

GISTED RISK ASSESSMENT

N15 Gisted Risk Assessment

1. This is an open version of a risk assessment completed by MPS for N15. The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in the risk of harm to N15 if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of him/her.
2. In summary, the risk to N15 of physical harm is assessed as **high**; the risk of action directed against N15 likely to interfere with private and family life in the event of identification through information disclosed by the Inquiry is **high**. The risk assessor was unable to assess the risk of psychological and/or emotional harm on the information available.
3. The risk assessment is prepared by assessors with relevant experience, and on the basis of consideration of a number of documents including N15's personal file, historical tactical risk assessments prepared in different years, Operation Herne documents, and open source material. N15 did not meet risk assessors for the purposes of assessment, although s/he has engaged with risk assessments in the past.
4. N15 is a former SDS officer. The risk assessment provides an overview of N15's career, including occasions of praise given to him/her for the provision of intelligence. The assessment also sets out his/her current level of exposure and an objective assessment of the impact on N15 and others close to N15 in the event of exposure. The objective assessment includes an examination of the group or groups infiltrated and the threat that they currently pose to N15.
5. N15 completed a recruitment process which included a series of interviews and psychological profiling. N15 was assessed as showing every sign of being able to cope with the particular stresses attached to the work during a long tour of duty. An established part of the recruitment process from the outset of the SDS was a visit by SDS management to the home address of the prospective SDS UCO, to check that the officer and their partner were prepared for what a typical SDS posting entailed, and to make assurances regarding the following points:
 - The officer's identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch.
 - The officer had an ongoing duty not to reveal their activities or status to anyone.
 - After the operation was concluded they would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.
6. It is expected that N15 also received such assurances. The preservation of an officer's anonymity and the protection of their identity were fundamental concepts that underpinned the whole SDS operation. SDS officers functioned in the absolute belief that their identities would never be disclosed under any circumstances. This was emphasised by the fact that SDS deployments were for intelligence purposes only and officers were therefore never expected to give evidence or reveal their true identities at court. The preservation of anonymity was also managed by the assimilation of an officer back into Special

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Branch at the end of their deployment and ensuring, at least up until the closure of the SDS, that they were not posted to a uniform role which could expose them to former associates and therefore compromise their security and the integrity of the SDS operation. N15 was, however, posted into a uniformed role at a later point in his/her career, although s/he was removed from such duties following a risk assessment.

7. The risk assessor identified the following risk factors from identification in N15's case:
 - Being targeted by groups infiltrated, acting at group level. The risk of physical harm from groups infiltrated acting at group level was considered to be **low**.
 - Being targeted by former associates within the groups infiltrated or persons currently involved in groups in the same areas as those N15 targeted. The risk of physical harm is assessed as **high**. The risk of action directed at N15 likely to interfere with family and private life is also **high**.
 - Being targeted by campaigners or others hostile to and seeking to expose any former undercover police officer. The risk of action directed at N15 likely to interfere with family and private life is assessed as **high**.
 - Being approached by the media. The risk of intrusion likely to interfere with N15's family and private life is assessed as **high**.
 - The psychological effects of fear of identification and/or its potential ramifications. This could not be assessed.
8. The risk assessment considered matters including the current level of activity of the groups infiltrated, and information about individuals against whom the N15 was targeted. The risk of physical harm, media intrusion and interference with private and family life also takes account of several factors specific to N15 and includes the public perception of the SDS as a rogue unit, the growing number of anti-UCO campaigners seeking to expose and confront former UCOs, and the risk to police officers generally. As to the latter, the current risk of terrorist action against police officers has been, since January 2015, rated 'severe' (an attack is highly likely).
9. The risk assessment notes risk to others including N15's family. The risk of harassment and media scrutiny likely to interfere with the private and family life of N15's family members was assessed to be **high**.
10. There is a risk-specific package of measures to manage the existing risk to N15 which is already in place. The risk assessment lists some further security measures which could be taken.

