Sunday, January 29, 2012

Salaried bourgeois on "revolt of the salaried bourgeoisie" posted by Richard Seymour

Zizek's latest for the LRB is proof of that old adage that those who attack multiculturalism in the name of class instantly forfeit their probity on both subjects.  Actually, that isn't an old adage.  I just made it up.  But it is nonetheless true.  To explain: Zizek has expended a lot of polemical energy attacking a certain kind of poststructuralist and post-marxist politics for its abandonment of class.  But this critique was bound up with a simultaneous attack on 'political correctness', 'multiculturalism', and so forth, in the name of a 'leftist plea for Eurocentrism'. Of course, it was possible to appreciate the former critique without subscribing to the latter.  (And if you want a serious critique of post-marxist fashion, you must read Ellen Wood's The Retreat from Class.)  But it was never very clear what Zizek understood by 'class', apart from a structuring discursive principle: it was always invoked somewhat dogmatically.  If one doesn't expect from Zizek a scientific analysis of social classes, one would at least expect him to know what he thinks classes are.  It's quite clear from his latest piece, which re-states some of the theses earlier expounded in Living in the End Times, that he either has no idea, or has a novel theory of classes that he has yet to explain.

Rent, surplus value and the "general intellect"
Zizek's main argument is that the current global upheavals comprise a "revolt of the salaried bourgeoisie" in danger of losing its privileges.  He begins by making an argument about the source of ruling class wealth in advanced capitalist formations.  Taking the example of Bill Gates, he asserts that the latter's wealth derives not from exploiting workers more successfully - "Microsoft pays its intellectual workers a relatively high salary" - but "because Microsoft has imposed itself as an almost universal standard, practically monopolising the field, as one embodiment of what Marx called the ‘general intellect’, by which he meant collective knowledge in all its forms".  In other words, Microsoft doesn't extract surplus value but rent, through its monopolistic control of information.  This is paradigmatic of "the gradual transformation of the profit generated by the exploitation of labour into rent appropriated through the privatisation of knowledge". The influence of post-operaismo in all this is clear: Zizek accepts and expounds the idea that intellectual labour is "immaterial" labour, which he maintains has a predominant or "hegemonic" role in late capitalism.  On this basis, he asserts that orthodox marxist value theory has become problematic, as "immaterial" labour simply cannot be appropriated in the way that "material" labour can.

Before going any further, just note that this whole line of argument is a red herring.  Even accepting the narrow focus on Microsoft's "intellectual workers" as a paradigm of 21st century work, their "relatively high salary" has no direct bearing on whether they are efficiently exploited. Or rather, if it indicates anything, it would tend to be that they are likely to be far more efficiently exploited than other workers. Globally, this is the trend: the higher the wages, the higher the rate of exploitation.  It is also the trend historically: the famous high wages offered by Ford were possible in part because the techniques of Taylorism allowed the more effective extraction of relative surplus value.  (The distinction between relative and absolute surplus value would be a fairly basic one for anyone claiming to operate within a marxisant radius.)  This is not to say that all of Microsoft's "intellectual workers" are therefore diamond proletarians.  Classes are formed in the context of class struggle, and the extent to which these workers are 'proletarianised' or 'embourgeoised' will depend on how successfully managers have subordinated the labour process, etc.  Nor does it strike me as a wholly unreasonable proposition that Gates' main source of added value is monopoly rent - it is arguable, at least.  But Zizek's argument in support of this idea is simply a non-sequitur.

Marx, the sock puppet
Zizek goes on to explain how his approach differs from that of orthodox marxism, and much of his argument hinges on how he sets up Marx as a foil.  Thus: "The possibility of the privatisation of the general intellect was something Marx never envisaged in his writings about capitalism (largely because he overlooked its social dimension)."  Setting aside the curious claim that Marx "overlooked" the "social dimension" of capitalist productive relations, it is worth re-stating what Zizek undoubtedly already knows: the writings on the 'general intellect' are part of an exceptionally brief fragment in the Grundrisse, and would thus be hard pressed to 'envisage' anything; nonetheless, the description of the "general intellect" in the Grundrisse as a "direct force of production" manifest in the "development of fixed capital" assumes that the "general intellect" is already privatized.

