Beat Me If You Can:

The Fairness of Elections in Dictatorship

By Masaaki Higashijima

This is the winning essay of the 2014 annual International IDEA/Electoral Integrity project (EIP; Harvard University & University of Sydney) award for the best graduate student paper on electoral integrity.

Beat Me If You Can:
The Fairness of Elections in Dictatorship

Masaaki Higashijima
Michigan State University
higashij@msu.edu

Abstract

When do dictators refrain from electoral fraud? This paper sheds light on a dilemma that dictators face in elections: rigged elections facilitate obtaining a supermajority but the results of such dirty elections do not guarantee informational benefits—credibly signaling regime strength and receiving reliable information on distribution of popular support. Under this dilemma, the dictator's power of popular mobilization via economic distribution determines the level of electoral fairness. Dictators with rich financial resources, disciplinary ruling organizations and weak opposition make elections more transparent by relying less on electoral manipulation. Statistical analysis of 67 dictatorships provides empirical support for the hypotheses.

Introduction

Most modern dictatorships hold elections even though citizens hardly expect to peacefully replace political leaders via the ballot box (Przeworski et al. 2000; Hyde and Marinov 2012).[1] Although not truly fair and free (Schedler et al. 2006; Levistky and Way 2010), there is remarkable variation with respect to how much political leaders rig authoritarian elections: some dictators resort to whatever fraudulent measures they can take to secure an overwhelming electoral "victory," while others are rather loath to committing electoral malpractices and even willingly make efforts to keep the electoral field fairer through electoral reforms. For instance, in the heyday of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party during the 1970s, stunned by the fact that the main opposition boycotted the 1976 presidential election, the authoritarian government embarked on making elections more transparent thereby enabling opposition parties to gain some presence in Mexican politics (Eisenstadt 2004, 32-44). In a similar vein, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, announced shortly before the 2012 election that he would "reform" electoral laws so that moderate opposition parties could gain some seats in parliament (Mutlu 2012). Indeed, cross-national evidence shown in Figure 1 suggests that the extent of election fraud varies substantially in authoritarian regimes. The data show that there are some authoritarian states where election violence, electoral cheating and legal restrictions on electoral participation are not as severe like Bongo's Gabon (especially 1990s-2000s), Mahathir's Malaysia (1980s-2000s), Singapore under People's Action Party's rule (1970s-2000s), Kuomintang's Taiwan (1980s through

[1] According to Hyde (2011: 262), only China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Eritrea did not hold national elections between 1960-2006.

1995), Indonesia during the 1980s, and Kuwait (1980s-2000s). On the other hand, in other autocracies including Mugabe's Zimbabwe (2000s), Karimov's Uzbekistan (1990s-2000s), Togo (1990s-2000s), Suharto's Indonesia (1990s), and Paraguay (1970s-1980s), dictatorial leaders used extreme manipulation techniques in the attempt to fabricate election results. Why do we see such difference in the level of electoral fraud under authoritarian regimes where dictators are entitled to dominant political power?

Figure 1: Variation in the Level of Electoral Fraud in 67 Dictatorships (1975-2004)



Note: The data source is Kelley (2012). Electoral fraud here consists of the five subcomponents including pre-electoral violence, election-day violence pre-electoral cheating, election-day electoral cheating and legal structural problems. Each component has 4 scales (0 = no problems, 1=minor problems only, 2=moderate problems, 3=major problems).

In solving this puzzle of elections in dictatorship, the paper theoretically and empirically explores the logic of electoral fairness in authoritarian regimes. This paper first suggests that

authoritarian leaders face a serious dilemma between the credibility of election results and the certainty of winning big at the ballot box. Dictators can stay in power by rigging elections through vote stuffing, violent repression, and the manipulation of election rules and institutions. Pro-regime bias on electoral results, however, makes it difficult for dictators to not only convey a credible signal on their regime strength to potential opponents, but also to collect reliable information on key actors' strengths. On the other hand, if dictators allow excessive electoral reforms, then they may fail to obtain an overwhelming victory, which may result in fueling anti-regime sentiment thus threatening their dictatorial rule.

This paper argues that the balance of power between the dictator and potential opponents (from both ruling elites and opposition forces) explain the level of electoral fraud under the constraint of this electoral dilemma. More specifically, if there exists a large gap between the dictator and the elites in their ability to mobilize voluntary popular support, the former can win a supermajority without relying on heavy electoral fraud. Thus, the stronger the dictator is, the more able he is to signal his strength by producing an overwhelming majority without electoral manipulation. By contrast, if the elites possess greater political resources to mobilize their supporters, the dictator is not able to organize large-scale mobilization of popular support. In this case, fair elections are less likely to bring a big victory to the dictator. Therefore, he has a strong interest in using blatant fraud to bias the election results.

To empirically assess my theory of authoritarian elections, cross-national statistical analysis is conducted. The three main findings of the statistical analysis follow. First, the amount of oil-gas rent and other tax and non-tax revenues, which are viable measures of capturing dictators' financial resources, is negatively correlated with election fraud. Second, disciplinary political organizations that strongly bind ruling elites tend to magnify the effect of

natural resources on reducing electoral fraud. More specifically, both dominant-party regimes and less fractionalized, large dominant ethnic groups have such conditional effects. Finally, pre-electoral anti-government collective action significantly increases the propensity of dictators' employing electoral fraud.

The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is twofold. First, introducing the idea of the election dilemma in dictatorship, this research attempts to bring the dictator's crucial decision making -- how much he will manipulate elections -- into theoretical consideration of authoritarian elections. Second, different from conventional wisdom that focused on political-institutional, socio-economic or international factors influencing election fraud, this research sheds light on the importance of the governments' ability to garner voluntary popular support. In so doing, I suggest that there may be a trade-off between political manipulation of elections (electoral fraud) and pre-electoral manipulation of economic policy instruments.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the idea of the electoral dilemma, while reviewing the previous literature of authoritarian elections. Section 3 discusses electoral fraud in authoritarian regimes. In Section 4, I theorize how the dictator decides the level of electoral fraud under the constraint of the electoral dilemma. Section 5 empirically tests observable implications of the theory with a series of statistical models. Finally, conclusions and policy implications follow.

The Electoral Dilemma in Dictatorship

In dictatorship, the political leader and potential opponents both are likely to suffer information shortages, because political transparency is seriously circumscribed (Wintrobe

1998; Egorov et al. 2009). This is problematic for the dictator, because potential opponents likely fail to correctly estimate the dictator's de facto strength and thus may challenge the dictator after such miscalculation, resulting in political turmoil. Strengthening the military is one of the most frequently used measures to credibly demonstrate the dictator's power to potential opponents, yet heavily relying on the sword threatens his tenure by overpowering the military (Svolik 2012). Thus, it is not a perfect solution. Second, information shortages in dictatorship make it difficult for the dictator to know accurate distribution of popular support among the citizenry. Without reliable sources of information on popular support, the dictator faces difficulties in governing the country efficiently. In authoritarian regimes where political leaders retain large potential to use violent repression, people are more tempted to conceal their true preferences for fear of being targeted by state repression (see, e.g. Kuran 1991; Wintrobe 1998). Therefore, the dictator needs to pursue alternative measures other than violent means, by which to solve these information problems.

Scholars have argued that authoritarian leaders use elections to overcome information problems in dictatorships. First, some researchers point out that elections in dictatorships help dictators show regime invincibility to potential opponents (Hermet 1978, 12; Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2006; Simpser 2013). Winning elections while obtaining an overwhelming majority, dictators are able to demonstrate that the regime is unshakable. In so doing, they can prevent potential opponents from launching coups, defecting from the regime, and leading popular uprisings. Second, elections allow dictators to know accurate distribution of political support among population. Through election results, dictators can be informed about local popularity of ruling elites, which becomes one of the criteria to pick up competent and loyal politicians and screen out others (Ames 1970; Shi 1999; Magaloni 2006; Boix and Svolik 2007;

Blaydes 2010; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Reuter and Robertson 2011). Or, election results also render information on the distribution of popular support for the regime and/or popularity of opposition parties (Magaloni 2006; Cox 2009; Miller 2012), thereby enabling dictators to decide the targets of repression or make efficient allocation of economic resources to cement political support.

