Official Masks And Shadow Powers: Towards An Anthropology Of The Dark Side Of The State

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ABSTRACT: Despite a degree of "democratic opening," optimistic assessments of political change in Mexico must be tempered by noting the effects of the militarization of internal security and the intimate relations between political power and involvement in illegal activities. Starting from a discussion of wider literature on the relationships between economic globalization and the rise of Shadow States, ethnographic material and press reports from Mexico are used to carry forward a critique of the "New Barbarism" theorists' treatment of these developments as pathologies of the periphery, rooted in state crisis or partial exclusion from global networks. It is argued that while the Shadow State is not an entirely new phenomenon in Mexican history, contemporary developments reflect the emergence of new forms of state power and governmentality that are connected in important ways to the continuing regulatory powers of Northern governments and the interventions of transnational capital. Although the fact that their field of accumulation is the global economy problematizes the position of Shadow State actors, their capacity to build and rebuild clienteles and political networks in societies shattered by neoliberalism throws doubt

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on the capacity of an untainted "civil society" to enforce political reform and accountability.

Prologue: On Northern Interventions, Dangerous Peripheries and Shadow States

In the era of the Cold War, the North Atlantic powers offered their citizens a relatively straightforward model of the world in which freedom was menaced by an organized "evil empire" fostering subversion in former colonial territories. Northern imagery of the present epoch is of a different and less coherent kind. In the case of Latin America, we are presented with a positive message on "transitions to democracy" and "economic reform," which is nevertheless qualified by anxiety focused on "threats to regional security," such as that posed by Colombian "narco-terrorism." In the case of the Middle East, continuing sanctions (and low-intensity military action) against Iraq are justified, in the words of Britain's Prime Minister, by the need to "keep Saddam Hussein in his cage," despite some public disquiet about the consequences of this policy for the civilian population of Iraq in general, and for that country's children in particular. "Fundamentalist movements" also remain a preoccupation for Northern powers in the region, despite their limited political success in recent years. For "fundamentalist" in this geo-political rhetoric, we should, of course, read Islamic, despite the fact that forms of Christianity that might equally well (if equally simplistically) be labeled "fundamentalist" are experiencing explosive growth elsewhere, notably Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America, without causing similar offense to Northern sensibilities.

Such a public rhetoric of labeling and personifying the causes of conflict and suffering constitutes an imagery in which, in the words of Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique,

part of the world is "made up of sui generis madmen and terrorists, warlords and drug barons, charismatic leaders and fundamentalist mass movements" (Poole and Rénique 1991: 160). These "pathologies" are constructed in post-Cold War political discourse as non-systemic, problems of an irrational periphery separate from a rational center represented by the United States and Europe. To see them as systemic would be to:

> unveil the unutterable connections (or "linkages") between center and periphery, between drug economies and the international capitalist economy, between Third World debt, metropolitan banks and financial institutions, between Third World dictators like Saddam Hussein and the military industrial complex (Poole and Rénique 1991: 191).

The purpose of this paper is to look through the kinds of constructions that Poole and Rénique criticize to the underlying connections, focusing principally on the case of Mexico. My broader aim, however, is to suggest that the Mexican case should be included in a more general theory of state transformation.

By insisting that this broader framework is applicable to Mexico, I am arguing that analysis of the process of "democratization" in Mexico needs to be tempered by consideration of the issues highlighted in the pages that follow. It is not my intention to induce deep pessimism about the prospects for achieving more socially just and democratic societies in Latin America or other parts of the world. I simply wish to emphasize that the efforts of local and global actors to promote such a future are hampered by the way that efforts to promote liberal political institutions are constrained by the drive to promote a pattern of global capitalist development that has deeply socially polarizing consequences, in the North as well as the South. If we persist in treating systemic effects of global transformation as anomalies rooted

in purely local conditions, it will prove difficult indeed to make the world a better place.

This is not to deny that Mexico has its specific characteristics. Its political history differs in an obvious way from that of other countries of Latin America, given the continuity of civilian rule since the 1910 Revolution and the grip on national power maintained by its ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). This political history can be related to the particularities of Mexico's social and cultural history, but it can also be related to the country's relationships with its Northern neighbor, which annexed half the territory of the fledgling nation state in the nineteenth century, played a significant role in the processes which enabled the post-revolutionary regime to consolidate itself during the turbulent 1920s, and has substantially increased its influence on government decisions south of the border since the 1980s. Yet we must be wary of over-hastily embracing exceptionalist arguments about Mexico, and it seems particularly important to begin with a more general picture in any effort to deconstruct Northern post-Cold War imagery, since another of its striking characteristics is a tendency to selective vision. Explanations might be sought in the pragmatics of geopolitical calculation for the Russian Federation's operations in Chechnya to be considered an internal matter not susceptible to international intervention, for the East Timor situation to be subject to a belated process of international response, and for the Bosnia and Kosovo catastrophes to be treated in their own different ways. Yet it is less easy to explain why dominant Northern discourse on some parts of the world remains one of hoped-for economic recovery and democratization rather than "state collapse," whereas Africa is more commonly treated as a "basket case" about which little can be done. I therefore begin by exploring ways in which a critique of misdiagnoses of the problems of Africa

can lead us towards a recognition of some of the problems facing democratization in Mexico.

A leading example of post-Cold War thinking on Africa is the "New Barbarism" thesis of Robert Kaplan (1994). Its basic premise is that crisis is not a result of past or ongoing relationships with the West but of weak ties with the centers of global order and progress. Economic crisis in Africa is naturalized as Malthusian catastrophe; violence and disorder are seen as either products of a cultural atavism that weakened state machineries are no longer able to contain, or as reactions to "exclusion" from the global system of consumerism and informational economy, as Manuel Castells suggests in applying the thesis more widely (Castells 1996: 31).On this reading, violence is the result of conditions inside "peripheral" countries and "excluded regions." It cannot be seen as rational or meaningful and it cannot be stopped by reasonable methods of diplomacy and conciliation that respect national sovereignty.

This diagnosis is robustly challenged in Paul Richards's analysis of the Sierra Leonean civil war (Richards 1996). Richards charts the way the 1992 coup by young army officers started well, with promises of reform of the patrimonial state, and ended badly, as the occupying forces in the rainforest zone succumbed to the temptations of diamond smuggling and regular troops began to dress as rebels of the Revolutionary United Front and plunder impoverished villagers. By 1992 elites could no longer construct effective power relations simply by controlling the institutions of the official state, even if they helped themselves to foreign aid budgets and appropriated tax revenues to reward their clients. The only place effective power relations could now be built was within the "Shadow State" tied to "informal markets," in this case illegal diamond mining. In considering how the Shadow State emerges, Richards points us away from considering Sierra Leone as a periphery isolated from

global cultural flows, whose political problems reflect structural adjustment and reduced foreign aid, towards its relations with the North Atlantic powers. Firstly, urban-biased western development policies destroyed rural subsistence economies; secondly, the withdrawal of De Beers and other transnational mining companies from Sierra Leone did not end their role as price fixers in the international market, which ensured the continuing profitability of diamond smuggling.

The idea that the growth of "illegal" economies is simply a consequence of the failure of "normal" forms of development in Africa has also been challenged by Janet MacGaffey and a group of Zairian collaborators. MacGaffey insists that the growth of the "second economy" must be related to political dynamics, rather than simply to the need for people to construct "survival strategies" or to the existence of "corruption." "Second economies" depend on local and foreign states classifying certain kinds of commodity flows and transactions as "illegal" (MacGaffey et al. 1991: 9-10). Evading the official state can be a way of expressing resistance to the state, and wealth generated in the second economy can lead to social mobility, class formation and the replacement or recomposition of elites.

Nevertheless, as the case of Mexico's "narco-politicians" demonstrates, existing political elites can also consolidate their power by seizing the commanding heights of the illegal economy. The Mexican state apparatus has hardly decayed to a point which would make a direct comparison with African cases such as Liberia or Sierra Leone meaningful. However, there may be scope for comparison if one accepts William Reno's argument (against MacGaffey) that private and political circuits of accumulation can reinforce one another and that the Shadow State represents an alternative institutionalization of power that may achieve relative stability (Reno 1995: 183). Reno offers a detailed analysis of how

the social foundations of the Sierra Leonean "Shadow State" were laid in the colonial period. He argues that a "state-centered" analysis focused solely on recent crisis obscures the long-term relations between control of informal markets and the exercise of political power in a context shaped by the country's place in the global economy. If the field of accumulation for the political actors in the Shadow State is that global economy, and their power networks include foreign companies, they become vulnerable to shifts of political and economic wind far beyond their immediate field of action and control. Yet the local social power of such Shadow State actors throws doubt on the capacity of an untainted and romanticized "civil society" to enforce political reform and accountability. The more "globalized" a local economic system becomes, the more acute this problem becomes. The boundaries between roles in the public and private sector are likely to become increasingly blurred as more former state functions are privatized, and entrepreneurial activity becomes a means not only of exercising power but of occupying formal positions in the political field.