What Zizek means, I assume, is that Marx did not anticipate the monopolization of "general social knowledge", and therefore did not anticipate that the major class struggles in an advanced capitalist formation might be over the share of rent rather than over the direct extraction of surplus value.  This is clear in the way that he treats the example of oil.  For, according to Zizek: "There is a permanent struggle over who gets this rent: citizens of the Third World or Western corporations. It’s ironic that in explaining the difference between labour (which in its use produces surplus value) and other commodities (which consume all their value in their use), Marx gives oil as an example of an ‘ordinary’ commodity. Any attempt now to link the rise and fall in the price of oil to the rise or fall in production costs or the price of exploited labour would be meaningless: production costs are negligible as a proportion of the price we pay for oil, a price which is really the rent the resource’s owners can command thanks to its limited supply."  So, this raises two questions: i) did Marx really not anticipate in his theory the possibility that rent extraction would be a source of major class struggles?; and ii) as a corollary, does the example of oil and its absurdly high prices undermine the labour theory of value?

This is fairly straightforward to establish.  First of all, the evidence of Marx's writings is that he understood that there could exist a class or fraction of people whose income depended on rent extraction.  Marx discussed two main types of rent.  These were, differential rent, and absolute ground rent.  To explain the first type of rent, it is necessary to specify some implications of the labour theory of value, which Zizek maintains is outmoded.  First of all, if the value of goods is determined by the socially necessary labour time invested in them, it would tend to follow that if less labour time is needed to make the goods then over time the exchange value of these goods would decline.  But the fact is that producers are in competition with one another for market share, so will tend to invest in labour saving devices so as to reduce their labour costs.  And even if, over time, the replication of this tendency throughout the economy - enforced by imperative of competition - the result is to reduce the total profit on the goods, the immediate effect is to enrich whoever temporarily has a more efficient firm as a result.  They obtain a differential rent because their investment enables them to obtain a larger share of a diminishing pool of surplus value.  The second type of rent, absolute rent, needs no lengthy exposition here, but can be said to be that type of rent that would most naturally arise in monopoly situations.  At any rate, it's reasonable to suppose that Bill Gates' wealth must embody some of both types of rent, alongside an unknown quantity of direct surplus labour.

Secondly, Marx's labour theory of value is not rebutted by the fluctuations of oil prices.  The theory is not supposed to explain price fluctuations, which respond to supply and demand.  The exchange value is an average across the productive chain; there is no mathematically fixed relation between the price of one particular commodity and the exchange value that exists as an average over the whole class of commodities which changes over time.  Nor is the theory endangered by the fact that the relation between supply and demand can be manipulated in monopoly situations to drastically increase the actual price of a good.  I am well aware that there are valid controversies regarding the labour theory of value.  Nor do I imagine that Kliman's heroic work will completely save the orthodox theory from its doubters, many of whom aren't even operating on the same theoretical terrain.  But Zizek's challenge is, purely on theoretical grounds, ineffectual.  It is a straw man that he dissects to such devastating rhetorical effect in this article.  For the sake of concision, I omit other instances in which he travesties Marx, both in this and other articles - we'd be here for a long, tedious time.

The "salaried bourgeoisie"
Zizek uses terms extraordinarily loosely.  Take the "salaried bourgeoisie", whose "revolt" apparently motivates this piece.  They are said to be leading most of the strikes taking place.  Zizek thus presumably includes in this groups like the public sector workers who have struck in most European countries.  Yet, he doesn't say what makes them a "salaried bourgeoisie".  His useage implies a novel class theory, but the closest he comes to defining this term is where he specifies that he means those who enjoy a 'privilege', being a surplus over the minimum wage.   Now, it's not at first clear what he means by the minimum wage.  There are, of course, legally enforced minimum wages in a number of advanced capitalist societies, but he doesn't mean that.  That would be arbitrary and would tell us nothing directly about productive relations.  But mark what he does mean by the 'minimum wage': "an often mythic point of reference whose only real example in today’s global economy is the wage of a sweatshop worker in China or Indonesia".  This no less arbitrary, as Zizek himself acknowledges.

