McGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney R. STEVEN LAPHAM ELLEN V. ENDRIZZI Assistant U.S. Attorneys 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, California Telephone: (916) 554-2700

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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27 28 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

) NO. 2:06-cr-00035 MCE

Plaintiff,) UNITED STATES' MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE AN ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE v. ERIC McDAVID, Date: September 7, 2007) Time: 9:00 a.m.) Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr. Defendant. The United States respectfully moves this Court to preclude the

defendant, Eric McDavid, from raising an entrapment defense. McDavid cannot present evidence of a prima facie case of entrapment, and for that reason, any testimony regarding inducement and predisposition should be excluded as irrelevant and misleading. See Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403.

A district court may require a criminal defendant to make a pretrial offer of proof to demonstrate that the evidence in support of an affirmative defense is sufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the elements of the defense. See <u>United States v. Moreno</u>, 102 F.3d 994, 997-99 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that evidence related to an affirmative defense is not admissible if the defendant fails to make

a prima facie case of the defense); <u>United States v. Brebner</u>, 951 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1991). If the defendant fails to present sufficient evidence, the district court may preclude the defendant from presenting the defense at trial, as well any evidence supporting the defense. <u>See id.</u>

Entrapment has two elements: 1) government inducement to commit the crime; and 2) the absence of predisposition to commit the crime. United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917 (1997). The government induces a crime when it creates a special incentive for the defendant to commit the crime. Inducement is "'any government conduct creating a substantial risk that an otherwise law-abiding citizen would commit an offense.'"

United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). However, "the fact that officers or employees of the Government merely afford opportunity or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).

Even if evidence exists that a government agent induced a defendant, s/he is not protected by the "narrow" entrapment defense if the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime "at a time prior to the Government acts intended to create predisposition." <u>United States v. Skarie</u>, 971 F.2d 317, 321 (9th Cir. 1992); see <u>Sandoval-Mendoza</u>, 472 F.3d at 649. The Ninth Circuit has identified five factors to consider when determining predisposition: 1) the defendant's character or reputation; 2) whether the government first suggested the criminal activity; 3) whether the defendant profited from the activity; 4) whether the defendant demonstrated reluctance;

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and 5) the nature of the government's inducement. <u>United States v.</u> <u>Citro</u>, 842 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1988). "Although none of the factors is conclusive, the defendant's reluctance is the most important." <u>Thickstun</u>, 110 F.3d at 1396-97. The Supreme Court has explained that "the ready commission of the criminal act amply demonstrates the defendant's predisposition." <u>Jacobson v. United States</u>, 503 U.S. 540, 549-50 (1992).

McDavid is charged with conspiring to damage property by fire or explosives; he will have to proffer evidence that the United States' cooperating witness, "Anna", entrapped him into making the agreement, not into committing an overt act. The Court is already familiar with the facts of this case as the record in the magistrate court has been extensive and McDavid has appealed his pretrial detention and has filed a myriad of motions. See C.R. 52-60, 64-68, 84-85, 99, 124-151, 184. In none of these motions does McDavid identify the "special incentive" used to induce him to commit the crime. closest McDavid comes is the unsupported allegation that Anna of "worked her charms" on the defendant, to influence him romantically, but McDavid does not provide any evidence of this, video, audio, or documentary. C.R. 129 at 3:10-4:4:5. To the contrary, there is evidence that "Anna" rebuffed McDavid's unwanted advances, which is recorded on audio and video. The Court denied McDavid's motion to dismiss the indictment based on Anna's alleged misconduct. C.R. 192. McDavid should not be permitted to slander the witness by suggesting an improper relationship without proof.

In a separate motion to dismiss, McDavid alleges "outrageous government misconduct in the FBI and their informant urging, teaching, explaining and paying for the making of a dangerous

explosive device." C.R. 128 at caption. In that motion, McDavid essentially argues that Anna induced him into committing the crime.

See C.R. 128 at 3:8-4:15. Again, McDavid provides no evidence of this, just argument. The Court denied this particular motion as well. C.R. 192. As stated above, even if Anna had provided the opportunity to commit the crime, that, in and of itself, is not entrapment. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 441; United States v. Winslow, 962 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1992) (undercover agent purchased beer and food for defendants, paid for a trip to Seattle, and paid for bomb components in connection with a plot to detonate a bomb at a gay bar in Seattle). McDavid should not be permitted to

