Showing newest posts with label Iran. Show older posts
Showing newest posts with label Iran. Show older posts
Tuesday, 19 October 2010
Wednesday, 18 August 2010
DOES THE RECENT UN RESOLUTION ON IRAN EXPOSE THE WEAKNESS OF THE YANKS?
By Massoud Parsi
After six months of intense US and Israeli lobbying, the UN
Security Council has voted for a new round of sanctions
against
But most commentators agree that Resolution 1929 is so
watered down - as a result of Chinese and Russian efforts -
that it will have little or no impact on
energy programme or Iranian trade and economic development.
decades and with none of the country’s key economic sectors
targeted by the new sanctions - and many provisions in the
new resolution voluntary rather than mandatory - there is
no reason to believe that
hardship now.
The timing of this latest round of sanctions - coming a few
days before the first anniversary of Iran’s controversial
presidential elections and a few weeks after what was
hailed by many as a landmark nuclear fuel swap deal between
Turkey, Brazil and Iran - raises many questions.
Key among these is why did the Americans reject
swap offer and how could such toothless sanctions be
considered a step in the right direction?
Undermined and delegitimised
The only feasible rationale for imposing further sanctions
in the face of Iran's obvious willingness to negotiate must
be found not in any wish to reduce the threat posed by
nuclear weapons, but instead in the geopolitical interests
of a few power-hungry countries - and their allies and
client states - who possess an undemocratic veto power in
the UN.
The UN, it appears, does not desire a nuclear-free
East
After the
the UN Security Council only serve to further delegitimise
the UN and to undermine its charter.
While the first round of sanctions against Iran were
unanimously adopted, this latest round - the fourth in as
many years - was called "a mistake" by Turkey and Brazil,
who voted against the motion, while Lebanon abstained -
pointing to the clear lack of consensus within the council.
Glaring contradictions
The senseless nature of the situation was immediately
obvious as statements emerged from various quarters.
On the one hand there were the Chinese who argued for
negotiations as the best way forward both before and after
voting in favour of further sanctions.
This stance may have been intended as a clever public
relations exercise, but its inherent contradiction is
glaring.
investment opportunities over the past decade and has
managed to further boost her opportunities by taking the
West for a "voluntary sanctions" ride that is destined to
further isolate the latter from
There are several emerging markets and technological
alternatives in the new post-financial crisis world
economic order.
While Iran certainly does not need greater economic
cooperation with the West, the latter's insistence on
limiting their own trade opportunities with one of the
world's largest economies - and one that owns vast amounts
of natural gas and oil - is quite baffling.
It does, however, make good sense to Chinese strategists.
Shrewd geopolitical game
supplying
by the latter help to maintain
in depth
Furthermore, closer collaboration between
would reduce the Americans' losses in
and reduce
keep
It is for this reason that
ostensibly designed to limit
while at the same time planning to open a new nuclear power
station in
sites in
with the kind of weapons that would effectively defend
All of these "exemptions" were included in a UN resolution
allegedly aimed at reducing
So a geopolitical game looks set to continue with comical
consequences.
'Nuclear apartheid'
With nothing offered in return for its willingness to
negotiate,
talks.
With limited options left for talks with
continue to limp along in the
quagmires and spending beyond its means while anti-American
sentiments are further boosted in the region.
At the same time, the Europeans decline in economic terms
and global influence, while the Chinese and Russians
continue to rise.
Add to this a shameless display of what may be described as
"nuclear apartheid" by the nuclear-armed culprits at the
direct expense of the non-proliferation agenda.
After decades of aimless talks, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) recently managed to put
illegal nuclear weapons on the agenda.
But what hope can the world really have for a serious
debate when it is only
and which has endured more than 4,000 invasive IAEA
inspections to date – that faces sanctions?
Ahmadinejad: A willing partner
It is hard to fathom what real long-term benefits the
hoping to gain from its obstructionism and exceptionalism
when it comes to the nuclear debate.
Perhaps the
more sanctions just before the June 12 anniversary, it may
undermine the Iranian regime.
But the Iranian opposition's position on the nuclear issue
is no less determined. And no Iranian group can hope to
gain power by challenging the Iranian government on the
basis of foreign dictates. To imagine otherwise is to
misunderstand Iranians.
In fact, and despite the rhetoric, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the
Iranian president, has turned out to be the most willing
partner for rapprochement with the
He has made several gestures, starting with a
congratulatory letter to Barack Obama, the
upon his election, and a daring proposal for a nuclear fuel
swap deal that was largely in line with a proposal made by
the UN six months earlier.
But Obama has responded with New Year messages to the
Iranian people and sanctions against their economy.
On no known occasion has the current - or previous -
administration made any direct approach to the Iranian
leaders for talks. Quite the opposite: Whether it is the
nuclear issue or Middle East affairs,
pointedly excluded from the list of invitees.
Irrelevant and biased
So, with the negotiations door firmly shut by the West,
Iran has little option but to turn its back on the UN's
nuclear apartheid policies, and to continue to build its
economy and strategic relations with the countries of the
South, while those of the North continue to isolate
themselves.
To the great majority of the people of
world, the UN Security Council is growing increasingly
irrelevant and biased.
The
Perhaps this is one of those hidden aims too, not just to
elevate the
that US allies never face the consequences of their
excesses, including those on the nuclear issue.
Sunday, 14 February 2010
OBAMA AND HILARY LEAD THE EMPIRE IN UNDERHAND DIVIDE AND RULE BETWEEN ARAB WORLD, IRAN AND CHINA
China feels US-Iran fallout
By Peter Lee
Asia Times Online
The question of the day in Washington is will the People's
Republic of China veto further United Nations Security
Council sanctions against Iran over Tehran's nuclear
program?
Informed opinion says "no".
China has exercised its veto only six times in 30 years on
the council. In matters core to national priorities, like
punishing countries such as Guatemala and Macedonia for
their ties to the Republic of China (Taiwan) and protecting
the interests of Pakistan, it has acted alone.
However, on broader geopolitical issues, in recent years it
has vetoed resolutions only when joined by at least one
other Security Council member.
France and the United Kingdom are lined up solidly behind
the United States on Iran's nuclear program, which some say
is geared towards making a nuclear bomb, a charge Tehran
consistently dismisses.
Russia this year is interested in improving ties with the
US and Europe and has moved toward support of sanctions. No
Russian veto, no Chinese veto, says the conventional
wisdom.
On the other hand, chances of China voting for sanctions
are slim. A press report covering Chinese Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi's visit to Paris at the beginning of February
says it all: "China Says Iran Sanctions Hinder Diplomacy."
Abstention is, therefore, China's most likely course.
Beijing's reaction might be expected to be a dismissive and
a resigned shrug: a symbolic vote, another toothless round
of sanctions, more political kabuki, and eventually
business as usual.
However, China's expected non-vote will be accompanied by
new feelings of unease and anger, reflecting Beijing's
growing suspicion that an important motivation for the Iran
sanctions, and the escalation of Iran tensions in general,
is Washington's desire to employ the issue as a wedge
against China.
In past years, China could regard US sanctions against
authoritarian regimes with a certain amount of complacency.
The George W Bush administration's heavy-handed approach
dismayed and divided natural allies of the US and drove its
targets deeper into China's embrace.
However, the Obama administration has decided to supplement
brute power with smart power. It apparently promotes
divisive international initiatives only when the splits in
international opinion and alliances are expected to go
America's way.
China first got a taste of the smart-power approach in
December at the Copenhagen climate summit. The US linked
the release of billions of dollars of climate adaptation
aid to vulnerable developing countries with China's
acceptance of a satisfactory transparency regime. Its
delegation passed the message to smaller nations that
China's intransigence was standing between them and
billions of dollars of much-needed assistance.
Despite the treaty debacle, the geopolitical results for
the Obama administration were encouraging. The European
Union sided with the US. According to an internal Chinese
report, a good number of Group of 77 nations were, for the
large part, influenced by the American position but did not
openly confront China. China cobbled together an alliance
with the emerging economies of Brazil and India and,
despite a concerted "blame China" effort by the US and the
UK, was able to limit the political damage.
However, it was a sobering experience for Chinese
diplomats. The report concluded "A conspiracy by developed
nations to divide the camp of developing nations [was] a
success."
Now, the Obama administration is picking on the regionally
and globally unpopular government of Iran, thereby exposing
China as the regime's lone international supporter of note.
The US has worked to bring the EU and Russia to its side.
The EU, at least, is now an enthusiastic ally. Relieved to
be dealing with a judicious and consultative American
president, it no longer sees the need to accommodate a
greater role for China on the world stage.
Russia has joined the American team (with sub voce
reservations), reportedly in response to the Obama
administration's concessions on shelving plans for a
missile defense shield in Eastern Europe.
The State Department has also worked with the Gulf states
to gain their support for a policy of putting Iran in its
place.
As far as the China issue is concerned, America's direct
solicitation of China's Security Council vote involved
Obama passing the word to President Hu Jintao that China's
interests would suffer if diplomatic pressure failed,
Israel attacked Iran's nuclear facilities, and the price of
oil went up.
It is unlikely that the Israel attack card was persuasive
to the Chinese leadership, and did little more than
convince them that Washington was using it as an excuse to
justify an extension of US influence in the Middle East.
A pre-emptive attack by Israel to nip Iran's nuclear
ambitions in the bud is unlikely.
Despite Tel Aviv's brave talk of its ability and
determination to launch a raid independent of US approval,
even a resounding success would probably only slow down the
program a few years while earning the undying enmity of the
Iranian people and the Muslim world toward Israel ... and
the United States, which would have to provide Israel with
flight privileges over Iraq to stage the attack.
American assertions that the Iranian nuclear program will
spark a ruinous arms race in the Gulf no doubt elicited
similar skepticism from China, with the unspoken
observation that, since most of those arms would be
supplied by the US and EU, the onus for (and profits of) an
arms race would probably fall to the West.
American efforts to wedge the Arab states away from China
are more likely to attract Beijing's attention and concern.
James Phillips of the Heritage Foundation spun US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton's current trip to the Middle East:
Clinton will be looking to the Arabs to "act as a
counterweight [to Iran] on China and help unlock its
Security Council vote.
The US is hoping to use these discussions with the Arabs as
a way to encourage China to look at its long-term economic
interests," Phillips added. "The Arabs could let the
Chinese know that it will hurt them economically with the
Arab countries in the long run if China clings to this
pro-Iran position.
United States protestations that all this diplomatic
maneuvering directed at China is justified by the need to
exhibit international unity on Iran ring hollow.
Invocation of the Israeli attack and the Gulf states arms
race bogeymen notwithstanding, the primary justification
for the current spasm of concern over Iran's nascent
nuclear activities is the dreaded Western "impatience",
which appears very similar to the manufactured impatience
that sent the coalition of the willing charging into Iraq
in 2003.
The stated remedy for this impatience, the UN sanctions, is
unlikely to work.
Russia cares enough about its relationship with Tehran to
make sure anything that gets through the Security Council
will not be particularly catastrophic.
On February 11, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Ryabkov made
this memorable statement: "We do not think sanctions will
work, but we understand that it is impossible to get by
without them in certain circumstances."
With early reports that a massive government presence
marginalized Green Movement demonstrators on the February
11 anniversary of the Iranian revolution of 1979, regime
change in Iran is probably off the table, too.
Even if a new regime came to power, Iran's national
commitment to nuclear power - and the perceived nuclear
weapons threat to the region - would probably remain
unchanged.
By conventional geopolitical logic, China would seem to
have the right idea: more jaw-jaw and engagement or, as it
called for in a recent editorial, "patience, patience and
more patience."
But US policy seems to be moving in the opposite direction,
stoking the crisis instead of lowering the heat.
So what's China's takeaway from the Iran crisis?
Absent an immediate, credible threat of an Israeli attack
on Iran, the US is rushing the international community
toward "crushing sanctions" on Tehran that, if carried out,
would result in disruption of Iran's energy exports.
If this were to actually occur, the big loser in the Iran
crisis would be China.
As a Chinese analyst told Reuters: "Fully going with
Western expansion of sanctions on Iran so they restrict
Iran's energy exports would amount to disguised sanctions
against China, and China certainly won't agree," Wang Feng,
a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences told
the Global Times, a Chinese newspaper published on
Thursday.
Reportedly, the US had advised China it would dispatch
Hillary Clinton to visit Iran's enemies in the Persian Gulf
and ensure that, if sanctions disrupted the supply of
Iranian oil, Saudi Arabia and its associates would ensure
that China's petroleum needs would continue to be met.
It is unlikely that China's vision of its energy security
involves relying on the US's good offices to deal with the
consequences of a US-imposed policy that it rejects and had
no voice in formulating.
In any case, the prospects for an oil-price Armageddon are
unlikely. Given free-market realities and the greed of oil
producers inside and outside the Gulf, the world would
suffer as much as China if Iranian crude disappeared from
the market.
For Beijing, the biggest concern is its perception that
Europe, Russia and the Gulf states are signing on to an
anti-Iran initiative that could impact China's interests in
such a major way without accommodating China's priorities.
From Beijing's point of view, China is the main superpower
stakeholder in the Iran crisis.
So it is asking why isn't it being consulted? Indeed, why
aren't its critical interests given priority, instead of
subjecting it to moonshine about an Israeli attack, an arms
race in the Gulf and lectures about its geopolitical
interests?
China is not a threat to the international order, but it is
its most independent and uncontrollable element. There are
growing signs of a shared consensus in the West that
reliance on China as a stabilizing financial, economic and
geopolitical factor must be reduced.
The past few years have been good to China's competitors
-especially India - and bad for China's allies - Pakistan
and Iran.
By accident or design, the Obama administration's decision
to heat up the Iran controversy has driven another wedge
between China and the US, the EU, the Gulf states and even
Russia.
The issue for China is whether the purpose of America's
Iran campaign is to isolate Iran ... or to isolate China?
This is a consequence of China's participation in the
security initiatives that the US chooses to organize to
protect and promote its own and loyal allies' interests.
China responded to the escalation of the Iran nuclear
crisis with a remarkable lead editorial in the Global
Times, the international affairs organ of People's Daily,
the government mouthpiece,.
The editorial, with the eye-catching title "Iran and the
West: Neither Should Think of Taking China Hostage",
painted China as the victim of the standoff. In an effort
to be even-handed, both Iran and the West are criticized
for their intransigence.
Nevertheless, both the West and Iran are unheeding at this
time. They both believe that only if they are unyielding,
then the other side will back off. This unenlightened
attitude even extends to their attitude toward China. Both
sides believe that all that's needed is to put pressure on
China, then China will, without considering its own
interests ... lower its head to them ... This thinking is
unrealistic.