Now, while the manner of his exposition implies a critical distance from such concepts, he nonetheless deploys them, arguing that they are themselves constitutive of a politically and discursively constructed division of labour: "The bourgeoisie in the classic sense thus tends to disappear: capitalists reappear as a subset of salaried workers, as managers who are qualified to earn more by virtue of their competence (which is why pseudo-scientific ‘evaluation’ is crucial: it legitimises disparities). Far from being limited to managers, the category of workers earning a surplus wage extends to all sorts of experts, administrators, public servants, doctors, lawyers, journalists, intellectuals and artists. The surplus takes two forms: more money (for managers etc), but also less work and more free time (for – some – intellectuals, but also for state administrators etc).  The evaluative procedure used to decide which workers receive a surplus wage is an arbitrary mechanism of power and ideology, with no serious link to actual competence; the surplus wage exists not for economic but for political reasons: to maintain a ‘middle class’ for the purpose of social stability."

In this sense, the "surplus wage" that characterises the exploitation of the proletariat by the "salaried bourgeoisie" is a discursive fiction, unanchored in real productive relations.  Still, having thus qualified his terms, it is nonetheless clear that it corresponds to some material processes.  After all, if the labour theory of value no longer adequately captures the workings of surplus extraction, and if the 'hegemonic' pattern of accumulation is the extraction of rent, then the 'surplus wage' has some material basis as that which is paid out of a share of the rent (largely extracted by Western corporations from the citizens of the Third World).  Further, Zizek goes on to maintain that the efficacy of such 'classes' is not the less real for their being political and discursive.  It explains current political behaviour, he says (and here I must quote at length):

"The notion of surplus wage also throws new light on the continuing ‘anti-capitalist’ protests. In times of crisis, the obvious candidates for ‘belt-tightening’ are the lower levels of the salaried bourgeoisie: political protest is their only recourse if they are to avoid joining the proletariat. Although their protests are nominally directed against the brutal logic of the market, they are in effect protesting about the gradual erosion of their (politically) privileged economic place. Ayn Rand has a fantasy in Atlas Shrugged of striking ‘creative’ capitalists, a fantasy that finds its perverted realisation in today’s strikes, most of which are held by a ‘salaried bourgeoisie’ driven by fear of losing their surplus wage. These are not proletarian protests, but protests against the threat of being reduced to proletarians. Who dares strike today, when having a permanent job is itself a privilege? Not low-paid workers in (what remains of) the textile industry etc, but those privileged workers who have guaranteed jobs (teachers, public transport workers, police). This also accounts for the wave of student protests: their main motivation is arguably the fear that higher education will no longer guarantee them a surplus wage in later life."

Zizek goes on to qualify this observation - each protest must be taken on its own merits, we can't dismiss them all, etc. - but is clearly arguing that the general thrust of the strikes and protests is in defense of relative privilege.  This is especially true of the "special case" of Greece, where "in the last decades, a new salaried bourgeoisie (especially in the over-extended state administration) was created thanks to EU financial help, and the protests were motivated in large part by the threat of an end to this".  So far the only evidence offered for the existence of this 'salaried bourgeoisie' is in its ostensibly discernible, concrete effects in the political behaviour of social layers affected by crisis.  Yet this behaviour can be explained far more efficiently by the class interests of fractions of the proletariat who, due in part to superior organisation vis-a-vis their employers, have obtained a degree of job security and in some cases relatively high wages.  In which case, the concept is useless.

As is typical with Zizek, each step in his argument is characterised by an astonishing lack of precision, a slipshod and loose useage of terms, straw man attacks, sock puppetry and so on.  There are lots of fireworks, but little real theoretical action: all show, no tell, an empty performance of emancipatory politics.  And I just thought I'd spell that out because so many people messaged, prodded and otherwise cajoled me into criticising this latest from Zizek.  I hope you're satisfied.

