

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 10 December 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council**

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in accordance with paragraph 18 (d) of resolution 1807 (2008), I have the honour to submit herewith the final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) R. M. Marty M. **Natalegawa**  
Chairman



**Enclosure**

**Letter dated 21 November 2008 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)**

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Group prepared pursuant to paragraph 18 (d) of Security Council resolution 1807 (2008).

*(Signed)* Jason **Stearns**

*(Signed)* Dinesh **Mahtani**

*(Signed)* Mouctar Kokouma **Diallo**

*(Signed)* Peter **Danssaert**

*(Signed)* Sergio **Finardi**

## Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

### I. Methodology

1. The Group of Experts submitted its interim report on 28 July 2008. By his letter dated 6 August 2008 (S/2008/526), the Secretary-General appointed two experts, Mr. Peter Danssaert (Belgium, arms) and Mr. Sergio Finardi (Italy, aviation), to replace two members who were not able to continue their functions. The Group continued to be assisted by Ms. Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Secretariat, and Mr. Brian Johnson-Thomas, consultant (aviation). The Group began the second part of its mandate with consultations with United Nations officials and diplomatic missions. The Group arrived in Kinshasa on 16 August 2008 to begin 12 weeks of field work in the region.

2. Pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 1807 (2008), the Group has continued with its case study approach, focusing on North and South Kivu provinces, the most violent region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, focusing in particular on the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi* (FDLR-FOCA) and the *Congres national pour la defense du peuple* (CNDP).

3. Pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 1807 (2008), the Group has also investigated individuals who have committed violations of international humanitarian law by targeting women and children, who have impeded the disarmament process, and who have recruited child soldiers. The Group has worked in close collaboration with MONUC, relevant United Nations agencies and local organizations on these matters.

4. As requested by the Security Council in paragraph 5 of its resolution 1807 (2008), the Group has investigated arms shipments to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of which exporting countries have failed to notify the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004).

5. The Group also monitored the implementation by Member States of targeted travel and financial measures imposed against individuals and entities listed by the Committee.<sup>1</sup>

6. Pursuant to paragraph 18 (d) of resolution 1807 (2008), the Group has examined the link between natural resources and the financing of illegal armed groups.

7. The Group met with many different interlocutors during its fieldwork, including the civilian and military authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other regional States, national and international civil aviation authorities, staff of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), traders, air and land transport companies, and former and current militia members.

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pdf/1533\\_list.pdf](http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pdf/1533_list.pdf).

**Standards of evidence**

8. The Group used evidentiary standards recommended by the report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997), relying on authentic documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. Otherwise, the Group corroborated information by using at least three independent and reliable sources.

9. Given the nature of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are few documents that provide incontrovertible proof of weapons transfers to non-governmental armed groups. The Group has therefore based much of its research into arms supply and recruitment on verified eyewitness testimony from members of local communities, ex-combatants and current members of armed groups. In the cases of former soldiers and officers of armed groups, the Group conducted the interviews in a neutral place, often the MONUC demobilization camp in Goma, and whenever possible recorded the interviews on video or audio tape. Those interviews have been put in a United Nations archive. All of these ex-combatants came straight from their armed group to MONUC, without passing through CNDP, FDLR or *Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) detention facilities, where they could have been influenced.

10. The Group does not have subpoena powers or the ability to interview witnesses under oath, and has relied on Member States for access to confidential documents and data. It has written 120 letters to Governments and private companies in this regard, with varying degrees of success. It has, nonetheless, been able to obtain telephone records, bank statements, flight records, cargo manifests, land registry documents, private e-mail correspondence and customs declarations related to its investigations.

11. The Group has benefited from the cordial collaboration of Congolese institutions in its efforts to obtain material evidence. The Prosecutor's Office seconded a magistrate in Goma who helped subpoena information judged by the Group to be relevant to its mandate.

12. In order to ensure the physical security of some of its sources, the Group decided to convey to the Security Council a separate confidential annex containing the most sensitive evidence.

13. The Group has attached to the present report all annexes it deems essential for making its case. Other lengthy documents, including telephone records and land registry documents, are available in United Nations archives.

**II. Political context**

14. There has been a serious escalation of fighting in North Kivu since the Group submitted its interim report to the Security Council on 28 July 2008. Following a skirmish in Ntamugenga (Rutshuru territory) on 28 August 2008, between FARDC and CNDP forces, large-scale hostilities broke out on several fronts in Masisi and Rutshuru territories, pitting FARDC, FDLR, the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO) and various Mai-Mai groups against CNDP. This new round of hostilities has displaced 250,000 people and prompted CNDP to withdraw from the Amani programme in late August 2008.

15. The fighting peaked on 8 October 2008, when CNDP briefly took control of the Rumangabo military camp (Rutshuru territory), capturing a large stockpile of weapons and ammunition from FARDC. MONUC tried to broker a disengagement plan, but fighting erupted again on 26 October, with CNDP taking over Rumangabo again and advancing to within several kilometres of Goma.

16. This escalation has been accompanied by numerous developments relevant to the mandate of the Group, including widespread child recruitment by various armed groups, the influx of weapons and ammunition and violence against women and children.

17. Two parallel processes have guided the approach of the international community to the conflict: the Amani programme, in which the 22 armed groups engaged in talks to implement decisions agreed on in the *Actes d'engagement* of 23 January 2008; and the Nairobi communiqué (S/2007/679), signed by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, regarding armed groups that constitute a threat to security in the region. There has been little progress in either process, although in South Kivu the Amani programme has had more success than in North Kivu.

18. The Group continues to see tension between its mandate and the political process. Funds that members of the Congolese Government provided to feed and house the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD)-Urunana and PARECO militia around Kasiki (Lubero territory) could be interpreted as support to a non-governmental armed group; the diplomatic activities of CNDP representatives in Uganda and Rwanda could be seen as important in engaging CNDP politically, whereas the Group believes their presence in both countries has also allowed them to rally funds and organize supplies.

### III. Case study I: *Congres national pour la defense du peuple*

19. CNDP is a political movement with a military wing called the Congolese National Army (ANC). Its political headquarters is based in Kitchanga and Kilolirwe (Masisi territory), led by its chairman, General Laurent Nkunda, while its military wing, which falls under Nkunda's command, is led by General Bosco Ntaganda, who was listed on the Committee's assets freeze and travel ban in November 2005 and is currently based in Runyoni (Rutshuru).

20. CNDP control an estimated 4,000 to 7,000 soldiers. After the 26 October 2008 offensive, CNDP connected its previously separated western and eastern sectors by taking the strategically key town of Rutshuru. It now controls roughly a third of Masisi and Rutshuru territories.

21. CNDP reorganized its political leadership on 3 October 2008. Deogratias Nzabarinda is now the executive secretary, and Kambasu Ngeve is his deputy. Rene Abandi became the commissioner for foreign affairs, while Major Castro Mbera was named commissioner of finance and Philo Sankara was appointed his deputy. Colonel Innocent Gahizi was maintained as the chief logistics officer. These are also some of CNDP leaders the Group considers the most important in fund-raising in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and abroad. In November 2008, the military structure of CNDP was also reorganized into five operational sectors under the

command of Colonels Sultani Makenga, Eric Geriat, Munyakazi, Eric Ruohimbere and Claude Mucho.

22. CNDP is a sophisticated organization that has set up its own state-like apparatus with administrators, taxes, a flag, two websites, a radio station, ideological training courses and its own military hospital.

### **A. Political support**

23. CNDP has a political and financial support network that is active throughout the Great Lakes region and spans several continents. Representatives of CNDP are active in Kigali and Kampala, where they meet regularly with embassies. Most contribute voluntarily for ideological reasons. CNDP has a particularly strong appeal for the Congolese Tutsi diaspora.

24. CNDP operates two websites ([www.kivupeace.org](http://www.kivupeace.org) and [www.cndp-congo.org](http://www.cndp-congo.org)):

(a) Both websites feature regular news flashes and updates on military and political developments in the Congo with a strong slant in favour of CNDP and against the Government. Both websites have been used to contest investigations of CNDP abuses by the United Nations and international human rights groups. Kivupeace.org has received over 242,000 visits since its creation;

(b) The websites are an important vector for CNDP ideology. They are critical tools for public relations and potentially for fund-raising. The Group considers supporting such websites as “the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to military activities, including financing”, as set out by paragraph 1 of resolution 1807. The website Kivupeace.org has a PayPal link for donations, although it has not been used for any significant contributions to date. The website [cndp-congo.org](http://cndp-congo.org) offers a membership form, which supporters are supposed to submit via e-mail to a CNDP e-mail address, whereupon they will be contacted for a contribution;

(c) Several CNDP leaders have e-mails linked to the website that they use for public relations and communicating with CNDP support networks;

(d) Both websites are registered at Melbourne IT, Limited and hosted on the Yahoo! server. The Group has written to these companies, informing them that their support of the sites could be considered as support to a non-governmental Congolese armed group. The registrant name for the Kivupeace website is Vincent Mbera.

### **B. Military support and recruitment**

25. The Group believes that CNDP captures most of its weapons and ammunition during offensives against FARDC. It seized large weapons stocks at Kikuku and Mushaki in December 2007 and during two subsequent attacks on Rumangabo in October 2008. In September 2008, CNDP looted the Katsiro weapon depot. To transport the arms, CNDP needed four trucks, each with the capacity to carry six metric tons. They obtained seven 82 mm mortars, four 60 mm mortars, one 75 mm recoilless rocket launcher, eight heavy machine guns, one 14 mm mortar, 22 rocket-propelled grenades, 130 AK-47 assault rifles, and ammunition for the mortars and

rifles. On 8 October 2008 in Rumangabo, CNDP reportedly captured two multiple rocket launchers and various other heavy weapons. According to MONUC officers, during the fighting in Rutshuru town in early November 2008, CNDP captured up to 12 FARDC trucks full of ammunition.

26. Corruption within FARDC has allowed for complicity with CNDP at high levels within the military hierarchy, further undermining the national army and facilitating the transfer of weapons and ammunition to CNDP. The commander of the FARDC 7th integrated brigade, Colonel Rigobert Manga, was suspended from his command and is being investigated for alleged mutiny when CNDP seized Nyanzale on 6 September 2008. During a similar incident in November 2007, the 15th integrated brigade was also overrun by CNDP troops in Kikuku and Nyanzale, losing a large stockpile of weapons and ammunition. According to high-ranking FARDC intelligence officials, 15th brigade officers may have been complicit in that defeat as well, but the 8th military region did not initiate any investigations into the matter.

27. According to numerous CNDP ex-combatants, several shipments of uniforms to the rebels from Rwanda have taken place. Seven soldiers gave individually recorded testimony that they had received new uniforms with Rwandan flags on the shoulder, and that they had to remove the flag with a razor. One former combatant said he was present when Vincent Mwambutsa, General Nkunda's uncle and a CNDP official, brought a truck with uniforms to Bunagana over the Ugandan border crossing. The Group has obtained such a Rwandan flag from an international humanitarian official who found it in a CNDP compound in Kitchanga (Masisi territory).

28. In October 2008, Rwandan security services seized a shipment of uniforms destined for CNDP at Kanombe airport in Kigali. According to diplomatic sources, a forklift broke open the crate containing the uniforms, whereupon the police confiscated the shipment and arrested several individuals. The shipment reportedly originated in Boston, Massachusetts, United States. On 19 November 2008, the Government of Rwanda informed the Group that Rwandan police had arrested an individual named Claude Nsegiyumva in this connection. The Government also informed the Group that the individual has since been released, and that following investigations, no serious elements could be found against the accused individual. The Group is continuing its investigations in this regard.

29. The Group has received numerous allegations that CNDP also receives shipments of ammunition through neighbouring countries, including Rwanda and Uganda. The Group has not been able to corroborate those allegations.

### **C. CNDP financing**

30. The Group has learned about the existence of a "pool" system of financing, a sophisticated financial network of Congolese and Rwandans in the diaspora. According to numerous sources close to CNDP, there are regular meetings in Kigali, Goma, Gisenyi, Kampala, Johannesburg, Arusha and other cities in Africa, Europe and North America where individuals contribute voluntary donations. Bank accounts controlled by CNDP agents have also been opened in Rwanda to receive financial donations from this pool. These accounts are used to disburse cash sums to appointed go-betweens who then transport the cash to CNDP leadership.

31. The Group understands from numerous interviews, including with members of the business community and CNDP defectors, that businessmen in Goma support or cultivate influence with the rebel movement by donating cash, food and other goods, including vehicles. Other businesses in Goma are also approached and strongly encouraged to make private donations or else face possible retribution. Government authorities in Goma have admitted to the Group that they are reluctant to tackle this problem as they fear security-related repercussions.

32. The Group has learned that a number of mineral-exporting companies, transport companies and fuel businesses could be acting as fronts for CNDP interests.

33. According to numerous local sources interviewed, as well as receipts (see annex 1) obtained by the Group, CNDP leaders gather hundreds of thousands of dollars in administrative taxes in the area they control. These taxes include in some areas:

(a) 10 kilograms (kg) of beans, sorghum or corn per household per harvest to feed the soldiers; \$5 to \$10 per year for a mud or straw house; \$20 for a house with a corrugated iron roof; \$30 to \$50 per year for the small business owner; according to administrative officials, CNDP is in the process of instituting a poll tax as well;

(b) Charcoal taxes: the Group visited Kingi market, a five-hour walk from the edge of Virunga National Park, where it spoke with charcoal porters who informed the Group that they paid up to 3,000 Congolese francs (about \$5) in tax to CNDP officers present at the market for every 30-kg bag of charcoal, worth about \$18 on site. Market traders and CNDP officers told the Group that up to 300 bags passed through every day, six days a week, giving an upper limit estimate of \$36,000 revenues per month from this one charcoal market alone. CNDP controls other charcoal markets around Burungu and Kitchanga as well;

(c) Road tolls for cars on the two main axes controlled by CNDP Sake-Masisi and Sake-Mweso. These tolls have shot up from between \$60 and \$100 for a small truck before the fighting in August 2008 to over \$400 per small truck since then. Dozens of trucks used these two roads daily before the fighting, but traffic has been blocked by both sides since. Since CNDP took control of the Goma-Rutshuru road at the end of October, it has been imposing similar taxes there as well.

34. Since land has been a key component of conflict in the Kivus, the Group has conducted an analysis of land records to examine who has been buying land in CNDP-controlled areas and whether there is a link to CNDP financing. While land and cattle ownership are not lucrative enough at the moment to constitute a central cause of the conflict, they have a strong symbolic importance and are an indication of the affinities of individual businessmen:

(a) Despite the conflict, numerous businessmen reportedly close to the rebels have invested in land and cattle in CNDP territory. Among the businessmen who have purchased or invested in land in CNDP-controlled territory are Philippe Gatutsi, Fiat Felin, Damien Munyarugerero, Emmanuel Kamanzi, Tribert Rujugiro and Kampala Karitanyi. The Group has obtained the land registry documents for these concessions. According to locals, these owners have cows on their ranches and pay CNDP for protection;



(b) While many ranchers already present had no choice but to accommodate the CNDP troops, those individuals knowingly invested there after the rebels had already taken control;

(c) Since the beginning of the conflict, many cows have been brought to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from Rwanda also because of grazing restrictions recently imposed by Rwandan authorities. The Group has seen official agricultural documents showing that CNDP officers own over 1,500 cows in a small area of their territory, worth between \$450,000 and \$750,000, and probably own far more than that in other areas they occupy. According to ranchers, there could be as many as 180,000 cows in North Kivu, many of them in territory under CNDP control.

#### **D. CNDP control of Bunagana border post**

35. One of the principal sources of revenue for CNDP has been the control of the Bunagana customs on the Democratic Republic of the Congo/Uganda border. The Group visited this border crossing and spoke with customs agents there, in Goma and Kinshasa. The Group has evidence that CNDP made at least \$700,000 in revenues from this border crossing between September 2007 and September 2008, and has strong indications that it made much more.

36. CNDP troops, under the command of Colonel Sultani Makenga, have fully controlled Bunagana since September 2007. An officer under Makenga's command, Major Castro Mbera, was put in charge of gathering revenues from the border crossing and was named finance commissioner of CNDP in October 2008. CNDP troops forced out government agents, including the police and officials of the Direction générale des recettes administratives, judiciaires, domaniales et de la participation (DGRAD), a customs authority, filling both services with its own officials.

37. The Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities nevertheless retained officials at Bunagana from three other customs authorities, the Office des douanes et accises (OFIDA), the Office congolais de contrôle (OCC) and Direction générale des migrations (DGM). CNDP officials inspected their registries once a week and forced them to share revenues.

38. According to DGRAD officials, revenues earned at Bunagana between September 2006 and September 2007 amounted to \$120,000. They argued that given that the volume of traffic through Bunagana to date in 2008 has been roughly 30 per cent higher, revenues earned by CNDP should be higher this year. The Group has obtained an internal DGRAD document estimating CNDP revenues between September 2007 and September 2008 to be approximately \$154,000.

39. According to interviews with OCC, CNDP imposed a 50 per cent quota share on the OCC. OCC documents show that between September 2007 and August 2008, \$399,841 was given to CNDP.

40. Documents obtained by the Group indicate that CNDP had given DGM a quota of \$200 per week from money the rebel group obtained from immigration fees.

41. According to OFIDA in Kinshasa, revenues received by OFIDA from Bunagana during CNDP occupation there rose more than at other customs posts

during the same period. CNDP claims that OFIDA collected 1,956,510,520 Congolese francs between September 2007 and July 2008 at Bunagana, and that CNDP has not taken any OFIDA revenues. Nonetheless, the Group has evidence from interviews that CNDP took a percentage of OFIDA taxes at Bunagana, but has not been able to establish how much this amounted to.

42. According to OFIDA, the only customs revenues that CNDP claimed were road taxes, which OFIDA normally collects. These are normally levied at a rate of \$100 per large truck, \$50 per medium-sized truck and \$20 per car, contributing thousands of dollars a month in total to CNDP. According to Ugandan customs authorities, since CNDP began controlling Bunagana, roughly 1,800 vehicles have entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo from Uganda through Bunagana. The Group has documents showing the transfer of such taxes from OFIDA to CNDP (see annex 2). For example, between 19 September 2007 and 30 April 2008, OFIDA gave CNDP \$140,919 in road and other petty taxes.

43. A form of customs fraud common elsewhere in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from which CNDP has benefited at Bunagana involves false declarations of exported or imported goods. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo a distinction is made between taxes levied on large-scale commercial movements (*déclaration définitive*), which have to be cleared by customs authorities in regional capitals such as Goma, and taxes levied on local goods, which are levied at the border (*déclaration simplifiée*). According to numerous sources within OFIDA, some economic operators choose to break up large-scale shipments and bring them through Bunagana customs as local trade in return for bribes, from which CNDP benefits.

44. Customs officials have informed the Group that in spite of a monopoly on the importation of cement into North Kivu, which has been granted to a local businessman, traders smuggle through at least 150 sacks of 50 kg cement per day in return for \$1.45 per sack bribes to CNDP.

45. CNDP has reportedly provided preferential treatment to affiliated businessmen, waiving taxes on their goods:

(a) The Group has obtained customs records from the Uganda Revenue Authority showing that an articulated truck, with license plate RAB 056 RL 0447, crossed the border at Bunagana on 8 September 2008, over a week after Democratic Republic of the Congo customs officials withdrew. This entry must have been carried out with the exclusive permission of CNDP;

(b) The truck entered Bunagana six times between March and September 2008, according to documents in the Group's possession, bringing a total of 309,053 litres of fuel into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to several customs officials, it never paid taxes. Credible sources have identified the vehicle as belonging to Etablissement la Merveille, which is run by Rwandan businessman Steve Muvunyi. According to several sources, including two former CNDP officers, customs officials and local businessmen, Muvunyi is reported to have close connections to CNDP. Rwandan officials have identified the owner of the truck as Telesphore Ndekezi.

46. The Group has detected various flaws in the customs administration in Goma that have allowed for smuggling of a general nature, and leave open the possibility of unchecked weapons and ammunition transfers through customs points:

(a) The Group has confirmed through high-ranking OFIDA officials in Goma that once exporters paid taxes to the central bank, they would often hand their receipts to non-OFIDA staff to clear their goods at Bunagana with a simple telephone call;

(b) The Group believes that the lack of checks and balances in OFIDA, coupled with the fact that export fees are often paid in cash, which, unlike cheques or bank transfers, does not leave indelible marks in the banking system, leaves an opportunity for economic operators to undervalue goods and share kickbacks.

47. The Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities withdrew all customs agents from Bunagana on 28 August 2008, but CNDP and the Government of Uganda have continued allowing traffic through Bunagana, claiming they do not want to damage local trade or inconvenience the local population. CNDP has begun issuing its own immigration papers, which are accepted by Ugandan authorities.

## **E. Individual financiers of CNDP**

### **Raphael Soriano (aka Katebe Katoto)**

48. The Group obtained information that one of the financiers of CNDP is Raphael Soriano, a wealthy Congolese opposition politician originally from Katanga province in southern Democratic Republic of the Congo, but now of Belgian nationality and based in Bruges, Belgium. Mr. Soriano, also known as Katebe Katoto, had previously been alleged to have funded the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD), a Rwandan-backed rebel group of which he was vice-president briefly in 2003.

49. The Group learned through eyewitness accounts that Mr. Soriano has not only been supplying funds to CNDP, but that he was also involved in providing money and logistical support to the Forces républicaines fédéralistes (FRF), a rebel group in South Kivu that has been closely affiliated with CNDP in the past.

50. The Group has obtained copies of bank statements belonging to Nele Devriendt, the wife of Mr. Soriano, showing transfers from her account at ING Bank at Bruges. Mr. Soriano has power of attorney over this account. Among the transfers, the Group has noticed at least three that confirm verbal testimonies by the Group's sources about Mr. Soriano's links to CNDP and FRF (see annex 3):

(a) The ING Bank records confirm a transfer of \$25,000 on 7 February 2006 from Ms. Devriendt's account to an account held at Banque Commerciale du Rwanda in the name of Elisabeth Uwasse, whose location is given as Gisenyi, the Rwandan border town next to Goma. In the course of its investigations, the Group has been able to establish that Ms. Uwasse is a name used by the wife of General Laurent Nkunda. The Group has also obtained a land registry document that refers to Ms. Uwasse as the wife of Laurent Mihigo. The full name of Laurent Nkunda is Laurent Nkunda Mihigo (see annex 4);

(b) The ING Bank records also confirm a transfer of \$20,000 on 10 April 2006 to an account held at Centenary Rural Development Bank, Kampala (Uganda), in the name of Gendarme Rwema. Prior to obtaining this confirmation, the Group had already established from independent sources, including two former senior FRF and CNDP officers who were personally involved in these transfers, that

Mr. Soriano had sent money to Mr. Rwema, who was tasked with supplying FRF with Motorola equipment and cash for their operations. Sources close to FRF have also told the Group that they have seen Dada Abbas and Richard Tawimbi, individuals who have had various leadership functions within FRF, staying at the house of Mr. Rwema. The Group has informed the Government of Uganda of Mr. Rwema's activities;

(c) The ING Bank records also show a transfer of \$60,000 on 25 January 2006 to an account held at Banque de Commerce, de Developpement et d'Industrie, a Rwandan bank, in the name of Bilal Abdul Kalim Bakizi, a Lebanese businessman based in Goma. According to testimonies received by the Group, including from a high-ranking former CNDP officer, Mr. Bilal has been used as a conduit for external funding coming in to CNDP. Mr. Bilal comes from a prominent Lebanese family, many of whose members fled Kinshasa after being accused of alleged financial involvement in the assassination of Laurent Kabila. The Group has a copy of a fax from ING Bank to Mr. Bilal, confirming that the \$60,000 sent from Mr. Soriano to Mr. Bilal should be released to Ghislain Kikudji (see annex 5), who was once the Burundi representative of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), the rebel movement led by Laurent Kabila. The Group has several independent testimonies from reliable sources in Goma and Bujumbura, including an official involved in the transfer, that Mr. Kikudji was a close associate of Mr. Soriano, that he was tasked with handling important cash transfers, and that he handled more than one transfer from the account of Mr. Bilal. The Group also has information that Mr. Kikudji was arrested in Rwanda in 2006 in relation to this money transfer before being handed over to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for interrogation;

(d) The Group wrote to the Government of Rwanda on 27 October 2008 requesting details of all transactions to and from the accounts of Elisabeth Uwase and Bilal Abdul Kalim Bakizi. The Group has also written to the Government of the United States to request its assistance in obtaining the records of United States dollar transactions relating to these accounts. At the time of submission of the report, the Rwandan authorities responded to the Group's letters referring the issue directly to the banks concerned, which the Group had previously done in one case, only to be told that the Rwandan Government reserved the right to share such information. The Group continues investigating this matter. The Group is concerned that Mr. Soriano could be using millions of dollars of allegedly embezzled money to continue financing CNDP and FRF. He is currently being prosecuted in London for his alleged role in the embezzlement of millions of dollars of Zambian State funds. According to court documents, he has kept this money, worth some \$20 million, in two accounts: an account with KBC Bank in Belgium and a Swiss bank account with the Dutch bank ABN-AMRO. The Group has received documents from KBC Bank indicating that the account related to Mr. Soriano has been closed. The Group understands that the ABN-AMRO account was also closed in 2006, and continues to investigate this matter;

(e) During the escalation of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo at the end of October 2008, the Group received reports from foreign diplomats and CNDP sources that Mr. Soriano had left Belgium for Kigali, Rwanda. The Group continues to investigate his current activities related to CNDP.

### **Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa**

51. The Group has received testimonies, including from CNDP insiders and three separate former high-ranking CNDP officers, that Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa, a presidential adviser and the founder of the Rwandan Investment Group, a Government-backed private sector conglomerate, plays a role in CNDP financing. One former high-ranking CNDP officer told the Group that he used to see Mr. Rujugiro regularly in 2006 at his farm in Kilolirwe, where he held meetings with CNDP leaders, including General Nkunda.

52. Mr. Rujugiro is from North Kivu province. He is known to have been an important backer of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) during the Rwandan civil war of 1990-1994. In April 2001, he was named (as Tibere Rujigiro) by the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Rujugiro owns or has stakes in numerous businesses in Africa and the Middle East, including in the tobacco, construction, real estate and banking sectors. Mr. Rujugiro was arrested in London in October 2008 on a South African warrant for tax evasion and is due to face an extradition hearing on 28 November 2008.

53. The Group has obtained land registry documents indicating that Mr. Rujugiro owns hundreds of hectares of land in areas now controlled by CNDP. The Group has visited one of his cattle ranches in Kilolirwe (Masisi territory), on which Laurent Nkunda has set up a military operational base:

(a) Although Mr. Rujugiro purchased these properties before CNDP occupied the area, he has continued to invest in them in recent years, finalizing the purchase of two ranches totalling 300 hectares in the heart of CNDP territory in June and July 2006 (see annex 6). General Nkunda had established effective control of this area by mid-2005; CNDP was officially created in July 2006;

(b) The Group has reviewed documents showing that Mr. Rujugiro has over 650 cows on his various ranches in CNDP territory, worth between \$300,000 and \$400,000. Based on interviews with ranchers, agricultural officials and CNDP soldiers, it is clear that ranchers have to pay CNDP for the protection of their cattle;

(c) Land registry documents and testimony from other ranchers prove that Mr. Rujugiro has officially mandated Colonel Innocent Gahizi as the manager of his ranches to sign land documents in his name (see annexes 6 and 7). According to CNDP officials, foreign journalists and former combatants, Colonel Gahizi is one of the most influential CNDP commanders, in charge of financing and logistics and is closely in touch with Mr. Rujugiro.

54. The Group has obtained an original e-mail in electronic form sent from Mr. Gahizi to Mr. Rujugiro on 6 June 2008, in which Mr. Gahizi explains that he has all the “material” and “people” and is prepared to move towards the “city.” He then asks Mr. Rujugiro “what we should do”. He says, still within the context of logistics support: “That is why I have been asked to reach out to you and inform you that we won’t ask for assistance until December”. He also reminds Mr. Rujugiro not to forget to send “the device” he had promised. According to a former CNDP officer who saw this e-mail, Mr. Gahizi was clearly using code suggesting military operations (see annex 8).

<sup>2</sup> S/2001/357, paras. 91 and 197.

55. The Group also has an electronic copy of an e-mail sent from Mr. Rujugiro to Rene Munya, an associate of his in South Africa. The Group has since established from e-mails and conversations with people close to CNDP that Mr. Munya is an active organizer and fund-raiser for CNDP. In his e-mail, Mr. Rujugiro asks Mr. Munya to clarify the identity of some financial transactions sent by a “friend” who uses multiple identities (see annex 9). The Group is investigating further whether this e-mail is related to CNDP.

56. The Group has obtained a paper copy of an e-mail from Mr. Rujugiro dated 28 August 2007, thanking a Dubai-based employee for making the necessary arrangements to pay \$120,000 to cover the salaries of the “soldiers” for “our friend Laurent N” (see annex 10). The Group is in the process of confirming that this e-mail is authentic and, after contacting the e-mail server used by Mr. Rujugiro, understands that there are roughly 700 e-mail exchanges between Mr. Rujugiro and the e-mail address used by his employee and which appears on the hard copy. The server has said that this e-mail could have been manually erased or saved elsewhere if Mr. Rujugiro was sending e-mails from a mirror e-mail address. United States officials are also working on obtaining this information from the recipient’s e-mail inbox, which is hosted in the United States.

## **F. CNDP and natural resources**

57. The Group made a field visit to Rubaya, a town a few kilometres away from the Bibatama coltan mine in Masisi territory, where it was informed by a local administrator that mining police loyal to CNDP are monitoring production at the Bibatama mine. The mine itself has been a site of several conflicts over the last few years, most recently in 2006 and 2007, when CNDP clashed with FARDC and PARECO for control of the mine, which eventually was left in CNDP hands.

58. Edouard Mwangachuchu, a national senator, obtained a licence to exploit the mine in 2001. He exports the coltan through his *comptoir* (buying house) MH1. He says he has no choice but to accept the presence of CNPD and carry on working at Bibatama, as he needs money to pay \$16,000 in taxes to the Government. Sources in the mining industry say General Nkunda has given him permission to remain at the concession in return for a cut of production. Mr. Mwangachuchu himself informed the Group that he pays \$0.20 per kilogram of coltan exported at checkpoints set up in the vicinity of the mine, which he suspects are linked to CNDP.

59. The Group understands from interviews with mining sources and from a MONUC report that a land dispute has broken out between Mr. Mwangachuchu and Bayose Senkoke, a local businessman. CNDP has sided with Mr. Senkoke, who has partnered with Mboni Habarugira, an OCC official based in Goma, and has been given permission by CNDP to exploit part of the concession. Their product is sold to the MUNSAD *comptoir* in Goma, run by Damien Munyarugerero. Mr. Munyarugerero has been named by several sources as being close to CNDP. As mentioned above, Mr. Munyarugerero has also acquired over 600 hectares of ranch land in CNDP territory since their occupation.

60. The Group has confirmation through official export documents that MUNSAD began exporting coltan in 2008. The Bibatama mine produces hundreds of kilograms of coltan ore per week. The Group has reviewed official documents showing that MUNSAD has exported 8 tons of coltan to date in 2008, valued at \$64,000 (see

annex 11). The purchaser was Trademet, a Belgian company that has indicated that it has worked with and pre-financed MUNSAD for years. MH1 produced 13.5 tons between January and May of 2008.

## **G. Support to CNDP by the Government of Rwanda**

61. The Group has investigated allegations that the Government of Rwanda is providing support to CNDP. It has found evidence that the Rwandan authorities have been complicit in the recruitment of soldiers, including children, have facilitated the supply of military equipment, and have sent officers and units from the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in support of CNDP.

62. Given the nature of the support, there is little documentation available to prove Rwandan material support to CNDP. The Group has based its research on dozens of interviews with eyewitnesses to this collaboration, including former CNDP combatants and officers, members of the business community, regional intelligence officials and local eyewitnesses. These testimonies have been consistent and credible in describing the involvement of the Government of Rwanda.

63. CNDP operates recruitment networks in Rwanda. In some cases, there has reportedly been complicity by Rwandan officials in this recruitment. At the very least, it is clear that the Rwandan Government could do more to shut down these recruitment activities. Following are some examples of recruitment:

(a) Between January 2007 and October 2008, MONUC repatriated over 150 Rwandans, including 29 children, most of whom had been recruited by CNDP in Rwanda in 2007 or 2008. The Group interviewed 20 of the ex-combatants before they returned to Rwanda and obtained MONUC files for 15 additional individuals. The Group believes that these deserters represent only a fraction of the total number of soldiers recruited in Rwanda;

(b) Most were recruited by Rwandan or Congolese individuals in civilian dress. Some of the recruiters were reportedly former Rwandan army officers. Most ex-combatants said they had joined for financial reasons: they were promised large amounts of money, between \$100 and \$500 per month, but when they arrived in the Democratic Republic of the Congo they never received a salary and living conditions were very difficult. Several of those interviewed were captured by force by men in civilian dress;

(c) According to a dozen of these recruits, there have been incidents indicating complicity by the Rwandan authorities in their recruitment. A 12-year-old from Nkamira testified to MONUC that, "I was caught [in July 2007] while guarding cattle in our pasture in Nkamira by five armed men in military uniforms supposed to be RDF [Rwandan Defence Force], but surprisingly they came along with us and 15 others to Kilolirwe (in the Congo) via the Virunga park";

(d) Three ex-combatants testified that they had passed through the Rwandan immigration services without having their documents checked, adding that the border officials knew their recruiter. On the other side of the border, they had bribed the Democratic Republic of the Congo officials;

(e) While many new recruits pass through Goma on their way to training camps in Masisi, others pass through the Volcanoes National Park in northwestern

Rwanda. There the ex-combatants cross into the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the southern slope of the Sabinyo volcano. These forest paths are well known to locals. The Rwandan army has a military base in Kinigi, close to the Volcanoes National Park, and regularly patrols the park, but has never, as far as the Group knows, arrested any of these CNDP recruits;

(f) According to a recorded interview with a former Congolese CNDP combatant, a 16-year-old from Tongo, "We used to get new recruits from Rwanda, we went to pick them up at border in park, by Sabinyo volcano. The Rwandan army brought these recruits, including children, to the border and then went back". Two other former CNDP officers have given similar testimonies;

(g) In one case, Rwandan officers were reportedly present during the recruitment; in another, Rwandan military trucks were allegedly used to transport the recruits from Ruhengeri to Gisenyi, from where they crossed the border on foot;

(h) According to information obtained by the Group, CNDP has continued recruiting in the Kiziba refugee camp in Rwanda, home to roughly 16,000 Congolese refugees. According to several sources, Rwandan police or administrative officials have reportedly been present during the recruitment at times. These reports are very similar to recruitment drives documented in the January 2005 report of the Group of Experts (S/2005/30). The Group officially asked the Rwandan authorities for access to the camp on 8 October 2008 and is currently scheduling such a visit.

64. As mentioned above, numerous former CNDP combatants, both Congolese and Rwandan, have testified that RDF officers and units provide support to CNDP on Congolese territory:

(a) The Group has received numerous reports of RDF presence within CNDP and RDF units deployed in support of CNDP. Eight former CNDP combatants have testified to the Group that there were active RDF officers or units supporting CNDP. In one case, a Rwandan former-CNDP soldier told the Group in a recorded interview that he had recognized his uncle, a second lieutenant in RDF, who had told him that he was still receiving his RDF salary. In six other cases, CNDP ex-combatants informed the Group that their commanding officer had told them that they were receiving support from Rwanda; several of them saw small formed Rwandan units enter the Democratic Republic of the Congo in support of CNDP;

(b) The path the infiltrations take through the park is usually from Njerima on the Rwandan border through Kabara, Bitsitsi, Magarure, Nyesisi, Bukima, and Runyoni to Chanzo, or directly from Kinigi in Rwanda through the park to Sabinyo and then Chanzo;

(c) The Group has recorded an interview with a Congolese farmer, who was cutting bamboo on 10 June 2008 at Ruhungeta in the Virunga National Park when he was taken captive by around 100 troops coming across the border from Rwanda. Ruhungeta is 2 kilometres from the Rwandan border, and he said it was clear that that was where they were coming from. By their accent he recognized them as Rwandans. They were all armed and wearing military uniforms. He was held captive there until 30 June 2008, when he managed to escape;

(d) According to MONUC reports and local sources interviewed by the Group, an RDF battalion based on the other side of the border from Kibumba (Rutshuru territory) has made several targeted strikes into territory of the



Democratic Republic of the Congo against FDLR positions close to the border. On 1 May 2008, around 10 RDF soldiers crossed the border to Ruhunda market and abducted an FDLR officer, Captain Kasereka, after killing the FARDC soldier Issa Molimo from the 83rd brigade. The Group received confirmation regarding this incident from MONUC and the local population. The second incident took place in August 2008, when a group of RDF soldiers injured an FDLR commander and the woman he was staying with.