The use of the loaded term, "lower its head", conjuring
images of the humiliating kowtow, instead of a more neutral
term such as "support one or the other" is an indication
that red lines are being drawn.
The fact that China's main worry is the West, and not Iran,
is unambiguously conveyed in the editorial's conclusion.
Recently in Western public opinion has been a call to use
the Iran issue to isolate China. This is extremely
superficial ... China is a big country and its interests
must be respected. China's dilemma must be sympathized
with. China's proposal opposing sanctions must be
understood. The big powers must cooperate and negotiate on
the Iran issue ...
China is a great country. If anyone seeks to compel her, to
injure her, they will certainly pay the price. Pretty
strong stuff.
The editorial is a clear indication that China considers
itself the target - or at least intended collateral damage
- in America's anti-Iran campaign. It makes the case that,
if the Obama administration sincerely cared about its
relationship with China, Washington would back off from the
sanctions campaign and allow negotiations to continue.
But that doesn't look like it's going to happen.
Sanctions will probably go ahead, with China either
abstaining or throwing in a tactical "yes" vote to postpone
an overt breach, and Washington will obtain another point
of leverage against China in the Persian Gulf.
If that happens, China will have to think about adjusting
to a new world situation in which the West seems less
interested in bargaining for its support or respecting its
interests.
Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy.
By Peter LeeAsia Times Online
The question of the day in Washington is will the People's
Republic of China veto further United Nations Security
Council sanctions against Iran over Tehran's nuclear
program?
Informed opinion says "no".
China has exercised its veto only six times in 30 years on
the council. In matters core to national priorities, like
punishing countries such as Guatemala and Macedonia for
their ties to the Republic of China (Taiwan) and protecting
the interests of Pakistan, it has acted alone.
However, on broader geopolitical issues, in recent years it
has vetoed resolutions only when joined by at least one
other Security Council member.
France and the United Kingdom are lined up solidly behind
the United States on Iran's nuclear program, which some say
is geared towards making a nuclear bomb, a charge Tehran
consistently dismisses.
Russia this year is interested in improving ties with the
US and Europe and has moved toward support of sanctions. No
Russian veto, no Chinese veto, says the conventional
wisdom.
On the other hand, chances of China voting for sanctions
are slim. A press report covering Chinese Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi's visit to Paris at the beginning of February
says it all: "China Says Iran Sanctions Hinder Diplomacy."
Abstention is, therefore, China's most likely course.
Beijing's reaction might be expected to be a dismissive and
a resigned shrug: a symbolic vote, another toothless round
of sanctions, more political kabuki, and eventually
business as usual.
However, China's expected non-vote will be accompanied by
new feelings of unease and anger, reflecting Beijing's
growing suspicion that an important motivation for the Iran
sanctions, and the escalation of Iran tensions in general,
is Washington's desire to employ the issue as a wedge
against China.
In past years, China could regard US sanctions against
authoritarian regimes with a certain amount of complacency.
The George W Bush administration's heavy-handed approach
dismayed and divided natural allies of the US and drove its
targets deeper into China's embrace.
However, the Obama administration has decided to supplement
brute power with smart power. It apparently promotes
divisive international initiatives only when the splits in
international opinion and alliances are expected to go
America's way.
China first got a taste of the smart-power approach in
December at the Copenhagen climate summit. The US linked
the release of billions of dollars of climate adaptation
aid to vulnerable developing countries with China's
acceptance of a satisfactory transparency regime. Its
delegation passed the message to smaller nations that
China's intransigence was standing between them and
billions of dollars of much-needed assistance.
Despite the treaty debacle, the geopolitical results for
the Obama administration were encouraging. The European
Union sided with the US. According to an internal Chinese
report, a good number of Group of 77 nations were, for the
large part, influenced by the American position but did not
openly confront China. China cobbled together an alliance
with the emerging economies of Brazil and India and,
despite a concerted "blame China" effort by the US and the
UK, was able to limit the political damage.
However, it was a sobering experience for Chinese
diplomats. The report concluded "A conspiracy by developed
nations to divide the camp of developing nations [was] a
success."
Now, the Obama administration is picking on the regionally
and globally unpopular government of Iran, thereby exposing
China as the regime's lone international supporter of note.
The US has worked to bring the EU and Russia to its side.
The EU, at least, is now an enthusiastic ally. Relieved to
be dealing with a judicious and consultative American
president, it no longer sees the need to accommodate a
greater role for China on the world stage.
Russia has joined the American team (with sub voce
reservations), reportedly in response to the Obama
administration's concessions on shelving plans for a
missile defense shield in Eastern Europe.
The State Department has also worked with the Gulf states
to gain their support for a policy of putting Iran in its
place.
As far as the China issue is concerned, America's direct
solicitation of China's Security Council vote involved
Obama passing the word to President Hu Jintao that China's
interests would suffer if diplomatic pressure failed,
Israel attacked Iran's nuclear facilities, and the price of
oil went up.
It is unlikely that the Israel attack card was persuasive
to the Chinese leadership, and did little more than
convince them that Washington was using it as an excuse to
justify an extension of US influence in the Middle East.
A pre-emptive attack by Israel to nip Iran's nuclear
ambitions in the bud is unlikely.
Despite Tel Aviv's brave talk of its ability and
determination to launch a raid independent of US approval,
even a resounding success would probably only slow down the
program a few years while earning the undying enmity of the
Iranian people and the Muslim world toward Israel ... and
the United States, which would have to provide Israel with
flight privileges over Iraq to stage the attack.
American assertions that the Iranian nuclear program will
spark a ruinous arms race in the Gulf no doubt elicited
similar skepticism from China, with the unspoken
observation that, since most of those arms would be
supplied by the US and EU, the onus for (and profits of) an
arms race would probably fall to the West.
American efforts to wedge the Arab states away from China
are more likely to attract Beijing's attention and concern.
James Phillips of the Heritage Foundation spun US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton's current trip to the Middle East:
Clinton will be looking to the Arabs to "act as a
counterweight [to Iran] on China and help unlock its
Security Council vote.
The US is hoping to use these discussions with the Arabs as
a way to encourage China to look at its long-term economic
interests," Phillips added. "The Arabs could let the
Chinese know that it will hurt them economically with the
Arab countries in the long run if China clings to this
pro-Iran position.
United States protestations that all this diplomatic
maneuvering directed at China is justified by the need to
exhibit international unity on Iran ring hollow.
Invocation of the Israeli attack and the Gulf states arms
race bogeymen notwithstanding, the primary justification
for the current spasm of concern over Iran's nascent
nuclear activities is the dreaded Western "impatience",
which appears very similar to the manufactured impatience
that sent the coalition of the willing charging into Iraq
in 2003.
The stated remedy for this impatience, the UN sanctions, is
unlikely to work.
Russia cares enough about its relationship with Tehran to
make sure anything that gets through the Security Council
will not be particularly catastrophic.
On February 11, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Ryabkov made
this memorable statement: "We do not think sanctions will
work, but we understand that it is impossible to get by
without them in certain circumstances."
With early reports that a massive government presence
marginalized Green Movement demonstrators on the February
11 anniversary of the Iranian revolution of 1979, regime
change in Iran is probably off the table, too.
Even if a new regime came to power, Iran's national
commitment to nuclear power - and the perceived nuclear
weapons threat to the region - would probably remain
unchanged.
By conventional geopolitical logic, China would seem to
have the right idea: more jaw-jaw and engagement or, as it
called for in a recent editorial, "patience, patience and
more patience."
But US policy seems to be moving in the opposite direction,
stoking the crisis instead of lowering the heat.
So what's China's takeaway from the Iran crisis?
Absent an immediate, credible threat of an Israeli attack
on Iran, the US is rushing the international community
toward "crushing sanctions" on Tehran that, if carried out,
would result in disruption of Iran's energy exports.
If this were to actually occur, the big loser in the Iran
crisis would be China.
As a Chinese analyst told Reuters: "Fully going with
Western expansion of sanctions on Iran so they restrict
Iran's energy exports would amount to disguised sanctions
against China, and China certainly won't agree," Wang Feng,
a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences told
the Global Times, a Chinese newspaper published on
Thursday.
Reportedly, the US had advised China it would dispatch
Hillary Clinton to visit Iran's enemies in the Persian Gulf
and ensure that, if sanctions disrupted the supply of
Iranian oil, Saudi Arabia and its associates would ensure
that China's petroleum needs would continue to be met.
It is unlikely that China's vision of its energy security
involves relying on the US's good offices to deal with the
consequences of a US-imposed policy that it rejects and had
no voice in formulating.
In any case, the prospects for an oil-price Armageddon are
unlikely. Given free-market realities and the greed of oil
producers inside and outside the Gulf, the world would
suffer as much as China if Iranian crude disappeared from
the market.
For Beijing, the biggest concern is its perception that
Europe, Russia and the Gulf states are signing on to an
anti-Iran initiative that could impact China's interests in
such a major way without accommodating China's priorities.
From Beijing's point of view, China is the main superpower
stakeholder in the Iran crisis.
So it is asking why isn't it being consulted? Indeed, why
aren't its critical interests given priority, instead of
subjecting it to moonshine about an Israeli attack, an arms
race in the Gulf and lectures about its geopolitical
interests?
China is not a threat to the international order, but it is
its most independent and uncontrollable element. There are
growing signs of a shared consensus in the West that
reliance on China as a stabilizing financial, economic and
geopolitical factor must be reduced.
The past few years have been good to China's competitors
-especially India - and bad for China's allies - Pakistan
and Iran.
By accident or design, the Obama administration's decision
to heat up the Iran controversy has driven another wedge
between China and the US, the EU, the Gulf states and even
Russia.
The issue for China is whether the purpose of America's
Iran campaign is to isolate Iran ... or to isolate China?
This is a consequence of China's participation in the
security initiatives that the US chooses to organize to
protect and promote its own and loyal allies' interests.
China responded to the escalation of the Iran nuclear
crisis with a remarkable lead editorial in the Global
Times, the international affairs organ of People's Daily,
the government mouthpiece,.
The editorial, with the eye-catching title "Iran and the
West: Neither Should Think of Taking China Hostage",
painted China as the victim of the standoff. In an effort
to be even-handed, both Iran and the West are criticized
for their intransigence.
Nevertheless, both the West and Iran are unheeding at this
time. They both believe that only if they are unyielding,
then the other side will back off. This unenlightened
attitude even extends to their attitude toward China. Both
sides believe that all that's needed is to put pressure on
China, then China will, without considering its own
interests ... lower its head to them ... This thinking is
unrealistic.
The use of the loaded term, "lower its head", conjuring
images of the humiliating kowtow, instead of a more neutral
term such as "support one or the other" is an indication
that red lines are being drawn.
The fact that China's main worry is the West, and not Iran,
is unambiguously conveyed in the editorial's conclusion.
Recently in Western public opinion has been a call to use
the Iran issue to isolate China. This is extremely
superficial ... China is a big country and its interests
must be respected. China's dilemma must be sympathized
with. China's proposal opposing sanctions must be
understood. The big powers must cooperate and negotiate on
the Iran issue ...
China is a great country. If anyone seeks to compel her, to
injure her, they will certainly pay the price. Pretty
strong stuff.
The editorial is a clear indication that China considers
itself the target - or at least intended collateral damage
- in America's anti-Iran campaign. It makes the case that,
if the Obama administration sincerely cared about its
relationship with China, Washington would back off from the
sanctions campaign and allow negotiations to continue.
But that doesn't look like it's going to happen.
Sanctions will probably go ahead, with China either
abstaining or throwing in a tactical "yes" vote to postpone
an overt breach, and Washington will obtain another point
of leverage against China in the Persian Gulf.
If that happens, China will have to think about adjusting
to a new world situation in which the West seems less
interested in bargaining for its support or respecting its
interests.
Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy.
Sunday, 10 January 2010
A DEEPER LOOK INTO US INVOLVEMENT IN YEMEN
Obama's Yemeni odyssey targets China
By M K Bhadrakumar
Asia Times
A year ago, Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh made the
startling revelation that his country's security forces
apprehended a group of Islamists linked to the Israeli
intelligence forces. "A terrorist cell was apprehended and
will be referred to the courts for its links with the
Israeli intelligence services," he promised.
Saleh added, "You will hear about the trial proceedings."
Nothing was ever heard and the trail went cold. Welcome to
the magical land of Yemen, where in the womb of time the
Arabian Nights were played out.
Combine Yemen with the mystique of Islam, Osama bin Laden,
al-Qaeda and the Israeli intelligence and you get a heady
mix. The head of the US Central Command, General David
Petraeus, dropped in at the capital, Sana'a, on Saturday
and vowed to Saleh increased American aid to fight
al-Qaeda. United States President Barack Obama promptly
echoed Petraeus' promise, assuring that the US would step
up intelligence-sharing and training of Yemeni forces and
perhaps carry out joint attacks against militants in the
region.
Another Afghanistan?
Many accounts say that Obama, who is
widely regarded as a gifted and intelligent politician, is
blundering into a catastrophic mistake by starting another
war that could turn out to be as bloody and chaotic and
unwinnable as Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, on the face of it,
Obama does seem erratic. The parallels with Afghanistan are
striking. There has been an attempt to destroy a US plane
by a Nigerian student who says he received training in
Yemen. And America wants to go to war.
Yemen, too, is a land of wonderfully beautiful rugged
mountains that could be a guerilla paradise. Yemenis are a
hospitable lot, like Afghan tribesmen, but as Irish
journalist Patrick Cockurn recollects, while they are
generous to passing strangers, they "deem the laws of
hospitality to lapse when the stranger leaves their tribal
territory, at which time he becomes 'a good back to shoot
at'." Surely, there is romance in the air - almost like in
the Hindu Kush. Fiercely nationalistic, almost every Yemeni
has a gun. Yemen is also, like Afghanistan, a land of
conflicting authorities, and with foreign intervention, a
little civil war is waiting to flare up.
Is Obama so incredibly forgetful of his own December 1
speech outlining his Afghan strategy that he violated his
own canons? Certainly not. Obama is a smart man. The
intervention in Yemen will go down as one of the smartest
moves that he ever made for perpetuating the US's global
hegemony. It is America's answer to China's surge.
A cursory look at the map of region will show that Yemen is
one of the most strategic lands adjoining waters of the
Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. It flanks Saudi
Arabia and Oman, which are vital American protectorates. In
effect, Uncle Sam is "marking territory" - like a dog on a
lamppost. Russia has been toying with the idea of reopening
its Soviet-era base in Aden. Well, the US has pipped Moscow
in the race.
