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As
I read Eric
Hobsbawm’s autobiography* I found myself sometimes puzzled,
sometimes irritated, and eventually saddened. Over the years
I have appreciated the works that brought him his reputation
as a left historian. Unfortunately, his autobiography does
not enhance that reputation.
Hobsbawm’s has
certainly been a life crowded with incident. There cannot be
many whose political life spans participating in the last
legal Communist demonstration in Berlin on 25 January 1933
(p. 73) and watching the build-up to the 2002 invasion of
Iraq from a London hospital bed (p. 412. But with so much to
tell, the telling of it obviously posed problems of form and
content as well as of aesthetic and moral judgement that in
my estimation Hobsbawm has failed to come to grips with.
Autobiography must satisfy certain expectations while
observing certain limits. The account of anyone’s life
cannot merely be a collection of facts, for the facts
attaching to anyone’s life are, roughly, infinite in number.
Second, the revelation of even the most intimate minutiae of
anyone's life are likely to seem boring or in poor taste
unless carefully chosen for their significance. An account
of even an eventful life must, therefore, be artfully
crafted if it is to be judged praiseworthy. And if the
autobiographer claims to be contributing to our
understanding of his era, we should be able to detect that
which would encourage us to believe that we are engaging
with someone thinking carefully and critically about his
encounters with people and events.
Hobsbawm’s
autobiography is problematical in these respects. It is in
three parts: a “roughly chronological” account of his life,
a section on his scholarly career, and a concluding section
on his visits to countries other than his “native
Mitteleuropa and England” (p. xiv). Thus, he covers sections
of his life several times over, each time with a different
focus. The somewhat arbitrary way in which Hobsbawm does so
raises the question, whether he has actually sought to
arrive at a coherent understanding of his own development as
a person and as an intellectual. His Mitteleuropean/English
self has always been somewhat separate from his
French/Spanish/American selves, and these selves seem to
have had little to do with his historian self. Such a
division of himself is hardly satisfying, especially from
one we would expect to be inclined to self-reflection and
responsive to the experiences that make the world an
interesting puzzle. An attempt to interweave these selves
together would have been welcome, not least because that
would have helped us appreciate his understanding of
history.
An autobiography
must surely also convey to those acquainted with its subject
a recognizable likeness--or else suggest how the one they
thought they knew came to wear a mask. [Incidentally,
Hobsbawm notes just such a case. His boyhood acquaintance
Rudolf Leder--aka Stephan Hermlin, the East German poet--who
recruited him into a Communist student organization, may
have invented an entire autobiography for himself, only to
be exposed by a vengeful West German literary bloodhound
(pp. 62-65).] To those of us unacquainted with its subject,
it must connect with our notions of humanity, or instruct us
how our notions ought to be modified. Beyond this, since an
autobiography is necessarily a work of selection and
presentation, it will prove praiseworthy if it suggests to
all of us more about the author than he has specifically
chosen to tell. But such windows into his life and character
must be born of his artistry and his willingness to reveal
himself. We must beware of mistaking for windows what are
actually accidental gaps in the wall within which he has
sought to conceal himself. If he intimates things about
himself he has asserted he would conceal, this would
constitute a flaw in his artistry—perhaps even flaws in his
personality.
Hobsbawm
confesses he has sought to keep much concealed, even much
that those closest to him deemed important (p. xiv). Even
so, his courage in revealing what he does deserves our
respect. For autobiography is surely among the most
dangerous of the literary arts. To undertake one is to
undertake to reveal something of oneself and one’s
circumstances during various stages of one’s life with
considerable honesty, requiring one to explore in public
one’s thoughts, goals and emotions. It may also bring one
face to face with thoughts and emotions one has resisted
acknowledging even to oneself. And even if one chooses not
put it all down, can one be sure traces of these
self-discoveries will not find their way into the finished
work? Just such traces are, I believe, to be found in
Hobsbawm’s self-portrait. And his failure to address what
these traces intimate about his engagement with life vitiate
what he has presented to us.