65. The Group has obtained satellite phone records for members of CNDP and the FRF leadership for the period of August 2007 to September 2008. It is clear from these records that both groups, particularly FRF, make and receive calls to and from the RDF high military command and the Rwandan presidency. While the Group cannot be sure of the content of the telephone calls, they are frequent and long enough to indicate at least extensive sharing of information. The Group has archived these records at the United Nations.

66. The Group has evidence that indicates that RDF provided support to CNDP during their recent offensive of 26 to 30 October 2008:

(a) According to four separate interviews with eyewitnesses from Gasizi and Ruhunda, Congolese villages located along the Rwandan border directly to the east of Kibumba, at least two Rwandan tanks were deployed to the Kabuhanga border crossing on 25 or 26 October 2008. The Group visited this border post later and saw that it overlooks the Kibumba refugee camp and that tank fire could have reached the Kanyamahoro FARDC headquarters of the 83rd brigade;

(b) The same local sources consistently reported that on 25 and 26 October 2008, they saw troops crossing from Rwanda through Kikeri and Mashahi forest area in support of CNDP advance. The Group was unable to ascertain whether these were RDF or CNDP troops, but the sources were certain they came from Rwandan territory;

(c) Following skirmishes between FARDC and CNDP on 25 October 2008, CNDP launched a major offensive against FARDC, capturing the Rumangabo military camp for a second time in a month and pushing towards Goma. On 28 October 2008, FARDC, together with MONUC attack helicopters, pushed CNDP back just north of the Kibumba internally displaced person camp. However, the following day CNDP renewed its offensive with greater firepower on its southern front by Kibumba, as well as on its northern front by Rubare. Some foreign military officers deployed in the field concluded that this greater firepower was due to external support;

(d) On 29 October 2008, senior MONUC officers and foreign journalists witnessed tank and mortar fire in support of the CNDP advance coming from the Rwandan border around Kabuhanga. According to locals interviewed by the Group, this was not an area previously under the control of CNDP, and it is likely that these weapons were transported there through Rwandan territory;

(e) During the afternoon of 29 October 2008, MONUC reported that one of its attack helicopters deployed around Kibumba had received anti-aircraft fire from the direction of the Rwandan border. While CNDP is in possession of anti-aircraft guns — the Group observed one deployed at Kabuhanga on 9 November 2008 — the direction the fire was coming from and the heavy nature of the artillery suggests that it was transported there by road. At that point, all road access to the Ruhunda-

Kabuhanga area was under the control of FARDC except for the roads through Rwanda. It is likely that the anti-aircraft gun was transported there through Rwandan territory;

(f) According to senior MONUC and FARDC sources, the tank and mortar fire was instrumental in breaking the FARDC defence and scattering FARDC forces as CNDP advanced towards Goma.

67. On 9 November 2008, members of the Group saw General Bosco Ntaganda, the CNDP chief of staff, crossing the Kabuhanga border and getting out from a Land Rover Defender jeep with a dozen soldiers. He was coming from a neutral zone, 1 to 2 kilometres wide, between the Rwandan and Congolese border. While the Group was not allowed to pass the Democratic Republic of the Congo border to see what lay beyond, locals informed the Group that the road did not lead anywhere else besides the Rwandan border. The Group believes that it is very likely that General Ntaganda was coming from Rwandan territory.

68. Rwanda has also been a rear base for CNDP in other ways:

(a) As explained above, bank accounts that CNDP uses for financing are located in Rwanda;

(b) CNDP officials have houses and families in Rwanda, whom they visit. CNDP delegates meet regularly with embassies there, despite the Nairobi communiqué, in which the Government of Rwanda pledged to prevent the entry into and exit from its territory of members of CNDP;

(c) The Group was informed, including by CNDP operatives and local businessmen, of fund-raising meetings held in Gisenyi on a regular basis, especially during the offensive on Goma in late October 2008;

(d) The CNDP leadership uses a series of around 30 consecutive MTN Rwandacell telephone numbers for much of their communication. Until September 2008, when the transmission towers were disabled, Rwandacell phones could operate on their Supercell sister network that operated in Masisi and Rutshuru (Democratic Republic of the Congo). CNDP regularly buys or is sent credit for these telephones through representatives in Rwanda. According to documents that the Group has obtained, one of the satellite telephones CNDP uses was issued to an individual, Lambert Amahoro, based in Kigali;

(e) As explained above, some of the trucks that supply CNDP with fuel and goods are registered in Rwanda;

(f) The Group has provided detailed information on these activities to the Rwandan authorities and requested information regarding the telephone numbers, bank accounts and trucks. The Group received a response from the Government of Rwanda on 19 November 2008, which the Group will follow up.

## **IV. Case study II: Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda**

### **A. Political leadership in Europe**

69. The FDLR political leadership continues to operate in Europe. Its most active members are President Ignace Murwanashyaka and Executive Secretary Callixte Mbarushimana. The latter was arrested in July 2008 in Germany on war crime charges, but was released again in November 2008.

70. Mr. Murwanashyaka and Mr. Mbarushimana remain active in writing press releases and speaking with the press. Since the beginning of 2008, they have signed 24 press statements in the name of FDLR and have been quoted in numerous international media. According to an analysis of satellite telephone records that the Group has obtained, Mr. Murwanashyaka speaks several times a week with General Sylvestre Mudacumura, the Force Commander of FDLR, and is frequently in contact with Colonel Leopold Mujoyambere, the South Kivu commander of FDLR, as well as with other commanders. According to former FDLR officers interviewed by the Group who worked with Mudacumura and Mujoyambere, Murwanashyaka is involved in day-to-day operational decisions. According to numerous consistent testimonies from former FDLR soldiers, Mr. Murwanashyaka visited the troops in the Kivus in 2005 with hundreds of thousands of dollars in salaries, believed by the troops to be back pay from the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their work.

71. FDLR maintains a website ([www.fdlr.org](http://www.fdlr.org)) hosted on a French server ([www.ovh.net](http://www.ovh.net)) and registered under the name of Ignace Murwanashyaka. The website is used by FDLR to post press releases and to provide its version of recent events. The Group has written to the server, informing it that hosting the website could be considered as support to a non-governmental Congolese armed group.

### **B. FDLR financing through natural resources**

72. The principle method used by FDLR to raise funds is through the illegal trade of mineral resources. The Group has visited FDLR-controlled mining areas, interviewing NGOs, civilians and mineral traders within those zones and FDLR ex-combatants in Goma and Rwanda. The Group has mapped out the scale of FDLR mining operations and linked the trade to export companies based in South Kivu and North Kivu provinces, and then to foreign end-users. The intention of the Group has been to pinpoint the degree of responsibility by those individuals and companies, domestic and foreign, that knowingly purchase minerals from FDLR-controlled mines. The Group believes that targeting companies complicit in systematically trading minerals with FDLR and promoting due diligence within the international minerals supply chain represent effective ways of cutting off the financial support of FDLR. The Group emphasizes that its predecessors have been meeting with mineral traders in North and South Kivu since 2006, when, in paragraph 5 (d) of its resolution 1698 (2006), the Security Council mandated the Group to research the link between minerals trade and arms-trafficking. Since then, the Group has consistently raised the connection between non-governmental armed groups and the exploitation of minerals. It is clear that the traders named below are aware of the

profits these groups derive from this trade, and that they are not vigilant enough in the sourcing of minerals they purchase.

73. The Group estimates that FDLR is reaping profits possibly worth millions of dollars a year from the trade of minerals in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular cassiterite, gold, coltan and wolframite. The minerals business is a high priority for FDLR, whose commanders detach units to tax and control the trade of minerals in a system they call “non-conventional logistics”. Some former combatants have informed the Group that the revenues earned by FDLR have been passed back up through the movement’s hierarchy.

74. Mining regulations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo make a distinction between local traders, or *negociants*, who are licensed to buy in the field and to sell to any domestic exporting company, or *comptoirs*, which are only licensed to export. The *comptoirs* often use the excuse that, because they are not theoretically involved in buying minerals in the field, they are unaware of the origin of the minerals they buy. But many *negociants* have told the Group that *comptoirs* need to know where their product comes from, as the ore content varies from one area to the next. In addition, these buying houses are aware of the presence of armed groups, as their taxation often drives prices higher. In practice, many *comptoirs* work with preferred *negociants* who they know and trust, pre-financing their activities. These *negociants* have often developed close relationships with FDLR at mining sites.

75. The Group has analysed hundreds of official mineral transportation documents issued by Government authorities present at transit centres where minerals arrive before being loaded onto trucks for Goma, Uvira, Butembo and Bukavu. Many of these documents confirm that certain *negociants* have purchased consistently from areas controlled by FDLR and have sent the product consistently to the same *comptoirs*.

76. The Group has also reviewed official export and mining ministry documentation that indicates that certain *comptoirs* buying from FDLR-controlled areas sell their product to a narrow range of foreign companies. The Group has learned from many *negociants* and the director of a foreign purchasing company that some of the foreign companies pre-finance their “own” *comptoirs*, in other words, acknowledging a chain of financing that flows from the foreign companies down to the FDLR-controlled mining pit.

77. The Group estimates that FDLR controls the majority of the principle artisanal mining sites in South Kivu, which are mostly cassiterite, gold and coltan mines. In North Kivu, FDLR controls many gold-mining pits based in the jungle west of the town of Lubero. The rebel group is also involved in trafficking minerals by road from Walikale and controls the vast majority of territory in the mineral-rich Kahuzi Biega National Park.

#### **South Kivu networks and end buyers**

78. The Group has identified several *comptoirs* in Bukavu as directly complicit in pre-financing *negociants*, who in turn work closely with FDLR. These companies are Groupe Olive, Etablissement Muyeye, MDM, World Mining Company (WMC) and Panju. These companies are the top five exporters of cassiterite, coltan and wolframite from South Kivu, according to 2007 Government statistics, and are

explicitly licensed to export minerals by the Government. The Group also has evidence that Etablissement Namukaya, a gold *comptoir* in South Kivu, is also heavily involved in pre-financing gold purchases from FDLR territory in South Kivu.

79. The Group has learned from interviews with minerals traders, FDLR deserters and employees of Groupe Olive, Panju, WMC, MDM and Etablissement Muyeye that these trading houses are aware that certain mines they buy from are controlled by FDLR. The Group has found that it is common knowledge within the mineral houses in South Kivu as to which mines are occupied by which armed group.

80. According to official mining ministry documents and a document issued by the Fédération des Entreprises du Congo (FEC), Groupe Olive is run by Mudekereza Namegabe, the head of FEC. Etablissement Muyeye is run by another prominent businessman, Muyeye Byaboshi. MDM is a joint venture, officially run by Mr. Mudekereza, but with other shareholders, including a Belgian national, Michel Defayi, and allegedly Edouard Kitambala, who also manages WMC. Panju is owned by Panju Zulfikar Ali. The exact ownership structure of these companies is not yet clear, but the companies are acknowledged by FEC to be owned by the above individuals (see annex 12). Etablissement Namukaya is run by Shamamba Evariste, a Bukavu-based businessman who has built a near monopoly on the gold trade in South Kivu.

81. The Group visited the town of Numbi (Kalehe territory, South Kivu), where it had received information on a number of nearby cassiterite, coltan, gold and wolframite mines controlled by armed groups, principally FDLR and PARECO, with some jointly controlled with FARDC elements of the 3rd and 8th integrated brigades. Residents of Numbi explained to the Group that armed FDLR officers frequent the weekly minerals market in town. Government mining officials gave the Group enough information to map out which mines are controlled by the different armed groups. Residents, local administrators and mining officials confirmed that most minerals that come into Numbi are essentially from FDLR- and PARECO-controlled mines.

82. The Group reviewed official Government mining documents in Numbi that showed a number of *negociants* buying from Numbi. The chief mining inspector at Numbi noted that the main buyer of cassiterite is WMC, which, according to official documents, has bought dozens of tons of the mineral, while MH1 is the main buyer of coltan. The main buyer of gold is a registered *negociant* called Majambere Gikeri, who the Group later identified from multiple sources as a wealthy businessman based in Rwanda.

83. In Mwenga town, the Group met with agents of *negociants* that buy minerals on behalf of certain *comptoirs* from FDLR-controlled mines. Many of these agents admitted they were pre-financed with large sums of money through the *negociants* from the *comptoirs*. For example, agents from Zombe, a major FDLR-controlled mine near Mwenga town, informed the Group that minerals purchased there were mainly on behalf of MDM, Muyeye and Groupe Olive. Official documents from the Government mining division in Mwenga shows thousands of kilograms of cassiterite removed from Zombe in the name of Tchikoma, a *negociant* who mining officials and traders have identified as working for MDM. The Group also viewed documents that show that Groupe Olive operated from the Zombe area in 2008 (see annex 13).

84. The Group received information from a local agent of Groupe Olive in Mwenga, who admitted that he was tasked and paid directly by Mr. Mudekereza to acquire minerals in Zombe. Local traders also confirmed the presence of another *negociant* known locally as “Shaba Deux”, who supplies MDM. Two FDLR deserters, one from Mwenga and one from Hombo, on the border of North Kivu and South Kivu, informed the Group that “Shaba Deux” is a leading buyer of cassiterite controlled by FDLR. Their physical description of him matched that of a description given by the head of the *negociant* association in Bukavu, who named “Shaba Deux” as Mr. Ciruza, a trader who works for the freight company Agefreco. Mr. Ciruza denied to the Group that he bought from FDLR, but admitted it in private to another source.

85. The Group visited Lemera, where it received information that FDLR-controlled cassiterite, gold and coltan was being carried by FDLR soldiers to traders in Lemera town. The Group confirmed from local officials, NGOs, civilians and local FARDC officers that FDLR is bringing its minerals to sell in Lemera from the Itombwe region of South Kivu. Mining officials reported that Group Olive, Muyeye, MDM and WMC have been the main purchasers over the last two years from Lemera. According to testimonies given to the Group, Mr. Mudekereza himself has visited Lemera, where he has a mining concession at the edge of town.

86. Building on work done by the previous Group of Experts, which in 2007 visited the remote town of Lulingu on the edge of the Kahuzi Biega National Park, the Group spoke with transporters who move minerals out of there, a park ranger based there and local NGO workers. All confirmed that FDLR controls mining pits in the park and uses intermediaries to send minerals to the Lulingu airstrip. The airstrip is controlled and taxed by units of the 18th integrated FARDC brigade. Sources confirmed that traders know they are buying from FDLR and communicate with FDLR via intermediaries. The sources reported that WMC, Muyeye, Panju and MDM all purchase minerals from Lulingu. Official government documentation confirms this. Sources from Lulingu noted that more than 90 per cent of minerals arriving at the Lulingu airstrip come from FDLR-controlled areas (see annex 14).

87. The Group learned that there is a lucrative gold trade passing through Uvira, to where gold is transported from FDLR-controlled mines in Fizi territory of South Kivu. The Group has heard from various civilians and gold traders that Djuma Tatu, a local gold trader, is pre-financing much of this trade. The Group reviewed official documents that showed that Mr. Tatu sold his gold to Etablissement Namukaya in Bukavu, often in amounts worth more than \$20,000 a month (see annex 15). The Group was informed that Mr. Tatu often travelled to Bujumbura, Burundi, to trade gold. The Group has conferred with representatives of NGOs and traders who have been to FDLR gold-mining sites and confirm that Namukaya and Mr. Tatu are principal clients.

88. The Group has obtained official documents that show that in 2007, the only importers of cassiterite and coltan from Olive, Muyeye, WMC and MDM were the Belgian company Traxys, and the United Kingdom-based company Afrimex. Mining sources, including a WMC employee, reported that Traxys effectively controls WMC and pre-finances other houses. In 2007, Traxys officially purchased 1,631 tons of cassiterite through these four *comptoirs* and 226 tons of coltan. Afrimex, which is run by the Kotecha family and has been based in Bukavu for decades, purchased 832 tons of cassiterite in 2007 through Muyeye. The Group has also

obtained documents showing that all of Panju's minerals purchases were sold to the Thailand Smelting and Refining Company.

89. The Group has asked both Traxys and Afrimex in writing for all financial transactions between themselves and these companies, as well as details of all pre-financing arrangements. Traxys confirmed that it has a buying relationship with the clients above but denies any pre-financing arrangements. Afrimex, which the United Kingdom authorities recently concluded had breached guidelines of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for multinational companies, informed the Group that it is not purchasing minerals any more.

90. The Group has also concluded through interviews with several sources in the gold industry that gold purchased by Etablissement Namukaya and Mr. Tatu has predominantly been sold in Bujumbura to two companies, Gold Link Burundi Trading and Farrel Trade and Investment Corporation. Both companies have long-standing links with Congolese trading houses, notably Namukaya.

91. The Group has received documents from Emirates Gold in the United Arab Emirates showing that it traded with Rajendra (Raju) Vaya and Vipul Kumar, under the name of Farrel Trade and Investment Corporation, in Bujumbura. Mr. Vaya is registered as the director of Machanga Limited., a Kampala-based company that was placed on the Committee's sanctions list in March 2007.<sup>3</sup> According to the documents, Emirates Gold traded with Farrel Trade and Investment Corporation in April 2007. The Group also has documents showing that Emirates Gold made a business transaction with Machanga Limited in October 2007 (see annex 16).

92. Mr. Vaya informed the Group that he had stopped his activities in Burundi, and split from his local partners there. However, Emirates Gold informed the Group in writing that it purchases gold from Ushindi Exports in Kenya. Mr. Vaya, of Machanga Limited, admitted to the Group that his family members own Ushindi Exports. Trading sources have also informed the Group that Machanga Limited is still trading Congolese gold via Nairobi and from a front company in Kampala.

93. Gold Link Burundi Trading is a company run by a Burundian national, Mutoka Ruganyira, who used to supply gold to Machanga Limited in Bujumbura. The Group has reviewed civil aviation documents indicating that hundreds of kilograms of gold were flown out to Dubai by Gold Link Burundi Trading, and several million dollars in cash were brought into Bujumbura between January and August 2008 (see annex 17). Mr. Mutoka informed a member of the Group that he had sold gold to Emirates Gold on visits to Dubai, but now sells his gold to Kaloti Jewelry, another company in Dubai. He then later changed his story and said he visited but never sold gold to Emirates Gold. He later admitted to buying about 7 kilograms of Congolese gold a month, worth tens of thousands of dollars, not from Namukaya but from small traders.

#### **North Kivu networks and end buyers**

94. The Group visited Walikale territory in North Kivu and travelled to the edge of the Kahuzi Biega National Park on the road to Bukavu. According to numerous testimonies, FDLR-taxed cassiterite leaving the park near Itebero is sold at the market town on Musenge in private depots supervised by FDLR. *Negociants*

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8987.doc.htm>.

working with Olive and Muyeye purchase large amounts of cassiterite at Musenge market, which is jointly controlled by the 85th FARDC brigade and FDLR. This information was corroborated by a MONUC staff member who visited Musenge. The Group has also heard from employees of Mr. Muyeye that he has direct connections with FDLR in the minerals trade.

95. The Group collected evidence showing that a group of gold traders in Butembo linked to the late Kisoni Kambale, who was also placed on the Committee sanctions list in March 2007, is purchasing large quantities of gold from FDLR-controlled areas. The Group visited Kasugho, the main trading transit point for this gold, on a market day when hundreds of armed FDLR elements patrolled the town. Residents and local government officials told the Group that FDLR operated a regime of terror in the bush, controlling production from over 100 small gold-mining pits.

96. The Group identified two traders, Pierre Karamba and Kambale Kitambala, who are named on official government documents as gold traders in Kasugho (see annex 18). Government officials and other traders informed the Group that these two men had the virtual monopoly of gold exports from Kasugho and are financed by a group of four traders in Butembo: Kahindo Muhiwa, Katina Kambale, Kambale Vikalwe and Nzanzu Mbusa, the widow of Dr. Kisoni, who sold his gold through Uganda Commercial Impex (UCI), a Kampala-based company also sanctioned in March 2007. Mr. Karamba admitted he sold gold to Katina Kambale. One of his employees informed the Group that local traders could handle up to \$20,000 worth of gold purchases on a single market day.

97. The Group has obtained a document showing that the four Butembo traders have together registered a company, Glory Minerals, whose objective is to export gold (see annex 19). Traders in the region informed the Group that the four traders who established Glory Minerals were already exporting gold to businessmen in Kampala. Nzanzu Mbusa has contacted the Group through a representative, who claims that she has written officially to withdraw her name from Glory Minerals.

98. The Group has documents showing that prior to his death, the late Mr. Kisoni and his widow, Nzanzu Mbusa, had tried and failed to set up another company, Aurum Africa, in partnership with UCI just weeks after both Mr. Kisoni and UCI were placed on the Committee sanctions list in March 2007 for buying illegal gold. Aurum Africa named Siva Reddy, a UCI employee, as manager of the company (see annex 20).

99. The Group met in September 2008 with the directors of UCI, J.V. Lodhia and Kunal Lodhia, in Kampala. They indicated that they were no longer involved in gold trading, that Aurum Africa was never granted a licence and that they no longer had any business interests in Dubai.

100. The Group has reviewed flight records from Emirates Airlines that confirm a possible traffic of gold from Butembo to Dubai. The records show that a member of Glory Minerals, Kahindo Muhiwa, travelled from Entebbe to Dubai earlier this year. The Group also has seen flight records showing that Sudhakar Reddy, a former UCI employee and brother of Siva Reddy, flew to Dubai from Kampala two days after Mr. Muhiwa. The Group has received information that Sudhakar Reddy is engaged in buying gold from Butembo. UCI Director, J. V. Lodhia, who used to sell gold to Emirates Gold, confirmed that Sudhakar Reddy had been in Butembo and Dubai recently, but said that he was no longer in the service of UCI. The Group has



obtained the client list of Emirates Gold, updated to 15 July 2008, which shows that UCI remains a client of Emirates Gold. Other documents indicate that Emirates Gold made business transactions with UCI eight months after sanctions were imposed on UCI (see annex 21). Mr. Lodhia argues that these transactions do not represent the trading of new gold stock, but rather are transactions relating to the refining of stock present with Emirates Gold at the time of the freeze, or trading on the gold futures market authorized by Dubai Multicommodities Centre on the condition that profits were not to be paid to UCI.

101. The Group has contacted representatives of Emirates Gold, who indicated that they are guarding frozen funds belonging to UCI and Machanga Limited at the Bank of Nova Scotia, pending instructions to release these funds to a supervised account in Uganda. The Group intends to follow up this issue, as well as why UCI continued to trade with Emirates Gold.

### **C. FDLR-FARDC collaboration**

102. The Group has obtained strong evidence showing that FARDC collaborated with FDLR, including through the provision of military equipment and in joint operations against CNDP. FDLR collaborated extensively with FARDC during the December 2007 clashes with CNDP in Masisi and Rutshuru territories and has continued to collaborate with FARDC during fighting that began on 28 August 2008.

103. The Group interviewed over 30 FDLR ex-combatants, mostly in the MONUC disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camp in Goma, but also in transitory care centres and in the demobilization camp in Mutobo, Rwanda. Of those interviewed, 15 individuals provided first-hand, concrete testimony of FARDC-FDLR collaboration. The Group also interviewed several former and active FARDC soldiers who have corroborated this information.

104. According to the interviews, FDLR battalions most involved in collaboration were the Sabena battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Marc Habimana (aka Ndinzi Mihigo), and the Bahama battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Henri Maitre. The main areas of such collaboration are on the following axes: Ngungu-Mushaki, Katale-Mushaki, Kiwanja-Kinyandoni, Rugari-Kibumba, all in the territories of Masisi and Rutshuru in North Kivu. Typically, the collaboration is sparked by impending offensive or defensive operations against CNDP. The assistance usually takes the form of joint attacks, with the two forces splitting operational axes. In return, FARDC provides FDLR with ammunition.

105. The Group has focused on three units of FARDC in North Kivu and South Kivu for case studies. The first case concerns the 11th special battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Pili Pili Kamatimba, initially deployed as part of "Operation Kimia" against FDLR and trained by MONUC. The Group has evidence of a transfer of up to 50,000 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition. The Group interviewed a 39-year-old FDLR officer (recorded on video) in the Mutobo demobilization camp in Rwanda in June 2008. He informed the Group how he had been an eyewitness in early 2008, when the 11th battalion, on its way through Hombo (Kalehe territory) to Nabyiondo (Masisi territory), stopped and transferred the ammunition to a delegation from FDLR that had come from the FDLR headquarters in Kibua (Masisi territory). The recipient of the ammunition was Captain Jean Victor, the FDLR liaison officer posted in Hombo:

(a) The Group was able to corroborate this information with two rank-and-file FARDC soldiers in the 11th battalion who also witnessed the Hombo transfer;

(b) The Group travelled to Hombo to speak with the population about the transfer. Locals confirmed seeing the FARDC trucks at the location indicated by the FDLR ex-combatant;

(c) In addition, the Group obtained a list of the inventory of the 11th FARDC battalion (see annex 22) in August 2008, clearly showing a difference of over 60,000 rounds of ammunition since they were deployed in late 2007. According to Lieutenant Colonel Pili Pili himself, his unit had only fought in one light skirmish lasting two days and involving around a dozen of his soldiers since deployment in 2007. The amount of ammunition used in that skirmish is not enough to explain the discrepancy shown in the inventory.

106. The second case involved the 81st FARDC brigade, commanded by Colonel Philemon Yav and based in Katale (Masisi territory):

(a) According to six separate FDLR ex-combatants, three former PARECO soldiers and two former FARDC soldiers, the 81st brigade has supplied both rebel groups with ammunition and conducted joint operations with them on several occasions between November 2007 and October 2008;

(b) According to a soldier based with the Sabena FDLR battalion led by Colonel Ndinzi Mihigo, he witnessed Colonel Yav hand weapons and ammunition over to FDLR Colonel Ndinzi Mihigo in Katale in late 2007, including AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and heavy machine guns. Several PARECO soldiers informed the Group that they had witnessed transfers of ammunition around the same time for operations against CNDP;

(c) On 16 September 2008, the 81st brigade fought against CNDP in Rubaya (Masisi territory) and entered the town together with PARECO, where they stayed together for several days, according to two separate reliable local eyewitnesses;

(d) According to an FDLR ex-combatant, a PARECO ex-combatant and local authorities, the Rubaya fighting was followed by a CNDP offensive against Masisi town, during which FDLR and PARECO troops were pushed back from Gasizi and Busiye to Kahongole, five kilometres north of Masisi, and then manned a defensive line side-by-side with the 81st brigade in defence of Masisi town;

(e) High-ranking FARDC officers in Goma have informed the Group that the 81st brigade has far fewer troops than it has declared, and that it may have called on PARECO and FDLR for reinforcements;

(f) Colonel Yav has been absent from his command owing to illness since February 2008 and has been replaced by Colonel Cyrille. However, the collaboration has continued unabated. While FARDC is aware of possible complicity between the 81st brigade and FDLR, they admitted informally to the Group that they had other priorities than to crack down on this sort of abuse. In October 2008, Colonel Yav was promoted to become the chief of staff of the 2nd military region in Bas-Congo.

107. The third case concerns the 81st battalion of the 8th FARDC brigade, based in Kamanyola (Uvira territory), South Kivu:

(a) According to an internal report by the provincial director of the national intelligence agency obtained by the Group (see annex 23), dated 22 April 2008, Major Frank Migabo, the commander of the 112th battalion based in Sange (Uvira territory), met with two FDLR colonels in Sange on 12 April 2008. Shortly afterwards, a non-commissioned officer of the 112th battalion sold weapons and ammunition to FDLR. According to informal discussions by the Group with staff of the national intelligence agency, they believe Major Migabo ordered the transfer of weapons. Major Migabo is still the commander of the 112th battalion, and the Group is not aware of any investigation against him by FARDC;

(b) Telephone records show that Major Migabo made and received calls to and from Colonel Edmond Ngarambe, the FDLR liaison officer based nearby, four times in February and March 2008 (no telephone records were available for April 2008);

(c) According to Congolese intelligence sources, Major Migabo travelled to Lemera, approximately 20 kilometres from his command post and outside his deployment zone, in November 2008 to meet with Colonel Ngarambe again;

(d) The Group visited Major Migabo's headquarters in Sange, in August 2008 and was informed by several independent local sources that there was open cohabitation between FARDC and FDLR there.

108. Twenty FDLR deserters, interviewed separately in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, informed the Group that they purchased military supplies from rank-and-file FARDC officers on a regular basis. The price of a bullet is around 50 Congolese francs (\$0.10) and between \$2 and \$3 for a uniform.

109. The Group has conducted an analysis of satellite and cellular telephone records of around 20 FDLR commanders during a 12-month period in 2007 and 2008. There was frequent contact between high-ranking FARDC officers and the FDLR hierarchy; the Group has documented 98 such calls during that period based on a small sample of telephone records. Four regional commanders, two of whom are not based close to FDLR territory, have received or made a total of 26 calls to senior FDLR commanders, including 16 to the Force Commander, General Mudacumura. A high-ranking FARDC officer in the 8th military region in Goma spoke with General Mudacumura 11 times, while a provincial director of the national intelligence agency spoke with an FDLR liaison officer 39 times. While the Group does not know the content of those calls, at the very least they prove extensive sharing of information, even between officers deployed far from FDLR.

110. Colonel Ngarambe, the most senior FDLR liaison officer, was often present in Bukavu during 2008, where he met with MONUC officials and FARDC commanders, staying for weeks at a time in town. According to sources within the intelligence services of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colonel Ngarambe is in charge of liaison with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which in itself the Group considers to be an indication of collaboration.

111. The Group has observed extensive cohabitation between FARDC and FDLR throughout the Kivus. The Group has witnessed first-hand such cohabitation in Nyabiondo (Masisi territory), Masisi town (Masisi), Sange (Uvira), Lemera (Uvira), Kasugho (Lubero) and Hombo (Kalehe) and has received reliable reports from MONUC and international NGOs of such cohabitation in numerous other places in North Kivu and South Kivu. The cohabitation includes mingling at markets,

drinking alcohol together in bars and visiting each others' command positions. When questioned about this practice, FARDC commanders said that they had not received orders to treat FDLR as enemies or to disengage, despite the timetable set out in the Nairobi communiqué, which called for military operations against FDLR by September 2008. The Group believes that this cohabitation facilitates the exchange of arms and allows FDLR to travel freely across much of the Kivus.

112. The telephone records reveal relationships between the FDLR command and liaison officers, Rwandan and Congolese, in Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa, including with Hyacinthe Rafiki Nsengiyumva, who played an important liaison role in the past for FDLR and RUD-Urunana while based in Point Noire and Kinshasa. He currently travels between Kinshasa and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group has spoken to several of these liaison figures, including General Mudacumura's sister, who lives in Lubumbashi and is in frequent contact with her brother, as well as a clandestine FDLR operative based in Goma and known by Congolese intelligence services to be involved in arms-trafficking.

113. FDLR and FARDC also jointly benefit from illegal charcoal trade in the Virunga National Park:

(a) According to an exhaustive study conducted by an international NGO, and Congolese conservation authorities, some 60,000 tons of charcoal worth around \$25 million, are consumed annually in Goma. Between 80 and 90 per cent of this charcoal comes from the national park, as the hardwoods there produce better quality charcoal;

(b) As cutting trees and making charcoal in the park is illegal, protection is needed along the supply chain. In Rutshuru territory, it is mostly FDLR personnel who provide security for charcoal production in the park, charging a tax of \$4 to \$6 per sack of charcoal. The charcoal traders then transport their goods to Goma on trucks, paying protection money to the 83rd and 9th FARDC brigades who controlled the Rutshuru road until late October 2008. FDLR allegedly has rented entire trucks to sell its production in Goma, implying that there may have been collusion with the FARDC commanders who control the road. Using a conservative estimate, if the FDLR tax around half of the charcoal production, they could generate over \$2 million annually in revenues from charcoal;

(c) According to the local population and conservation workers, the 83rd brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jean Claude Mosala, is also involved in this illegal taxation. There was a charcoal furnace located close to his headquarters in Kanyamahoro, and his soldiers have been in close contact with the FDLR units based around Rugari and Kibumba. The Group has also obtained documents showing the personal involvement of Major Zaire Ndahrihoranye, a 9th brigade officer, in the charcoal trade. Major Zaire has also frequently been cited by local leaders as having close ties to FDLR;

(d) As mentioned in its interim report, the Group has obtained numerous testimonies regarding the involvement of the 15th integrated FARDC brigade, under the command of Colonel Richard Mungura, in cannabis and timber trade, in complicity with FDLR;

(e) The Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN) put up a roadblock at Kibati, just north of Goma, in February 2008, to check for illegal charcoal. It is easy to detect the difference between charcoal made of hardwood

from Virunga National Park and other charcoal. However, in August 2008, the Minister of the Interior asked for the roadblock to be taken down within the context of the Amani programme, as all roadblocks were supposed to be dismantled. The roadblock, which had been manned by ICCN park guards, had helped reduce illegal charcoal trade into Goma by over 40 per cent, thereby also reducing FDLR revenues;

(f) In 2005, the Government of Rwanda passed a law banning most domestic production of charcoal to prevent deforestation. An unintended side effect has been the increase in charcoal imports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with most of the charcoal coming from the Virunga National Park, probably taxed by FDLR. Rwandan authorities have not set up adequate control mechanisms to check for charcoal coming from the national park.

## **V. Other armed groups**

### **A. Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance**

114. As explained in the Group's interim report, the Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO) is probably the third largest armed group in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo after FDLR and CNDP. It was created on 15 March 2007 out of various ethnic-based militias.

115. Since its inception, PARECO has grown rapidly, recruiting and creating an important second front line against CNDP to the west and south of their main positions in Masisi, distracting CNDP from its main offensive line against FARDC in the east.

116. The Group has examined the question of how an armed group such as PARECO could have expanded so quickly. Some of its high-ranking commanders have close links to FARDC officers. Colonel Banga, a PARECO commander based in Kinigi, was the main bodyguard to General Mayanga Wabishuba, a former Hutu militia leader and 9th integrated FARDC brigade commander based in Rutshuru, who is reported by sources within FARDC and MONUC to have close links to both FDLR and PARECO. Colonel Banga, then a lieutenant, travelled to Kinshasa with Mayanga in early 2007 before returning to North Kivu to help create PARECO. Mayanga was then promoted to the rank of general and named the deputy commander of the 3rd FARDC military region in Equateur province. According to a former FARDC officer close to General Mayanga, General Mayanga gave weapons and ammunition from the 9th integrated brigade to Colonel Banga as a contribution to PARECO. According to local leaders nearby who were interviewed by the Group, Colonel Banga was initially based in General Mayanga's house in his hometown of Busiye.

117. The Group has also obtained records of five incoming and outgoing telephone calls between General Mayanga and Lieutenant Colonel Kanzeguhera, otherwise known as Sadiki, the Montana battalion commander for FDLR, between February and April 2008. This reinforces the Group's belief, confirmed by MONUC officials and local leaders, that General Mayanga is in regular contact with Rwandan and Congolese Hutu armed groups.

118. On 8 November 2008, the Group witnessed a conversation between a senior PARECO commander and a former Congolese security officer describing their collaboration with FARDC: “We split up the axes, they attack the CNDP from one side and we come from the other.” The Group has obtained a document from the same commander in which he asks the Congolese Government for material assistance.