The US has signaled that the odyssey doesn't end with
Yemen. It is also moving into Somalia and Kenya. With that,
the US establishes its military presence in an entire
unbroken stretch of real estate all along the Indian
Ocean's western rim. Chinese officials have of late spoken
of their need to establish a naval base in the region. The
US has now foreclosed China's options. The only country
with a coastline that is available for China to set up a
naval base in the region will be Iran. All other countries
have a Western military presence.
The American intervention in Yemen is not going to be on
the pattern of Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama will ensure he
doesn't receive any body bags of American servicemen
serving in Yemen. That is what the American public expects
from him. He will only deploy drone aircraft and special
forces and "focus on providing intelligence and training to
help Yemen counter al-Qaeda militants", according to the US
military. Obama's main core objective will be to establish
an enduring military presence in Yemen. This serves many
purposes.
A new great game begins First, the US move has to be viewed
against the historic backdrop of the Shi'ite awakening in
the region. The Shi'ites (mostly of the Zaidi group) have
been traditionally suppressed in Yemen. Shi'ite uprisings
have been a recurring theme in Yemen's history. There has
been a deliberate attempt to minimize the percentage of
Shi'ites in Yemen, but they could be anywhere up to 45%.
More importantly, in the northern part of the country, they
constitute the majority. What bothers the US and moderate
Sunni Arab states - and Israel - is that the Believing
Youth Organization led by Hussein Badr al-Houthi, which is
entrenched in northern Yemen, is modeled after Hezbollah in
Lebanon in all respects - politically, economically,
socially and culturally.
Yemenis are an intelligent people and are famous in the
Arabian Peninsula for their democratic temperament. The
Yemeni Shi'ite empowerment on a Hezbollah-model would have
far-reaching regional implications. Next-door Oman, which
is a key American base, is predominantly Shi'ite. Even more
sensitive is the likelihood of the dangerous idea of
Shi'ite empowerment spreading to Saudi Arabia's highly
restive Shi'ite regions adjoining Yemen, which on top of it
all, also happen to be the reservoir of the country's
fabulous oil wealth.
Saudi Arabia is entering a highly sensitive phase of
political transition as a new generation is set to take
over the leadership in Riyadh, and the palace intrigues and
fault lines within the royal family are likely to get
exacerbated. To put it mildly, given the vast scale of
institutionalized Shi'ite persecution in Saudi Arabia by
the Wahhabi establishment, Shi'ite empowerment is a
veritable minefield that Riyadh is petrified about at this
juncture. Its threshold of patience is wearing thin, as the
recent uncharacteristic resort to military power against
the north Yemeni Shi'ite communities bordering Saudi Arabia
testifies.
The US faces a classic dilemma. It is all right for Obama
to highlight the need of reform in Muslim societies - as he
did eloquently in his Cairo speech last June. But
democratization in the Yemeni context - ironically, in the
Arab context - would involve Shi'ite empowerment. After the
searing experience in Iraq, Washington is literally perched
like a cat on a hot tin roof. It would much rather be
aligned with the repressive, autocratic government of Saleh
than let the genie of reform out of the bottle in the oil
rich-region in which it has profound interests.
Obama has an erudite mind and he is not unaware that what
Yemen desperately needs is reform, but he simply doesn't
want to think about it. The paradox he faces is that with
all its imperfections, Iran happens to be the only
"democratic" system operating in that entire region.
Iran's shadow over the Yemeni Shi'ite consciousness worries
the US to no end. Simply put, in the ideological struggle
going on in the region, Obama finds himself with the
ultra-conservative and brutally autocratic oligarchies that
constitute the ruling class in the region. Conceivably, he
isn't finding it easy. If his own memoirs are to be
believed, there could be times when the vague recollections
of his childhood in Indonesia and his precious memories of
his own mother, who from all accounts was a free-wheeling
intellectual and humanist, must be stalking him in the
White House corridors.
Israel moves in But Obama is first and foremost a realist.
Emotions and personal beliefs drain away and strategic
considerations weigh uppermost when he works in the Oval
Office. With the military presence in Yemen, the US has
tightened the cordon around Iran. In the event of a
military attack on Iran, Yemen could be put to use as a
springboard by the Israelis. These are weighty
considerations for Obama.
The fact is that no one is in control as a Yemeni
authority. It is a cakewalk for the formidable Israeli
intelligence to carve out a niche in Yemen - just as it did
in northern Iraq under somewhat comparable circumstances.
Islamism doesn't deter Israel at all. Saleh couldn't have
been far off the mark when he alleged last year that
Israeli intelligence had been exposed as having kept links
with Yemeni Islamists. The point is, Yemeni Islamists are a
highly fragmented lot and no one is sure who owes what sort
of allegiance to whom. Israeli intelligence operates
marvelously in such twilight zones when the horizon is
lacerated with the blood of the vanishing sun.
Israel will find a toehold in Yemen to be a god-sent gift
insofar as it registers its presence in the Arabian
Peninsula. This is a dream come true for Israel, whose
effectiveness as a regional power has always been seriously
handicapped by its lack of access to the Persian Gulf
region. The overarching US military presence helps Israel
politically to consolidate its Yemeni chapter. Without
doubt, Petraeus is moving on Yemen in tandem with Israel
(and Britain). But the "pro-West" Arab states with their
rentier mentality have no choice except to remain as mute
spectators on the sidelines.
Some among them may actually acquiesce with the Israeli
security presence in the region as a safer bet than the
spread of the dangerous ideas of Shi'ite empowerment
emanating out of Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah. Also, at some
stage, Israeli intelligence will begin to infiltrate the
extremist Sunni outfits in Yemen, which are commonly known
as affiliates of al-Qaeda. That is, if it hasn't done that
already. Any such link makes Israel an invaluable ally for
the US in its fight against al-Qaeda. In sum, infinite
possibilities exist in the paradigm that is taking shape in
the Muslim world abutting into the strategic Persian Gulf.
It's all about China
Most important, however, for US global
strategies will be the massive gain of control of the port
of Aden in Yemen. Britain can vouchsafe that Aden is the
gateway to Asia. Control of Aden and the Malacca Strait
will put the US in an unassailable position in the "great
game" of the Indian Ocean. The sea lanes of the Indian
Ocean are literally the jugular veins of China's economy.
By controlling them, Washington sends a strong message to
Beijing that any notions by the latter that the US is a
declining power in Asia would be nothing more than an
extravagant indulgence in fantasy.
In the Indian Ocean region, China is increasingly coming
under pressure. India is a natural ally of the US in the
Indian Ocean region. Both disfavor any significant Chinese
naval presence. India is mediating a rapprochement between
Washington and Colombo that would help roll back Chinese
influence in Sri Lanka. The US has taken a u-turn in its
Myanmar policy and is engaging the regime there with the
primary intent of eroding China's influence with the
military rulers. The Chinese strategy aimed at
strengthening influence in Sri Lanka and Myanmar so as to
open a new transportation route towards the Middle East,
the Persian Gulf and Africa, where it has begun contesting
traditional Western economic dominance.
China is keen to whittle down its dependence on the Malacca
Strait for its commerce with Europe and West Asia. The US,
on the contrary, is determined that China remains
vulnerable to the choke point between Indonesia and
Malaysia.
An engrossing struggle is breaking out. The US is unhappy
with China's efforts to reach the warm waters of the
Persian Gulf through the Central Asian region and Pakistan.
Slowly but steadily, Washington is tightening the noose
around the neck of the Pakistani elites - civilian and
military - and forcing them to make a strategic choice
between the US and China. This will put those elites in an
unenviable dilemma. Like their Indian counterparts, they
are inherently "pro-Western" (even when they are
"anti-American") and if the Chinese connection is important
for Islamabad, that is primarily because it balances
perceived Indian hegemony.
The existential questions with which the Pakistani elites
are grappling are apparent. They are seeking answers from
Obama. Can Obama maintain a balanced relationship vis-a-vis
Pakistan and India? Or, will Obama lapse back to the George
W Bush era strategy of building up India as the pre-eminent
power in the Indian Ocean under whose shadow Pakistan will
have to learn to live?
US-India-Israel axis
On the other hand, the Indian elites
are in no compromising mood. Delhi was on a roll during the
Bush days. Now, after the initial misgivings about Obama's
political philosophy, Delhi is concluding that he is all
but a clone of his illustrious predecessor as regards the
broad contours of the US's global strategy - of which
containment of China is a core template.
The comfort level is palpably rising in Delhi with regard
to the Obama presidency. Delhi takes the surge of the
Israeli lobby in Washington as the litmus test for the
Obama presidency. The surge suits Delhi, since the Jewish
lobby was always a helpful ally in cultivating influence in
the US Congress, media and the rabble-rousing think-tankers
as well as successive administrations. And all this is
happening at a time when the India-Israel security
relationship is gaining greater momentum.
United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates is due to
visit Delhi in the coming days. The Obama administration is
reportedly adopting an increasingly accommodative attitude
toward India's longstanding quest for "dual-use" technology
from the US. If so, a massive avenue of military
cooperation is about to open between the two countries,
which will make India a serious challenger to China's
growing military prowess. It is a win-win situation as the
great Indian arms bazaar offers highly lucrative business
for American companies.
Clearly, a cozy three-way US-Israel-India alliance provides
the underpinning for all the maneuvering that is going on.
It will have significance for the security of the Indian
Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Last
year, India formalized a naval presence in Oman.
All-in-all, terrorism experts are counting the trees and
missing the wood when they analyze the US foray into Yemen
in the limited terms of hunting down al-Qaeda. The hard
reality is that Obama, whose main plank used to be
"change", has careened away and increasingly defaults to
the global strategies of the Bush era. The freshness of the
Obama magic is dissipating. Traces of the "revisionism" in
his foreign policy orientation are beginning to surface. We
can see them already with regard to Iran, Afghanistan, the
Middle East and the Israel-Palestine problem, Central Asia
and towards China and Russia.
Arguably, this sort of "return of the native" by Obama was
inevitable. For one thing, he is but a creature of his
circumstances. As someone put it brilliantly, Obama's
presidency is like driving a train rather than a car: a
train cannot be "steered", the driver can at best set its
speed, but ultimately, it must run on its tracks.
Besides, history has no instances of a declining world
power meekly accepting its destiny and walking into the
sunset. The US cannot give up on its global dominance
without putting up a real fight. And the reality of all
such momentous struggles is that they cannot be fought
piece-meal. You cannot fight China without occupying Yemen.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet
Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
By M K Bhadrakumar
Asia TimesA year ago, Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh made the
startling revelation that his country's security forces
apprehended a group of Islamists linked to the Israeli
intelligence forces. "A terrorist cell was apprehended and
will be referred to the courts for its links with the
Israeli intelligence services," he promised.
Saleh added, "You will hear about the trial proceedings."
Nothing was ever heard and the trail went cold. Welcome to
the magical land of Yemen, where in the womb of time the
Arabian Nights were played out.
Combine Yemen with the mystique of Islam, Osama bin Laden,
al-Qaeda and the Israeli intelligence and you get a heady
mix. The head of the US Central Command, General David
Petraeus, dropped in at the capital, Sana'a, on Saturday
and vowed to Saleh increased American aid to fight
al-Qaeda. United States President Barack Obama promptly
echoed Petraeus' promise, assuring that the US would step
up intelligence-sharing and training of Yemeni forces and
perhaps carry out joint attacks against militants in the
region.
Another Afghanistan?
Many accounts say that Obama, who is
widely regarded as a gifted and intelligent politician, is
blundering into a catastrophic mistake by starting another
war that could turn out to be as bloody and chaotic and
unwinnable as Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, on the face of it,
Obama does seem erratic. The parallels with Afghanistan are
striking. There has been an attempt to destroy a US plane
by a Nigerian student who says he received training in
Yemen. And America wants to go to war.
Yemen, too, is a land of wonderfully beautiful rugged
mountains that could be a guerilla paradise. Yemenis are a
hospitable lot, like Afghan tribesmen, but as Irish
journalist Patrick Cockurn recollects, while they are
generous to passing strangers, they "deem the laws of
hospitality to lapse when the stranger leaves their tribal
territory, at which time he becomes 'a good back to shoot
at'." Surely, there is romance in the air - almost like in
the Hindu Kush. Fiercely nationalistic, almost every Yemeni
has a gun. Yemen is also, like Afghanistan, a land of
conflicting authorities, and with foreign intervention, a
little civil war is waiting to flare up.
Is Obama so incredibly forgetful of his own December 1
speech outlining his Afghan strategy that he violated his
own canons? Certainly not. Obama is a smart man. The
intervention in Yemen will go down as one of the smartest
moves that he ever made for perpetuating the US's global
hegemony. It is America's answer to China's surge.
A cursory look at the map of region will show that Yemen is
one of the most strategic lands adjoining waters of the
Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. It flanks Saudi
Arabia and Oman, which are vital American protectorates. In
effect, Uncle Sam is "marking territory" - like a dog on a
lamppost. Russia has been toying with the idea of reopening
its Soviet-era base in Aden. Well, the US has pipped Moscow
in the race.
The US has signaled that the odyssey doesn't end with
Yemen. It is also moving into Somalia and Kenya. With that,
the US establishes its military presence in an entire
unbroken stretch of real estate all along the Indian
Ocean's western rim. Chinese officials have of late spoken
of their need to establish a naval base in the region. The
US has now foreclosed China's options. The only country
with a coastline that is available for China to set up a
naval base in the region will be Iran. All other countries
have a Western military presence.
The American intervention in Yemen is not going to be on
the pattern of Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama will ensure he
doesn't receive any body bags of American servicemen
serving in Yemen. That is what the American public expects
from him. He will only deploy drone aircraft and special
forces and "focus on providing intelligence and training to
help Yemen counter al-Qaeda militants", according to the US
military. Obama's main core objective will be to establish
an enduring military presence in Yemen. This serves many
purposes.
A new great game begins First, the US move has to be viewed
against the historic backdrop of the Shi'ite awakening in
the region. The Shi'ites (mostly of the Zaidi group) have
been traditionally suppressed in Yemen. Shi'ite uprisings
have been a recurring theme in Yemen's history. There has
been a deliberate attempt to minimize the percentage of
Shi'ites in Yemen, but they could be anywhere up to 45%.
More importantly, in the northern part of the country, they
constitute the majority. What bothers the US and moderate
Sunni Arab states - and Israel - is that the Believing
Youth Organization led by Hussein Badr al-Houthi, which is
entrenched in northern Yemen, is modeled after Hezbollah in
Lebanon in all respects - politically, economically,
socially and culturally.
