IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BEFORE THE HONORABLE MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., JUDGE

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

No. 2:06-cr-0035

ERIC McDAVID,

Defendant.

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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2008

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Reported by: DIANE J. SHEPARD, CSR #6331, RPR

1 SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 2 THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2008 3 ---000---THE CLERK: Calling criminal case 06-00035, United States v. Eric McDavid. On for Defendant's Motion For Downward 5 6 Departure and Sentencing, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. LAPHAM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Steve 8 Lapham and Ellen Endrizzi for the United States. 9 10 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 11 MR. REICHEL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Mark 12 Reichel with Mr. McDavid. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 13 14 MR. REICHEL: He is present, in custody. We're ready 15 to proceed, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Thank you. This is the time and place set for the pronouncement of judgment and sentence. 17 18 On February 4th, 2008 -- pardon me -- on 19 September 27, 2007, Mr. McDavid was convicted by a jury of a 20 violation of 18 United States Code, Section 844, subsection (n), Conspiracy to Damage and Destroy Property By Fire and an 21 2.2 Explosive as alleged in the one count Indictment.

The Court ordered, after the return of the verdict, a Presentence Evaluation and Report. The Court has received, read and considered that Presentence Report, dated May 22,

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2008. 1 2 Mr. Lapham, have you received a copy of that 3 Presentence Report? 4 MR. LAPHAM: I have, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Have you had sufficient time to review 6 it? 7 MR. LAPHAM: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And Mr. Reichel, have you also received a 8 9 copy of that Presentence Report? 10 MR. REICHEL: Yes, I have, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: And have you had sufficient time to discuss it with Mr. McDavid? 12 13 MR. REICHEL: Yes, I have, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. McDavid, have you also received and 14 15 read a copy of that Presentence Report? 16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 17 THE COURT: And have you had sufficient time to 18 discuss it with your attorney, Mr. Reichel? 19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 20 THE COURT: I will note for the record that there were objections to that report which were filed. The Court has 21 2.2 reviewed the objections and also the responses that were 23 provided to those objections by the probation officer. 24 Is there anything further that you wish to add at

this point in time, Mr. Lapham?

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1 MR. LAPHAM: To the guideline calculations? 2 THE COURT: Actually, just the objection issue at 3 this point. 4 MR. LAPHAM: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Reichel? 5 6 MR. REICHEL: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. Having reviewed those objections and also the responses to the objections from the 8 probation officer, I'm going to find the sentencing 9 10 classification, advisory sentencing quidelines and/or policy 11 statements, statements of material fact to be true and correct. I will simply advise at this point in time that the 12 13 probation report has provided for advisory guideline range --14 pardon me -- offense level of 33, with a criminal history 15 advisory range of VI. 16 The probation report refers to an advisory range of 17 234 to 240 months of imprisonment. 18 Did you wish to be heard on that particular issue at 19 this time, Mr. Lapham? 20 MR. LAPHAM: Unless I'm mistaken, I thought it was 235 to 240. 21 2.2 THE COURT: That's what I should have said, but I 23 misspoke. It's 235 to 240. 24 MR. LAPHAM: Then I have no further comment. I think 25 that's correct.

THE COURT: Mr. Reichel?

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MR. REICHEL: Yes, Your Honor.

I would urge the Court to sustain the objections filed by the defense in our Sentencing Memorandum for the reasons set forth therein, including all the attachments, the references to what I believe the testimony was at the trial that the Court sat through.

Taking into consideration the Court's written order following the post-trial motions and so forth, I believe that the objections should be sustained to those calculations based on my -- based on my objections.

THE COURT: All right. First of all, at the outset, let me indicate for the record so that it's clear that in determining what the proper sentence will be for Mr. McDavid at this time, the Court will be utilizing the guidance provided by the United States Supreme Court in the cases of United States versus Booker and United States versus Fanfan.

In addition, the Court will also look to the advisory sentencing guidelines. And the Court will note for the record that it is well aware that these are advisory and not mandatory guidelines that have been promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission.

In addition, the Court will also look to the guidance provided in the statute of 18 United States Code, Section 3553(a). Section 3553(a) requires that the Court impose a

sentence which is sufficiently long enough to punish this particular defendant, deter others from committing similar types of criminal conduct, but also not be longer than necessary to obtain those objectives. Furthermore, the Court must fashion a sentence which will be fair, just and reasonable.

In looking to the statutory guidance provided by 18
United States Code, Section 3553(a), the Court understands that
it has an obligation to look to the nature and circumstances of
the offense, and the history and characteristics of this
particular defendant, the need for the type of sentence to be
imposed, the kinds of sentences that are available to the
Court, the kinds of sentencing and the sentencing ranges that
are established for this offense, any and all policy statements
which have been issued by the United States Sentencing
Commission, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct, and the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the offense.

I will indicate that it is the recommendation of the probation officer that Mr. McDavid be sentenced to a term of 156 months of imprisonment.

Is there any legal cause why judgment and sentencing should not proceed at this time?

MR. LAPHAM: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Mr. Reichel?

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MR. REICHEL: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. At this time, I would like to address issues that were raised in the Sentencing Memoranda.

The first I would like to address would be the issue of the statements or affidavits from the jurors, which were attached to your memorandum, Mr. Reichel.

MR. REICHEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: My reading, first of all, Mr. Reichel, is that statements of the jury in such a case are not appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).

Is there any reason why you believe that is not an accurate statement of the law?

MR. REICHEL: Yes, Your Honor, for the reasons set forth in my pleading against the United States, that the Evidence Code itself advises that the Evidence Code doesn't apply at sentencing.

And throughout all sorts of reported opinions throughout the appellate courts in the United States, the Government has taken the position in that litigation that the Evidence Code, in fact, does not apply at sentencing.

Specifically, this arises in issues regarding hearsay and a multitude of other issues that are violative of the Evidence Code that the Court can consider at sentencing.

As set forth in my memorandum, 606(b) is headed as

Impeaching a Verdict, Evidence to Impeach a Verdict. It's clearly for and the legislative history of it shows it's for new trial motions. It's to preclude that type of information for new trial motions and motions to set aside a verdict; whereas, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that regard sentencing, they are a different chapter, they are a different act of Congress, and the United States seeks to apply the Evidence Code at sentencing in the FRCPs without any authority citing, finding any cases that say the Evidence Code does apply at sentencing.

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And the problem with that, Your Honor, is it's very clear by statute that it does not apply at sentencing. We're in a different world. There is no dispute it has been a sea of change in federal sentencing since the Booker decision the Court has referenced earlier. Especially in this case, in this type of case, where there are guideline ranges that then jump up exponentially based upon specific factors, I think it's clearly admissible.

There is no rule that finds it to be inadmissible.

606(b) is clearly for one purpose and one purpose only.

Additionally, 606 contains exceptions when they are allowed, when there is extraneous evidence introduced into the jury deliberations or the jury room.

THE COURT: Or error in preparing the verdict. Are you saying there's been such evidence presented?

1 MR. REICHEL: What I think there is -- I believe, 2 first of all, we are then debating whether or not 606(b) would apply, and whether or not the exceptions of 606(b) would apply, 3 4 which is an evidentiary issue. And I think that just gets into whether or not it's applicable at sentencing, which it clearly 5 6 is not, and I don't think the Government, which should speak with one voice nationwide, it is one Government. They should 7 not be allowed to turn their position to gain an advantage in 8 litigation when it is to their benefit. They cannot argue at a 9 10 suppression motion that hearsay, which hurts their case, is not 11 allowed. They cannot argue at sentencing that hearsay that helps their case should be allowed. And then take the Evidence 12 13 Code, 606(b), which prevents some evidence that I have and say 14 that does apply at sentencing. It's fundamentally unfair and 15 not accurate.