Which benefits dictators want to exploit the most might be different across authoritarian regimes. Regardless of which electoral benefits each dictator emphasizes, however, the crucial fact is that authoritarian elections do not always bring informational benefits to dictators. The probability that dictators obtain a supermajority at elections will increase as they rig elections in more heavy-handed ways. In fact, using a comprehensive cross-national data on electoral manipulation and electoral margins, Simpser (2013: 67-72) shows that manipulated elections tend to bring larger margins of victory. The credibility of election results, however, will decrease as authoritarian leaders resort to more serious electoral fraud. When elections are rigged, dictators lose the potential informational benefits of elections in the following two ways. First, results of seriously rigged elections can no longer send a credible signal on regime strength. For instance, if it is obvious that dictators can receive 100% of seats and votes easily by not allowing oppositions or using too much election violence and cheating, then election results do not reflect true popularity of the dictator. By contrast, if dictators do not resort to manipulation but they still win by a large margin, elections can send a costly signal of the dictators' strength to potential opponents. Second, if they commit serious electoral fraud, then dictators can no longer gather reliable information on the distribution of popular support. When fraud is used to bias election results toward the dictator, the results do not reflect the true preferences of voters (Wintrobe 1998). Therefore, in addition to making themselves

invincible during elections, dictators simultaneously have to consider how they can make these election results believable.

If dictators fail to wisely calculate between the certainty and credibility of election results, then it becomes harder for dictators to efficiently use elections as a useful tool to consolidate their rule. When dictators refrain from using a series of electoral manipulation, elections will set a higher hurdle to obtain an overwhelming majority. The failure to craft a landslide victory is likely to activate the defection of ruling elites and invigorate opposition parties. In fact, Kuhn (2012) shows cross-national empirical evidence suggesting that post-electoral protests are more likely to occur after close elections like in the cases of Mexico (2000) and Ukraine (2004). Conversely, when dictators resort to too much election fraud, then their governance may become more inefficient because (1) dictators can no longer know distribution of popular support, and (2) potential opponents cannot accurately estimate strength of the dictator. Subsequent misinformation and miscommunication among the political actors will increase the possibility of political conflict: dictators may be forced to use indiscriminate state repression, whereas potential opponents may be also tempted to stage coups and protests either for preemptive purposes or as a result of underestimating dictators' strength. Indeed, Gandhi and Vreeland (2004) empirically demonstrate that authoritarian legislatures with no multiparty systems contribute to increasing the risk of violent conflict.

In his excellent study of electoral manipulation, Simpser (2013) argues that committing serious electoral fraud itself enables governments to show their strength because election fraud is costly in that it needs vast amounts of human and economic resources. I do not deny façade elections entail some costs in resource mobilization. From the following three reasons, however, I argue that as long as dictators can retain a sufficient supermajority, partially

transparent elections become more useful for dictators than façade elections for consolidating authoritarian rule. First, election results from free and fair elections are more informative and overcome information shortages in dictatorships – increasing the credibility and reliability of election results. Second, some empirical studies suggest that excessive and blatant electoral manipulation may contribute to revealing the dictator's weakness rather than his strength potentially leading to massive protest movements and leadership change in the aftermath of elections (see, e.g. Tucker 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Hafner-Burton et al. 2013). Further, although Simpser's theory tells us why political leaders use excessive, blatant electoral manipulation, it does not provide an adequate answer as to why some political leaders use serious electoral fraud while others do not. Building upon Simpser (2013) by assuming that dictators try to obtain an overwhelming majority, this paper tries to fill these gaps by drawing more attention to the credibility of election results in authoritarianism.

Electoral Fraud and the Manipulation of Policy Instruments in Authoritarian Regimes

In this paper, electoral fraud is defined as a series of illegal measures that bias election results in favor of the political leader (Lehoucq 2003). In light of this broad definition, electoral fraud consists of the following three subcomponents: (1) election violence, (2) election cheating, and (3) undemocratic restrictions on electoral law. Election violence is physical intimidation during elections exercised largely by incumbent parties (Straus and Taylor 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2012). Governments intend to use electoral violence to make violent threats against opposition candidates and citizens, thereby undermining oppositions' effective campaigns and decreasing turnout of opposition supporters. Electoral cheating allows dictators to affect the number of votes during campaign periods and election days with

nonviolent but still illegal measures such as undermining of oppositions' freedom to campaigns, media bias, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, nonviolent intimidation, and so on (Kelley 2012). Restrictions on electoral law refer to a series of regulations that prevent citizens and electoral candidates from influencing politics, including limits on voting rights by certain social characteristics like gender and ethnicity, flaws in the complaints procedures, high thresholds for new parties to get registered and gain seats, constraints on the right to run for office such as language and educational requirements and so on (Kelley 2012). All the three fraud techniques, though how to manipulate elections is considerably different, contribute to making an artificial electoral victory with a margin that could not be achieved if dictators have not committed them.

Burgeoning literature of electoral fraud has focused on various factors to explain electoral fraud. First, placing emphasis on domestic political factors, researchers find severe political competition (Lehoucq and Molina 2002), single-member districts (Birch 2007) and the absence of domestic election monitoring (Ichino and Schuendeln 2012) encourage politicians to use serious electoral fraud. Second, socio-economic variables such as poverty (Lehoucq and Molina 2002), the size of population (Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Fukumoto and Horiuchi 2011), and economic inequality (Zibratt 2009) have also been regarded as important. Third, emphasizing international election observers and economic sanctions, scholars maintain that trade openness and foreign direct investment (Birch 2011) and international election monitoring (Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012) reduce electoral fraud.

Though these studies have significantly increased our understanding of election fraud, I suggest that there are at least two problems that still need to be addressed in further research. First, most importantly, since they disregard the importance of the election dilemma, the

existing studies fail to consider relationships between "illegal," undemocratic strategies at elections such as election violence, election cheating and manipulation of electoral law, and "legal," legitimate ones including manipulation of fiscal and monetary policies. Put differently, previous literature does not consider the possibility that political leaders may willingly refrain from using fraud to mitigate information shortage especially when they can garner popular support using their financial resources. Since previous studies have exclusively focused on the electoral fraud side without drawing much attention to the distribution strategies that governments can alternatively take,[2] their theories cannot provide adequate answers to this important question about the relationships between political fraud and economic distribution during an election. Second, the existing studies do not consider possible differences in theoretical scope conditions between democracies and autocracies. Cross-national studies include all the countries in their samples assuming that election fraud should play the same roles both in democracies and dictatorships, namely, producing a victory at elections. Most single case studies primarily focus on election fraud in democratic countries where party competition is strong enough to generate government alternation. As Magaloni (2006) and Geddes (2006) argued, however, the purpose of holding authoritarian elections is not to get reelected at elections, but to obtain an *overwhelming majority* to show regime strength via elections (see also Simpser 2013). This notable difference in the governments' purpose of holding elections may change the motivations for committing election fraud.

Power Distribution between the Dictator and Elites:

Financial Resources, Disciplinary Organizations and Opposition Strength

[2] An important exception is Hyde and O'Mahoney (2011).

Under the constraint of the electoral dilemma, the dictator[3] decides the level of electoral fraud. After observing the level of electoral fraud and election results, potential opponents determine whether they revolt or not. As a large literature of authoritarian politics has assumed (e.g. Magaloni 2006; Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012), potential opponents are among political elites who possess political resources other than ballots, including both ruling and opposition elites. The dictator aims to achieve an overwhelming majority in as credible a way as possible, thereby trying to exploit the informational benefits and thus maximize their prospects of survival. Potential opponents opportunistically target the seat of the next political leader in the sense that they try to rebel against the current ruler only when they think that the current regime is too weak to withstand their challenge after the election. More specifically, when elections are either too transparent to obtain a supermajority or too rigged to solve information shortage, the dictator is more likely to face such challenges from potential opponents, compared to when he wins a credible supermajority.