Yemenis are an intelligent people and are famous in the
Arabian Peninsula for their democratic temperament. The
Yemeni Shi'ite empowerment on a Hezbollah-model would have
far-reaching regional implications. Next-door Oman, which
is a key American base, is predominantly Shi'ite. Even more
sensitive is the likelihood of the dangerous idea of
Shi'ite empowerment spreading to Saudi Arabia's highly
restive Shi'ite regions adjoining Yemen, which on top of it
all, also happen to be the reservoir of the country's
fabulous oil wealth.
Saudi Arabia is entering a highly sensitive phase of
political transition as a new generation is set to take
over the leadership in Riyadh, and the palace intrigues and
fault lines within the royal family are likely to get
exacerbated. To put it mildly, given the vast scale of
institutionalized Shi'ite persecution in Saudi Arabia by
the Wahhabi establishment, Shi'ite empowerment is a
veritable minefield that Riyadh is petrified about at this
juncture. Its threshold of patience is wearing thin, as the
recent uncharacteristic resort to military power against
the north Yemeni Shi'ite communities bordering Saudi Arabia
testifies.
The US faces a classic dilemma. It is all right for Obama
to highlight the need of reform in Muslim societies - as he
did eloquently in his Cairo speech last June. But
democratization in the Yemeni context - ironically, in the
Arab context - would involve Shi'ite empowerment. After the
searing experience in Iraq, Washington is literally perched
like a cat on a hot tin roof. It would much rather be
aligned with the repressive, autocratic government of Saleh
than let the genie of reform out of the bottle in the oil
rich-region in which it has profound interests.
Obama has an erudite mind and he is not unaware that what
Yemen desperately needs is reform, but he simply doesn't
want to think about it. The paradox he faces is that with
all its imperfections, Iran happens to be the only
"democratic" system operating in that entire region.
Iran's shadow over the Yemeni Shi'ite consciousness worries
the US to no end. Simply put, in the ideological struggle
going on in the region, Obama finds himself with the
ultra-conservative and brutally autocratic oligarchies that
constitute the ruling class in the region. Conceivably, he
isn't finding it easy. If his own memoirs are to be
believed, there could be times when the vague recollections
of his childhood in Indonesia and his precious memories of
his own mother, who from all accounts was a free-wheeling
intellectual and humanist, must be stalking him in the
White House corridors.
Israel moves in But Obama is first and foremost a realist.
Emotions and personal beliefs drain away and strategic
considerations weigh uppermost when he works in the Oval
Office. With the military presence in Yemen, the US has
tightened the cordon around Iran. In the event of a
military attack on Iran, Yemen could be put to use as a
springboard by the Israelis. These are weighty
considerations for Obama.
The fact is that no one is in control as a Yemeni
authority. It is a cakewalk for the formidable Israeli
intelligence to carve out a niche in Yemen - just as it did
in northern Iraq under somewhat comparable circumstances.
Islamism doesn't deter Israel at all. Saleh couldn't have
been far off the mark when he alleged last year that
Israeli intelligence had been exposed as having kept links
with Yemeni Islamists. The point is, Yemeni Islamists are a
highly fragmented lot and no one is sure who owes what sort
of allegiance to whom. Israeli intelligence operates
marvelously in such twilight zones when the horizon is
lacerated with the blood of the vanishing sun.
Israel will find a toehold in Yemen to be a god-sent gift
insofar as it registers its presence in the Arabian
Peninsula. This is a dream come true for Israel, whose
effectiveness as a regional power has always been seriously
handicapped by its lack of access to the Persian Gulf
region. The overarching US military presence helps Israel
politically to consolidate its Yemeni chapter. Without
doubt, Petraeus is moving on Yemen in tandem with Israel
(and Britain). But the "pro-West" Arab states with their
rentier mentality have no choice except to remain as mute
spectators on the sidelines.
Some among them may actually acquiesce with the Israeli
security presence in the region as a safer bet than the
spread of the dangerous ideas of Shi'ite empowerment
emanating out of Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah. Also, at some
stage, Israeli intelligence will begin to infiltrate the
extremist Sunni outfits in Yemen, which are commonly known
as affiliates of al-Qaeda. That is, if it hasn't done that
already. Any such link makes Israel an invaluable ally for
the US in its fight against al-Qaeda. In sum, infinite
possibilities exist in the paradigm that is taking shape in
the Muslim world abutting into the strategic Persian Gulf.
It's all about China
Most important, however, for US global
strategies will be the massive gain of control of the port
of Aden in Yemen. Britain can vouchsafe that Aden is the
gateway to Asia. Control of Aden and the Malacca Strait
will put the US in an unassailable position in the "great
game" of the Indian Ocean. The sea lanes of the Indian
Ocean are literally the jugular veins of China's economy.
By controlling them, Washington sends a strong message to
Beijing that any notions by the latter that the US is a
declining power in Asia would be nothing more than an
extravagant indulgence in fantasy.
In the Indian Ocean region, China is increasingly coming
under pressure. India is a natural ally of the US in the
Indian Ocean region. Both disfavor any significant Chinese
naval presence. India is mediating a rapprochement between
Washington and Colombo that would help roll back Chinese
influence in Sri Lanka. The US has taken a u-turn in its
Myanmar policy and is engaging the regime there with the
primary intent of eroding China's influence with the
military rulers. The Chinese strategy aimed at
strengthening influence in Sri Lanka and Myanmar so as to
open a new transportation route towards the Middle East,
the Persian Gulf and Africa, where it has begun contesting
traditional Western economic dominance.
China is keen to whittle down its dependence on the Malacca
Strait for its commerce with Europe and West Asia. The US,
on the contrary, is determined that China remains
vulnerable to the choke point between Indonesia and
Malaysia.
An engrossing struggle is breaking out. The US is unhappy
with China's efforts to reach the warm waters of the
Persian Gulf through the Central Asian region and Pakistan.
Slowly but steadily, Washington is tightening the noose
around the neck of the Pakistani elites - civilian and
military - and forcing them to make a strategic choice
between the US and China. This will put those elites in an
unenviable dilemma. Like their Indian counterparts, they
are inherently "pro-Western" (even when they are
"anti-American") and if the Chinese connection is important
for Islamabad, that is primarily because it balances
perceived Indian hegemony.
The existential questions with which the Pakistani elites
are grappling are apparent. They are seeking answers from
Obama. Can Obama maintain a balanced relationship vis-a-vis
Pakistan and India? Or, will Obama lapse back to the George
W Bush era strategy of building up India as the pre-eminent
power in the Indian Ocean under whose shadow Pakistan will
have to learn to live?
US-India-Israel axis
On the other hand, the Indian elites
are in no compromising mood. Delhi was on a roll during the
Bush days. Now, after the initial misgivings about Obama's
political philosophy, Delhi is concluding that he is all
but a clone of his illustrious predecessor as regards the
broad contours of the US's global strategy - of which
containment of China is a core template.
The comfort level is palpably rising in Delhi with regard
to the Obama presidency. Delhi takes the surge of the
Israeli lobby in Washington as the litmus test for the
Obama presidency. The surge suits Delhi, since the Jewish
lobby was always a helpful ally in cultivating influence in
the US Congress, media and the rabble-rousing think-tankers
as well as successive administrations. And all this is
happening at a time when the India-Israel security
relationship is gaining greater momentum.
United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates is due to
visit Delhi in the coming days. The Obama administration is
reportedly adopting an increasingly accommodative attitude
toward India's longstanding quest for "dual-use" technology
from the US. If so, a massive avenue of military
cooperation is about to open between the two countries,
which will make India a serious challenger to China's
growing military prowess. It is a win-win situation as the
great Indian arms bazaar offers highly lucrative business
for American companies.
Clearly, a cozy three-way US-Israel-India alliance provides
the underpinning for all the maneuvering that is going on.
It will have significance for the security of the Indian
Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Last
year, India formalized a naval presence in Oman.
All-in-all, terrorism experts are counting the trees and
missing the wood when they analyze the US foray into Yemen
in the limited terms of hunting down al-Qaeda. The hard
reality is that Obama, whose main plank used to be
"change", has careened away and increasingly defaults to
the global strategies of the Bush era. The freshness of the
Obama magic is dissipating. Traces of the "revisionism" in
his foreign policy orientation are beginning to surface. We
can see them already with regard to Iran, Afghanistan, the
Middle East and the Israel-Palestine problem, Central Asia
and towards China and Russia.
Arguably, this sort of "return of the native" by Obama was
inevitable. For one thing, he is but a creature of his
circumstances. As someone put it brilliantly, Obama's
presidency is like driving a train rather than a car: a
train cannot be "steered", the driver can at best set its
speed, but ultimately, it must run on its tracks.
Besides, history has no instances of a declining world
power meekly accepting its destiny and walking into the
sunset. The US cannot give up on its global dominance
without putting up a real fight. And the reality of all
such momentous struggles is that they cannot be fought
piece-meal. You cannot fight China without occupying Yemen.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet
Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
Thursday, 7 January 2010
VOICE OF BRITISH FINANCIAL ELITE: US ARE LOSING THE FREE WORLD
Ever since 1945, the US has regarded itself as the leader of the “free world”. But the Obama administration is facing an unexpected and unwelcome development in global politics. Four of the biggest and most strategically important democracies in the developing world – Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey – are increasingly at odds with American foreign policy. Rather than siding with the US on the big international issues, they are just as likely to line up with authoritarian powers such as China and Iran.
The US has been slow to pick up on this development, perhaps because it seems so surprising and unnatural. Most Americans assume that fellow democracies will share their values and opinions on international affairs. During the last presidential election campaign, John McCain, the Republican candidate, called for the formation of a global alliance of democracies to push back against authoritarian powers. Some of President Barack Obama’s senior advisers have also written enthusiastically about an international league of democracies.
But the assumption that the world’s democracies will naturally stick together is proving unfounded. The latest example came during the Copenhagen climate summit. On the last day of the talks, the Americans tried to fix up one-to-one meetings between Mr Obama and the leaders of South Africa, Brazil and India – but failed each time. The Indians even said that their prime minister, Manmohan Singh, had already left for the airport.
So Mr Obama must have felt something of a chump when he arrived for a last-minute meeting with Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, only to find him already deep in negotiations with the leaders of none other than Brazil, South Africa and India. Symbolically, the leaders had to squeeze up to make space for the American president around the table.
There was more than symbolism at work. In Copenhagen, Brazil, South Africa and India decided that their status as developing nations was more important than their status as democracies. Like the Chinese, they argued that it is fundamentally unjust to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of poor countries at a lower level than the emissions of the US or the European Union; all the more so since the industrialised west is responsible for the great bulk of the carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere.
Revealingly, both Brazilian and Chinese leaders have made the same pointed joke – likening the US to a rich man who, after gorging himself at a banquet, then invites the neighbours in for coffee and asks them to split the bill.
If climate change were an isolated example, it might be dismissed as an important but anomalous issue that is almost designed to split countries along rich-poor lines. But, in fact, if you look at Brazil, South Africa, India and Turkey – the four most important democracies in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the greater Middle East – it is clear that none of them can be counted as a reliable ally of the US, or of a broader “community of democracies”.
In the past year, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil has cut a lucrative oil deal with China, spoken warmly of Hugo Chávez, president of Venezuela, and congratulated Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad on his “victory” in the Iranian presidential election, while welcoming him on a state visit to Brazil.
During a two-year stint on the United Nations Security Council from 2006, the South Africans routinely joined China and Russia in blocking resolutions on human rights and protecting authoritarian regimes such as Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan and Iran.
Turkey, once regarded as a crucial American ally in the cold war and then trumpeted as the only example of a secular, pro-western, Muslim democracy, is also no longer a reliable partner for the west. Ever since the US-led invasion of Iraq, opinion polls there have shown very high levels of anti-Americanism. The mildly Islamist AKP government has engaged with America’s regional enemies – including Hamas, Hizbollah and Iran – and alarmed the Americans by taking an increasingly hostile attitude to Israel.
India’s leaders do seem to cherish the idea that they have a “special relationship” with the US. But even the Indians regularly line up against the Americans on a range of international issues, from climate change to the Doha round of trade negotiations and the pursuit of sanctions against Iran or Burma.
So what is going on? The answer is that Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and India are all countries whose identities as democracies are now being balanced – or even trumped – by their identities as developing nations that are not part of the white, rich, western world. All four countries have ruling parties that see themselves as champions of social justice at home and a more equitable global order overseas. Brazil’s Workers’ party, India’s Congress party, Turkey’s AKP and South Africa’s African National Congress have all adapted to globalisation – but they all retain traces of the old suspicions of global capitalism and of the US.
Mr Obama is seen as a huge improvement on George W. Bush – but he is still an American president. As emerging global powers and developing nations, Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey may often feel they have more in common with a rising China than with the democratic US.
WHAT EGYPT's CLASHES WITH THE VIVA PALESTINA CONVOY TELL US
Terror is the price of support for despots and dictatorsEgypt's complicity in the Gaza's siege underlines the role of
western support for such regimes in the spread of war
Seumas Milne
The Guardian
If an 85-year-old Holocaust survivor had gone on hunger
strike in support of a besieged people in another part of
the world, and hundreds of mostly western protesters had
been stoned and beaten by police, you can be sure we'd have
heard all about it. But because that is what's been
happening in western-backed Egypt, rather than Iran, and
the people the protesters are supporting are the
Palestinians of Gaza instead of, say, Tibetans, most people
in Europe and north America know nothing about it.
For the last fortnight, two groups of hundreds of activists
have been battling with Egyptian police and officials to
cross into the Gaza Strip to show solidarity with the
blockaded population on the first anniversary of Israel's
devastating onslaught. Last night, George Galloway's Viva
Palestina 500-strong convoy of medical aid was finally
allowed in, minus 50 of its 200 vehicles, after being
repeatedly blocked, diverted and intimidated by Egyptian
security – including a violent assault in the Egyptian port
of El Arish on Tuesday night which left dozens injured,
despite the participation of one British and 10 Turkish
MPs.
That followed an attempted "Gaza freedom march" by 1,400
protesters from more than 40 countries, only 84 of whom
were allowed across the border – which is what led Hedy
Epstein, both of whose parents died in Auschwitz, to refuse
food in Cairo, as the group's demonstrations were violently
broken up and Israel's prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu
was feted nearby. Yesterday, demonstrations by Palestinians
on the Gazan side of the border against the harassment of
the aid convoy led to violent clashes with Egyptian
security forces in which an Egyptian soldier was killed and
many Palestinians injured.