Thinking About States in the North and the South

The contemporary problem of the state is not simply the problem of the quest for "good governance" in peripheral societies. Even the most robust liberal-democratic states have always invited questions about the backstage power of corporate capital and the extent of political control over national security services. It was, after all, Eisenhower who coined the phrase "the military-industrial complex." Yet post-Cold War thinking not only celebrates the transparency of Northern systems of governance, but distracts our attention from the way one country's "state crisis" might be related to another country's foreign policy.

Freedom of information legislation in the United States enables us, with hindsight, to discover much of the hidden agenda of the U.S. invasion of Panama, including its role as a rehearsal for the subsequent intervention in the Gulf. Yet this desirable democratic freedom has not materially affected the outcome of the invasion: a large number of dead, poor and largely black and mestizo Panamanians and an annihilated Panamanian Defense Force (Weeks and Gunson 1990; Johns and Ward Johnson 1994). Although the Clinton administration is honoring the provisions of the treaty transferring the canal to Panamanian control that populist leader General Torrijos negotiated with Carter prior to his death (in an aircraft that witnesses said exploded in a ball of flame), it is doing so under conditions in which the absence of a Panamanian army places a continuing question mark over the rights of the United States to intervene in Panamanian affairs.

It was evidently hoped in security circles that the 1989 invasion would enable the United States to maintain forward bases for operations in South America within Panama. The issue was revived in June 1999 when General Wilhelm of the U.S. Southern Command testified to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that contingency plans for unilateral intervention had been drawn up in response to an alleged increase in drug-trafficking activity and penetration by Colombian "narco-guerrillas" of the Darién region following the beginning of withdrawal of Southern Command units from their Panamanian bases (Latin American Weekly Report, WR-99-25). Wilhelm's interpretation of the De Concini Congressional Amendment to the Torrijos-Carter treaties as a license to intervene was endorsed by Guillermo Endara, General Noriega's successor, whose election campaign was aided by the U.S. taxpayer (Latin American Weekly Report, WR-99-27). Although it was strongly resisted (as incompatible with international law) by the outgoing Panamanian

government, as were calls on Costa Rica to accept U.S. bases as a replacement for those to be abandoned in Panama, it is difficult to ignore either the way the present "War Against Drugs" has been harnessed to the long-term strategic thinking of the groups in charge of the U.S. national security apparatus (an issue to which I will return) or evidence from the past that U.S. attitudes towards drug-trafficking have been tempered by perceived geopolitical interest. It was, after all, George Bush who originally brought General Noriega back onto the CIA payroll, after his links with drug-traffickers were known, thus enabling him subsequently to play his part in the Iran-Contra affair.

The government of the United States is not a transparent affair, despite the existence of electoral democracy. While elected politicians in democracies need to exercise caution with regard to favoring specific private interests in public policy-making and responsiveness to lobbyists, the domain of national security is one of the areas that most strongly diminishes transparency: the culture of the personnel who occupy this niche in the state apparatus, their mode of recruitment and social background, is a research issue in its own right (Ross 1998). I find it difficult to discern any fundamental difference between the kind of politics embodied in the Iran-Contra affair and the politics of the world south of the Río Grande. There is, however, a pervasive assumption that there is a difference, rooted in different public attitudes and political cultures which, it is assumed, make Mexicans or Colombians less concerned about political corruption. Thus, what appears an anomaly in the United States, heavily and seriously castigated on discovery, becomes a ritual gesture elsewhere.

I would dispute this view. "Latin America" may have been colonized by the European country least transformed by the Enlightenment. Yet this is precisely what made the region a precocious laboratory of "modernity," as Benedict

Anderson conceded in recasting his account of Latin America's contribution to the rise of western nationalisms in the second edition of IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (Anderson 1991). Faced with elites that embraced the values of liberalism on paper rather than in social practice, the ideals of equality before the law and transparency, accountability and predictability in the administration of justice were popular ideas in 19th century Latin American societies. They frequently manifested themselves in peripheral places, as David Nugent has shown in his study of the province of Chachapoyas, Peru (Nugent 1997). The long-term result was not exactly a "hybrid of modernity" because such a concept would deny Latin America's right to be considered to have pursued a distinct but coeval and interrelated path of development to European societies. It was, however, a type of society in which there is a constant and continuing tension between different sets of principles. On the one hand, as DaMatta has argued, clientalistic relationships and social "connectedness" have remained essential to successful negotiation of life. They pervert the operation of the rule of law into an instrument of class privilege (DaMatta 1991: 180-181). To be an isolated individual lacking connections is a personal disaster. Patron-client relations, including political clientalism, can be cognized as "moral economy" and citizens are forced into complicity with everyday law-breaking in order to resolve their problems. The equalizing potential of liberal constitutions was further neutralized by appeals to essentialized racial or gender difference: the different "souls" of Blacks, Indians and women. Yet all this is in tension with another model, in which taxes are collected to finance public services, accounts are duly rendered by officials, and justice operates without fear or favor. It is a model that has been regularly articulated in civic culture and public political conflict, especially at the level of municipalities, and it is a model on which ordinary citizens spontaneously

reflect on a daily basis. It is a model that people have died for, and still die for.

The difference between Latin Americans and the citizens of Northern liberal democracies is that the former are less inclined to suspend their disbelief about the way power actually works. The "culture of the state" in post-revolutionary Mexico was based on the twin ideas that the law was not a totally dead letter but that the wheels of justice fail to grind without engaging the shadow powers behind the legal apparatus. One should thus seek to use the law to solve problems, such as land disputes, but by finding intermediaries who could take the case forward through the bureaucratic labyrinth by virtue of their connections to higher instances of power and influence, hopefully, to the President himself (Lomnitz-Adler 1992: 307; Nuijten 1998).

Although this was, in a sense, a "correct" theory, it could fail miserably in any particular instance, and generally did. Issues such as land claims dragged on for decades. The very dragging on became a means of political control as well as a means of self-enrichment for officials and community leaders. Recourse to the law in other contexts was and is inhibited by the awesome power of impunity. Let me give a small example of how awesome that power can be.

A small town in the state of Michoacán, Mexico, elected a municipal government drawn from the center-left opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). The mayor and other officials, accompanied by their wives, were strolling down the main street on their way to lunch when they were shot at by a group of assailants armed with automatic weapons normally issued to the state judicial police. One of the women died. The culprits, not local people, were pursued and arrested by the town police, who were also quite well armed. After an ungentle interrogation, the assailants confessed that they had been hired by the former police chief, an ally and political associate of the former community boss.

The latter was a well-connected member of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) at state level. He was considered to have made his fortune in the marijuana business, like many local politicians of his day. On removal to the state capital, the assailants changed their story: the official version now became that the attack had been motivated by "purely personal grudges." The point of the official version was, of course, that it should totally lack credibility: the message was simply that "we can kill you and you cannot do anything about it." This was a highly effective message, at this historical moment, in terms of convincing citizens that defying the powers that be by flirting with democracy was likely to cause them "problems."

Yet it was effective only in so far as it appeared at this moment in time that the national president and his party were reconsolidating their grip on power after the disputed 1988 presidential elections.[1] Furthermore, it was not totally effective. Use of these kinds of tactics strengthened the determination of domestic civic and human rights NGOs, especially in urban areas, where the straightforward application of state terror seemed less viable. This should be sufficient to set the scene for a deeper exploration of the role of shadow powers in Mexican politics and the extent to which such power can be contested by popular social movements and middle class advocates of liberal democracy and human rights.

The Shadow State in Mexico

In 1994, the Chiapas revolt and the murder of the PRI's candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, produced a sweeping electoral victory for his successor, Ernesto Zedillo. Mexicans now became afraid of chaos. This needs to be understood in terms of a traumatic past history of revolutionary violence ex-

tended over two decades, complemented by a less well-known history of local violence in some parts of the country linked to the failures of the land reform process and clandestine opposition by Catholic organizations that had some affinities with European Fascism (Meyer 1977; Aguilar Valenzuela and Zermeño Padilla 1989). By the end of 1994, however, economic collapse changed the scenario again, laying the basis for a slow recovery of the electoral opposition from the Center-Left, aided by growing evidence of factional conflict within the old political class.

To understand why this mattered and what its implications are, we first need to consider how the old regime worked. The ruling party was created by the military victors of the revolution to perpetuate their power. Access to high office and distribution of the spoils of office were regulated from the 1940s onward by a structure of cliques (Camp 1996: 114-118). Over time, the development of these backstage power networks overcame regional differences and created a remarkably solidary ruling elite. This now incorporates leading members of the "real" political parties that coexisted with the ruling party without, in the past, alternating in power with it. The center-left PRD was originally formed by the fusion of dissident members of the ruling party and members of smaller left-wing parties, including the communists. As time has gone by, it has drawn in more defectors from the ruling PRI, several of whom have now won state governerships after being rejected as PRI candidates. This suggests that the logic of the clique structures and traditional ways of doing politics could survive an apparent shift to more democratic governance based on political party alternation. Yet matters are less straightforward once we factor in the shadow networks of power.