In this strategic interaction between the dictator and potential opponents, the dictator decides the level of electoral fraud. I argue that differences in power of mobilizing popular support between the dictator and potential opponents are important to determine the level of electoral fraud. If the dictator is stronger than the elites, that is, when there is a large gap between them in the amount of political resources to mobilize popular support, the former can garner more supporters who willingly vote for the dictator than potential opponents do. Thus, the stronger the dictator is, the more able he is to signal his strength by producing an overwhelming majority without using electoral fraud. By contrast, if the elites possess greater political resources vis-à-vis the dictator, the dictator is not able to organize a large scale of

[3] Here the dictator refers to the top leader who holds de jure supreme authority in the country.

mobilization by himself. In this situation, less-manipulated elections are more likely to produce surprising results, so that the dictator has a strong interest in stealing elections and manipulating electoral institutions more in his favor.

Instead of resorting to electoral fraud, dictators with rich resources can mobilize voters through large-scale economic distribution implementing expansionary economic policies. Loosening fiscal policies and strengthening pork-barrel politics, authoritarian leaders can create public employment, adopt tax exemption for party supporters and the poor, provide bonus for public employees, construct infrastructure and implement other forms of public goods provision, all of which are not illegal but make it possible for them to garner voluntary political support. In fact, numerous studies on authoritarian politics demonstrate that durable dictatorships are more likely to manipulate economic policies prior to elections such as Russia, Mexico, Malaysia, Kazakhstan and Egypt (e.g. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; Magaloni 2006; Pepinsky 2009; Higashijima 2010; Blaydes 2011; Wright 2011) to win elections with large margins. Importantly, relying more on manipulation of economic policy instruments, dictators can increase the credibility of election results, which helps them send a clear signal of regime invincibility. In sum, prioritizing economic distribution instead of political fraud, dictators are more able to make the credibility and certainty of election results compatible. In so doing, they can enjoy the informational benefits of elections.

This research observes the balance of mobilization power between the dictator and elites in three ways: (1) the amount of financial resources that dictators can control at their disposal, (2) disciplinary ruling organizations that prevents ruling elites' opportunistic behavior and thus streamline economic distribution and (3) opposition's collective action capability.

Financial Resources

Financial resources that the dictator controls are important to empirically observe his power of popular support mobilization. A large body of previous studies has robustly demonstrated that abundant financial resources brought by various sources are more likely to prolong authoritarian rule. First, natural resource wealth such as oil and gas, most of which is owned by state-run companies,[4] significantly enriches state coffers without levying tax to citizens and thus increase public spending (see, e.g., Ross 2001; Desai et al. 2009; Morrison 2009; Wight, Frantz and Geddes 2013). Second, non-tax revenue other than natural resources such as foreign aid also enables the governments to provide extra resources to their citizens without taxation (van de Walle 2001; Morrison 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011; Ahmed 2012). Third, even if revenue is brought through taxation, dictators can still cement public support mainly collecting taxes from opposition loyalists and using it to benefit regime supporters, as is the case in many authoritarian regimes including Cambodia, Ghana, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Russia (Levistky and Way 2010, 10-11, Chapters 5-7).[5] Regardless of financial

[4] According to Morrison (2009, 110), 75 percent of the world's oil production and 90% of its reserves are owned by state companies.

[5] That being said, tax revenue may also inspire dictators to refrain from election fraud through a different mechanism: a large scale of tax collection by the government urges citizens to demand more political representation, which helps reduce electoral fraud (e.g. Levi 1988). To partial out my theoretical expectation from this "no representation without taxation" mechanism, my empirical analysis controls for political competition and political representation using Polity IV and Freedom House index.

origins, rich financial resources enable dictators to widely distribute patronage to their citizens to satisfy them.[6]

If dictators possess greater financial resources, then they do not need to institutionalize the electoral arena in ways that are extremely advantageous to them. Mobilizing regime supporters using rich financial resources, dictators can win elections with a large margin without relying so much on political manipulation of elections. In order to exploit the informational benefits brought by elections, dictators should refrain from resorting to manipulation measures.

Hypothesis 1: If financial resources are abundant, dictators are less likely to rig elections.

Organizational Bases

Authoritarian leaders need to outsource everyday governance of the regimes to the members of ruling coalitions including ministers, lawmakers, bureaucrats, and local politicians. Put differently, there is a power-sharing contract between the dictator and ruling elites (Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013). To make such deal successful, dictators need to discipline the members of ruling coalitions to make them loyal to the regimes. If dictators cannot get ruling elites to comply with deals, then ruling elites are more likely to be tempted to commit serious political corruption and accumulate power resources secretly using given authorities from the dictators (Haber 2006; Magaloni 2008).

[6] Of course, whether such resources are well controlled by dictators themselves is obviously important. I will further think about this issue by considering organizational bases

According to the previous literature, strong organizational bases that bind ruling elites allow dictators to prevent ruling elites from engaging in such opportunistic behavior and thus to promote cooperation of ruling elites in the following two ways. First, since organizational bases such as dominant parties allow dictators to guarantee institutionalized career promotion to party cadres, dictators can make inter-temporal power sharing deals credible through the creation of such party institutions (Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012, Chapter 6; Boix and Svolik 2013). Such disciplined elites work for the dictator loyally while engaging in less political corruption, leading to enhance dictators' mobilization potential. Second, organizational bases may enable dictators to police ruling elites effectively for detecting politicians' corruption and conspiracies, thereby easily deterring ruling elites' corrupt behaviors and anti-regime actions. For example, in African countries, when dictators are facing strong coup threats from potential rivals belonging in other ethnic groups, they often allow only members of their own ethnic groups to get access to power, aiming at increasing the coherence of ruling coalitions (Roessler 2011, 312-314).

These disciplinary organizations may have different implications on the level of electoral fraud, depending on financial resources available to the dictator. When the dictator does not hold abundant financial resources, he is more likely to order ruling elites to engage in serious electoral fraud because he is unable to garner voluntary support from citizens. In such resource-scarce scenario, if dictators are equipped with strong political organizations, ruling elites will follow his order loyally and engage in more systematic electoral fraud in their local strongholds (Levitsky and Way 2010: 63). In fact, dominant-party dictatorships, when suffering serious decline in popular support such as Mexico's PRI from the late 1980s until the late 1990s and Zimbabwe in the 2000s, systematically resorted to electoral cheating and

violence through local party organizations (e.g. Eisenstadt 2004; LeBas 2006). On the other hand, when the dictator has rich financial resources, he can confidently delegate to ruling elites the task of collecting popular support in locality through economic distribution, rather than fraud. In this case, financial resources for electoral mobilization will be used more efficiently to garner popular support with local elites committing less political corruption. In fact, Chang and Golden (2010) show that single-party regimes tend to suffer less political corruption than personalist regimes that under-institutionalize ruling coalitions. In addition, numerous studies also show that dictators with rich financial resources and dominant parties such as PRI's Mexico (Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007), UMNO's Malaysia (Pepinsky 2009), Mubarak's Egypt (Blaydes 2011) have all successfully engineered strong pre-electoral economic distribution during their heydays, by which they could win elections and demonstrate regime invincibility.[7]

Because of these reasons, I hypothesize that strong organizational bases enhance the dictator's power of voluntary support mobilization only when he holds rich financial resources. As strong organizations discipline ruling elites, dictators can effectively streamline the distribution of public resources. Therefore, financial resources with strong organizations should further reduce the need for dictators to manipulate elections in favor of them.

Hypothesis 2: The positive impact of financial resources on electoral fairness will become larger if dictators possess stronger organizational bases.

[7] See also Greene (2009) for cross-national evidence regarding the impact of public resources on longevity of dominant party regimes.