But although the confrontation has been largely ignored in
the west, it has been a major media event in the Middle
East which has only damaged Egypt. And while the Egyptian
government claims it is simply upholding its national
sovereignty, the saga has instead starkly exposed its
complicity in the US- and European-backed blockade of Gaza
and the collective punishment of its one and a half million
people.
The main protagonist of the siege, Israel, controls only
three sides of the Strip. Without Egypt, which polices the
fourth, it would be ineffective. But, having tolerated the
tunnels that have saved Gazans from utter beggary, the
Cairo regime is now building a deep underground steel wall
– known as the "wall of shame" to many Egyptians – under
close US supervision, to make the blockade complete.
That's partly because the ageing Egyptian dictator, Hosni
Mubarak, fears cross-border contamination from Gaza's
elected Hamas administration, whose ideological allies in
the banned Muslim Brotherhood would be likely to win free
elections in Egypt.
But two other factors seem to have been decisive in
convincing Cairo to bend to American and Israeli pressure
and close the vice on Gaza's Palestinians, along with those
who support them. The first was a US threat to cut hundreds
of millions of dollars of aid unless it cracked down on
arms and other smuggling. The second is the need for US
acquiescence in the widely expected hereditary succession
of Mubarak's ex-banker son, Gamal, to the presidency. So,
far from protecting its sovereignty, the Egyptian
government has sold it for continued foreign subsidy and
despotic dynastic rule, sacrificing any pretence to its
historic role of Arab leadership in the process.
From the wider international perspective, it is precisely
this western embrace of repressive and unrepresentative
regimes such as Egypt's, along with unwavering backing for
Israel's occupation and colonisation of Palestinian land,
that is at the heart of the crisis in the Middle East and
Muslim world.
Decades of oil-hungry backing for despots, from Iran to
Oman, Egypt to Saudi Arabia, along with the failure of Arab
nationalism to complete the decolonisation of the region,
fuelled first the rise of Islamism and then the eruption of
al-Qaida-style terror more than a decade ago. But, far from
addressing the natural hostility to foreign control of the
area and its resources at the centre of the conflict, the
disastrous US-led response was to expand the western
presence still further, with new and yet more destructive
invasions and occupations, in Iraq, Afghanistan and
elsewhere. And the Bush administration's brief flirtation
with democratisation in client states such as Egypt was
quickly abandoned once it became clear who was likely to be
elected.
The poisonous logic of this imperial quagmire is now
leading inexorably to the spread of war under Barack Obama.
Following the failed bomb attack of a Detroit-bound flight
on Christmas Day, the US president this week announced two
new fronts in the war on terror, faithfully echoed by
Gordon Brown: Yemen, where the would-be bomber was
allegedly trained; and Somalia, where al-Qaida has also put
down roots in the swamp of chronic civil war and social
disintegration.
Greater western military intervention in both countries
will certainly make the problem worse. In Somalia, it has
already done so, after the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of
2006 overthrew the relatively pragmatic Islamic Courts
Union and spawned the more extreme, al-Qaida-linked Shabab
movement, now in control of large parts of the country.
Increased US backing for the unpopular Yemeni government,
already facing armed rebellion in the north and the threat
of secession from the restive south – which only finally
succeeded in forcing out British colonial rule in 1967 – is
bound to throw petrol on the flames.
The British prime minister tried this week to claim that
the growth of al-Qaida in Yemen and Somalia showed western
strategy was "working", because the escalation of the war
in Afghanistan and Pakistan had forced it to look for
sanctuaries elsewhere. In reality, it is a measure of the
grotesque failure of the entire war on terror. Since its
launch in October 2001, al-Qaida has spread from the
mountains of Afghanistan across the region, to Iraq,
Pakistan, the horn of Africa, and far beyond.
Instead of scaling down the western support for
dictatorship and occupation that fuels al-Qaida-style
terror, and concentrating resources on police action to
counter it, the US and its allies have been drawn
inexorably into repeating and extending the monstrosities
that sparked it in the first place. It's the recipe for a
war on terror without end.
Wednesday, 23 December 2009
Friday, 26 June 2009
Saturday, 20 June 2009
THE OTHER VIEW ON THE IRANIAN ELECTIONS
Ahmadinejad won. Get over itFlynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
June 15, 2009
Politico
Without any evidence, many U.S. politicians and “Iran
experts” have dismissed Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad’s reelection Friday, with 62.6 percent of the
vote, as fraud.
They ignore the fact that Ahmadinejad’s 62.6 percent of the
vote in this year’s election is essentially the same as the
61.69 percent he received in the final count of the 2005
presidential election, when he trounced former President
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The shock of the “Iran
experts” over Friday’s results is entirely self-generated,
based on their preferred assumptions and wishful thinking.
Although Iran’s elections are not free by Western
standards, the Islamic Republic has a 30-year history of
highly contested and competitive elections at the
presidential, parliamentary and local levels. Manipulation
has always been there, as it is in many other countries.
But upsets occur — as, most notably, with Mohammed
Khatami’s surprise victory in the 1997 presidential
election. Moreover, “blowouts” also occur — as in Khatami’s
reelection in 2001, Ahmadinejad’s first victory in 2005
and, we would argue, this year.
Like much of the Western media, most American “Iran
experts” overstated Mir Hossein Mousavi’s “surge” over the
campaign’s final weeks. More important, they were oblivious
— as in 2005 — to Ahmadinejad’s effectiveness as a populist
politician and campaigner. American “Iran experts” missed
how Ahmadinejad was perceived by most Iranians as having
won the nationally televised debates with his three
opponents — especially his debate with Mousavi.
Before the debates, both Mousavi and Ahmadinejad campaign
aides indicated privately that they perceived a surge of
support for Mousavi; after the debates, the same aides
concluded that Ahmadinejad’s provocatively impressive
performance and Mousavi’s desultory one had boosted the
incumbent’s standing. Ahmadinejad’s charge that Mousavi was
supported by Rafsanjani’s sons — widely perceived in
Iranian society as corrupt figures — seemed to play well
with voters. The Politico 44 Story Widget Requires Adobe
Flash Player.
Similarly, Ahmadinejad’s criticism that Mousavi’s reformist
supporters, including Khatami, had been willing to suspend
Iran’s uranium enrichment program and had won nothing from
the West for doing so tapped into popular support for the
program — and had the added advantage of being true.
More fundamentally, American “Iran experts” consistently
underestimated Ahmadinejad’s base of support. Polling in
Iran is notoriously difficult; most polls there are less
than fully professional and, hence, produce results of
questionable validity. But the one poll conducted before
Friday’s election by a Western organization that was
transparent about its methodology — a telephone poll
carried out by the Washington-based Terror-Free Tomorrow
from May 11 to 20 — found Ahmadinejad running 20 points
ahead of Mousavi. This poll was conducted before the
televised debates in which, as noted above, Ahmadinejad was
perceived to have done well while Mousavi did poorly.
American “Iran experts” assumed that “disastrous” economic
conditions in Iran would undermine Ahmadinejad’s reelection
prospects. But the International Monetary Fund projects
that Iran’s economy will actually grow modestly this year
(when the economies of most Gulf Arab states are in
recession). A significant number of Iranians — including
the religiously pious, lower-income groups, civil servants
and pensioners — appear to believe that Ahmadinejad’s
policies have benefited them.
And, while many Iranians complain about inflation, the TFT
poll found that most Iranian voters do not hold Ahmadinejad
responsible. The “Iran experts” further argue that the high
turnout on June 12 — 82 percent of the electorate — had to
favor Mousavi. But this line of analysis reflects nothing
more than assumptions.
Some “Iran experts” argue that Mousavi’s Azeri background
and “Azeri accent” mean that he was guaranteed to win
Iran’s Azeri-majority provinces; since Ahmadinejad did
better than Mousavi in these areas, fraud is the only
possible explanation.
But Ahmadinejad himself speaks Azeri quite fluently as a
consequence of his eight years serving as a popular and
successful official in two Azeri-majority provinces; during
the campaign, he artfully quoted Azeri and Turkish poetry —
in the original — in messages designed to appeal to Iran’s
Azeri community. (And we should not forget that the supreme
leader is Azeri.) The notion that Mousavi was somehow
assured of victory in Azeri-majority provinces is simply
not grounded in reality.
With regard to electoral irregularities, the specific
criticisms made by Mousavi — such as running out of ballot
paper in some precincts and not keeping polls open long
enough (even though polls stayed open for at least three
hours after the announced closing time) — could not, in
themselves, have tipped the outcome so clearly in
Ahmadinejad’s favor.
Moreover, these irregularities do not, in themselves,
amount to electoral fraud even by American legal standards.
And, compared with the U.S. presidential election in
Florida in 2000, the flaws in Iran’s electoral process seem
less significant.
In the wake of Friday’s election, some “Iran experts” —
perhaps feeling burned by their misreading of contemporary
political dynamics in the Islamic Republic — argue that we
are witnessing a “conservative coup d’état,” aimed at a
complete takeover of the Iranian state.
But one could more plausibly suggest that if a “coup” is
being attempted, it has been mounted by the losers in
Friday’s election. It was Mousavi, after all, who declared
victory on Friday even before Iran’s polls closed. And
three days before the election, Mousavi supporter
Rafsanjani published a letter criticizing the leader’s
failure to rein in Ahmadinejad’s resort to “such ugly and
sin-infected phenomena as insults, lies and false
allegations.” Many Iranians took this letter as an
indication that the Mousavi camp was concerned their
candidate had fallen behind in the campaign’s closing days.
In light of these developments, many politicians and “Iran
experts” argue that the Obama administration cannot now
engage the “illegitimate” Ahmadinejad regime. Certainly,
the administration should not appear to be trying to “play”
in the current controversy in Iran about the election. In
this regard, President Barack Obama’s comments on Friday, a
few hours before the polls closed in Iran, that “just as
has been true in Lebanon, what can be true in Iran as well
is that you’re seeing people looking at new possibilities”
was extremely maladroit.
From Tehran’s perspective, this observation undercut the
credibility of Obama’s acknowledgement, in his Cairo speech
earlier this month, of U.S. complicity in overthrowing a
democratically elected Iranian government and restoring the
shah in 1953.
The Obama administration should vigorously rebut any
argument against engaging Tehran following Friday’s vote.
More broadly, Ahmadinejad’s victory may force Obama and his
senior advisers to come to terms with the deficiencies and
internal contradictions in their approach to Iran. Before
the Iranian election, the Obama administration had fallen
for the same illusion as many of its predecessors — the
illusion that Iranian politics is primarily about
personalities and finding the right personality to deal
with. That is not how Iranian politics works.
The Islamic Republic is a system with multiple power
centers; within that system, there is a strong and enduring
consensus about core issues of national security and
foreign policy, including Iran’s nuclear program and
relations with the United States. Any of the four
candidates in Friday’s election would have continued the
nuclear program as Iran’s president; none would agree to
its suspension.
Any of the four candidates would be interested in a
diplomatic opening with the United States, but that opening
would need to be comprehensive, respectful of Iran’s
legitimate national security interests and regional
importance, accepting of Iran’s right to develop and
benefit from the full range of civil nuclear technology —
including pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle — and aimed at
genuine rapprochement.
Such an approach would also, in our judgment, be manifestly
in the interests of the United States and its allies
throughout the Middle East. It is time for the Obama
administration to get serious about pursuing this approach
— with an Iranian administration headed by the reelected
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Flynt Leverett directs The New America Foundation’s Iran Project and teaches international affairs at Pennsylvania State university. Hillary Mann Leverett is CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy. Both worked for many years on Middle East issues for the U.S. government, including as members of the National Security Council staff.
Friday, 19 June 2009
DISCUSSION ON THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION
Sons of Malcolm's Sukant Chandan discusses Iran's
current crisis with a friend - Dominic Kouros Kavakeb
Dominic's piece is below my reply which follows:
Thanks Dominic for your very thoughtful piece on current
events in Iran. I think it’s an important contribution
amongst ourselves as to understand the unquestionably
complex and at times confusing events which have been
unfolding in Iran of late.
There is much with which I agree in your piece. However, I
also sense some contradictions in your piece, and some
other points which I would like to bring up and engage you
and others reading this with.
I want to come across brotherly and in a spirit of
anti-imperialism solidarity in my comments. If I inspire
any negative feelings, please excuse me, it’s certainly not
my intention.
I would like to start by stating that I am no natural
friend of the Iranian regime. I have many problems and
differences with it. I am not going to list these here, but
my differences with the regime are sometimes quite deep and
glaring.
Nevertheless, believing as I do in the maximum
non-sectarian unity on an anti-imperialist internationalism
basis, I cannot ignore that Iran is a very important state
which is contributing massively to the international
struggle against imperialism and for a new multi-polar
world, a struggle that we need to understand and engage
with more and more to contribute to the re-building of that
internationalism that we lost since the 1980s.
“… since the early 90’s, which has had to deal with its own
strengths and weaknesses. The reform movement has always
been extremely broad in nature, encompassing figures such
as Hashemi Rafsanjani, the current chair of The Assembly of
Experts and former President to women’s rights activists
and left wingers. Despite its breadth and in fact most
probably because of this, the reform movement has always
lacked a clear leadership and direction.”
You are right to highlight Rafsanjani in the reform camp;
but in my understanding, he is one perhaps one of the most
problematic figures in the regime who has a massive
economic estate and protects some of the most corrupt
mullahs in the country, something which President Nejad has
attacked, but more of this later.
The point I am making is that we need to have a clear idea
of what different sections of the opposition stand for,
ie., where do they stand on Palestine (and Zionism), on
economic rights for Iran’s poor, for relations with the
West and the East, what is their attitude towards the
Non-Aligned Movement, UN reform, SCO, etc. Only then can we
really dissect the pros and cons of the opposition. But
like you say, it seems the opposition are united only in
their opposition to Nejad. So what IS the big problem with
Nejad? More on this issue in a second.
“… Economically Mousavi favours further neo-liberalisation,
although this is not something Ahmadinejad is specifically
adverse to. The difference may be where Mousavi is happy to
trade with the west, Ahmadinejad not so. To a degree this
determines their stances on foreign policy. Mousavi
ridiculed Ahmadinejad for the way in which he’s made Iran
look childish in the face of international diplomacy. The
President retorted with the idea that regardless of whether
or not Iran does what the West wants, they will always face
threats. It is impossible to beat The United States at
their own game (i.e. within the arena of the UN).”
This is a very important section of your article, in my
opinion perhaps the MOST important, as it starts to delve
into what the nature of the crisis in Iran is all about,
and what the main two camps – Nejad and Mousavi – stand for
and against. I think this aspect, and the attitude towards
regional and international issues are the two most
important points that we have to look into, make sense of
and that which can inform our political positions on the
current crisis in Iran.