THE COURT: Mr. Lapham?

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MR. LAPHAM: Your Honor, I'm not aware that the Government has ever taken a position in any court that juror declarations are admissible at sentencing.

The declarations clearly violate the spirit if not the letter of 606(b). And I think the last thing that the Supreme Court thought they were doing when they decided Booker was opening up juries to being questioned by defense attorneys to try and essentially impeach the verdict or to weigh in on sentencing issues before the Court.

As we argued in our brief, sentencing is quintessentially the role of the Court. You sit as the thirteenth juror. You were as -- you are more capable, because of your experience and your qualifications, to decide the issues of punishment.

And they are simply irrelevant. Juror declarations are simply irrelevant in this context.

MR. REICHEL: Your Honor, to reply. The Government has not cited one case that states that juror information is not allowed at sentencing. And yet 606(b) by its definition does not apply at sentencing. So it is more of a stretch for the Government to preclude. The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly there are all sorts of relevant factors for the Court to consider at sentencing.

These individuals have drafted this the same as a letter from a family member, from a member of the public, anyone. In fact, Ms. Runge has on her declaration -- I have a copy of it here -- she writes at the bottom, the Court may please consider this as a letter to the Court in the alternative.

And I've got that to show to the Court, and I've got it notarized as well. These are, in effect, at the very least these are letters from individuals who know something about the case, who want to have their voices heard at sentencing.

And for the reasons I set forth in my pleading,

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Mr. McDavid has every right to put forth evidence and other matters before this Court. The Court may not weigh them with an evidentiary value to -- for whatever reason that the Government is worried about; however, to strike them, I think, denies Mr. McDavid due process and a fair sentencing hearing as well.

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THE COURT: Mr. Reichel, let me ask you a question.

And I'm going to use an example of a type of case that has become fairly prevalent in the district courts.

I'm sure you are aware of the number of cases that have been brought before courts involving the use of medical marijuana and as used in the State of California. Those cases have been brought in federal court, and juries have convicted individuals for possession and/or sale of marijuana.

At the end of the trial, they have been informed that the State of California allows that to happen. The jurors have been upset or could be very upset that they were not given that information.

Clearly, that jurors' decision or feeling that they were not given all of the information, or that the law as written and the Federal Government is not fair, may be their personal viewpoints, but are you saying that the Court should consider that in that particular situation when determining what the sentence should be, when the violation is not of any state law, but is a violation of the Controlled Substances Act

as promulgated by the United States Congress?

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MR. REICHEL: Your Honor, my answer is I don't think the Court should discount anything at sentencing that's relevant, anything that is relevant for sentencing purposes.

The Court may weigh much differently what those jurors wrote to the Court about the law in California with medical marijuana.

THE COURT: Is it relevant though, Mr. Reichel, that a juror disagrees with the law?

MR. REICHEL: I don't think that's the case in this case, Your Honor. It's not that the juror disagrees with the law in this case. The jurors are telling the Court what they observed, what they saw, and what they know of the case, and offering that to the Court for sentencing.

THE COURT: But it also appears that even -- without getting -- I don't want to go too far into this area -- that there may be jurors who disagreed with this Court's ruling on a legal issue, which is not in the purview of a juror.

Their purview as a juror is to deal with the facts as they see them and apply the law as the Court gives it to them. Without regard to their personal likes or dislikes, we're here to follow what the law is.

Just as I am required to apply the law as it is written today, regardless of what my likes or dislikes are of the law, the sentencing laws, whatever it is, I have to apply

the law. So I just want to try to make sure the record is clear that although I am allowing this conversation to take place, I don't believe that it is within a juror's purview to comment under a declaration which is attached to a Sentencing Memorandum, to -- for the Court to take that into or give it any greater significance than, as you said, any other document that may be filed by any other person with respect to the sentencing of a particular individual.

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In other words, if there are -- if the Court wishes to consider them letters or correspondence or something else, then anyone can file anything, and there have been a number of character letters, reference letters filed on behalf of Mr. McDavid. And to the extent they act as a character reference, I think that that may have some relevance.

But to the extent that they are expressing displeasure as to legal issues or facts contained within the case or Court's ruling, they are irrelevant, and the Court will not consider them. And I believe that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) requires that the Court do so absent any other evidence of improper conduct or error as far as drafting of the actual verdict form.

So to that extent, I will accept them, and, of course, I've reviewed everything that's been filed at any rate, but I want the record to reflect clearly the weight, if any, that the Court will be giving to those particular pieces of

1 correspondence that have been filed with the memorandum. 2 MR. REICHEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 Just briefly for a housekeeping matter. Ms. Runge handwrote: The Court can consider this declaration as a letter 5 for sentencing purposes. 6 I've got it notarized. I've given a copy to 7 Mr. Lapham. What I would like to do is just ECF after the hearing today. Scan it and file it with the Court. Would the 8 9 Court care to review it? 10 THE COURT: Yes, I would like to see that, please. 11 MR. REICHEL: Permission to approach, Your Honor? 12 THE COURT: You may. (Pause in proceedings.) 13 14 THE COURT: All right. I have reviewed the document, 15 and Mr. Reichel will be filing that document electronically 16 after this hearing. 17 THE CLERK: I'll file it for you. 18 MR. REICHEL: Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Reichel, I have reviewed, as I 19 20 believe I stated, your Sentencing Memorandum and all the other documents that you have included. 21 22 Is there anything else that you wish to provide to 23 the Court at this time that has not been previously included, 24 or make your summation at this point in time, if you'd like?

MR. REICHEL: Your Honor, I'll just highlight again

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-- you know, unfortunately for the Court, I'm just going to highlight what's already in here.

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And it's just briefly that I think it was clear that in this case we probably needed a special verdict form.

Because I stated from the outset, the Indictment itself said

"to wit" colon, and it listed targets. The Government started their opening statement with exhibits that were on the overhead that were the targets. There was then a stipulation about the Government funding of those specific targets. There was a stipulation about the Commerce Clause connection with those targets. And then the trial proceeded with evidence really about those targets.

At the close, the jury was not given a special verdict form to find would Mr. McDavid be found guilty of the conspiracy as the statute set forth in the Indictment. But the there was no special verdict form which said including the specific targets.

And my concern is that I think the United States'
position in sentencing, and I believe the probation report, and
I think that the large enhancement in the guideline is driven
by a feeling that the specific targets in the Indictment were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.

I think that's highly significant post-Booker, including the cases I've cited, you know, Rita, Gall, Kimbrough, Cunningham, that this Court is very familiar with.

I think that's significant when the individual has no prior criminal history, but that one enhancement makes that individual a Category VI. Our book doesn't go higher than a Category VI.

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And I think that's so significant an issue that in light of the fact -- the way -- the manner -- the way the case was prosecuted by the United States, required, at the end, a special verdict form if we are to imply that type of an enhancement, which is so large.

And I think we didn't have that in this case. And I think as a result I believe the United States bears the burden of proof with real evidence, at least by clear and convincing evidence, of an enhancement. They bear that burden under the guideline advisory calculations. And I don't think that has been met in this case by the way the case was prosecuted.

That doesn't impeach the verdict itself, but what that does do is limit the sentencing options available.

THE COURT: Mr. Lapham?

MR. LAPHAM: Well, it does impeach the verdict because the only thing that he was charged with was violating 844(f), which targets federal property or federal buildings.