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N16 Gisted Risk Assessment

1. This is an open version of a risk assessment completed by MPS for N16. The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in the risk of harm to N16 if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N16.
2. In summary, the risk to N16 of physical harm is assessed as **medium**; the risk of psychological/emotional harm is assessed as **high**; the risk of action directed against N16 likely to interfere with private and family life in the event of identification through information disclosed by the Inquiry is **high**.
3. The risk assessment is prepared by an assessor with relevant experience, following a debrief with N16, and on the basis of consideration of a number of documents including a number of previous risk assessments, SDS documents, Operation Herne documents, N16's witness statement, and a tactical threat assessment.
4. N16 is a former SDS officer. The risk assessment provides an overview of N16's career, including occasions of praise given to him/her for the provision of intelligence. The assessment also sets out his/her current level of exposure and an objective assessment of the impact on N16 and others close to N16 in the event of exposure. The objective assessment includes an examination of the group or groups infiltrated and the threat that they currently pose to N16.
5. An established part of the recruitment process from the outset of the SDS was a visit by SDS management to the home address of the prospective SDS UCO, to check that the officer and their partner were prepared for what a typical SDS posting entailed, and to make assurances regarding the following points:
 - The officer's identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch. N16 has a clear recollection of this assurance.
 - The officer had an ongoing duty not to reveal their activities or status to anyone.
 - After the operation was concluded they would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.
6. The preservation of an officer's anonymity and the protection of their identity were fundamental concepts that underpinned the whole SDS operation. SDS officers functioned in the absolute belief that their identities would never be disclosed under any circumstances. This was emphasised by the fact that SDS deployments were for intelligence purposes only and officers were therefore never expected to give evidence or reveal their true identities at court. The preservation of anonymity was also managed by the assimilation of an officer back into Special Branch at the end of their deployment and ensuring, at least up until the closure of the SDS, that they were not posted to a uniform role which could expose them to former associates and therefore compromise their security and the integrity of the SDS operation.

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7. The risk assessor identified the following risk factors from identification in N16's case:
 - Being targeted by groups infiltrated of by individuals within those groups. The risk of physical harm is assessed as **medium**. The risk of action directed at N16 likely to interfere with family and private life is assessed as **high**.
 - Being targeted by anti-UCO campaigners or others hostile to UCOs. The risk of action directed at N16 likely to interfere with family and private life is assessed as **high**.
 - Being targeted by the media. The risk of intrusion likely to interfere with family and private life is assessed as **high**.
 - The psychological effects of fear of identification and/or its potential ramifications. The risk is assessed as **high**.
8. The risk of physical harm, media intrusion, psychological/emotional harm and interference with private and family life takes account of several factors specific to N16 and includes how stressful N16 found deployment, the public perception of the SDS as a rogue unit, the growing number of anti-UCO campaigners seeking to expose and confront former UCOs, and the risk to police officers generally. As to the latter, the current risk of terrorist action against police officers has been, since January 2015, rated 'severe' (an attack is highly likely).
9. The assessment notes some additional risks to persons other than N16.
10. There is a risk-specific package of measures in place to manage the existing risk to N16. The risk assessment lists further measures which could be considered in the event of disclosure of N16's identity, but observes that none of the available measures would be able to reduce the high impact on psychological emotional wellbeing should disclosure take place