In my understanding the strategies and policies of these
two camps are quite different. Mousavi seems to represent
the more elite elements in the regime, and the more
affluent urbane (esp in Tehran) sections of society. As you
say, Mousavi is in favour of privatisation and liberalising
the economy. Also standing in Mousavi’s camp, perhaps the
biggest patron is the highly problematic Rafsanjani. On the
regional and international positions, Mousavi represents a
softer approach to the West, and perhaps not as much solid
and forthright support for Lebanese Hizbullah and Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
One should also keep in mind that what the West fears most,
perhaps more than anything else about Iran, is it’s nuclear
program. If Iran reached a stage of technology where it
could convert civil use to military use, that would be the
end of western and Zionist hegemony of the region. Mousavi
is obviously seen by the West as the man/camp able to
scupper this. Mousavi is more susceptible to putting the
Iranian nuke program in the hands of some western dominated
‘international’ body, whereas Nejad is going it all by the
Iranians self.
Nejad has distinguished himself in clear and militant
support for the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese
resistance. Nejad is a great proponent of an
anti-imperialist international alliance, allying closely
with China, Russia, Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil and of course his
great friend and ours –President Chavez of Venezuela.
On these regional and international issues we outside of
Iran must place special importance; when I say ‘we’ I mean
those of us who believe in internationalism based upon the
independence, development and social justice of the
oppressed masses and nations of the world, those subject to
sanctions, invasions, occupations, covert dirty tricks etc.
If we believe in this internationalism then these are the
most important issues upon which we must judge the two
different camps.
I don’t need to stress that Iran has been under sanctions
ever since 1979, has seen the region beset by Western
intervention, stunting the economic development of the
region, creating divisions, occupations and wars. Those
asserting their independence in the world against ‘the
great satan’, ie., the heroes of the Palestinian
Revolution, an the Lebanese Hizbullah are close allies of
Nejad and Iran. Furthermore, Nejad’s Iran has been the
leading force behind trying to get the regions powers to
come to the defence of the Palestinians, and as such, to
the defence of themselves, as there is no progress for the
region without an end to US Hegemonic control of the region
which is exercised foremostly through its attack dog – the
zionist state. Iran is surrounded by two imperialist
occupations – in Iraq and Afgahnistan, and have been
threatened with a preemptive nuclear strike for some years
now.
On the other hand we have Mousavi and his camp, whose
slogan is ‘Iran first’, which is a veiled attack on the
anti-imperialist militancy of Nejad. Yes, we have problems
with Nejad’s comments on certain things, esp the holocaust,
but this is a detail and not a strategic problem with
Nejad. It is rumoured that Mousavi might lessen support for
the Palestinian Revolution and Hizbullah; I am not so sure
about this, but one thing is clear: the West know who their
preferred candidate is, and I don’t need to say that the
West are fundamental to the problems of the region, and
their friends are not ours.
What is possibly some of the most interesting aspects of
Nejad rule is his populism. Nejad has in a most vociferous
and surprising manner attacked the corruption and elitism
of ruling sections in Iran, including attacking corrupt
mullahs. He has given increased economic rights to some of
societies poorest, and is an incredibly humble and modest
president – something which is striking to everyone.
It is also true at the sametime that his economic strategy
hasn’t perhaps benefitted the economy on the whole as it
has led to inflation. But those who follow the reformist
press in Iran like myself, know that all the criticism
against Nejad’s policies are not to have better policies
for the poor, but intended in defending some of societies
privileged sections; as the reformist camp support
neo-liberal policies. For those of us who believe in a
leadership which seeks to empower some of the poorest in
society, on a platform of anti-corruption of the elites,
with a clear militant anti-imperialist internationalism,
then Nejad is your man, and his is your camp. ‘But what
about the socialist and left opposition, the too want
rights for the poor!’ I hear some cry, more on this in a
moment.
“What has been the state response, besides Ahmadinejad’s
bizarre trip to Russia to celebrate his victory?”
Why was it ‘bizarre’? Nejad’s trip to Russia and to the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is all part of the
important anti-imperialist (‘multi-polar world’) rise
across the world. The SCO is the closest thing to an
anti-imperialist bloc which in the future can push the West
out of Asia, and this process is in progress right now with
this article outlining these developments.
So I would argue far from Nejad’s trip being ‘bizarre’, it
shows him in one of his elements – being amongst those who
are leading the rise of a new multi-polar world, ie, and
end to US/western hegemony, which is the grand prize for
which we have been struggle for since nearly seven
centuries.
And as Nejad has gone over for the SCO conference, it is
maybe another dig at Mousavi – saying to him ‘this is where
my primary allies are, and I am not one for pussy-footing
with the west’.
“Yes there has been repression of the most brutal kind.
We’ve all seen the images of blood stained University
halls, motorbiked thugs chasing protestors and street
clashes … “In addition foreign media has been restricted,
the internet and mobile phone calls limited and other
repressive techniques that can only be inflicted by state
apparatus.”
You mention the brutal repression, but don’t mention the
context in which they have taken place. I would put this
repression into context of the provocations of some of the
students who wanted to burn down the Basij base. It’s
tragic and sad, but not surprising that those who want to
burn down the building of the revolutionary guards, then
see the guards hitting back, it has to be said AFTER they
were besieged. Who were these students? What is the sense
in these provocations? Tragic deaths are the result, and a
deepening of the sense of confrontation, which I don’t
think is to anyone’s advantage in Iran.
Students are mainstays of the banned opposition movements,
and there has been a long history of student based
anti-regime elements, and the regime clamping down on them.
It’s been terrible that students have been attacked on
their campuses and some reportedly killed, but we have to
also put some responsibility at least on those students who
are out to overthrow the regime, which results in the
regime coming down hard on some students.
As for the restrictions on the foreign media etc, I think
Obama let it out of the bag when he successfully for
Twitter to keep them online when they were going to be shut
today for maintenance work. I don’t think any of us are so
naïve as to be blind to the fact that mainstream Western
media outlets are arms of the western states and serve
their states, not the Iranians. And seeing that the
Iranians have plenty of examples as to the dirty role of
these agencies in many other peoples affairs,, then no-one
can accuse them, let alone those advocating
non-western-intervention in Iran, that they have strict
restrictions on them.
“One thing that is absolutely clear is that any repression
of any protest is unacceptable. People have the right to
protest and political expression and any attempts to halt
this must be rejected.”
So would you support the protests of people burning down
government buildings? The seriousness of the situation in
Iran is partly highlighted when you go on to state:
“The simple answer is that as far as the imperialists are
concerned, this could be the perfect opportunity to
dismantle Iran as an obstacle to the domination of the
Middle East. The Iraq war has only strengthened Iran as a
regional power; all the worse that it is prepared to stand
up to the West. Very few countries are as vocal as Iran on
issues such as Palestine and very few countries, if any,
can or will not provide the support that the resistance
across the Middle East needs.”
So seeing that this is the perfect opportunity for the West
to push their strategies in regard to Iran (which I agree
with of course) it is natural for their direct and indirect
allies to do all that they can in Iran to make things hard
for the regime. I am sure you know that there are many
kinds of groupings in Iran which are in a war with the
state and have backing by the West (the MKO is an obvious
example), and many others who are supported, based,
financed etc by the West. In this context, I think the
Iranian sate is much more relaxed than I thought they might
be, with very little police around on the Mousavi protests,
apart from when after there was some skirmishes, especially
around the Guards base issue.
“… The simple answer is that as far as the imperialists are
concerned, this could be the perfect opportunity to
dismantle Iran as an obstacle to the domination of the
Middle East. The Iraq war has only strengthened Iran as a
regional power; all the worse that it is prepared to stand
up to the West. Very few countries are as vocal as Iran on
issues such as Palestine and very few countries, if any,
can or will not provide the support that the resistance
across the Middle East needs.
“We must be clear that we will not allow the West to hijack
this movement and use it to its advantage. Since 1989
western powers have used genuinely democratic movements to
further their own aims, as seen across Eastern Europe and
beyond. The same cannot and must not happen with Iran. …
The Iranian people are displaying that they are not ‘too
oppressed to fight back’ or in any way too weak to fight
their own battles. They do not want western intervention
and they do not need western intervention.”
“The Iranian left needs to play a better role and provide
some organisation to the movement. … Victory to the Iranian
people; against both their oppressors in the regime and the
global imperialist project.”
The question of the Iranian and anti-imperialism in the
context of Iran is a very important issue that needs a lot
of debate. My position is that the Iranian left are
playing, for the most part, directly or indirectly the job
of the West. I saw an Iranian leftist (perhaps some of you
know who he is, as I recognise him, but don’t know his
name) on Newsnight the other day, giving an Iranian voice
to the West’s attitude towards Iran.
Some socialists in the West are supporting the left who are
active in the Mousavi camp. This is very ironic, because
here you have a ‘left’ allied to a political camp of the
corrupt elites, and those who want to water down the
Iranian state’s anti-imperialism. This is not new, as this
has happens and is happening in many areas around the world
from Venezuela, Zimbabwe, China, Lebanon, Iraq and many
other places, where the left are allied to the west’s
allies who are often some far from socialistic groupings.
If the Iranian left were a major mass force in Iran; if
they had a good anti-imperialist practice and position; if
they had a good chance at capturing power: perhaps people
should seriously consider supporting them. But it seems
they are very marginal, so establishing one’s position on
Iran from an anti-imperialist perspective based merely on
these minute leftist elements is at best missing the whole
nature of this clash in Iran, and at worst is avoiding some
hard decisions and allowing the West to take the political
advantage in terms of how current events in Iran are
reported and (mis)understood.
It’s also very dangerous to the left groups in Iran itself
to think that they are getting support from those in the
West, as it may add to their sense of confidence in
confronting the state, which will lead to more arrests,
jail and unfortunately deaths for some more.
I don’t know how much you have thought about your
concluding slogan:
“Victory to the Iranian people; against both their
oppressors in the regime and the global imperialist
project”
But for me it raises some problems: when the main clash is
between two camps, why should we not discuss this central
issue rather than be drawn into subsidiary issues about
opposing the West and the oppressors in the regime?
Also those amongst the left who are supporting the Mousavi
camp because some Iranian left-wingers are in and around
that camp, fail to recognise a much more important issue
which effects the Iranian masses and poor and the masses of
the people in the region, and in relation to which, the
world anti-imperialist movement. For those in the left who
believe in social justice on a national and international
scale, Nejad’s camp is advocating this, in the face of
resistance of the Mousavi camp.
Finally, we have to constantly revise and understand the
contradictions within the struggles of the peoples of the
South, such as the one taking place in Iran, and also the
machinations of the West and especially the USA and UK.
This is especially important as we have entered into a
crucial phase of the anti-imperialist struggle, where the
US and the West have taken a massive beating thanks to the
twin tracks of resistance in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon,
Somalia, Afghanistan etc, and the rise of the third world
economies led by China, but also Brazil, Venezuela, Iran
etc. If Obama is a good guy personally, he is being used by
the elites to further their aims by other more crafty and
subtle means, but trying to enforce their retreating
hegemonic position all the same.
Obama’s speech in Cairo, far from a new positive era with
the region, has led or perhaps has problematically
contributed to the current crisis in Iran, in the sense
that Mousavi’s camp and followers think they can throw out
the militants (Nejad etc) now they have a ‘good guy’ to
deal with in Obama. And also Obama’s speech has egged on
those Tehrani elites who think they got a nod from Obama to
get rid of that little upstart and friend of the resistance
– President Nejad.
The anti-imperialist approach, as expressed by Tupac Amaru,
Simon Bolivar, through to Malcolm X, Che Guevara, Leila
Khaled, Lumumba and today with Hizbullah and Chavez is
never to stop intensifying your struggle; increase one’s
assertiveness and confidence in material, spiritual,
cultural and armed strength is the ONLY path to complete
liberation. In this, I know who I am with in Iran, despites
all the hype from the west, a hype which I don’t trust; and
I take this position despite my differences, sometimes
serious, with the Iranian regime.
Look forward to yours and others thoughts and reflections
on this issue.
Sukant Chandan
'Iran. 1979 and 2009.'
By Dominic Kouros Kavakeb
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a mass event, a popular
uprising of a scale rarely seen before. 30 years on, the
Iranian people are out in their millions once again but the
questions remain, what is this really about and where is
this movement going?
Last week the Iranian Presidential elections took place
with the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad being most strongly
challenged by former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. A
close election was widely expected, yet the final result
was in Ahmadinejad’s favour by 63% to Mousavi’s 34%. This
immediately led to widespread suspicion amongst Mousavi
supporters that the vote had been rigged to exaggerate the
current Presidents votes.
The purpose of this article is not to attain whether or not
there was indeed electoral fraud. The point is to examine
this new wave of protest and the situation as a whole.
However, for purposes of clarity it is necessary to state a
few things. Firstly, Ahmadinejad was expected to win. A
telephone poll was conducted by an international group,
independent from the regime and had Ahmadinejad as wining 2
to 1. Personally, I expected Ahmadinejad to win albeit with
slightly less of a majority. The main arguments from those
who suspect fraud are based on how the result was
announced. In addition Ahmadinejad’s support seemed to
spread far more evenly than previously expected, with him
winning in areas that were considered Mousavi territory. So
it is clear that we cannot be sure whether or not the vote
was fixed.
What is an indisputable fact is that over the past 5 days
millions of people have taken to the streets to protest. In
anytime this is a deeply encouraging, inspiring and very
exciting moment. Much of the talk on the Iranian street is
about the 1979 revolution and how the same atmosphere has
gripped the country. It is probably true to say that the
first people out onto the streets were disgruntled Mousavi
fans from the middle class who would benefit from the
neo-liberal economic policies proposed by Mousavi as well
the social freedoms; however this is no longer the case. As
time has passed the movement has become much more than this
and now encapsulates all layers of Iranian society. Indeed
the control Mousavi has from this movement is entirely
questionable and in all probability actually rather
limited.
It would seem that the election was result was the spark
that the lit the fire of Iranian society, which had been
building up for many years. Iran has had a very strong
reform movement, since the early 90’s, which has had to
deal with its own strengths and weaknesses. The reform
movement has always been extremely broad in nature,
encompassing figures such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, the
current chair of The Assembly of Experts and former
President to women’s rights activists and left wingers.
Despite its breadth and in fact most probably because of
this, the reform movement has always lacked a clear
leadership and direction. This is mirrored by the current
events where you have massive protest, yet very little
coordinated direction.