Oppositions' Capability of Collective Action

Lastly, the strength of opposition groups is also an important factor that determines the extent to which dictators rely on electoral manipulation. Especially, the capability of opposition groups launching collective action against dictatorial governments is a good indicator to observe how much they can mobilize their supporters against the dictator. In authoritarian regimes, challenging dictators is an extremely costly political behavior because in most cases anti-regime protests are brutally repressed (e.g. Davenport 2007). On the other hand, however, once initiated, this costly action will result in credibly showing the dictator that a considerable number of people are extremely unsatisfied with the regime and opposition leaders have enough mobilization power to lead citizens to take to the street (Kuran 1991; Kricheli et al. 2011; Weiss 2012). Therefore, after observing such popular collective action, dictators should consider that they might not be able to bring an overwhelming victory at the next election without serious electoral manipulation. For instance, in Zimbabwe, facing growing power and protests organized by the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), President Robert Mugabe resorted to brutal election violence and serious vote stuffing in the 2008 presidential election. After all, the MDC presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangiarai withdrew from the presidential race in the second round, which resulted in Mugabe's victory with 85 percent of the vote (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 41). Conversely, if opposition parties are weak so as to not be able to mobilize citizens and coordinate collective action, dictators are willing to open the electoral field, because it is highly likely that they can win big. Prior to the Kazakhstan 2012 parliamentary elections, President Nazarbayev changed the electoral law to make it easier for moderate opposition parties to obtain seats. One of his motivations behind this electoral

reform was in the fact that opposition parties were too unpopular among citizens to threaten his overwhelming victory in the election. Despite the most "transparent" elections in over a decade in Kazakhstan (Olcott 2012), the dominant party Nur-Otan obtained 80.99% of total votes whereas the main opposition National Social Democratic Party only gained a mere 1.4% of votes.

Hypothesis 3: The higher the oppositions' capability of collective action, the more likely dictators are to use serious electoral fraud.

One important caveat in this paper is that my theoretical framework does not consider *when* dictators begin to hold elections. There are three reasons why I limit my analysis exclusively on the level of electoral fraud. First, most modern dictatorships hold periodical elections other than a handful of countries such as Chica and Saudi Arabia, and thus there is hardly any significant variation on whether dictators hold elections or not (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Hyde 2011: 262; Hyde and Marinov 2012: 3). Second, it is reasonable to think that when elections are held may be determined more by different factors such as colonial heritages, the end of the Cold War, temporal differences in international pressure, and civil war onset. Third, coding when dictators begin to hold elections is empirically intractable. Since dictators can easily manipulate election timing, it is often the case there are a surprisingly long period of time between elections (e.g. Angola, Libya, and Qatar). When such a long periods between elections occurs, empirically identifying when dictators begin to hold the first election is challenging.

Evidence

Data and Methodology

The unit of analysis in this paper is country/election year in dictatorships. In testing the three hypotheses, I conduct cross-national statistical analysis. First of all, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2009) *Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited Dataset* is used to dichotomously distinguish authoritarian countries from democratic ones. Then, in order to measure the dependent variable, electoral fraud, this study relies on *The Quality of Elections Dataset (QED)* constructed by Kelley (2012).[8] The dataset evaluates to what extent each election is characterized by electoral fraud using country reports published by the U.S. Department of State. In light of my definition of electoral fraud, I use the following five variables to measure the level of election fraud from this dataset: [9] (1) Was the legal framework not up to standards,

[8] There are two other global datasets that are publicly available and globally measure electoral fraud. The first is Birch's (2011) *Index of Election Malpractice (IEM)*. The second is Hyde and Marinov's (2012) *National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA)*. IEM is similar with QED in many respects, yet only covers between 1995 and 2007. NELDA covers more extensive period (1945-2010), yet focuses more on the competitiveness of elections and does not evaluate the magnitude of election cheating and election violence.

[9] Previous cross-national studies (Birch 2011; Kelley 2012) use the overall evaluation on the quality of elections to measure electoral fraud, yet this treatment is problematic especially for this research. The overall evaluation includes election administrative capacities as a subcomponent measuring electoral fraud, yet this does not necessarily come from dictators' eagerness to commit electoral fraud but often stems from the quality of bureaucracy and central electoral management bodies.

limits on the scope and jurisdiction of elective offices, and unreasonably limits of who can run for office etc.? (Legal problems or restrictions) (2) Were there restrictions on freedom to campaign, media restrictions, intimidations, and improper use of public funds? (Pre-electoral cheating) (3) Was there any violence or unrest before an election day? (Pre-electoral violence) (4) Did any vote padding, tampering with ballot box, voter impersonation, double voting, vote buying,[10] intimidation etc. occur? (Election-day cheating) (5) Did any violence and unrest occur on an election day? (Election-day violence). Each of the variables takes 4 values between 0 (no problem) and 3 (serious problem). I aggregate those variables and create a dependent variable "Election Fraud" which ranges from 0 to 15. For an alternative measure to make sure the robustness of results, I prepare another dependent variable that takes into account only

[10] Election day cheating includes vote-buying practices and thus one may think that this component of fraud may be overlapped with pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal policy that I conceptualize not as a strategy of electoral fraud. Yet, this is not the case theoretically and empirically. Vote buying and manipulation of economic policy instruments are theoretically different techniques of distributing economic favors. The former assumes direct, illegal exchanges between votes and (relatively small) goods under monitored circumstances, while the latter is delivered more or less legally through programmatic fiscal policy and/or pork-barrel politics, not presupposing clientelistic structures (Stokes et al. 2013: 6-18). Furthermore, if the data wrongly codes pre-electoral manipulation of economic policy instruments as vote buying practices in a serious way, election-day cheating should be positively associated with financial resources. Yet, oil-gas value per capita, general fiscal revenue, tax revenue and non-tax revenue are all negatively correlated with election day cheating, suggesting the possible measurement errors are not that serious.

election cheating and violence (which ranged from 0 to 12 aggregating the values of questions (2) through (5)) while excluding the "legal problems" variable and using it as a control. Since voters can relatively easily recognize to what extent dictators commit electoral violence and cheating at the ballot box compared to implicit legal restrictions, dictators should be more careful about the extent of those fraudulent strategies for the signaling purpose. My dataset includes 255 elections in 67 dictatorial countries between 1975-2004. One may think dictatorship with no electoral competition should be excluded from the sample because dictators have no incentive to resort to fraud in such plebiscite elections. Yet, my theory suggests that whether to allow opposition parties to join electoral battles is also in dictators' toolbox of electoral manipulation. Indeed, it is empirically captured in a subcomponent of electoral fraud, "legal problems and restrictions." To confirm this, I conducted t-test to see if there is a meaningful difference between the two types of dictatorships on the level of electoral fraud and could not find a statistically significant difference.[11] As I have already shown in Introduction, Figure 1 shows a histogram on the distribution of the dependent variable (including components of legal restrictions, election violence and electoral cheating).

For Hypothesis 1, I mainly use Ross' (2011) oil-gas value per capita in constant 2000 dollars to operationalize economic resources that dictators can use at their disposal. This variable most extensively covers authoritarian countries compared to other variables that I use to measure financial resources. The variable is calculated multiplying a country's total oil-gas

[11] To observe electoral competition, I relied on Hyde and Marinov's (2012) empirical definition of electoral competition: elections are competitive if they satisfy that (1) opposition is allowed, (2) multiple parties are legal, and (3) more than one candidate compete (Hyde and Marinov 2012: 2).

production by the current oil-gas price and then divided by total population. As shown in Appendix A2, I also use alternative measures of state resources such as general fiscal revenue,[12] tax revenues, and non-tax revenues (Morrison 2009).