119. According to seven separate eyewitness accounts, PARECO received ammunition from the 81st FARDC brigade based in Katale (Masisi territory) in return for support in operations against CNDP. The 81st brigade, which was under the command of Colonel Philemon Yav, is also one of the units the Group believes has collaborated with FDLR (see above). Following are examples of collaboration:

(a) According to former PARECO soldier “IN”, 21, in August 2008 he was present when Major Fimbo of the 81st FARDC brigade came from Katale to Kaniro and gave PARECO soldiers 40 boxes of AK-47 ammunition and asked them to help them in an offensive against CNDP;

(b) A former FARDC soldier based with the 81st brigade command in Katale reported that PARECO commander General Mugabo visited Katale on several occasions in 2008, spoke with Colonel Yav and received ammunition. General Mugabo also participated in several joint operations, during which FARDC and PARECO were mixed. After Colonel Yav’s departure, Colonel Cyrille continued this collaboration. FARDC gave PARECO walkie-talkies, on which they could coordinate operations;

(c) According to a former Rwandan PARECO combatant based in Chugi with Colonel Kifaro, he saw Colonel Yav hand over three boxes of AK-47 ammunition to PARECO in return for support to stave off the CNDP offensive against Katale and Masisi in September 2008. He said that joint operations took place on a regular basis;

(d) A former FARDC soldier from the 81st brigade informed the Group that on several occasions during 2008, PARECO officers came to Katale to receive ammunition. On one occasion, PARECO Colonel Moomba received five boxes of AK-47 ammunition from Major Fimbo. He also took part in joint FARDC-PARECO operations against CNDP at Kagundu in 2007 and Katale in September 2008.

120. Several PARECO leaders are employed as civil servants by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, as such, continue to receive state salaries and benefits. This includes its executive secretary, Sophie Bwiza, who works for the national electricity company in Kinshasa, and Sendugu Museveni, the PARECO president and an employee of the Congolese Control Office in Goma.

## **B. Front populaire pour la justice au Congo**

121. The Front populaire pour la justice au Congo (FPJC) was created around September 2008 from the remnants of various Ituri militias. In September and October 2008 they launched an offensive against FARDC in the area to the south of Lake Albert. They control a small number of soldiers, estimated between 400 and 1,000. Their leader is Colonel Cherif Manda, a former leader of the Front de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FPRI). They criticize the authorities of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo for having betrayed agreements with several Ituri commanders who have been arrested and demand ranks in the national army.

122. In October 2008, several civil society leaders and politicians in Ituri expressed concern that many demobilized soldiers in the district were disappearing and thought to have joined FPJC. These leaders have also alleged that there are training camps for those militia in Uganda. The Group has not been able to travel to the region to verify that information.

123. High-ranking FPJC and CNDP officials informed the Group that their organizations are closely linked and that the two offensives they launched in August and September 2008, respectively, should be seen as joint initiatives.

124. The Group met with a high-ranking FPJC officer in Kampala and spoke with another on the telephone. The former admitted to the Group that two opposition politicians of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from North Kivu, Victor Ngezayo and Gaston Kangele, are political leaders of FPJC. The Group has heard from other sources, including Congolese and Ugandan intelligence services, that these two individuals are active in support of FPJC. Victor Ngezayo is also an active political supporter of CNDP. The Group is continuing investigations in this regard.

125. The Group provided the Government of Uganda with information regarding several FPJC leaders who use Kampala as a rear base for political activity and fund-raising, including Colonel Stefano and Colonel Cherif. The Group is not aware of any action the Ugandan authorities have taken to prevent their territory from being used by these individuals.

126. The Group intends to scrutinize FPJC and its support networks in the coming mandate period.

## **VI. Natural resources and arms embargo violations**

127. Pursuant to paragraph 18 (d) of resolution 1807 (2008), and following interest expressed by members of the Committee, the Group has been working to develop information about the role of natural resources in contributing to the financing of illegal armed groups.

128. According to the Centre d'Evaluation, d'Expertise et de Certification (CEEC), official exports of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of cassiterite from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 were roughly 14,694 tons, valued at roughly US\$ 45 million; 1,193 tons of wolframite worth \$4.27 million; and 393 tons of coltan worth \$3.62 million. In 2008, official statistics of CEEC showed that the amount of cassiterite exports had already hit nearly 12,000 tons by July 2008, which were valued at roughly \$127 million owing to spikes in tin prices before global commodity prices slumped. Coltan production by then had hit nearly 300 tons and was also valued at \$5.42 million. Wolframite production came in at 384 tons, valued at \$2.62 million. Gold production in 2007 was officially recorded at 105 kilograms. The Group believes that all these figures are grossly undervalued, including through the systematic underestimate of ore content, and has received credible accounts of large-scale smuggling to neighbouring countries.

129. Cassiterite, coltan and wolframite are officially exported through companies based in Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Hong Kong (China), India, Malaysia,

Thailand, Rwanda, South Africa, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The principle points of export for these minerals are Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. Cassiterite and coltan are used principally in the global electronics industry, while wolframite is used to make tungsten. Gold is smuggled out mainly through neighbouring countries and principally into the United Arab Emirates and Europe.

130. As indicated above, various non-governmental armed groups profit from these natural resources. The mines themselves are often taxed by FDLR, PARECO and other Mai-Mai groups, and some mining houses in Goma allegedly have links to CNDP.

131. The analysis of the Group has been based on whether buyers knowingly purchase minerals that come from areas controlled by these armed groups. The Group also believes that it is incumbent upon all companies, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and abroad, to conduct due diligence and to know where the product comes from.

132. The Group met with the *comptoirs* association in North Kivu in July 2008 and held a meeting with *comptoirs* in South Kivu in August 2008 to request information on which *negociants* they buy from, and from which geographical zones these *negociants* trade from, as well as information on quantities of minerals purchased over the past year. No *comptoir* has to date provided any of this information. The respective heads of the *comptoirs* associations in Goma and Bukavu, John Kanyoni and Mudekereza Namegabe, have meanwhile proclaimed that they are working with the United Nations to increase transparency in the sector.

133. The Group has nevertheless been developing a list of principal mining sites in North and South Kivu under the control of armed groups. While the Group has demonstrated that many *comptoirs* do buy knowingly from areas controlled by armed groups, the Group encourages donors to help develop a map of mineral rich zones, based on the Group's own public information, and to make the map public (on the Internet) by the end of the next mandate of the Group. The map should serve the purpose of removing the excuse that companies are unaware of which areas are controlled by armed groups.

134. In the meantime, the Group recommends that exporters and consumers of Congolese mineral products should step up their due diligence efforts by publicly disclosing evidence that would demonstrate that they are not knowingly purchasing tainted minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Too many *comptoirs* are exploiting the legal distinction between themselves and *negociants* to claim they do not know the origin of the minerals they purchase, when clearly they often do, and, if they do not, it would be fairly easy to find out.

135. FARDC itself is heavily involved in the minerals trade, typified by 85th brigade's control of Bisie mine. The Group believes that it is not in the interest of certain FARDC commanders to end the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as long as their units are able to deploy to, and profit from, mining areas. Preventing illegal exploitation of minerals is inextricably linked to security sector reform, given the deeply rooted corruption and divided loyalties within FARDC that lends itself to deal-making with non-State armed groups.



## **VII. Arms supply to non-governmental armed groups**

### **A. FARDC supply of arms to non-governmental groups**

136. As stated in the interim report, FARDC is the main source of weapons and ammunition for non-governmental armed groups. The weakness of the Congolese army prompts commanders to call on other armed groups for assistance, occasioning larger transfers of arms. At the same time, poverty and the lack of accountability allows rank-and-file soldiers to sell small quantities of weapons and ammunition for money.

137. A rank-and-file soldier in FARDC receives around \$62 a month in salary. A brigadier general makes around \$100 a month. Pay is more or less regular for integrated brigades, but they receive little health care, food and lodging for themselves and their families. Non-integrated units fare worse, often not receiving their due wages. FARDC has currently around 150,000 soldiers, of which one third (or 45,000) are in 18 integrated brigades (see FARDC salary table, annex 24).

138. The Group of Experts examined stockpile management within FARDC to review what safeguards had been put in place to prevent the loss of arms. The Group focused on stockpile security, maintenance, marking, record-keeping and the accountability of small arms and light weapons and ammunition. According to foreign military advisers and sources within FARDC, stockpile management is almost non-existent. The Government does not know how many of its arms are stored at which depots and with which units. There are accordingly few safeguards in place to prevent the illegal sale of weapons and ammunition to non-governmental armed groups.

139. While some units showed the Group inventories, many others did not seem to have an accurate picture of the state of their armoury. Individual soldiers are often held accountable for their weapons and ammunition, but there is little such accountability for stocks and depots.

140. Most of the FARDC depots are insecure and outdated. The majority of the ammunition is kept in open dumps exposed to the elements, causing rapid decomposition owing to the harsh climate. In various parts of the country, soldiers are allowed to take their weapons home, contributing to insecurity in these areas.

141. The Democratic Republic of the Congo signed the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons in April, 2004. According to article 7, paragraph (b) of the Protocol, all signatories commit to marking weapons at the time of import. The national focal point on small arms and light weapons in Kinshasa informed the Group that the Government of the United States recently donated one machine for marking small arms and light weapons, which is insufficient to mark all the small arms and light weapons in possession of the police and army of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

142. The Group has worked with MONUC to improve the Mission database on small arms and light weapons collected from armed groups. The MONUC database does not currently provide enough information on the arms collected to be of any use in tracing. The database does not identify the factory markings on the weapons, without which they cannot be traced. MONUC officials also do not take pictures of the arms seized, and its military personnel have not received training in identifying

and recording small arms and light weapons and ammunition. The Group also believes that much of the arms and ammunition collected by MONUC is not entered into the database, as there are relatively few entries compared with what the Group believes has been seized. This is evidenced by the fact that MONUC often hands over to FARDC more weapons than it has collected.

## **B. Other sources of arms for non-governmental armed groups**

143. Following numerous allegations that CNDP and FDLR receive arms through neighbouring countries, the Group has requested various arms exporters to provide statistics on their sales to the region in the past year. However, the Group has not, to date, obtained sufficient data to give a conclusive opinion on whether these countries provide weapons and ammunition to these armed groups.

## **C. Notifications to the sanctions Committee**

144. Under paragraph 5 of resolution 1807 (2008), the Security Council decided that all States shall notify in advance to the Committee any shipment of arms and related materiel for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or any provision of assistance, advice or training related to military activities. To date in 2008, military personnel from Angola, Belgium, China, France, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States and MONUC have provided training to FARDC. At the time of writing, the Group is aware only of notifications to the Committee received pursuant to paragraph 5 from Belgium, China, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

145. The Group has obtained information regarding military supplies flown to FARDC from Khartoum without notification to the sanctions Committee. The flights were performed by Hewa Bora Airways, registered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which supplied the Group with documentation:

(a) On 18 September 2008, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Ministry of Defence requisitioned all cargo aircraft belonging to Hewa Bora, Trans Air Cargo and Gomair “for operational imperatives in the East of our country”. (N° MDNAC/CAB/1624/2008) (see annex 25);

(b) Aircraft and crew were henceforth wet-leased to the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities. Hewa Bora invoice N° 042/DG/HBA/FIH/2008 records that a Hewa Bora Boeing-707 with registration number 9Q-CKR performed five flights between Khartoum and Kisangani for the Forces Armées de la République du Congo (see annex 26). The maximum payload of that aircraft is 38 tons. The Group is not aware of the required notification to the Security Council by the Government of the Sudan;

(c) The Group has received credible information that the weapons transported originated in China. The Group has written to the Government of China and is awaiting a reply.

146. In general, the Group is aware of large amounts of ammunition arriving in eastern Congo without any notification by exporters to the sanctions Committee. In addition, the Group would like to bring to the attention of the Security Council the prospect that FARDC may also be exporting weapons and ammunition to other countries in the region. As the Democratic Republic of the Congo does not produce

weapons or ammunition, this stock would have been imported to the Democratic Republic of the Congo without notification and then possibly exported in violation of the original end-user agreement with the original exporter. Between 20 and 22 August 2008, a Boeing-707-3B4C (registration number 9Q-CRM, manufacturing number 20259) performed four flights (Kinshasa-Harare; Harare-Lubumbashi; Lubumbashi-Harare; Harare-Kinshasa) and transported a total of 53 tons of ammunition destined to the Zimbabwean army. While this is not a violation of the arms embargo, it is an indication that the Democratic Republic of the Congo could become a transit point for weapons destined for other countries.

#### **D. Arms-trafficking and border control**

147. The Group visited Uganda border posts with the Democratic Republic of the Congo at Bunagana and Mpondwe and the Rwanda border post with the Democratic Republic of the Congo at Cyanika. There are currently few provisions to prevent the smuggling of weapons and ammunition across the border. Ugandan customs officials do not routinely stop and inspect vehicles that they consider to be involved in local trade. In the Group's opinion, these vehicles have the potential to carry large quantities of ammunition.

148. Similarly, it is not the practice of Ugandan customs officials to physically inspect transit cargoes against cargo manifests. For example, the Group was informed about an alleged shipment of weapons on 27 June 2008 through the Kasindi-Mpondwe border crossing between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. The prosecutor in Kinshasa requested that three trucks with the licence plates NK2431BB, NK6861BB, NK5287BB-NK5288BB (articulated truck) be stopped just outside of Beni and searched by police on suspicion of arms-trafficking. There was a stand-off with soldiers, allegedly sent by a high-ranking Kinshasa official, which resulted in the trucks getting away into Beni town. At Mpondwe, the Group gathered documentation in relation to these shipments that has not been inspected by Ugandan authorities. According to the documents, two identically sized containers, one filled with motorcycles and the other filled with aluminium utensils, had almost similar weights, which is physically impossible.

##### **Box 1**

##### **Rumangabo**

The authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo claimed to have seized a number of military items, as well as Rwandan money and pictures of RDF graduating classes, in Rumangabo on 7 October 2008, which the authorities allege constitutes proof of Rwandan support to CNDP. The Group has inspected these items and is currently pursuing three leads:

(a) A Bulgarian RPG-7 rocket grenade: the Group has asked the Bulgarian authorities to supply information regarding (a) who purchased this type of equipment in the Great Lakes region; and (b) if the authorities can identify a specific buyer based on the lot number;

(b) 7.62 x 39 mm Kalashnikov ammunition sold by Zimbabwe Defence Industries under the trade name CHEETAH: the Group requested the Zimbabwe authorities to supply a list of all buyers in the Great Lakes region of this type of ammunition, and whether sufficient information, based on the bar code, is available to identify a particular buyer. The Zimbabwean authorities responded that the ammunition was made for hunting purposes and that Zimbabwe has not supplied arms to the Democratic Republic of the Congo since its troops withdrew in 2002 and has not provided any military material to Uganda, Rwanda or Burundi, although those countries did capture some Zimbabwean equipment during the 1998-2003 war;

(c) The Group also examined the allegedly Israeli manufactured combat vests with misspelled labels “RDF — Rwanda Deffence Forces”. The Group has asked the Israeli company Achidatex if it recognizes the vests as those manufactured by the company, and if Achidatex sold such items to countries in the region. At the time of writing, the Group was still verifying this information with the cooperation of Achidatex, which has indicated that such an export might have taken place to the Government of Rwanda in 2005.

Nonetheless, the Group considers that the photographs and money do not constitute “irrefutable proof” of Rwanda’s involvement in the recent clashes. The Rwandan money allegedly found on the bodies of RDF soldiers dates to the 1980s, and some of the pictures of Rwandan staff officers were readily available during the Rwandan-backed 1996-1997 war against former President Mobutu. In addition, even if the above arms had been sold to the Rwandan Government, that would not constitute absolute proof that RDF was deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

#### Box 2

##### **Grenade launcher**

The Group received information that during the screening of a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) interview with Laurent Nkunda (10 October 2008), the BBC also took footage of some of the weapons used by CNDP. Some of the footage included a 6-shot grenade launcher. This type of grenade launcher is manufactured in only three countries: Croatia (Alan Agency d.o.o.), South Africa (Milkor) and Turkey (MKEK). The Group is continuing its investigations in this regard. The Government of South Africa confirmed that such equipment was not exported by Milkor or a South African broker to the Democratic Republic of the Congo or any country in the region. Milkor further clarified that the last export of such equipment dates back to 1993 to the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).

## VIII. Civil aviation and logistics

149. In connection with paragraph 6 of resolution 1807 (2008), and in particular subparagraph (a), the Group of Experts examined two versions (September and November 2008) of the Aircraft Registry of the Democratic Republic of the Congo provided by the Autorité de l'aviation civile (AAC). From the beginning of 2008, AAC carried out an extensive review of the Registry and has improved the accuracy of the data. However, the Group found that despite those efforts, the Registry still includes several inconsistencies and mistakes, and does not include essential information for a sizeable number of aircraft.

(a) The table below shows a summary of the declared status of 586 aircraft registered under the country's marking "9Q-" between 1969 and 2008. During this period, the same registration number has been assigned to different aircraft, which accounts for the large number of aircraft included in the Registry (see annex 27). There are 95 aircraft active in 2008 and declared airworthy, but this number also includes aircraft whose certificate of air worthiness is unknown;

(b) The status of a majority of aircraft — 323 of 586 — is unknown. This fact poses a threat to the safety and security of aviation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(c) The Registry also includes 20 aircraft with an obviously incorrect registration number and, most importantly, 89 aircraft whose manufacturing number (the real aircraft identifier) is missing or incorrect;

(d) Not included in the Registry is an Ilyushin-76, bearing the registration number 9Q-CLR, for which the Group has received credible information to have landed in Nairobi early in November 2008. The same registration number is assigned in the Registry to a Cessna P-210N.

### Democratic Republic of the Congo Aircraft Registry (November 2008)

<i>AAC declared status</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Period of registration</i>
No certificate of airworthiness information	323	From 1969 to 2007
De-listed, destroyed or sold	24	From 1985 to 2007
Expelled	34	From 1978 to 2005
Grounded	110	From 1976 to 2007
Airworthy	95	From 1977 to 2008
of which:		
Certificate of airworthiness expired in 2006	1	
Certificate of airworthiness expiring in 2008	50	
Certificate of airworthiness expiring in 2009	34	
Certificate of airworthiness unknown	10	
<b>Total</b>	<b>586</b>	<b>From 1969 to 2008</b>

Source: AAC, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, November 2008.

150. The Group has also established that aircraft banned from flying by AAC for safety reasons continue to fly:

(a) Compagnie Africaine d'Aviation (CAA)-owned DC-9-819 (MD81), registration number 9Q-CBD, manufacturing number 48018, whose certificate of airworthiness expired on 13 January 2008, flew in and out of Goma airport in May and June 2008;

(b) African Air Services Commuter-owned Antonov-26 (AN-26) or AN-28, registration number 9Q-CFQ, serial number 1AJ008-05, and with its certificate of airworthiness expired 8 December 2007, was flying in and out of Goma airport in July and August 2008. Aircraft operated by CAA and African Air Services Commuter are also banned from flying within the European Union.<sup>4</sup>

#### A. Case study: Great Lakes Business Company

151. The Group has investigated two aircraft with registration numbers 9Q-CGQ and 9Q-CGO belonging to Great Lakes Business Company, an entity named in the Committee's sanctions list in March 2007.<sup>5</sup> The manufacturing number (4341801) recorded in the Aircraft Registry of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as belonging to the AN-12 with registration number 9Q-CGQ, grounded by AAC and currently in Goma, actually belongs to the AN-12 that crashed in Goma in July 2003, with registration number 9L-LCR.

152. The AN-12 with registration number 9L-LCR previously bore the registration number 9Q-CGO and was part of the fleet of Great Lakes Business Company. According to the logs of aircraft registration maintained by AAC, no such aircraft was ever registered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the registration number 9Q-CGO was previously assigned to a Boeing-707 derelict in Kisangani. In the AAC Registry there is no update of this registration as belonging to an AN-12.

153. According to official AAC documents obtained by the Group of Experts during a previous mandate in 2005, the 9Q-CGQ-registered aircraft was acquired by Great Lakes Business Company on 2 August 2003 and registered as an AN-12 with manufacturing number 4341801 (see annex 28). The 9Q-CGQ-registered aircraft apparently received its certificate of airworthiness on 1 September 2004.

154. According to photographic and documentary evidence (see annex 29) collected by the Group and confirmed by the manufacturer Antonov Design Bureau, as well as the authors of the leading publication *Soviet Transports*, the manufacturing number 4341801 and the parts that bear manufacturing number 3341801 found in the wreckage of the 9L-LCR-registered aircraft, actually belonged to the 9Q-CGO-registered aircraft that crashed in Goma as the 9L-LCR-registered aircraft. This aircraft was built for the Soviet Air Force and was later apparently recorded as CCCP-12166 (the number 166 is still visible on the front lower window of the crashed aircraft (see annex 30).

155. Inquiries addressed to the Civil Aviation Authority of the Government of Sierra Leone requesting the registration documents of the 9L-LCR-registered aircraft have not yet been answered. The inquiry on the Goma-impounded 9Q-CGQ-

<sup>4</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/atoz\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/atoz_en.htm).

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8987.doc.htm>.

registered aircraft continues and the Group has not reached conclusive evidence of its identity.

## **B. Commercial aviation and requisitioned aircraft**

156. Over the past two years, FARDC has extensively used cargo planes belonging to MONUC and commercial aviation companies for the transport of military equipment to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In particular, since September 2008, the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have commandeered aircraft of three Democratic Republic of the Congo-registered companies: Hewa Bora Airways, Gomair, and Trans Air Cargo Service.

157. The aircraft transported FARDC military equipment and supplies from and to various locations, in particular Kinshasa, Kisangani and Goma. Goma and Kisangani airports' movements and cargo manifests obtained by the Group show that in September 2008, Hewa Bora Airways aircraft performed 33 flights (Kisangani, Goma, Kinshasa) and 11 flights in October 2008 using the same route. In September 2008, Gomair aircraft performed six flights (Kisangani, Goma) and six flights in October 2008 (Kisangani, Goma, Isiro). Trans Air aircraft performed 10 flights in September 2008 (Kisangani, Kinshasa) and 5 in October 2008 (Kisangani, Kinshasa). Cargo manifests from Gomair obtained by the Group and statements made by Hewa Bora Airways management confirm the military contents of cargo of these flights.

158. Another company, Enterprise World Airways (EWA) (ICAO call-sign EWS), which was put into government service, performed nine flights (Kisangani, Kinshasa) in September 2008 and six flights in October 2008 for FARDC (Kisangani, Kinshasa), with a Boeing-707 aircraft with the registration number 9Q-CRM. Subsequently the Group witnessed the unloading of ammunition boxes from this aircraft in Kisangani on 27 October 2008.

159. The Group would like to underline that, in connection with paragraph 6 of resolution 1807 (2008), the use of civil aircraft in conflict and war zones is prohibited by the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation<sup>6</sup> and ICAO rules, because this use puts at risk the lives of civilian crew and pilots who are not provided with military support.

### **Enterprise World Airways and ammunition shipments to Zimbabwe**

160. The Boeing-707 aircraft with registration number 9Q-CRM used for military supply to Zimbabwe is registered as belonging to EWA, headquartered in Kinshasa on Boulevard Lumumba 68 and run by Charles de Schrijver and Mr. Birindwa. As recorded in Goma's airport movements, EWA (misspelled Hewa) operated with the same 9Q-CRM-registered aircraft for FARDC with military personnel and ammunition destined to North Kivu. At the time of the Zimbabwe mission, the aircraft was still officially airworthy, but its certificate of airworthiness expired on 1 November 2008.

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<sup>6</sup> [http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto\\_m.pl?/icaonet/dcs/7300.html](http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m.pl?/icaonet/dcs/7300.html).

### C. Maritime and lake traffic

161. The Group has investigated cargo movements through the ports of Dar es Salaam, Kigoma, Matadi and Mombasa. These ports have been cited by sources of the Group as transit points for military equipment destined to non-governmental armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group analysed the daily port movements of ships that docked and unloaded cargo at these ports from January to October 2008. The analysis of port movements and the provenance of the ships calling at those ports, as well as information received by the Group, highlighted potential arms shipments, and the Group submitted a list of vessels to local authorities to request access to the cargo manifests.

162. The Group has not detected any military shipments through these ports that are obviously destined for non-governmental armed groups. However, it is still inquiring on a large cargo of ammunition recently unloaded at the port of Dar es Salaam from a general cargo ship that loaded the cargo at the Ukrainian port of Oktyabrsk.

163. In Mombasa, the Group focused its inquiry on transit cargo and on manifests of goods recorded by OFIDA and destined for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group also asked the Kenya customs authority to provide cargo manifests for shipments of military equipment unloaded in Mombasa, and in particular for a general cargo ship that docked at Mombasa in January 2008 with a military cargo loaded in the Ukrainian port of Oktyabrsk. Kenya customs authorities only provided a summary of contents of shipments destined to or originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group is still inquiring on the end-user certificate of a cargo of military equipment unloaded from another ship and small arms originating in the same Ukrainian port destined for Mombasa.

164. In Dar es Salaam, the Group asked port and customs authorities for cargo manifests of 21 ships that docked in Dar es Salaam in 2008, but obtained only four manifests.

165. In Matadi, the Group asked cargo manifests for 42 vessels docked at Matadi on various dates in 2008, including a general cargo ship, the *St Georg*,<sup>7</sup> that unloaded Chinese military trucks and other military equipment in Matadi on 30 September 2007. The ship changed its name in Padna in February 2008. To date, the Group has not yet received the cargo manifests.

166. In Kigoma the Group asked customs and port authorities for various types of documents on the port traffic with Uvira and other lake ports in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular on a ship suspected of having transported weapons from Kigoma to Uvira in July 2007. The Group received the documents and the inquiry is still ongoing.

## IX. Recruitment and use of children by armed groups

167. The Group of Experts obtained information directly from local transitory care centres where children are relocated after they separate from armed groups, as well as from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), MONUC and other child

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<sup>7</sup> The above-mentioned ship is cited in para. 79 of S/2008/43 as *Saint George*.



protection partners. The Group also conducted a number of field verifications missions and conducted direct interviews with demobilized children.

168. In total, the Group analysed 374 files of demobilized child soldiers and interviewed several dozen in person. On the basis of this data and on the Group's field missions and direct testimonies, the most active commanders responsible for recruitment or use of child soldiers are:

(a) CNDP: Colonel Innocent Kabundi, Colonel Sultani Makenga and Colonel Munyakazi. However, given the strong command and control within CNDP, and the frequent visits by General Nkunda and General Taganda with the troops, the Group believes that both commanders are responsible for maintaining children within the ranks of CNDP;

(b) PARECO: A significant number of children had been recruited by bodyguards of General Mugabo, the North Kivu commander of PARECO, indicating his personal responsibility.

## **A. Trends of recruitment**

169. The resurgence of recent violence and active fighting in Masisi and Rutshuru territories, as well as in Ituri district since August 2008, contributed to a new wave of child recruitment. The Group travelled to Kilolirwe and Kitchanga, where it obtained consistent reports from schools, local authorities and humanitarian workers of large-scale child recruitment. The Group has also received numerous reports of children recruited by PARECO since January 2008.

170. According to information gathered by child protection actors, it is estimated that at least 150 children have been recruited in Rutshuru territory since the resumption of fighting in late August 2008. According to child protection agencies, from the week of 24 October to 2 November 2008, 36 children were reportedly recruited by Mai-Mai in the area of Nyamilima (Rutshuru territory), likely in response to the recent offensives by CNDP. During the third week of November 2008, the Group received reports of systematic and ongoing recruitment in Kitshanga, Masisi territory. The same sources reported that almost all children reunified with their families in the last three months have been re-recruited, in particular in the areas of Kitshanga, Mweso and Kashuga, by CNDP. During the same period, the Group received information of 52 children having been re-recruited by Mai-Mai militias.

## **B. Re-recruitment**

171. Former child soldiers are vulnerable to re-recruitment, as they are already trained combatants and constitute an appealing asset to armed groups. On the basis of the above-mentioned data analysis, the Group is aware that of the 350 demobilized children, 24 were recruited more than once by more than one armed group. Following are some examples:

(a) A 15-year-old was recruited in 2005 by FDLR in Ngungu, Masisi territory, before escaping two weeks later. Two days after being reunited with his family, the child was recruited by CNDP. He was released at the end of 2007 from CNDP but was re-recruited by the same group in September 2008. Another young

boy, age 15, was first recruited in Kagusa (Masisi) by Lieutenant Mugenzi of CNDP in April 2008, and re-recruited by Colonel Muomba of PARECO in May 2008;

(b) Three boys from the rebel group Mai-Mai Cobra (14, 15 and 16 years old, respectively) were first recruited at Renga (Masisi) by Captain Elie of Mai-Mai Cobra between 2005 and 2006. The boys were used as bodyguards. They were demobilized and transferred to a transit centre in Goma before being reunified with their families in March 2008. The boys were re-recruited at Kingi (Masisi) territory by Mai-Mai Cobra elements in June 2008.

### C. CNDP child recruitment

172. Among the 374 cases of recruitment analysed by the Group, there were 60 cases of recruitment by CNDP.

173. According to information obtained locally and from child protection actors, the recruitment of children by CNDP intensified in September 2008, in particular in the territory of Masisi. Two children who escaped in mid-October 2008 from CNDP reported that they had been recruited in early October 2008 in the area of Ngungu and Murambi by Colonel Baudoin and Major Butoni, respectively. A direct testimony received by the Group in October 2008 reported on 40 minors being trained in a camp in Mushake. The Group received corroborated information that the areas of Karuba, Kagungu, Rubaya, Mushake and Muremure were particularly targeted for child recruitment. On the night of 11 October 2008, MONUC intervened twice to stop recruitment at local houses by CNDP elements near Osso farm (Masisi).

174. The Group received a number of reports of children being targeted for recruitment and approaching bases of the MONUC North Kivu brigade seeking protection. In mid-October 2008, the Group received a report that 16 boys were relocated by MONUC to transitory care centres in response to several attempts to recruit them in the area of Mushaki.

175. On the basis of direct testimonies of demobilized children, recruitment in schools remains a worrying method used by CNDP to enlist children in its ranks:

(a) In the course of a field mission in mid-October 2008, the Group received verified information from two schools in Masisi and Rutshuru territories, respectively, of 14 cases of child recruitment;

(b) On 24 October 2008, CNDP elements reportedly targeted the primary and secondary schools in Shasha (Masisi). Thirteen children recruited in the schools were able to escape, although one was reportedly killed;

(c) The Group learned from direct testimonies that in June 2007 a massive recruitment operation took place in the primary school of the Nyakariba parish (Masisi). According to one of the children recruited, CNDP elements led by Colonel Innocent Kabundi raided the school and abducted all the children over the age of 10, including girls;

(d) In April 2008, CNDP soldiers forcefully recruited 16 boys from a church in Masisi. The boys were taken to Mweso for training under the command of Captain Habimana. During an attack by FARDC, three of the children were killed.

176. The Group has also received reports of abuse of children within CNDP. The Group interviewed 10 CNDP deserters in Kisoro, Uganda, between 15 and 26 years old, including 8 Rwandans, 1 Burundian and 1 Congolese. They reportedly witnessed three summary executions of children who had attempted to escape the Chanzo military camp under the command of CNDP commander Colonel Sultani Makenga during the months of August and September 2008. The Group has received numerous other eyewitness reports of executions within CNDP for various offences, including attempted desertion and rape.

#### **D. FDLR**

177. Of the 374 cases of recruitment analysed by the Group, 62 cases are attributed to FDLR. Following are some examples:

(a) A 17-year-old boy was recruited at Kabizo in January 2007 by FDLR Major Didi. He escaped at Katwiguru, Rutshuru territory;

(b) Another boy was first recruited in 2005 at Kagando, Rutshuru territory, by a group of FDLR-Forces combattantes abacunguzi (FOCA) combatants under the command of Captain Job. The same boy was re-recruited in July 2008 in the same area by a group of FDLR-FOCA combatants under the command of Colonel Maitre;

(c) A 13-year-old boy, interviewed by the Group in November 2008 after having escaped from Kibati, was recruited two months earlier by FDLR Lieutenant Vumilia Kasa at the market in Kibumba;

(d) Among the children who recently fled FDLR-FOCA, the Group received a report of a 15-year-old Rwandan boy who was brought to Numbi in Kalehe territory by a Rwandan farmer in August 2008, and recruited by FDLR-FOCA in September 2008. He is one of many Rwandan cowherds who have been recruited in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by FDLR and CNDP and with whom the Group has spoken.

#### **E. RUD-Urunana**

178. Of the 374 recruitment cases analysed by the Group, six children were found to have been recruited by RUD-Urunana. Following are other examples of recruitment:

(a) The Group also received reports that in mid-September 2008, six children were kidnapped by elements led by General Musare in Nyamilima, Rutshuru territory;

(b) Three boys, between the ages of 16 and 17, escaped from RUD troops in early October 2008 at Kasiki (Lubero). They had been used as bodyguards by RUD commanders;

(c) Another 15-year-old declared to have been recruited in Rutshuru territory by Major Ndeko under the command of General Musare in June 2008;

(d) Among the children who recently escaped from RUD-Urunana was a 17-year-old Rwandan boy who had been brought to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by a Congolese farmer as a cowherd. The boy was allegedly first recruited at

Rubaya in Masisi by an Nkunda loyalist before escaping and being re-recruited at Kilama (Rutshuru) by Captain Marius of RUD in December 2005. The boy declared that he had been re-recruited a third time by Major Mwendebantu at Sake in August 2008.

## **F. PARECO and other Mai-Mai militias**

179. From its analysis of the 374 child recruitment cases, the Group found 163 cases attributed to PARECO, making it one of the most prolific recruiters of children. Following are examples of recruitment by PARECO:

(a) The Group received corroborated reports of 30 children who escaped from PARECO between August and November 2008. They had all been recruited in 2008;

(b) On 6 October 2008, the Group was informed of a 17-year-old boy who had been recruited by Major Prince of PARECO on 20 February 2008 in Mayamaoto, Kanyabayonga area;

(c) Five children were allegedly recruited at Buhoye (Masisi) by Major Akili between September 2007 and March 2008. A sixth child was allegedly recruited at Rukopfu (Masisi) by Major Baseme Pitchen in September 2008, while a seventh child was also first recruited in Masisi, by Lieutenant Mugenzi of CNDP in April 2008, and re-recruited by PARECO Colonel Muomba, in May 2008;

(d) Three additional boys were recruited by Major Kikokota on 13 April 2007 and by Captain Musafiri and Colonel Janvier in August 2008 at Shasha, Rutshuru territory. Two more children were recruited in Kibirizi, respectively, by Major Pondu and Major Bahati, in August and December 2008. Another boy declared that he had been recruited by General Mugabo in April 2007, after having been previously demobilized twice from RCD and Mai-Mai Forces Autodefense Populaires, in 2004 and 2006, respectively.

180. Of the 374 cases of recruitment analysed by the Group, 38 were attributed to Mai-Mai militias operating in North Kivu. Among the 38, 10 were demobilized by Mai-Mai Cobra and recruited in 2003.

181. The Group received frequent reports of ongoing recruitment by Mai-Mai and by commanders obstructing the verification and separation of children by child protection actors. Following are some examples:

(a) In Kayna, Lubero territory, the local commander of Mai-Mai Kasindien, Colonel Kapangala, refused to recognize 10 soldiers as children and prevented efforts by child protection actors to separate them;

(b) On 15 August 2008, eight children were separated from Mai-Mai Kalehe led by Colonel Sido Naengo. All of them had been recruited between June and January 2008;

(c) In Uvira territory, throughout 2008, Mai-Mai under the command of General Zabuloni continued to recruit and use children in their ranks, although sensitization efforts by child protection actors seemed to have started bearing fruit in the last weeks of October 2008. On 10 September 2008, MONUC facilitated the

separation of three children between the ages of 15 and 17 from Zabuloni Mai-Mai elements;

(d) In early October 2008 the Group received reports of two children who left Zabuloni Mai-Mai. One, a 16-year-old boy, was voluntarily recruited by Captain Claude Majaga in 2006. He was recruited a second time after a temporary reunification with his family in May 2007. Another 14-year-old boy was demobilized at the end of October 2008 by Lieutenant Mulizima Malipo after being recruited in the summer of 2007;

(e) In mid-October 2008, 18 children were separated from the Cobra Brigade of Colonel Tangazo Kabiona Gislain of Mai-Mai Kifwana. The children were between 15 and 17 years old and were recruited between 2001 and 2008 in Masisi and Kalehe territories.