It would also be
a very odd autobiography that excluded interactions with
other people. For human interaction is crucial to our
becoming fully human. So we would expect to learn how others
significantly affected the author. Moreover, we need to be
told something about these others as people in their own
right, for how otherwise are we to gauge the
autobiographer’s connection with them. In the case of the
autobiography of an intellectual--this is how Hobsbawm
delimits his project (pp. xii-xiv)--we expect to learn
something about the formation of his intellect through his
engagement with teachers and scholars and their works; mere
mention of them tells us nothing. Also, even an intellectual
autobiography must, I think, tell us something about the
human side of the “public man,” for the furniture of our
minds surely comes to us through informal as well as formal
educational channels. Also, we surely want to learn about
the larger horizons within which he thinks, about what
really matters to him and why. Otherwise, why attend to
anything other than his scholarly works?
Hobsbawm's
intentions are not at odds with these expectations:
To write an
autobiography is to think of oneself as one has never really
done before. In my case it is to strip the geological
deposits of three-quarters of a century away and to recover
or to discover and reconstruct a buried stranger. As I look
back and try to understand this remote and unfamiliar child,
I come to the conclusion that, had he lived in other
historical circumstances, nobody would have forecast for him
a future of passionate commitment to politics, though almost
every observer would have predicted a future as some kind of
intellectual (p. 56).
But consider
Hobsbawm's “historical circumstances.” They are most
specific:
[I]f I were to make the mental experiment of transposing the
boy I was then into another time and/or place--say, into the
England of the 1950s or the USA of the 1980s--I cannot
easily see him plunging, as I did, into the passionate
commitment to world revolution (p. 57).
Is it his passion
or his politics he is trying to explain here? In either
case, is it only one's own immediate experiences that count?
Certainly, many individualistic autobiographers have
undertaken just such a recovery and presentation of their
selves. But surely some additional expectations attach to
the autobiography of a self-avowed Marxist? Yet despite the
fact that class society long predated his entry into the
world and will long survive him and that its injustices
still require to be denounced and fought (pp, 410, 418),
Hobsbawm seems to believe his own politics could only have
sprung from that Berlin of 1931-3. Had he been young in
another place or time he would not have become a Communist?
Can this be the self-understanding of an internationalist
Marxist? It certainly does not seem to provide much of a
basis for solidarity with anyone whose formative experiences
were different. Were such an explanation of political
commitment to be generalized, the revolutionary movement to
which Hobsbawm belonged would never have coalesced into
anything more coherent than, say, the variously instigated
and rooted Movement of the Sixties, a movement which
Hobsbawm viewed negatively because the participants “did not
seem much interested in a social ideal, communist or
otherwise, as distinct from the individualist ideal of
getting rid of anything that claimed the right or power to
stop you doing whatever your ego and id felt like doing” (p.
250)--in other words, in Hobsbawm’s estimation, rooted only
in themselves and their unique experiences, their politics
lacked any common foundation. But even if so, did they then
differ from Hobsbawm and his politics?
But to resume my
point: surely, given his politics, Hobsbawm must believe
that he has been significantly shaped and reshaped by the
weightiest, most widely prevailing features of the world
system he still believes he inhabits as well as by that
system's most cutting local variations upon a particular
person? Indeed, he almost asserts as much in his Preface:
[T]here is a more
profound way in which the interweaving of one person's life
and times, and the observations of both, helped to shape a
historical analysis which, I hope, makes itself independent
of both.
That
is what an autobiography can do. In one sense this book is
the flip side of The Age of Extremes: not world
history illustrated by experiences of an individual, but
world history shaping that experience, or rather offering a
shifting but always limited set of choices from which, to
adapt Karl Marx's phrase, 'men make [their lives], but they
do not make [them] just as they please, they do not make
[them] under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted
from the past' and, one might add, by the world around them
(p. xiii; brackets in the text).