But, Your Honor, I'm comfortable. You sat through all the evidence. The Government put on more than clear and convincing evidence. We proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the primary target here was the IFG, a federal facility. I

would submit it on that.

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THE COURT: Mr. Reichel, I know you recall, as I did, the testimony as well as the very detailed exhibits regarding the Institute for Forest Genetics as far as the visits, the maps, and the locations that were designated on the maps as to where various parts of the buildings where, where people were located.

Where does that fit in as far as your argument that this is not involving federal lands or property, if you will?

MR. REICHEL: Thank you, Your Honor. That actually does fit in. And that was the Government's theory, that these

individuals conspired, and those were the targets.

And my recollection, Your Honor, without the transcript, because we haven't got it, but my recollection was that we did approach the witnesses for the Government -- not my witnesses -- to say who did he conspire with on that, who did he conspire with on that.

And for the record, I'm sorry for pointing for three different areas, but I mean the dam, the three factory, the cell phone towers.

And my recollection is we have arrows going everywhere, but we don't have Government evidence that Mr. McDavid agreed with any one of the other two participants -- not the informant -- but the other participants -- do one of those specific targets listed in the Indictment.

And, in fact, I believe when examining Anna, the informant for the Government, we were never able to get that exact -- the combination of those two persons on one target.

THE COURT: Response.

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MR. LAPHAM: Your Honor, these are not sentencing issues. These were dealt within the post-trial motions that the Court all denied.

The conviction is for conspiracy to damage or destroy federal property. The jury found that this was a conspiracy involving federal property. They obviously found that based on the IFG because you heard the evidence and how -- you just recounted how strong that evidence was.

MR. REICHEL: Just briefly, Your Honor, my opinion.

The guidelines have no larger -- there is no larger, I believe, enhancement in that entire book for a situation like this.

Career offender, armed career criminal enhancement involves prior convictions, so you have recidivism of someone.

This enhancement can apply to someone who has no prior criminal history whatsoever, and can take them all the way to a VI and boom them all the way up on the guideline point level to where it becomes -- it is -- I believe it may be the largest single enhancement in the guidelines.

And as a result of that, I think Mr. Lapham and I differ on this that -- it is a sentencing matter. I think a special verdict form would have been needed in this case, and I

think I've set that forth in my pleadings very clearly.

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THE COURT: And the Court's responded to that

particular issue, and I'm very cognizant of the fact that the

-- this particular statute will cause for a person who has zero

criminal history to be raised to the highest level, a VI, for

sentencing purposes. That particular decision is one that is

not for the judicial branch to deal with. That was a decision

which was enacted by the legislative and confirmed by the

executive branches, which now causes this branch to have to

follow.

And upon conviction of the particular crime in question, the law requires that the criminal history be raised, as you say, from the -- probably the highest that it can be based upon the terrorism acts, as you want Bush to call them, from a zero or one -- no matter what it would be -- up to a VI, and that is what the sentencing criteria is.

That having been said, I want to make sure that even though the Court is indicating that this is the statute, the Court still understands that there is the discretion that's given within the advisory guidelines and the statute. So I want to make it very clear that regardless of what's being said about what requirements there are, the Court does not feel that it is bound to follow any particular advisory guideline at this point in time. The other factors will also be taken in consideration.

Is there anything else that you have, Mr. Reichel, with respect to the sentence?

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MR. REICHEL: Oh, yes, Your Honor. Actually, if the Court's -- if the Court has finished with some of my objections, the Court knows that I've made a request for a variance -- we're still within the guidelines, as I'm talking to the Court, I hope, and that is I have extensive reasons for a variance or departure. And we talked about that.

I talk about the boom to a VI. The Court still has the discretion to move that down in criminal history if it believes it's overstated. And if the Court can do it in ATCA cases, in career offender -- and I've cited them there -- it can do it in this instance and find that, yes, the points can go up to who knows where, but the criminal history of VI can be reduced down upon motion within the advisory guideline range as a departure or variance by the defendant, which we do here in our motion and we do here today with the Court.

It just seems to clearly overstate the likelihood to re-offend. Clearly overstates his prior criminal history.

That's one of the matters that's in my motion, and I know the Court has reviewed and will be considering today.

Would the Court like me to go through my request for the departure and variance within the guidelines?

THE COURT: Why don't we go ahead and do that, so we get that on the record, and keep it moving in an orderly

fashion.

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MR. REICHEL: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

I emphasis to the Court the disparity with similarly-situated co-defendants, those with the exact same culpability, that I've cited, and why that Mr. McDavid, I think, is -- would be sentenced much, much higher. And that violates, I think, the spirit of the original guidelines. As well, I believe this is a case that there was -- that the Court can reduce the sentence based on sentencing entrapment.

Specifically, that if this informant was involved with individuals that had a goal of doing vandalism on a billboard, which is illegal, but instead in the old sentencing entrapment cases before Booker, where the individual would sell narcotics to an officer who would then say, we need to get a pound for this guy for us to get the mandatory minimums and so forth, so they keep sending the person back. And the sole issue — they send the person back to get more product, Your Honor, so they can get higher guidelines.

And if the Court finds that at some point, you know, you had the individual, they could prosecute him, but they kept him going to increase his guidelines, it's not a defense to be acquitted on, but it's sentencing entrapment, so to speak.

And as a result, the sentence should not be increased solely because the agents had that sole discretion to increase someone's sentence.

And in this case I believe that if the agent -- Anna was with this group, and they desired to do certain things like vandalize a billboard or so forth, but if it was her pushing and prodding, not enough to acquit you, but her pushing and prodding to get a certain target that is going to get you the Domestic Terrorism Enhancement, then that does qualify under the pre-Booker days, when the guidelines were so important, for a sentencing entrapment, an entrapment for sentencing purpose allowing you to have a reduction.

I think equitably, fairness, I think all of that applies in this specific case. Because the evidence the Court saw in this case was that I believe the informant and the FBI kept rounding up the group and getting them back to their ultimate goal. When I say "their," not necessarily this group's all by themselves, but with prodding by law enforcement to the goals of this IFG, to the goals of the dam, to the goals of the cell phone tower. And that's why I believe he's entitled to a reduction for sentencing entrapment.

THE COURT: Response.

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MR. LAPHAM: Your Honor, on that particular issue, sentencing entrapment, Your Honor, I would agree with Mr. Reichel in principle that if there were sentencing entrapment, that would be a basis for the Court to give lenient treatment. That's not the case here.

The very first time the IFG was mentioned, it was

mentioned by Eric McDavid in that ride from Bloomington to
Chicago. It was his idea. When they discussed it in November,
they all went around the table and asked: What's your target?
What's your target? McDavid's target, which expressed before
Anna made any comment at all, was the IFG.

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When they talked about doing actual surveillance of the IFG, put that on the list of things to do in the burn book. That was Eric McDavid's idea. When they went to the IFG to do their surveillance, it was Eric McDavid who was carrying around the book and created the map of the institution.

When they discussed the pros and cons of their various targets, and Lauren Weiner expressed some kind of confusion about why the IFG should be a target because she had the misimpression that we were talking about burning down trees, it was Eric McDavid who explained the rationale for why the IFG was a legitimate eco-terrorist target.

None of this pushing that Mr. Reichel is talking about was proved at trial. That was all Eric McDavid's idea. So there simply is no evidence of sentencing entrapment here. It was his idea from the start to the finish.

THE COURT: All right. Next issue?

MR. REICHEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

I speak to the Court in my memorandum about the fact that he is going to be in isolation in prison based upon his high notoriety, and that's just a reality of the Bureau of

Prisons. Reality of life. The high notoriety of these inmates make them targets for other inmates.