To test Hypothesis 2, organizational bases of dictators are empirically observed from the following two perspectives: (1) party-based organizations and (2) ethnicity-based networks. Indeed, Levitsky and Way (2010, 60-66) conclude that dominant party organizations and ethnic-based identity are two of the most important aspects to measure dictators' organizational power. Dominant-party regimes are likely to solve commitment problems between the dictator and ruling elites (Magaloni 2008). Increasing coherence of ruling coalitions, dominant-party regimes contribute to reducing the need for fraud by increasing the efficiency of economic distribution, but only when the dictator has rich financial resources. I use Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2010; 2014) to introduce a dummy variable of dominant-party regimes. This measure of dominant-party regime is the most suitable for my purpose, because the variable defines party regimes based on whether party organizations control selection of officials, organizes distribution of benefits, mobilizes citizens to vote and show party support (Geddes 2003; Wilson 2013: 5) "though other parties may exist and compete as minor parties in elections," (Geddes 2003: 51)[13] I code other types of dictatorships (military, personalist and monarchy dictatorships) as non-dominant party regimes to see difference in

[12] Revenue is central governments' total revenue plus grants to GDP. Regarding data sources, see Bodea and Higashijima (2013).

[13] Other datasets such as Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Svolik (2012) focus primarily on the number of political parties in legislature to define single-party regimes.

marginal effects of natural resources on fraud between dominant-party and non-dominant-party regimes.

Second, the size and cohesiveness of dominant ethnic groups is another good measure to capture a different aspect of organizational bases — ethno-organizational power of dictators. If an ethnic coalition consists of many ethnic groups, it is more difficult to monitor ruling elites' opportunistic behaviors through intra-ethnic policing mechanisms (Fearon and Laitin 1995). Indeed, cross-national studies have demonstrated that ethnically fractionalized ruling coalitions are more exposed to the risk of coups and internal struggles (Cederman, Min, Wimmer 2009; Roessler 2011). Furthermore, as the size of ethnic groups gets larger, it becomes easier for dictators to distribute patronage to broader citizens by using extensive ethnic networks than when their ethnic groups are small (Fearon 1999; Chandra 2004; Habyarimana et al. 2008). In fact, a large literature compellingly demonstrates that ethnic diversity prevents efficient public good provisions (see, e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999; Habyarimana et al. 2008; Franck and Rainer 2012). In measuring the size and cohesiveness of dominant ethnic groups simultaneously to operationalize ethno-organizational power, I multiply the proportion of politically dominant ethnic groups in total population by the fractionalization index of dominant ethnic groups. To distinguish politically dominant ethnic groups from politically excluded ones, I rely on Cederman et al.'s (2010) *Ethnic Power Relations* Dataset. The variable has a lower value as ethnic groups in ethnic coalitions occupy a smaller portion of total population and as ethnic coalitions are composed of more ethnic groups. I expect that the effect of financial resources will significantly change depending on both regime types and ethno-organizational power: financial resources make autocratic

elections even fairer if dictators have already constructed dominant-party regimes and/or had big, cohesive ethnic coalitions as their supporting bases.

The third variable is the opposition's capabilities of collective action (Hypothesis 3). Following Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's (2010) and Howard and Roessler's (2006: 372) operationalization where they observe "revolutionary threats" or anti-government collective action made by opposition parties, I use indicators counting the number of demonstrations, riots, and strikes from Arthur Banks's *Cross-National-Time-Series Data Archive*, to create a collective action variable. To consider that launching only one anti-regime protest is very costly in dictatorship and avoid simultaneity bias,[14] if the country experienced at least one riot, demonstration, or strike at (t-1) year, then the variable is coded as 1 and otherwise 0. I expect the variable to have a positive coefficient.

To control for other confounding factors possibly influencing the level of electoral fraud, I introduce logged GDP per capita,[15] GDP growth,[16] Polity IV score,[17] rural population (% of

[14] As a large literature of election violence demonstrates, incumbents predominantly exercise electoral violence (See, e.g. Straus and Taylor 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2012), so the collective action measure is not empirically overlapped with election violence. Yet, it may be the case that the variable includes many post-electoral anti-government protests. To avoid this simultaneity bias and capture temporal causality, the collective action variable is lagged by one year.

[15] It comes from Maddison's (2011) GDP per capita data.

[16] It is taken from *World Development Indicators (WDI)*. Missing values are dealt with by using Maddison (2011).

total population),[18] trade openness (sum of export and import relative to GDP, Birch 2011),[19] election administrative capacities,[20] types of elections (parliamentary or presidential; dummy variable)[21], and presence of domestic and international observers (Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012; dummy variables).[22] I also include decade interval dummies (1980s, 1990s and 2000s) to control for time-specific effects. I use OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered by countries to cope with heteroscedasticity.

---

[17] Marshall and Jaggers (2002). It ranges from -10 to 10. High political competition may reduce electoral fraud by increasing the mass pressure or influences of civil society (Birch 2011, 62). On the other hand, as Lehoucq and Molina (2002) argued, it may encourage fraud by increasing electoral stakes.

[18] It is taken from *WDI*. It is a proxy to consider clientelistic explanations of fraud (Birch 2011, 62). The direction of the coefficient is expected to be positive.

[19] It comes from *Penn World Table 7.1*. Missing values are supplemented by *WDI*.

[20] This is taken from Kelley (2012). The variable includes both pre-electoral and election-day administrative capacities ranging from 0 [no problem] to 6 [serious problems]).

[21] It comes from Kelley (2012). Presidential elections are more likely exposed to serious fraud than parliamentary elections because of high electoral stakes.

[22] Both are based on Kelley (2012).

Results

Table 1: Determinants of Electoral Fraud in Dictatorship

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Dependent Variables	VCL	VC	VCL	VC	VCL	VC
Oil-Gas value percapita (hundred dollars)	-0.0168**	-0.0149*	-0.0128**	-0.0109*	0.0244	0.0382*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Collective Action (t-1) year	0.938**	0.926**	0.923**	0.911**	0.943**	0.932**
	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.38)
Party	-0.437	-0.324	-0.286	-0.177	-0.394	-0.266
	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.43)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.45)
Party X Oil-Gas			-0.0430***	-0.0419***		
			(0.01)	(0.01)		
Ethnic Organizational Power	0.359	1.01	0.271	0.995	0.768	1.557**
	(0.83)	(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.69)	(0.91)	(0.78)
Ethnic Organizational Power X Oil-Gas					-0.193*	-0.248***
					(0.11)	(0.09)
Polity IV	-0.298***	-0.148***	-0.301***	-0.151***	-0.301***	-0.147***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Election Adminisrative Capacity	0.242	0.245	0.271	0.273	0.222	0.219
	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Logged GDP percapita (t-1) year	-0.224	-0.042	-0.178	-0.044	-0.200	-0.013
	(0.42)	(0.19)	(0.43)	(0.19)	(0.42)	(0.19)
Economic Growth (t-1) year	-0.024	-0.379	-0.031	-0.335	-0.023	-0.353
	(0.03)	(0.47)	(0.03)	(0.47)	(0.03)	(0.46)
Trade (t-1) year	-0.005	-0.016	-0.005	-0.022	-0.006	-0.014
	(0.005)	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.026)
Rural Population (t-1) year	0.010	-0.006	0.010	-0.006	0.008	-0.007
	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.005)
Parliamentary Elections	-0.179	0.007	-0.217	0.008	-0.233	0.005
	(0.25)	(0.02)	(0.25)	(0.02)	(0.26)	(0.02)
Domestic Election Monitoring	0.298	-0.217	0.197	-0.254	0.274	-0.288
	(0.64)	(0.22)	(0.63)	(0.23)	(0.65)	(0.23)
International Election Monitoring	0.833	0.346	0.87	0.247	0.841	0.316
	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.53)	(0.60)	(0.53)	(0.62)
Legal Problems		1.012*		1.047*		1.028*
		(0.53)		(0.53)		(0.53)
1980s	0.745	0.45	0.573	0.28	0.729	0.42
	(0.63)	(0.52)	(0.66)	(0.53)	(0.61)	(0.50)
1990s	2.557***	2.233***	2.422***	2.102***	2.645***	2.336***
	(0.71)	(0.57)	(0.75)	(0.58)	(0.70)	(0.55)
2000s	3.311***	2.694***	3.156***	2.545***	3.481***	2.894***
	(0.77)	(0.59)	(0.79)	(0.60)	(0.76)	(0.58)
Constant	3.92	4.074	3.74	3.902	3.77	3.881
	(4.16)	(4.41)	(4.24)	(4.49)	(4.14)	(4.36)
Observations	255	255	255	255	255	255
F-value	16.24***	11.11***	17.4***	17.00***	14.33***	10.91***
R-squared	0.44	0.39	0.44	0.40	0.44	0.40

Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. VCL= election violence + election cheating + legal problems, VC = election violence + election cheating.