## **G. Lord's Resistance Army**

182. The Group was not able to directly investigate the use of child soldiers by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). However, the Group received verified information that in the course of attacks by LRA elements in 16 locations of Dungu territory, Orientale Province, in September and October 2008, 177 children were abducted. The Group is alarmed by what it considers to be systematic abduction of children by elements of LRA.

183. The Group believes that the kidnapping of these children could be part of LRA preparations for upcoming operations against FARDC and MONUC, as well as a means to intimidate the local population and prevent locals from sharing information with the rebel group's enemies.

## **H. FARDC**

184. The Group is encouraged by the general trend in child protection within FARDC, as it did not find evidence of systematic recruitment of children. Of the 374 recruitment cases, 10 were from FARDC ranks. However, concern remains with respect to the presence of children in two FARDC non-integrated brigades, the 81st brigade based in Katale, until recently under the command of Colonel Yav, and the 85th FARDC brigade in Walikale, led by Colonel Matumo:

(a) As mentioned in the Group's interim report, the 85th brigade continues to maintain children in its ranks. The Group was recently informed that after the separation of 30 children in May 2008, more children were recruited;

(b) Of the 10 recruitment cases examined, four children were recruited by the 81st non-integrated brigade between October and November 2007. FARDC authorities informally told the Group that Colonel Yav had not handed over CNDP deserters who had reached his position, including children. The Group also received testimony from a 16-year-old who declared to have been the escort of Colonel Yav for six months. A 14-year-old declared to have been recruited in mid-2007 by soldiers of the 81st brigade. He was the bodyguard of Captain Innocent, second-in-command to battalion commander Major Fimbo.

185. The Group is also concerned about frequent reports of the prolonged detention of children at FARDC detention centres following their separation from armed groups. This practice often involves interrogation of children and inhumane treatment.

186. Child protection actors voiced concerns to the Group regarding the presence of children at *brassage* centres and the disregard of child protection verification procedures. Following are some examples:

(a) In October 2008, 490 elements of the Mai-Mai Cobra brigade were transferred to the *brassage* centres of Kamina, Kitona and Kisangani. Child protection actors were given the opportunity to screen only part of the demobilized combatants;

(b) In October 2008, FARDC contested the transfer of 111 children who were relocated from the Kitona *brassage* centre. The Group learned that at least 10 of those children were removed by FARDC and transferred to the *brassage* centre, and that other children in foster families were harassed.

## **X. Serious violations of international law targeting women and children**

187. In connection with its mandate pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 1807 (2008), the Group examined medical records of 300 cases of sexual violence perpetrated against women in North Kivu. On the basis of data collected, all armed groups and FARDC are responsible for committing such violations. The data collected, as well as the reports received by the Group during the current mandate, did not however provide sufficient information about the authors or the chain of command.

188. The Group has noted a lack of systematization of data on sexual violence. The Group understands that efforts are under way to collect such data and would urge the United Nations Population Fund, as the lead United Nations agency on this issue, to consider including a mechanism for the identification of the authors of such acts, while respecting the sensitivity of this information and the confidentiality of the victims.

189. Unfortunately, the Group was not provided access to a confidential database of incidents of sexual violence maintained by MONUC, and it received only limited reporting on instances of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

190. Below are some of the examples of serious abuses by all armed groups that the Group has collected:

(a) The Group received reports about systematic harassment of the population, including looting and raping, by the 182nd FARDC battalion led by Major Charles deployed in Walungu territory;

(b) During the period from 22 to 28 August 2008, FARDC elements of the 13th integrated brigade were responsible for seven cases of rape in the village of Luofu (Lubero). The perpetrators were all from the 2nd company of the 131st

battalion. According to MONUC and local health authorities, 33 rape cases have been treated in Lufo since the beginning of 2008;

(c) Eleven girls, between the ages of 11 and 16, were raped north of Bunia by FARDC elements of the 11th battalion of the 1st FARDC brigade under the command of Colonel Esperant Masudi;

(d) MONUC was able to confirm 10 cases of rape perpetrated by retreating soldiers of the FARDC 7th and 15th integrated brigades in Kibirizi and Nyanzale (Rutshuru) since the beginning of September 2008. Elements of the same units were reported to be implicated in five other cases of rape in Kanyabayonga.

191. The Group received eyewitness testimonies that on 5 November 2008, CNDP carried out summary executions in Kiwanja (Rutshuru territory). The Group has also received indications about the CNDP chain of command in Kiwanja at the time of the killings and continues investigating the matter:

(a) These reports included video footage by foreign journalists from Kiwanja and Rutshuru town showing corpses in the streets and in houses. This was confirmed by reports from eyewitnesses who witnessed summary executions being carried out by CNDP. The individuals targeted by CNDP were suspected Mai-Mai and PARECO sympathizers in Kiwanja and Rutshuru town;

(b) On 7 November 2008, a MONUC mission visited Kiwanja to verify allegations of the arbitrary execution of civilians. Members of the mission visited 11 gravesites, alleged to contain the remains of 26 victims, including combatants. Among the victims were two children (one and a half years old and two years old) and several young adults. Local authorities claimed to have buried 62 civilians since the clashes. Eyewitnesses interviewed by the team confirmed that the majority of the civilians found dead in their homes had been victims of arbitrary executions perpetrated by CNDP elements, who were engaged in targeted and reprisal killings after PARECO withdrew from the village. The victims, mainly young men, were accused of being PARECO combatants or collaborators. MONUC investigations were hampered by time constraints and security concerns, particularly the presence of armed CNDP elements in the nearby vicinity.

## **XI. Compliance with the sanctions regime**

192. In the course of its mandate, the Group wrote 112 official communications to Member States and private entities requesting information deemed relevant to its mandate. Many of these requests did not receive satisfactory responses:

(a) Despite several requests to the competent authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa, the Group has not received cargo manifests of flights performed in September and November 2007 and in September 2008 by the Khartoum-based Azza Transport Company from Khartoum to Kisangani (see S/2008/43, paras. 68-74). With regard to the South African authorities, the Group has not received the flight records of Pretoria Airport to verify the claim of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2008/43, paras. 75-78) that a flight by an II-76 aircraft (registration number YU-AMJ, belonging to the Belgrade-based company Air Tomisko and wet-leased to the Tuzla-based ICAR Air), transporting military equipment to FARDC, actually flew to Kinshasa from Pretoria. The claim of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been

contradicted by the overflight and landing permission records filed by ICAR Air to several countries along the route Nis (Serbia)-Kinshasa;

(b) The Group requested information from the Government of Burundi and subsequently transmitted two letters requesting information relating to Gold Link Burundi Trading, Farrel Trade and Investments Corporation, and customs declarations of all gold exports. More than three months since the Group's initial request, the Burundian authorities are still unwilling to provide this information. The Group requested the Government of Uganda to provide statistics on all gold exports from its Bureau of Statistics, but to date has received no response. The Group also requested from the Ugandan Revenue Authority information on gold exports of two companies, but similarly has received no response to date. The Group has also not received a response from the Ugandan immigration authorities concerning the travel through Kenya of Frank Bwambale Kakolele, who has been subject to the Committee's travel ban since November 2005 (see para. 99 (b) of the Group's interim report);

(c) The Group also received information that individuals linked to sanctioned entities were travelling between Kampala and Dubai, using Ethiopian Airlines. The Group wrote to Ethiopian Airlines to request more information in this connection, but to date has received no response;

(d) Kenya customs authorities, despite several requests, have not provided cargo manifests of ships on which the Group requested documentation. The Kenya customs authority has only provided a summary of contents of shipments destined to or originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As in the case of Uganda, the Group has not received a response from the Kenyan immigration authorities concerning the travel through Kenya of Frank Bwambale Kakolele;

(e) Dar es Salaam port and customs authorities, despite several requests, provided the Group with only 4 of the 21 cargo manifests it had requested;

(f) Customs authorities in Matadi, despite several requests, never provided the Group with the requested cargo manifests of 42 vessels docked at Matadi on various dates in 2008;

(g) The Kigoma port and customs authorities fully cooperated with the Group and provided the requested information;

(h) In addition, few States, particularly in the Great Lakes region, have taken steps to implement the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. The Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda have not instructed customs officials to implement the travel ban on sanctioned individuals, and their respective Central Banks have not made systematic efforts to freeze the assets of those on the sanctions list. In one case, General Bwambale Kakolele, who has been on the sanctions list since its inception on 1 November 2005, expressed surprise when the Group informed him that he had been sanctioned, as he claimed he had never been informed.

193. The Group discussed sanctions implementation at length with the Government of Uganda:

(a) The Group met with the Governor of the Bank of Uganda in September 2008 and conveyed the view that sanctions against both UCI and Machanga Limited had not been implemented since these entities were listed in March 2007. The Bank



of Uganda has responded to the Group's request to freeze the Machanga Limited accounts at DFCU Bank, where Machanga Limited keeps its corporate accounts, but the Bank of Uganda has not yet responded to requests to do the same for other banks where Machanga Limited has accounts. The Group has also discovered that Crane Bank, where UCI holds its accounts, had not enforced an assets freeze on UCI since March 2007, claiming it had no instructions to do so from the Bank of Uganda;

(b) After Machanga Limited and UCI were listed by the Committee in March 2007, the United Arab Emirates-based company Emirates Gold withheld \$2,052,622 owed to UCI, using the pretext of the assets freeze to retain these funds. As a result, UCI became subject to heavy interest payments owed to Crane Bank to clear loans and overdrafts. The directors of UCI responded by paying in hundreds of thousands of dollars from a personal account and an account of a flower business they own in order to manage the interest payments;

(c) Following a request by the Government of Uganda, the Chairman of the sanctions Committee wrote to the United Arab Emirates authorities on 24 July 2008 to request Emirates Gold to pay the \$2,052,622 under an exemption so that the debts owed to Crane Bank by UCI could be cleared, and the assets freeze could be imposed with no outstanding disputes. The Group wrote to the Committee on 23 September 2008 to inform it that no adequate monitoring mechanism had been set up to ensure that the balance of \$840,542 would be frozen after the \$1,212,080 of debts owed by UCI to Crane Bank were paid off. The Committee subsequently wrote to the Ugandan authorities to request the Bank of Uganda to set up an escrow account where the balance of the returned funds could be monitored as frozen once the debts worth \$1,210,080 were cleared. The Group notes that the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed the request of the Committee to the Bank of Uganda on 14 October 2008, but to date no action has been taken by the Bank;

(d) While the Group notes the cooperation given by the Bank of Uganda on other issues, the Group has reiterated to the Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Uganda that it remains the responsibility of Governments to enforce United Nations sanctions. If the UCI assets had been immediately frozen after March 2007, and the Bank of Uganda had intervened to ensure any funds remained frozen, Emirates Gold would have had little justification to benefit from the retention of these funds for so long.

194. The Group has tried, whenever possible, pursuant to paragraph 18 (a) of resolution 1807 (2008), to examine and analyse information gathered by MONUC. The Group has also shared extensively data it has collected with MONUC. Following are some observations regarding information gathering:

(a) Given the confidentiality of documents such as daily and weekly political and military reports, as well as human rights and child protection reports, MONUC has not given the Group systematic access to information it has gathered. Instead, MONUC has appointed a focal point who produces a weekly report based on inputs from relevant divisions;

(b) In practice, it is left to each division within MONUC to determine on a case-by-case basis whether and how they should share information with the Group. The Group has benefited greatly from the collaboration of some units, especially the Joint Military Analysis Cell (JMAC), while it has received little information from others;

(c) While the Group is grateful for these efforts, and for the extensive administrative support it has received, it believes that it could benefit much more from the information gathered by MONUC staff, in particular in the fields of human rights and child protection;

(d) The Group has interacted extensively with MONUC staff in the field, including civilian staff, military observers and military contingents. It is clear from these interactions that many MONUC officials are not aware of the mandate of the Mission with regard to the arms embargo and do not feel that it is their duty to gather information on support to non-governmental armed groups.

195. It was clear from the level of cooperation provided by some Member States that the sanctions regime is not given the importance and seriousness it merits, despite the fact that the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1807 (2008) under Chapter VII as mandatory on all States. In some cases, Government officials were not aware of, or did not understand, the mandate of the Group. Above all, as evidenced by informal communications with some Member States, there are no consequences for States that do not provide the requested information. There is, therefore, little incentive to comply with the sanctions regime despite its mandatory authority on all States.

196. If steps are not taken by Member States to enforce compliance with the sanctions regime and relevant Security Council resolutions, the work of the Group will have little impact.

## **XII. Recommendations**

**1. The Group recommends that the sanctions Committee enforce compliance with the arms embargo by writing officially to Member States that have not responded to the requests and questions of the Group, and noting their compliance status.**

**2. The Group recommends that the Committee consider political leadership in non-governmental armed groups as inherent support to these groups. These leaders, many of whom reside in Europe and the United States, form a crucial part of fund-raising, public relations and diplomatic strategies.**

### **FARDC support to FDLR and PARECO**

**3. The Group has put forward several FARDC commanders for sanctions for supporting FDLR and PARECO. The Group recommends that the Committee request the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to issue clear directives to its troops that collaboration and cohabitation with FDLR and PARECO are prohibited. Appropriate disciplinary measures should be taken against FARDC soldiers collaborating with these armed groups. FARDC units deployed in areas occupied by FDLR should distance themselves from FDLR.**

### **Government of Rwanda support to CNDP**

**4. The Group recommends that the Committee remind the Government of Rwanda of its obligations under the Nairobi communiqué (S/2007/679), in which the Government of Rwanda pledged to prevent any form of support to CNDP and the entry into and exit from its territory of its members. This would**

include preventing CNDP from using Rwandan telephone networks and banking systems and from holding fund-raising meetings on Rwandan territory.

#### MONUC

5. The Group recommends that the Security Council clarify, in its upcoming resolution extending the mandate of MONUC, the role that MONUC should play with regard to collecting information on the support of armed groups, as well as its collaboration and sharing of information with the Group of Experts.

6. The Group recommends that the Committee encourage the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to provide clear guidance to the civilian staff and contingents of MONUC on their obligations regarding the arms embargo. This should include gathering information on all forms of support to non-governmental armed groups, including through foot patrols along the border and random searches of vehicles for smuggled weapons at border crossings and checkpoints.

#### Arms

7. The Group recommends that the Committee request the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to promote stockpile security, accountability and management of arms and ammunition as an urgent priority. Donors involved in security sector reform should include stockpile management in their assistance to FARDC.

8. The Group recommends that the Committee request MONUC to take steps to improve its database of small arms and light weapons, including by:

(a) Tasking contingents in the field to collect all the necessary information on each weapon, including factory markings. Photographs should be taken and submitted to MONUC in Kinshasa for all arms and ammunition collected;

(b) Training officers in how to register and manage small arms and ammunition.

#### Border control

9. The Group recommends that the Security Council consider requesting MONUC to establish border-monitoring teams, in particular at the Bunagana and Kasindi border crossings. Those teams would have the authority to undertake random checks of goods crossing the border into the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

#### Children and armed conflict and serious violations of human rights

10. The Group recommends that the Committee address a letter to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo requesting the full implementation of child protection verification procedures, as agreed by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular:

(a) To allow verification of the presence of children among troops prior to their transfer to *brassage* centres;

(b) To grant full access by local and international child protection partners to troops and *brassage* centres for the purpose of verification and separation of children;

(c) To stop the practice of prolonged and arbitrary detention of children at military detention facilities;

(d) To implement a more effective liaison with relevant child protection partners for a rapid transfer of separated children to transitory care centres or, where possible, for direct family reunification.

11. The Group recommends that the Committee encourage MONUC and UNICEF to increase coordination among child protection partners, including in the data collection phase, with a view to creating a unified database on demobilized children, which should identify as much as possible the recruiter and the chain of command to which the children were subject.

12. The Group recommends that the Committee call upon MONUC to share information with the Group of Experts on child recruitment and the targeting of women and children in situations of armed conflict, in order to ensure maximum support to the Group of Experts for the purpose of verifying and analysing relevant information.

#### Natural resources

13. The Group recommends that the Committee call upon Member States to work with local and international NGOs to develop a map of mineral-rich zones and armed groups, to be made public by the end of the next Group's mandate period. The map would serve to create awareness and remove uncertainty among commercial entities with respect to the origin of minerals purchased from areas controlled by armed groups.

14. The Group recommends that the Committee urge Member States to take appropriate measures to ensure that exporters and consumers of Congolese mineral products under their jurisdiction conduct due diligence on their suppliers and not accept verbal assurances from buyers regarding the origin of their product.

#### Aviation

15. As recommended in previous reports of the Group of Experts (S/2006/525 and S/2007/423), the Group recommends that the Committee request the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take concrete steps towards improving the safety and security of its airspace by:


(a) Modernizing its equipment by adding state-of-the-art, radar-based platforms and monitoring systems that should cover the entire airspace of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;


(b) Improving the training of civil aviation authority and airport personnel;

(c) Updating and reviewing the Democratic Republic of the Congo Aircraft Registry to include information on the airworthiness and identities of all aircraft.

16. In this context, the Group also notes that the bill on the competencies of the Government Autorité de l'aviation civile, which is currently under discussion, include several clauses that are not in line with ICAO rules and recommends that the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo amend the bill accordingly.

Annex 1





Annex 2


25/07/07

Declaracion

Je soussigné ZWATSEWIRE fin  
avoir reçu huit cent dollars  
américains (800\$) en provenance de  
péages routes national et  
international par le compte  
de l'ATIC -

Fait à Brazzaville

le 25/07/07





## Annex 3

OMZET	4	BEWIJSSTUK	-60.000,00
3802555120006		25/01/2006	
Uw betalingsopdracht van			60.000,00 USD
Ref. van de verrichting: H90601250220006			
Valuta 24/01/2006			
De kosten zijn afzonderlijk aangerekend in de rekening 380-0085369-80			
Begunstigde rek.	01944-01-26		
Begunstigde :	BILAL ABDUL KALIM BAKIZI		
Mededeling	REMBOURSEMENT		
Correspondent :			
	BCDIRRW		
	BANQUE DE COMMERCE DE DEVELOPPEMENT		
	et d industrie		
	AVENUE DE LA PAIX		
	Kigali rwanda		
Telefoonnr. van uw gesprekspartner ING België NV voor deze verrichting:			
(09)268.17.40			

OMZET	7	BEWIJSSTUK	-25.000,00
3800755155013		07/02/2006	
Uw betalingsopdracht van			25.000,00 USD
Ref. van de verrichting: H90602070255013			
Valuta 06/02/2006			
De kosten zijn afzonderlijk aangerekend in de rekening 380-0085369-80			
Begunstigde rek.	0042447-01-23		
Begunstigde :	UWASSE ELISABETH		
Mededeling	GISENYI		
Correspondent :	ACOMPTE-ACHAT MAISON		
	BCRWRWRW		
	BANQUE COMMERCIALE DU RWANDA SA		
	bp 354		
	BLVD DE LA REVOLUTION 11		
	Kigali rwanda		
Telefoonnr. van uw gesprekspartner ING België NV voor deze verrichting:			
(09)268.17.40			

OMZET	128	BEWIJSSTUK	-16.796,74
3801055128003		10/04/2006	
Uw betalingsopdracht van 20.000,00 USD			
Ref. van de verrichting: H90604100228003			
Koers 1 EUR =	1,1948	USD	
Tegenwaarde			16.739,20 EUR
Kosten van de correspondent			20,81 EUR
Betalingsprovisie			16,74 EUR
Manuele intoetsing			5,00 EUR
Dringende verwerking			5,00 EUR
BTW : 21% op 47,55 EUR			9,99 EUR
Totaal			16.796,74 EUR
Valuta 07/04/2006			
Begunstigde rek.	8528000088		
Begunstigde :	GENDARME RWEMA		
	ENTEBBE ROAD		
	KAMPALA		
	OGANDA		
Mededeling	REMBOURSEMENT A MR RWEMA		
Correspondent :			
	CERBUGKA		
	CENTENARY RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK		
	talenta house		
	PLOT 7 ENTEBBE ROAD		
	Kampala uganda		
Telefoonnr. van uw gesprekspartner ING België NV voor deze verrichting:			
(09)268.17.40			

## Annex 4

**REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO**

PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU  
CONSERVATION DES TITRES  
IMMOBILIERS DE MASISI-WALIKALE  
B.P. 81 GOMA

TERRITOIRE DE : MASISI  
LOTISSEMENT DE : KASHUN GURU.

**CONTRAT D'EMPHYTEOSE N° D8/E MW.....DU.....**  
**POUR UNE DUREE DE VINGT CINQ ANS RENOUEVELABLES**

ENTRE

LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO, représentée par le Gouverneur de Province du Nord-Kivu à Goma, agissant en vertu des pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés par la loi n° 73-021 du vingt juillet mil neuf cent soixante treize tel que modifiée et complétée à ce jour par la loi n° 80-008 du dix-huit juillet mil neuf cent quatre vingt, portant régime général des biens, régime foncier et immobilier et régime des sûretés de spécialement en son article 183, paragraphe 1 et en exécution de l'Ordonnance n° 86-115 du dix avril mil neuf cent quatre-vingt six modifiant celle n°74-148 du deux juillet mil neuf cent soixante quatorze, portant mesure d'exécution chapitre 9, article 14 alinéa C.....

CI - après dénommée LA REPUBLIQUE de première part

ET Madame UWASE ELISABETH, de Nationalité Congolaise, né à Kisangani le douze octobre dix neuf cent septante et sept, marié à Laurent MITHIGO par le Régime de communauté de biens, ayant comme identité provisoire n°74IO-13-18652 délivré à Goma, résidant tous ensemble sur Av.

CI - après dénommés « L'EMPHYTEOTE » de seconde part.

**IL A ETE CONVENU CE QUI SUIV :**

ARTICLE 1. La République Démocratique de Congo concède à l'Emphytéote qui accepte un droit d'emphytéose sur une parcelle de terre à usage **Agro-pastoral** d'une superficie de 118 Ha située à Kashun ayant le numéro SR 1598 du plan cadastral du Territoire de Masisi et dont les limites sont représentées sous liséré Vert au croquis ci-annexé, dressé à l'échelle de 1 à 50.000ème.

ARTICLE 2 : Le présent contrat fait suite au.

Il est conclu pour un terme de vingt-cinq ans prenant cours le 01/04/07 à l'expiration duquel il sera renouvelé pour une durée égale, pour autant que le terrain ait été mis et maintenu en valeur conformément aux obligations contractuelles et réglementaires de l'emphytéose.

La redevance annuelle sera fixée conformément au tarif en vigueur lors du renouvellement.

ARTICLE 3 : L'emphytéote est tenu d'occuper le terrain dans les six mois et d'en commencer effectivement la mise en valeur dans le dix-huit mois de la conclusion du présent contrat.

Annex 5

**Fax**

Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 Révision de page(s) \_\_\_\_\_

**ING**  
 To: Ghislain Kikudji

EXPEDITEUR \_\_\_\_\_ DESTINAIRE \_\_\_\_\_


Ing  
 St Andries  
 Fax: 050/406368

A l'attention de: Denis gerant ou pour Bilal  
 Fax: 00230540010

Tél: \_\_\_\_\_  
 E-mail: \_\_\_\_\_


URGENT     ATTENTE REMISE     POUR INFO

Cher monsieur,  
 la semaine passée on a transféré 60.000USD (référence de l'opération à l'auteur). Nous complétons le message cidé Remboursement destiné à monsieur Ghislain Kikudji.

Nos meilleures salutations  
  
 Ing St Andries

**ING Belgica NV**  
 Kontoor St. Andries  
 Gieselssteppenweg, 128  
 8200 ST. ANDRIES  
 Inyuge.sint-andries@ing.be  
 tel 050/40.03.60 Fax 050/40.63.68

Annex 6



2

l'ingénieur abandonna la concession vers 1960 qui ne fut pas concédée par les mesures dites économiques du 30/11/1973, la zonalisation de liste mémoire.

- La plantation fut alors classée parmi les biens abandonnés faisant partie du patrimoine privé de l'Etat.
- Plus tard, la concession n'ayant été sollicitée par personne d'autre, Monsieur **Libert RUJUGIRO-NYABATWA** fut autorisé par l'Administration foncière à occuper le terrain; il y entreprit une mise en valeur importante par l'élevage et des cultures vivrières.
- Dès lors, l'occupant du terrain s'estime en droit de solliciter auprès de l'autorité compétente les titres nécessaires lui permettant de jouir de l'investissement déjà réalisé sur la concession.

### 3. LA SUPERFICIE DE LA CONCESSION

- La superficie totale du terrain est de 107 Ha 12a 50ca en un seul bloc.

### 4. LE SOL

- Le sol de la concession est de **type argileux**, à couche superficielle constituée de cendrée volcanique d'origine éolienne très ancienne.
- L'altitude du terrain est comprise entre 1.600 et 1.800 m.
- La végétation naturelle est essentiellement constituée de *Pennisetum - Purpureum*.
- La concession est arrosée par les rivières KATUHENDA et KAHIRA.

### 5. LA MISE EN VALEUR DU TERRAIN

- La concession est mise en valeur par Monsieur **Libert RUJUGIRO - NYABATWA** comme suit :
- **2 80 Ha de pâturage**
- **2 20 Ha de cultures vivrières** (haricots, maïs, sorgho, taro, etc.)
- **2 4 ha de boisement** (Eucalyptus).
- Une dizaine de maison d'habitation en matériaux préfabriqués pour travailleurs.

### 6. LA VOIE D'ACCES A LA CONCESSION

- La concession est située non loin de la route GOMA - SAKZ - GANDJO - NYAMTABA - NYABURA; cette route est malheureusement en mauvais état.





**RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO**

**PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU  
INSPECTION PROVINCIALE  
DE L'AGRICULTURE, PÊCHE  
ET ÉLEVAGE  
B. P. 197 GOMA**

**RAPPORT TECHNIQUE D'ENQUÊTE AGRO-PASTORALE  
SUCCINCT, DE CONSTAT DES LIEUX, DE MISE EN  
VALEUR ET D'EXPERTISE AGRICOLE DE LA FERME  
CHANDEREMA, N° SR. 1503, SUPERFICIE 193 HA 09A,  
SITUÉE EN TERRITOIRE DE MASISI OCCUPEE PAR  
MONSIEUR TRIBERT – RUJUGIRO – NYABATWA.-**

- **En date de jeudi 13/07/2006**, agissant **en vertu de la réquisition** du 20/06/2006 **du colonel Innocent – GAHIZI**, mandaté par Monsieur Tribert RUJUGIRO – NYABATWA, nous KAHENE – MURHEMULA, Agronome – Chef de Bureau de la Production et Protection des Végétaux à l'Inspection Provinciale de l'Agriculture, Pêche et Elevage du Nord-Kivu, en présence de **Monsieur NZABARINDA – Léonidas (Jock)**, Chef de localité MUSONGATI et voisin de la ferme et **d'une cinquantaine de personnes**, avons dressé le rapport technique agro-pastoral, de constat des lieux, de mise en valeur et d'expertise agricole de la ferme CHANDEREMA, mieux identifiée plus haut, comme ci-dessous :

**1. La ferme CHANDEREMA du point de vue localisation :**

- La ferme de CHANDEREMA est située au lieu dit « CHANDEREMA », dans la localité administrative de KINGI, Groupement KAMURONZA, Chefferie de **BAHUNDE** en territoire de MASISI, à **± 15 km de MUSHAKI à l'Ouest sur une piste en mauvais état.**
- Elle est limitée par :
- **Au Nord** : la concession de Madame MERLO et le village KABATEZI (au Nord-Ouest).
- **Au Sud** : la ferme de Monsieur BAKAKA (Calixte).
- **A l'Est** : la ferme de Monsieur KALINDA et le terrain n° SR. 1482.
- **A l'Ouest** : la ferme de Monsieur MUTWARE (ex. HABIMANA –

SERUBUNGO), des terres coutumières et la ferme de Monsieur NGEZAYO.

**N.B. :** LA ferme CHANDEREMA est **entièrement** située dans le **Groupement KAMURONZA**, elle constitue la limite entre le Groupement précité et celui de BASHALI – KAEMBE.

## 2. La ferme CHANDEREMA du point de vue historique et juridique

- La ferme CHANDEREMA n° SR. 1503 faisant l'objet du présent rapport est un **terrain domanial** qui avait appartenu à **Monsieur MERLO**.-
- La concession **fut vendue à Monsieur NGEZAYO par le propriétaire** qui était en possession de tous les titres nécessaires.-
- **En 1986, un compromis de vente** intervint entre Monsieur NGEZAYO et Monsieur Tribert – RUJUGIRO – NYABATWA qui acheta la ferme.
- Etant donné que la concession était **dès le début** aménagée en **pâturage**, l'acheteur y entreprit des **travaux d'entretien et de peuplement en bétail**.
- Suite aux **événements malheureux** intervenus dans la Province, le **bétail fut pillé et toutes les infrastructures détruites**.-
- En 2002, alors que la **situation sécuritaire** s'améliorait dans le milieu, Monsieur Tribert – RUJUGIRO – NYABATWA relança les **activités pastorales** sur la ferme et y entreprit la **réhabilitation des infrastructures** qui avaient été détruites.
- Selon Monsieur le Chef de localité MUSONGATI, **Monsieur NZABARINDA – Léonidas (Jock) et la population** qui étaient avec nous sur les lieux, la ferme CHANDEREMA, occupée depuis 1986 par Monsieur Tribert – RUJUGIRO – NYABATWA, n'a **jamais fait l'objet d'un conflit quelconque**, ni avec les fermes voisines, ni avec la chefferie.

**N.B. :** La seule ferme qui était en conflit dans la région est celle de **Monsieur HABIMANA – SERUBUNGO, n° SR. 1255**, le problème ayant été résolu, il a vendu le terrain à Monsieur **MUTWARE** qui l'occupe maintenant.

## 3. La concession CHANDEREMA du point de vue pastoral

- La ferme CHANDEREMA, n° SR. 1503, d'une superficie totale de **193 Ha 09a**, est occupée de façon ininterrompue par Monsieur Tribert – RUJUGIRO – NYABATWA qui l'a mise en valeur comme suit :

### a) Le cheptel

- **200 têtes de gros bétail de races améliorées ;**
- 40 ovins
- 13 caprins ;



- 10 porcs ;
- 10 dindons ;
- 13 poules.

#### b) Les infrastructures réhabilitées

- Une **fromagerie** en construction en matériaux semi durables dont les travaux sont **au niveau de finissage** (portes et fenêtres).
- Deux **maisons** en matériaux précaires dont l'une sert d'habitation au Gérant de la ferme et l'autre comme entrepôt (lait, fromages, outillage, etc.).

#### 4. La ferme CHANDEREMA du point de vue agro-éco-climatique

- La concession située à **2 1800 m d'altitude**, possède un sol constitué de la **cendrée volcanique d'origine éolienne** ancienne sur un **sous-sol argileux**.
- La ferme est arrosée par **plusieurs cours d'eau** dont le plus important est la **rivière NYAGISENYI** qui constitue la **limite Est** du terrain.
- **Le terrain est délimité** au Sud, à l'Est et à l'Ouest par des **Évodyp-fulu**.
- La ferme est à vocation pastorale par excellence.

#### 5. La ferme CHANDEREMA du point de vue socio-économique

- La ferme utilise comme main-d'œuvre :
  - **20 ouvriers permanents** pour l'entretien du pâturage
  - **20 bergers** pour l'entretien du bétail.
- La ferme produit du lait, des fromages et du beurre ; les ouvriers et **la population environnante** bénéficient du lait principalement, les fromages et le beurre sont acheminés à Goma pour vente.
- Cette ferme est visiblement la mieux entretenue du milieu.
- La main-d'œuvre est **régulièrement payée**.

#### 6. La ferme CHANDEREMA du point de vue avenir :

- Monsieur **Libert - RUGIRO - NYABATWA**, occupant de la ferme, compte y introduire du **bétail de races pures** pour une **meilleure production de lait** (et de ses sous-produits), **de la viande**, dans le cadre de la **sécurité alimentaire** de la région.
- Il envisage également la construction d'une **fromagerie moderne**, tout en participant aux différents **projets de développement** du milieu.

**7. Conclusion**

1. **La ferme CHANDEREMA n° SR. 1503 est un terrain domanial entièrement mis en valeur par Monsieur Tribert – RUJUGIRO – NYABATWA, la concession n'est grevée d'aucun droit en faveur du pouvoir coutumier.**
2. **Aucun conflit n'a été enregistré sur le terrain, il ne faudrait pas confondre les fermes CHANDEREMA n° SR. 1255 ex. HABIMANA – SERUBUNDO et n° SR. 1503 occupée par Monsieur Tribert – RUJUGIRO – NYABATWA, faisant l'objet du présent rapport.**
3. **J'estime qu'à la lumière de ce qui précède, l'autorité compétente peut délivrer à Monsieur Tribert – RUJUGIRO – NYABATWA qui le sollicite, le contrat d'emphytéose sur cette ferme, pour lui permettre de jouir avec quiétude, de l'investissement déjà réalisé sur le terrain.**

Fait à CHANDEREMA, le 13 / 07 / 2006.

**Pour approbation**

L'Inspecteur Provincial de l'Agriculture,  
Pêche et Elevage du Nord-Kivu  
= : **Dr Gilbert NDABAGERA KASORE** : =

L'agronome - chef de Bureau  
de la Production et Protection  
des Végétaux,  
= : **KAHENE – MURHEMULA** : =

\_\_\_\_\_  
Chef de Division

\_\_\_\_\_  
Chef de Bureau



## Annex 7

Reçu le.....  
Et inscrit au registre de  
Demande de terre  
Sous le numéro.....

Demande à envoyer  
- 2 exemplaires à l'Administrateur  
du Territoire du lieu  
- 1 exemplaire au Gouverneur de Province  
(chaque exemplaire avec les deux croquis exigés)

**DEMANDE DE TERRE**

Je soussigné (Nom, Postnom et Prénom)..... RUJUGIRO AYABATWA  
Profession..... ELEVEUR  
Lieu et date de naissance..... 1944  
N° carte d'identité..... 63636  
Ou bien  
La Société (Nom officiel).....  
dont les statuts sont publiés au B.A.B.O. OU M.C. du..... page.....  
ai l'honneur de demander la location pour une durée de .....ans d'un terrain  
destiné à l'usage .....que je propose de mettre en valeur (comme  
suit programme détaillé des réalisations projetées.....  
figuré au plan parcellaire de la localité de..... sous le n° SR..... 1503  
ou bien  
Ce terrain est situé à CHANDERETA dans le Territoire de ITASIS  
suivant croquis de situation ci-joint (extrait de la carte du Territoire), il a une superficie  
de 1938a.09a.....et représente au plan détaillé longueur de limite et toutes autres  
dimensions ayant servi au calcul de la superficie : il mentionne en outre les éléments de  
répérage du terrain par rapport à des accidents du sol, à des constructions et à des ouvrages  
d'un caractère permanent, etc.....  
Les cours d'eau, route ou sentier le traversant.  
J'évalue à.....hommes, la main d'œuvre indigène qui sera nécessaire à l'entreprise  
projetée.  
Je dispose de cette main d'œuvre ( ceci lorsqu'il s'agit d'exten  
sion à des entreprises existantes ) et ne devrait faire appel à aucun engagement nouveau.  
Cette main d'œuvre sera recrutée (indiquer le lieu de recrutement ou de l'engagement projetée  
sur place, dans telle Province ou Territoire, etc.....  
N°.....