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N26 Gisted Risk Assessment

1. This is an open version of a risk assessment completed by MPS for N26. The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in the risk of harm to N26 if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N26.
2. In summary, the risk to N26 of physical harm is assessed as **medium**; the risk of psychological/emotional harm is assessed as **high**; the risk of action directed against N26 likely to interfere with private and family life in the event of identification through information disclosed by the Inquiry is **high**.
3. The risk assessment is prepared by an assessor with relevant experience on the basis of consideration of a number of documents including a note from N26 setting out his/her concerns, N26's personal file, SDS documents, Operation Herne documents, a tactical threat assessment and open source material.
4. N26 is a former SDS officer. The risk assessment provides an overview of N26's career, including occasions of praise given to him/her for the provision of intelligence. The assessment also sets out his/her current level of exposure and an objective assessment of the impact on N26 and others close to N26 in the event of exposure. The objective assessment includes an examination of the group or groups infiltrated and the threat that they currently pose to N26.
5. An established part of the recruitment process from the outset of the SDS was a visit by SDS management to the home address of the prospective SDS UCO, to check that the officer and their partner were prepared for what a typical SDS posting entailed, and to make assurances regarding the following points:
 - The officer's identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch.
 - The officer had an ongoing duty not to reveal their activities or status to anyone.
 - After the operation was concluded they would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.
6. The preservation of an officer's anonymity and the protection of their identity were fundamental concepts that underpinned the whole SDS operation. SDS officers functioned in the absolute belief that their identities would never be disclosed under any circumstances. This was emphasised by the fact that SDS deployments were for intelligence purposes only and officers were therefore never expected to give evidence or reveal their true identities at court. The preservation of anonymity was also managed by the assimilation of an officer back into Special Branch at the end of their deployment and ensuring, at least up until the closure of the SDS, that they were not posted to a uniform role which could expose them to former associates and therefore compromise their security and the integrity of the SDS operation. N26 recalls being promised "anonymity for life."

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7. The risk assessor identified the following risk factors from identification in N26's case:
 - Being targeted by former associates within the groups infiltrated or persons currently active within those areas. The risk of physical harm is **medium**. The risk of action directed at N26 likely to interfere with family and private life is **high**.
 - Being targeted by campaigners or others hostile to and seeking to expose any former undercover police officer. The risk of action directed at N26 likely to interfere with family and private life is **high**.
 - Being approached by the media. The risk of intrusion likely to interfere with family and private life is **high**.
 - The psychological effects of exposure and/or fear of exposure and its potential ramifications. The risk is **high**.
8. The risk of physical harm, media intrusion, psychological/emotional harm and interference with private and family life takes account of several factors specific to N26 and includes the public perception of the SDS as a rogue unit, the growing number of anti-UCO campaigners seeking to expose and confront former UCOs, and the risk to police officers generally. As to the latter, the current risk of terrorist action against police officers has been, since January 2015, rated 'severe' (an attack is highly likely).
9. The risk assessment also has regard to specific risks posed to those close to N26 in the event of N26's identification.
10. There is a minimal package of measures in place to manage the existing risk to N26. The risk assessment lists further measures which could be considered in the event of disclosure of N26's identity, but observes that none of the available measures would be able to reduce the high impact on psychological emotional wellbeing should disclosure take place

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N58 Gisted Risk Assessment

1. This is an open version of a risk assessment completed by MPS for N58. The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in the risk of harm to N58 if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N58.
2. In summary, the risk to N58 of physical harm is assessed as **low**; the risk of psychological/emotional harm is assessed as **medium**; the risk of action directed against N58 likely to interfere with private and family life in the event of identification through information disclosed by the Inquiry is **high**.
3. The risk assessment is prepared by an assessor with relevant experience, and on the basis of a debrief, consideration of a number of documents including N58's previous risk assessment, personal file, minutes of a meeting with Operation Herne and an Operation Herne witness statement.
4. N58 is a former SDS officer. The risk assessment provides an overview of N58's career, current level of exposure and an objective assessment of the impact on N58 and others close to N58 in the event of exposure. The objective assessment includes an examination of the group or groups infiltrated and the threat that they currently pose to N58.
5. An established part of the recruitment process from the outset of the SDS was a visit by SDS management to the home address of the prospective SDS UCO, to check that the officer and their partner were prepared for what a typical SDS posting entailed, and to make assurances regarding the following points:
 - The officer's identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch.
 - The officer had an ongoing duty not to reveal their activities or status to anyone.
 - After the operation was concluded they would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.
6. The preservation of an officer's anonymity and the protection of their identity were fundamental concepts that underpinned the whole SDS operation. SDS officers functioned in the absolute belief that their identities would never be disclosed under any circumstances. This was emphasised by the fact that SDS deployments were for intelligence purposes only and officers were therefore never expected to give evidence or reveal their true identities at court. The preservation of anonymity was also managed by the assimilation of an officer back into Special Branch at the end of their deployment and ensuring, at least up until the closure of the SDS, that they were not posted to a uniform role which could expose them to former associates and therefore compromise their security and the integrity of the SDS operation. N58 received and relied on such assurances.
7. When asked, N58 stated that the posting was stressful with a constant fear of compromise.