Table 1 shows results of statistical analysis. Models 1 and 2 examine Hypotheses 1 and 3. The variable of oil-gas value per capita is statistically significant and negatively correlated

with electoral fraud in both models. More concretely, using estimation results of Model 1, authoritarian states with $100 of natural resource endowments per capita tend to lower the level of election fraud by 0.017 points. A case in point is the Suharto regime of Indonesia. From the late 1970s until the middle of the 1980s, Suharto enjoyed rich oil revenue because of surges in international oil prices (Smith 2007, 135-137)[23] and thus parliamentary elections held in 1977 and 1982 were both relatively clean (the election fraud level [including cheating, violence and legal problems] was 2 and 4 respectively in my data). After a significant drop in oil price after the late 1980s, however, Suharto began to seriously rig elections. In the 1997 parliamentary elections, when oil-gas value per capita was just 98 dollars, the level of election fraud reached 15, the maximum value in the sample.

In a similar vein, even if I use different measurements to operationalize state resources (fiscal revenue, non-tax revenue and tax revenue), these alternative variables are also negatively correlated with electoral fraud with 5% or 10% statistical significance (See Models 7 and 8 in Appendix A2). One percent increase in general fiscal revenue tends to lower electoral fraud by 0.04, whereas tax and non-tax revenues both reduce electoral fraud by 0.1 and 0.02 respectively. As I have controlled for political competitiveness using Polity IV, the effect of tax revenue is mainly brought by the distribution mechanism assumed in my theory, rather than as a result that high political representation brought by high tax collection leads to clean elections (Levi 1988). Models 1 and 2 also show that the opposition's collective action is positively correlated with electoral fraud, supporting Hypothesis 3. If the country experienced

[23] My data indicates oil revenue in Indonesia in the early 1980s was about ten times as high as in the early 1970s. In 1981, one year before a parliamentary election, oil-gas value per capita was 305 dollars.

at least one riot, strike or demonstration one year before an election, the level of electoral fraud increases by 0.938.

On the other hand, neither dominant-party regime dummy nor ethno-organizational power per se has any statistically significant impacts on electoral fraud in the two models. As previous studies suggested (see, e.g. Levitsky and Way 2010, 63), this may reflect the fact that these organizational bases are often used to commit electoral fraud to systematically fabricate election results by mobilizing local ruling elites, rather than to streamline economic distribution. Especially when dictators do not possess rich financial resources to distribute, they have a stronger incentive to use their organizational power for fraud purposes. Since these models do not condition the effect of organizational power upon the amount of financial resources, the positive and negative effects of organizational power on fraud may be cancelled out.

Figure 2: The Different Effects of Natural Resource Endowments between Dominant-Party and Non-Dominant-Party Regimes



Note: The graph is based on estimation results of Model 3.

Thus, in Models 3 and 4, I examine a conditional effect of oil-gas rent per capita upon the presence of dominant-party regime and found evidence supporting Hypothesis 2. In both models, the oil-gas rent variable and its interaction term with dominant-party regime are both negative and statistically significant. Figure 2 visually demonstrates the difference in the impact of natural resources on electoral fraud between dominant party and non-dominant party regimes. In non-dominant party regimes, natural resources lower electoral fraud only by 0.013. If the country is dominant-party regime, however, the impact of natural resources is 4.3 times higher than non-dominant party regimes. Under dominant-party regime including

Malaysia, Mexico, Tanzania and Gabon, 100 dollars increase in natural resource endowments lowers the level of electoral fraud by 0.056.

Figure 3: The Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Endowments Conditional upon Ethnic Organizational Power



Note: The graph is based on estimation results of Model 5.

Finally, Models 5 and 6 test Hypothesis 2 from the other perspective – ethnic organizational power. Interaction terms of the ethnic organizational power variable and oil-gas value per capita are negative and statistically significant. Figure 3 depicts a graph illustrating how the coefficient of oil-gas per capita will change according to values of ethnic organizational power. As the graph shows, when ethnic organizational power is weak (from 0 through around 0.2), the impact of natural resource endowments is not statistically distinguishable from 0. As

politically dominant ethnic groups become more cohesive and larger, however, the negative impact of natural resource endowments on reducing fraud also becomes larger. At the maximum value where only one dominant ethnic group occupies 100 % of total population (ethnic organizational power = 1), the coefficient of oil-gas rent per capita is about -0.17.

Regarding control variables, only Polity IV score consistently has a negative, statistically significant association with electoral fraud suggesting that political competition lowers the level of electoral fraud. Other variables generally show expected signs, yet do not reach standard statistical significance levels.

Robustness Check and Additional Data Analysis

For robustness checks, I conducted additional statistical analyses. First, I added regional dummies to control for regional specific factors influencing electoral fraud, yet the main results hardly changed. Second, I added the lagged dependent variable to deal with possible time-series autocorrelation. And again, most results remain almost the same.[24] Third, I added

[24] Adding lagged dependent variables drastically reduces the number of observations by 42 %. In this lagged dependent variable model, the collective action variable and the interaction effect between oil and ethnic organizational power become statistically insignificant, yet these changes mostly come from reduction of the number of observations caused by including the lagged dependent variable. This is because, using the same sample and model specification without including the lagged dependent variable, I have got the same results on these variables, suggesting that reduction of the sample size mainly brought changes in the results. Furthermore, time-series autocorrelation is not so serious in this case, because the correlation

one-year lag to the oil-gas rent, fiscal revenue, and tax and non-tax revenue variables to consider possible simultaneity bias,[25] yet results did not change. Fourth, to cope with possible heteroscedasticity within regions, I alternatively computed robust standard errors clustered by region, instead of country, and there were no significant changes in the main results. Finally, Additionally, I introduced other control variables such as Freedom House index,[26] foreign direct investment,[27] forms of government (presidentialism vs parliamentarism),[28] the Cold War dummy, and military spending,[29] yet those additional controls did not affect overall results.

---

coefficient is just 0.33 and the lagged dependent variable is consistently statistically insignificant in all the models.

[25] For instance, if election violence erupts in election year, the country might not be able to extract oil resources efficiently.

[26] This is an alternative measurement to capture the mass pressure and the strength of civil society (Birch 2011, 62).

[27] I use inflow of foreign direct investment relative to GDP (*WDI*).

[28] This comes from *Database of Political Institutions*.

[29] Rich resources, especially natural resource wealth, may be also used to strengthen security apparatus (see, e.g. Ross 2001, 332-336). The strong military may encourage dictators to hold partly free elections because they can more easily repress post-electoral protests. To make sure that the effect of natural resource endowments largely comes from economic distribution, I control for military spending relative to GDP (taken from *the Correlates of War Project*).