That is to say, Hobsbawm envisages his autobiography as
providing an account of how Hobsbawm became Hobsbawm. It is
also, it seems, an explanation of the self-awareness he
brought to his scholarly work and is intended to augment
that (pp. xiii-xiv). It is “about his ideas, attitudes and
actions,” it is not a piece of advocacy or an apologia (p.
xii).
But is it carping
to note that Hobsbawm indicates that it is only the
historical analysis (independent, he hopes, of experience in
a particular social context) that has been so shaped? Even
the most committed Marxist must surely know that he still,
despite all his efforts, bears within himself the
contradictions that mark the society he inhabits. And would
not such an autobiographer have to explore and then convey
how he has always had to struggle to extirpate from himself
and his scholarship those bourgeois characteristics the
dominant society shoveled into him via the family, the
educational system, the job, etc. Given what Hobsbawm tells
us about himself it is at least questionable whether he has
ever subjected himself to such self-criticism; further, he
seems to have been frozen in time, out of touch with and
analytically unresponsive to the developments of and
responses to capitalism after 1956.
What more ought its readers expect of the autobiography of a
lifelong Marxist (p. xii)? Whatever else, surely it would be
intended to affect the future of the world, if only by
teaching us the ways of a left intellectual and warning us
of the difficulties in trying to live such a life even while
encouraging us to make the attempt. More ambitiously, it
might constitute a political intervention in its own right,
as did, for example, Trotsky’s autobiography. The closing
sentences of Hobsbawm's book suggest that he, too, conceived
of his autobiography as part of the struggle to make the
world of tomorrow (p. 418). Unfortunately, he has just
revealed that he only hopes his book will help him pass “the
test of a historian's life” (p. 417).
Turning to some more detailed aspects of his work, how
Hobsbawm has written about those who populate his pages is
particularly striking. Be they family, friends, colleagues
or comrades, they are for the most part merely briefly,
coldly sketched. A good caricaturist can, of course, suggest
much with a few strokes of the pen. But Hobsbawm does not
seem to possess that skill. He provides little more than a
list of notable academic and political personalities he has
met in the course of his long life. The distant stance is
even evident in the first and perhaps most important
instance in the case of his parents. Of his father, who died
when Hobsbawm was only eleven, he has, he says, almost no
memories (p. 28). His mother, who died when Hobsbawm was
fourteen, did make a lasting moral impression on him. He
particularly remembers her telling him, “You must never do
anything, or seem to do anything that might suggest that you
are ashamed of being a Jew” (p. 24)--an injunction he has
always sought to honor, although he regards himself as a
“non-Jewish Jew” (p. 24). Her approval is something Hobsbawm
has always sought: “[I]f somewhere across the Styx we were
to meet . . . I would expect her to ask me what I had done
with my life . . .” (p. 40). Hobsbawm's summing up of the
dissolution of his family is particularly telling:
In retrospect the
years between my parents' deaths appear a period of tragedy,
trauma, loss and insecurity, which was bound to leave deep
traces on the lives of two children who passed through it. .
. I have no doubt at all that I must also bear the emotional
scars of those sombre years somewhere on me. And yet I do
not think I was conscious of them as such. That may be the
illusion of someone who, like a computer, has a 'trash'
facility for deleting unpleasant or unacceptable data. . .
However, I do not believe that this is the only explanation
why , though not particularly happy, I did not experience
these years as specially distressing. Perhaps the realities
of the situation passed me by because I lived most of the
time at some remove from the real world . . . (p. 41).
--then he quickly
hurries on to mention building a radio set, only to return a
moment later to acknowledge his embarrassment over his
mother's last birthday present to him: “a very cheap
second-hand bike” (p. 42) which would cause him shame when
he had to ride it across Berlin to school (p. 60), and which
he would manage to lose when he had to leave Berlin for
London (p. 77). Clearly, that bicycle and what it stands for
still agitates him. Yet he does not begin to explore that.
