta* no 21, Buenos Aires, forthcoming.

Negri, A 1991: *The Savage Anomaly. The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics*, University Minnesota Press: Minneapolis.

Observatorio Social de América Latina (OSAL) 2001/2002 no 5 and 6, Buenos Aires, CLACSO.

Perez Esquivel L 2002 'Cuando las cacerolas sonaron contra el neo-liberalismo' in Several Authors, op.cit. pp. 56-68

Sabanes Plou, D 'Argentina; controles para evitar la fuga de divisas' Servicio Informativo Alai-amlatina, info@alai.ecuanex.net.ec, 5.12.01,

Sevares, J (2002) 'La crisis del sistema bancario' in *Le Monde Diplomatique* Junio, Buenos Aires

Several Authors (2002) *Que son las Asambleas Populares*, Buenos Aires: Peña Lillo – Continente.

Taylor, G 2002 'Labour and Subjectivity: Rethinking the Limits of Working Class Consciousness' in Dinerstein A and Neary M (eds.) *The Labour Debate. An Investigation into ...* op. cit.: 89-107.

Tedesco L 1999 *Democracy in Argentina. Hope and Disillusion*, London Portland, Frank Class

Tischler S 2001 'La "sociedad Civil": ¿Fetiché? ¿Sujeto?' *Bajo el Volcán* 3, Benemérita Universidad de Puebla, Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades, Puebla: 169-181.

Vargas P and Cañas M 2002 '¡Ya Basta! ¡Que se vayan todos, que no quede ni uno solo!' in Several Authors op.cit. pp. 105-127.