The old regime was based on the political class's ability to exploit the tributary mechanisms of the state apparatus for private purposes. In the 1970s, a vast expansion of the

state sector of the economy made this type of "political accumulation" increasingly important. From the beginnings of the post-revolutionary state, political leaders converted themselves into "revolutionary capitalists" and self-enrichment and the acquisition of private sector assets was considered normal. Real capitalists by and large kept out of politics, with the exception of the powerful elite of the northern industrial city of Monterrey (Saragoza 1988). Between 1950 and the 1970s, the private sector's relationship with the regime was relatively cordial, but growing state intervention produced tensions that the new neoliberal orientation of the ruling party in the 1980s and 1990s was designed to defuse (Bensabet-Kleinberg 1999: 72-73). To a great extent, this strategy has been successful. The problem lies with the substantial sectors of business and elements of the political class that are not tied to the large-scale, transnational, financial and commercial interests now served by the state. The corporatist mechanisms embedded in the old order could be used to manage the transition to neoliberalism, by implementing a selective strategy of using resources to divide the social movements coalition that had threatened to defeat the PRI's candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, in the 1988 elections. Repression was also selectively deployed from the start of the 1990s to further incapacitate those sectors of the opposition that remained recalcitrant. After the 1994 economic crash, however, militarization of internal security was increasingly used to plug widening gaps in the power structure (Gledhill 1998a). This was not simply a question of Chiapas, but of other rural states in which armed movements were developing and above all, of the cities, where preemptive strikes were made against the popular bases of important urban social movements.

This is one aspect of an increasingly visible dark side of the Mexican state. One striking example is the case of SUTAUR (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de Auto-

transportes Urbanos Ruta 100), the union that organized the drivers of Mexico's urban buses, noted for its left-wing politics. The union itself ran the bus company, which was liquidated on grounds of corruption. The sacked workers went on strike. A settlement was finally reached for conventional reasons: the drivers had mortgages to pay and children to send to school and gradually lost the will to resist. Yet there was never a satisfactory explanation of how the former head of the company managed to commit suicide by shooting himself in the head twice. Suspicions of foul play deepened after unknown assailants murdered the investigating judge who declared the original liquidation of the company illegal. The deployment of the army to deal with Mexico City's crime wave led to some scandalous generalized assaults on low income neighborhoods. The Jaguars, a new police unit created under the Zedillo's government's program to improve public security, had to be disbanded after its own involvement in crime became too obvious. Here we can discern various distinct dimensions of shadow power.

First, there are official conspiracies, none more apparent than in the investigation of the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio. The Colosio family has never been satisfied with the official version. Most ordinary Mexicans appear to believe that Colosio was killed on the orders of the man who chose him, ex-president Carlos Salinas, after Colosio showed signs of being unwilling to be a puppet of his former master and thereby blocked Salinas's ambitions to break the rules of the political game by perpetuating his own backstage power. The purpose of the much-extended investigation was clearly to ensure that the truth could never be established. That Mexicans could readily believe that Salinas killed Colosio is a significant window onto popular views of power, but it is not necessarily an index of hostility towards the former president: strong men can be admired and Salinas had improved his public rating by being seen in those terms.

Although intensified intra-elite conflict in the next *sexenio* was eventually to turn the adjective "Salinista" into a term of abuse and forced all aspirants for the PRI presidential nomination in 2000 to dissociate themselves from ties to Salinas and his allies, Ernesto Zedillo had difficulties in capitalizing on his driving of Salinas into exile, since he was perceived as a weak president, and, objectively, remained a weak president, as a young man of relatively humble origins who had difficulties building up a strong clique network centered on himself. Salinas was more adept in this regard, and better placed by virtue of his family's wealth, social status and connections, despite also being young and a "technocrat." The network he fostered leads us straight into a second dimension of the Shadow State: the links between its agents, notably the police, politicians and illegal activities.

Ex-president Salinas's own brother Raúl was arrested and, in February 1999, convicted, for "intellectual authorship" of the murder of his own brother-in-law, José Francisco Ruíz Massieu, a former governor of Guerrero state. The motive was sought in Raúl Salinas's links with drug trafficking and money laundering in addition to theft from the public purse. The whole Salinas presidency is now seen as one in which Mexico became the principle source of drug shipments into the United States, allegedly through the brokering of deals between the President and drug cartels. Although the "narco-político" predates the Salinas era, several figures in his cabinet and major political allies in the backstage networks of power were alleged by the press on both sides of the border to have been major players in the drug economy.

According to recent official U.S. statements, Zedillo's government has only scratched the surface of a corruption that runs deep in Mexican politics. Yet this did not inhibit the Clinton administration from persuading Congress to "certify" Mexico as cooperating in the war against drugs. At

the end of May, 1999, THE WASHINGTON POST and NEW YORK TIMES published articles citing leaked official reports that implicated the fabulously wealthy former Minister of Agriculture under Salinas, former regent of Mexico City, and political boss of bosses of the State of Mexico, Carlos Hank González, in links with the drug trade.[2] As the Mexican government protested, the State and Justice Departments expressed themselves "unaware" of any grounds for such charges. However, they did also seized the opportunity to reiterate their concern about the continuing flow of drugs from the south and the need to adopt further measures to attack the cartels (La Jornada, June 3rd, 1999). In October 1999, former FBI agent Stanley Pimental renewed the assault on the Salinas administration, following the suicide (while he was awaiting trial in a U.S. prison on money laundering charges) of Mario Ruíz Massieu, once deputy attorney general and brother of the politician for whose murder Raúl Salinas was convicted. Pimental published an article in the magazine TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME asserting that money from drug trafficking had ended up directly in Salinas's office, stressing that the PRI had provided protection to Mexico's drug cartels throughout its history (Mexico and Nafta Report, RM-99-10). Once again, the Mexican government position was that Pimental was simply repeating familiar slanders, while the U.S. administration remained in a "refusal to confirm or deny" posture.

There may be more to the U.S. administration's ambiguous stance on these issues than pragmatic "reasons of state": the need to balance considerations of political stability in Mexico against other concerns. U.S. behavior suggests that the drugs issue provides a convenient pretext for ensuring Mexico's compliance on other issues of vital U.S. interest, the NAFTA and immigration policy. If U.S. official agencies continue to be "economical with the truth" as far as their real knowledge of the private economic activities of power-

ful Mexicans are concerned, this would, after all, be a pattern of behavior with precedent in the Panamanian case mentioned earlier. The idea that the transition from the Reagan-Bush to Clinton eras has not totally changed the nature of U.S. foreign policy is further reinforced by considering how some aspects of the Panamanian case resonate with current stances towards the situation in Colombia as well as Mexico, different though U.S. attitudes towards Mexico and Colombia appear to be at first sight.

The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) guerrillas were allowed by the Pastrana government to take charge of a demilitarized zone in the South as a preparatory step in a "peace process," which seems increasingly vulnerable at the time of writing, following renewed FARC military operations and increasing evidence of U.S. interest in a military solution and possible direct intervention. What remains far from clear is whether drugs are really the salient issue. Whereas it is undeniable that the guerrilla movement has used income from cocaine laboratories to finance its operations, and affords protection to peasant coca producers, the 5,000 strong right-wing paramilitary army Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) has a direct link to the cartels through its leader, Carlos Castano, whose brother Fidel was a close associate of Pablo Escobar. According to GUARDIAN journalist Jeremy Lennard ("A war run on drugs," The Guardian Weekend, November 13th, 1999), Drug Enforcement Agency sources are diffident even on the issue of whether Fidel Castano actually died in 1994, as previously reported, or is still active, and acknowledge links between the paramilitaries and the Russian mafia. While the AUC is allowed to run drugs with apparent impunity in northern Colombia (under the protection of army generals who learned their counter insurgency tactics at the School of the Americas), the suggestion that a counter insurgency agenda remains more significant than an anti-drugs agenda

does not seem far-fetched. Somewhat against the grain of the image of the post-ideological "narco-terrorist" organization, the FARC has justified its continuing bellicosity by arguing that the first priority in the peace negotiations should be reversal of the social polarization that has been induced by Colombia's pattern of high-growth capitalist development in the 1990s, which reflects both the structural effects of opening to the world market and the contribution of the violence to displacing and impoverishing rural people (Latin American Weekly Report WR-99-43). The one thing that is clear, from recent public demonstrations involving up to 12 million citizens in urban and rural areas, is that most Colombians want peace above all else, an outcome made less rather than more likely by current U.S. policy.