Lastly, I disaggregate the election fraud variable into election violence and election cheating and run ordered logistic regression with clustered robust standard errors to see whether different causal mechanisms exist between electoral violence and electoral cheating (Appendix A2).[30] Oil-gas rent per capita always has a negative association with both electoral violence and cheating (Models 9 and 12). Second, the collective action variable is better at explaining variation in electoral violence rather than electoral cheating (Models 9 and 12). In the cheating model, the coefficient of collective action is as expected yet does not reach to the 10% significance level. Third, an interaction between dominant-party regime and natural resource endowments has a statistically significant impact on reducing electoral cheating rather than electoral violence (Models 10 and 13). Conversely, the conditional effect of the oil-gas variable upon ethnic organizational power better explains electoral violence than electoral cheating (Models 11 and 14). These results suggest strategies that dictators use to bias election results do not change if they possess large amounts of economic resources, yet they decide to use distinctive strategies according to (1) whether they face strong opposition groups and (2) what type of political organization the dictator can rely on. In a nutshell, these additional analyses suggest that all other things being equal, strong oppositions and weak politically dominant ethnic groups fuel violence, whereas non-single party regimes are more likely to commit electoral cheating.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the logic of electoral fairness in dictatorship. Dictators face the electoral dilemma between the certainty and credibility of election results. Focusing on the

[30] Two variables range from 0 (no problems) to 6 (major problems).

balance of mobilization power between the dictator and the elites, this research has argued that strong dictators, who can mobilize a large amount of votes via economic distribution, are more willing to open the electoral field and hence lower the degree of electoral fraud. This paper suggests that though it may sound counter-intuitive, powerful dictators willingly liberalize the electoral market and embark on electoral reforms to exploit the benefits that partly free elections can bring to them. In this sense, the findings in this paper imply that the mere existence of free and fair elections does not necessarily lead to further democratization in dictatorial countries.

The paper suggests that international development assistance organizations should recognize the political difficulty of democratization and the temptation for weak dictators to use cheating and violence. International development assistance organizations send election observers and/or peacekeeping agents to prevent dictators from committing serious election cheating and violence (see, e.g. Kelley 2012). If dictators are weak, however, fair elections brought by international election monitoring might lead to post-election conflict by revealing the weakness of dictators, which in turn might threaten political order after elections. Conversely, when dictators are strong, election monitoring and subsequent higher quality of elections might legitimate those dictators that get an overwhelming victory by mobilizing their rich political resources. This is more likely to prevent conflict, but also encourage authoritarian leaders to hold on to power through "legitimized" elections. Based on this understanding of the trade-off between democracy and political order, international development assistance organizations need to develop roadmaps and effective strategies to transform dictatorial countries into democratic, peaceful ones. Without them, international

assistance will be trapped by either democracy without order or strong order without democracy.

Appendix

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

	The Number of Obs	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Data Sources
Electoral Fraud (VCL)	366	5.37	2.94	0	15	Kelley (2012)
Electoral Fraud (VC)	371	3.94	2.64	0	12	Kelley (2012)
Electoral Violence	409	1.25	1.59	0	6	Kelley (2012)
Electoral Cheating	450	2.74	1.84	0	6	Kelley (2012)
Legal Problems	571	1.72	1.2	0	3	Kelley (2012)
Oil-Gas value percapita (hundred dollars)	565	3.3835	14.2346	0	206.27	Ross (2011)
Fiscal Revenue	394	22.76	11.39	2.83	73.05	Various Sources (a)
Tax Revenue	185	17.05	7.38	0.06	44.13	Morrison (2009)
Non Tax Revenue	177	10.82	12.71	-1.56	131.27	Morrison (2009)
Single Party Regime	538	0.5	0.5	0	1	Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2011)
Ethnic Organizational Power	442	0.45	0.28	0.03	0.98	Wimmer, Min and Cederman (2009)
Collective Action	590	0.26	0.44	0	1	Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive
Polity IV	574	-3.3	5.04	-10	10	Polity IV Project
Election Administrative Capacity	470	0.65	1.13	0	5	Kelley (2012)
Logged GDP percapita	553	7.54	0.85	6.07	10.02	Maddison (2011)
Economic Growth (% of GDP)	570	2.71	7.37	-28	63.37	World Development Indicators (WDI)
Trade Openess (% of GDP)	545	72.66	51.87	8.79	376.28	Penn World Table 7.1. and WDI
Rural Population (% of Total Population)	544	58.25	20.89	0	95.72	WDI
Parliamentary Elections	590	0.67	0.46	0	1	Kelley (2012)
Domestic Electoral Monitoring	586	0.16	0.37	0	1	Kelley (2012)
International Electoral Monitoring	585	0.35	0.47	0	1	Kelley (2012)

Note: (a) Government Financial Indicators (IMF) , International Financial Indicators (IMF), IMF Annual Country Report, OECD Statistics, EBRD Transitional Report and Brender and Drazen (2006).

Table A2: Additional Statistical Analyses

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
Dependent Variables	VCL	VCL	Violence	Violence	Violence	Cheating	Cheating	Cheating
Oil-Gas value percapita (hundred dollars)			-0.086*	-0.050	0.003	-0.021*	-0.016***	-0.011
			(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Fiscal Revenue	-0.0424**							
	(0.02)							
Tax Revenue		-0.102**						
		(0.05)						
Non-Tax Revenue		-0.0224*						
		(0.01)						
Collective Action (t-1) year			0.840**	0.803**	0.870**	0.216	0.171	0.211
			(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Party			-0.321	-0.138	-0.35	0.0168	0.233	0.0281
			(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.40)
Party X Oil-Gas				-0.001			-0.071*	
				(0.001)			(0.038)	
Ethnic Organizational Power			0.35	0.32	0.71	0.574	0.57	0.681
			(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.67)	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.73)
Ethnic Organizational Power X Oil-Gas					-0.193*			-0.0445
					(0.10)			(0.09)
Polity IV	-0.25***	-0.24***	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.21***	-0.22***	-0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Election Adminisrative Capacity	0.434***	0.369	-0.031	-0.024	-0.067	0.38**	0.424**	0.373**
	(0.16)	(0.45)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Logged GDP percapita (t-1) year	0.167	1.066	0.121	0.129	0.097	-0.385	-0.356	-0.382
	(0.51)	(0.68)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.37)
Economic Growth (t-1) year	-0.023	0.009	-0.028	-0.027	-0.026	0.006	0.002	0.006
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trade (t-1) year	-0.0065*	-0.003	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.015**	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Rural Population (t-1) year	0.005	0.0450*	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.0023	0.001	0.0019
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Parliamentary Elections	-0.171	-0.102	-0.351*	-0.322*	-0.392**	-0.0007	-0.013	-0.018
	(0.25)	(0.46)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Domestic Election Monitoring	0.287	0.965	-0.481	-0.534	-0.453	0.716	0.586	0.71
	(0.52)	(0.99)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.49)
International Election Monitoring	0.611	0.459	0.798	0.751	0.81	0.665	0.666	0.664
	(0.45)	(0.68)	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.45)
1980s	0.968	1.553**	1.146	1.15	1.109	0.139	0.0794	0.137
	(0.65)	(0.76)	(0.83)	(0.83)	(0.84)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.51)
1990s	2.627***	2.629***	1.967**	2.024**	2.003***	1.582***	1.597***	1.607***
	(0.79)	(0.90)	(0.79)	(0.80)	(0.78)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.52)
2000s	3.264***		1.926**	1.943**	2.046**	2.143***	2.104***	2.192***
	(0.84)		(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.80)	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.62)
Constant	2.184	-6.737						
	(4.93)	(6.67)						
Observations	257	104	255	255	255	255	255	255
Number of Countries	67	38	67	67	67	67	67	67
F-value	14.18***	4.51***	44.8*** (a)	42.71***(a)	58.55***(a)	186.53***(a)	213.32***(a)	183.78***(a)
R-squared	0.415	0.422	0.1 (b)	0.1027 (b)	0.1036 (b)	0.1511 (b)	0.1555 (b)	0.1514 (b)

Note: Models 9-14 are estimated using ordered logistic regression. Cut points are not reported. (a) reports Wald Statistics. (b) reports pseudo R squared. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1

References

Akhmedov, Akhmed and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119-4:1301-1338.

Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly. 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Division." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114: 1243-1284.

Ames, Barry. 1970. "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party." *American Political Science Review* 64 (1): 153-167.

Birch, Sarah. 2007. "Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct." *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (12): 1533-1556.

Birch, Sarah. 2011. *Electoral Malpractice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blaydes, Lisa. 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, Michael and Eldred Masunungure. 2008. "Zimbabwe's Long Agony," *Journal of Democracy* 19-4: 41-55.