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8. The risk assessor identified the following risk factors from identification in N58's case:
 - Being targeted by groups infiltrated. The risk of physical harm is assessed as **low**.
 - Being targeted by individuals within the groups. The risk of physical harm is assessed as **low**.
 - Being targeted by anti-UCO campaigners or others hostile to UCOs. The risk of interference with N58's family and private life were his/her identity to be disclosed directly or indirectly by the Inquiry is assessed as **high**.
 - Being targeted by the media. No specific level is recorded.
 - The psychological effects of fear of identification and/or its potential ramifications. The risk is assessed as **medium**.
9. The risk of physical harm, media intrusion, psychological/emotional harm and interference with private and family life takes account of several factors specific to N58 and include the public perception of the SDS as a rogue unit, the growing number of anti-UCO campaigners seeking to expose and confront former UCOs, and the risk to police officers generally. As to the latter, the current risk of terrorist action against police officers has been, since January 2015, rated 'severe' (an attack is highly likely).
10. There is a risk-specific package of measures in place to manage the existing risk to N58. The risk assessment lists further measures which could be considered in the event of disclosure of N58's identity, but observes that none of the available measures would be able to reduce the impact on psychological emotional wellbeing should disclosure take place.

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N81 Gisted Risk Assessment

1. This is an open version of a risk assessment completed by MPS for N81. The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in the risk of harm to N81 if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N81.
2. In summary, the risk to N81 of physical harm is assessed as **high**; the risk of psychological/emotional harm is assessed as **high**; the risk of action directed against N81 likely to interfere with private and family life in the event of identification through information disclosed by the Inquiry is **high**.
3. The risk assessment is prepared by an assessor with relevant experience, following meetings with N81, and on the basis of consideration of a number of documents including a number of previous risk assessments, N81's personal file, SDS documents, Operation Herne documents and N81's witness statement; the Stephen Lawrence Independent Review Volume 1, a tactical threat assessment, Operation Motion documents and open source material.
4. N81 is a former SDS officer. N81 has been referred to, using nominal "N81" only, in reports by Mark Ellison QC, Operation Herne, and the IPCC. All the reports have been subject to extensive reporting in the media.
5. The risk assessment provides an overview of N81's career including occasions of praise given to him/her for the provision of intelligence. The assessment sets out his/her current level of exposure. The assessment contains an objective assessment of the impact on N81 and others close to N81 in the event of exposure. The objective assessment includes an examination of the group or groups infiltrated and the threat that they currently pose to N81.
6. N81 was provided with assurances regarding the following points:
 - The officer's identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch.
 - The officer had an ongoing duty not to reveal their activities or status to anyone.
 - After the operation was concluded he/she would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.
7. The preservation of an officer's anonymity and the protection of their identity were fundamental concepts that underpinned the whole SDS operation. SDS officers functioned in the absolute belief that their identities would never be disclosed under any circumstances. This was emphasised by the fact that SDS deployments were for intelligence purposes only and officers were therefore never expected to give evidence or reveal their true identities at court. The preservation of anonymity was also managed by the assimilation of an officer back into Special Branch at the end of their deployment and ensuring, at least up until the closure of the SDS, that they were not posted to a uniform role which could expose them to former associates and therefore compromise their security and the integrity of the SDS operation.