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And, you know, because he is getting painted with this terrorism enhancement and terrorism label, there is nothing they are going to do for him in the Bureau of Prisons but isolate him from others.

I don't think, you know, anyone can dispute that sensory deprivation, isolation of a human being to an extent like this for an extensive period of time serves no rehabilitative purpose. The rehabilitative purposes of sentencing are not served by isolation, but instead you have extreme punishment. I think that it's something that, you know, no one should have to undergo.

The reality is courts have departed in the past under the advisory guidelines, pre-Booker, and found valid departures for the cases I cite in my pleadings for high notoriety inmates who may be in isolation thereafter, and -- or who could be subject to attacks by other inmates. It's not going to be a, you know, a bowl of cherries, to simplify it, for someone doing prison time with this type of a conviction.

And as a result, the Court can consider that. I mean, we all remember Coon and Powell, when the case came down from the Ninth Circuit. Those were individuals that were police officers. Their guideline was a certain amount of time clearly by the guidelines. They said our time is different.

We're former law enforcement. We're going to prison.

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Mr. McDavid will suffer the same type of maltreatment by other inmates. He will also suffer the same type of maltreatment in isolation. And that is a factor. There is no dispute, I mean, the Court can consider that. And in this case it is a very valid factor.

MR. LAPHAM: Your Honor, sending a police officer to prison to be surrounded by criminals is not a valid analogy to Eric McDavid. I, frankly, don't know. This is entirely speculative. I have sent prisoners away for terrorism offenses in the propane tanks case. I frankly don't know what happens to them. I've never heard that they were put in isolation as a result of their being convicted for terrorism offenses. And I don't think Mr. Reichel knows that either.

But we're not talking about John Gotti here. We're not talking about police officers. We're talking about, in the grand scheme of things, a fairly obscure case.

MR. REICHEL: Briefly, Your Honor. Unfortunately for Mr. McDavid the reality is that I'm not speculating about anything for the last two-and-a-half years. He has been in the isolation ad seg at the Sacramento County Jail for the exact reasons I announced on the record just now. Because he is considered to be anti-American and because, number two, it's a terrorism case. He is high risk for other inmates to attack. As a result, he has been in isolation for two-and-a-half years.

THE COURT: Next issue.

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MR. REICHEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

I talk about overstated criminal history again, and the Court acknowledged that a moment ago. His overstated criminal history -- it listed him as a VI. The factors for a VI just aren't met in this case.

And I also talk about his health issues, Your Honor. Unfortunately, as the Court knows, he developed pericarditis. The record -- we have put on the record in the case about his percarditis shows that he is a different person. He contracted it in the jail. He has it. It's life long. There have been flare-ups since he first contracted it. I have personally seen him on few occasions where it's been flared up, where he has had a relapse of it.

As the Court knows from the pleadings that are in this docket, that are on this docket, and the reason he was taken to U.C. Davis Medical Center on emergency basis a year ago and treated there was because he had pericarditis. And as a result, this is a guy who couldn't lay down, couldn't sit up, could barely breathe. He felt like there was a knot in his chest.

And the problem with pericarditis which he has is that the worst treatment for it is institution -- to be put in an institution is the worst possible treatment for percarditis. As a result, he is going to suffer for that throughout his

prison term, and that's something that the Court really should consider.

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MR. LAPHAM: Your Honor, the only thing I can say to the Court is the facts as I know them. And I contacted the Marshal's office. I was provided with an e-mail response, which I provided to Mr. Reichel. The Marshal advises me, after contacting the jail doctor, that Mr. McDavid had an attack of percarditis in April of 2007, and has had no recurrence. He has had no other reason for medical treatment that they are aware of.

If Mr. Reichel thought this was a legitimate issue, I think he could have had his client seen by a physician. He could have filed some kind of medical declaration. I'm just saying it's speculative at this point. It's not a reason for — in any event for providing leniency because the Bureau of Prisons is equal to the task of even more serious medical conditions than this. But right now, as we sit here today it is entirely speculative.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. REICHEL: Briefly, Your Honor, in November of '07

I filed a letter with this Court, which was to the Marshal

Service and the jail and announced that he was in a really bad

situation. That Mr. McDavid had a flare-up of percarditis.

That it was consistent with the diagnosis that he had gotten

from the jail.

Additionally, I know Mr. Lapham had the Marshal Service contact a nurse at the jail who, I believe, spoke with a doctor. I know that in my many dealings with the doctor there, Peter Dietrich, who talked to me about Mr. McDavid's case repeatedly -- and he is head of the jail medical there -- he's advised me that he does have pericarditis, and there have been flare-ups.

And they certainly were the times I contacted. Since April of '07 he has had a few. I've contacted the jail. We tried to get his medical records, and we've had all sorts of problems with H-I-P-P-A, HIPPA, and I see that the Government had no problem accessing it.

But I can tell you the times we have called the jail and spoken to nurses, they've given us incorrect information.

I've talked to the head, Dr. Peter Dietrich. He's advised me that he does have it. He has had recurrences of it, and he will have recurrences of it. And they were doing everything they could to try to take care of it.

THE COURT: Next.

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MR. REICHEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

His family ties, I believe, are extensive. They are unique. And as we used to say, they are outside the heartland. In this case, they compel the Court to consider it for a reduction in his sentence from the advisory guideline range that's been set forth in the probation report.

The Court heard from his sister, her wonderful testimony. The Court has also all of the letters from his family members and friends. The scenario that is set forth is someone that is extremely tied to his family. Under a different portion of today's proceedings, when it comes to the analysis under 3553, I've got his entire family here, as well as some friends who would speak to the Court.

I can just reference it now that there's no dispute, this is an individual who has extremely unique family ties. They did not miss one minute of this case. They have routinely seen him at the jail. At the bail hearing before this Court they offered everything they had on a Vaccaro Bond, which means that any violation would have resulted in them losing all of their property. They couldn't be more committed to their son. You couldn't find a more committed family, and a family with stronger family ties anywhere on the planet.

THE COURT: All right. Any response?

MR. LAPHAM: Your Honor, there is not a doubt in my mind about that. It seems to be a very strong family relationship. But as I stated in my Sentencing Memorandum, I'm just not sure they know the person anymore that once existed. I think Eric McDavid changed at some point in time and became a different person, and it was the person we saw and heard on the audio and video tapes in this case.

I won't repeat the arguments I made there, but I just

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think that you have to take those statements with a grain of salt.

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THE COURT: Mr. Reichel, anything else?

MR. REICHEL: Those are the reasons I had asked the Court in my Sentencing Memorandum to reduce the sentence from the calculated guideline range by the probation department in their advisory report. I'll submit.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lapham.

MR. LAPHAM: Your Honor, the only thing I would say,
I didn't get a chance to respond to the disparity argument, and
I would like to address that just briefly.

I don't want to repeat what I put in the Government's Sentencing Memorandum, but I do want to talk about the case that I think if we're going to start comparing cases, the propane tanks case is actually the closest case.

That was a plot to destroy the propane tanks in Elk Grove. It was -- it did not go to fruition. The case was taken down before the defendants had a chance to carry out their plan. They had assembled all the components, like they had in this case. They had not actually gone so far as to start mixing the components, as in this case, but the terrorism enhancement applied, and Kevin Patterson received a 293 month sentence.

I think that is the baseline -- or I think the baseline in this case is the terrorism enhancement. That's

what Congress has directed, and that gives a low offense level of 235 months.

