August 31 marked the end of an golden era in Brazil and its economic development. On that Wednesday afternoon, the Senate voted to impeach President Dilma Rousseff. After six years in power, tales of endemic corruption and the hard-hitting reality of an economic downturn had wrought so much political disengagement that this head had to roll. And so, with tears aplenty from both sides and a count of 61-20, Brazil’s first female president was indicted for manipulating the federal budget in order to conceal deficits.
When the Workers’ Party first came to power in 2003 under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil began to enjoy the fruits of political stability and fiscal growth. Through Silva, the country’s working class was finally represented. Welfare programmes aimed at low-income families began to narrow the gap between the country’s rich and poor; an astounding 29 million people were lifted out of poverty.
A profound sense of optimism thus continued through to Rousseff’s election in 2010, thanks to high commodity prices, oil discoveries and peak levels of foreign investment. By 2012, Brazil passed the UK to become the world’s sixth biggest economy. With this new standing the state pushed forward with foreign policies that aimed to see this role truly consolidated.
And just like that, Brazil’s short-lived economic success began to unravel. The worldwide collapse of commodity prices was the main culprit, waving farewell to Brazil’s ten-year-long export boom. Social discontent swiftly emerged, particularly when over-zealous plans for the World Cup 2014 and Olympics 2016 were revealed. To the revulsion of the public, rather than spending on much needed infrastructure development, the government instead ploughed billions into supersized vanity projects.
Falling Chinese demand for goods such as iron ore and soy beans contributed to the economy’s deterioration. Unemployment grew, as did inflation, culminating in the economy shrinking by 4 per cent in 2015. Such setbacks inevitably led to political tension, and as the blame game played out in full swing, Rousseff lay at the centre of it all.
While corruption scandals wreaked havoc on the reputation of the Workers’ Party, with many of Rousseff’s confidantes and key players found guilty, the President herself was not accused. Still, her image was tarnished. Rousseff’s reputation worsened as speculation about her inflexibility and poor decision-making grew rife. Plummeting ratings saw Rousseff abandoned by her former allies, particularly in her moment of truth on 31 August.
Yet to blame all of Brazil’s current misfortunes solely on Rousseff would be an over-simplication. In fact, her impeachment has a resounding sense of irony. Many of those 61 that voted for her indictment are themselves guilty of corruption, particularly in respect to the infamous Petroban scandal. As such, these culprits hope that in targeting the President, the spotlight will not shine down on them and become as ruinous to their careers as it has been for her. Rousseff has thus become a scapegoat for the corruption that perverted Brazil’s economy and political system.
Just days after Rouseff’s impeachment, on September 5, a 500,000-strong protest broke out across the streets of Sao Paulo, rallying against the new President Michel Temer, former Vice President under both Silva and Rousseff. With Temer set to serve the remainder of Rousseff’s term, which is due to end in 2019, protestors have called for immediate elections. Indeed, many have labelled the impeachment as a coup, a coup hidden under the mask of legality in a successful bid to overthrow Brazil’s regime.
Brazil remains deeply divided and highly polarised – more so than ever before. Little faith remains in the political system, in addition to the country’s ability to push forward economically. Even the glory of hosting the world’s biggest sporting event could not shake the feeling of pessimism that pervades Brazil’s social consciousness.
Rouseff’s impeachment leaves an unsavoury vacuum in Brazil’s democracy, particularly in light of speulation about the damage that Temer could inflict. Many Brazilians fear he will deprioritise labour protections and spending on welfare education and health. This is especially concerning as many of those in his new coalition, headed by the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, have often overlooked the impact of their policies on the working class. Other fears concern Temer’s likely postponement of illiteracy programmes, the expanding privatisation of prisons and greater access to firearms across the country.
If such rumours are true, Temer’s ultra-conservative and anti-welfare policies can be expected to make a horrid impact on low-income families, and so disenchant the population even further. If true, Brazil’s return to economic progression will remain paused for the foreseeable future – to the detriment of millions of its people.