Other family relationships receive even terser
acknowledgement. In the very little he tells us about his
sister there seems to be a strong urge to protect her, yet
the way she lived her life seems not to have interested him
much (pp. 59-60, 79). About his first and, especially, his
second wife, he is even less forthcoming--it is almost as if
they did indeed occupy an entirely separate sphere of
existence from the one Hobsbawm is determined to tell us
about. Only in one other place does Hobsbawm indicate that
he experienced anguish:
The darkest period of public anti-communism . . . coincided
with a dark moment in my own life. In the summer of 1950 my
first marriage, rocky for some time, broke up in
circumstances which left me wounded and for some years
acutely unhappy (p. 185).
But here too the
mask of imperturbability, barely lowered, is quickly
resumed.
That we have no
right to be made privy to his pain is not what is at issue
here. But if Hobsbawm has indeed throughout his life tended
to bracket off in the manner he does here the emotional
dimensions of his engagements with others, that is surely
relevant to understanding him as a person and as a
historian. For his intellectual engagements have surely also
incorporated emotional aspects. He is certainly aware that
the emotions of others are intimately linked to their
political--and their chess-playing--judgement (p. 207). Yet
he repeatedly seeks to suggest his intellect and his
passions are disconnected.
Perhaps it is
stretching matters to detect in his accounts of his most
intimate familial relationships clues to Hobsbawm's
impersonal autobiographical style? To be sure, his rejection
of what he terms the “confessional mode” is explicit (p.
xii). But what he does tell us about the traumatically
pivotal moments in his early life does suggest that his
detachment may not be something over which he exercises much
control. (His “trash facility” is not so much an explanation
as an excuse.) One can infer deep, unresolved pain that may
well render certain sorts of self-reflection difficult.
This brings us to
another, related problem so far as an intellectual
autobiography is concerned. For whom did Hobsbawm encounter
on his intellectual and political journey? Certainly a very
great many. But what do we learn of them? Their names; a
brief physical description; an ethnic identification; the
identification of their political or scholarly role. But we
do not learn how they and Hobsbawm interacted, we do not
learn how they contributed to Hobsbawm's political or
intellectual development. This oddity is highlighted by the
fact that the only person other than members of his family
who is described quite fully--and with affection—is the
Welsh landowner and architect, Clough Williams-Ellis (pp.
233-43). There is, less fully, the economic historian, M. M.
Postan, who figures as one of the few Cambridge scholars
whose lectures Hobsbawm bothered to attend (pp. 110-111),
described as something of a friend (pp. 183-4), but also,
like Williams-Ellis, as something of a character (pp.
282-5). Moreover, Hobsbawm is at pains to emphasize that
Postan was not his teacher (p. 283). Even more briefly,
there is the school teacher who “pressed a volume of the
philosopher Immanuel Kant”--which one? to what effect?--
into Hobsbawm's hands (p. 93). In sum, then, we are led to
believe that in his scholarly as in his personal life no one
really touched him, that Hobsbawm is a self-made man. Or if
anyone did help shape him, personally, politically or
intellectually, it is too private a thing to be discussed.
Ordinary people,
working-class people fare even worse. Most of them are
unnamed and undescribed.--Did not Raymond Williams observe
that “there are in fact no masses; there are only ways of
seeing people as masses?”--Those that do emerge from the
mass are, for the most part, those whom Hobsbawm encountered
during his wartime service. Of them Hobsbawm writes,
By and large in my days as a Sapper I lived among
workers--overwhelmingly English workers--and in doing so
acquired a permanent, if often exasperated, admiration for
their uprightess, their distrust of bullshit, their sense of
class, comradeship and mutual help. They were good people. I
know that communists are supposed to believe in the virtues
of the proletariat, but I was relieved to find myself doing
so in practice as well as in theory (p. 159).
