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Iran Tracker weekly report: Week of November 30, 2015
View related content: Foreign and Defense Policy, Middle East
This blog series analyzes the most important Iran news events of the past week and provides an outlook of the regime’s strategic calculus.
Russian president Vladimir Putin’s high-profile meeting with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran on November 23 has triggered speculation that the two sides are weighing some serious policy choices about Syria. The key question, as always, is the fate of Syrian president Bashar al Assad.
There is no doubt that Putin’s visit to Iran was of major import. The Supreme Leader’s foreign policy adviser Alai Akbar Velayati claimed that the Russian president’s meeting with Khamenei was the most important in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, explaining that Putin agreed that “no type of agreement [on Syria] would occur…without coordinating with Iran.”
Iranian coordination will almost certainly support the Syrian regime. When Velayati met with President Assad on November 29, he noted that Iran “will not accept any peace plan that has not been approved by the Syrian government and nation.” Iran maintains a firm red line that the Syrian president should not be forced to relinquish power, and must be allowed to stand for any election during a transition process. President Assad would have a good chance of winning any vote held in the coming months, due to the regime’s demographic manipulation of territory under its control and the displacement of nearly half the Syrian population. There is no doubt Iran will fight hard for this option.
But what if Moscow forced Tehran to accept Assad’s departure as part of a negotiated settlement? This is frankly a terrifying prospect for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders who manage the Syria portfolio.
Tehran would need a candidate acceptable to a number of key constituencies within the Syrian regime, including the army, the intelligence services, the minorities at the core of the Syrian state, and the remaining Sunni community that still back the president. At present, Assad is arguably the only candidate suitable for all these constituencies. Any other compromise candidate is unlikely to be able to unify diverse constituencies and avoid paralyzing infighting.
Assad has faced the risk of assassination since the civil war began in 2011, and Tehran has undoubtedly considered alternatives. What would Iran accept for a Syria without Assad?
None of these options beat Assad, however.
Moscow’s new interventionist Middle East policies are a potentially profound geopolitical shift in Iran’s favor. However, they also create an uncomfortable fear that a political decision on Syria will ultimately be driven by Russia, perhaps at the expense of key Iranian interests.
Tehran usually bets on multiple horses and is probably already laying the groundwork for an aligned post-Assad Syria, as difficult as it may be to achieve. If there is a Plan B for Iran, it probably incorporates elements from many of the five options above:
Remolding Syria from a secular Baathist Arab state to a more Iranian-style government has always been Iran’s long game. But there remains for Khamenei an even scarier prospect than Russia caving on Assad: A Russia not very keen on an Iran-driven Syria Plan B.
J. Matthew McInnis is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. This report was produced in cooperation with the Iran Team of the Critical Threats Project. It analyzes the most important Iran news events of the past week and provides an outlook of the regime’s strategic calculus.
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I have read many similar so called “analysis” from self-proclaimed experts. They have however failed to answer a simple question which really stems from suffering from selective amnesia. In other words, no knowing their own history. Here is that question: how is that when America was in Iraq, at a time with 150,000+ troops, unmatched military and technological advantage, suffered as they, and at the end had no choice but to leave Iraq to Iran? Now all of then sudden, Russia, with its limited resources can turn the tide and do to the Iranians what Americans and the P5+1 was not able to with all their military might and sanctions? How exactly? Iranians can make Russians suffer in ways that would end up turning the Sovient guagmire in Afghanistan so insignificant. Please, learn your history.
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Diplomacy is a game of chess . It the Iranian who invented chess .
Iran will win .
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I don’t see a US dog in this fight. Looks like another quagmire. The Russians want waste resources there, let them.
The Russians are so stupid they actually tried to intervene in Afghanistan.
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