Labels: , , , , , , , , , , ,

9:51:00 pm | Permalink | Comments thread | | Print | Digg | del.icio.us | reddit | StumbleUpon | diigo it | Share| Flattr this

Monday, June 21, 2010

Working for capitalism posted by Richard Seymour

Class is not a thing but a relationship, an antagonism that is situated in production. Sociologists have long tried to understand class by reference to occuptional groupings because one can only identify what class one belongs to by locating oneself within the system of production. It is not a coincidence that workplace sociologists such as Bradley et al have done some of the essential work in restoring class to its central explanatory role in the social sciences. They build on the work of a generation of radicalised social theorists such as Huw Beynon, Theo Nichols, Richard Pfeffer and Harry Braverman, in describing how class power is inherited, wielded in the workplace, and rewarded with a greater or lesser share of profits - as well as how class systems are perpetually restructured as production is reshaped, and work takes on new forms.

Some social theorists maintain a sort of apocalyptic thesis in which technology and the 'knowledge economy' are rapidly obliterating the working class. In this view, work is something antiquated and mechanical, not something that one performs with advanced information technology or, heaven forfend, with the use of skilled knowledge. The worker is a dusty old chap with a spanner, not someone in a pressed shirt sitting in front of an LCD screen. Of course, 'work' has always had a broader meaning than such revisionists allow. The 'working class' has never been defined by a particular skill set, a particular kind of consumption, a particular set of values, sartorial tendencies or gustatory propensities. Therefore the emergence of a white collar proletariat with the ability to use Microsoft Office programmes should not seem counterintuitive - recruitment agencies make a living from this phenomenon. Their class situation is predicated on their relationship to the means of production, which determines how much power and self-direction they will have in the workplace.

In light of this, consider the following talk from Dan Pink, a sort of management guru and former speech-writer for Al Gore. He introduces the topic of 'drive', of what motivates people, and affirms - in a strangely affectless, yet gushing manner - the virtues of autonomy and self-direction in the workplace. It's a mantra for hippy capitalism:



Pink's assertions about what motivates people are not without interest. However, the first thing that strikes one about this little talk is that all of Pink's examples of "cool" workplace practises, wherein workers' productivity dramatically improves upon their being freed from management and the incentives structure, are taken from the software industry. They are taken from a set of employees whose particular role in production is necessarily in some sense both directive and executive. They are an atypical group of workers in this respect. The very fact that it would be possible to give them enough money for cash not to be a motivational issue, and thereafter allow them autonomy in the workplace, means that they are closer to the professional middle class than to the working class. For Pink and those of his persuasion, (and class purview no doubt), this is the future of work. But what the Pinks of this world don't get is that management has an interest in proletarianising such workers, and thus of turning their labour into a routinised series of discrete, mechanical tasks as far as possible.

When new technologies come along, part of the struggle between workers and management takes place over the former's mastery of the subject and thus their ability to resist managerial attempts to oversee, discipline and control their working day. The more managers can get to grips with this technology, or find surrogates and auxiliaries who already have a firm grip on it, the more they can break down workers' tasks into manageable units, the better to surveille, control and extract more surplus value. These processes are already well under way in the IT sector, and in all areas where information technology plays an important role. This is because it is capitalism, and under capitalism managers will always find themselves compelled to exert more control in the workplace, and reduce workers' autonomy accordingly. This might be irrational in one sense, in that suppressing creativity holds back innovation and production - but when has this not been the case under capitalism? When have management ever allowed skills to remain on the shop floor for too long? And when has bourgeois social theory not been available to obscure this process, such that the distribution of rewards and privilege is held to closely mirror the distribution of talent and desert? Only under socialism, in a situation where industry was democratically controlled and not subject to the extraction of profit, would motivations such as creativity, autonomy and altruism be important to production.

