Indian military at 70

India’s defence report card for the past seven decades is more positive than negative. But the credit for that goes less to our policies and strategies —and more to those responsible for operational planning and execution on ground. Despite reactive policies, intelligence failures and strategic surprises, the defence forces have maintained India’s security and international territory better than any other developing nation in the world. Our baptism started soon after Independence. The military was employed to force the reluctant rulers of Hyderabad and Junagarh to integrate their states. In the same year, we had to defend Jammu and Kashmir when Pakistani raiders led and supported by the Pakistani Army, attacked the state.

We liberated Goa in 1961 and fought the ignominious Sino-Indian war in 1961. In 1965, Pakistani military ruler Ayub Khan launched Operation Gibraltar in J&K with a side show in Kutch. There was a skirmish with the Chinese at Nathu La in 1967. The third India-Pakistan war in 1971 resulted in a glorious victory and liberation of Bangladesh. In 1984, we pre-empted the Pakistani attempt to occupy the Silcher glacier. The WangDung (Arunachal Pradesh) skirmish with China took place in 1986. In 1987-88, due to the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, we intervened in Sri Lanka’s civil war and put down an attempted coup in the Maldives. In 1999, despite the intelligence failure a we defended Pakistani intrusion in the Kargil sector.

Apart from these external aggression engagements, the defence forces have fought insurgencies in North-Eastern states since the mid 50’s: Naxalites in Bengal in the late 60’s and terrorism in Punjab in the mid- 80s, and the still continuing proxy war in J&K since the late 80s.

Since the mid-50s the defence forces have also worked on a large number of UN peacekeeping missions.

The defence forces have made a substantial contribution in nation-building as well. They remain a role model for ‘unity in diversity’ of an apolitical outlook with loyalty only to the Indian Constitution. They are also the nation’s chief rescue and relief force for disaster management. Barring 1962 war in China, which taught strategic lessons, that we often tend to forget, India’s national defence has been ensured in all military engagements. However it is unfortunate that many a time we have failed to convert hard-won operational achievements into long-term politico-strategic successes. In 1948, we decided to approach the UN on the J&K issue, just when we had reached the Muzaffrabad gates. We granted suzerainty to China over Tibet in 1954, without any quid pro quo. In 1962 we indulged in provocative forward deployment of the Sino-Indian border without adequate political or military preparedness.

We returned to the strategically important Haji Pir pass to Pakistan in the 1965 war. And after the 1971 war, returned 92,000 prisoners without ensuring that Pakistan agrees to a permanent solution of J&K. We dithered for 24 years between the testing of a nuclear device and becoming a nuclear weapons state. In 2002, we mobilised and deployed troops for 10 months without a clear political objectives, reflecting our lack of strategic vision, mindset and management. defence decisions are primarily politico-economic decisions. Unless the right questions are asked, and appropriate alternatives selected, military power and national defence tend of suffer. The Kargil war made me realise that unless India becomes adequately self-reliant in arms, and national security will remain highly vulnerable. During that war, every country that we approached, either refused, or took us for a ride. That situation is not very different today. After 70 years, we still import nearly 70 per cent of our defence equipment. We carry the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest importer of defence equipment.With the latest increase in the FDI, and an elaborate defence Procurement Procedure 2016 in place, India’s defence industrial base will take 20 - 25 years to make up for deficiencies in our arms and equipment, with a reasonable level of modernisation. There is a need to work out a comprehensive strategy and holistic policy framework for the immedicate long term defence requirements. The strategy should include (a) facilitating the domestic defence industrial houses to expand their high tech base soonest (b) creating of a skilled worker base (c) a level playing field for public and private defence sectors (d) an unambiguous export policy, and most importantly (e) sufficient defence budget for capital purchases.

Along with a strong push to ‘make in India’, it would be necessary to place some order on approved original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) – to meet our minimum essential, operational requirement, lest we are caught in another Kargil war situation. Strategic and technological developments keep adding new dimensions of security challenges, greater uncertainties, and reduced reaction time. New defence related problems can emanate unexpectedly, in many forms. In the current strategic and operational environment, we have to develop integrated defence capabilities, and procedures, to be able to obtain optimum results. Capabilities like space, cyber and information war, strategic and special forces require inter-service and not single service organisations. Everywhere it has become necessary to achieve a greater synergy through integration and joint-ness. This quality in military operations validates the well-known principle of war, ‘economy and effort’ in financial and human resources. it preludes wastage of resources by using an appropriate mix of force capabilities. Two other essential requirements are — greater direct politico-military interaction, not though civilain bureaucracy as happening now —faster decision making and integration of the three deference forces vertically at the top. This should cover defence planning and force structuring, strategic and operational planning and logistic policies.

Despite recommendation by the group of Ministers in 2002, we have neither delivered a Chief Defence Staff, nor addressed many organisational problems of the defence forces. Soldiers ask why they are kept outside the decision making loop: the lack of single point military advice and coordination, planning and implementation of force modernisation and deterrence; even about civil governance which leads to prolonged employment has become indispensable to develop. There has also been a steady erosion of soliders’ status by the government and in the society. This is reflected in the dilution of the military rank and file. Honour, izzat, comparable status and emoluments have sustained the armed forces and enabled them to draw the right kind of leadership. By taking away its pride, status and making the career unattractive, the military is no longer a prime choice. Given the globalised security challenges, while territorial defence would remain our primary concerns, India is also a strategic stabiliser, without expansionist designs or character. This will be possible only if we pay serious attention to our strategic policies, higher defence control organisations, forces’ modernisation and military morale.

The author was the 19th Chief Of Army Staff of the Indian Army, and served during the Kargil war.