“They were good
people?” Who is Hobsbawm writing for? Who needs such
reassurances? Why do I find myself remembering Robert
Graves' anecdote in Goodbye To All That of a British
military officer expressing his surprise that the skins of
his working-class troops were so white? Hobsbawm does not
depict himself as having learned anything from what he terms
his “proletarian experience” (p. 158), though the lads did
amaze him with their “instinctive sense or tradition of
collective action” (p. 158)--my god, there really was a
working class! And then there was the named, described Bert
Thirtle, with whom he had to share a room, who even “lacked
the social reflexes which I found so striking in my
otherwise politically disappointing mates, and which
explains so much about British trade unionism” (p. 157). It
is, it seems, not only the poor stockinger who needs to be
rescued from condescension.
With the War’s end, despite having been made aware that he
had lived in only marginal contact with the great majority
his fellow citizens (p. 157), working class people disappear
from Hobsbawm's recorded life. The parade of names of
scholars, intellectuals and Party notables resumes,
signaling his re-immersion in the British and international
academic and left elites. But since no one seems to have
affected his political or historical understanding, such
isolation from those his politics was intended to benefit
was perhaps of little consequence?
Hobsbawm's
disinclination to explore his relationships in any depth has
another, awkward, consequence which would be of no relevance
if it did not unfortunately emphasize his lapses into
gossipy prurience in places. For instance, should not one
who rejects the confessional mode (p. xii) have exercised
more care when writing of his comrade James Klugmann?
Initially, his remarks are unexceptionable, but then for no
apparent reason he remarks,
As far as I know
he continued a monastic existence as an unattached man for
the rest of his life, surrounded, when the occasion arose,
by admiring juniors I am told he made sexual jokes in the
company of intimates--of whom I was never one--and since he
had been at Gresham's School, the nursery of more than one
eminent homosexual of his day, he may very well have been
queer (p. 123)
Neither is this
the only occurrence of gratuitous sexual speculation. Does
it convey anything of substance to note (parenthetically)
that Paul Baran’s connections with San Francisco’s
longshoremen came about because for a time he was the lover
of a Californian Japanese woman (pp. 391-2)? Do we really
need to be told that 'Peter Bratt' was not only a
“wonderfully cultured, soft faced, . . . relative of
Bismarck” but also homosexual (p. 168)? I suppose it is de
rigueur to mention the “atmosphere of cultured
homosexuality” of pre-War Cambridge, But I fail to see how
it advances our understanding of the historian and his
analyses to be told that in passing or to be told that the
post-War Cambridge students had other sexual inclinations.
If, on the other hand, the sexual orientations of his
acquaintances were really relevant to his life and thought,
Hobsbawm fails to explain how.
To be fair,
Hobsbawm is occasionally personally indiscrete (pp. 221,
315). But Hobsbawm's comments on sexuality strike me as of a
piece with his seeming disinclination to explore his family
traumas. It would have been better had he left these things
unmentioned given that the mention he does make of them only
serves to suggest that he has never applied himself to
understanding such matters, or at least that he has never
been able to talk comfortably about them. As it is, these
traces running through his bowdlerized autobiography suggest
that there may be much more than discomfort involved.
Let me now turn
to Hobsbawm's politics, which are not, it turns out, so
remote from the matters just discussed. Indeed, given what
he does say about the passionate foundations of his
political activism, his determination to exclude intimacies
from his autobiography seems even more peculiar. Seventy
years after that 1933 demonstration in Berlin, he describes
that and similar events thus:
Next to sex, the
activity combining bodily experience and intense emotion to
the highest degree is the participation in a mass
demonstration at a time of great public exaltation. Unlike
sex, which is essentially individual [sic], it is by its
nature collective, and unlike the sexual climax, at any rate
for men, it can be prolonged for hours. On the other hand,
like sex it implies some physical action . . . through which
the merger of the individual in the mass, which is the
essence of the collective experience, finds expression (p.
73)
Later, in
Britain, he came to see that that sense of “mass ecstasy”
was one of the things that led him to Communism (p. 74).