Vu et transmis avec  
avis favorable  
Le...../...../200

Fait à Goma.....le 10.05.2006

L'ADMINISTRATEUR DU TERRITOIRE      SIGNATURE

P.O. [Signature]  
Cel Innocent-GATHA

## Annex 8

---

**From:** "Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa" <rujugiro@fastmail.fm>  
**To:** "Gahizi Enoc" <gahizi.enoc@yahoo.fr>  
**Sent:** Sunday, 08 June, 2008 10:12 PM  
**Subject:** Re: Bonjour Mzee

Dear Enoc,

Message yawe narayibonye, gusa ni uko yasanze ndi mu rugendo nta mwanya munini mfitte wo gusubiza  
Ibyo unsaba ntabwo bishoboka, nagirango tu bikomeze uko twabyumvikanye, ubu mu matarki 2o ngarutse  
nzabahe 30 nkuko twabivuze, hanyuma mu kwa munani nongere, ibya nyuma mu kwa cumi na kumwe  
Nzagaruka mu matarki 20z, ukwa gatandatu, ubwo uzahamagare kugira mbitunganye kandi nibinashoboka  
tubonane. N, akariya ka appareil ubwo nibwira ko nzaza nkazanye kuko nzaca Dubai mu kugaruka  
Biriya by, amabati nabyo ntabwo nabishobora muli iki gihe  
Ubwo rero ni ah, ubutaha,

On Fri, 6 Jun 2008 07:13:33 +0000 (GMT), "Gahizi Enoc"

<gahizi.enoc@yahoo.fr> said:

> Mzee muraho? Ni minsi myichi, Natwe twari turaho. Ikindeye kukwandikira, nuko  
> nakubuze kuri Tel, bambwirako uri murugendo hanze. Kuri byabindi  
> twavunganye ubushize, ndetse waduhayeho le 16/04/08 byaradufashije, ariko  
> ubu bishobotse, nubwotwagombaga kukubwira le 16/06/08 bibaye ngombwa ko  
> tukubwira ubu. Byabindi byachu bya Conference bise "Programme  
> Amani". Ntakigenda, ahubwo ubu turarebana ayingwe, umwanya wariwose wakunva  
> bihindutse. Kubera besoins ya byabintu twavuganye ubushize, twabonye 1/4  
> twagiraga rero batazafunga amayira tukabura uko tubigenza. Byibura tubonye  
> ibyasigaye byadufasha kubi recupera byose. Barantumye rero ngo  
> nkugereho, nkubwire kontakibazo kugera mukwa 12, ntacyo tuzakubaza  
> ryose. Natwe ntawo twichaye, ahubwo ubu twakoze stock yibyo kudya.  
> Situation generale: Turaho kandi twariyongereye, twavuye kuri 6 turihafi  
> gukubakaba 8. Twabonye natwe akanya kokwisuganya. Bishobotse uzibuke kaka  
> appareil. Yariyatumye niba hari amabati wamuha yukubakira abana amashuri  
> yasenutse. Reka ndekeraha naza niho naza tukabonana kuko ari  
> byinchi. Kandi iyi niyo yanyuma, ibikiresho turabifite, abantu turabafite  
> ubu tuzagura tugana mumugi. Turashaka kutubwira icyo twakora. Murakoze  
> urugendo rwiza, muzagaruke amahoro. Mugire Imana Nyagasani. Niyo Email  
> yanjye Gahizi Innocent  
>  
>  
>

---

> Envoyez avec Yahoo! Mail. Une boîte mail plus intelligente

> <http://mail.yahoo.fr>

--

Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa  
[rujugiro@fastmail.fm](mailto:rujugiro@fastmail.fm)

20/11/2008

**[Unofficial translation as follows]**

----- Original Message -----

From: "Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa" <[rujugiro@fastmail.fm](mailto:rujugiro@fastmail.fm)>

To: "Gahizi Enoc" <[gahizi.enoc@yahoo.fr](mailto:gahizi.enoc@yahoo.fr)>

Sent: Sunday, 08 June, 2008 10:12 PM

Subject: Re: Bonjour Mzee

Dear Enoc,

I saw your message. Unfortunately I was on the road and I didn't have time to respond. What you are asking me is impossible. How about we stick to the original plan as discussed in two weeks when I return. I will give you 30 as discussed then in August I will give you again the same amount and the last amount in November. I will be back around the 20th of June. Call me then so that I can make arrangements and if possible let's try to meet. I might also be able to bring that device because I will be going through Dubai. As for the shingles, I can't do it right now.

Let's catch up later.

On Fri, 6 June 2008 07:13:33 +000 (GMT), Gahizi Enoc <[gahizi.enoc@yahoo.fr](mailto:gahizi.enoc@yahoo.fr)> said

Mzee how are you? It's been a while. Here all is good. I am writing you this note because I couldn't get a hold of you on the phone. I was told that you were abroad. About what we had discussed, your assistance of 16/04/08 was very helpful. That is why I would like to remind you now, not to forget assistance for 16/06/08. About the Amani Program: It is not working! We are actually on the brink of war. Anytime, you might hear that the situation has changed. Because of what we had discussed we received ¼, so we wanted to inform you earlier on before the roads were closed. We might actually be able to recuperate the remaining things. That is why I have been asked to reach out to you and inform you that we won't ask for assistance until December. On our side, I can assure you that we are not seating on our hands and that we have already stored food.

General Situation: All is good and our effective has increased. We went from 6 to 8. If you have a chance, please do not forget that little device. He had asked me if you had any shingles that you would send him to build schools for children\*. That is it for now, hopefully when you return we will be able to meet. This is probably the last message, because we have the material, people and it is possible that now we might be heading towards the city. So, please let us know what we should do. Thanks and have a safe trip Mugire Imana Nyagasani ( May God Nyangasani) protect you. Gahizi Innocent

*\* A former CNDP officer and Kinyarwanda speaker, who also translated this email, declared to the Group that in CNDP military jargon, the word "children" is used to refer to soldiers.*

## Annex 9

Page 1 of 1

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**From:** "Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa" <rujugiro@fastmail.fm>  
**To:** "Sipho Zama Zulu" <josephmaboko@yahoo.com>  
**Cc:** "Rene K. Munya" <renemunya@hotmail.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, 07 August, 2007 9:26 AM  
**Subject:** Re-Transfers

Dear Rene,  
Nous avons difficulté à suivre les transferts de notre ami.  
Ne serait-il pas possible qu'il nous donne le nom de la société qui a effectué le transfert et le montant ? Il utilise plusieurs noms et il est difficile de confirmer que c'est de lui ou d'un autre payeur.

Merci de nous communiquer les info a partir du 1/8/2007

A bientôt,  
T. Rujugiro

--  
Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa  
[rujugiro@fastmail.fm](mailto:rujugiro@fastmail.fm)

20/11/2008



## Annex 10

**Main Identity**

**From:** "Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa" <rujugiro@fastmail.fm>  
**To:** "eric mutambuka" <emutambukat@yahoo.fr>;  
**Cc:** "BF BISHAHUSHI" <shika95@yahoo.fr>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 28, 2007 8:26 AM  
**Subject:** Re: Tr. details for money transfer

Dear Eric,  
 Merci de bien vouloir faire le necessaire pour mettre a disposition la somme de 120.000 USD aux gens de notre ami Laurent N. afin que les soldats puissent ain si etre paye en avance,

Merci et a bientot,

On Mon, 27 Aug 2007 13:18:13 +0200 (CEST), "eric mutambuka" <emutambukat@yahoo.fr> said:

> Dear Frederic,

>

> Priere suivre et vous assurer que le payement arrive a destination  
 > rapidement,

>

>

> Franche collaboration.

>

> Eric M.

>

>

>

>

> Remarque : message transféré en pièce jointe.

>

>

> Eric MUTAMBUKA

> Phone : +971 4 340 62 86

> Fax : +971 4 340 62 87

> Mob. : +971 50 518 79 39

> emutambukat@yahoo.fr

>

>

>

>

>

> -----  
 > Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo!

> Messenger

> Téléchargez le ici !

--

Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa  
 rujugiro@fastmail.fm

12/9/2007

## Annex 11

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU  
DIVISION PROVINCIALE  
DES MINES ET GEOLOGIE  
B.P. 101 GOMA

**AUTORISATION D'EXPORTATION**  
N°DIVIMINES-GEO/3547.0/276/2008

Pour l'exportation du..... **COLTAN**.....provenant du gisement..... **SECONDAIRE**.....  
En vertu des dispositions légales et comme suite à la demande n°..... **MM/006/2008**.....  
Du... **13/06/2008**.....de Monsieur..... **MUNYARUGERERO Damien**.....  
Pour le compte de la Société..... **COMPTOIR MUNSAD**.....  
Adresse au Congo..... **GOMA / NORD-KIVU**.....  
Est habilité à exporter..... **DU COLTAN**.....  
Lot N°..... **002/2008**.....Teneur.....  
FBL N°..... du.....  
Poids humide..... Poids net sec..... **4.000 KGS**.....  
Poids brut..... **4.132 KGS**..... Nature des emballages..... **FUTS METALLIQUES**.....  
Nombre de colis..... **08**..... Marques..... **MUNSAD**.....  
Chantier de provenance..... **DIVERS**..... Période de production..... **JUIN 2008**.....  
Pays d'origine :..... **REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO**.....  
Destinataire Firme :..... **TRADEMET S.A. 7.B GREZ-DOICEAU**.....  
Adresse..... **BELGIQUE**.....  
Valeur..... Unitaire estimée :..... **8,5 SUS**.....  
Valeur..... Globale estimée :..... **34.000 SUS**.....  
Valeur..... Unitaire estimée..... **8,5 SUS**.....



## Annex 12

**FEC**

**Fédération des  
Entreprises du Congo**  
*Province du Sud-Kivu*

H. HES

**ENTREPRISES MEMBRES DE LAFEC OPERANT DANS  
LE SECTEUR MINIER AU SUD- KIVU**

**A. EXPLOITATION**

**1. Société BANRO**

**B. COMPTOIRES D'ACHAT ET EXPORTATION**

**1. Société OLIVE**

- Chef d'entreprise : Monsieur MUDEKEREZA NAMEGABE
- Adresse physique : N° 4 av KASONGO / Commune d'Tbanda
- Tél : 0810564856
- Email : [groupeolive@yahoo.fr](mailto:groupeolive@yahoo.fr)  
[gr-olitragem@yahoo.fr](mailto:gr-olitragem@yahoo.fr)

**2. ETS. MUYEYE**

- Chef d'entreprise : Monsieur MUYEYE BYABOSHI
- Adresse physique : N° 08 AV Kasongo / Commune d'Tbanda
- Tél : 0817172148
- Email : [lemeraplant@yahoo.fere](mailto:lemeraplant@yahoo.fere)

« *Rassemblés pour construire* »

Kinshasa : 10, Avenue des Aviateurs – Commune de la Gombe / Kinshasa – République Démocratique du Congo  
B.P.7247 Kin 1 – Téléphone (+243) 81 248 88 90 (+243) 81 248 89 09 – E-mail : [fec@ckt.cd](mailto:fec@ckt.cd)/[feccongo2@yahoo.fr](mailto:feccongo2@yahoo.fr)  
Lubumbahi – Kisangani – Bukavu – Mbadaka – Matadi – Kananga – Mbuji Mayi – Kikwit – Goma – Kindu

**IDENT.NAT.A 16217 C**

④ **3. ETS. PANJU**

- Chef d'entreprise : Monsieur PANJU ZULFIKARALI
- Adresse physique : N° 21 Av. Industrielle
- Tél : 0813186646
- Email : zpanju@kivu-online

**4. ETS. AMUR**

- Chef d'entreprise : Monsieur RUTERA MUHINDAGIRA Antoine
- Adresse physique : N° 08 AV P.E LUMUMBA /Commune d'Ibanda
- Tél : 0994400804

**5. SOCIETE SOGIMPEX**

- Chef d'entreprise : Monsieur MOHAMEN KALANGAY
- Adresse physique : Av. P.E LUMUMBA /Commune d'Ibanda
- Tél : 0998669469
- Email : [kalengay@yahoo.fr](mailto:kalengay@yahoo.fr)

Ⓜ **6. SOCIETE M.D.M**

- Chef d'entreprise : Monsieur MUDEKEREZA NAMEGABE
- Adresse physique : Av. LUNDULA /Commune d'Ibanda
- Tél : 0810564856

Ⓜ **7. SOCIETE W.M.C**

- Chef d'entreprise : Monsieur Edouard KITAMBALA ANZUATA
- Adresse physique : AV LUNDULA /Commune d'Ibanda
- Tél : 0812770860



## Annex 13

**MINÉRALES DES PRODUCTIONS ARTISANALES**  
(article 217)

Huit <sup>21</sup> <sup>umène</sup>  
L'an deux mille Le jour du mois  
AOUT CHEF de SECTEUR de BASILE  
nous (1) MWENGA

agissant en vertu du décret n° 038/2003  
GULBER  
le 25 mars 2003 en son article 217 et sur demande de Monsieur (3)  
détenteur de la Carte d'exploitant ou de Négociant n° 5101/047/2002  
MWENGA

avons autorisé le requérant ci-  
après à transporter les substances minérales de vers  
portant les indications ci-après

NATURE DE LA SUBSTANCE: CASSITERITE  
BRUTE  
MARQUE: GULBER - BUHATDO  
PROPRIÉTAIRE: MWENGA  
POIDS TOTAL TRANSPORTE: 250 KG  
TRANSPORTEUR: SEPL (7) - 1  
NOMBRE DE COLIS: SAC à LINGE  
NATURE D'EMBALLAGE: MWENGA / ZOMBE  
PROVENANCE: BUKAVU  
DESTINATION: COMPTOIR OLIVE  
ADRESSE DU DESTINATAIRE: LUMENE  
RECEPTIONNE PAR:

La présente attestation est valable à dater de sa signature et sa validité expire dès que le produit arrive au destinataire.

## Annex 14

## 2. COMPTOIR ETS PANJU

DATE	QUANTITE en KGS	VALEUR en USD	N° BA	PROVENANCE	Prix moyen
05/05/2008	7143,55	52308,85	034306	KASESE	
	5939,80	47518,40	034307	LULINGU	
	4460,95	35687,60	034308	KASESE	
	17544,30	135514,85			
06/05/2008	13389,15	107113,20	034309	KASESE	
	13389,15	107113,20			
07/05/2008	4159,15	33273,20	034310	LULINGU	
	4159,15	33273,20			
08/05/2008	4497,15	35977,20	034311	KASESE	
	4497,15	35977,20			
09/05/2008	4391,55	35132,40	034312	KASESE	
	4391,55	35132,40			
10/05/2008	4165,80	33326,40	034313	LULINGU	
	4165,80	33326,40			
12/05/2008	4165,80	33326,40	034314	LULINGU	
	2417,80	19342,40	034315	KASESE	
	6563,60	52668,80			
14/05/2008	7138,50	57108,00	034316	LULINGU	
	5224,00	41792,00	034317	KASESE	
	12362,50	98900,00			
15/05/2008	9870,80	78966,40	034318	LULINGU	
	9870,80	78966,40			
16/05/2008	11955,70	95645,60	034319		
	11956,70	95653,60			
20/05/2008	2287,00	18296,00	034321	KASESE	
	8911,75	71294,00	034322	LULINGU	
	12917,00	103338,00	034323	LULINGU	
	24115,75	192926,00			
22/05/2008	8590,70	68725,60	034326	LULINGU	
	10985,48	87883,84			
	19576,18	156609,44			
26/05/2008	8161,05	65288,40	034330	MWENGA	
	7898,30	63188,40	034331	LULINGU	
	5470,30	43762,40	034332	LULINGU	
	21529,65	172237,20			
27/05/2008	3497,40	27979,20	034334	LULINGU	
	3497,40	27979,20			
28/05/2008	8342,75	66742,00	034336	LULINGU	
	8342,75	66742,00			
30/05/2008	7267,35	58298,80	031338	KILEMBWE	
	6068,17	48545,36	031339	LUNTUKULU	
	13355,52	106844,16			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>179337,95</b>	<b>1429884,05</b>			<b>7,97</b>

## 3. COMPTOIR M.D.M

DATE	QUANTITE	VALEUR	N° BA	PROVENANCE	Prix moyen
------	----------	--------	-------	------------	------------

## 3. COMPTOIR M.D.M

DATE	QUANTITE en KGS	VALEUR en USD	N° BA	PROVENANCE	Prix moyen
02/05/2008	96,50	530,75	036601	KATOGOTA	
	296,30	1629,65	036602	NZIBIRA	
	2648,70	14567,85	036603	NZIBIRA	
	921,50	5068,25	036604	KASESE	
	949,00	5219,50	036605	MWENGA	
	256,10	1408,55	036606	NZIBIRA	
	297,30	1635,15	036607	LULINGU	
	1572,50	8648,75	036608	NZIBIRA	
	348,90	1918,95	036609	NZIBIRA	
	7386,80	40627,40			
06/05/2008	681,30	5450,40	036610	KASESE	
	542,50	4340,00	036611	KASESE	
	248,00	1984,00	036612	NZIBIRA	
	1481,40	11851,20	036613	LULINGU	
	1684,60	13476,80	036614	LULINGU	
	1331,00	10648,00	036615	UVIRA	
	2344,80	18758,40	036616	KALIMA	
	191,90	1535,20	036617	MWENGA	
	8505,50	68044,00			
09/05/2008	3562,60	28500,80	036618	SHABUNDA	
	249,50	1996,00	036619	LULINGU	
	296,50	2372,00	036620	LULINGU	
	3599,00	28792,00	036621	KALIMA	
	1029,00	8232,00	036622	KASESE	
	537,50	4300,00	036623	NZIBIRA	
	792,60	6340,80	036624	MWENGA	
	292,60	2340,80	036625	MWENGA	
	230,50	1844,00	036626	NZIBIRA	
	1124,40	8995,20	036627	MWENGA	
	11714,20	93713,60			
12/05/2008	1929,90	15439,20	036628	LEMERA	
	2341,30	18730,40	036629	SHABUNDA	
	4736,90	37895,20	036630	KALIMA	
	5694,10	45552,80	036631	LULINGU	
	1938,20	15505,60	036632	KASESE	
	557,50	4460,00	036633	SHABUNDA	
	17197,90	137583,20			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>44804,40</b>	<b>339968,20</b>			<b>7,59</b>

## 7. COMPTOIR W.M.C

DATE	QUANTITE en KGS	VALEUR en USD	N° BA	PROVENANCE	Prix moyen
06/05/2008	2298,40	18387,20	097292	LULINGU	
	1013,90	8111,20	097293	KASESE	
	1473,20	11785,60	097294	MWENGA	
	246,40	1971,20	097295	LULINGU	
	564,60	4516,80	097296	LULINGU	
	330,20	2641,60	097297	MWENGA	
	597,40	4779,20	097298	MWENGA	
	1384,30	11074,40	097299	KALIMA	
	295,50	2364,00	097300	LEMERA	
	8203,90	65631,20			
07/05/2008	175,50	1404,00	051201	NZIBIRA	
	4307,60	34460,80	051202	KASESE	
	4483,10	35864,80			
16/05/2008	769,80	6158,40	051212	KALIMA	
	3032,30	24258,40	051213	KALIMA	
	573,10	4584,80	051214	LULINGU	
	4208,60	33668,80	051215	KASESE	
	8583,80	68670,40			
20/05/2008	2618,80	20950,40	051216	KALIMA	
	2312,90	18503,20	051217	KASESE	
	794,50	6356,00	051218	NZIBIRA	
	352,70	2821,60	051219	NZIBIRA	
	4241,00	33928,00	051220	MWENGA	
	971,80	7774,40	051221	NZIBIRA	
	244,00	1952,00	051222	KALIMA	
	865,10	6920,80	051223	LEMERA	
	635,80	5086,40	051224	MWENGA	
	607,40	4859,20	051225	NZIBIRA	
	13644,00	109152,00			
TOTAL	34914,80	273318,40			3,00

## 3. COMPTOIR MUYEYE

DATE	QUANTITE en KGS	VALEUR en USD	N° BA	PROVENANCE	Prix moyen
05/05/2008	52242,50	522425,00	036719	MANONO	
	52242,50	522425,00			
12/05/2008	156,00	2340,00	036725	SHABUNDA	
	381,00	5865,00	036726	SHABUNDA	
	658,50	9877,50	036727	SHABUNDA	
	386,00	5790,00	036728	SHABUNDA	
	1591,50	23872,50			
14/05/2008	329,50	4942,50	036738	KALEMIE	
	329,50	4942,50			
16/05/2008	186,50	2797,50	036743	KALEMIE	
	586,50	8797,50	036744	LULINGU	
	773,00	11595,00			
21/05/2008	33,50	502,50	036745	KALEMIE	
	303,50	4552,50	036746	KALEMIE	
	337,00	5055,00			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>55273,50</b>	<b>567890,00</b>			<b>10,27</b>

## 4. COMPTOIR AMUR

DATE	QUANTITE en KGS	VALEUR en USD	N° BA	PROVENANCE	Prix moyen
21/05/2008	3 500,00	52 500,00	051004	KALEMIE	
	4 500,00	67 500,00	051005	KALEMIE	
	2 500,00	37 500,00	051006	KALEMIE	
	750,00	11 250,00	051007	KALEMIE	
	600,00	9 000,00	051008	KALEMIE	
	11 850,00	177 750,00			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11850,00</b>	<b>177750,00</b>			<b>15,00</b>



Annex 15

**CENTRE D'EVALUATION, EXPERTISE ET DE CERTIFICATION DES SUBSTANCES MINÉRALES PRÉCIEUSES ET SEMI-PRÉCIEUSES**

**ANTENNE DE Bukavu**

COMPTOIR: HAMUKAYA

Nature de la substance précieuse: OR

Bureau d'Achat situé à: Bukavu

Province de: Sud-Kivu

Quantité achetée: 430,6 grammes

Valeur d'achat payée au(x) vendeur(s):

Montant en chiffres: 80468

Montant en toutes lettres: Huit mille quarante-six dollars

Date d'achat: 07/07/2008

Lieu d'achat: av. PC Lumumba n° 113

**ARRÊTÉ D'ACHÈMENT**  
N° 0226/001/001/08  
Valable du 07/07/2008 au 07/07/2008  
N° 994/08

ACHETEUR: Nshamamba Bisimwa  
Vendeur: Mzée Nyuma Mutabaho



## Annex 16

# Emirates Gold D.M.C.C. الإمارات جولد مردمس



**Emirates Gold**  
P.O.Box 24305 - Dubai, U.A.E  
Tel : 3679030 Fax: 3679022

**200-589 MACHANGA LIMITED**  
P.O.Box 29498  
KAMPALA - UGANDA  
TEL: 256-41-330138/9  
FAX: 256-41-530140

Contact Person:  
RAJU

Print Date: 21/09/2008  
**Statement of Account - DIRHAMS**  
From 01/04/2007 To 19/09/2008

Date	Doc	Ref. #	Particulars	Debit	Credit	Balance
			Opening Balance	3,783,008.33		
01/04/2007	FRN	2500	DOT GOLD \$664.0/Oz (V.D:03.04.07)	0.00	2,743,263.33	1,040,325.00
01/04/2007	BPV	4484	PYMT RE:GOLDSALE/VIPUL KUMAR/RM VAYA	2,500,000.00	0.00	3,640,325.00
01/04/2007	DN	2975	CHRG - O/B FR MAR 26-APRIL 01,2007	6,703.24	0.00	3,647,028.24
02/04/2007	FRN	2507	DOT GOLD \$669.70/Oz (V.D:04.04.07)	0.00	1,356,342.40	2,190,685.84
02/04/2007	FRN	2508	DOT GOLD \$664.0/Oz (V.D:04.04.07)	0.00	2,351,386.71	-160,699.87
02/04/2007	FRN	2509	DOT SILVER \$13.26/Oz (V.D:04.04.07)	0.00	61,383.87	-222,063.74
03/04/2007	DN	2982	CHRG-O/B FR APRIL 02-03,2007	1,777.98	0.00	-220,285.78
04/10/2007	CEN	1004	BOUGHT US\$69,966.18 @3.6735	220,285.76	0.00	0.00
			<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>5,213,375.31</b>	<b>6,813,378.31</b>	
			<b>Net Balance</b>	<b>0.00</b>		

# Emirates Gold D.M.C.C. الإمارات جولد مردمس



**Emirates Gold**  
P.O.Box 24305 - Dubai, U.A.E  
Tel : 3679030 Fax: 3679022


**200-670 FARREL TRADE & INVESTMENT CORP.**  
BUJUMBURA,  
BURUNDI  
TEL: +257-210437  
FAX:

Contact Person:

Print Date: 21/09/2008  
**Statement of Account - DIRHAMS**  
From 01/01/2007 To 31/12/2007

Date	Doc	Ref. #	Particulars	Debit	Credit	Balance
14/04/2007	BPV	4582	PYMT RE:GOLDSALE/VIPUL KUMAR/RM VAYA	2,400,000.00	0.00	5,191,669.75
15/04/2007	FRN	2535	DOT GOLD \$681.0/Oz (V.D:17.04.07)	0.00	3,215,449.13	1,976,220.62
15/04/2007	BPV	4584	PYMT RE:GOLDSALE/VIPUL KUMAR/RM VAYA	350,000.00	0.00	2,326,220.62
16/04/2007	DN	3002	CHRG-O/B FR APRIL 09 TO 15, 2007	6,077.36	0.00	2,332,297.98
16/04/2007	FRN	2536	DOT GOLD \$686.0/Oz (V.D:18.04.07)	0.00	2,534,175.24	-501,877.26
16/04/2007	FRN	2542	DOT GOLD \$686.50/Oz (V.D:18.04.07)	0.00	1,620,709.13	-2,122,556.39
17/04/2007	MRN	18174	RCD SCRAP GOLD KG 43.9138	8,122.11	0.00	-2,114,464.28
17/04/2007	BPV	4603	PYMT RE:GOLDSALE/VIPUL KUMAR/RM VAYA	3,400,000.00	0.00	1,285,535.72
18/04/2007	FRN	2545	DOT GOLD \$688.80/Oz (V.D:20.04.07)	0.00	1,576,587.32	-291,051.60
18/04/2007	BPV	4611	PYMT RE:GOLDSALE/VIPUL KUMAR/RM VAYA	600,000.00	0.00	309,948.40
19/04/2007	FRN	2549	DOT GOLD \$688.80/Oz (V.D:23.04.07)	0.00	2,010,066.82	-1,701,107.42
19/04/2007	FRN	2552	DOT GOLD \$682.40/Oz (V.D:23.04.07)	0.00	2,416,644.59	-4,117,652.01
21/04/2007	MRN	18203	RCD SCRAP GOLD KG 62.5725	9,723.51	0.00	-4,107,928.50
21/04/2007	BPV	4626	PYMT RE:GOLDSALE/VIPUL KUMAR/RM VAYA	3,660,000.00	0.00	-557,928.50
22/04/2007	BPV	4631	PYMT RE:GOLDSALE/VIPUL KUMAR/RM VAYA	175,000.00	0.00	-382,928.50
22/04/2007	DN	3016	CHRG-O/B FROM APRIL 16 TO 22, 2007	4,040.37	0.00	-378,888.13
23/04/2007	FDN	2586	SOLD GOLD \$692.0/Oz (V.D:23.04.07)	368,850.46	0.00	-10,037.67
23/04/2007	BPV	4641	PYMT RE:GOLDSALE/VIPUL KUMAR/RM VAYA	10,037.67	0.00	0.00
			<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>101,792,286.05</b>	<b>101,792,286.05</b>	
			<b>Net Balance</b>			

Annex 17



## Annex 18

3

## I.2. OEUVRANT EN TERRITOIRE DE LUBERO

## I.2.1. De WOLFRAM

N°	NOMS DU NEGOCIANT	SUBSTANCE	RAYON D ACTION	QUITTANCE N°
01	BAN'SOMIRE BAGUMA	WOLFRAM	BANDULU	249402 ( Acompte )
02	MAOMBI KIYAMBU	WOLFRAM	BANDULU	249409 (Acompte)
03	JOHN MUTULO	WOLFRAM	BANDULU	249415 (Acompte)
04	MUHINDO NGOLO	WOLFRAM	BANDULU	249418 et 249419
05	KALEGHIRE ROGER	COLTAN	MANGURE DJIPA	249420
07	MBUSA RICHARD	OR	BURANDA	249423 (Accompte)
08	KAMBALE BARAZANI	WOLFRAM	BANDULU	249426
09	MBAKULIRAYI BOSCO	OR	BANDULU	249428
10	KAHINDO KIKUKU	OR	MUHANGI	249429
11	BAKELE MATHE	OR	MANGURE DJIPA	249431
12	FATAKI MULEWA	OR	MANGURE DJIPA	249432
13	KAMBALE KATIMONGO	OR	MANGURE DJIPA	249433
14	SAPROBAN	OR	Bunia - KISENGE	249434
15	YUMA LWANGA	CASSITERITE	LUBERO	249435 (Acompte)
16	Pierre KARAMBA	OR	KASUGHO	249437
17	KAMBALE KITAMBALA	OR	KASUGHO	249438
18	Déo KYABUMBA	OR	KIRUMBA	249442
19	MUHINDO KAPITULA	OR	Bunia-KISENGE	249443
20	KAKULE MUHASA	OR	MANGURE DJIPA	249444
21	KAMATE LUSENGE	OR	MANGURE DJIPA	249445
22	Edison KULU	Autres substances	MANGURE DJIPA	249446

Annex 19

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO  
 PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU  
 GLORY MINERALS SPRL  
 10, Av. de l'Eglise / BUTEMBO

PROCES VERBAL DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE  
 D'ADOPTION DES STATUTS

L'an deux mille huit, le 28<sup>ème</sup> jour du mois de février,

1. Mr MUHINDO MUHIWA
2. Mr KATINA KAMBALE MBAYAH
3. Mr KAMBALE VIKALWE
4. Mme NZANZU MBUSA Jeanne

Associés de la société des personnes en responsabilité limitée  
 GLORY MINERALS, en sigle « GLORYM sprl » formant l'Assemblée  
 Générale de la société susvisée, adoptons à ce jour l'acte constitutif et  
 statuts de la dite société.

Ainsi fait à Butembo, le 28 Février 2008.

1. Mr MUHINDO MUHIWA
2. Mr KATINA KAMBALE MBAYAH
3. Mr KAMBALE VIKALWE
4. Mme NZANZU MBUSA Jeanne

**ACTE NOTARIE**

L'an deux mil huit, le ..... Jour du mois de .....

Nous soussigné YALALA MAMBO, Notaire de la Ville de Butembo et y résidant;

Certifions que l'acte visé au prescrit de la loi et dont les clauses ci-dessus insérées nous a été présenté ce jour à Butembo par :

1. Monsieur (Madame) : KAMBALE KATINA, né (e) à : ILOTA, le 1<sup>er</sup>/06/1958.

Fils de : KAMBERE et de : KANYERE

Etat-civil : MARIE, de nationalité : CONGOLAISE,

Résidant à 10 Av. DE L'EGLISE, n° PASSEPORT 043-008/2006,

Agissant en qualité de ASSOCIE ET GERANT DE GLORY MINERALS sprl

2. Monsieur : MUHINDO MUHIWA, né (e) à : VUSOKOLI, le 22/06/1957.

Fils de : KAMBALE et de : KAVIRA

Etat-civil : MARIE, de nationalité : CONGOLAISE,

Résidant à RUE MATADI N°07, Carte d'électeur n° 5946-13-1492,

Agissant en qualité de ASSOCIE DE GLORY MINERALS sprl.

3. Monsieur : KAMBALE VIKALWE, né (e) à : KATIRI, le 10/09/1956.

Fils de : KALEMBO et de : KALUNGERO

Etat-civil : MARIE, de nationalité : CONGOLAISE,

Résidant à Av. BUKAVU N°12, Carte d'électeur n° 6160-13-1744,

Agissant en qualité de ASSOCIE DE GLORY MINERALS sprl

4. Madame : NZANZU MBUSA, né (e) à : BUTEMBO, le 06/12/1963.

Fille de : MBUSA NZANZU et de : KAHAMBU LUSASA

Etat-civil : VEUVE, de nationalité : CONGOLAISE,

Résidant à Q. MGL N° 50A, n° PASSEPORT N°C127541,

Agissant en qualité de ASSOCIEE DE GLORY MINERALS sprl

Comparaissant en personne et en présence de KAHAMBU VYALENGEKANIA et de KATSONGO MUSAVULI, fonctionnaires de l'Administration Publique, tous deux résidant à Butembo, témoins instrumentaires à ce requis, réunissant les conditions exigées par la loi .....

Lecture du contenu de l'acte susdit a été faite par nous, Notaire aux comparants et aux témoins .....

Lecture faite, les comparants préqualifiés ont déclaré devant nous, Notaire, et en présence des témoins que l'acte susdit tel qu'il est dressé, renferme bien l'expression de leur volonté .....

En foi de quoi, les présentes ont été signées par nous, Notaire, les comparants et les dits témoins et revêtues du sceau de l'Office Notarial de la Ville de Butembo .....



VERSEMENT EN ESPECES

RD-KIVU VIC EAD PROVINCE / CARTE DE NEGOCIANT

La somme de Francs DEUX VINGT CINQ MILLE

pour être portée au crédit de son / leur compte

N° 274-00-9173305-81

Versement effectué par KABERE KAMBALE KATINA

Monnaie Fc 125.000 -

Valeur 17/04/08

N° 374464 TSHINYATOLE. L.

Kinshasa, le 17/04/2008

QUANTITE	COUPURES	MONTANT
150 x	FC 500	Fc 75000
150 x	FC 200	Fc 30000
200 x	FC 100	Fc 20000
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
TOTAL Fc		Fc 125000

Mod. 025 Adu. (1000) 05.07.2005

N.B.: Le présent reçu est, pour engager la BANQUE CONGOLAISE SARL. émis revêtu de deux signatures.

Handwritten signatures and stamps, including 'BANQUE CONGOLAISE SARL' and 'Kinshasa'.

Glory

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO  
COMMISSION ELECTORALE INDEPENDANTE  
CARTE D'ELECTEUR

NUMERO NATIONAL  
N° Centre - N° Bureau - N° Ordre  
6160 - 13 - 1744

Nom  
KAMBALE

Sexe  
M

Post-nom / Prénom  
VICALWE EDUARD

Adresse QUARTIER VETERINAIRE 007  
BUTEMBO KIMESI

Date / Lieu de naissance  
10/09/1956 KATRI

Secteur ou chefferie d'origine / Territoire d'origine / Province d'origine  
Barwaga / Lubero / Nord-Kivu

Nom du père  
KAHINDO

Nom de la mère  
KAVIRA

JEANNETTE KAMALA  
*Kamala*



NGO *EX. 2008*

née du N° *22698*


ent d'Espèces

*KAMBALE VICALWE  
E. EDUARD  
BUTEMBO  
N° 10*

ompte  
*22-394-A*

de  
*PROVINCE N-KIVU*

la somme de *Cents vingt cinq  
MILLE FRANCS Congolais*



Montant du versement *125.000FC*

Observation: *TAXE SUR CARTE DE NEGOCIANT  
NOTE PERC N° 3743  
SCE: MINES & GEOL*

*UR BUTEMBO le 01 oct 2008*

Signature du déposant

*[Signature]*

*GLORY*

**UNION INTERNATIONALE DES BANQUES AFRICAINES**  
 50, 16, 13, 1492  
 Nom: **KAHINDO**  
 Post-nom / Prénom: **MUHIWA FABBA**  
 Adresse: **QUARTIER MUTIRI YUHOUSI 125 BUTEMBO BULENGERA**  
 Date / Lieu de naissance: **22/06/1987 BUSOKOLA**  
 Sexe: **M**  
 Nom du père: **KAMBALE**  
 Nom de la mère: **KAVIRA**  
 Signature: **MUHIWA FABBA**  
 Numéro: **374482**

**VÉRSEMENT EN ESPECES**

*QUINZE PARTIE DE NEGOCIANT  
EX 2008.*

QUANTITE	COUPURES	MONTANT
50	FC 500	Fc 25000
500	FC 200	Fc 100000
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
x	FC	
TOTAL Fc		Fc 125000

Fc **125.000** — **1**  
 Montant  
 Valeur **125.000**

Mod.025 AGE (10/00) 05.07.AGE  
 N° **374482**  
 Kishasha, le **21/04/2008**

*TSHIRYATOLE*

*Muhiwa Fabba*  
 BANQUE CONGOLAISE S.A.R.L.  
 Janvier BAKIHEMURA B.  
 Chef d'Agence Adjoint

*Glory*



Je Soussigné PALUYEN  
KASILEME  
 Officier de l'Etat civil à VULAMBA  
 et y résidant, atteste par la Présente que :  
 Mr, Mme, Mlle NZANZU MBEWA  
 Né(e) à : BUTEMBO  
 Le : 23.03.1963  
 Fils(le) de : M. N.S.S. NZANZU  
 Et de : M. N.S.S. NZANZU  
 Etat civil : MARIÉ

Profession : COMMERCE  
 Originaire du village de : M. N.S.S.  
 Groupement : B. N.S.S.  
 Chefferie (sec/eur) : BASSE ASALA  
 Territoire : N.S.S.  
 Province : N.S.S.  
 Résident à : S. M. N.S.S.