On this reading, the "War Against Drugs," which, as Jeremy Lennard noted, currently costs the U.S. taxpayer almost three times as much annually as it would cost to buy the world's entire production of cocaine, may be a war to guarantee the continuation of the neoliberal economic model in Latin America. The "facts," of course, are likely to remain murky, but this is precisely the point. Shadow State networks in Latin America are the subject of controlled leaks to journalists from "official sources" in the United States, and may contain as much misinformation as information; there is a clear selectivity in what is being disclosed at any moment. An emphasis on the way the drug issue can be harnessed to other economic and geopolitical agendas, however, does not exhaust the "linkages" that can be discerned in present patterns of development. Following through the logic of Janet MacGaffey's position, understanding the drug economy in Latin America should be a matter of understanding how states, by classifying activities as illegal, create frameworks for legal and illegal activities to articulate to each other. The powerful political networks said to be associated with drug trafficking and money laundering in Mexico are also central

partners in transnational consortia developing a range of "legitimate" businesses in the fields of financial services, resort, hotel, condominium and commercial gambling development (casinos and betting).

Unspeakable Connections

This model of development is taking away the traditional livelihoods of rural Mexicans while offering them a variety of new ones, some of which are linked to the ever diversifying production and transshipment of narcotics as well as other kinds of contraband operations. Therefore, there is a strong connection between the pattern of development being fostered by "official states" and that linked to shadow powers, which is heavily mediated by corporate capital. The connections seem extremely visible in the careers of the overnight millionaires of the Salinas era, in particular, that of the fugitive banker, Carlos Cabal Peniche, who added to the PRI's woes from a jail cell in Australia by claiming to have made a major financial contribution to both the Colosio and Zedillo presidential campaigns. Cabal's investment portfolio revealed the tell-tale signs of drug investment by combining industrial assets with the common denominator of legal use of precursor chemicals with a financial sector portfolio including banks and currency exchanges. Yet his deeper significance lies in the way his career manifested the entire web of connections established between the formal political sphere, privatizations of public enterprises, and "legal" and "illegal" economic activities.

After a false start to a business career as administrator of his father's enterprises in Tabasco, Cabal Peniche proved more successful in the shrimp export business in Campeche, where his export company, Promo-Sea, secured an 80,000 U.S. dollar credit in 1987 from Eastbrook Inc., brokered by

Merrill Lynch (Proceso, 6th September 1998). The credit was never repaid, since the operation was part of the BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International) fraud. BCCI was denounced in the North as a "rogue" bank created by "Third World criminals" (doing business in "non-Western" ways through patronage, clientalism, bribery and political lobbying). Yet, as Ananth Aiyer has noted, there appeared to be little concern about BCCI's practices when they were contained in the South (Aiyer 1998). Important U.S. political lobbyists and government officials had dealings with BCCI; it played a significant role in the Iran-Contra affair; and its overall pattern of activity as a global financial enterprise registered in Luxembourg, the Cayman Islands and other offshore banking centers hardly made it unusual. BCCI became a problem when its operations broke down the insulation between "North" and "South" and it made moves on American banks (Aiyer 1998: 6). In addition, as we will see shortly, this may help us to understand the increasing exposure to public scrutiny of the activities of the family of Carlos Hank González, but for the moment the important point is that entrepreneurs such as Cabal Peniche not only benefited from the BCCI affair, but became "model entrepreneurs," patronized first by Federico de la Madrid, son of Salinas's predecessor, and then by Salinas himself.

According to press reports, Salinas not only provided Cabal with government credits to assist his private sector initiatives and participation in the purchase of privatized public assets, but provided him with personal introductions to other entrepreneurs now accused of involvement in the drug business (Proceso, 6th September 1998). It was not, however, merely politicians who participated in the social networks that underpinned Cabal Peniche's rise to fame and fortune in the early 1990s. Cabal's most intimate business advisor was the priest Jacques Charveriat Prenat, who returned to his native France in August 1994, a month before

Cabal himself fled the country to escape the consequences of further investigation into the insolvency of the two banks that he owned. Charveriat formed part of the circle of Carlos Hank González when he was regent of Mexico City, but clerical associates of Cabal Peniche supposedly also included the Bishop of Tabasco, Rafael García González.[3] At the time of his purchase of the Unión and Cremi banks, Cabal's network of associates ramified throughout the Mexican political and social elite of his day, demonstrating the high degree of integration that elite achieved when it came to business opportunities.

Political patronage enabled Cabal to conduct some of his business with loans from public bodies, such as NAFINSA, which helped to finance his takeover of one of the divisions of the Del Monte corporation, while Carlos Hank González was Secretary of Agriculture (Proceso, 6th September 1998). Yet political favor also facilitated operations based on unsecured loans provided by other arms of Cabal's business empire, and offered protection to those parts of the Cabal business empire which serviced the drug economy. There are no clear boundaries between public and private power here. Once again according to press reports, Carlos Hank González, Cabal's most powerful patron, invested freely in companies and consortia which had direct financial relations with the government offices that he directed. Indeed, this is something that Hank González himself has recently conceded, arguing that "interest conflicts" were not proscribed under the traditional rules of Mexican politics, although he contends that the rules changed and that when they did, he immediately complied with the letter of the law (Proceso, 28th November 1999). This contention is part of a comprehensive public campaign to contest the further allegations that have been made about the Hank family, for which they have hired a group of former U.S. law enforcement officers and secured the testimony of former U.S. ambassadors to

Mexico (Proceso, 28th November 1999). The claims being contested include the charge that Carlos Hank's sons forged close relationships with the organizations of the Arellano Felix brothers, Amado Carillo Fuentes and other drug cartels, as the family's investments in racetracks and casinos (on both sides of the border) became central to the cartels' money-laundering operations (Proceso, 7th November 1999). The airline TAESA, also in the news for its lamentable safety record, and the Transportación Marítima Mexicana (TMM) company, which went on to invest in railroads with Kansas City Southern and manufactured its own containers, are alleged to have formed another part of the Hank family's criminal empire. The charge is that they were not only used by the cartels, but received additional direct investments from them (Proceso, 7th November 1999).

Once again, we are faced with the problem of "facts" that become increasingly murky as "leaks" combine with rumors and possible systematic diffusion of misinformation; the deliberate diffusion of a demonstrable falsehood is a useful means of casting doubt on other evidence. The security of shadow power depends on the way in which actors with diverse interests are willing to allow a lack of clarity to prevail. Raúl Salinas might legitimately claim that his own fate was determined on the basis of "facts" that a court might have found less convincing under different political circumstances.

Factional competition within the Mexican political elite has allowed a limited official exposure of other "narcopolíticos," notably Mario Villanueva, former PRI governor of Quintana Roo. Accused of links with both the Ciudad Juárez cartel in Northern Mexico and the Cali cartel, Villanueva was, nevertheless, able to flee the country after charges were laid against him. Although patrons in the political and military elite could not guarantee total impunity to the traffickers, given the existence of competition within

and between the cartels themselves as well as U.S. pressure for some evidence of action in the "War Against Drugs," the principle that some politicians' positions have been fortified by infusions of funds from the second economy is not officially contested. What is important are the clear limits set to political and judicial action from above and reactions from below to public revelations about the structures of shadow power.

This is nowhere more apparent than in the career of the controversial governor of Tabasco state, Roberto Madrazo Pintado, who reassumed his office for the third time in December 1999 after two periods of leave of absence, with the blessing of President Zedillo. Madrazo was accused by the PRD in his home state of spending more on his gubernatorial campaign than Clinton spent on getting into the White House, thanks to funding received from Carlos Cabal Peniche. Despite the scandal these charges provoked, Madrazo was able to run, albeit unsuccessfully, for the PRI's nomination for presidential candidate in 2000. In doing so, on an antineoliberal neopopulist platform that, together with an ebullient personality, brought him good poll ratings, Madrazo was anxious to play down his well-documented links with the Hank family (Proceso, 12th April, 1998; La Jornada, May 14th, 1999). Such a move made political sense given the Hanks' recent reversal of political fortune, although there was an obvious Hank influence at an earlier stage in the Zedillo administration, as a function of both the patriarch's great personal wealth (estimated at more than one thousand million dollars by Forbes) and the range and complexity of the clique network that he built up over the decades from his base in the State of Mexico and positions in the Federal government. Madrazo nevertheless also appeared to be asserting his independence from the PRI political machine. He conducted his campaign for the nomination against the victorious candidate, Francisco Labastida,

in an extremely intemperate way, accusing Zedillo and the PRI apparatus of aiding Labastida with government resources and violating their pledge to allow the militants of the PRI to choose their candidate freely. Yet this was all forgotten after Labastida secured a handsome majority, with the President publicly presiding over embraces between the victor and the vanquished, embraces that appeared to guarantee Madrazo continuing impunity and a possible place in a future Labastida administration. As 1999 drew to a close, the PRI appeared to have secured the realignments necessary to retain power against a divided opposition in the 2000 elections.