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8. The risk assessor identified the following risk factors from identification in N81's case:
 - Being targeted by former associates within the groups infiltrated, and/or by activists which are currently involved in the same areas as the groups N81 targeted. The assessor assessed the risk of physical harm to be **high**. Accordingly, the assessor did not agree with a view expressed by N81 in March 2014, that, although the possibility could not be discounted, s/he did not believe there to be a high likelihood that individuals who discovered him/her would seek to do him/her serious physical harm. The risk of action directed at N81 likely to interfere with family and private life was also assessed as **high**.
 - Being targeted by campaigners or others hostile to and seeking to expose any former undercover police officer. The risk of action directed at N81 likely to interfere with family and private life is assessed as **high**.
 - Being approached by the media. The risk of intrusion reaching a level likely to interfere with N81's family and private life is assessed as **high**.
 - The psychological effects of exposure and/or fear of exposure and its potential ramifications. The risk – to both N81 and N81's family - is assessed as **high**.
9. The high risk of physical harm, harassment, media intrusion, psychological/emotional harm and interference with private and family life takes account of several factors specific to N81 and includes the public perception of the SDS as a rogue unit, the negative publicity surrounding N81's deployment, the growing number of anti-UCO campaigners seeking to expose and confront former UCOs and the risk to police officers generally. As to the latter, the current risk of terrorist action against police officers has been, since January 2015, rated 'severe' (an attack is highly likely).
10. There is a risk-specific package of measures in place to manage the existing risk to N81. The risk assessment lists the further measures available in the event of disclosure of N81's identity, but the risk assessor observes that the further available measures would not be able to reduce the impact on psychological emotional wellbeing should disclosure take place.

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N123 Gisted Risk Assessment

1. This is an open version of a risk assessment completed by MPS for N123. The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in the risk of harm to N123 if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N123.
2. In summary, the risk to N123 of physical harm is assessed as **medium**; the risk of psychological/emotional harm is assessed as **high**; the risk of action directed against N123 likely to interfere with private and family life in the event of identification through information disclosed by the Inquiry is **high**.
3. The risk assessment is prepared by an assessor with relevant experience on the basis of consideration of a number of documents including Operation Herne documents, a tactical threat assessment and open source material.
4. An established part of the recruitment process from the outset of the SDS was a visit by SDS management to the home address of the prospective SDS UCO, to check that the officer and their partner were prepared for what a typical SDS posting entailed, and to make assurances regarding the following points:
 - The officer's identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch.
 - The officer had an ongoing duty not to reveal their activities or status to anyone.
 - After the operation was concluded they would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.
5. The preservation of an officer's anonymity and the protection of their identity were fundamental concepts that underpinned the whole SDS operation. SDS officers functioned in the absolute belief that their identities would never be disclosed under any circumstances. This was emphasised by the fact that SDS deployments were for intelligence purposes only and officers were therefore never expected to give evidence or reveal their true identities at court. The preservation of anonymity was also managed by the assimilation of an officer back into Special Branch at the end of their deployment and ensuring, at least up until the closure of the SDS, that they were not posted to a uniform role which could expose them to former associates and therefore compromise their security and the integrity of the SDS operation.
6. N123 is a former SDS officer. The risk assessment provides an overview of N123's career, current level of exposure and an objective assessment of the impact on N123 and others close to N123 in the event of exposure. The objective assessment includes an examination of the group or groups infiltrated and the threat that they currently pose to N123.
7. The risk assessor identified the following risk factors from identification in N123's case:

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- Being targeted by groups infiltrated. The risk of physical harm is **low** or **medium** (by reference to different target groups). The risk of action directed at N123 likely to interfere with family and private life is **high**.
 - Being targeted by individuals within the groups. There is some risk, but it was not possible to provide a formal assessment of level.
 - Being targeted by anti-UCO campaigners or others hostile to UCOs. This risk was assessed to be highly likely and likely to be particularly distressing for N123.
 - Being targeted by the media. Risk identified by no specific risk level given.
 - The psychological effects of fear of identification and/or its potential ramifications. The assessor concluded this risk is **high**.
8. The risk of physical harm, media intrusion, psychological/emotional harm and interference with private and family life takes account of several factors specific to N123 including the public perception of the SDS as a rogue unit, the growing number of anti-UCO campaigners seeking to expose and confront former UCOs, and the risk to police officers generally. As to the latter, the current risk of terrorist action against police officers has been, since January 2015, rated 'severe' (an attack is highly likely).
9. The assessment also found a risk of a significant detrimental impact to N123's partner if the Inquiry disclosed information leading to the identification of N123.
10. There is a minimal package of measures in place to manage the existing risk to N123. The risk assessment lists further measures which could be considered in the event of disclosure of N123's identity, but observes that none of the available measures would be able to reduce the high impact on psychological emotional wellbeing should disclosure take place.