Conjoint  
 PHOTO

introduit sa demande d'obtention d'une  
 pièce d'identification.

En foi de quoi, la présente pièce lui est  
 délivrée pour valoir et servir à qui de droit.

Fait à VULAMBA le 23.03.2002

PROVINCE DU MOUANGA  
 BOURGEMESTRE.  
 OFFICIER DE L'ETAT CIVIL  
 PALUYEN KASILEME  
 N.S.S.

Glory

## Annex 20

### Ordre du jour

- a. Changement de la dénomination :
- b. Transport du siège social
- c. Agrément de cession des parts
- d. Nomination du Gérant



Le Président donne ensuite lecture du rapport de la Gérance.

Cette lecture terminée, le Président ouvre les discussions, un échange de vue intervient sur les réponses. Le Président met successivement aux voix les résolutions suivantes, figurant à l'ordre du jour :

#### **Première résolution**

La collectivité des associés décide du changement de dénomination de CONGO METAL SPRL en AURUM AFRICA SPRL.

Cette résolution mise aux voix est adoptée à la majorité.

#### **Deuxième résolution**

La collectivité des associés décide du transport du siège social à Kinshasa, commune de la Gombe, avenue Isiro, aux nouvelles galeries présidentielles, appartement 1MCI.

Cette résolution mise aux voix est adoptée à la majorité.

#### **Troisième résolution**

La collectivité des associés décide de la cession des parts à Monsieur VASANJI JAMNADAS LODHIA à hauteur de 80% et Monsieur LODHIA KUNAL JAMNADASS à hauteur de 20%.

#### **Quatrième résolution**

Conséquemment à cette cession des parts sociales la collectivité des associés décide de nommer Monsieur ARUMALLA SIVA NNARAYANA REDDY en qualité de Gérant.

#### **Cinquième résolution**

La collectivité des associés constate et prend acte de la cession des parts représentant la totalité du capital social à Monsieur JAMNADAS LODHIA et Monsieur LODHIA KUNAL JAMNADASS

De sorte que la répartition du capital social se fait de la manière suivante :

- Monsieur VASANJI JAMNADAS LODHIA devient propriétaire de 80 parts sociales soit 80% du capital.

## Annex 21

**Emirates Gold** D.M.C.C.

الإمارات جولد مردمس

Emirates Gold

P.O.Box 24305 - Dubai, U.A.E

Tel : 3679030 Fax: 3679022

**200-590** UGANDA COMMERCIAL IMPEX  
 P.O BOX 22709  
 KAMPALA, UGANDA  
 TEL: +25641533578/9  
 FAX: +25641533570

Contact Person:  
 KUNAL LODHIA

Print Date: 21/09/2008

Statement of Account - DIRHAMS

From 01/04/2007 To 19/09/2008

Date	Doc	Ref. #	Particulars	Debit	Credit	Balance
			Opening Balance	42,610,987.25		
01/04/2007	MRN	18018	RCD SCRAP GOLD KG 105.6451	29,037.47	0.00	42,640,024.72
01/04/2007	DN	2976	CHRG - O/B FR MAR26-APR101,2007	54,280.39	0.00	42,694,305.11
01/04/2007	DN	2979	AIRPORT HANDING - MRN 18018	400.00	0.00	42,694,705.11
02/04/2007	FRN	2506	BOT GOLD \$664.0/Oz (V.D:05.04.07)	0.00	18,419,188.05	24,275,517.06
02/04/2007	BPV	4505	TRANS US\$600T EG/18963/04/07	2,204,100.00	0.00	26,479,617.06
05/04/2007	FRN	2519	BOT GOLD \$673.0/Oz (V.D:11.04.07)	0.00	7,944,189.67	18,535,427.39
08/04/2007	DN	2989	CHRG-O/B FR APRIL 02- 08, 2007	42,855.68	0.00	18,578,283.07
12/04/2007	FRN	2534	BOT GOLD \$684.0/Oz (V.D:17.04.07)	0.00	4,037,017.63	14,541,265.44
15/04/2007	DN	3004	CHRG - O/B FR APRIL 09 TO 15, 2007	25,619.94	0.00	14,566,885.38
16/04/2007	FRN	2543	BOT GOLD \$689.0/Oz (V.D:18.04.07)	0.00	4,066,527.99	10,500,357.39
19/04/2007	FRN	2553	BOT GOLD \$692.0/Oz (V.D:24.04.07)	0.00	4,084,234.21	6,416,123.18
22/04/2007	DN	3015	CHARG-O/B FROM APRIL 16 TO 22, 2007	14,868.58	0.00	6,430,991.76
24/04/2007	FRN	2561	BOT GOLD \$689.0/Oz (V.D:26.04.07)	0.00	4,066,527.99	2,364,463.77
29/04/2007	DN	3026	CHRG-O/B FROM APRIL 23 TO 29, 2007	5,799.02	0.00	2,370,262.79
06/05/2007	DN	3039	CHRG-O/B FROM APR30 TO MAY06, 2007	2,893.17	0.00	2,373,155.96
13/05/2007	DN	3051	CHRG-O/B FROM MAY07 TO MAY13,2007	2,975.63	0.00	2,376,131.59
20/05/2007	DN	3060	CHRG-O/B FROM MAY 14 TO 20, 2007	3,018.61	0.00	2,379,150.20
27/05/2007	DN	3077	CHRG-O/B FR MAY 21-27, 2007	3,051.30	0.00	2,382,201.50
03/06/2007	DN	3091	CHRG O/B FR 28/05 to 03/06/07	2,983.33	0.00	2,385,184.83
10/06/2007	DN	3106	CHRG O/B FRM JUN 04 TO 10, 2007	3,531.71	0.00	2,388,716.54
17/06/2007	DN	3121	CHRG-O/B FR JUNE 11-17, 2007	3,063.55	0.00	2,391,780.09
24/06/2007	DN	3141	CHRG-O/B FR JUNE 18-24, 2007	3,072.58	0.00	2,394,852.67
01/07/2007	DN	3155	CHRG-O/B FR JUN 25 to JUL 01	3,095.89	0.00	2,397,948.56
05/07/2007	FDN	2692	SOLD GOLD \$649.50/Oz (V.D:10.07.07)	3,835,484.32	0.00	6,233,432.88
08/07/2007	DN	3175	CHRG O/B FR JULY 02-08, 2007	3,076.71	0.00	6,236,509.59
09/07/2007	FRN	2664	BOT GOLD \$655.0/Oz (V.D:11.07.07)	0.00	3,865,857.53	2,370,652.06
09/07/2007	FRN	2668	BOT GOLD \$659.0/Oz (V.D:11.07.07)	0.00	1,555,786.33	814,865.73
11/07/2007	FDN	2704	SOLD GOLD \$665.50/Oz (V.D:13.07.07)	3,929,968.92	0.00	4,744,834.65
15/07/2007	DN	3192	CHRG: O/B FR JULY 09-15, 2007	4,412.13	0.00	4,749,246.78

Tel: +971-4-3679030, Fax: +971-4-3679022, Sheikh Zayed Rd, P.O. Box : 24305 - Dubai, U.A.E.  
 e-mail: uaegold@emirates.net.ae Website: www.emiratesgold.ae

Emirates Gold		D.M.C.C.	الإمارات جولد مردوس			
22/07/2007	DN	3210	CHRG:O/B FR JULY 16-22, 2007	6,838.63	0.00	4,755,085.41
23/07/2007	FRN	2729	BOT GOLD \$684.0/Oz (V.D:25.07.07)	0.00	4,037,017.63	718,067.78
29/07/2007	DN	3233	CHRG:O/B FR JULY 23-29, 2007	2,378.49	0.00	720,446.27
02/08/2007	FDN	2755	SOLD GOLD \$666.0/Oz (V.D:06.08.07)	3,932,921.56	0.00	4,653,367.83
05/08/2007	DN	3246	CHRG:O/B FR JUL 30 to AUG 05	900.06	0.00	4,654,267.89
09/08/2007	FRN	2768	BOT GOLD \$673.50/Oz (V.D:14.08.07)	0.00	7,950,091.74	-3,295,823.85
12/08/2007	DN	3266	CHRG:O/B FR AUGUST 06-12, 2007	5,819.24	0.00	-3,290,004.61
16/08/2007	FDN	2787	SOLD GOLD \$658.50/Oz (V.D:21.08.07)	3,888,631.91	0.00	598,627.30
19/08/2007	DN	3280	CHRG:O/B FR AUG 13-19, 2007	847.82	0.00	599,475.12
26/08/2007	DN	3302	CHRG:O/B FR AUG 20-26, 2007	646.14	0.00	600,121.26
02/09/2007	DN	3319	CHRG:O/B FR AUG 27-SEPT 02 '07	749.14	0.00	600,870.40
09/09/2007	DN	3332	CHRG:O/B FR SEP 03-09, 2007	721.14	0.00	601,591.54
10/09/2007	FRN	2822	BOT GOLD \$700.0/Oz (V.D:12.09.07)	0.00	4,131,450.79	-3,529,859.26
10/09/2007	FRN	2823	BOT GOLD \$704.0/Oz (V.D:12.09.07)	0.00	4,155,059.08	-7,684,918.33
13/09/2007	FRN	2834	BOT GOLD \$714.0/Oz (V.D:18.09.07)	0.00	4,214,079.81	-11,898,998.14
17/09/2007	FRN	2836	BOT GOLD \$719.0/Oz (V.D:19.09.07)	0.00	4,243,590.17	-16,142,588.31
20/09/2007	FRN	2845	BOT GOLD \$729.0/Oz (V.D:24.09.07)	0.00	4,302,610.90	-20,445,199.21
26/09/2007	FRN	2854	BOT GOLD \$732.0/Oz (V.D:01.10.07)	0.00	4,320,317.12	-24,765,516.33
03/10/2007	CEN	1018	BOT US\$6,741,867.71@3.6735	24,765,516.33	0.00	0.00
01/11/2007	FRN	2926	BOT GOLD \$794.25/Oz (V.D:06.11.07)	0.00	4,687,721.13	-4,687,721.13
01/11/2007	CEN	1005	BOT US\$1,276,786.36@3.6715 (VD:06.11.07)	4,687,721.13	0.00	0.00
<b>Grand Total</b>				<b>90,081,267.77</b>	<b>90,081,267.77</b>	
<b>Net Balance</b>				<b>0.00</b>		

A-01-200-518	AL KHAYAL AL DHAWABI JEW. L.L.C	MR. RAJESH	P.O. BOX 51377	DUBAI, U.A.E	0507468503/2354890	04-2354891	nick700@msn.com
A-01-200-521	AL NIN JEWELLERY	F. BANOATI	P.O. BOX 2635	ABU DHABI, U.A.E	TEL: 04-6274074	FAX: 02-6275040	alininlow@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-526	SPARKLE JEWELLERY LLC	KAMLESH BAMBESH	P.O. BOX 21112	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 04-2359052	FAX: 04-2350054	qashthe@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-533	ORNAURE BLDG MATRUS FZCO	MR. HUSSIN	P.O. BOX 10022	JEBEL ALI, U.A.E	TEL: 04-8871234	FAX: 04-8871235	ledalnuh@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-535	AL KAWA JEWELLERS QFC	SHARIF FADDOY	207 GOLD HOUSE	DEIRA, DUBAI	TEL: 226 6680	FAX: 225 0386	ksayf@sharifs9@pfn-ua.com
A-01-200-535	IBRAHIM AL SWEIGHI	KAMLESH BAMBESH	CR. SPARKLE JEW.	316 GOLD LANE, DUBAI	TEL: 235 0052	FAX: 235 0054	qashthe@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-542	SMARAT JEWELLERS LLC	RAJESH SWARAT	P.O. BOX 30109	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 04-3328219	FAX: 04-3356466	simaid@qansh.com
A-01-200-558	KOTI TRADING COMPANY	KHURRUMAD ISMAIL	P.O. BOX 13590	DUBAI, U.A.E	2473876	3473338	fozal@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-560	E-DINAR FZ L.L.C	DR. HINDEN ZENO	P.O. BOX 500294	DUBAI, U.A.E	390 0010	FAX: +4101222-667	uzeno.deh@dnb@hsbc
A-01-200-561	MOHAMMED ALI ALTHOR BNC.	MOHAMMED ALI ALTHOR	THE GOLD CENTER 5/F	KOJ: 030-6007276	TEL: +9671500659/61	FAX: +9671500659	MOB: +96713777560
A-01-200-566	SHADIA JEWELLERY(L.L.C)	MOHAMAD BAKI FALAH	P.O. BOX 46351	DUBAI, U.A.E	2200600	3290685	Yesh@urc_rsl@hqbmail.com
A-01-200-574	DOMAS JEWELLERY	TMWED ABDULLAH	P.O. BOX 1572	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 04-2354890	FAX: 04-2354891	qak@damasjewellery.com
A-01-200-582	BIN HAFUQZ JEWELLERS(DXB)	SULEI MOHAMMED B.H	P.O. BOX 88380	DEIRA, U.A.E	TEL: 2356643	FAX: 2357226	info@binhafuqz.com
A-01-200-587	SEPHINA GOLD	AMIR H. BARKSIAN	P.O. BOX 22709	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 04-2233435	FAX: 04-2273302	kenad@urb.biz
A-01-200-592	HANSAUR FARAQ GENERAL TRADING	MR. Soud Karan Farhat	P.O. BOX 47063	KAMPALA, UGANDA	TEL: +3564153378/9	FAX: +35641533370	Karan@qgoldtrading.com
A-01-200-593	INDIA JEWELLERY	SUNIL TAYEB	P.O. BOX 3031	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 226 6722	FAX: 2356795	raj@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-595	MAJDI JEWELLERY TRDG LLC	MR. GHULAM SAWAR	P.O. BOX 42063	ABU DHABI, U.A.E	TEL: 06-7420549	FAX: 06-7422356	majdi@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-596	BOCH TRADING LLC	SQAITH YAMANEVAH	P.O. BOX 172521	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 227 2404	FAX: 222 7935	pur@boch@qgold.com
A-01-200-601	DELTA JEWELLERS	HR. SANDEY	P.O. BOX 45649	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 339 9360	FAX: 2242356	shah@delat@hqbmail.com
A-01-200-602	AL KHAWES JEWELLERY	HAJDOO AL KHAWES	P.O. BOX 39437	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 06-2500327	FAX: 224129	mp@al-khawes@hqb.com
A-01-200-609	BAG AL RAVAN JEW.	HR. KUMAR NARESH	P.O. BOX 21547, 0-35	ABU DHABI, U.A.E	TEL: 06-7427511	FAX: 06-7427512	abun@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-613	IGOLD STAR FZE	MR. R.P. RAJ	P.O. BOX 112621	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 226 5795	FAX: 226 7773	raj@igold.com
A-01-200-614	ALLURE JEWELS LLC	HANISH KOTHARI	P.O. BOX 37464	ABU DHABI, U.A.E	TEL: 02 6441575	FAX: 02 6442240	zaza@allure.com
A-01-200-621	SULTAN BIN AL AL OYANIS CUL. PROTH	ABDUL ELAH ABDOU KADIR	P.O. BOX 14300	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 224 3111	FAX: 228 0034	mail@soyate.net.ae
A-01-200-628	SIKA COCO LTD.	ABRAHAM VARGHESE	PHYS23, OSU Post Bldg	ACCRA GHANA	TEL: +233-21-761078	FAX: +233-21-761079	sharon@sybil.com
A-01-200-635	STANDARD BANK PLC	MR. Paul McKend	BKCC OFFICE	LONDON	TEL: 00942078194/02	FAX: 00442078154058	pol.mckend@standardbank.com
A-01-200-636	USHINDI EXPORTS LIMITED	MR. A. PATTINI	P.O. BOX 10040	HABERO, KENYA	TEL: +254 203755467	FAX: +254 203740206	ad@ushindi@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-643	IBRAHIM JEWELLERY	Zakir Al-Nasser	P.O. BOX 81031	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 225 5000	FAX: 225 5111	ibrahim@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-645	FEE JEWELLERS L.L.C	MR. SALEH MOHAMAD	4/F ART 86, GOLD SCUL.	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 2269514	FAX: 2269504	g@fj@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-646	WREN JEWELLERY (L.L.C)	MR. HALL BOUZ	P.O. BOX 81031	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 2266037	FAX: 2291337	g@wren@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-648	JANZE JEWELLERY	RAJUL GUPTA	GOLD CENTRE, PLAT 22	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 2254423	FAX: 2254432	raj@janze@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-658	THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA (QFSC)	MR. KUMAR VACHAND	P.O. BOX 57979	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 44-207-4909750	FAX: 44-207-4909750	raj@novascotia@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-663	YUDYA JEWELLERY (SH)	CHANG TWEDDY	SCHEERL VEDANDATH	SCHEERL VEDANDATH	TEL: 06-5613615	FAX: 06-5613638	tweddy@yudya@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-666	DAWOOD TRADING CO. (L.L.C)	MR. TEJAL	P.O. BOX 62419	ROJLA, SAUDI	TEL: 862 9776	FAX: 862 9776	teja@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-674	EL FAYO	HANDBER MESIH ESSEMDIR	Q/E: POLIRHANG JEW	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 8819032	FAX: 8817653	handber@emirates.net.ae
A-01-200-675	JOY ALUKVAS JEWELLERY (HO)	JOY ALUKVAS	ICE: ISKANDAR GRP	DUBAI, U.A.E	TEL: 225 3221	FAX: 226 4932	joy@alukvas.com


Annex 22

UNCLE PRINCE  
 41 BOUTIQUE BUREAU GENEVA  
 4301 MARSE  
 GENEVA 4  
 THE DECISION  
 SITUATION MAN 41816 KRISTIC EN DATE DU 18/09/08  
 BY Lela

N°	DESCRIPTION	QTE	RECEU	EXTRAINS	MVA	MVA	PROPORTION PAR SECTEUR			VALISE			STOCK	MONTANT	OBT.
							CVE VP	100%	RUE	100%	100%	100%			
01	7.62000 x 39	188.9655	130.9675	71.9305	74.4785	2.8505	13.4935	10.7785	15.7505	205	6.2.2505				
02	7.62000 x 77	1.7661	1.1115	9805	-	1.2205	-	-	-	-	1115				
03	7.62000 x 77	34.4985	43.2985	2405	8605	4.2205	3.4535	5.1255	2.4005	-	30.0205				
04	12.2000	2.5285	2.5285	-	-	4.2205	-	-	-	-	2.0745				
05	R70 20000	06	06807	02	03	12	33	15	35	-	0.3807				
06	R70 40000	267	106807	02	09	12	33	15	35	-	8.6807				
07	Aver 81000	8645	30645	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.6045				
08	Aver 60000	21545	94645	10	05	-	20	39	20	-	30.80045				
09	Aver 18000	172	888005	-	-	41	-	-	-	-	576045				
10	Aver 10000	40	10	-	-	0.6000	-	-	-	-	10				
11	CHARGES AVER 42	170	22061	8061	4161	4061	5361	5361	5361	-	10				
12	CHARGES PROPORTION	0661	0661	0161	0161	0161	0161	0161	0161	-	-				
13	CHARGES R2-R-1/10/10	04	04	-	-	02	-	-	-	-	02				

VU ET APPROUVE  
 17/09/08  
 KAMATIANG PILLILI  
 4301 MARSE  
 GENEVA 4

Fait a GENEVA, le 19/09/08.  
 BRUNO - 207570  
 08/09/08  
 4301 MARSE





## Annex 23

Page 1 of 1

1802  
07 MAI 2008

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO  
Ministère de l'Intérieur, Décentralisation et Sécurité



AGENCE NATIONALE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS  
DIRECTION PROVINCIALE DU SUD-KIVU

Bukavu, le 2 AVRIL 2008

N°05/46/ANR/DSI/503/08

C.1 : A Son Excellence  
Monsieur le Gouverneur

**NOTE D'INFO AU COMMANDANT DE LA 10<sup>E</sup> R.M**

**CONCERNE :** Rencontre clandestine entre le Commandant 112<sup>e</sup> Bn  
FARDC/SANGE et les FDLR

Mon Général,

Il nous revient de vous informer qu'en date du 12 avril 2008 une réunion clandestine s'est tenue au bureau de la Cité de Sange par Chef de Cité Monsieur NDABWIRWA RUKALISHA, Major MIGABO FRAI Commandant 112<sup>e</sup> Bataillon /FARDC basé à Sange et deux colonels FDLR/Interahamwe non autrement identifiés à l'insu des autres membres du comité local de sécurité et avec un ordre du jour inavoué.

Une vente d'armes et munitions s'en est suivie aux FDLR par le sous-lieutenant NTUMBA de 112<sup>e</sup> Bn FARDC. Pris en flagrant délit par sous-lieutenant GUSTAVE Commandant PM, ces deux sous-officiers FARDC se feront corrompre par leurs clients FDLR moyennant 50 \$ us laisseront ces derniers partir avec armes et munitions.

Dénoncés par la population, le Chef de cité et le Major FRAI procéderont à l'arrestation de ces deux S/officiers précités.

Nous vous prions de bien vouloir prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour sanctionner ces militaires et éviter que Sange ne soit une plaque tournante d'approvisionnement des FDLR en armes et munitions.

Franche collaboration.

**LE DIRECTEUR PROVINCIAL  
DE L'ANR/SUD-KIVU (en mission)**

<https://webmail06.un.org/mail/jannotf1.nsf/0/96A6466E54126B50852574D30046E44F/SF...> 9/29/2008

## Annex 24


GRADE	WAGE	WAGE	WAGE
	01/09/07	16/08/08	16/08/08
	FC	FC	USD
Gen A	53.500		
Lt Gen	48.500	61.956	112,7
Gen Maj	43.500	56.956	103,6
Gen Bde	40.580	54.036	98,3
Col	35.500	48.956	89,0
Lt Col	32.500	45.956	83,6
Maj	30.870	44.326	80,6
Capt	28.000	41.456	75,4
Lt	27.500	40.956	74,5
Slt	27.000	40.456	73,6
Adj Chef	26.300	39.756	72,3
Adj 1cl	25.930	39.386	71,6
Adj 1cl	25.500	38.956	70,8
1 Sgt Maj	24.800	38.256	69,6
Sgt Maj	24.451	37.907	68,9
1 Sgt	23.960	37.416	68,0
Sgt	22.300	35.756	65,0
Cpl	22.000	35.456	64,5
Sdt 1cl	21.650	35.106	63,8
Sdt 2cl	21.320	34.776	63,2
No Grade	21.320	34.776	63,2

(USD1 = 550 FC)



## Annex 25

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE  
ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

**Le Ministre**

Kinshasa, le 18 SEP 2008

N° MDNAC/CAB/1624/2008

Transmis copie pour information à :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Premier Ministre ;  
• Avec l'expression de ma haute considération •  
à KINSHASA/GOMBE
- Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Transports et Voies de Communication ;
- Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre du Budget ;
- Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Finances ;
- Son Excellence Monsieur le Vice-Ministre de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants ;
- Monsieur le Chef d'Etat-Major Général des Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo ;
- Monsieur le Chef d'Etat-Major Particulier du Président de la République ;
- Monsieur l'Administrateur-Directeur Général de la Régie des Voies Aériennes.  
(TOUS) à KINSHASA

Objet : Réquisition des avions cargo.

A Messieurs :

- Le Président Directeur Général de HEWA BORA ;
- Le Président Directeur Général de TRANS AIR CARGO ;
- Le Président Directeur Général de GOMAIR.  
à KINSHASA/GOMBE

Messieurs,

J'ai l'honneur de vous saluer et de vous informer que, en référence à ma lettre N°MDNAC/CAB/1623/2008 du 18 septembre 2008, pour des impératifs opérationnels à l'EST de notre PAYS, TOUS vos avions cargo sont réquisitionnés et ce, sans exception.

Vous voudrez bien prendre des dispositions idoines quant à ce.

ma considération distinguée.

Vous voudrez bien prendre des dispositions

Veillez agréer, Messieurs, l'assurance de

Pour le Ministre en mission,  
Le Vice-Ministre de la Défense Nationale  
et des Anciens Combattants

Luc AMURI MUKULUYAKE  
de la République Nationale  
des Anciens Combattants

SEC	FD	
C P	DRH	DR
D C	SEC GEN	VPCP
TRANSPORTS		
N		
RECU LE		
RECSP		
HSA		

## Annex 26

**hewa bora airways**

FORCES ARMÉES  
SECRETARIAT GÉNÉRAL  
03 OCT 2008  
2305

Kinshasa, le 1<sup>er</sup> octobre 2008

Client : Forces Armées de la République  
Démocratique du Congo  
C/o Ministère du Budget  
à KINSHASA

**FACTURE N° 042/DG/HBA/FIH/2008**

**LIBELLE**

Doit pour l'affrètement de notre avion B707 immatriculé 9Q-CKR sur le routing ci-après :

Le 18/09/2008	:	Kinshasa - Kisangani
Le 19/09/2008	:	Kisangani - Khartoum
Le 20/09/2008	:	Khartoum - Kisangani - Kinshasa
Le 21/09/2008	:	Kinshasa - Kisangani
Le 22/09/2008	:	Kisangani - Khartoum
Le 23/09/2008	:	Khartoum - Kisangani - Khartoum
Le 24/09/2008	:	Khartoum - Kisangani - Khartoum
Le 25/09/2008	:	Khartoum - Kisangani - Khartoum
Le 26/09/2008	:	Khartoum - Kisangani - Kinshasa

**PRIX**

Prestation : 36 heures 35' x 5.000 USD	=	182.916 USD
Prime de risque : 36h35' x 500 USD	=	18.292 USD
7 night stop x 2.500 USD	=	<u>17.500 USD</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	=	<b><u>218.708 USD</u></b>

**N.B.** : Le carburant, les taxes aéronautiques et handling à charge de l'affrèteur.

CC : - Ministère de la Défense  
- Etat Major Général  
- Ministère des Transports et Communications.

AF 000 00 7279 49510 - W.P.C. 40714

## Annex 27

N°	Propriétaire/Exploitant	Immatr.	Type/Modèle	N° ENREG.	DATE D'ENR.	Num. Serie	Base	Validité CDN	ETAT	Poids T.O.
229	C.A.A	9Q-CAA	IL-18	1068	4/29/2003	187009702	N'djili/Kin	10/13/2006	AOG	62.300kg
24	C.A.A	9Q-CAA	B727					9/12/2008	A. Apte	
82	C. Méthodistes Unis	9Q-CAB	Cessna 182F	915	5/12/1992	18254682	Luena/Shaba			
538	C.A.A	9Q-CAB	AN-26	1038	1/13/2000	5605	N'djili/Kin	Déclassé		24.000kgs
164	G.L.B.C.	9Q-CAC	AN-32	1129	3/8/2005	1407	Goma		Declassé	27.250Kgs
190	National Trading Company	9Q-CAD	Parcanavia P68 B	834	3/21/1986	131	Bukavu	Radié		
90	Central Air Express	9Q-CAD	DC-8-63F	1065	2/7/2003	46000	N'djili/Kin	Radié le 28/03/05		
99	Air Kasai	9Q-CAE	AN-2	1130	19747317	1G747313	Tshikapa	11/30/2006	AOG	5.500kgs
202		9Q-CAE		621						
123	Africa One	9Q-CAF	AN-32	1051	2/14/2001	1703	N'djili/Kin	2/14/2008	AOG	27.250Kgs
539	Business Aviation	9Q-CAF	AN-32	1051	2/14/2001	1703	N'djili/Kin	Cédé à AFO		27.250Kgs
171	Strabaq Bau-aq	9Q-CAG	Cessna 404 Titan	853	11/27/1987	637	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu		
177	I.T.A.B.	9Q-CAI	PA 31 Navajo	715	4/30/1998	31-8152188	Luano/L'shi	Radié		
140	ITAB	9Q-CAI	HS125-600A	1183	9/29/2006	256047	Luano/L'shi	10/10/2007	AOG	11.567kgs
527	I.T.A.B.	9Q-CAI	HS125	1183	10/4/2006	256047	Luano/L'shi	2/20/2009	A. Apte	
192	Air Tropiques	9Q-CAJ	BEECH A 200	1210	8/27/2007	BD-05	N'dolo/Kin	3/14/2009	A. Apte	12.500lbs
232		9Q-CAJ	BA200			B2-05				
466	Archidiocèse de Kananga	9Q-CAK	P 68 B	685			Kananga	Etat inconnu		
54	M.A.F	9Q-CAL	Cessna 207	593	2/18/1985	208-00010	N'dolo/Kin	10/30/2008	A. Apte	
205	Waltair	9Q-CAL	Caravelle SE 210-11R	1043	6/9/2000	240	N'djili/Kin			
387	LUKAS	9Q-CAM	DC-3	683	7/14/1980	451139	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu		
172	V.A.C	9Q-CAM	DC3			NIL	Goma	Etat inconnu		
193	3 MAS	9Q-CAN	Viscount 708	814	5/17/1985	36	N'djili/Kin			
175	ORIENT STAR	9Q-CAN	DC-8-55F	0058A	10/29/2002	45258	N'djili/Kin			
204	KINAJIR-Cargo	9Q-CAP	DC-4	616	7/20/1978	18366	N'djili/Kin	Radié		
463	I.T.A.B.	9Q-CAP	Nord 262	971	4/2/1995	35	Luano/L'shi	10/26/2007	AOG	10.850kgs
207	J.R. LUNGUMBU	9Q-CAR	C402B	1025	4/13/2004	402B-0304	N'djili/Kin			
248	Business Aviation	9Q-CAS	PIPER NAVAJO	480	5/19/1969	400	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu		
174	Yashin Munshi	9Q-CAS	PA31	480	5/19/1969	400	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu		
189	International Air Center	9Q-CAT	DC-6 C54D	598	12/11/1977	72-42618	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu		
452	ONATRA	9Q-CAT	C404 TITAN	615	6/28/1978	404-0112	N'djili/Kin			
53	IAC	9Q-CAU	DC 6 C54D	605	2/28/1978	42-72625	N'djili/Kin	Radié		
120	Aero Technique Service	9Q-CAU	Caravelle SE210	793	9/6/1984	-	N'djili/Kin			
261	M.A.F	9Q-CAU	Cessna Caravan 208	828	10/30/1985	208-00010	N'djili/Kin	Radié		
210	IAC	9Q-CAV	DC4 C-54 G	601	12/16/1977	45-586	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu		
166	SHABAIR	9Q-CAV	B727-100	912	3/13/1992	18967	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu		
353	MIDDLELAND/TRACEP	9Q-CAW	AN-26	1117	10/8/2004	2206	Buzembo			24.000kgs
38	MIDDLELAND/TRACEP	9Q-CAX	AN-28	1101	5/20/2004	1A100208	Bukavu	1/22/2008	A. Apte	6.500kgs
76	Air Trans Inc	9Q-CAV	AN-2	1138	5/2/2005	1G18557	N'djili/Kin			5.500kgs
196	CETRACA	9Q-CAZ	LET 410 UVP	1090	12/30/2003	790205	Beni-Waqeni	2/9/2009	A. Apte	5.800kgs
212	Nv Transami	9Q-CAZ	Mitsubishi MU-2B-35J	889		586	N'djili/Kin	Radié		
178	Business	9Q-CBA	Nord 262	1145	10/13/2005	57	N'dolo/Kin	Déclassé		
181	Helmut Moszkowicz	9Q-CBB	Cessna 182P	873	11/14/1988	182-61379	N'djili/Kin			
40	JP BEMBA	9Q-CBC	HS125-600	1102	7/23/2004	24258	N'djili/Kin	6/19/2007	AOG	25.500kgs
213	Scibe Airift	9Q-CBD	F27 MK 500	841	7/14/1986	10687	N'djili/Kin	Radié		

183	C.A.A	SQ-CBD	Gulfstream	926	5/29/1993	35	N'djili/Kin	Radié			
182	C.A.A	SQ-CBD	DC-9-819(MD81)	1139	6/18/2005		N'djili/Kin	1/13/2008	AOG	64.540kg	
184	Lufthair	SQ-CBE	Cessna 206	830	6/12/1985	U29606585	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu		1.640kg	
214	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBE	F27 Mk 400	835	7/14/1986	10655	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu			
168	JB BEMBA	SQ-CBF	8727-100	1110	8/19/2004	19139	N'djili/Kin	6/22/2007	AOG	72.955kg	
302	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBG	8727-30	803	11/29/1984	18367	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu			
185	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBH	F27 Mk 400	840	7/14/1986	10649	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu			
191	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBI	F27 Mk	848	1/14/1987	10425	N'djili/Kin	Radié			
176	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBL	Partenavia	620	9/28/1978	131	Bukavu	Radié			
24	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBL	Boeing 707-321	835	3/29/1986	19266	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu			
217	COZA airways	SQ-CBM	MI-8PS-11	1097	3/19/2004	9960	N'djili/Kin	Déclassé			
22	Défense Nationale	SQ-CBM	AN-26	Provisoire			N'djili/Kin			24.000kg	
211	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBN	DHC-6	695	1/19/1981	513	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu			
334	TMK	SQ-CBO	DHC-6-300	886		735	Goma	Etat inconnu			
215	TMK	SQ-CBP	F27 Mk 600	961	11/30/1994	10401	Goma	Radié			
186	Kin-Airways	SQ-CBP	Boeing A/C	6051A	9/13/2002	21328		Etat inconnu			
540	Central Air Express	SQ-CBP	Cessna 206	1131	8/28/2006	U296-02660	Kisangani/Bangui	4/3/2007	AOG	1.640kg	
231	Doren Air Congo	SQ-CBQ	LET 410 UVP	1141	11/12/2005	85138	Goma	11/9/2006	AOG	5.800kg	
187	Pax de Garamba	SQ-CBR	Cessna S.206	815	5/17/1985	6821	Goma	Radié			
188	FREE AIRLINES	SQ-CBR	LET 410 UVP-E	1045	7/7/2000	851435V	N'djili/Kin		AOG	6.400kg	
173		SQ-CBR	LET 410 UVP	1045			Kananga				
492	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBS	B707-329C	813	5/17/1985	20.200	N'djili/Kin	Radié			
283	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBS	Challenger CL601	870	9/16/1988	9018	N'djili/Kin	Radié			
229	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBS	Challenger CL600	899	1/18/1991	9061	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu			
240	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBT	8727	778	10/13/1983	727-89	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu			
114	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBU	F27 Mk	849	1/14/1987	10459	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu			
508	Comac	SQ-CBV	Beech Bonanza	505	2/1/1971	E 11	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu			
348	Scbe Airfr	SQ-CBW	B707-329C	869	8/26/1988	20200	N'djili/Kin				
444	COZA airways	SQ-CBW	B707-329C	869	6/26/2004	20200	N'djili/Kin				
79	C.A.A	SQ-CBY	Q159	940	1/14/1994	33	N'djili/Kin				
131	Aéro Club	SQ-CBZ	C-150				Luano/L'ahi				
393	BOSS MINING	SQ-CCA	FALCON 10	1169	6/28/2006	150	Likasi	7/31/2008	A. Apte	18.700kg	
390	TRAFMAN CHRSE	SQ-CCB	Cessna 402	772	11/5/1985	E 120	N'djili/Kin				
541	Méthodiste	SQ-CCC	Cessna 210	609	6/5/1978	62.052	Luano/L'ahi				
193	Gula Air	SQ-CCD	Nord 2501	920	5/9/1992	135	N'djili/Kin				
418	M.A.F	SQ-CCF	C208	1128	2/22/2005		N'djili/Kin	1/19/2008	AOG	3.638kg	
391	BOSS MINING	SQ-CCF	Beech B200	1170	6/28/2006	88934	Luano/L'ahi	9/25/2008	A. Apte	12.500kg	
63	José Luis Pombo Rodriguez	SQ-CCH	Pitts S-2B	882	8/9/1989	5145	N'djili/Kin				
241	Jetair	SQ-CCJ	P 68 B				N'djili/Kin				
238		SQ-CCJ	P 68 B				Kananga				
106	J.R. LUNGUMBU	SQ-CCX	Cessna 402B	1025	5/15/1998	402 B 0304	N'djili/Kin	Mutalon	A. Apte		
372	Liberty/Malu	SQ-CCX	Cessna/58210-11R	1030	12/5/1998	240	N'djili/Kin				
254	Jetair	SQ-CCL	Cessna 206	999	11/14/1994	P 2060156	Tshikapa				
262	COMAIR	SQ-CCM	AN-28	1134	5/3/2005	IA010-04	Goma	11/23/2007	AOG	6.500kg	
517	Aéro Club	SQ-CCP	Cessna 150 K	602	2/2/1978	150.571	Likasi				
291	ACS	SQ-CCR	Nord 262	907	7/19/1991	MSN	N'djili/Kin				
404	Suzanne Kuvu Nsonge	SQ-CCS	CT 188 C	1136	5/11/2005	T 188028115	Kuvu Nsonge	6/4/2008	AOG	4.400kg	
409	I.T.A.B	SQ-CCS	Cessna 206				Luano/L'ahi			1.640kg	
462	Arc - En - Ciel	SQ-CCT	Cessna TU 206	714	8/4/2004	U296-0872	Kuvu Nsonge				