While elite compromise may be on the agenda again in Mexico, the particular difficulties faced by the Hanks may reflect the way that their transnational operations broke down a necessary insulation between "North" and "South," as I suggested earlier. Carlos Hank Rohn, son of Hank González, was fined and ordered by the Federal Reserve Bank to divest himself of the 71% holding that he and his relatives had acquired in the Laredo National Bank in Texas. This was on the grounds that he had dishonestly manipulated the accounts of holding companies and other individuals managed by Citibank to disguise the identity of the bank's real owners, in violation of U.S. banking regulations (La Jornada, June 6th, 1999). Citibank was not itself accused of any criminal offense or violation of Federal Reserve rules. Yet the case has revealed a long history of transnational financial manipulation managed by the bank on behalf of Carlos Hank González himself, dating from the time when he occupied federal office and mirroring the kinds of services offered by the same bank to Raúl Salinas.

It now transpires that a number of U.S. agencies have been conducting investigations of the Hank family empire. At one level, the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate activity seems somewhat blurred when one considers

the ways the "deals" are actually made in these complex transnational financial relationships. What has sustained it, however, as a classificatory device, is a complex institutional and political construction in which Citibank is kept at a safe distance from people dying from drug abuse and its ethics are protected by a transcendent discourse of commercial confidentiality and client privilege, despite the fact that its employees concede that they make special arrangements to ensure that the private affairs of Mexican political figures are protected from public scrutiny. Recent developments, however, have highlighted the difficulties of maintaining this fragile insulation of the worlds of the licit and illicit.

In U.S. Senate committee hearings on the Raúl Salinas case, senior executives of Citibank had some difficulty explaining not merely why they had allowed the former Mexican president's brother to deposit millions of dollars in separate accounts under a series of false names that included the somewhat implausible Bonaparte, but also why Citibank staff had actively impeded the tracing of these accounts after Raúl's arrest (Proceso, 14th November 1999). After Citibank's Amy Elliot (also private banking executive to Carlos Hank Rhon) failed to convince the senators that her confidence in Raúl Salinas could have been justified simply by the international eminence of his reforming brother, combined with their membership of an old and wealthy Mexican elite family, she caused further consternation by asserting that the Salinas brothers had been major investors in the privatization of Teléfonos de México (TELMEX), whose principal shareholder is nominally the millionaire Carlos Slim. Although it has indeed long been popularly believed in Mexico that Salinas must have been a secret beneficiary of the privatizations (a matter that was not, in itself, a cause for censure, since the powerful were expected to serve their personal interests whilst performing their public functions) Elliot's effort to explain the Salinas family's increasing wealth

by linking it to the share value of TELMEX backfired, given that the private excess of the Salinas family was now associated with an absolute loss in terms of public benefit.

A major element in Mexico politics during 1998 had been the controversy over the FOBAPROA (Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorro). In addition to rescuing banks, FOBAPROA was to rescue other private companies which were in difficulties, including those that had received concessions to build private toll-roads (superhighways) under Salinas. FOBAPROA transformed private debt into public debt, but in a manner that favored the interests of a small number of enormously wealthy families enjoying privileged political connections with the groups close to the Zedillo administration. The rescue package did nothing for smaller businesses, and was vigorously opposed not only by the Center-Left opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution but by the El Barzón debtors' movement, representing such smaller urban businesses and commercial farmers. Faced with a public outcry, Zedillo was forced to allow an independent audit of the bad debts of the banks, which fueled public outrage as the sheer cost to the taxpayer was augmented by revelations of "anomalies" of the kind already described in the context of the career of Cabal Peniche. In the case of the superhighway concessionaires, three families were to benefit from public indemnification while enjoying a "light touch" in terms of promised audits by the Communication and Transport Industries (Proceso, 8th November 1998).

Although the institutional basis for rescuing Mexico's rich was finally created, thanks to the last minute support of the opposition Party of National Action (PAN), and FOBAPROA was replaced, at the end of 1998, by a new agency, the IPAB (Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario), Mexico's banking system remains in crisis. With a sum equal to 1.5 times Mexico's 1998 oil export revenues being needed to res-

cue the fourth largest bank, Bancrecer, at the end of 1999, and foreign banks buying heavily into the Mexican system, it seems likely that the country will follow global trends towards concentration of bank capital, and that foreign capital will exercise an increasing hegemony over the Mexican financial system (Mexico & Nafta Report, RM-99-10; RM-99-11). Once again, it is difficult to preserve the fiction that what happens North and South of the border belong to completely separate worlds.

In one sense, the indemnification of Mexico's rich mirrors a long-standing tendency for Latin American elites to transfer losses incurred during economic downswings to the public purse and thus to lower-class taxpayers: capital that fled the country in bad times had to be induced to return with fiscal concessions and could acquire new assets extremely cheaply (Petras and Morley 1990: 198). Yet what public opinion questioned during the FOBAPROA scandal was whether elites should be indemnified for losses made on enterprises that they had acquired or launched through what were, in effect, legalized forms of corruption in the disposal of state assets as well as involvement in a wide range of more strictly illegal transactions. Elliot's efforts to defend the Salinas brothers simply strengthened the sentiment that the nation's assets had been hijacked by a small coterie of politicians, their domestic business partners and allies in transnational corporations, leaving the Mexican public in the unfortunate position not merely of footing the bill, but of relying on foreign governments to exercise what regulation they might be disposed to exercise. Given that the ultimate beneficiaries of mismanagement of the Mexican banking system are the foreign corporations now able to buy up the equity of these failing enterprises, while relatively transparent connections between private wealth and political influence continue to manifest themselves, the public airing of a few scandals does not, once again, in itself promise any

change other than a regrouping within the power blocs lying behind the formal facade of the state. Significant action from the U.S. government seems unlikely, given the advantages to U.S. capital of letting matters take their course.

In discussing these issues, it is essential to reject the perspective that we are dealing with "pathologies" of peripheral regions, rooted in distinct political cultures, "development failure" and flawed transitions to "modernity." Illicit activity has long been integral to the accumulation of capital by members of Mexico's political class. As I discovered in my own ethnographic research, even the great populist President of the 1930s, Lázaro Cárdenas, took his personal cut of the development projects that he won for his home state, using *prestanombres* (front-men). His younger brothers were epitomes of corruption. Yet all this pales into insignificance in comparison with the systemic relationships between the types of development the North Atlantic hegemon now imposes on its satellites, on the one hand, and the growth of the second economy, on the other. In insisting on the privatization of state enterprises, the World Bank and IMF gave the holders of political power yet another opportunity to make money for themselves and their circle at the expense of the domestic taxpayer.

It is quite evident ethnographically that the "second economy" is flourishing. In provincial regions such as Michoacán, it is easy enough to collect evidence on illicit dimensions of the "wealth-creation" process in the personal biographies of some local businessmen and politicians, and to trace the linkages which tie these local actors into larger networks. Yet it is important not to stop at this level, but to recognize the way the possibilities of such local developments are rooted in the structures of national and international power relations, because nothing will change unless those relations change. The small fry rise, fall and are sacrificed, because they are simply cogs in a much larger ma-

chine. One of the factors that sustains the machine is the eagerness of transnational corporations and banks to court the politicians of the South and grant them confidentiality, undermining local efforts to insist on a separation of public functions from private interests. There is also a direct relationship between the effects of neoliberal development on local economies (through the exposure of undercapitalized producers to world-market pricing, for example) and the kinds of activities that are adopted as substitutes. Not only is the cultivation of opium poppies and marijuana the most remunerative alternative use of land that has been commercially devalued in other uses, but the trade can use the same infrastructure of transport and migratory movements as earlier systems of production. It should be stressed that the majority of local people derive very limited benefits from these developments. They are driven by Northern demand in just the same way as production of winter vegetables or assembly work in the *maquiladora* plants, and they obey the cost reduction imperatives of the competitive global market economy. Although life might now be unimaginable without it, the countervailing force of the second economy has not greatly moderated the socially polarizing effects of the neoliberal development model, either in Mexico or other Latin American countries, and it brings its own problems of violence and further perversion of an already weak justice system.

Transnational Processes and National States

I have argued that Shadow State networks constitute emergent forms of state power that are different from those which existed earlier in the century in Mexico. One of the things that makes them different is their "transnational connections." It might be argued, however, that transnational

processes also undermine the basis of the Shadow State, by strengthening local social movements through the proliferation of global discourses on rights and accountability, furthered by global media and NGO interventions in foreign countries, and by promoting a global "public sphere" in which issues of accountability and models of development can not only be debated but possibly changed through international pressure on governments. It seems necessary to juxtapose this line of argument against other positions that stress the increasing global power of capital.