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¹ The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims of outrageous government conduct: United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2003) (government informant pretended to be an experienced money launderer, approached the defendant, proposed that they launder money, and then provided the money to be laundered); United States v. Haynes, 216 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir. 2000) (government informant encouraged defendants to engage in new criminal activity); United States v. <u>Franco</u>, 136 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1998) (government informant supplied precursor chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs); <u>United States v. Garza-Juarez</u>, 992 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (government agent initiated all contacts, raised subject of illegal firearms, and offered to supply materials); <u>United States v. Hart</u>, 963 F.2d 1278, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1992) (government used an informant who befriended the defendant allegedly during a time of emotional turmoil and induced him to buy drugs); <u>United States v. Berrera-Moreno</u>, 951 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1991) (government failed to be aware of and stop informant's use and distribution of cocaine and falsely asserted that informant was tested for drug use); United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1988) (undercover agent proposed and explained details of credit card scheme and supplied defendant with counterfeit credit cards); <u>United States v. Stenberg</u>, 803 F.2d 422, 430 (9th Cir. 1986) (the commission of equally serious offenses by an undercover agent as part of the investigation); Shaw v. Winters, 796 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986) (use of false identities by undercover agents); <u>United States v. Wiley</u>, 794 F.2d 514, 515 (9th Cir. 1986) (government introduced drugs into a prison to identify a distribution network); United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir.

suggest that there is anything improper about the government providing money, transportation, or resources.

McDavid cannot proffer evidence regarding government inducement, and he cannot proffer evidence demonstrating that he was not predisposed to the crime prior to his contact with Anna. To the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence of McDavid's predisposition. McDavid attended the July 2005 CrimethInc Convergence in Bloomington, Indiana², which was organized by the "Roadless Summer" group of anarchists and environmentalists who oppose the Interstate 69 expansion in Indiana.³ At the Convergence, workshops were held on topics such as dagger fighting, urban survival, train hopping, handcuff escape, prisoner support, urban guerrilla warfare. Anna attended the Convergence and observed that McDavid had participated in the prisoner workshop and commented that he had a "buddy in California [Ryan Lewis] looking at 40 years."

Anna also observed that McDavid participated in a guerrilla warfare workshop discussion. In that workshop, McDavid said that "direct action" is the only way to accomplish anything and advised that attacking semi trailer trucks and transportation networks would be effective in keeping products off the shelves and causing fear in society.

Later in the week during the Convergence, Anna spoke with McDavid. McDavid told Anna that his friend Ryan Lewis had burned

^{1986) (}the assistance and encouragement of escape attempts).

² McDavid had also attended the 2004 CrimethInc Convergence held in Des Moines, Iowa.

 $^{^{\}mbox{\scriptsize 3}}$ Co-conspirator Zachary Jenson also attended the Convergence with McDavid.

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down several apartment complexes in Auburn and Lincoln, California. While McDavid denied participating in the arson, he told Anna that Lewis should not have committed the acts so close to home. It was at that time that McDavid shared with Anna his plan to blow something up. McDavid said that he would blow something up this winter [2005/06] and then disappear. During this conversation, McDavid told Anna that he was going to make homemade C4 [an explosive] from a recipe in the Anarchist's Cookbook. McDavid identified the following as targets of his future attack: a genetically engineered tree factory in Placerville, California [USFS Institute of Forest Genetics], banks, construction sites, West Virginia mountaintop removal sites and mines, and communist party offices. McDavid further explained his bombing plans to Jenson and Weiner during "Pointless Fest" held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in August 2005, and told them that he wanted Anna to be part of their group. Weiner, Jenson, and Anna will testify that McDavid recruited them to help him achieve his bombing plans. McDavid cannot demonstrate that he had an absence of predisposition before Anna made any contributions to his bombing campaign.

Thus far, McDavid has not proffered any evidence that would support an affirmative defense of entrapment. Instead, McDavid attempts to discredit Anna and smear the FBI by making unsubstantiated claims and wild accusations. The United States respectfully requests that the Court bar McDavid from presenting an entrapment defense if he can not proffer particular evidence of a prima facie case of entrapment prior to trial. If McDavid cannot argue entrapment at trial, then the United States requests that he be barred from suggesting, commenting on, or asking questions regarding

issues relating to inducement or predisposition.

The preclusion of the entrapment defense does not affect a defendant's constitutional right to testify. "The constitutional right to testify is not absolute." United States v. Moreno, 102 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing <u>Rock v. Arkansas</u>, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987)). As the Moreno Court wrote, "In Rock, the Supreme Court referred to this guarantee as 'the right to present relevant testimony.'" Id. (emphasis in original). Further, "the Rock Court noted that '[t]he right may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.'" Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It is undisputed that the United States has a legitimate interest in excluding evidence that is not relevant or is confusing under Rule 4024 and Rule 403^5 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As noted above, evidence of entrapment is not relevant if McDavid fails to present evidence of a prima facie case of the affirmative defense. See Moreno, 102 F.3 at 998.

For the reasons set forth above, the United States respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion.

Dated: August 31, 2007

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McGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney

By: /s/ Ellen V. Endrizzi

R. STEVEN LAPHAM

²⁵ Rule 402 provides in pertinent part: "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."

⁵ Rule 403 permits exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of ... confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."

ELLEN V. ENDRIZZI Assistant U.S. Attorneys