458	Air Kasai	9Q-OCT	Cessna 205			NIL	N'djili/Kin			
242	TSA	9Q-CCV	Electra L-188A	936	9/13/1993	1126	N'djili/Kin			
295	CBBU/ECZ	9Q-CCW	Cessna 175 A	827	10/22/1985	56728	-			
309	Kivu Air	9Q-CCX	Piper PA 30	1105	8/5/2004	30308	Goma			
469	Kivu Air	9Q-CCX	DHC - 6-300				Goma			
294	National Trading Company	9Q-CDA	Short Skyvan	801	10/23/1984	SH 1903	Bukavu			
519	Nipetaya Kambele	9Q-CDB	Partenavia	619	8/24/1978	127	Luano/L'shi			
268	Aéro Club	9Q-CDC	Cessna F 150 K	608	4/26/1978	150-0571	L'kaai			
269	Prési Congo	9Q-CDC	B727	1617	12/23/1997	18934	N'djili/Kin		AOG	
100	CMZ	9Q-CDC	Cessna 182	542						
417	Duchene Patrice	9Q-CDD	Cessna 205	624	7/11/1978	U02604234	Luano/L'shi			
139	Cocora Zaïre	9Q-CDE	Cessna 337	-	-	21	N'djili/Kin			
270	V.A.C.	9Q-CDF	Cessna 402B	-	-	510	Goma			
301	Blue Airlines	9Q-CDG	Electra L-188A	935	8/9/1993	1119	N'djili/Kin			
271	L.T.A.B.	9Q-CDH	Nord 262	1140	7/28/2005	36	Luano/L'shi	4/29/2008	AOG	10.850kgs
216	Lars & Ake Jansson	9Q-CDI	Cessna 310 Q	607	4/5/1978	310-07335	N'djili/Kin			
161	Blue Airlines	9Q-CDE	Electra L-188A	934	8/28/1993	1037	N'djili/Kin		Declassé	
21	Gomair	9Q-CDI	B727	923	1/7/1993	20424	N'djili/Kin	10/30/2008	A. Apte	76.894kgs
273	DANGER Zaïre	9Q-CDK	Cessna 404 Titan	618	8/22/1978	404-0607	N'djili/Kin			
66	Blue Airlines	9Q-CDK	Electra L-188A	942	3/1/1994	1024	N'djili/Kin			
119	Blue Airlines	9Q-CDL	Electra L-188A	943	3/1/1994	1093	N'djili/Kin			
75	Sicora Zaïre	9Q-CDM	DC-8-54F	808	1/2/1985	45685	N'djili/Kin	Radé		
314	Blue Airlines	9Q-CDM	B727	909	1/18/1992	18919	N'djili/Kin	AOG/Goma		
327	Filair	9Q-CDV	JET 410 UVP-E	1163	4/20/2006	902422	N'djili/Kin	12/18/2008	A. Apte	6.400kgs
69	L.T.A.B.	9Q-CDG	C-185	550	1/7/1975	2502	Luano/L'shi			
243	BRAVO AIR CONGO	9Q-CDD	DC-9-32	1181	9/29/2006	48123	N'djili/Kin	12/11/2007	AOG	49.090kgs
87	L.T.A.B.	9Q-CDP	JET 410 UVP-E	1069	4/23/2003	902819	Luano/L'shi	4/5/2009	A. Apte	6.400kgs
438	Imena de	9Q-CDQ	Glastar	1096	3/19/2004	5413	Goma			
309	Congo Safari/Elyma	9Q-CDR	Cessna 205	574	8/16/1976	U02603220	Luano/L'shi	7/12/2008	AOG	1.636kgs
9	Fonshi Aviation Service	9Q-CDR	Cessna S 210	887	1/26/1990	254	N'djili/Kin			
394	Aéro Club	9Q-CDS	C-150				Luano/L'shi			
398	BRAVO AIR CONGO	9Q-CDT	DC-9-32	1182	9/29/2006	48128	N'djili/Kin	12/11/2007	AOG	49.090kgs
406	Dépense de Dundu Dénoué	9Q-CDV	Cessna 205	1151	11/9/2005	U026-1868	Dundo/Prov. Orient.	3/16/2008	AOG	1.640kgs
407	Maly Aviation	9Q-CDV	PA 68 P	684	-	207	N'djili/Kin			
408	TRAPMAN CHRIS	9Q-CDW	PA 31-350	547						
409	L.T.A.B.	9Q-CDV	BAC-1-11	1100	4/2/2004	261	Luano/L'shi	7/31/2006	AOG	
312	C.A.A	9Q-CDV							AOG	
323	Kin-Airways	9Q-CDZ	B727-200	0047 A	7/18/2002	21179	N'djili/Kin			
127	LAC	9Q-CEA	PA 38	729	-	79 A0976	N'djili/Kin			
198	LAC	9Q-CEB	PA 38	730	-	79 A1142	N'djili/Kin			
494	LAC	9Q-CEC	PA 38	731	-	79 A 1170	N'djili/Kin			
316	LAC	9Q-CED	PA 38	732	-	79 A 1166	N'djili/Kin			
130	ECZ	9Q-CEE	Cessna U 206 G	613	5/22/1978	3699	Bukavu			
197	Filair	9Q-CEP	AN-26	-	-	10410	N'djili/Kin			
126	KIN-AVIA	9Q-CEG	JET 410 UVP	1106	8/5/2004	912607	N'djili/Kin	3/17/2009	A. Apte	5.400kgs
128	Chabair	9Q-CEH	BAC 1-11	901	2/5/1991	57	Luano/L'shi	Radé		
60	STERNAE	9Q-CEI	AN-2	1066	2/18/2003	10 13244	Tshikapa			5.500kgs
230	ERIC DISTAVE	9Q-CEI	JET 410 UVP	1177	9/8/2006	851415	N'djili/Kin			5.800kgs
416	Air Tropiques	9Q-CEJ	BEECH1900	1062	10/3/2002	UR-74	N'djili/Kin	3/13/2009	A. Apte	7.545kgs

116	C.A.A	9Q-CEJ	Conair 590	939	11/13/2004	79	N'djili/Kin	3/23/2009	A, Apte	
276	TMK	9Q-CEL	DHC-6-300	1160	2/24/2006	719	Goma	9/13/2008	A, Apte	5,800kgs
454	Air Tropiques	9Q-CEM	Beech A 100 King Air	1055	10/12/2001	8-105	N'djili/Kin	3/21/2009	A, Apte	
335	Adala Airways	9Q-CEN	AV-12	1056	10/22/2001	83454100	N'djili/Kin	Radié le18/11/05		
249	KIN-AVIA	9Q-CEN	LET 410 UVP-E	1152	12/29/2005	892325	N'djili/Kin	3/8/2009	A, Apte	6,400kgs
44	LANCAS	9Q-CEN	PA 1B	639			N'djili/Kin			
2	Air Tropiques	9Q-CEQ	LET 410 UVP	1121	12/20/2004	820837	N'djili/Kin	3/24/2009	A, Apte	5,700kgs
71	Mme Yvonne Munshi	9Q-CEP	PA 105	640	5/29/1979	22-9648	N'djili/Kin			
292	Business Aviation	9Q-CEP	Piper				N'djili/Kin			
107	Aerofin RSA	9Q-CER	AV-12	1113	9/17/2004	2340805	Beni-Wazeni			
67	FREE AIRLINES	9Q-CET	LET 410 UVP	0116 A	8/8/2005	831023	N'djili/Kin			5,800kgs
290	FREE AIRLINES	9Q-CEU	LET 410 UVP	1132	4/15/2005	841217	N'djili/Kin	7/8/2007	AOG	5,800kgs
491	FREE AIRLINES	9Q-CEV	PA 31	1143	10/6/2005	31469	N'djili/Kin	5/2/2006	AOG	
255	Jetair	9Q-CEZ	PA 68 B	817	6/26/1985	163	N'djili/Kin			
30	Air Kasai	9Q-CFA	LET 410 UVP-E	1206	6/28/2007	871921	N'djili/Kin	12/25/2008	A, Apte	
490	Air Kasai	9Q-CFA	LET 410 UVP-E			871921	N'djili/Kin	12/27/2007	AOG	6,400kgs
145	Flair	9Q-CFB	AV-26	1053	4/24/2001	12909	N'djili/Kin	12/10/2007	AOG	24,000kgs
340	Sotacoo	9Q-CFC	Cessna stationair	617	7/28/1978	207-90434	N'djili/Kin			
135	Carlos Ferreira/Sotacoo	9Q-CFC	Piper PA 31	911	1/20/1992	31-730 5082	N'djili/Kin			
96	Air Kasai	9Q-CFD	AV-26	1073	7/11/2003	12901	N'djili/Kin		Declassé	24,000kgs
374	Saficas	9Q-CFE	King Air 200	686	9/15/1990	88722	N'djili/Kin			
375	ROBERT FERNANDES	9Q-CFE	AV-12	1173	7/8/2006	1612031	Kananga	1/27/2007	AOG	
447	Air Kasai	9Q-CFG	LET 410 UVP		00/10/2007		N'djili/Kin	11/7/2008	A, Apte	6,400kgs
498	Air Kasai	9Q-CHN	AV-2	1194	1/26/2007	1613735	Tshikapa	10/28/2008	A, Apte	5,500kgs
143	Gécamines	9Q-CFI	Jetstream 31	896	6/12/1990	852	Luano/L'shi			
147	I.T.A.B.	9Q-CFJ	Beech 95-C55	852	12/4/1996	7E-499	Luano/L'shi			
260	I.T.A.B.	9Q-CFK	HS125	1201	4/13/2007	256051	Luano/L'shi	12/16/2008	A, Apte	11,340 Kgs
296	I.T.A.B.	9Q-CFL	BE 55	1201	4/13/2007	256051	Luano/L'shi			
244	MBA	9Q-CFK	Merlin IV	855	10/13/1987	AT 423	Mbuji-Mayi			
256	SWALA	9Q-CFK	C 401 A	1095	3/17/2004	401A-0129	Bukavu			
81	Kayunga Air Transport	9Q-CFL	Beech Baron 55	969	1/16/1995	TC-363	N'djili/Kin			
90	Air Kasai	9Q-CFL	AV-26	71	1/14/2004	10003	N'djili/Kin	11/2/2008	A, Apte	24,000kgs
65	Air Kasai	9Q-CFL	AV-26	1091	2/7/2004	14903	N'djili/Kin			
111	Air Kasai	9Q-CFM	AV-26	1148	11/7/2005	10405	N'djili/Kin	11/21/2008	A, Apte	24,000kgs
257	Aéris Club	9Q-CFN	Cessna 150	727	-	150-76154	Luano/L'shi			
328	Air Kasai	9Q-CFO	AV-2	1111	8/31/2004	2622437	Tshikapa			5,500kgs
329	Air Kasai	9Q-CFP	AV-26	1127	2/24/2005	10605	N'djili/Kin	3/3/2009	A, Apte	24,000kgs
330	African Air Service Commuter	9Q-CFQ	AV-26	1171	7/8/2006	1A0008-05	Bukavu	12/8/2007	AOG	24,000kgs
51	Fernandes Robert	9Q-CFR	AV-2	1188	10/23/2006	108544	Kananga	2/13/2008	AOG	5,500kgs
104	Air Kasai	9Q-CFS	AV-2	1164	4/27/2006	3020129	Tshikapa	3/9/2009	A, Apte	5,500kgs
341	Fontshi Aviation Service	9Q-CFT	B720	888	1/26/1990	18043	N'djili/Kin			
448	Air Kasai	9Q-CFT	AV-2	1089	12/30/2003	1G-22314	Tshikapa		A, Apte	5,500kgs
66	Fontshi Aviation Service	9Q-CFT	B720	876	-	18043	N'djili/Kin			
41	Fontshi Aviation Service	9Q-CFT	B720				Mbuji-Mayi			
349	Air Kasai	9Q-CFU	AV-2	1190		1613749	Tshikapa	3/26/2009	A, Apte	5,500kgs
347	Air Kasai	9Q-CFU	AV-2	1196		1613749	Tshikapa	10/12/2007	AOG	5,500kgs
470	MBA	9Q-CFV	Metco TC 202	506	1/28/1971	5A 226 TC	Mbuji-Mayi			
476	Gécamines	9Q-CFV	HS 125-600	563	5/13/1975	256031	Luano/L'shi			
518	African Air Service Commuter	9Q-CFV	AV-28	1172	7/8/2006	1A0006-3	Bukavu	12/8/2007	AOG	6,500kgs

110	Missionnaires d'Afrique	SQ-CFZ	Partenavia P68B	694	2/7/2002	202	Bukavu	6/22/2007	AOG	
520	Gulla Air	SQ-CGA	Viscount 744	937	1993	41	N'djili/Kin			
542	GUILA - AIR	SQ-CGA	VISCOUNT 806				Tshikapa			
155	RDC	SQ-CGC	B707-327C	1037	9/28/1999	19531	N'djili/Kin			
338	Prel Congo	SQ-CGC	B707				N'djili/Kin		AOG	
293	TSA	SQ-CGD	Electra L-188C	941	1/24/1994	1139	N'djili/Kin			
396	Forrest	SQ-CGF	HS 125-600	563	11/15/2000	256031	Luano/L'sh	7/27/2008	A. Apte	
19	Forrest	SQ-CGF	HS 125-600	563	11/15/2000	256031	Luano/L'sh	3/9/2009	A. Apte	
467		SQ-CGG	KA - 26 Hélicoptère	0123A	9/26/2005	7605414	Kameva			
543	V.A.C	SQ-CGH	AN-26	0147A	6/3/2006	083450	Rutshuru			24.000kgs
39	Gecamines	SQ-CGK	Mystère Falcon 50	874	11/26/1988	177	Luano/L'sh			
227	Mango Airlines	SQ-CGM	AN-26	1207	6/5/2006	6401	Beni-Wageni	12/10/2008	A. Apte	24.000kgs
297	Christopher Tracman	SQ-CGN	Piper Aztec PA22-150	833	3/15/1986	27-73-05146	N'djili/Kin			
329	Eidro Graca de Souza	SQ-CGO	B707-321F	879	2/19/1989	17602	N'djili/Kin			
354		SQ-CGP	Piper	-	-	187239				
	ORIENT STAR	SQ-CGP	B727-100	0051 A	13 09 02	21320	N'djili/Kin			
346	O.L.B.C.	SQ-CGQ	AN-12	1103	8/39/2004	4341801	Goma	11/6/2007	AOG	
456	Kamov	SQ-CGR	KA - 26	0121A	9/26/2005	7505119		Radié le 26/09/05		
	Congocom	SQ-CGS	PA 22-256	1014	6/21/1997	27-7334042	Goma			
414	Gecamines	SQ-COT	Hélicoptère Alouette	-	-	1540	Luano/L'sh			
233	HEROS CONGO	SQ-CGU	KAMOV 26	1166	4/29/2006	7705918	Luano/L'sh			
483	Mr Rev. Beasley	SQ-CGV	Piper Triquest PA-22	818	7/12/1986	22-7112	N'djili/Kin			
296	GRAN. PROPELLER	SQ-CGV	IL 76TD	1062	11/6/2003	333449441	Goma			
70	LAC/Erig Transworld	SQ-CGW	B737	0168A	2/21/2007	19594	N'djili/Kin		AOG	
356	GOMASR	SQ-CGW	B 737-210	1221	6/19/2008	19594	N'djili/Kin	12/13/2008	A. Apte	117.000lbs
449	A. Goetz	SQ-CGX	LET 410 UVP	-	-	851402				5.900kgs
74	Com. Des Eclises Chrét.	SQ-CGY	Piper Aztec PA22-250	-	-	27-7754072	N'djili/Kin			
357	Service Air	SQ-CGZ	DC 6	-	-		N'djili/Kin			
78	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHA	Tristar L1011-190	Provisoire	12/1/2000	1227	N'djili/Kin		AOG	
506	MIBA	SQ-CHB	UAM Safari	910	1/29/1992	sans référence	Mbutima			
32	C.A.A	SQ-CHC	IL 18	1049	10/19/2000	180002003	N'djili/Kin	12/11/2007	AOG	62.300kg
132	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHC	TRISTAR	1061	8/16/2002	193H-1200	N'djili/Kin	1/3/2008	AOG	510.000kgs
376	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHC	TRISTAR	1061	8/16/2002	193H-1200	N'djili/Kin		AOG	
117	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHD	B727	1076	12/26/2003	22494	N'djili/Kin	1/17/2008	AOG	83.727kgs
377	TMK	SQ-CHÉ	King Air 90	856	2/1/1988	LJ 969	Goma			
358	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHÉ	B727-232	1142	9/1/2005	21310	N'djili/Kin	11/22/2008	A. Apte	191.000lbs
382	I.T.A.B.	SQ-CHF	Augusta	Provisoire	9/8/2000	7410	Luano/L'sh			
378	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHF	B727-227	1075	7/25/2003	22677	N'djili/Kin	10/9/2008	A. Apte	84.100kgs
88	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHG	B727-100	0085A	9/1/2004	19389	N'djili/Kin			
379	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHG	B727-232	254	1/7/2006	21586	N'djili/Kin	8/5/2008	A. Apte	185.200lbs
134	I.T.A.B.	SQ-CHH	Alouette II 3110	1080	6/8/2003	1603	Luano/L'sh			
194	IBA	SQ-CHI	DC-4	622	11/7/1978	52026	N'djili/Kin			
136	I.T.A.B.	SQ-CHJ	Alouette	Provisoire	6/8/2000	1355	Luano/L'sh			
35	I.T.A.B.	SQ-CHJ	Alouette	Provisoire	6/8/2000	1360	Luano/L'sh			
464	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHK	B727-100	1140	9/1/2004	19401	N'djili/Kin	2/12/2009	A. Apte	
465	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHL	DCB-55F	0176A	7/11/2007	45820	N'djili/Kin	10/15/2008	A. Apte	147.727kgs
477	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHM	DCB-55F	0177A	7/12/2007	45764	N'djili/Kin	10/28/2008	A. Apte	
442	Hevia Bora	SQ-CHN	DC9-54F	0178A	7/11/2007	47731	N'djili/Kin	LP	Declassé	
277	ONATRA	SQ-CHP	Cessna 404	615	6/28/1978	404-0112	N'djili/Kin			

420	Kiva Air	9Q-CHP	CASA 212-20	1104	8/3/2004	263	Goma	4/5/2007	AOG	15,976lbs
521	ONATRA	9Q-CHP	Cessna 404	-	-	404-0112	N'djili/Kin			
154	Rovair	9Q-CHR	AN-2	1019	1/20/1990	11347308	N'djili/Kin			5,500kgs
205	Mecstaric	9Q-CHV	Pictavia/4	711	-	208	Luano/L'shi			
206	M Forrest	9Q-CHW	PA 23-230	493	11/29/1964	27-4391	Luano/L'shi			
275	Business Cash Flow	9Q-CHV	Britania	804	1/30/1985	13431	N'djili/Kin			
355	V.A.C	9Q-CIA					Goma			
163	C.A.A	9Q-CIB	AN-26	1016	11/28/1997	1701	N'djili/Kin		Declassé	24,000kgs
383	C.A.A	9Q-CIB	AN-26	1114	10/24/2004	12701	N'djili/Kin			24,000kgs
43	C.A.A	9Q-CIB	MO82-	1220	6/7/2008	49294	N'djili/Kin	12/5/2008	A. Apte	149,500kgs
322	Bulco	9Q-CII	KA - 26 (Hélic)	1165	4/29/2005	7605413	Luano/L'shi			
218	HEROS CONGO	9Q-CII	HELICO KA-26	1165	4/29/2005	7605413	Luano/L'shi		AOG	
486	Business Aviation	9Q-CIM	LET 410 UVP-E	1036	7/11/2003	830935	N'djili/Kin	Cédé		6,400kgs
250	Cargo Bull /SOMMERAUER	9Q-CIM	LET 410 UVP	1030	7/11/2003	830935	N'djili/Kin	7/7/2007	AOG	6,000kg
62	ICCN/VAC	9Q-CIN	ISLANDER B-12	6599	9/12/1977	0746	N'djili/Kin		A. Apte	
479	V.A.C	9Q-CIN	ISLANDER	599	8/29/2003	0746	N'djili/Kin			
455	V.A.C	9Q-CIO	Cessna 205	606	3/16/1978	2050118	Bukavu	Rad4		
77	Aerofit RSA	9Q-CIP	AN-32	1107	8/14/2004	2206	Goma			27,250kgs
287	SNEL	9Q-CIU	Hélic Bell 206	-	-	1579	N'djili/Kin			
245	SAFE AIR COMPANY	9Q-CIV	LET 410 UVP	1158	1/6/2006	831020	Goma	11/18/2008	A. Apte	5,800kgs
311	Monsieur Lars Johanson	9Q-CJA	Islander B02A	605	11/14/1984	B02A-21-996	N'djili/Kin			
503	C.A.A	9Q-CJB	Gouman 159	928	5/5/1993	155	N'djili/Kin			
224	C.A.A	9Q-CJB	AN-26	1032	12/11/1998	8002	N'djili/Kin			24,000kgs
201	C.A.A	9Q-CJB	DC-9-819(M081)	1159	1/19/2006	48016	N'djili/Kin	1/17/2008	AOG	142,000kgs
512	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJC	DC-8-55F	75	5/18/2004	45821	N'djili/Kin		A. Apte	
85	Aéro Club	9Q-CJC	PA 22	-	-	-	Kananga			
496	Sifozal	9Q-CJD	DHC-6	738	12/29/1992	300-97	Makulu	Rad4 le 16/11/03		
	Hewa Bora	9Q-CJD	B767-200	0163A	1/12/2007	23178	N'djili/Kin	3/17/2009	A. Apte	
162	TAC	9Q-CJE	DC-6	-	-	45329	N'djili/Kin	2/2/2009	A. Apte	
421	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJG	DC8-63F	1208	7/23/2007	46110	N'djili/Kin	7/28/2008	A. Apte	156,730kgs
219	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJH	Britania 253	946	4/21/1994	13568	N'djili/Kin			
133	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJH	DC8-63F	1222	6/14/2008	46023	N'djili/Kin	12/13/2008	A. Apte	151,916kgs
460	Succes Airlines / Stair	9Q-CJI	AN-26	1048	7/24/2000	6004	N'djili/Kin		Declassé	24,000kgs
312	I.T.A.B.	9Q-CJJ	DC-3	1072	1/22/2004	42-24248	Luano/L'shi	AOG/L'SHE		
359	M.A.F	9Q-CJK	Cessna 185	905	7/11/1991	18502948	N'djili/Kin			
388	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJL	DC-4	947	4/21/1994	1009	N'djili/Kin	Rad4		
388	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJL	DC-8-63	1175	8/25/2006	45969	N'djili/Kin	10/13/2008	A. Apte	160,450kgs
314	New ACS	9Q-CJM	B707	950	6/17/1994	19044	N'djili/Kin			
251	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJP	DC-6A	995	9/27/1996	44645	N'djili/Kin			
315	Hewa Bora	9Q-CJQ	DC-6A	980	5/5/1995	45373	N'djili/Kin			
239	Jansson Aka	9Q-CJR	Piper	890-bis	-	448095098	N'djili/Kin			
316	Air Kasai	9Q-CJS	Cessna 182	868	8/26/1988	182-99962	N'djili/Kin			
262	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJT	B707-123B	988	10/3/1995	19335	N'djili/Kin			
323	Aerofit RSA	9Q-CJU	AN-32	1085	12/8/2003	1408	Goma			27,250kgs
	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJV	F27	1112	9/8/2004	10430	N'djili/Kin			
505	ACS	9Q-CJW	B707-321F	900	3/11/1991	17602	N'djili/Kin			
360	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CJX	DC-6B	985	7/18/1995	45201	N'djili/Kin			
36	Archidiocèse de Kananga	9Q-CJZ	Cessna 180H	527	10/16/1972	18052171	Kananga			
37	V.A.C	9Q-CJZ	C-172				Goma			



445	TAZ	9Q-OXA	DC-3	681	8/25/1981	42104850	N'djili/Kin			
125	KIN AVIA	9Q-OXA	12	1230	10/6/2008	861722	N'djili/Kin	2/5/2009	A. Apte	6,400 kgs
313	Heva Bora	9Q-OXB	B707-366C	1009	3/17/1997	20761	N'djili/Kin			
222	M.A.F	9Q-OXC	C208	1138	4/24/2005	20888829	N'djili/Kin	5/14/2007	AOG	4,000kgs
361	COMAR	9Q-OXC	AN-28	1135	5/3/2005	1A7009-18	Goma	5/20/2007	AOG	6,500kgs
362	Methodistes	9Q-OXE	Cessna 206	893 (0541)	1990	21064060	Luana/Shaba			
419	Egitro	9Q-OXF	Aerocommander	-	-	-				
342	Suairé Kivulu Ngongo	9Q-OKG	Cessna 188	739	5/25/1982	18003593	Kivulu Ngongo	Rad4 le 11/05/05		
20	Heva Bora	9Q-OKG	B707-336C	987	10/20/1995	19844	N'djili/Kin			
363	Lct Floriz et Succésia G	9Q-OD1	DC-8-55F	809	12/18/1984	45682	N'djili/Kin			
352	Heva Bora	9Q-OD1	BAC 1-11	966	12/15/1994	177	N'djili/Kin			
364	Gilat Vicent	9Q-OD3	Beech Muskaber K90	821	8/10/1985	M 2104	Kananga			
544	Trans Service Airlift	9Q-ODK	Viscount 782	861	6/8/1988	298	Luana/L'shi			
45	HBA	9Q-ODK	B707-300	948	4/26/1994	20761	N'djili/Kin			
350	Heva Bora	9Q-ODK	B707-366C	948	4/26/1994	20761	N'djili/Kin			
331	Heva Bora	9Q-ODK	B707-320C	1008	3/17/1997	19877	N'djili/Kin			
510	Heva Bora	9Q-ODK	B707	1009	4/5/2000	20761	N'djili/Kin	10/15/2006	AOG	
321	M.A.F	9Q-OXL	Cessna 206	722	10/3/1978	U 206 06373	N'djili/Kin	8/9/2007	AOG	1,640kgs
84	Footair Aviation Service	9Q-ODM	Beech Knapair B90	816	5/15/1983	LJ 402	N'djili/Kin			
118	Gulla Air	9Q-ODO	Nord 2501	892	3/17/1990	169	N'djili/Kin			
365		9Q-ODO	NORD ATLAS				N'djili/Kin			
399	Express City	9Q-ODP	BAC 1-11	863	12/5/1994	191	N'djili/Kin			
485	CETRACA	9Q-ODQ	AN-26	1093	3/3/2004	5210	Beni-Wageni	12/4/2008	A. Apte	24,000kgs
489	Heva Bora	9Q-ODR	B707-	1094	6/21/2002	19411	N'djili/Kin	4/5/2009	A. Apte	120,412kgs
303	Heva Bora	9Q-ODR	B707-351C	1074	4/26/2005	19411				
366	SOMIC-Zaire	9Q-ODS	Beechcraft	822	8/10/1985	M-1914	N'djili/Kin			
121	Sisotra Zaire	9Q-ODS	Beechcraft	858	3/18/1988	FA 110	N'djili/Kin			
326	Kin-Airways	9Q-ODS	B707-399 C	0053 A	10/29/2002	19415	N'djili/Kin			
490	Defense Nationale	9Q-ODT	AN-26	Provisoire	-	-	N'djili/Kin			24,000kgs
159	Fonseca	9Q-ODV	Panavia 588	738	-	26	N'djili/Kin			
267	CETRACA	9Q-ODX	LET 410 UVP	1094	3/5/2004	790303	Beni-Wageni	8/19/2008	A. Apte	5,800kgs
208	SOMIC-Zaire	9Q-ODY	Beech C23K90	854	12/3/1987	M1914	-			
367	Heva Bora	9Q-ODY	BAC 1-11	964	12/5/1994	179	N'djili/Kin			
15	Heva Bora	9Q-ODZ	B737-293	1000	10/25/1996	19309	N'djili/Kin			
394	Heva Bora	9Q-ODZ	B737-293	1000	8/12/2002	19309	N'djili/Kin	AOG	AOG	
29	Beelen Henri et De Moura	9Q-ODZ	Beechcraft	823	-	LS 494	N'djili/Kin			
152	M.A.F	9Q-OLA	Cessna 210	-	-	-	Bangui	Rad4		
499	JP BEMBA	9Q-OLA	AN-26			3001	N'djili/Kin		AOG	24,000kgs
410	EWA	9Q-OLB	YAK-40	1174	7/18/2006	9231622	N'djili/Kin	1/17/2007	AOG	16,000kgs
368	GAP	9Q-OLD	Cessna 402B	908	11/3/1991	4621080	N'djili/Kin	12/2/2008	AOG	
259	Malu Aviation	9Q-OLD	Short Skyvan	1086	12/11/2003	SH 1831	N'djili/Kin	12/2/2008	A. Apte	5,5700kgs
457	SWAIA	9Q-OLD	SC7 SKY VAN	1086	12/11/2003	SH 1831	N'djili/Kin			Vendu
94	LAC	9Q-OLG	DC-8-63CF	503	11/21/1970	540	N'djili/Kin			
203	Heva Bora	9Q-OLI	DC-10	875	12/19/1988	47886	N'djili/Kin			
189	Air Kasai	9Q-OLJ	AN-2	949	4/22/1994	1052-20	N'djili/Kin			5,300kgs
234	Mzee Laurent Désiré Kabila	9Q-OLK	B720	1027	5/28/1998	17702	N'djili/Kin		A. Apte	
206	I.T.A.B.	9Q-OLL	H5748	951	4/24/1995	15637	Luana/L'shi	Rad4		
57	I.T.A.B.	9Q-OLL	H5748-2A	1033	1/28/1999	1561	Luana/L'shi	4/24/2008	AOG	
289	Gulla Air	9Q-OLM	Nord 2501	899	3/18/1988	131	N'djili/Kin	Rad4		

298	A.T.O	SQ-CLM	DC4-C54D	990	5/15/1996	10644	N'djili/Kin			
179	Air Tropiques	SQ-CLN	F27	1070	10/21/2003	10152	N'djili/Kin	10/29/2007	AOG	19.068kgs
290	LAC	SQ-CLN	ATR 42	-	-	76	N'djili/Kin	Radio		
225	C.A.A	SQ-CLO	Cessna 206	821	12/20/1985	020603505	Lada			
253	Congolais	SQ-CLO	AN-24	997	-	9911010	N'djili/Kin			24.000kgs
481	MAROTE II	SQ-CLP	Cessna 172 BR	612	5/18/1978	1830585	N'djili/Kin	Etat inconnu		
411	C. Methodistes Unis	SQ-CLR	Cessna P-210-N	916	5/12/1992	821000410	Luena/Shaba	7/2/2005	A. Apte	
412	A.T.O	SQ-CLS	AN-32	Provisoire	-	2206	N'djili/Kin			27.250kgs
122	Air Creation	SQ-CLU	Ultra leger motorisé	871	11/14/1988	10	Mbuimayi			
228	Sankair	SQ-CLU	Conair 480/580	Provisoire	1/13/2001	11154	N'djili/Kin			
422	LAC	SQ-CLV	DC-8	-	-	-	N'djili/Kin			
11	LAC	SQ-CLV	DC-8				Goma			
252	M.A.F	SQ-CMA	Cessna U206	610	5/10/1978	020603962	N'djili/Kin	Radio le 27/04/04		
389	M.A.F	SQ-CMA	Cessna U206	-	-	020603962	Nairobi			
528	KIN-AVIA	SQ-CMA	LET 410 UVP-E			902515	N'djili/Kin	2/14/2009	A. Apte	
278	José de Moura	SQ-CMB	Cessna U206	623	2/15/1990	020604312	Luana/L'ahi	7/31/2005	AOG	
434	Walair	SQ-CMB	Caravelle SE 210	1065	12/17/1996	169	N'djili/Kin			
308	Africa One	SQ-CMC	AN-26				N'djili/Kin		Declassé	24.000kgs
311	JP BEMBA	SQ-CMC	B727-30	1200		18371	Portugal			
333	Business Cash Flow	SQ-CMD	B707-441	885	11/23/1969	18694	N'djili/Kin			
138	Malta Avifit	SQ-CMD	AN-32	1023	4/15/1990	2210	N'djili/Kin			27.250kgs
400	Dominique Chappelle	SQ-CMF	PA 18	-	-	121525	Europe			
423	E.G.M Forrest	SQ-CMF	Helico - Gazelle	1189	30/10/2006	24803 -1793	Luana/L'ahi			
424	Forrest	SQ-CMF	Helico							
475	O.L.B.C.	SQ-CMG	AN-32	1118	10/9/2004	3201	Goma	10/29/2008	Declassé	27.250kgs
439	M.A.F	SQ-CMG	Cessna 206	1119	2/22/2005	020606927	N'djili/Kin			1.640kgs
12	Kin-Airways	SQ-CMG	DC 8	0054 A	28.10.02	45683				
5	M.A.F	SQ-CMH	Cessna U206	802	12/1/1984	020605411	N'djili/Kin			
435	Projet Nord Shaba	SQ-CMI	Cessna U206	625	12/7/1978	020604159	-			
453	M.A.F	SQ-CMI	Cessna 206	862	5/19/1988	0206-05626	N'djili/Kin	8/19/2006	AOG	1.640kgs
395	Malu Aviation	SQ-CMI	Handover 780	998	-	1575	N'djili/Kin			
58	Missionnaires d'Afrique	SQ-CMK	Cessna 150A	791	9/22/1984	15000139	Niara			
425	Malta Avifit	SQ-CMK	AN-24	1023	3/28/2000	47309902	N'djili/Kin	5/23/2006	AOG	24.000kgs
16	Malta Avifit	SQ-CMK	AN-26	1039	-	-	N'djili/Kin			24.000kgs
144	M.A.F	SQ-CML	Cessna U206	806	11/29/1984	020604973	N'djili/Kin			
446	JP BEMBA	SQ-CML	AN-26	1096	3/19/2004	7488	N'djili/Kin		AOG	24.000kgs
545	E.C.Z/C.M.U	SQ-CMM	Cessna U206	894	8/16/1990	020604922	Luana/Shaba	10/29/2007	AOG	
223	MR IVES	SQ-CMM	ISLANDER	732	2/6/1997	814	Goma	9/10/2006	AOG	
89	Methodistes	SQ-CMN	Cessna 206	-	-	-	Nyamba Mounsy			
426	M.A.F	SQ-CMO	Cessna 206	906	7/11/1991	020603292	N'djili/Kin	Radio le 13/04/05		
80	M.A.F	SQ-CMO	Cessna 208B			020880829	N'djili/Kin	11/3/2008	A. Apte	
169		SQ-CMO	Caravelle SE210							
427	GOMAIR	SQ-CMP	B727-100	1144	10/13/2005	19892	N'djili/Kin	1/7/2009	A. Apte	82.082kgs
27	M.A.F	SQ-CMQ	Partenavia	611	3/11/1978	38	N'djili/Kin			
428	M.A.F	SQ-CMQ	Cessna T210	863	6/2/1988	64936	Vana	2/11/2008	AOG	
	ATS	SQ-CMR	Caravelle SE 210	829	7/11/1985	229	N'djili/Kin	détruit		
492	M.A.F	SQ-CMR	Cessna 206	1119	10/13/2004	0206-06927	N'djili/Kin		A. Apte	
221	M.A.F	SQ-CMR	Cessna 206	-	-	0206-02181	Semendua			
343	Malta Avifit	SQ-CMS	AN-26	1154	11/24/2005	4206	N'djili/Kin	12/13/2006	AOG	24.000kgs