The debates about economic globalization and transnational movements of people have often invoked the idea that the national state is of declining significance. Critics of that "post-national" position have not only come up with a series of arguments about why national states remain important, but often accuse their adversaries of neglecting the continuing salience of the term "imperialism" to the contemporary world order. Yet as Aihwa Ong has recently put it, both sides of the debate capture only part of what is a more complex dialectic of change:

> Transnationality induced by accelerated flows of capital, people, cultures, and knowledge does not simply reduce state power, but also stimulates a new, more flexible and complex relationship between capital and governments. The term transnational first became popular in the late 1970s largely because global companies began to rethink their strategies, shifting from the vertical-integration model of the "multinational" firm to the horizontal dispersal of the "transnational" corporation. Contrary to the popular view that sees the state in retreat everywhere before globalization, I consider state power as a positive generative force that has responded eagerly and even creatively to the challenges of global capital (Ong 1999: 21).

Ong's observations have important implications for the long-standing debate about whether transnational corpora-

tions undercut the powers of national states or convert themselves into "sovereign states" ruling through local proxies in certain countries, since she suggests that today's transnational corporations are different from the multinational firms of the past. Transnational companies are in the increasingly happy position of being able to extract concealed subsidies and even, in many cases, investment, from host areas that are competing for mobile production facilities. State governments in countries such as Mexico and Brazil are now playing as important a role as federal government in trying to lure foreign plants to their regions. The kind of influence this provides on other aspects of governance should not be ignored. On the other hand, transnational corporations would scarcely find it convenient to take on responsibility for governing a country at this stage in history. Even disciplining labor is an expensive business that eats into profits, but more general governmental functions involve obligations that it is best to slough off onto others; examples of capitalist elites investing in running the social infrastructures of health care and education are relatively rare. They are also, as the case of biotech company Monsanto demonstrates, vulnerable to public opinion and media campaigns. What Ong suggests, plausibly in my view, is that contemporary globalization involves new kinds of alliances and divisions of labor between transnational corporations and national states.

Governments have responded to the conditions of economic globalization by subjecting their middle and working classes to distinct disciplinary regimes, creating differentiated forms of governmentality aimed at dividing potential forces of opposition and disarming resistance to the market economy. In some cases limited state functions have been "outsourced" to private enterprises, producing "zones of graduated sovereignty" involving the deployment of different forms of disciplinary power which evolve and adapt

in a way that reflects the exigencies of the global economic system (Ong 1999: 217). Yet even in these cases, national states continue to supervise the overall framework for adapting capitalist accumulation to a specific cultural and institutional context.

National states also still play important roles in structuring the way other transnational processes work. I have already stressed their role as the definers of "illegality," which is also integral to the structuring of movements of people across international borders and the way that those people are treated after they cross them. In the case of Mexicans in the United States, the recent articulation of legislation on immigration, drugs and terrorism has created a "regime of truth" in the U.S. public sphere that has profound effects on the life situations of all Mexicans in the country, irrespective of their migratory status (Gledhill 1998b). Yet Mexico also illustrates ways in which state capacities can be undermined by transnational processes. It has become more difficult, for example, to repress indigenous activists in Oaxaca state now that such actions can be answered by a public protest outside the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles within hours of the event (Besserer 1997).

However, it has not become impossible to engage in repression, especially with the logistical and technological support of the United States, even if using repression has these new consequences. Furthermore, there is also still scope for encouraging migrant organizations that have achieved this greater tactical flexibility to negotiate with government. Some transmigrant organizations are actually helpful to the neoliberal project since their members are eager to participate in programs for encouraging the growth of small business or larger scale commercial networks (as is the case with the overseas Chinese). It is clear that some transnationally organized people are more "post national" than others, and there are other good reasons for not making "the

transmigrant" a universal hero of "resistance" in the face of disillusion with former heroes, such as the working classes or post-colonial subalterns. As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Gledhill 1995; 1998b), many of those who leave Mexico for the United States are seeking individualistic solutions to their problems, and live lives that are full of tensions with other categories of Mexican migrants and other subaltern groups across the border.

Robert Kaplan, writing in Britain's OBSERVER newspaper, has in fact invoked Mexico as well as the Arab countries of the Middle East as likely arenas for state collapse and regionalist fragmentation in the face of the pressures of economic globalization. Even at first glance, the comparison seems superficial. It is true, for example, that Mexico does display a growing pattern of regional polarization. This reflects a long-standing cultural historical differentiation between the North and the "deep South," with its much greater proportion of population actively maintaining and reworking "indigenous identities." The NAFTA may well exacerbate aspects of this division linked to economic factors, and is already eroding the position of the central regions of the country, which are also more socially and culturally heterogeneous. It is not immediately clear, however, what kinds of political consequences these processes might have.

The U.S.-Mexico border remains relatively porous to migrants from the Center and South of Mexico despite its growing militarization (Dunn 1996). Some of the most politically interesting developments among transmigrant populations are related to the southern state of Oaxaca, which is also a region with an armed insurgent movement, and to the relatively poor state of Zacatecas, which is on the borderland between Central and Northern Mexico. In the Oaxaca case, reworked ethnic identities and attempts to create more inclusive kinds of "Indian" identities that transcend past ethnic fragmentation are central to transnational politi-

cal projects (Stephen 1997: 82-83). The people involved seldom saw themselves as part of the nation of which they were notionally citizens. They have a different kind of project for developing their rights in Mexico as members of a transnational population which is also diasporically distributed within national territory from, for example, the *mestizos* of Zacatecas, who are seeking rights in Mexico through new rules on dual nationality.[4]

All that it might be possible to say in general terms is that different kinds of political projects can draw on global discourses focused on rights. Some of these invoke claims to special treatment by states on grounds of disadvantage linked to historical minority identities, whereas others seek to appeal to the conscience of an emergent international public sphere and are more radically "post-national." There is no simple and uniform global tendency to identify here, for two reasons. First, the publics of more affluent countries articulate to the global rights discourse in a contradictory way: they pity the victims of Third World development and accept cultural difference as sanitized multicultural consumerism, but have difficulty accepting the full personhood of migrants and are susceptible to anti-immigrant politics in an era of generalized social insecurity (Leach 1998). Second, only certain categories of people can play the game of rights discourse beyond the discourse of citizenship. The real problem in Mexico is not the marked category, "indigenous" but the unmarked category, *mestizo*, which was made integral to the model of national identity, *mexicanidad*, forged by the post-revolutionary state (Gledhill 1997: 91-92). Since the distinction between "Indians" and "non-Indians" remains deeply embedded in everyday practices of discrimination, the specific historical features of state- and nation-building in Mexico may well impede the development of a new popular imaginary of the "nation" as a collective in which all citizens are stakeholders now that the positive features of the

old regime have largely disappeared. Here we also need to consider the way the structures of Shadow State power enter the everyday lives of ordinary people.

Globalized Feudalism as an Emergent Form of Power

I have sketched out a model of how what was previously a conflictive but relatively solidary structure of elite networks distributed positions within the formal structure of the official state. This structure permeated all levels of government and was able to absorb and co-opt new social elements, including elements that expressed dissidence. The army was effectively kept out of politics after 1940, serving its political masters obediently in return for a dignified public position and a high degree of impunity with regard to the private economic interests of the upper echelons. The shift to neoliberalism involved acceptance of the overriding interests of the segment of the Mexican bourgeoisie whose financial and industrial interests were already transnational. This in turn forced a progressive dismantling of the corporatist features of the old post-revolutionary regime, which was accelerated by the economic shocks resulting from the opening up of the economy and speculative capital inflows, plus direct political pressure from the United States under the NAFTA regime.

There are innumerable other cases where opening to the global economy had a major impact on how politics could be conducted. In Sri Lanka, for example, there were challenges from new elites tied to the global economy while existing elites played the ethnic card in trying to cope with mounting social dissidence from Sinhalese, creating a double spiral of escalating ethnicization of conflict and state assaults on trade unions and left organizations, with the latter drawing legitimation from the "security situation" (Tambiah 1996).

Although each of these cases develops in ways that we can only fully comprehend in terms of local cultural logics, specific colonial legacies and other contextual factors, there are some interesting common features that are related to the way in which forms of political organization are built from clientship networks.

In Mexico, the 1970s saw a massive expansion of systems of state clientalism, funded from oil revenues. Yet these processes also strengthened what might be described as local "feudal" structures. One illustration would be the domain of the boss of the Oil Workers Union, Joaquín Hernández Galicia, "La Quina," who was removed and jailed by Carlos Salinas after it became clear that he was backing Salinas's rival Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. After La Quina was incarcerated, the economy of his home region suffered a severe recession.[5] Figures such as Carlos Hank González who grew fat in the era of statization created much larger networks and continued to be major power brokers in the years of neoliberal government. Such power blocs can certainly be challenged in the political arena, by opposition groups as well as by rival cliques within the ruling party. The dynamics of political competition have always provoked a movement between cliques and a constant process of realignment. The more fundamental issue, however, is the tremendous economic power that the cliques that lie behind the state now possess. By whatever means they originally achieved their wealth, they are clearly among the winners from the new economic development model, and their power is not simply local or regional, in contrast to the *caudillos* of the early years of the revolutionary era. Transnationally connected shadow powers pose an enormous challenge for any genuine democratization in Mexico, particularly if it continues to prove impolitic for administrations in the United States to take actions that would support any domestic campaign against the entire elite system in Mexico (as distinct from

particular power blocs that go too far in escaping their "containment" in the South).