It should come as no surprise that the Government is recommending the bottom of the guidelines following a full-blown trial in the case. In fact, I think it would be surprising if we were not, given the facts that we have before us.

There is no question that the defendant has a Constitutional Right to choose not to testify at trial. There is no doubt he has a Constitutional Right not to speak at probation. Nobody quarrels with that. But what that does is it deprives the Court and the Government of any facts that might allow us to distinguish this individual from other similarly-situated individuals and perhaps assign a more lenient sentence to him.

As we sit here today, there is no reason to deviate because this was a very serious offense, terrorism.

ELF-inspired terrorism is a serious problem around the country, and it inspires others to commit offenses of a similar type, and that calls for a very severe sentence.

Under the circumstances, bottom of the applicable sentencing guidelines, given no other reasons to depart downward is an appropriate sentence.

And I would submit it on that.

MR. REICHEL: Your Honor, I need to respond to

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Mr. Lapham's comments.

We're going to get to some other 3553 factors in a minute, as well as the ability to allocate and give summation on the overall sentence. But as far as similarly-situated defendants, it seems to be, unfortunately, that when Mr. Lapham speaks about that, he then goes on to something that is highly objectionable. And that is, give him the max, Your Honor, he didn't testify at trial. Give him the max, Your Honor. He lost at trial, and he is going on appeal, so he didn't tell the probation officer something that could be used against him at a trial later on, should he prevail on appeal.

The Court is very aware that we plan to appeal this case. We fought about a lot of issues with Mr. Lapham in this case. We do plan to appeal it. And you have an individual, on the advice of counsel, who doesn't talk about the facts of the offense. And then the Government says, we'll make an example out of him, we'll show those people.

You know, Mr. McDavid did not testify at trial, so we'll make an example of him, and we'll give him the max.

That's objectionable. I think it's inappropriate for the Court to consider. We've done what every other defendant who does -- who loses at trial does. We've given you a snapshot of him from everyone who knows him that we can think of. And we've given those to the Court in every fashion possible. But he can't talk to probation. Mr. Lapham knows that about the facts

of the offense.

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evidentiary matter that came on in this trial, or pretrial, and we come back to a second trial, we have -- we can't. They will just bring the probation officer in to say this is what he told me during the probation interview. He's sorry. He's guilty. And for today we would get -- Mr. Lapham alleges that we would get a reduced sentence from his office, and I don't think that would happen. I think it would be used against us in some fashion.

So I would ask the Court not to give that too much weight today because it's the standard procedure that someone should do when their lawyer is advising them about a case.

THE COURT: Let me just make it clear for the record that the Court will not hold that against Mr. McDavid. He has the right to do so.

But I think, on the other hand, it does limit the amount of information the Court can use to make its overall decision when it comes to the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and characteristics of the defendant. I have to go with what I have. And that's simply the way it is.

But that will not be used as a sword, if you will, to try to use that against a person. But I very well understand what you are referring to. That's simply the way it is at this

1 point in time. I think we've commented on that. Did you want 2 to go to the 3553 factors? 3 MR. REICHEL: I do, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go ahead. 5 MR. REICHEL: Thank you. In that regard, the Court 6 has the letters from the family members? 7 THE COURT: Yes. MR. REICHEL: The Court heard the testimony of his 8 9 sister, Sarah McDavid, and recalls that testimony? THE COURT: Yes. Absolutely. 10 11 MR. REICHEL: Thank you, Your Honor. They are present today. Mrs. McDavid is here. Mr. McDavid. His 12 13 sisters are here. I would like them, with the Court's 14 indulgence, to speak briefly here, maybe at sidebar, about 15 their thoughts about the appropriate sentence in this case for 16 Mr. McDavid. 17 THE COURT: From the Government? 18 MR. LAPHAM: Entirely up to the Court, Your Honor. 19 That's fine. Maybe at someplace close so THE COURT: 20 we can hear is the only question that I would have. MR. REICHEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 2.2 Your Honor, thank you very much. I've got the 23 McDavid family assembled here. And we talked briefly before 24 court. They realize he has got an appeal coming, and so they 25 are going to make some comments about what they know about

Eric, the particular nature of Eric McDavid that they know and they think is relevant for the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you. State your name, please?

MRS. EILEEN McDAVID: Eileen McDavid. I'm his

mother. Um, Eric is the same person that I've always known

Eric to be. He is not a violent person. He never has been.

And, you know, I hear that, you know, the Government says that

he has changed, and he hasn't. We visit him every week. Every

week that he has been in jail. He is the same Eric. He is

loving. He is kind. He takes care of us. I mean, you know,

we go in there crying, and he's, you know, telling us wisdom,

you know, to breathe, to get through it together. And we're

supporting him all the way, and we believe in him, and we love

him.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. GEORGE McDAVID: George McDavid. I'm Eric's father. I would just like to reiterate what my wife said. That there is no point in time that I felt like Eric changed, and I didn't know him anymore. I've always known Eric. I've always known him to be peaceful, kind, and caring. I personally looked at the tapes. And my response to some of what is in the tapes is talk is one thing, act is another. It was very different when I was a child. And when I was a child, the word was talk is cheap. The -- while Eric may have said many things to maybe impress Anna, I know deep in his heart he

could never hurt anybody. I mean, Eric would catch spiders and carry them out of the house because he didn't want us to kill them.

He is a caring person. He wouldn't hurt anyone. And I know that. I know that hasn't changed, and it never will change. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MS. RACHEL McDAVID: My name is Rachel McDavid. I'm his younger sister.

I'd also like to reiterate what they've said already. You know, my brother, he is so caring and so thoughtful, and he has always been there for me. Always. No matter when, he is always there for me. In his letters he has helped me out with situations. He's always been supportive and caring. He never did anything, and he never would have. I agree with my dad, it is all talk. And he is caring, and he has taught me how to be thoughtful of others.

Like I said, even the letters, he'll help me out with situations to be caring -- excuse me -- and thoughtful of other individuals. And so I appreciate him and always have, and I always will, and I always will love him. Thank you.

MS. SARAH McDAVID: My name is Sarah McDavid. I'm his sister. I'm probably going to say the same thing, but it's really frustrating to hear the Government say that he's changed into somebody that we don't know. I've known my brother for

28 years, almost 29 now, and he is the same man, same boy as he was when we were growing up.

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And he has always been one of my best friends, somebody I've always been able to turn to. And he has never agreed with -- you know, I have a complete fear of spiders, and he's never let me kill 'em, or bugs, or any bugs in that sense. You know, it's like we used to have pet snails, okay, like this is the kind of person that is caring and loving.

And I really am offended by the Government's stance that they know him better than I do. And I think that that's so ludicrous. And just I really ask you to hear our words and really hear where we're coming from and respect the family ties that we do have to him. Thank you.

MR. REICHEL: Your Honor, just so the Court knows, at the trial, only Sarah testified, and they can affirm this for the Court.

As far as character witnesses at trial, they didn't testify because they knew they had to make an election, which was to not sit and watch and observe the entire trial. Sarah, unfortunately was unhappy that if she was going to testify as a defense witness, she couldn't watch the trial under the rule on exclusion of witnesses. As a result, Sarah didn't get to watch until she was done.

The mother and father didn't want to miss one in limine ruling, one minute of the trial for their son. That's

why the Court didn't hear from them during the trial. And I want the Court to know that, and I asked the McDavids to say that was --

MRS. EILEEN McDAVID: Yes, that is the reason.

MR. REICHEL: Good. They made me out not to be a liar. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Reichel, did you have other factors?