Labels: , , , , , , ,

11:52:00 am | Permalink | Comments thread | | Print | Digg | del.icio.us | reddit | StumbleUpon | diigo it | Share| Flattr this

Friday, November 13, 2009

Immanence posted by Richard Seymour

Just a thought. In Zombie Capitalism, Chris Harman points out that the 2,000 largest companies control half of the world's wealth. Harman figures that if a board of directors has about ten people on it, that's 20,000 people (or, by my calculation, 0.0003% of the world's population) who have decisive control over the world's production, output and surplus. There's another way to look at it, of course. The workers of those companies exert decisive leverage over the future of production. They don't constitute a multitude, admittedly, but if they formed communist associations - workers' councils, soviets, whatever - that would surely establish a new hegemonic paradigm of work that could increasingly become the norm. Admittedly, they would then have to wrest control of the means of production from the employers and then eventually take on the state (who seem to get uppity when workers decide to take control of the means of production). But such a process seems altogether more probable than, say, a sphere of cooperative value production gradually eroding the boundaries of capitalist production until the latter withers away. Doesn't it?

Labels: , , , , , , , ,

6:45:00 pm | Permalink | Comments thread | | Print | Digg | del.icio.us | reddit | StumbleUpon | diigo it | Share| Flattr this

Sunday, November 11, 2007

Spectres of labour posted by Richard Seymour


Someone insisted I give an account of the meeting on modalities of political power, which discussed dual power and Negri and immaterial labour, and so on. I said it would be ugly, because I totally lack grounding in Negri, but I'll give it a shot before I head off for the afternoon sessions. And, if anyone dares to dissent, I'll give them a shot to the back of the head. First up was Alberto Toscano with a discussion of dual power (some of it reproduced here). The concept of dual power has experienced increased profile due to the uprisings in Latin America, where it is routinely bruited in the literature (see this, for example). But its use today is somewhat different to the way in which it was conceived in its original form, during the "tumultuous interregnum" between the revolution of February 1917 and that of October 1917. Lenin stressed, to the consternation of most of his Bolshevik comrades at first, the unprecedented situation in which alongside the Provisional Government, there existed another form of government embodied in the soviets. The prevailing historiographical obsession with the precise nature of the Bolshevik "seizure of power" obscures the way in which power was already sundered in two. This dual power (better termed "dual sovereignty" by Trotsky - see chapter 11 of his History of the Russian Revolution for an account of instances of dual power) can only exist as an emergency for the existing regime, because all power wielded by the soviets is incompatible with parliament. The model of soviet power is the Paris Commune, with the direct recall of officials and the active involvement and initiative of the masses. It not only produces a different locus of power, which could potentially be coopted and integrated under duress, but a different form of sovereignty. Tellingly, Trotsky considered dual sovereignty a form of "dual impotence", not a situation that merited continuous elaboration - it is inherently linked to civil which, being a deeply undesirable state of affairs, needs to end quickly. It was possible only in a revolutionary situation, and it should terminate with a revolution rather rapidly, precisely to reunify sovereignty.

Yet, today, Venezuelan activists like Roland Denis uses the term "dual power" to describe a permanent strategy (as quoted in the linked article): "The old slogan of ‘dual power’ (bourgeois and working-class) valid for the summit of the revolutionary movement today becomes a permanent strategy in accord with the need for the organization of a socialized and non-state power." The origins of this reconceptualisation of dual power are in Negri's engagement with Lenin. Negri, though hostile to dialectics, criticises Lenin's account of power as un-dialectical. Negri maintains that the workers' movements of the Sixties and Seventies introduced a new form of power, a "dialectical absolute" allowing "dual power to spread over a long period, as a struggle that upsets the capital relation by introducing into it the worker variable as the conscious will of destruction." I think this is based on Negri's account of "immaterial labour" - in which the increasingly hegemonic paradigm of work is that centred on the production of intellect and affect, so-called "immaterial" commodities. Like the industrialised working class of the 19th Century, it constitutes a minority of actual production, but threatens to become the dominant paradigm. This production of value erodes the distinction between working life and life as such, since an idea or a solution can occur to one while in the shower or on the crapper. Further, this form of value production constitutes a plenitude that the capitalist cannot ever wholly appropriate: we are all constantly producing value which we share and cooperate over in a proto-communist fashion. For example, bloggery is a form of value-production which capitalists try to capture with advertising deals and Comment is Free offers, but they can never fully penetrate it any more than they can other, more private forms of value-production. As such, the new paradigm practically demands what Negri calls "extremist gradualism": the slow but insistent destruction of capitalist social-property relations, and their replacement by eminently sensible communist networks of cooperation. This is civil war over a much longer duration, only occasionally punctuated by direct physical violence.