The period since 1994 has seen a further building of the civic and human rights movement. Since 1997, the center-left PRD has been allowed to win four state governorships, achievements that were denied it under the previous administration. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, defeated presidential candidate in 1988 and 1994, also won a landslide victory in the first direct elections for Mayor of Mexico City. There are many other local examples of an apparent strengthening of democratic life. On the other hand, there have also been many examples of continuing impunity, notably the case of Roberto Madrazo Pintado. In this mixed pattern of developments, many of the vices of the old way of conducting Mexican politics continue in place, and these are not restricted to the PRI. Indeed, since the proportion of former PRI politicians in the PRD is increasing, one could argue that this is entirely predictable. That would, however, be somewhat simplistic, since effective ways of conducting politics vary according to situational fields of force rather than follow the innate predispositions of politicians. What we need to look at is what might be structuring the situations.

Economic misery and dislocation in marginalized rural areas has laid at least a passive base of support for guerrilla movements in some areas of the country, notably Guerrero and parts of Oaxaca. The evidence suggests, however, that the attempt to revive 1960s style "protracted people's war" has proved a failure. The well-armed but small Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) split in 1999, after a number of incidents in which defectors were eliminated by their own side. In contrast to the Colombian guerrilla organizations, the Mexican guerrillas command considerably less firepower and resources than the drug cartels, and have fewer opportunities to insert themselves into the sector as leading players. Drug cartels do at least offer opportunities for gaining

livelihoods and employment. This is a powerful consideration in discussing the possible future of the Shadow State, at the margins of Mexican society at least. Leaders of officially recognized peasant organizations are already warning that the tentacles of clientship linked to this sector of the real economy are penetrating deeper into rural communities as the old organs of political control decay for lack of resources (La Jornada, February 12th, 1999). My own ethnographic experience suggests that such anxieties are not misplaced.

At one level, such developments would correspond to established patterns. For example, at the start of the decade, the perceived weakening of the ruling party after the 1988 elections produced some quite vigorous mobilizations in Michoacán state against local bosses who were involved in illegal logging, drugs, and tourism development (Zárate Vidal 1998). All of these were prejudicial to the interests of peasant communities, especially indigenous peasant communities. They were defeated or reduced in effectiveness by two factors. One was the backing such local figures received from higher political levels, but the other was the sheer desperation of the poor and landless. People were willing to take risks to get land, but they were unwilling to turn down offers of jobs. Providing the bosses could stay out of jail, they possessed a great capacity to subvert movements by offering economic alternatives: agrarian militants by day crept off to work in the next community's illegal sawmill by night. If we look at how these local, ethnographically visible, figures articulate to the larger networks of the kind I have described as emergent feudal domains with transnational connections, we can begin to see how new kinds of power can be reforged in the shadows.

State Violence Through Proxies

This does not mean that the federal state apparatus in Mexico ceases to play any significant role in the new power relations. Another recent development is the appearance of paramilitary groups, notably though not exclusively in Chiapas. This fits into a broader global pattern by which embattled states use "proxies" to conduct dirty wars against civilians, since their actions have the useful quality of official "deniability." As Eric Wolf noted, the privatization of property and service provision is matched by a growing privatization of the means of violence, in which extra-legal force can also become a major instrument for advancing new agendas for global economic transformation (Wolf 1999: 273). It has now become clear that the emergence of paramilitary groups in Chiapas was part of the military counterinsurgency plan drafted in 1994 to deal with the EZLN rebellion (Proceso, 4th January, 1998). The foot soldiers of the paramilitary groups are recruited from poor and landless households, and the attractions of joining such a group are manifold. They are a means of recuperating dignity and masculinity by possessing a modern automatic weapon, and achieving a position in which fear breeds respect.[6] Some of the groups in Chiapas are officially recognized as "social development organizations," headed by politicians of the ruling PRI (Gómez Tagle 1998; Craske et al. 1998). They receive federal social development funds and although there is no evidence of them using such funds for their ostensible purpose, not all of their budget goes on arms purchases, since most of the guns and training come from the federal army and state police. Although there are some historical precedents for this way of organizing repressive power, there are no precedents for the present level of militarization in a country which traditionally had one of the smallest national security budgets per capita in Latin America (Grindle 1987). Although the

massacre of women and children at Acteal in December 1997 proved a tactical error, the strategy as a whole reflects a quite subtle understanding of the realities of the Chiapas situation which is, alas, not shared by most of the international left (Viqueira 1999). Although I do not have space to expatiate on this theme here, the following points are worthy of reflection.

Contrary to popular opinion, Chiapas does not have a simple, polarized class structure, cannot be seen as a place untouched by the Mexican revolution and has followed a pattern of development strongly linked to ever closer integration between local actors and the federal government apparatus (Viqueira 1999; Ascencio Franco 1998). In particular, the wave of spontaneous land invasions outside the Zapatista core area in the Selva Lacandona which followed the failure of the initial attempt to put down the rebellion by force has alienated a politically significant group of small to medium-sized ranchers. These are exactly the same kinds of social actors who spearheaded the "reactionary" Mapache uprising against the Carranza government in 1914 (Benjamin 1995). Including them in the equation makes the rise of the paramilitaries even more alarming, for the ranchers have their own agendas for sponsoring violence, laden with racist attitudes, certainly, but also with a sense of moral indignation as a class of people victimized both by "Indians" and the country's modernizing elite. Another factor is the tactical errors of the EZLN rebels. In particular, their call for people to abstain from voting for the PRD in the 1995 municipal elections enabled a large number of community bosses to remain in power, and thus contributed to the subsequent cycle of violence and counter-violence in those communities (Viqueira 1999: 96).

This, then, is an extremely complex situation in which forces of opposition are divided, and a number of different groups have reasonable claims to have their diverse inter-

ests reconciled. It is the perfect setting for a counterinsurgency war of attrition. In the summer of 1999, however, the war seemed in danger of heating up again. On June 6th, the military entered six communities in Las Cañadas de Ocosingo. A thousand people became displaced in the process, and further violence was perpetrated against community activists and priests by *priísta* loyalists. The army subsequently entered Zapatista base communities in the biosphere reserve and blocked access to the press and human rights organizations. Although an impending state governorship election as well as the presidential elections of 2000 make further action in the immediate future unlikely, significant questions remain as to how far the counterinsurgency war has been conducted by a coherent national state apparatus. It is far from clear that political control over the army is what it was, and there are many risks in the present strategy. It has divided communities against themselves, by promoting religious divisions between Catholics and Protestants that are also linked to internal community political conflicts, and by implanting paramilitary groups even in some of the Zapatista base communities. Although this may incapacitate the EZLN, it may also fuel more intractable forms of communal violence. The army has also sacked churches and persecuted priests in a manner that recalls the anticlerical violence of the 1920s.

This kind of "dirty war" not only impedes a negotiated settlement but generates new problems, already manifest in declining personal security in regions constantly patrolled by the army and the distortions introduced into social and economic life by a huge military presence. Drug trafficking is increasingly important, along with other kinds of smuggling. The impact of these developments is visible in forms of popular culture that might be given an anti-state reading. The cassette tapes people were buying in the small towns of Chiapas when I last visited the state in August 1998 were

raunchy *norteño* ballads celebrating heroic drug dealers living and dying well in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. The federal government finds it convenient to evoke a false image of Chiapas as a backward and isolated place as a way of evading its own, very substantial, responsibilities for the situation that provoked the conflict. It is true that one reason that the people of the Selva Lacandona supported the EZLN uprising was that they had limited opportunities to solve their problems by migration,[7] but the role of the national state in shaping their recent history is central, ranging from the creation of a large bio-reserve as a cover for logging to transformations in the structures of local power consequent on the growing intrusion of federal agencies. As the transport infrastructure created by the military opens up new commercial possibilities, Chiapas is becoming a laboratory for new forms of power that may have messy consequences of a kind that might indeed make parts of Mexico more like Colombia. Yet given the countries' different political histories, different regional configurations and different histories of mass urbanization, it is equally possible that a PRI victory in the 2000 elections will lead Mexico as a whole towards a relatively stable institutionalization of new power relations in which the activities associated with the Shadow State of the 1990s will continue to play an important role.