MR. REICHEL: You know, just, Your Honor, they are set forth in my pleading, and I would just advise the Court that clearly, in my opinion, that the sentence I'm asking the Court for in my pleadings is sufficient but not greater than necessary, exactly under 3553.

And specifically if you take that phrase, "sufficient but not greater than necessary," here's why: The Court heard the trial. The Court watched the evidence. The Court actually issued a post-trial ruling on my motions, an order, which was significant, Your Honor, specifically in one area where the Court said: There's not enough evidence here, Mr. Reichel, despite your pleadings, that there was a withdrawal from the conspiracy.

And here's why this is important, I believe, under 3553. In this case, Your Honor, there are unique factors.

Every case has its own unique factors. This one is interesting because I believe in a conspiracy case 3553 -- the sentencing

factors are made more interesting and more unique in a conspiracy case because all you need to convict in a conspiracy case, like in this case, is an agreement to do something and then an overt act. After that, the Government, under the law, can convict.

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Now, after that, there can be withdrawal or evidence of withdrawal. Now, it may not be enough to vacate a verdict as the Court has ruled. It may not be enough for a complete defense to be somewhat reluctant at some point during it, but it is absolutely relevant, it is absolutely right directly in the middle of the street on 3553. And the theme that runs through 3553 is sufficient but not greater than necessary.

In a conspiracy case, Your Honor, if there is a completed act and strong evidence of a completed act or strong evidence there was going to be a completed act, I think the Court can sentence a certain way. But there's no dispute that when, at best case for the Government in this case, there is discussion, there is an overt act, and there is enough, as the Court has ruled, and as the jury found, at the best for the Government that's what you have.

But there is no dispute that I believe from the family members, the prior life of this young man, what happened with the informant in a case, with a young man who spoke, who was involved in possibly in agreement and discussions, there were also, Your Honor, there was nothing but discussion about

lesser involvement, about, well, maybe we should do nothing at all.

The Court recalls there was one point in this big conversation in the evening where Mr. McDavid says, perhaps we do nothing for two years. That's relevant. It doesn't mean that it could vacate the verdict, Your Honor. But it's highly relevant at sentencing.

The Court should not convict someone -- excuse me -the Court should not sentence someone, Your Honor, to this type
of sentence utilizing 3553 and the theme that runs through,
which is sufficient but not greater than necessary, when it's
clear there is an abundance of mitigating information, even at
best for the Government, that the individual would not have
gone through with the act.

You can be convicted of something you would not have gone through with the act if you agree, if you take an overt act, but there is no way -- or there is not strong evidence you would have gone through with the final act, the Court does not have to sentence that individual as if the act would have been completed. The Court knows that. The guidelines account for that. 3553 accounts for that.

So that's what I think is important about the Eric McDavid case under the 3553 factors.

THE COURT: Mr. Lapham.

MR. LAPHAM: Your Honor, I think Mr. Reichel and I

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simply disagree on this. There was not an abundance of evidence of mitigating factors.

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At the time this case was taken down, they had taken all the steps to carry their plans out. They were, in fact, on the way to the store to get more supplies to keep this thing going on. And we have no evidence anywhere in the record that Mr. McDavid ever renounced any of his, apparently, radical views. In fact, we've just got the opposite.

And if I could just address one statement that the family members made. I'm sorry that I've offended any family members. I didn't mean to give the impression that I thought that I knew Eric McDavid better than they do. I would never claim that.

What I'm saying is I can't reconcile their current statements about the kind, gentle man they know as their brother or son with the testimony at trial, which was that this is a man who was indifferent to the possibility that someone could be killed by his violent acts, that this was a man who could express the desire to, at one point, kill a potential informant if he found out she were an informant, or to regret the possibility that he was not involved in the death of a policeman.

That is simply irreconcilable with the statements that I'm hearing today, and I don't know what the answer to that is. But the Court has heard all the evidence, and you can

draw your own conclusions from that.

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THE COURT: Mr. Reichel, anything else?

MR. REICHEL: Just briefly, Your Honor. That just to mention, the Court heard testimony of them talking in the living room two nights before they were arrested, the night before they were arrested as well, where they talked about other targets, much lesser targets, not doing anything. There was testimony, I believe, from the main witness and others that Mr. McDavid talked about damaging and vandalizing small dams near the ocean where rivers flow into, which jeopardize the Salmon run. And they talked about things like that.

And I believe that that is something the Court needs to fix on to understand and to see the real -- excuse me -- to see what else was in this case besides the stuff the Government focuses on. We can't discount that.

And, finally, Your Honor, Mr. McDavid has the right, as this Court knows, of allocution. And I can just tell you that because of his appeal -- and the Court knows this was a hotly contested case. I filed as many in limine motions and pretrial motions to dismiss. I found it to be -- the case wrought with error by the Government's investigation and prosecution.

At trial, I think we all agreed that there were some areas we were treading on that were almost new areas about entrapment instructions. And in that regard, Mr. McDavid and I

plan to pursue his appeal vigorously, and as a result, as to right of allocution, after consulting with me, he is going to just submit the matter on everything that's been said by the family, the letters and so forth on his behalf, and leave it at that.

And, finally, I have summation I'll just cite from

Justice Kennedy in 2007, which is featured on the ABA, American

Bar Association's website. And Justice Kennedy, when he

testified in Congress to the Senate, stated that the American

sentences are too hash, too severe, and too long. And I think

that speaks like a megaphone in this case.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. REICHEL: Finally, Mr. McDavid is someone who has exhibited for the last two-and-a-half years to all of his family and friends and my entire defense team as somebody possessed with incredible dignity, with incredible humanity, incredible humility.

At the return the verdict, when his family broke down and cried, he turned around audibly to anyone around and said, just remember to breathe. And he was then taken away from the courtroom, and so everybody knows him, knows Eric McDavid.

THE COURT: You indicated and quoted from Justice
Kennedy about the harshness of the American sentencing laws.

Assume for the sake of argument that they are. Is it your
belief that it is this Court's obligation to change those laws

which have been enacted by the United States Congress on behalf of the People of the United States and signed by the President of the United States to determine that unilaterally on this Court's behalf that they are inappropriate, too long, and should be changed at the will of the trial court?

MR. REICHEL: No, Your Honor. I don't think this Court has the authority to change the law.

THE COURT: Well, in essence, you're asking the Court to vary from what the law would be and to a certain extent.

MR. REICHEL: I think the law, Your Honor, gives the Court to vary the sentence under 3553. As the Court knows, I believe it's in -- you know, I cited cases in here where there was a life imprisonment under the guidelines, and the Court gave a sentence of 42 months based on --

THE COURT: I'm referring, to be more specific, to the issue of the criminal history. That's what I'm going to -- and Ms. Algers, I'll just put you on notice. I'm going to come to you in just a moment for the reasons for your decision to go from a VI to a I. Take it to your recommended range.

But the law is that if you conspire to damage or destroy a federal building, institution under certain conditions, that that becomes an act of domestic terrorism, for which your criminal history category will be put to the max at VI. Whether you've ever been involved with the law or not.

And in this particular case, the jury has found that

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there was a conspiracy to destroy a federal installation, one of them, Nimbus Dam, IFG or the cell phone towers. And if that is the case, why is it that the Court should not follow what the apparent intent of Congress was both from a statute and also from the advisory guideline range?

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And I'm not trying to make this a rhetorical question. I'm trying to hone in very specifically on one issue that I would just like to have you address at this point in time. Because this is a very, as you said, as the probation officer recognized, you've recognized, I think everyone recognized it's a very onerous provision in the law. That once you are involving yourself with that, that this is where it goes.