429	Gemise	9Q-CMT	GA8	1214	11/22/2007	GA8-06-112	Kinshasa	12/16/2008	A. Apte	1,814 Kgs
246	SOZACA	9Q-CMU	HS748	-	-	-	Luano/L'ah			
401	M.A.F	9Q-CMV	Cessna TU-206G	926	3/11/1993	U20604565	N'djili/Kin	Radié le 08/09/05		
141	M.A.F	9Q-CMV	CTU-206G	906	3/11/1997	U20604565	N'djili/Kin			
304	GLOBAL AIRWAYS	9Q-CMV	AN-26	1109	8/16/2004	11506	Beni-Wageni			
180	Taxavia	9Q-CMX	Cessna 404	-	-	404-0415	N'djili/Kin			
497	Kin-Airways	9Q-CMX	B727-200	0056 A	29.10.02	31235				
332	Aéro Club	9Q-CMX					Kananga			
310	M.A.F	9Q-CMY	Cessna 206G	864	6/2/1988	U20603630	-	10/31/2008	A. Apte	
330	Fontehi Aviation Service	9Q-CMY	Caravelle 9E 210	878	-	254	N'djili/Kin			
380	Sun Air Service	9Q-CMZ	AN-28	1083	11/20/2003	A1005-17	Goma			
546	E.C.Z/C.M.Z	9Q-CNA	Cessna 172K	794	6/26/1984	1722175	Kananga			
49	Walair	9Q-CNA	BE210	1030	12/4/1990		N'djili/Kin		ADG	
351	Mr. Dreton J.C	9Q-CNA	Cessna 152-11	895	-	15280990		Etat Inconnu		
201	L.T.A.B.	9Q-CNB	Cessna 206	-	-	-	N'djili/Kin			
397	Guila Air	9Q-CNE	Nord 2501	919	9/9/1992	142	N'djili/Kin			
158		9Q-CNE	NORD ATLAS				N'djili/Kin			
369	M.A.F	9Q-CNF	Cessna 206	864	1/11/2002	U20603680	N'djili/Kin	10/9/2007	ADG	1,649Kgs
292	Kin Cargo	9Q-CNG	DC-3	621	7/11/1978	417856	N'djili/Kin			
413	C. Méthodistes Unis	9Q-CNG	Cessna TA-206G	917	9/12/1992	206005500	Luana/Shaba			
432	Baleka	9Q-CNI	B707	1070	6/13/2003	19369	N'djili/Kin	ADG		
443	LAC	9Q-CNK	B737	399	3/27/1975	20795	N'djili/Kin			
282	Heva Bora	9Q-CNK	B737	-	-	20795	N'djili/Kin			
430	Cdt Alain	9Q-CNV	Cessna 210	-	-	210-28290	N'djili/Kin			
206	Machado Mova	9Q-CNV	Aerocommander	811	3/1/1985	560F-1424-70	Luano/L'ah			
459	C. Presbytérienne	9Q-CNO	Cessna 185	-	-	1852694				
524	METHODISTE	9Q-CNO	C.172				Kananga			
156	M.A.F	9Q-CNU	Cessna T210R	731	4/29/1997	210-64981	Radié le 11/07/03			
61	Diocèse de Tshumbé	9Q-CNV	Cessna 206	-	-	336	Kananga			
493	NERA	9Q-CNZ	PA 23 Aztec	-	-	2-7754140	N'djili/Kin			
344	V.A.C	9Q-CNZ					N'djili/Kin			
97	SAFE AIR COMPANY	9Q-COA	LET 410 UVP	1205	6/23/2004	781116	Goma	06/06/2008	A. Apte	5,800kgs
326	MIDDLAND/TRACEP	9Q-COB	AN-72	1176	9/8/2006	365.720.20.258	Beni-Wageni	11/6/2007	ADG	24,800kgs
381	Spirit of Congo	9Q-COC					Dubai			
468	GLOBAL AIRWAYS	9Q-COD	VISCOUNT 802	1168	6/23/2006	170	N'djili/Kin		ADG	
264	OTRAG	9Q-COE	Argeev MK 1660	614	6/12/1978	6778	N'djili/Kin			
507	L.T.A.B.	9Q-COE	HS 7487 MF	1018	1/15/1998	28	Luano/L'ah			
313	L.T.A.B.	9Q-COE	Handover 780	1042	5/10/2000	7627	Luano/L'ah	Radié le 26/07/05	A. Apte	
157	L.T.A.B.	9Q-COE	GI-Gulfstream	1155	12/3/2005	156	Luano/L'ah	12/16/2008	A. Apte	15,921kgs
23	38ème C. Méthodiste	9Q-COF	Cessna U206F	986	10/1095	U20603268	Kananga	06/07/2008	A. Apte	1,727kgs
6	ELGYMA	9Q-COH	Cessna 206	574	-	NIL	Luano/L'ah			1,649kgs
345	TMK	9Q-COI	Cessna Caravane	832	8/2/1993	345	Goma			
478	ASF/Archidiocèse	9Q-COK	Cessna 206	1001	10/30/1996	206002307	Kiangari			
487	MIDDLAND/TRACEP	9Q-COL	AN-28	1149	10/28/2005	1A2003-09	Bukavu	11/17/2006	ADG	6,500kgs
547	MIDDLAND/TRACEP	9Q-COM	AN-28	1156	12/13/2005	1A2008-21	Bukavu	5/12/2006	ADG	6,500kgs
14	GLOBAL AIRWAYS	9Q-COO	VISCOUNT 806	1099	3/19/2004	302	N'djili/Kin		ADG	
32	Safel Air SRFIL	9Q-COO	Piper PA22-250 Aztec	832	2/3/1986	22-2462	N'djili/Kin			
209	SUDAVIATION/MALU	9Q-COO	HS 780C Andover	1071	6/13/2003	X5 612	N'djili/Kin	détruit		
394	SNEL	9Q-COP	PA 23-250	-	-	27-4836	N'djili/Kin			

300		SQ-COP	PA AZETEC								
304	MIDLAND/TRACIP	SQ-COR	AN-26	1157	12/27/2005	8602	Beni-Wageni	9/4/2006	AOG	24.000kgs	
305	SAM AIRLIFT	SQ-COS	AN-26	1186	10/17/2006	8807	N'djili/Kin	10/16/2007	AOG	24.000kgs	
471	INCK	SQ-COU	Cessna 206	762	9/5/1983	2366	N'djili/Kin				
436	CPC	SQ-CPA	Cessna 206	644	-	4903	Zambia	00/06/2009	A. Apte		
440	Défense Nationale	SQ-CPB	Fouga Magister	Provisoire	-	-	N'djili/Kin				
220	Défense Nationale	SQ-CPC	Fouga Magister	Provisoire	-	-	N'djili/Kin				
531	Prési Congo	SQ-CPE	HELICO ALLOUETTE			3180	N'djili/Kin				
548	Malu Airlift	SQ-CPG	AN-28	984	7/5/1995	1AM00412	N'djili/Kin			6.500kgs	
490	Malu Aviation	SQ-CPG	AN-28	984	2/9/1998	1AM00412	N'djili/Kin			6.500kgs	
549	CICET et HENIN	SQ-CPI	Cessna 152 II	636	10/23/1984	152-81278		Radié le 04/04/05			
590	Walair	SQ-CPI	SE210	1005	12/17/1996	163	N'djili/Kin		Déclassé		
91		SQ-CPI	Cessna 152								
307	MIBA	SQ-CPI	B727-22F	954	8/8/1994	19088	Mbuimayi			Déclassé	
223		SQ-CPK	DC-6/A								
472		SQ-CPK	DC-6								
551	Business Aviation	SQ-CPM	Nord 262A	1202	13-Apr	38	N'djili/Kin	10/28/2008	A. Apte	10.400kgs	
552	Domaine de Baikal	SQ-CPN	Cessna 182	-	-	180-4/480	N'djili/Kin				
553	Dioctés de Dumbo Dorsuma	SQ-CPQ	Cessna 206	819	7/22/1985	U20601995	Dumbo	Radié le 23/01/06			
317	Prési Congo	SQ-CPR	HS 125	1024		25247	N'djili/Kin		AOG		
554		SQ-CPR	HS 125-403B								
555		SQ-CPR	MISTER DA 20				Kisangani				
83		SQ-CPR	Morane								
556	Eni Ekif	SQ-CPS	Cessna 172J	1034	-	FR172-035	Kinshasa				
557		SQ-CPT	Islander								
558		SQ-CPV	Kingair 200								
559	Transair Cargo Service	SQ-CPW	HS 730C Andover	1002	12/21/2005	XS 607	N'djili/Kin	2/21/2008	AOG	47.600lbs	
560		SQ-CPW	HS740								
3		SQ-CPX	Britania								
4		SQ-COB	Cessna 206								
329		SQ-CQM	DC-6-53F								
561		SQ-COP	Merlin III								
562	ADEX /Central Air Express	SQ-COQ	PIPER AZTEC	1120	10/22/2004	27-7405459	Kisangani	5/20/2006	AOG		
148	Walair	SQ-COR	Caravelle SE 210	922	12/9/1992	183	N'djili/Kin				
563	ADEX /Central Air Express	SQ-COR	Cessna 206F	1131	4/9/2005	U206-02660	Kisangani	5/20/2006	AOG		
18		SQ-COS	CL-44								
564		SQ-COU	CL-44								
565		SQ-COU	CL-44								
495	Doran Air Congo	SQ-COZ	LET 410 WVP	1153	11/12/2005	851 339	Goma	11/21/2008	A. Apte	5.800kgs	
566	Malu Aviation	SQ-CRA	AN-28	1026	6/2/1998	1A3008-00	N'djili/Kin	10/12/2006	AOG	6.500kgs	
473		SQ-CRA	B707								
567		SQ-CRA	B727-146								
568	STEBHANE	SQ-CRB	AN-2	1067	2/18/2003	1G 13940	Ta'Niaga			5.500kgs	
437		SQ-CRC									
569	Prési Congo	SQ-CRD									
570		SQ-CROZ									
371		SQ-CSE									
129	Malta Forrest	SQ-CRF	Bech 100		4/24/1990	B-33	Luano/L'ah				
474		SQ-CRF									

572		SQ-CBG									
142		SQ-CRH									
112	KIN-AVIA	SQ-CRK	LET 410 UVP-E			872006	N'dolo/Kin		3/26/2009	A. Apte	6,400kgs
573	Phel Congo	SQ-CRK	HELICO AGUSTA			A109A II	N'djili/Kin				
370		SQ-CRL									
441	Iwa	SQ-CRM	B707	1128	2/22/2005	20299	N'djili/Kin		11/1/2008	A. Apte	
103	BOSS MINING	SQ-CRR	BURCOPTER	1193	12/28/2006	3455	Luano/L'shi		7/29/2008	A. Apte	1,162,26kgs
124		SQ-CRR	AS 350 B3								
494	Hewa Bora	SQ-CRS	B727-100	994	1995	19507	N'djili/Kin			ADG	
165	MAYCOM	SQ-CRU	Conair 580	970	2/2/1995	41	N'djili/Kin				
19	Service Air	SQ-CSA	AN-26	1132	5/14/2005	5005	N'djili/Kin		5/1/2008	ADG	24,000kgs
574	Air Tropiques	SQ-CSC	PIPER PA	688	8/3/2005	34-8070304	N'djili/Kin		9/10/2008	A. Apte	3,000kgs
92	SHABAIR	SQ-CSE	B727-100	967	12/15/1994	18332	N'djili/Kin				
73	Air Kasai	SQ-CSH	AN-2	1035	2/19/1999	107614	Tshikapa	Déclassé			5,500kgs
28	I.T.A.B	SQ-CSJ	BAC 1-11	904	7/20/2004	13	Luano/L'shi		7/31/2006	ADG	
488		SQ-CSL	DC3								
	Cargo Bull /SOMMERAUER	SQ-CSM	PIPER 34-200	535	2/20/1998	347250186	N'djili/Kin		4/18/2008	ADG	3,000Kgs
415	Mali Aviation	SQ-CSP	AN-28	1022	4/4/1998	1A3008-09	N'djili/Kin		12/28/2007	ADG	6,500kgs
170	SWALA	SQ-CST	Skyvan			1860	Bukavu		2/3/2009	A. Apte	12,500 Kgs
137	SNBL	SQ-CSU		572	5/19/1976	1579	N'djili/Kin				
590	SNBL	SQ-CSU	Helico 206	646	7/14/1979	1640	N'djili/Kin		1/7/2007	ADG	
591	IAG/First Transworld	SQ-CSV	B737	1180	9/9/2006	20711	N'djili/Kin			ADG	
46	SWALA	SQ-CSW	LET 410 A	1150	10/28/2005	730209	Bukavu		3/3/2009	A. Apte	
320	SWALA	SQ-CSX	LET 410 UVP	1111	11/25/2006	730209	Bukavu			A. Apte	
200	SWALA	SQ-CSX	AN-28	1191	11/25/2006	1A3003-12	Bukavu		10/28/2008	A. Apte	24,000kgs
7	Espace Aviation Service	SQ-CTA		1197	2/14/2007	45802	Brazzaville/Mayamaya		8/18/2007	ADG	
42	Helmut Messelwitz	SQ-CTB	Cessna 182 F	789	5/14/1993	182-61379	N'djili/Kin			Radié	
39	EXECUTIVE AVIATION	SQ-CTJ	AN-26	1052	4/6/2001	4206	N'djili/Kin				24,000kgs
160	V.A.C	SQ-CTK	CT210	1046	2/7/2004	7219-0319	N'djili/Kin		6/22/2006	ADG	
102	Business Aviation	SQ-CTM	LET 410 UVP	1928	6/22/1998	882031	N'djili/Kin		7/2/2007	ADG	6,400kgs
451	V.A.C	SQ-CTO	PARTENAVIA				Goma		6/20/2007	ADG	1,860kgs
575	THARCISCO / ATO	SQ-CTV	Electra L-188A	930	7/2/1999	1073	N'djili/Kin		ADG		
32	Doran Air Congo	SQ-CTR	AN-24	8137A	11/1/2006	77310882	Goma		2/11/2009	A. Apte	
525	MICHAEL SNOW	SQ-CTS	CL44-04	1054	10/8/2001	25	N'djili/Kin				
		SQ-CTV	AN-12			3341506					
113	V.A.C	SQ-CTW	Cessna 172	629	12/11/1978	R172-2516	Goma			A. Apte	
236	M.A.F	SQ-CTW	C207	593	2/18/1985	320	N'djili/Kin		3/28/2007	ADG	3,800lb
237	AAZ	SQ-CUA	DHC-4	973	2/27/1995	119	N'djili/Kin				
167	CHC -STELLAVIA	SQ-CUA	Jet 410 UVP	1228	9/24/2008	X -0101	Goma		3/19/2009	A. Apte	3800 Kgs
532	SAFE AIR COMPANY	SQ-CUB	LET 410 UVP	1167	5/5/2006	790325	Goma		1/27/2009	A. Apte	5,800kgs
431	AAZ	SQ-CUC	DHC-4	975	2/27/1995	241	N'djili/Kin				
385	Wolair	SQ-CUG	SE 210-R	1044	6/9/2000	264	N'djili/Kin				
115	M.A.F	SQ-CUI	Cessna 206	722	10/3/1978	206-06373	Nyakiunde			A. Apte	
71	ISAAC BESONGO	SQ-CUL	CESSNA 207A	720	6/14/2004	20700746	N'djili/Kin				
337	Business Aviation	SQ-CUM	Nord 262	1194	1/12/2007	49	N'djili/Kin		1/2/2009	A. Apte	10,600kgs
98	MIDDLELAND/TRACEP	SQ-CUN	AN-28	1204	6/11/2007	1A1006011	Bukavu		12/18/2008	A. Apte	6,500kgs
105	G.P.G	SQ-CUV	VISCOUNT				N'djili/Kin			ADG	
526	I.T.A.B	SQ-CVC	HS-780	1041	4/14/2004	7629	Luano/L'shi		4/29/2008	ADG	55,000lb
265	GALAXI KAVATSE	SQ-CVE	AN-26	1116	9/25/2004	5301	Bani-Wageni		1/22/2009	A. Apte	24,000kgs

47	VICTORIA AIR	9Q-CV6	AN-12	1087	12/15/2003	434204	Goma			
25	ATO	9Q-CVK	HS 780C Andover	1004	12/13/1996	MF/196600	N'djili/Kin			
26	FREE AIRLINES	9Q-CVL	LET 410 UVP	1047	7/21/2000	810617	N'djili/Kin	8/20/2007	AOG	5,800kgs
266	Mango Mat	9Q-CVM	AN-12	1162	3/11/2006	8345503	Goma	11/20/2006	AOG	
1	Mango Airlines	9Q-CVM	AN-12	1161	5/31/2006	334150	Goma	11/20/2006	AOG	
56	MIDDLELAND/TRACEP	9Q-CVR	AN-26	1122	12/17/2004	8602		1/18/2006	A. Apte	24,000kgs
371	ATO	9Q-CVS	HS 780C Andover	1003	12/13/1996	MF/193506				
534	BRAVO AIR CONGO	9Q-CVT	DC-9-32	1187	10/23/2006	48127	N'djili/Kin	10/27/2007	AOG	49,090kgs
13	Hewa Bora	9Q-CWA	B727	1007	10/19/1997	20775	N'djili/Kin		AOG	
48	Wimbi Dira	9Q-CWC	AN-12	1079	9/13/2003	2400201	N'djili/Kin			
533	Wimbi Dira	9Q-CWD	B727	1077	8/13/2003	19562	N'djili/Kin	8/21/2006	AOG	
31	Wimbi Dira	9Q-CWE	DC-9-32	1088	12/27/2003	47701	N'djili/Kin	10/3/2007	AOG	110,000kgs
17	Witrafu	9Q-CWF	DC-9-32	1050	1/13/2001	47531	N'djili/Kin		Declassé	
535	Wimbi Dira	9Q-CWG	B707	1084	12/3/2003	19587	N'djili/Kin	2/25/2007	AOG	151,153kgs
402	Wimbi Dira	9Q-CWH	DC-9-32	1092	3/2/2003	47744	N'djili/Kin	9/14/2006	AOG	
403	Wimbi Dira	9Q-CWI	DC-3/C-47B	0068A	12/8/2003	33237	N'djili/Kin			
109	Kin-Airways	9Q-CWK	B707-336 C	0048 A	7/18/2002	20517	N'djili/Kin			
502	Kin-Airways	9Q-CWY	B747-302	0049 A	2/18/2002	21300				
8	SWALA	9Q-CXF	SC7 SKY VAN	1123	12/31/2004	SH 1515	Bukavu	7/23/2008	A. Apte	5,675kgs
537	SWALA	9Q-CXF	Skyvan	1123	12/31/2004	SH 1915	Bukavu		A. Apte	
93	Zaabu Inter	9Q-CXL	AN-2	1125	3/11/2005	1G 20847	Tshikapa	6/22/2006	AOG	5,900kgs
55	Zaabu Inter	9Q-CXM	AN-2	1126	3/11/2005	1G20846	Tshikapa			5,900kgs
101	Doran Air Congo	9Q-CXZ	LET 410 UVP	1178	9/8/2006	841201	Goma	4/18/2008	AOG	5,800kgs
576	I.T.A.B.	9Q-CYA	ISLANDER	632	7/20/2004	617	Luanso/L'shi	10/26/2007	AOG	
146	I.T.A.B.	9Q-CYB	HS-780	1006	1/22/1990	R3/748MF/179/04	Luanso/L'shi	4/29/2008	AOG	50,000kgs
577		9Q-CYC	DC-3				N'djili/Kin			
	Air Katanga	9Q-CYD	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT	1218	5/20/2008	BEECH 1900C	Luanso/L'shi	11/19/2008	A. Apte	16,100kgs
		9Q-CYE	DC-3				N'djili/Kin			
536	EUROENERGY	9Q-CYK	AN-2	1184	10/14/2006	1G13723	Tshikapa		Declassé	5,900kgs
151	Yansa Aviation	9Q-CYL	Kingair C90	976	3/28/1995	13660C	N'djili/Kin			
279	Zaabu Inter	9Q-CYI	AN -2			1G15738	N'djili/Kin	2/20/2009	A. Apte	520 kgs
150	Business Aviation	9Q-CYM	LET 410 UVP	1029	6/22/1998	902402	N'djili/Kin	12/1/2008	A. Apte	5,800kgs
578	THOM'S AIRWAYS	9Q-CYN	AN-26	1190	11/1/2006	4001	Tshikapa	11/27/2008	A. Apte	24,000kgs
	Zaabu Inter	9Q-CYO	AN-2	0140A	4/17/2006	1G10015	N'djili/Kin	2/20/2009	A. Apte	5250 kgs
319	EUROENERGY	9Q-CYP	AN-2	1179	9/12/2006	1G18313	Tshikapa		Declassé	5,900kgs
336	Zaabu Inter	9Q-CYQ	AN -2			1G10015	N'djili/Kin	2/20/2009	A. Apte	5250 kgs
108		9Q-CYR	AN-2	1185	10/14/2006	1G17831	Tshikapa	7/3/2008	A. Apte	5,900kgs
86	Transair Cargo Service	9Q-CYS	YS-11A-500	1115	9/24/2004	2051	N'djili/Kin	3/14/2008	AOG	25,000kgs
423	MAP	9Q-CYT	C185	341	4/16/1974	211	Matadi			
324	Filair	9Q-CYU	DC-6/B	1013	5/6/1997	44891	N'djili/Kin			
95	Suzière Kivu Ngongo	9Q-CYV	C402B	673	6/3/1980	402C-0025	Kivu Ngongo	4/26/2008	AOG	6,850kgs
461	Nalanda Zamboko (P.A.I.)	9Q-CVZ	Beach 200	994	6/17/1996	FA173	N'djili/Kin			
149	Doran Air Congo	9Q-CZA	LET 410 UVP	1203	5/11/2007	851324	Goma	11/21/2008	A. Apte	5,800kgs
322	FARDC	9Q-CZB	AN-12				Mbuji-Mayi			
272	Blue Airlines	9Q-CZK	AN26				N'djili/Kin		Declassé	24,000kgs
273	Blue Airlines	9Q-CZL	AN-28	968	1/11/1995	1AN006-01	N'djili/Kin		Declassé	6,500kgs
247	Aéro Club	9Q-CZM					Kananga			
274	Blue Airlines	9Q-CZN	AN-28				N'djili/Kin		Declassé	6,500kgs
153	Blue Airlines	9Q-CZO	AN26	1040	4/29/2000	134-02	N'djili/Kin	12/6/2008	A. Apte	24,000kgs
64	Blue Airlines	9Q-CZF	AN-2	1146	10/20/2005	1G21144	Tshikapa	11/25/2007	AOG	5,900kgs
325	Filair	9Q-CZU	DC-6/C118	1010	3/17/1997	44644	N'djili/Kin			

## Annex 28

(05)

**République Dém. du Congo**

N° 1103

**DEPARTMENT DES TRANSPORTS ET COMMUNICATIONS**  
**Aéronautique Civile**

**CERTIFICAT DE NAVIGABILITE**

1. Marque de nationalité et d'immatriculation : RD - CGQ	2. Constructeur et désignation de l'aéronef délivré par le constructeur ARTEMIS AVIATION "RN" 12	3. Numéro du type de l'aéronef 4341001
4. Catégorie : NORMALE TRANSPORTE PUBLIC	5. Poids maximal au décollage 61.000 Kg	6. Poids maximal à l'atterrissage : 59.000 Kg

Émise à Kinshasa, le **01 SEPT 2004**


  
 Mlle FRAN K'SONDEY  
 Directeur de l'Aéronautique Civile

N.B. : Le présent certificat de navigabilité est soumis à l'ordonnance n° 62/321 du 6 octobre 1956, et l'aéronef est réputé apte au vol s'il est conforme à l'ordonnance n° 62/321 du 6 octobre 1956 et utilisé conformément aux textes précités et au manuel de vol qui lui est annexé.

7. Période de validité : voir verso.





08

**AGREED WORDING OF THE BILL OF SALE**

The Parties have agreed upon the following wording of the Bill of Sale that is to be signed by the Parties **only upon receipt by the Seller the full amount of purchase price of the Airframe of the Aircraft** according to the Clause 3.1. of the Agreement.

The wording is agreed upon by Seller Spectronic Limited, Limassol, Cyprus  
The wording is agreed upon by Buyer Great Lake Business Company, Goma, D.R.C.

**BILL OF SALE**

**KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS**

1) Company "Spectronic Limited, Limassol, Cyprus". "Seller" a company established and existing under the Laws of Cyprus, is the owner of the full, legal and beneficial title to Airframe of AN-12 Aircraft, manufacturer's serial No. 4341801 together with all appliances, parts, instruments, appurtenances, accessories, furnishings, or other equipment or property installed on the "Aircraft" and as described in the Purchase Agreement dated on 2 August 2003.

That for and in consideration of the sum of USD — ONE — only and other valuable considerations Seller does this day as mentioned below grant, convey, transfer, bargain, and sell, deliver, and set over at Goma Airport pursuant and subject to the Agreement all of the Seller's rights, title and interest in and to the Airframe of the Aircraft together with all appliances, parts, instruments, appurtenances, accessories, furnishings or other equipment installed thereto unto "Great Lake Business Company" (BUYER).

THAT SELLER hereby warrants to BUYER, its successors and assigns, that there is hereby conveyed to Buyer on the date hereof, good title to the Airframe of the Aircraft, together with all appliances, parts, instruments, appurtenances, accessories, furnishings or other equipment installed thereto as per Agreement free and clear of all liens, encumbrances and rights of others. THAT all amounts payable on account of the purchase price of the above described Airframe of the Aircraft together with all appliances, parts, instruments, appurtenances, furnishings or other equipment installed thereto pursuant to the above described aircraft sale Agreement have been paid and received by the Seller.

Date of signing: 2 August 2003

For and on behalf of  
Spectronic Limited



**DELIVERY NOTE**  
**An-12B AIRCRAFT (Serial No. 4341801)**

The present delivery note is made and certified by commission formed by the following members:

**On behalf of "Spectronic Limited", the Seller and owner of the said aircraft:**  
Alexandr Vorobyev, General Manager

**On behalf of "Great Lake Business Company", the Buyer**  
Mpamo Douglas, General Manager

who have performed technical check of An-12 Aircraft, Serial No.4341801.

The said commission certified that in virtue of Agreement No. SP/GL/TL dated 25 June, 2003, Seller has delivered and the Buyer has accepted the said Aircraft with Serial No. 4341801.

The Aircraft is fully completed with full sets of on-board documents for engines, tools and special equipment.

Defects endangering flight safety were not identified.

The present Delivery Note is signed at Goma, D.R.C. on \_\_\_\_\_, 2003 and confirm transfer of the ownership title to the Aircraft unto "Great Lake Business Company" since the mentioned date of signing the present Delivery Note, i.e. since \_\_\_\_\_, 2003.

"The Aircraft is delivered



(Signed and sealed with the stamp of "Spectronic Limited")

"The Aircraft is accepted



(Signed and sealed with the stamp of "Great Lake Business Company")

INSURANCE GROUP  
SPASSKIYE VOROTA

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Spasskiye Vorota  
Insurance Group  
36, Novy Arbat, Moscow,  
121205, Russia,  
Aviation department  
Tel: (095) 290-2848,  
Fax: (095) 290-2602.

**Insurance Certificate № 0700335**

Moscow

12 November 2005

Whereas the Insured named in the attached Schedule has paid the premium, Insurance group "Spasskiye vorota" hereby agrees to insure against loss, damage or liability arising from an Accident occurring during the Period of Insurance, to the extent and in the manner as specified hereinafter.

**Type:**

1. Third Party Legal Liability Insurance, including passenger liability.
2. Hull Insurance (Loss of and damage to the aircraft, including disappearance).
3. Crew Personal Accident Insurance (Duty risks only).

Subject to the Standard Aircraft Legal Liability Insurance Rules, Standard Aircraft Hull Insurance Rules and Accident Insurance Conditions of "Spasskiye vorota", including:

- Component Part Clause AVN-4 (in respect of Hulls only, according to enclosed Scale).
- Nuclear Risks Exclusion Clause AVN-38B,
- Noise Pollution and Other Perils Exclusion Clause AVN-46B,
- War, Hi-jacking and Other Perils Exclusion Clause AVN-48B,
- Date Recognition Exclusion Clause AVN-2000A,
- Premium Payment Clause AVN-5.

**Insured:** Great Lake Business Company, Goma, D.R.C., PO Box 315, / ILEX Ventures Ltd., Cassandra Center, Office 201&202, 2 floor, 29 Thekla, Lissioti St., PO Box 58184, 3731 Limassol, Cyprus.

**Loss Payee:** TECHNOCOMPLECTINVEST S.R.O., Slovakia, Budovatelska 14, 08001 Presov.

**Period** From: 12 November 2005,  
Till: 11 November 2006, both days inclusive.

36 Novy Arbat Str., Moscow 121205, Russia  
Tel: (095) 290-2048, Fax: (095) 290-7867  
Telex: 414076

Insurance Certificate № 0700335 (continued)

**Sum Insured** 1. Third Party Legal Liability Insurance:  
 Combined Single Limit US\$1,000,000.00 each accident, including sublimit for Passenger Liability – US\$200,000.00, but not more US\$20,000.00 each passenger and US\$20.00 each kilogram of baggage.  
 2. Hull Insurance - US\$250,000.00.  
 3. Crew Personal Accident Insurance – US\$30,000.00 each person.

**Situation** World-wide operations, but excluding countries subject to U.N. sanctions and war areas.

**Premium** In accordance with Debit Notes №0700334/1, 0700334/2, 0700334/3, 0700334/4.

**Additional conditions** Baggage Deductible – US\$1,250.00.  
 Hull Deductible – US\$10,000.00.  
 Crew benefits payment according to enclosed Scale.

Schedule of the aircraft

Type	Hull Number	Year of Manufacture	Crew number	Passenger number
AN-12	9Q-CGQ	1964	3 (Three) persons, according to enclosed list	10 (Ten)

For and behalf of  
 Spasskiye vorota Insurance Group

  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director



Annex 29









Annex 30







## Annex 31

### Meetings and consultations<sup>a</sup>

#### Belgium

##### *Government*

Ministère des Affaires étrangères

##### *Organizations*

Antwerp Port Consultancy — Port of Antwerp  
International Peace Information Service (IPIS)  
Ostend Airport Authority

##### *Private sector*

ING SV Bank

#### Bulgaria

##### *Government*

Ministry of Defence  
Ministry of Economy and Energy  
    Dual-Use Items and Technologies Export Control Department  
    Arms Export Control Department  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
    Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Department  
    Export Control Unit  
National Agency State Security

#### Burundi

##### *Government*

Forces de Défense Nationale  
Ministère de Defense  
Ministère de l'Eau, de l'Energie et des Mines  
Ministère des Finances  
Ministère des Relations Extérieures et de la Coopération  
Services de voies aériennes  
Service National de Renseignement

##### *Organizations*

Banyamulenge community representatives  
United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)  
Human Rights Watch  
International Crisis Group  
Norwegian Refugee Council

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<sup>a</sup> For security reasons, the names of certain individuals and entities that have provided information or statements to the Group of Experts cannot be listed.

*Private sector*

Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie

*Diplomatic representations*

Embassy of Belgium

United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID)

**Democratic Republic of the Congo***Government*

Administration Provinciale de Nord Kivu

Administration Provinciale de Sud Kivu

Agence nationale de renseignement

Assemblée provinciale du Nord Kivu

Assemblée nationale

Banque Centrale du Congo

Cadastre foncier de Masisi et Walikale

Centre d'évaluation, expertise et de la certification (CEEC)

Conseiller spécial du Chef de l'Etat en matière de sécurité

Détection militaire des activités anti-patrie (DEMIAP)

Direction de l'aéronautique civile

Direction générale de migration

Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)

Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature (ICCN)

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

Ministère de la Défense et des anciens combattants

Ministère de l'Intérieur

Ministère des Mines

Ministère des Transports

National Focal Point for Small Arms and Light Weapons

Office des douanes et accises

Office congolais de contrôle (OCC)

Office National des Transports (ONATRA)

Police nationale Congolais

Procureur de la République

Régie des voies aériennes

*Organizations*

Bego-Congo, Exploitation-Forestière

Centre des Jeunes Don Bosco Ngangi, Ouvres de Don Bosco A.S.B.L.

Centre de Coordination pour l'action contre les Mines, Bukavu

ENOUGH

EUPOL

EUSEC

Human Rights Watch

International Criminal Court

International Monetary Fund

MDRP

Médecins sans frontières

MONUC  
Radio Maendeleo  
Radio Okapi  
Pole Institute  
Save the Children  
United Nations Children's Fund  
United Nations Development Programme  
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
World Food Programme  
World Bank

*Diplomatic representations*

British Embassy  
Embassy of Belgium  
Embassy of China  
Embassy of France  
Embassy of Italy  
Embassy of the United States of America  
European Union

*Private sector*

Corporation des Comptoirs Agrées de Goma au Nord Kivu  
Federation d'Entreprise du Congo (Bukavu)  
SDV Agetraf  
TMK  
Tengen  
Hewa Bora Airways  
Supercell

*Non-governmental armed groups*

ADF-NALU  
CNDP  
Mai-Mai Ruwenzori  
Mai-Mai Mongol  
PARECO  
RUD-Urunana  
FDLR

**France**

*Government*

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

**Italy**

Procura della Repubblica di Perugia

**Kenya***Government*

Kenya Revenue Authority (Mombasa)

*Democratic Republic of the Congo Government*

OFIDA liaison office (Mombasa)

**Rwanda***Government*

External Security Organization

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Internal Affairs

Office of the President, Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region

Rwandan Defence Force

Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission

*Organizations*

MONUC

*Diplomatic representations*

British Embassy

Embassy of Belgium

Embassy of the United States of America

Embassy of France

**Serbia***Government*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Directorate for Armaments Control

Ministry of Economy and Regional Development

Department of Foreign Trade Policy and Regime

**Uganda***Government*

Bank of Uganda

Civil Aviation Authority

External Security Organization

Internal Security Organization, Bunagana

Kisoro District Local Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Uganda Immigration Department

Ugandan People's Defence Force

Uganda Revenue Authority

*Organizations*

MONUC  
Uganda Chamber of Commerce & Industries

*Private sector*

Machanga Limited  
Uganda Commercial Impex (UCI)  
Crane Bank  
DFCU

**Ukraine**

*Government*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
    Director-General for Armaments Control and Military Technical Cooperation  
Security Service of Ukraine  
Ukrspetsexport

**United Arab Emirates**

*Organizations*

Dubai Multi Commodity Centre

*Private sector*

Emirates Gold

**United Republic of Tanzania**

*Government*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Port Customs Authorities, Dar Es Salaam  
Port Authorities, Dar Es Salaam  
Port Authorities, Kigoma  
Port Customs Authorities, Kigoma

*Democratic Republic of the Congo Government*

Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Congo, Kigoma

**United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**

*Government*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*Organizations*

Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs  
Civil Aviation Authority  
Human Rights Watch  
International Transport Workers' Federation

Global Witness  
Omega Research Foundation

**United States of America**

*Diplomatic representations to the United Nations*

Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
Permanent Mission of Belgium  
Permanent Mission of France  
Permanent Mission of Germany  
Permanent Mission of Rwanda  
Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates  
United States Mission

*United Nations Headquarters*

Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Department of Field Support  
Department of Political Affairs  
Office of Internal Oversight Services  
Office of Legal Affairs  
Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict

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