It is also important to be able to understand the
limitations of the reform movement in terms of their
demands. The majority of the movement does not challenge
the Islamic regime itself nor the principles of the ’79
revolution. Watching the live debate between Ahmadinejad
and Mousavi at times it was almost as if they were trying
to ‘out Khomeini’ one another. Both spoke about their
dedication to the revolution and how they were the true
interpreters of Khomeini’s message. So where do the real
differences lie? This question will give us some insight
into the feelings of the Iranian people. Economically
Mousavi favours further neo-liberalisation, although this
is not something Ahmadinejad is specifically adverse to.
The difference may be where Mousavi is happy to trade with
the west, Ahmadinejad not so. To a degree this determines
their stances on foreign policy. Mousavi ridiculed
Ahmadinejad for the way in which he’s made Iran look
childish in the face of international diplomacy. The
President retorted with the idea that regardless of whether
or not Iran does what the West wants, they will always face
threats. It is impossible to beat The United States at
their own game (i.e. within the arena of the UN).
Mousavi was seen by many as being a candidate who would
open Iranian society and provide the freedoms that are
enjoyed by the bourgeois in the west. Therefore when he
lost it is easy to see why so many were so angry, although
that does not explain the large scale popular protest that
we have seen. It seems as if every section of society with
any qualm against the regime has come out to use this
opportunity, in a usually repressive state, to protest.
This is a window of chance for those who want change and
they are determined to use it. It is also important to note
that many of the protestors are not explicitly against the
Islamic regime. Having spoken to come of my family in Iran,
they are angry about the election and want to see change,
but within the foundations of the revolution. This is not a
movement that is challenging Islamic rule, in the abstract.
What has been the state response, besides Ahmadinejad’s
bizarre trip to Russia to celebrate his victory? Yes there
has been repression of the most brutal kind. We’ve all seen
the images of blood stained University halls, motorbiked
thugs chasing protestors and street clashes. In addition
foreign media has been restricted, the internet and mobile
phone calls limited and other repressive techniques that
can only be inflicted by state apparatus. However, the
official line is strangely subdued. The Grand Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei is due to give a speech tomorrow following Friday
prayers, and many expect to see a few surprises. Anyone who
attempts to simplistically align Ahmadinejad with the
religious elite is making a grave error. It is true that
Khamenei formally endorsed Ahmadinejad for a second term
but the reality is not so straight forward. Ahmadinejad’s 4
year term was marked by constant bickering between the
executive and the religious sections of the ruling class.
The fear amongst the religious establishment was that the
President was going too far to antagonise the west and
subsequently was damaging the trade deals that have been in
place since the 90’s. During the campaign period Khamenei
himself came forward to discredit a claim by Ahmadinejad
that Mousavi’s wife and campaigner, Zahra Rahnavand, is not
a real Doctor. So it is clear that are real splits opening
up inside the regime, which certainly does not bode well
for its long term survival.
One thing that is absolutely clear is that any repression
of any protest is unacceptable. People have the right to
protest and political expression and any attempts to halt
this must be rejected. Reports from the last couple of days
actually show a shift in the attitude of the Iranian police
towards the protestors. Rather than be used by the state as
a tool of repression they have begun to protect the
protestors from the feared Basiji and the other thugs.
Robert Fisk wrote yesterday in the Independent of the
Police holding back the armed thugs from attacking the
demonstrations; a moment last seen when the Iranian armed
forces turn on the Shah in the 1979 revolution.
However, we must also understand Iran in a global context.
This situation is very different to a General Strike in
France where we can analyse this as the state vs. the
people. As already outlined such an analysis is far too
simplistic. We have to question why the situation in Iran
is grabbing so many headlines and the attention of the
world. When in Egypt the state rigged the elections and
massive protests erupted, why did this not receive the same
coverage? The simple answer is that as far as the
imperialists are concerned, this could be the perfect
opportunity to dismantle Iran as an obstacle to the
domination of the Middle East. The Iraq war has only
strengthened Iran as a regional power; all the worse that
it is prepared to stand up to the West. Very few countries
are as vocal as Iran on issues such as Palestine and very
few countries, if any, can or will not provide the support
that the resistance across the Middle East needs.
We must be clear that we will not allow the West to hijack
this movement and use it to its advantage. Since 1989
western powers have used genuinely democratic movements to
further their own aims, as seen across Eastern Europe and
beyond. The same cannot and must not happen with Iran. The
vast majority of Iranian people themselves reject Western
influence in their affairs; the revolution of 1979 was
based around sweeping aside foreign rule. The collective
memory of the ghost of 1953 when Iranian Nationalist leader
Dr Mossadeq was overthrown in a CIA coup has not been
forgotten. Western powers must stay firmly out of this
affair. For years the liberal imperialists have argued that
we must intervene in countries with human rights abuses,
because the people of these nations are not capable of
doing it themselves. If this new movement in Iran proves
one thing it is that this formulation is false. The Iranian
people are displaying that they are not ‘too oppressed to
fight back’ or in any way too weak to fight their own
battles. They do not want western intervention and they do
not need western intervention.
So what will happen next? I honestly don’t know. Clearly we
have a series of events on a scale not seen in Iran since
1979. However, for all of the parallels this is not 1979
again. Protestors on both sides are chanting Islamic
slogans and we will not see an overthrow of the Islamic
Republic. There may well be changes in personnel, policies
and other reforms but I expect it to go no further, at
least at this stage. The Iranian left needs to play a
better role and provide some organisation to the movement.
But like 1979 the Iranian left is cutting itself off from
society. They are not central to these protests and would
rather see the Western powers launch an invasion than any
continuation of the current regime. At lot rests on what
the Supreme Leader has to say tomorrow, so we shall have to
wait and see.
Regardless, this is an exciting moment for Iran. This wave
of protest is unconditionally a good thing and healthy for
Iranian society. It is the product of years of social and
political unrest combined with the current economic crisis.
Victory to the Iranian people; against both their
oppressors in the regime and the global imperialist
project.
current crisis with a friend - Dominic Kouros Kavakeb
Dominic's piece is below my reply which follows:
Thanks Dominic for your very thoughtful piece on current
events in Iran. I think it’s an important contribution
amongst ourselves as to understand the unquestionably
complex and at times confusing events which have been
unfolding in Iran of late.
There is much with which I agree in your piece. However, I
also sense some contradictions in your piece, and some
other points which I would like to bring up and engage you
and others reading this with.
I want to come across brotherly and in a spirit of
anti-imperialism solidarity in my comments. If I inspire
any negative feelings, please excuse me, it’s certainly not
my intention.
I would like to start by stating that I am no natural
friend of the Iranian regime. I have many problems and
differences with it. I am not going to list these here, but
my differences with the regime are sometimes quite deep and
glaring.
Nevertheless, believing as I do in the maximum
non-sectarian unity on an anti-imperialist internationalism
basis, I cannot ignore that Iran is a very important state
which is contributing massively to the international
struggle against imperialism and for a new multi-polar
world, a struggle that we need to understand and engage
with more and more to contribute to the re-building of that
internationalism that we lost since the 1980s.
“… since the early 90’s, which has had to deal with its own
strengths and weaknesses. The reform movement has always
been extremely broad in nature, encompassing figures such
as Hashemi Rafsanjani, the current chair of The Assembly of
Experts and former President to women’s rights activists
and left wingers. Despite its breadth and in fact most
probably because of this, the reform movement has always
lacked a clear leadership and direction.”
You are right to highlight Rafsanjani in the reform camp;
but in my understanding, he is one perhaps one of the most
problematic figures in the regime who has a massive
economic estate and protects some of the most corrupt
mullahs in the country, something which President Nejad has
attacked, but more of this later.
The point I am making is that we need to have a clear idea
of what different sections of the opposition stand for,
ie., where do they stand on Palestine (and Zionism), on
economic rights for Iran’s poor, for relations with the
West and the East, what is their attitude towards the
Non-Aligned Movement, UN reform, SCO, etc. Only then can we
really dissect the pros and cons of the opposition. But
like you say, it seems the opposition are united only in
their opposition to Nejad. So what IS the big problem with
Nejad? More on this issue in a second.
“… Economically Mousavi favours further neo-liberalisation,
although this is not something Ahmadinejad is specifically
adverse to. The difference may be where Mousavi is happy to
trade with the west, Ahmadinejad not so. To a degree this
determines their stances on foreign policy. Mousavi
ridiculed Ahmadinejad for the way in which he’s made Iran
look childish in the face of international diplomacy. The
President retorted with the idea that regardless of whether
or not Iran does what the West wants, they will always face
threats. It is impossible to beat The United States at
their own game (i.e. within the arena of the UN).”
This is a very important section of your article, in my
opinion perhaps the MOST important, as it starts to delve
into what the nature of the crisis in Iran is all about,
and what the main two camps – Nejad and Mousavi – stand for
and against. I think this aspect, and the attitude towards
regional and international issues are the two most
important points that we have to look into, make sense of
and that which can inform our political positions on the
current crisis in Iran.
In my understanding the strategies and policies of these
two camps are quite different. Mousavi seems to represent
the more elite elements in the regime, and the more
affluent urbane (esp in Tehran) sections of society. As you
say, Mousavi is in favour of privatisation and liberalising
the economy. Also standing in Mousavi’s camp, perhaps the
biggest patron is the highly problematic Rafsanjani. On the
regional and international positions, Mousavi represents a
softer approach to the West, and perhaps not as much solid
and forthright support for Lebanese Hizbullah and Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
One should also keep in mind that what the West fears most,
perhaps more than anything else about Iran, is it’s nuclear
program. If Iran reached a stage of technology where it
could convert civil use to military use, that would be the
end of western and Zionist hegemony of the region. Mousavi
is obviously seen by the West as the man/camp able to
scupper this. Mousavi is more susceptible to putting the
Iranian nuke program in the hands of some western dominated
‘international’ body, whereas Nejad is going it all by the
Iranians self.
Nejad has distinguished himself in clear and militant
support for the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese
resistance. Nejad is a great proponent of an
anti-imperialist international alliance, allying closely
with China, Russia, Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil and of course his
great friend and ours –President Chavez of Venezuela.
On these regional and international issues we outside of
Iran must place special importance; when I say ‘we’ I mean
those of us who believe in internationalism based upon the
independence, development and social justice of the
oppressed masses and nations of the world, those subject to
sanctions, invasions, occupations, covert dirty tricks etc.
If we believe in this internationalism then these are the
most important issues upon which we must judge the two
different camps.
I don’t need to stress that Iran has been under sanctions
ever since 1979, has seen the region beset by Western
intervention, stunting the economic development of the
region, creating divisions, occupations and wars. Those
asserting their independence in the world against ‘the
great satan’, ie., the heroes of the Palestinian
Revolution, an the Lebanese Hizbullah are close allies of
Nejad and Iran. Furthermore, Nejad’s Iran has been the
leading force behind trying to get the regions powers to
come to the defence of the Palestinians, and as such, to
the defence of themselves, as there is no progress for the
region without an end to US Hegemonic control of the region
which is exercised foremostly through its attack dog – the
zionist state. Iran is surrounded by two imperialist
occupations – in Iraq and Afgahnistan, and have been
threatened with a preemptive nuclear strike for some years
now.
On the other hand we have Mousavi and his camp, whose
slogan is ‘Iran first’, which is a veiled attack on the
anti-imperialist militancy of Nejad. Yes, we have problems
with Nejad’s comments on certain things, esp the holocaust,
but this is a detail and not a strategic problem with
Nejad. It is rumoured that Mousavi might lessen support for
the Palestinian Revolution and Hizbullah; I am not so sure
about this, but one thing is clear: the West know who their
preferred candidate is, and I don’t need to say that the
West are fundamental to the problems of the region, and
their friends are not ours.
What is possibly some of the most interesting aspects of
Nejad rule is his populism. Nejad has in a most vociferous
and surprising manner attacked the corruption and elitism
of ruling sections in Iran, including attacking corrupt
mullahs. He has given increased economic rights to some of
societies poorest, and is an incredibly humble and modest
president – something which is striking to everyone.
It is also true at the sametime that his economic strategy
hasn’t perhaps benefitted the economy on the whole as it
has led to inflation. But those who follow the reformist
press in Iran like myself, know that all the criticism
against Nejad’s policies are not to have better policies
for the poor, but intended in defending some of societies
privileged sections; as the reformist camp support
neo-liberal policies. For those of us who believe in a
leadership which seeks to empower some of the poorest in
society, on a platform of anti-corruption of the elites,
with a clear militant anti-imperialist internationalism,
then Nejad is your man, and his is your camp. ‘But what
about the socialist and left opposition, the too want
rights for the poor!’ I hear some cry, more on this in a
moment.
“What has been the state response, besides Ahmadinejad’s
bizarre trip to Russia to celebrate his victory?”
Why was it ‘bizarre’? Nejad’s trip to Russia and to the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is all part of the
important anti-imperialist (‘multi-polar world’) rise
across the world. The SCO is the closest thing to an
anti-imperialist bloc which in the future can push the West
out of Asia, and this process is in progress right now with
this article outlining these developments.
So I would argue far from Nejad’s trip being ‘bizarre’, it
shows him in one of his elements – being amongst those who
are leading the rise of a new multi-polar world, ie, and
end to US/western hegemony, which is the grand prize for
which we have been struggle for since nearly seven
centuries.
And as Nejad has gone over for the SCO conference, it is
maybe another dig at Mousavi – saying to him ‘this is where
my primary allies are, and I am not one for pussy-footing
with the west’.
“Yes there has been repression of the most brutal kind.
We’ve all seen the images of blood stained University
halls, motorbiked thugs chasing protestors and street
clashes … “In addition foreign media has been restricted,
the internet and mobile phone calls limited and other
repressive techniques that can only be inflicted by state
apparatus.”
You mention the brutal repression, but don’t mention the
context in which they have taken place. I would put this
repression into context of the provocations of some of the
students who wanted to burn down the Basij base. It’s
tragic and sad, but not surprising that those who want to
burn down the building of the revolutionary guards, then
see the guards hitting back, it has to be said AFTER they
were besieged. Who were these students? What is the sense
in these provocations? Tragic deaths are the result, and a
deepening of the sense of confrontation, which I don’t
think is to anyone’s advantage in Iran.
Students are mainstays of the banned opposition movements,
and there has been a long history of student based
anti-regime elements, and the regime clamping down on them.
It’s been terrible that students have been attacked on
their campuses and some reportedly killed, but we have to
also put some responsibility at least on those students who
are out to overthrow the regime, which results in the
regime coming down hard on some students.