And there are many reasons for why this law has been enacted. The world is different than it was 10 years ago. We're in a different state at this point in time. So this is the state of the law, and this is the state that the Court has to deal with. So just give me a brief synopsis of why it should go from VI --

MR. REICHEL: To I.

THE COURT: -- to I.

MR. REICHEL: Because it's, actually, Your Honor because it's a guideline sentence. It's a guideline enhancement, Chapter 3A1.4, and it has elements in there, and it's simply a guideline enhancement. The Court can depart

downward from any guideline enhancement because, number one, the guidelines are not mandatory. The guidelines are simply advisory.

Additionally, there is no statute -- there is a statute which defines the federal crime of terrorism and gives the definition for the elements, Your Honor, but it doesn't make it mandatory as an act of Congress that that guideline section does not allow the Court to depart downward from it.

THE COURT: But, obviously, if Congress enacts a law, it would be the general intent that the law be followed when it comes to sentencing. I'm trying to ascertain from your position today why this particular case involving Eric McDavid is something that should not fall within what Congress has very plainly intended by enacting this particular statute.

MR. REICHEL: Your Honor, the Court has the authority. I cited cases about the career offender, which takes -- a career offender enhancement, Your Honor, takes someone to a Category VI also.

In a narcotics transaction -- excuse me -- narcotics charge in federal court if you have the predicate prior convictions, you become 360 months to life. The reason is because it doesn't matter what your criminal history is, you become a VI, so I cite cases in my memorandum -- I can repeat them for the Court --

THE COURT: Well, does career offender really apply

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to this case?

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MR. REICHEL: Well, it's the same concept, Your
Honor. It is the same concept because it makes someone a VI
under their criminal history. It doesn't just add certain
points to their base offense level or their adjusted offense
level. It makes them a VI regardless. You go to VI. And as a
result, that overstates in some cases, and courts -- the
appellate courts teach that the Court can depart downward if it
overstates.

THE COURT: But in this particular case, the statute, 3553(a) requires that the Court avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between defendants convicted of similar conduct with similar histories.

Clearly, Congress has determined that anyone who attempts to destroy any type of a federal installation and under certain circumstances falls into an entirely different category. It doesn't take a series of acts to get you up to that level, it only takes one time that you go there, and then you are now in that category, and that's it.

So how do I -- you are asking me to look to the career offender statute, which is a totally different issue where it can be a series of relatively minor events that lead you to that career category. Congress has made it very clear, one time, it's a one-strike offense, if you will. If you engage in this type of conduct, then that is the point of it,

you are a VI. Advisory, understood, but there seems to be a serious -- a very serious intent here that any type of act at this type of level deserves a very onerous or strict repercussion.

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MR. REICHEL: I think that there is no legislative history that I'm aware of that shows Congress intended the domestic terrorism enhancement to remain at a VI in all circumstances, and not allow the Court to break free from that, go down to a V, a IV, to a I. Because it's no different than any of the other enhancements that make it from the Sentencing Commission, through the Congress, back to the Sentencing Commission, and into the book, which is then one of five factors — a minimum of five factors under 3553.

And I don't think that's the one they've selected out and cast in stone as not to be broken away by the district courts.

THE COURT: Mr. Lapham, the Government, any response?

MR. LAPHAM: Only this, Your Honor. I think there is
no question that you can depart downward. But it rather states
the obvious that the Criminal-History Category VI overstates
this defendant's criminal history. That doesn't get us
anywhere. The point is you have to have a basis for departing
downward, and it's the Government's position that the terrorism
enhancement applied to this offense gives the proper baseline
rationale for this judgment that Congress intended.

And absent any other reasons to depart, that's what this Court should impose. And that doesn't constitute any disparity with other sentences as we've already discussed. That's, in fact, right in line with what we've seen with terrorism offenses.

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THE COURT: Ms. Algers, you in your recommendation came from a VI to a I from criminal history, and I've read what I believe would be the explanation from probation's standpoint. Is there anything that you elaborate on at this time which you feel would be appropriate?

MS. ALGERS: I don't know that I can elaborate, but I can explain my variance. It's -- my variance was based on what I felt was disparity amongst other similarly-situated defendants before this Court, before this district.

It just so happened that my recommendation fell within a Criminal-History Category I, which is what I was pointing out to Mr. Reichel in my response because he was talking about the overstated criminal history. And in my response I just pointed out that the range falls within Category I. But my reason for variance is for the disparity -- what I saw as the disparity.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. Anything else, Mr. Reichel?

MR. REICHEL: I want to ask the Court about a recommendation for a specific facility for the service of his

sentence to be imposed. As the Court -- he is very close with his family, and we looked at FCI Herlong. FCI Herlong,
H-e-r-l-o-n-g, I believe, which is one of newer facilities, in the last five years or so, but it's about three or four hours,
I believe, from Sacramento. I think that would serve the purposes of -- the rehabilitative purposes of sentencing and also the 3553 factors to be not greater than necessary or sufficient. I would ask the Court to make a recommendation subject to space availability and security classification.

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And, as well, I would ask the Court -- the final matter would be that we plan to appeal. We plan to appeal, expeditiously, the conviction. I would renew my motion for bail at this time, making it bail pending appeal. We had a bail hearing in this court over a year ago. I don't think the situation or the circumstances have changed. We had offered that the McDavid family would put up all the available equity in their home. He would be on house arrest, 24 hours a day. He would have no access to telephones, computers. He would have an ankle monitor. He would have a third-party custodian. And they would post all that as a Vaccaro Bond -- V-a-c-c-a-r-o, I believe is the spelling -- such that the violation of any term of his release would result in forfeiture of the entire collateral. And I would submit it on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Lapham.

MR. LAPHAM: Your Honor, that's not the only issue involved with bail pending appeal. One thing Mr. Reichel would have to show is that there is an issue on appeal that is likely to lead to reversal. He hasn't shown that. It should be denied on that basis alone.

THE COURT: All right. There are other comments you made. Do you have any other comments?

MR. LAPHAM: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Reichel, do you wish to -- I'm going to ask Mr. McDavid. I am obligated to give you, Mr. McDavid, your right of allocution, meaning you have the right to speak to the Court prior to your sentence being imposed. Your attorney has indicated that you do not wish to provide a statement. Is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Matter submitted?

MR. REICHEL: Matter submitted, Your Honor.

MR. LAPHAM: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I am hopeful that it's clear from the Court's questions, comments, and the amount of time that it's taken to listen to both sides of this argument, that it's given a great deal of thought and consideration into what the sentence should be in this particular case.

Once again, I want to reiterate the Court has complete understanding of its ability to fashion a sentence

which may be outside of the advisory guideline range. Those are simply advisory in nature.

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But it will look also to the other factors contained herein. I want to also point out that during the course of this trial, the Court had the opportunity to listen to the witnesses who testified, listen and observe audio recordings, video recordings, and other photographic evidence that was presented here in court.

The Court has already ruled on whether or not it determined whether there was entrapment by Anna or not. I'm not going to go back into that again. I believed at the time that the Court issued its ruling, and believe it strongly today, or even more so, that that ruling was accurate under the circumstances. To go otherwise would turn the ability of law enforcement on its head to investigate potential crimes or criminal activity.

That having been said, the Court was in a position to listen to testimony concerning the destruction of certain property, which was owned by the or operated by the federal Government.

In addition, there was also discussion regarding destruction of or damage to property that was not federal property, such as the highjacking trailers and putting some type of honey or jam on the freeways to disrupt traffic, putting sugar or other substances into gas station storage

tanks to ruin the fuel. And a number of different items that were discussed by the group with respect to how to disrupt the Government and the economy.