What else led Hobsbawm to his political commitment? “Pity
for the exploited, the aesthetic appeal of a perfect and
comprehensive intellectual system, . . . a little bit of
the Blakean vision of the new Jerusalem and a good deal of
intellectual anti-philistinism” (p. 74). Despite his
desperately insecure childhood he did not see himself as one
of the exploited? Had he done so he might have confessed to
anger, not pity. Or is it that he could not admit his own
vulnerability and so projected his sense of victimization
onto others in order to be able to engage with it? That from
1935 on he considered dialectical materialism to be perfect
and comprehensive may have provided him an unconquerable
defense against a personally traumatic world (p. 420, n.
5.6). No wonder, then, that he was not swayed by 1956, that
he held true (p. 218). A moment later, however, he adds that
his adherence to the Party after 1956 may have been
motivated by egotism (p. 218). After 1956, he became rather
disengaged from political activity (p. 263). So perhaps he
was more affected than he lets on by the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSU. As to the more general reaction of the British
Communists to the revelations of that conference, Hobsbawm’s
summary conclusion mirrors that dismissive stance towards
things British as compared with things continental for which
Edward Thompson took Anderson et al. to task (pp. 210,
217-8).
After 1956, his
personal and professional life also began to change for the
better. He remarried and his immediate world became much
more domestically oriented (pp. 220, 222). He found life
more pleasant than he'd imagined possible; at least for
those like him who had a “career” “postwar life was an
escalator which, without any special effort, took us higher
than we had ever expected to be”; it was “a Golden Age” (pp.
222-3). But even if we accept that the very great many who
only had jobs, not careers, also generally found their
standard of living improving over the longer term, shouldn't
a Marxist economic historian have viewed these changes more
critically? After all, had not his comrade Edward Thompson
argued quite convincingly that there had been another
painful side to a previous over-all advance in the British
standard of living?
Perhaps his
newfound sense of well-being made him rather complacent in
the face of new occurrences of inhumanity and injustice? I
do not mean that he ignored them, for he did not. But he
seems not to have been moved to try to understand what was
going on in all its ramifications. To be sure, he does say
that for leftists of his generation the Sixties were
enormously welcome, if enormously puzzling (p. 249). But he
doubted those in movement knew “how to achieve their
political objectives” (p. 250) or,even if they had any
politics (p. 248). So where, in Hobsbawm’s estimation, did
it all lead?
In politics, nowhere much. Since a revolution was not on the
cards [sic], the European revolutionaries of 1968 had to
join the political mainstream of the left, unless, being
very bright young intellectuals, as so many of them were,
they escaped from real politics into the academy, where
revolutionary ideas could survive without much political
practice. Politically, the 1968 generation has done well
enough, especially if one includes those recruited into
civil services and think tanks and the burgeoning numbers of
advisers in politicians’ private offices . . . (p. 261).
‘Twas ever thus for the lucky some, I suppose; even for the
lucky some among those of Hobsbawm’s generation, as his own
career trajectory suggests. But--to introduce here
Hobsbawm’s treatment of things American-- he simply does not
attend to the right-wing reaction against the Sixties which
began even before the Sixties were over and which continues
down to the present day. Admittedly, Hobsbawm writes from a
European perspective. But he has been a regular visitor to
the United States since 1960 (pp. 391, 402), and he has
taught at a number of American universities. So surely he is
aware of the efforts of a series of administrations to roll
back the Sixties? And surely he has encountered the culture
wars and the political correctness campaign designed to curb
those of a progressive persuasion who did find refuge in the
American academy? Again, oddly, although he acknowledges the
once-Communist historians of slavery (p. 289), the Civil
Rights Movement and the subsequent reactions against it go
unremarked, Hobsbawm’s great interest in jazz
notwithstanding (e.g., pp. 389, 391, 394-402).