As for the restrictions on the foreign media etc, I think
Obama let it out of the bag when he successfully for
Twitter to keep them online when they were going to be shut
today for maintenance work. I don’t think any of us are so
naïve as to be blind to the fact that mainstream Western
media outlets are arms of the western states and serve
their states, not the Iranians. And seeing that the
Iranians have plenty of examples as to the dirty role of
these agencies in many other peoples affairs,, then no-one
can accuse them, let alone those advocating
non-western-intervention in Iran, that they have strict
restrictions on them.
“One thing that is absolutely clear is that any repression
of any protest is unacceptable. People have the right to
protest and political expression and any attempts to halt
this must be rejected.”
So would you support the protests of people burning down
government buildings? The seriousness of the situation in
Iran is partly highlighted when you go on to state:
“The simple answer is that as far as the imperialists are
concerned, this could be the perfect opportunity to
dismantle Iran as an obstacle to the domination of the
Middle East. The Iraq war has only strengthened Iran as a
regional power; all the worse that it is prepared to stand
up to the West. Very few countries are as vocal as Iran on
issues such as Palestine and very few countries, if any,
can or will not provide the support that the resistance
across the Middle East needs.”
So seeing that this is the perfect opportunity for the West
to push their strategies in regard to Iran (which I agree
with of course) it is natural for their direct and indirect
allies to do all that they can in Iran to make things hard
for the regime. I am sure you know that there are many
kinds of groupings in Iran which are in a war with the
state and have backing by the West (the MKO is an obvious
example), and many others who are supported, based,
financed etc by the West. In this context, I think the
Iranian sate is much more relaxed than I thought they might
be, with very little police around on the Mousavi protests,
apart from when after there was some skirmishes, especially
around the Guards base issue.
“… The simple answer is that as far as the imperialists are
concerned, this could be the perfect opportunity to
dismantle Iran as an obstacle to the domination of the
Middle East. The Iraq war has only strengthened Iran as a
regional power; all the worse that it is prepared to stand
up to the West. Very few countries are as vocal as Iran on
issues such as Palestine and very few countries, if any,
can or will not provide the support that the resistance
across the Middle East needs.
“We must be clear that we will not allow the West to hijack
this movement and use it to its advantage. Since 1989
western powers have used genuinely democratic movements to
further their own aims, as seen across Eastern Europe and
beyond. The same cannot and must not happen with Iran. …
The Iranian people are displaying that they are not ‘too
oppressed to fight back’ or in any way too weak to fight
their own battles. They do not want western intervention
and they do not need western intervention.”
“The Iranian left needs to play a better role and provide
some organisation to the movement. … Victory to the Iranian
people; against both their oppressors in the regime and the
global imperialist project.”
The question of the Iranian and anti-imperialism in the
context of Iran is a very important issue that needs a lot
of debate. My position is that the Iranian left are
playing, for the most part, directly or indirectly the job
of the West. I saw an Iranian leftist (perhaps some of you
know who he is, as I recognise him, but don’t know his
name) on Newsnight the other day, giving an Iranian voice
to the West’s attitude towards Iran.
Some socialists in the West are supporting the left who are
active in the Mousavi camp. This is very ironic, because
here you have a ‘left’ allied to a political camp of the
corrupt elites, and those who want to water down the
Iranian state’s anti-imperialism. This is not new, as this
has happens and is happening in many areas around the world
from Venezuela, Zimbabwe, China, Lebanon, Iraq and many
other places, where the left are allied to the west’s
allies who are often some far from socialistic groupings.
If the Iranian left were a major mass force in Iran; if
they had a good anti-imperialist practice and position; if
they had a good chance at capturing power: perhaps people
should seriously consider supporting them. But it seems
they are very marginal, so establishing one’s position on
Iran from an anti-imperialist perspective based merely on
these minute leftist elements is at best missing the whole
nature of this clash in Iran, and at worst is avoiding some
hard decisions and allowing the West to take the political
advantage in terms of how current events in Iran are
reported and (mis)understood.
It’s also very dangerous to the left groups in Iran itself
to think that they are getting support from those in the
West, as it may add to their sense of confidence in
confronting the state, which will lead to more arrests,
jail and unfortunately deaths for some more.
I don’t know how much you have thought about your
concluding slogan:
“Victory to the Iranian people; against both their
oppressors in the regime and the global imperialist
project”
But for me it raises some problems: when the main clash is
between two camps, why should we not discuss this central
issue rather than be drawn into subsidiary issues about
opposing the West and the oppressors in the regime?
Also those amongst the left who are supporting the Mousavi
camp because some Iranian left-wingers are in and around
that camp, fail to recognise a much more important issue
which effects the Iranian masses and poor and the masses of
the people in the region, and in relation to which, the
world anti-imperialist movement. For those in the left who
believe in social justice on a national and international
scale, Nejad’s camp is advocating this, in the face of
resistance of the Mousavi camp.
Finally, we have to constantly revise and understand the
contradictions within the struggles of the peoples of the
South, such as the one taking place in Iran, and also the
machinations of the West and especially the USA and UK.
This is especially important as we have entered into a
crucial phase of the anti-imperialist struggle, where the
US and the West have taken a massive beating thanks to the
twin tracks of resistance in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon,
Somalia, Afghanistan etc, and the rise of the third world
economies led by China, but also Brazil, Venezuela, Iran
etc. If Obama is a good guy personally, he is being used by
the elites to further their aims by other more crafty and
subtle means, but trying to enforce their retreating
hegemonic position all the same.
Obama’s speech in Cairo, far from a new positive era with
the region, has led or perhaps has problematically
contributed to the current crisis in Iran, in the sense
that Mousavi’s camp and followers think they can throw out
the militants (Nejad etc) now they have a ‘good guy’ to
deal with in Obama. And also Obama’s speech has egged on
those Tehrani elites who think they got a nod from Obama to
get rid of that little upstart and friend of the resistance
– President Nejad.
The anti-imperialist approach, as expressed by Tupac Amaru,
Simon Bolivar, through to Malcolm X, Che Guevara, Leila
Khaled, Lumumba and today with Hizbullah and Chavez is
never to stop intensifying your struggle; increase one’s
assertiveness and confidence in material, spiritual,
cultural and armed strength is the ONLY path to complete
liberation. In this, I know who I am with in Iran, despites
all the hype from the west, a hype which I don’t trust; and
I take this position despite my differences, sometimes
serious, with the Iranian regime.
Look forward to yours and others thoughts and reflections
on this issue.
Sukant Chandan
'Iran. 1979 and 2009.'
By Dominic Kouros Kavakeb
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a mass event, a popular
uprising of a scale rarely seen before. 30 years on, the
Iranian people are out in their millions once again but the
questions remain, what is this really about and where is
this movement going?
Last week the Iranian Presidential elections took place
with the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad being most strongly
challenged by former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. A
close election was widely expected, yet the final result
was in Ahmadinejad’s favour by 63% to Mousavi’s 34%. This
immediately led to widespread suspicion amongst Mousavi
supporters that the vote had been rigged to exaggerate the
current Presidents votes.
The purpose of this article is not to attain whether or not
there was indeed electoral fraud. The point is to examine
this new wave of protest and the situation as a whole.
However, for purposes of clarity it is necessary to state a
few things. Firstly, Ahmadinejad was expected to win. A
telephone poll was conducted by an international group,
independent from the regime and had Ahmadinejad as wining 2
to 1. Personally, I expected Ahmadinejad to win albeit with
slightly less of a majority. The main arguments from those
who suspect fraud are based on how the result was
announced. In addition Ahmadinejad’s support seemed to
spread far more evenly than previously expected, with him
winning in areas that were considered Mousavi territory. So
it is clear that we cannot be sure whether or not the vote
was fixed.
What is an indisputable fact is that over the past 5 days
millions of people have taken to the streets to protest. In
anytime this is a deeply encouraging, inspiring and very
exciting moment. Much of the talk on the Iranian street is
about the 1979 revolution and how the same atmosphere has
gripped the country. It is probably true to say that the
first people out onto the streets were disgruntled Mousavi
fans from the middle class who would benefit from the
neo-liberal economic policies proposed by Mousavi as well
the social freedoms; however this is no longer the case. As
time has passed the movement has become much more than this
and now encapsulates all layers of Iranian society. Indeed
the control Mousavi has from this movement is entirely
questionable and in all probability actually rather
limited.
It would seem that the election was result was the spark
that the lit the fire of Iranian society, which had been
building up for many years. Iran has had a very strong
reform movement, since the early 90’s, which has had to
deal with its own strengths and weaknesses. The reform
movement has always been extremely broad in nature,
encompassing figures such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, the
current chair of The Assembly of Experts and former
President to women’s rights activists and left wingers.
Despite its breadth and in fact most probably because of
this, the reform movement has always lacked a clear
leadership and direction. This is mirrored by the current
events where you have massive protest, yet very little
coordinated direction.
It is also important to be able to understand the
limitations of the reform movement in terms of their
demands. The majority of the movement does not challenge
the Islamic regime itself nor the principles of the ’79
revolution. Watching the live debate between Ahmadinejad
and Mousavi at times it was almost as if they were trying
to ‘out Khomeini’ one another. Both spoke about their
dedication to the revolution and how they were the true
interpreters of Khomeini’s message. So where do the real
differences lie? This question will give us some insight
into the feelings of the Iranian people. Economically
Mousavi favours further neo-liberalisation, although this
is not something Ahmadinejad is specifically adverse to.
The difference may be where Mousavi is happy to trade with
the west, Ahmadinejad not so. To a degree this determines
their stances on foreign policy. Mousavi ridiculed
Ahmadinejad for the way in which he’s made Iran look
childish in the face of international diplomacy. The
President retorted with the idea that regardless of whether
or not Iran does what the West wants, they will always face
threats. It is impossible to beat The United States at
their own game (i.e. within the arena of the UN).
Mousavi was seen by many as being a candidate who would
open Iranian society and provide the freedoms that are
enjoyed by the bourgeois in the west. Therefore when he
lost it is easy to see why so many were so angry, although
that does not explain the large scale popular protest that
we have seen. It seems as if every section of society with
any qualm against the regime has come out to use this
opportunity, in a usually repressive state, to protest.
This is a window of chance for those who want change and
they are determined to use it. It is also important to note
that many of the protestors are not explicitly against the
Islamic regime. Having spoken to come of my family in Iran,
they are angry about the election and want to see change,
but within the foundations of the revolution. This is not a
movement that is challenging Islamic rule, in the abstract.
What has been the state response, besides Ahmadinejad’s
bizarre trip to Russia to celebrate his victory? Yes there
has been repression of the most brutal kind. We’ve all seen
the images of blood stained University halls, motorbiked
thugs chasing protestors and street clashes. In addition
foreign media has been restricted, the internet and mobile
phone calls limited and other repressive techniques that
can only be inflicted by state apparatus. However, the
official line is strangely subdued. The Grand Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei is due to give a speech tomorrow following Friday
prayers, and many expect to see a few surprises. Anyone who
attempts to simplistically align Ahmadinejad with the
religious elite is making a grave error. It is true that
Khamenei formally endorsed Ahmadinejad for a second term
but the reality is not so straight forward. Ahmadinejad’s 4
year term was marked by constant bickering between the
executive and the religious sections of the ruling class.
The fear amongst the religious establishment was that the
President was going too far to antagonise the west and
subsequently was damaging the trade deals that have been in
place since the 90’s. During the campaign period Khamenei
himself came forward to discredit a claim by Ahmadinejad
that Mousavi’s wife and campaigner, Zahra Rahnavand, is not
a real Doctor. So it is clear that are real splits opening
up inside the regime, which certainly does not bode well
for its long term survival.
One thing that is absolutely clear is that any repression
of any protest is unacceptable. People have the right to
protest and political expression and any attempts to halt
this must be rejected. Reports from the last couple of days
actually show a shift in the attitude of the Iranian police
towards the protestors. Rather than be used by the state as
a tool of repression they have begun to protect the
protestors from the feared Basiji and the other thugs.
Robert Fisk wrote yesterday in the Independent of the
Police holding back the armed thugs from attacking the
demonstrations; a moment last seen when the Iranian armed
forces turn on the Shah in the 1979 revolution.
However, we must also understand Iran in a global context.
This situation is very different to a General Strike in
France where we can analyse this as the state vs. the
people. As already outlined such an analysis is far too
simplistic. We have to question why the situation in Iran
is grabbing so many headlines and the attention of the
world. When in Egypt the state rigged the elections and
massive protests erupted, why did this not receive the same
coverage? The simple answer is that as far as the
imperialists are concerned, this could be the perfect
opportunity to dismantle Iran as an obstacle to the
domination of the Middle East. The Iraq war has only
strengthened Iran as a regional power; all the worse that
it is prepared to stand up to the West. Very few countries
are as vocal as Iran on issues such as Palestine and very
few countries, if any, can or will not provide the support
that the resistance across the Middle East needs.
We must be clear that we will not allow the West to hijack
this movement and use it to its advantage. Since 1989
western powers have used genuinely democratic movements to
further their own aims, as seen across Eastern Europe and
beyond. The same cannot and must not happen with Iran. The
vast majority of Iranian people themselves reject Western
influence in their affairs; the revolution of 1979 was
based around sweeping aside foreign rule. The collective
memory of the ghost of 1953 when Iranian Nationalist leader
Dr Mossadeq was overthrown in a CIA coup has not been
forgotten. Western powers must stay firmly out of this
affair. For years the liberal imperialists have argued that
we must intervene in countries with human rights abuses,
because the people of these nations are not capable of
doing it themselves. If this new movement in Iran proves
one thing it is that this formulation is false. The Iranian
people are displaying that they are not ‘too oppressed to
fight back’ or in any way too weak to fight their own
battles. They do not want western intervention and they do
not need western intervention.
So what will happen next? I honestly don’t know. Clearly we
have a series of events on a scale not seen in Iran since
1979. However, for all of the parallels this is not 1979
again. Protestors on both sides are chanting Islamic
slogans and we will not see an overthrow of the Islamic
Republic. There may well be changes in personnel, policies
and other reforms but I expect it to go no further, at
least at this stage. The Iranian left needs to play a
better role and provide some organisation to the movement.
But like 1979 the Iranian left is cutting itself off from
society. They are not central to these protests and would
rather see the Western powers launch an invasion than any
continuation of the current regime. At lot rests on what
the Supreme Leader has to say tomorrow, so we shall have to
wait and see.
Regardless, this is an exciting moment for Iran. This wave
of protest is unconditionally a good thing and healthy for
Iranian society. It is the product of years of social and
political unrest combined with the current economic crisis.
Victory to the Iranian people; against both their
oppressors in the regime and the global imperialist
project.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)