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The one thing that I cannot get out of my mind at this point in time from listening to the testimony, and this is probably contrary to what I have heard today from the family, and that was that what Mr. McDavid said with respect to what he wanted to accomplish was all talk.

I don't find that it was all talk. It was very serious. The very deliberate nature in which he referred to what goals and objectives he had with respect to the disruption of the Government were far more than just talk.

The comments of threatening the life of an individual if one were to reveal the nature of the discussions was definitely more than all talk. Going and purchasing the different equipment that we saw photographs of, the bleach, the jars, the different tubing, the containers was more than all talk.

Maybe it would have been all talk had it stayed at one location on the East Coast, but when that talk transferred to the West Coast, and continued on to actual acquisition and purchase of these items, it went beyond the point of all talk.

There was no question that this -- and the jury did so find -- that there was a conspiracy, and the object of the conspiracy were federal buildings or locations.

Accordingly, the Court would look to the statutes and what the guidelines are. And the Court believes that under the circumstances that the conspiracy, as shown, is a violation of the laws as set forth in the -- the law as set forth in the Indictment. And that the appropriate sentence would be what is called for under the statute.

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The Court has also considered a sentence here in this particular case, which as required by the statute, be fair, just and reasonable, and be sufficiently long enough to punish this particular defendant and deter others from committing similar types of criminal conduct, but not be longer than necessary to reach that objective.

Mr. McDavid has no criminal history. Taking that into consideration with the nature and circumstances of this offense, which individuals engaging in acts to destroy or otherwise disrupt the federal Government and the commerce of the United States is an extremely serious act. One that cannot be overlooked.

I find that to be an extremely serious offense, and the circumstances and nature of that offense would override the history and characteristics of this defendant for being a peaceful individual.

The Court has considered the kinds of sentences available, and the need for the type of sentence involved. There have not been many cases that have involved domestic

terrorism. This is one of the newer cases. As indicated, this is a new world after September 11, 2001. And, again, I cannot help but recall the audio transcript or audio recording of Mr. McDavid indicating that there will have to be collateral damage at some point in time. And that's referring to human lives, and IEDs, which is the talk that we listen to, we hear of when referring to actions that are taking place 6,000 miles away in Iraq, and what people are undergoing at that point in time.

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So when taking all of these factors into consideration, it is the judgment and sentence of this Court that in accordance with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, that the defendant, Eric McDavid, will be sentenced to 235 months in federal prison.

The Court finds that the appropriate Criminal-History Category would be VI in light of the nature of this particular offense, and looking at the Offense Level of 33, finds that 235 to 240 months is appropriate.

The defendant will also pay a special assessment of \$100 immediately.

The Court finds that the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine. Imposition of a fine is waived.

And before I go on, I do also want to indicate that the Court has considered the need to avoid any disparity of defendants who have engaged in similar conduct. And Mr. Lapham

referred to the propane tank case, and I think that that's also been considered and weighed by the Court as well. And there were substantially longer sentences that were provided in that particular case, but we are in a very similar situation.

The Court finds the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine. Imposition of a fine is waived.

2.2

Upon release from imprisonment, Mr. McDavid will be placed on supervised release for a term of 36 months.

Within 72 hours of release from the custody of Bureau of Prisons, the defendant will report in person to the probation office where he is released in that district.

While on supervised release, Mr. McDavid will not commit any other state, federal, or local crimes, nor possess a firearm, nor illegally possess any controlled substances or use any controlled substances.

He will submit to the collection of DNA and comply with the standard conditions recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Commission and adopted by this Court.

He will also submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment, and at least two periodic tests thereafter not to exceed four per month.

While on supervised release, the defendant will submit to the search of his person, property, home and vehicle by a U.S. Probation Officer or any other authorized person under the immediate and personal supervision of the Probation

Officer, based upon reasonable suspicion, with or without a search warrant. Failure to submit to searches will be grounds for revoking his supervised release.

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Mr. McDavid will warn any other residents where he resides that his premises will be subject to searches pursuant to this condition.

As directed by the Probation Officer, the defendant will participate in a correctional treatment program to obtain assistance for drug or alcohol abuse. He will participate in a program of testing to determine if he has reverted to the use of drugs or alcohol, and participate in a program of mental health treatment as directed by the Probation Officer. He will also participate in a copayment plan for treatment and testing up to \$25 per month.

The defendant will also consent to the Probation

Officer and probation service representative to conduct

unannounced, periodic examinations of any computer,

computer-related device, or equipment that has an

internal/external modem in the possession or control of the

defendant.

The defendant will consent to the retrieval and copying of any and all data from such computer or computer-related device or equipment, as well as any internal/external peripherals to insure compliance with these conditions.

The defendant will consent to the removal of such computer, computer-related device, or equipment, for purposes of conducting a more thorough inspection and analysis by the Probation Officer.

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The defendant will also consent to having installed in a computer, computer-related device and equipment, at the defendant's expense, any hardware or software systems to monitor the use of such computer, computer-related device and equipment at the direction of Probation Officer, and will agree not to tamper with such hardware/software and not install or use any software programs designed to hide, alter or delete his or her computer activities.

The defendant will consent to not installing new hardware without the prior approval of the Probation Officer.

The defendant will register in any jurisdiction where he resides as an arson offender.

The Court will find that the guideline range, advisory range here is a relatively short range of 235 to a maximum statutory allowable of 240 months notwithstanding that the actual advisory range would be 235 to 293 months.

That being said, the Court finds that a sentence at the bottom of the advisory guideline range is sufficiently long enough to satisfy the objectives as set forth in 18 United States Code, Section 3553(a), and will in fact deter others from committing similar types of conduct in the future.

Mr. McDavid, you have the right, as Mr. Reichel has
indicated several times here on the record, to appeal from the
sentence that this Court has just imposed on you.

Any appeal that you file must be made within 10 days
of Judgment being entered in this case. If you cannot afford

of Judgment being entered in this case. If you cannot afford the cost of the appeal, the cost of the appellate attorney, those costs can be waived.

If you request, the Clerk of the Court will file the notice of your appeal on your behalf.

Do you understand your rights of appeal as I've indicated today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. The request is that Mr. McDavid be released on bail pending appeal.

First of all, I find there's been no change in circumstances that have occurred since the last time the Court has heard this motion.

Second of all, as indicated by Mr. Lapham, there's been no direct indication of a substantial likelihood of reversal on appeal on this Court's previous rulings.

Therefore, the request for bail pending appeal is denied.

Is there anything further from the Government?

MR. LAPHAM: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Reichel, anything further?

MR. REICHEL: Nothing further for today, Your Honor.

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I'm sorry, Your Honor. Recommendation? 1 2 THE COURT: Yes. And I will make a recommendation that Mr. McDavid be housed at the Bureau of Prisons facility 3 4 located in Herlong. That recommendation would be based upon space availability and also any security classifications 5 regarding Mr. McDavid. 6 7 The Court would strongly make that recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons because I do believe it would be in all 8 9 best interest that he be as close as possible to his family. 10 Anything else? 11 MR. REICHEL: Nothing further for today, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. There being nothing else, 12 13 court is adjourned. Thank you. 14 (Court adjourned. 3:00 p.m.) 15 16 CERTIFICATION 17 18 I, Diane J. Shepard, certify that the foregoing is a 19 correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the 20 above-entitled matter. 21 2.2 /S/ DIANE J. SHEPARD DIANE J. SHEPARD, CSR #6331, RPR 23 Official Court Reporter United States District Court 24 25