But let me leave it to Hobsbawm himself to illuminate the
limits of his engagement with and understanding of the
United States during one of the most conflicted eras in its
history:
Looking back on forty years of visiting and living in the
United States, I think I learned as much about the country
in the first summer I spent there as in the course of the
next decades. With one exception: to know New York, or even
Manhattan, one has to live there (p. 403)
--perhaps New York chauvinists would agree with him; as a
Briton who has resided in several different regions of the
United States, I find Hobsbawm’s dismissiveness too familiar
an expression of a certain sort of European
superciliousness. Since the United States has constituted
such a significant place in Hobsbawm’s life story, it is
unfortunate that he has not chosen to engage with it in a
more reflective, comprehensive fashion. Again he seems to
have opted to remain frozen in his own particular past with
its own limiting prejudices.
What is most puzzling is that he seems content to be baffled
by the Sixties. He seems not to have been moved to try to
understand what was going on. While he himself would appear
to have been politically sustained throughout the rest of
his life by his ecstatic moment of collective action in
1933, all he seems to feel for those whose moment came a
generation later (many of whom have remained politically
sustained by their experiences) is satisfaction that they
were at last forced to face up to the dominant reality:
[A]s soon as the
dense clouds of maximalist rhetoric and cosmic expectation
turned into the rain of every day, the distinction between
ecstasy and politics, real power and flower power, between
voice and action, became visible once more. Jericho had not
fallen to the sound of Joshua's collective trumpets. The
political young had to consider what action was needed to
capture it (p. 259).
What they should
have learned was the need for “disciplined vanguard
organizations” and the necessity of contemplating what
Marxist parties “should do, indeed what their function could
be, in non-revolutionary countries” (p. 259).
Political
discipline would in fact appear to be Hobsbawm's watchword.
His most notable intervention in actually existing politics
began with his 1978 Marx Memorial Lecture. His message, that
the British Labour Party should behave as a disciplined
broad-based organization to accommodate to socio-economic
and cultural change, led to his involvement in a strident
debate (p. 263-4). Broadly, the question was, how to
challenge the emerging forms of conservative politics--a
question that assumed pressing significance once Thatcher
and her colleagues captured the Conservative Party. At risk
of overly simplifying Hobsbawm's position in the late 1970s
and thereafter, his advocacy of a broad alliance approach,
to include all those from the traditional right to the far
left in a coordinated effort to block the radical right,
will sound familiar to those contemplating the ‘anyone but
Bush’ campaign. Labour was to become a catch-all
party--wasn't it always that?--rather than a socialist
party. But just who were those “sectarians”--the term occurs
frequently in this part of his autobiography (pp.
263-277)--Hobsbawm was arguing against? Those driven from
the Party in 1956, those who had come to left politics in
the Sixties, militant workers, left-wing union leaders,
hard-line Communists, and those others who saw that all that
glittered in the Golden Age was not gold; in short, all
those Hobsbawm's autobiography suggests he had always been
distant from.
While he hopes
his arguments influenced the Labour Party to become a party
of “the political realists and the technicians of
government,” who “must operate in a market economy and fit
in with its requirements” (pp.276-7), Hobsbawm is
nevertheless eager to dissociate himself from New Labour:
New Labour has erred by going beyond accepting the realities
of living in a capitalist society to “accepting too much of
the ideological assumptions of the prevailing free market
economic theology” (p. 277)--”We wanted,” he complains, “a
reformed Labour, not Thatcher in trousers” (p. 276). Too
bad. William Morris, or Morris's biographer, Hobsbawm's
former comrade, Edward Thompson, could have warned him that
the struggle to change things often followed just this
pattern, and that the struggle had to be renewed again and
again. Of course, they were advocating efforts to undo
capitalism, not to get along with it while merely
repudiating its ideological aspects.
In conclusion, it
seems fitting to quote back at Hobsbawm his own words
concerning Klugmann, “What did one know of him? He gave
nothing away” (p. 123). Hobsbawm, I have urged, does give
some things away. But what he does inadvertently reveal
about himself raises the question, does Hobsbawm himself
know or dare to know how he became Hobsbawm? Perhaps. But he
certainly does not want to reveal it to his readers.
*Eric Hobsbawm,
Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life (New
York: Pantheon, 2002; first published London: Allen Lane,
2002).
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