Blaydes, Lisa, 2011, *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Boix, Carles and Milan Svolik. 2007. "Non-Tyrannical Autocracies." Paper presented at the UCLA Comparative Politics Seminar.

Boix, Carles and Milan Svolik. 2013. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships." forthcoming in *the Journal of Politics*.

Brender, Adi and Allan Drazen. 2005. "Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52 (7): 1271-1295.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2010. “Leader Survival, Revolutions and the Nature of Government Finance.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (4): 936-950.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Min Brian, and Wimmer Andreas. 2009. “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis.” *American Sociological Review* 74(2): 316-337.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chang, Eric and Miriam Golden. 2010. “Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes.” *Social Science Quarterly* 91 (1): 1-20.

Cheibub, Antonio, Jeniffer Gandhi and James Vreeland. 2009. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” *Public Choice* 143 (2): 67-101.

Cox, Gary. 2009. "Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975-2004." Unpublished Manuscript.

Davenport, Christian. 2007. *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*, Cambridge University Press.

Desai, Raj, Anders Olofsgard, and Tarik Yousef. 2009. “The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains.” *Economics and Politics* 21: 93-125.

Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin. “Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data.” *American Political Science Review* 103 (4): 645-668.

Eisenstadt, Todd. 2004. *Courting Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fearon, James and David Laitin. 1995. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.” *American Political Science Review* 90 (4): 715-735.

Fearon, James. 1999. “Why Ethnic Politics and ‘Pork’ Tend to Go Together?’ Working Paper.

Franck Raphael and Ilia Rainer. 2012. “Does the Leader’s Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa.” *American Political Science Review* 106 (2): 294-325.

Fukumoto, Kentaro and Yusaku Horiuchi. 2011. “Making Outsiders’ Votes Count: Detecting Electoral Fraud through a Natural Experiment.” *American Political Science Review* 105-3: 586-603.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2009. “Elections under Authoritarianism.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 403-422.

Gandhi, Jennifer and James Vreeland. 2004. "Political Institutions and Civil War:

Unpacking Anocracy." Unpublished Manuscript.

Geddes, Barbara. 2006. “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes.” Working Paper.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2014. “New Data on Autocratic Regimes,” Forthcoming in *Perspective on Politics*.

Greene, Kenneth. 2007. *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Greene, Kenneth. 2009. “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43-7: 807-834.

Haber, Stephen. 2006. “Authoritarian Government.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, eds., Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman. Oxford University Press, 693-707.

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 709-725.

Hadenius, Axel and Jan Teorrel. 2007. "Pathways from Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 18-1: 143-156.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Susan Hyde and Ryan Jablonski. 2012. "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" Forthcoming in *British Journal of Political Science*.

Hartlyn, Johathan, Jennifer McCoy, and Thomas Mustillo. 2008. "Electoral Governance Matters: Explaining the Quality of Elections in Contemporary Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 41: 73-98.

Hermet, Guy, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquie eds. 1978. *Elections without Choice*. John Wiley and Sons.

Higashijima, Masaaki. 2010. "Electoral Cycles, Party Competition and State Resources in Authoritarianism: Evidence from Kazakhstan," Working Paper.

Howard, Marc and Philip Roessler. 2006. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Comparative Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 50-2: 365-381.

Hyde, Susan. 2007. "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." *World Politics* 60: 37-63.

Hyde, Susan and Angela O'Mahoney. 2011. "International Scrutiny and Pre-Electoral Fiscal Manipulation." *Journal of Politics* 72 (3): 1-14.

Hyde, Susan. 2011. *The Pseudo Democrats Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm?* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hyde, Susan and Nichorai Marinov. 2012. "Which Elections Can be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20

(2): 191-210.

Ichino, Nahomi and Matthias Schuendeln. 2012. "Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana." *The Journal of Politics* 74 (1): 292-307.

Kelley, Judith. 2009. "D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation." *International Organization* 63: 765-787.

Kelley, Judith. 2012. *Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Kricheli, Ruth, Yair Livne and Beatriz Magaloni. 2011. "Taking to the Streets: Theory and Evidence on Protests under Authoritarianism," Working Paper.

Kuhn, Patrick. 2012. "Elections, Information, Fraud and Post-Electoral Protest." Working Paper.

Kuran, Timur. 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989." *World Politics* 44 (1): 7-48.

LeBas, Adrienne. 2006. "Polarization as Craft: Explaining Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe," *Comparative Politics* 38-4: 419-438.

Lehoucq, Fabrice and Ivan Molina. 2002. *Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in Costa Rica*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2003. "Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences." *Annual Review of Political Science* 6: 233-256.

Levi, Margaret. 1989. *Of Rule and Revenue*, University of California Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in*

Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Magaloni, Beatritz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41: 715-41.

Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2010. "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in a Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 103 (3): 482-502.

Miller, Michael. 2012. "Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes." Working Paper.

Morrison, Kevin. 2009. "Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability." *International Organization* 63: 107-138.

Mutlu, Gulay. 2012. "Transition to Multi-Party System in Kazakhstan?" *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*. January 12nd, 2012.

Olcott, Martha. 2012. "Kazakhstan's Political (R)evolution," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Pepinsky, Thomas. 2007. "Autocracy, Elections and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malaysia." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 42: 136-163.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Reuter, Ora John and Graeme Robertson. 2011. "Sub-National Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointment." *The Journal of Politics* 74 (4): 1023-1037.

Roessler, Philip. 2011. "The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa." *World Politics* 63 (2): 300-346.

Ross, Michael, 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53: 325-61.

Ross, Michael. 2012. *The Oil Curse*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Schedler, Andreas ed. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Shi, Tianjian. 1999. "Voting and Nonvoting in China: Voting Behavior in Plebiscitary and Limited-Choice Elections." *Journal of Politics* 61 (4): 1115-1139.

Simpser, Alberto. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice and Implications*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Benjamin. 2004. "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (2): 232-246.

Smith, Benjamin. 2007. *Hand Times in the Lands of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, Cornell University Press.

Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco, *Brokers, Voters and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*, Cambridge University Press.

Straus, Scott and Charlie Taylor. 2012. "Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008." in *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Dorina Bekoe. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 15-38.

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weiss, Jessica Chen. 2012. "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China." *International Organization* 67 (1): 1-35.

Wilson, Matthew, C. 2013. "A Discreet Critique of Discrete Regime Type Data," Forthcoming in *Comparative Political Studies*.

Wimmer, Andreas, Brian Min and Lars-Eric Cederman. 2009. "Ethnic Politics and Armed

Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set." *American Sociological Review* 74: 316-337.

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wright, Joseph. 2011. "Electoral Spending Cycles in Dictatorships." Working Paper.

Wright, Joseph, Erica Frantz and Barbara Geddes. 2013. "Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival." Working Paper.

Zibratt, Daniel. 2009. "Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany." *American Political Science Review* 103 (1): 1-21.

Data Sources

Banks, Arthur. 2009. *The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Brian Min and Andreas Wimmer. 2009. *Ethnic Power Relations Dataset*. Available at http://www.epr.ucla.edu/. (accessed on May 24, 2013)

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2010. *Autocratic Regime Data*. Available at http://dictators.la.psu.edu/. (accessed on May 24, 2013)

International Monetary Fund. 2010. *International Financial Statistics*.

International Monetary Fund. 2010. *Government Financial Statistics*.

International Monetary Fund, *IMF Annual Reports*.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *OECD Statistics*.

Kelley, Judith. 2012. *Quality of Elections Data*. Available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/31461/version/1. (accessed on May 24, 2013)

Maddison, Angus. 2011. *The Maddison Project Database*. Available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm. (accesses on May 24, 2013)

Marshall, Monty and Keith Jagger, *Polity IV Project*.

Penn World Table Version 7.1.

Ross, Michael. 2011. *Oil and Gas Production and Values, 1932-2009*. Available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross. (accessed on May 24, 2013)

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transitional Report*.

World Bank, *World Development Indicators*.