There have been excellent critiques of this account of value and 'immaterial labour' - David Camfield has written such in Historical Materialism 15.2. Peter Thomas extended this argument in the next contribution, 'Lenin as Bipolitician'. Biopower is one of those concepts elaborated by Foucault that I think I get the gist of. In previous forms of government, the body was something given, to be worked around and accomodated to, rather than decisively shaped by power. In modern sovereignty, the body is disciplined, constructed, remade, even destroyed (from potty training all the way to eugenics and genocide): the subject's very existence is even called into question by modern power. So, Negri offers a biopolitical version of Lenin, in which the latter is valorised as an organiser of the social body, giving form to the flesh of resistant subjectivity, rather than as the messianic figure he cuts in Badiou and Zizek (hardly much to choose between these two, really?). Lenin, it is emphasised, was able to produce organic forms that were adequate to the existing state of industry, the flesh of social life etc. So, from the late 1960s in Italian autonomism, we get not a focus on the strategic limits and weaknesses of capitalism, but of the strongest points of workers' subjectivity. For Negri, this strong point is workers' capacity as a constituting power itself, beyond its capacity for integration into the state or into the creation of surplus value. This raises the possibility of "organic sovietism". Thomas says that this reading of Lenin isn't even particularly new, however: it is actually the reading that the Bolsheviks' had of Lenin when he wrote his April Theses. He is misunderstood by Negri as a proponent of a "good form" of political power - as if his conception of dual power was to valorise 'living labour' versus parasitic capitalism and state power. Lenin, by contrast, was clear that soviet power was itself precisely a form of state power, a form of sovereignty. The source of power is the initiative of the masses, but this is still codified, institutionalised, federalised and disciplined. It is not merely an anarchistic dissolution of ordering, mediating structures. Lenin's critique of sovereignty is immanent: it is its irresponsibility and insusceptibility to the will of the masses that is criticised, not its existence as such.

Vittorio Morfino outlined the Spinozist metaphysical origins of Negri's conception of the 'Multitude'. My notes are not great for this part, because I didn't understand the argument that well, but it's roughly as follows. For Negri, there are two forms of power, 'potestas' and 'potentia': constituted and constituting power. The former is the current order and the latter is the inherent power of the multitude. For Negri, the only metaphysical horizon is that of potentia: the infinite is the organization of human liberation, and potentia is its telos. The relationship between potentia and time is not thinkable in terms of a philosophy of history - it is not a sequence of historical epochs completed by the emergence of potentia. Rather, for Negri, there are two times: the time of illusions, power, the constituted order; and the time of potentia, collective praxis etc. The first time is void, and the second is full, exuberant, living. The transition is not a historical one, but an ontological one: that is, the transition is between wholly different modes of existence, not between different historical stages. In Negri's eschatology, the multitude as the bearer of potentia becomes the "democratic living god" under communism. If I follow this argument properly, the revolution in Negri's philosophy would be much more like the Scientific Revolution than the Russian Revolution - a prolonged but profoundly transformative paradigm shift rather than a temporally concentrated overthrow of existing social relations. By elaborating and renewing modes of power that are adequate to the social flesh, the multitude can gradually attain communism and complete liberation by edging out capitalist power and making it redundant. Supposing there isn't complete nuclear annihilation in the meantime.

Labels: , , ,

10:56:00 am | Permalink | Comments thread | | Print | Digg | del.icio.us | reddit | StumbleUpon | diigo it | Share| Flattr this

Search via Google

Info

corbyn_9781784785314-max_221-32100507bd25b752de8c389f93cd0bb4

Against Austerity cover

Subscription options

Flattr this

Recent Comments

Powered by Disqus

Recent Posts

Subscribe to Lenin's Tomb
Email:

Lenosphere

Archives

Dossiers

Organic Intellectuals

Prisoner of Starvation

Antiwar

Socialism