Conclusion: Globalization and Governmentality

Economic globalization is clearly provoking changes in modes of governmentality in the North as well as the South. One factor in the changing social configuration of "developed" economies is the implosion of former colonial populations into the post-modern, post-industrial metropolis, coupled with the relative lack of mobility of "natives" whose livelihoods have been disrupted by economic restructuring.

Many of the contemporary functions of the national state center around dealing with the mounting problems of controlling the social tensions generated by the social exclusion of large segments of the "native" population and declining employment stability and economic security even for the affluent majority. All changing local modes of "governmentality," be they related to multiculturalism, immigration control, workfare or carceral regimes, seem to be reflections of the way global processes shape what states now do as they respond to changing conditions and how they do it (in association with the media, NGOs and transnational agencies such as the IMF and World Trade Organization).

This suggests that the politics of the new millennium will be different from those of the start of the 20th century. This is not simply a matter of what states do, and the claims that they are prepared to recognize from different elements of civil society, but of how citizens imagine the state and the nation. The popular imaginaries of a post-socialist and post-developmentalist late capitalist world are surely different from those of the formative decades of this century, when building effective and independent national states was still a project, linked to dreams of "social progress," in many regions. The construction of states and construction of nations may become increasingly independent processes, or at any rate processes that are linked in quite different ways. The collapse of the Soviet Empire has certainly been productive of nationalist sentiment of a chauvinistic kind, but it has also been more productive of transnationally connected shadow powers than strong official states with a popular base. China may be a distinct case, in so far as it retains a relatively coherent official state and has been able to draw strength from ethnonationalist sentiment throughout its diaspora in recent years (Ong 1999). Yet there is also a considerable weight of shadow power behind the facade of the official state in China.

Each case is subject to its own particular historicity. It is perhaps of significance that the Soviet Empire was more than a gulag, and that there were positive aspects of "actually existing socialism," which some people now reconstruct as a past that was morally superior to the epoch of "savage capitalism" (Rigi 1999). The key issue is not whether people seriously believe that such mythicized pasts might be recovered but how they act in terms of responding to their perceptions of contemporary realities of power. The Soviet Union was enormously economically, socially and culturally diverse and it would be surprising if post-socialist responses were uniform, even in the way the Soviet era was re-imagined and reinterpreted in the face of the experience of crisis. In her work on the Siberian Buryats, Caroline Humphrey (1998) has shown how indigenous culture offers alternative models for collective economic organization (of a hierarchical rather than egalitarian kind). At the same time she argues that Buryat responses reflect a habitus developed during Soviet times that can be meaningfully compared with the post-socialist dilemmas of communities in parts of the former Soviet Union that are culturally very different. She explains these similarities in terms of the influence of socialist political culture, in the sense of general political attitudes and collectivist values, ironically securing greater recognition in a moment when "their achievements are almost overwhelmed" (Humphrey 1998: 492). The political habitus of the ex-empire was tied to the practice of power as well as to its official ideology. Humphrey suggests that there is also an elective affinity between pre- and Soviet-era models of politics in the Buryat case: this still manifests itself in the search for vertical ties with community patrons who are international media and sports personalities with influence in Moscow and, in some cases, Mafia connections ("idols of the people") and in the popularity of charismatic but authoritarian political leaders whose wealth is also of dubious ori-

gin (Humphrey 1998: 499-501). Something similar might be argued about Mexico.

The problem with a case like Mexico is precisely that popular commitments to the state and nation were once integrally linked. It was not a question of the populace being naive about the nature of power in Mexico, since people always knew the real nature of the power that lay behind the official masks. It was a question of a degree of reciprocity. People could admire leaders such as Lázaro Cárdenas because he treated them as "persons" worthy of respect and took concrete, if far from wholly successful, measures to redistribute resources and lay the basis for social mobility. This did not simply mean land reform, but acts of personal patronage that enabled some of those who failed to get land to migrate to what usually did, at that time, prove a brighter future in Mexico City. The people of Cárdenas's home region in Michoacán had an intimate knowledge of his family's economic advancement and the General's personal wealth. They judged him and future Presidents in terms of their ability to maintain a vision of the future in which all Mexicans might eventually prosper as members of an independent, sovereign nation. The new public sector jobs and pervasive state clientalism of the neo-populist Echeverría period kept the dream alive, despite the fact that the internationalization of the Mexican economy proceeded apace, and many of the gains in living standards were the result of family economic strategies rather than state projects. The electoral shock suffered by the PRI in 1988 demonstrated that there were limits to the amount of economic retrenchment Mexicans would tolerate, but Salinas was able to recuperate control by combining a selective clientalism and political manipulation of social development programs with a rhetoric that acknowledged the vices of the old regime and promised that the market would deliver prosperity.

The crash of 1994 and the subsequent unmasking of the architects of the new order changed the situation at one level, since the difficulties of the many were now starkly juxtaposed to the extraordinary advantages of the few in the new model. Yet economic misery is not necessarily conducive to political mobilization, and the neoliberal state proved capable of responding to popular dissent by repression as well as by more subtle tactics of continuing selective disbursement of increasingly decentralized resources and negotiation. Elections as such became less negotiated, and opposition parties faced the dilemmas of exercising power. They also failed to produce any convincing alternative to continuing participation in the global market economy. Political life is increasingly dominated by fears of an uncertain future, and compromise with the shadow structures of social and political power may well seem a better bet to many than holding out for dreams of justice, fairness and democracy that have already been denied for more than a century and a half. Shadow actors control the resources, and offer not only livelihoods but also a measure of protection against the violence of which they are the intellectual authors. Like their Russian counterparts, they can project an image of success in the global wealth creation process and enjoy an apparent impunity. The PRI's closing of ranks after drawing a line under the Salinista past is not an encouraging development.

There are continuing efforts by civic movements, human rights movements, and popular organizations to contest the rule of impunity and cynicism. Yet in the last analysis, the everyday practice of social life makes a fundamental contribution to the reproduction and transformation of power relations. People need to have confidence that being on the side of the angels will not bring them death or destitution, and above all, some confidence that the angels who speak the language of rights, democracy and the rule of law have some viable plan for securing their families a livelihood in

the age of globalization. In particular, they must believe that some politicians really are angels, rather than replicas of the devils they know, linked to them by ties of common interest that transcend fine words. Otherwise they will keep their heads down, and accommodate to the new kinds of disciplines that global capitalism, as mediated through transformed state apparatuses, is seeking to impose on them, through the relative immobility of the victims of "downsizing" and a partial transfer of sovereignty to private enterprise in zones dedicated to both "legal" and "illegal" export production. This is not a comforting thought when one surveys the balance of forces at work in Mexico today and the way this could be seen as the perverse consequence of the geopolitical interests of Washington, the corporate economic interests of Wall Street, and that old North Atlantic habit of projecting perceptions of internal crisis onto an eternally "othered" periphery.

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NOTES

1 The candidate of the ruling party, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, was challenged by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the popular reformist president of the 1930s, Lázaro Cárdenas. Cárdenas's defection from the ruling party served as the symbolic catalyst for an unprecedented electoral manifestation of popular disaffection

with the PRI government's handling of the process of structural adjustment in the "lost decade."

2 The same report also implicated President Zedillo's own private secretary, José Liébano Sáenz.

3 Another of the great mysteries of the Salinas era is why and by whom Cardinal Posadas was gunned down in the Guadalajara airport car park.

4 I am grateful to Robert Smith, of Barnard College, for allowing me to read drafts of papers on his research on Zacatecas prior to publication.

5 Since La Quina's removal, his union has lost 200,000 jobs nationally, a reduction of more than two-thirds. This downsizing is characteristic of other sectors of the Mexican economy and a global tendency in both the public and private sector. In the case of Mexico's public sector, the labor recruitment practices over which official unions presided undoubtedly led to "over-manning" as well as a number of other abuses that made the more privileged elements of the PEMEX workforce something of a national joke. Nevertheless, my own observations of the downsizing of the labor force in privatized sugar mills suggest that the process can be pushed to a point that raises issues of safety and certainly strips the remaining workers of benefits that were an important complement to money wages as a condition for family welfare. For all their vices, figures such as La Quina still have their adherents, while their successors, including leaderships anxious to break the ties with the state of the old official union organizations, have found it difficult to defend the interests of a workforce disciplined by the 1994 crash and unswerving government commitment to the interests of big business (Bensabet-Kleinberg 1999: 78-80).

6 This is very much the ethos that attracted people from poor rural families throughout Mexico to join the judicial police in the past. Joining a paramilitary group is much more attractive, since it involves far less social isolation: judicial police work in small groups and are often rejected by their own kin, whereas paramilitaries become substantial communities with a local presence.

7 A full understanding of the background to the EZLN rebellion demands an understanding of the specific social history and multi-ethnic character of the communities of the Selva Lacandona. For more discussion see Leyva Solano (1995) and Leyva Solano and Ascencio Franco (1996).

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